[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 90 (Monday, May 24, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3355-S3362]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 1946. Mr. GRAHAM submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to 
amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. Schumer to the bill S. 1260, to 
establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the 
National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub 
program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, 
science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to 
establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        At the end, add the following:

          DIVISION G--COMBATING CHINESE THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS

     SEC. 7001. SHORT TITLE.

        This division may be cited as the ``Combating Chinese 
     Purloining of Trade Secrets Act'' or the ``CCP Trade Secrets 
     Act''.

 TITLE I--INCREASED PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 2512 OF TITLE 
         18, UNITED STATES CODE, INVOLVING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

     SEC. 7101. MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, POSSESSION, AND 
                   ADVERTISING OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC 
                   COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTING DEVICES PROHIBITED.

       (a) In General.--Section 2512 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(4) Any person who violates this section with the intent 
     to benefit any government of a foreign country (as defined in 
     section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as 
     amended (22 U.S.C. 611)), agency or instrumentality of a 
     foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, 
     United States Code), or agent of a foreign principal (as 
     defined in section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
     of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 611)) shall be fined under 
     this title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or 
     both.''.
       (b) Sentencing Enhancement for Foreign Involvement in 
     Violations of Section 2512 of Title 18, United States Code.--
     Pursuant to its authority under section 994 of title 28, 
     United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission 
     shall review and amend the Federal sentencing guidelines to 
     ensure that the guidelines provide an additional penalty 
     increase of not fewer than 4 offense levels if the defendant 
     violated section 2512 of title 18, United States Code, with 
     the intent to benefit any government of a foreign country, 
     agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, or agent of a 
     foreign principal.

  TITLE II--PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESSES FROM FOREIGN TRADE SECRET THEFT

     SEC. 7201. SHORT TITLE.

        This title may be cited as the ``Protecting U.S. 
     Businesses from Foreign Trade Secrets Theft Act of 2021''.

     SEC. 7202. PROHIBITION ON MISAPPROPRIATING U.S. TRADE 
                   SECRETS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 90 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1840. Applicability to foreign persons

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--

[[Page S3356]]

       ``(1) the term `critical technology' has the meaning given 
     the term `critical technologies' in section 721 of the 
     Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565);
       ``(2) the term `designated Federal agency' means--
       ``(A) the Department of Homeland Security;
       ``(B) U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
       ``(C) the Department of Commerce;
       ``(D) the Securities and Exchange Commission;
       ``(E) the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
       ``(F) the Department of State; and
       ``(G) the United States Patent and Trademark Office;
       ``(3) the term `foreign person' means a person that is not 
     a United States person;
       ``(4) the term `International Trade Commission' means the 
     United States International Trade Commission;
       ``(5) the term `offending foreign person' means a foreign 
     person--
       ``(A) who misappropriates a trade secret; and
       ``(B) with respect to whom a petition submitted under 
     subsection (b)(1) satisfies the requirements under that 
     subsection, as determined by the Attorney General;
       ``(6) the term `person' means--
       ``(A) an individual; and
       ``(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
     society, or trust, any other nongovernmental entity, 
     organization, or group, and any governmental entity operating 
     as a business enterprise; and
       ``(7) the term `United States person' means--
       ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States;
       ``(B) a corporation or other legal entity that is organized 
     under the laws of the United States, any State or territory 
     thereof, or the District of Columbia; and
       ``(C) a corporation or other legal entity--
       ``(i) organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States; and
       ``(ii) with respect to which a United States person 
     described in subparagraph (A) or (B)--

       ``(I) holds more than 50 percent of the equity interest by 
     vote or value;
       ``(II) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors; 
     or
       ``(III) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions.

       ``(b) Petition for Relief.--
       ``(1) Demonstration of misappropriation.--If an owner of a 
     trade secret, who is a United States person, wishes to have 
     the Attorney General or the head of the applicable designated 
     Federal agency apply a penalty under subsection (c) to a 
     foreign person who has misappropriated the trade secret, the 
     owner shall submit to the Attorney General a petition 
     demonstrating that--
       ``(A)(i) a court has entered a temporary restraining order, 
     preliminary injunction, or final judgment under section 1836 
     of this title against the foreign person for misappropriating 
     a trade secret of the owner;
       ``(ii) the International Trade Commission has issued a 
     temporary exclusion order or final exclusion order under 
     section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) 
     against the foreign person for misappropriating a trade 
     secret of the owner; or
       ``(iii) an indictment has been issued under section 1831 or 
     1832 of this title against the foreign person for 
     misappropriating a trade secret of the owner;
       ``(B) the trade secret described in the applicable clause 
     of subparagraph (A) involves or is a component of critical 
     technology; and
       ``(C) the remedies available to the owner under section 
     1836 of this title or section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
     (19 U.S.C. 1337), as applicable, are unlikely to provide 
     complete relief to the owner because the foreign person has 
     used or is reasonably likely to use the misappropriated trade 
     secret in the home country of the foreign person or a third 
     country, such that activities of the foreign person relevant 
     to the determinations under subparagraph (A) take place 
     outside the United States.
       ``(2) Review.--Not later than 60 days after the date on 
     which an owner who is a United States person submits a 
     petition to the Attorney General under paragraph (1), the 
     Attorney General shall determine whether the petition 
     satisfies the requirements under that paragraph.
       ``(3) Notification.--If the Attorney General determines 
     under paragraph (2) that a petition satisfies the 
     requirements under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     so notify the head of each designated Federal agency not 
     later than 30 days after the date of the determination.
       ``(4) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     if the Attorney General determines under paragraph (2) that a 
     petition relating to a foreign person satisfies the 
     requirements under paragraph (1), the Attorney General and 
     the head of each designated Federal agency should impose 1 or 
     more penalties on the foreign person under subsection (c), to 
     the extent that the penalties are applicable.
       ``(c) Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), not 
     later than 90 days after the date on which the Attorney 
     General provides notice to the head of each designated 
     Federal agency under subsection (b)(3) with respect to an 
     offending foreign person, the Attorney General or the head of 
     a designated Federal agency, as applicable, may impose 1 or 
     more of the following penalties on the offending foreign 
     person:
       ``(A) Import restriction.--The Commissioner of U.S. Customs 
     and Border Protection may exclude from entry into the United 
     States any articles produced by the offending foreign person.
       ``(B) Export licenses.--
       ``(i) Dual-use exports.--The Secretary of Commerce may 
     refuse to issue any specific license, or grant any other 
     specific permission or authority, for the export, reexport, 
     or in-country transfer of items to the offending foreign 
     person under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 
     4801 et seq.).
       ``(ii) Defense articles and defense services.--The 
     Secretary of State may refuse to issue any license or other 
     approval for the export of defense articles or defense 
     services to the offending foreign person under the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
       ``(C) Restricted parties.--
       ``(i) Commerce lists.--The Secretary of Commerce may add 
     the offending foreign person to one of the following lists 
     maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Secretary of the 
     Department of Commerce:

       ``(I) The Entity List set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 
     744 of the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter 
     C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
       ``(II) The Denied Persons List maintained pursuant to 
     section 764.3 of the Export Administration Regulations.

       ``(ii) Treasury list.--The Secretary of the Treasury may 
     add the offending foreign person to the list of specially 
     designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the 
     Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the 
     Treasury.
       ``(D) Securities reporting.--The Securities and Exchange 
     Commission may determine whether the use by the offending 
     foreign person of the misappropriated trade secret is a 
     reportable material condition in any filing by the offending 
     foreign person required under applicable securities laws of 
     the United States.
       ``(E) Patent protection.--The Under Secretary of Commerce 
     for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States 
     Patent and Trademark Office may prohibit the offending 
     foreign person from applying for patent protection, being 
     listed as an inventor on a patent application, or continuing 
     a patent application under title 35, United States Code.
       ``(F) Export-import bank assistance for exports to foreign 
     person.--The Export-Import Bank of the United States may 
     refuse to approve the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, 
     extension of credit, or participation in the extension of 
     credit in connection with the export of any goods or services 
     to the offending foreign person.
       ``(G) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The Secretary of 
     State may deny a visa application, and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security may deny an application for admission to 
     the United States, of any alien that the applicable Secretary 
     determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a 
     shareholder with a controlling interest in, the offending 
     foreign person.
       ``(H) Other penalties.--The Attorney General or the head of 
     a designated Federal agency--
       ``(i) may not procure, or enter into a contract for the 
     procurement of, any goods or services from the offending 
     foreign person;
       ``(ii) may prohibit, pursuant to notice issued by the 
     Attorney General, a United States person from knowingly 
     investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or 
     debt instruments of the offending foreign person;
       ``(iii) may impose on a principal executive officer of the 
     offending foreign person, or on an individual performing 
     similar functions and with similar authorities as such an 
     officer, any penalty under this subsection that could be 
     imposed on the offending foreign person; and
       ``(iv) may impose on the offending foreign person any other 
     penalty authorized under any provision of Federal law, as 
     determined appropriate.
       ``(2) Duration of penalties.--
       ``(A) Temporary penalty.--If a court enters a temporary 
     restraining order or preliminary injunction under section 
     1836 of this title against an offending foreign person for 
     misappropriating a trade secret, the International Trade 
     Commission issues a temporary exclusion order under section 
     337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) against an 
     offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, 
     or an indictment is issued under section 1831 or 1832 of this 
     title against an offending foreign person for 
     misappropriating a trade secret, the Attorney General or the 
     head of a designated Federal agency may impose a penalty 
     under paragraph (1) on the offending foreign person during 
     the period during which the temporary restraining order, 
     preliminary injunction, temporary exclusion order, or 
     indictment remains in effect.
       ``(B) Permanent penalty.--If a court enters a final 
     judgment under section 1836 of this title against an 
     offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret, 
     the International Trade Commission issues a final exclusion 
     order under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
     1337) against an offending foreign person for 
     misappropriating a trade secret, or an offending foreign 
     person is convicted under section 1831or 1832 of this title 
     of misappropriating a trade secret, the Attorney General or 
     the head of a designated Federal agency may permanently

[[Page S3357]]

     impose a penalty under paragraph (1) on the foreign person.
       ``(3) Petition for review.--
       ``(A) In general.--If the Attorney General or the head of a 
     designated Federal agency imposes a temporary penalty under 
     paragraph (2)(A) or a permanent penalty under paragraph 
     (2)(B) on an offending foreign person, the offending foreign 
     person may submit to the Attorney General or the head of the 
     designated Federal agency a petition for the revocation or 
     modification of the penalty--
       ``(i) not later 45 days after the date on which the penalty 
     is imposed; or
       ``(ii) in the case of a permanent penalty, if the final 
     judgment, final exclusion order, or conviction upon which the 
     permanent penalty is based is reversed on appeal or otherwise 
     vacated, not later than 45 days after the date of the 
     reversal or vacatur.
       ``(B) Contents of petition.--
       ``(i) In general.--An offending foreign person shall 
     include in a petition submitted under subparagraph (A) a full 
     written statement in support of the position of the offending 
     foreign person, including a precise statement of why--

       ``(I) an insufficient basis exists for the penalty; or
       ``(II) the circumstances resulting in the penalty no longer 
     apply.

       ``(ii) Remedial steps.--An offending foreign person may, in 
     a petition submitted under subparagraph (A), propose remedial 
     steps that would negate the basis for the penalty.
       ``(C) Determination.--The Attorney General or the head of a 
     designated Federal agency, as applicable, shall make a 
     determination with respect to a petition submitted under 
     subparagraph (A).
       ``(d) Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this section, and each year thereafter, the 
     Attorney General, in coordination with the head of each 
     designated Federal agency, shall submit to the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report that--
       ``(A) with respect to the preceding year--
       ``(i) identifies foreign countries, state-owned and state-
     controlled entities, and other persons that engaged in the 
     misappropriation of trade secrets owned by United States 
     persons;
       ``(ii) describes any strategy used by a foreign country to 
     undertake misappropriation of trade secrets owned by United 
     States persons;
       ``(iii) identifies categories of technologies developed by, 
     or trade secrets owned by, United States persons that were 
     targeted for misappropriation;
       ``(iv) lists legal actions taken under section 1836 of this 
     title, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
     1337), or section 1831 or 1832 of this title--

       ``(I) against an offending foreign person who 
     misappropriated a trade secret owned by a United States 
     person; and
       ``(II) as a result of which the products of the offending 
     foreign person described in subclause (I) may never enter the 
     United States; and

       ``(v) describes progress made in decreasing the prevalence 
     of misappropriation of trade secrets owned by United States 
     persons; and
       ``(B) recommends strategies to the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
     the House of Representatives to decrease the misappropriation 
     by foreign persons of trade secrets owned by United States 
     persons.
       ``(2) Form of report.-- A report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a 
     classified annex.''.
       (b) Table of Sections.--The table of sections for chapter 
     90 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:

``1840. Applicability to foreign persons.''.

                    TITLE III--COMBATING CYBERCRIME

     SEC. 7301. SHORT TITLE.

        This title may be cited as the ``International Cybercrime 
     Prevention Act''.

     SEC. 7302. PREDICATE OFFENSES.

       Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 1956(c)(7)(D)--
       (A) by striking ``or section 2339D'' and inserting 
     ``section 2339D''; and
       (B) by striking ``of this title, section 46502'' and 
     inserting ``, or section 2512 (relating to the manufacture, 
     distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or 
     electronic communication intercepting devices) of this title, 
     section 46502''; and
       (2) in section 1961(1), by inserting ``section 1030 
     (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with 
     computers) if the act indictable under section 1030 is 
     felonious,'' before ``section 1084''.

     SEC. 7303. FORFEITURE.

       (a) In General.--Section 2513 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 2513. CONFISCATION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC 
                   COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTING DEVICES AND OTHER 
                   PROPERTY.

       ``(a) Criminal Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) In general.--The court, in imposing a sentence on any 
     person convicted of a violation of section 2511 or 2512, or 
     convicted of conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 2512, 
     shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and 
     irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person 
     forfeit to the United States--
       ``(A) such person's interest in any property, real or 
     personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or 
     to facilitate the commission of such violation; and
       ``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or 
     derived from any gross proceeds, or any property traceable to 
     such property, that such person obtained or retained directly 
     or indirectly as a result of such violation.
       ``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Pursuant to section 2461(c) 
     of title 28, the provisions of section 413 of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) 
     thereof, shall apply to criminal forfeitures under this 
     subsection.
       ``(b) Civil Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) In general.--The following shall be subject to 
     forfeiture to the United States in accordance with provisions 
     of chapter 46 and no property right shall exist in them:
       ``(A) Any property, real or personal, used or intended to 
     be used, in any manner, to commit, or facilitate the 
     commission of a violation of section 2511 or 2512, or a 
     conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 2512.
       ``(B) Any property, real or personal, constituting, or 
     traceable to the gross proceeds taken, obtained, or retained 
     in connection with or as a result of a violation of section 
     2511 or 2512, or a conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 
     2512.
       ``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures 
     under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of 
     chapter 46 relating to civil forfeitures, except that such 
     duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under 
     the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be 
     performed by such officers, agents, and other persons as may 
     be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security or the Attorney General.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 119 is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 2513 and inserting the following:

``2513. Confiscation of wire, oral, or electronic communication 
              intercepting devices and other property.''.

     SEC. 7304. SHUTTING DOWN BOTNETS.

       (a) In General.--Section 1345 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by inserting ``and abuse'' after 
     ``fraud'';
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``or'' after the 
     semicolon; and
       (iii) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
       ``(D) violating or about to violate section 1030(a)(5) of 
     this title where such conduct has caused or would cause 
     damage (as defined in section 1030) without authorization to 
     100 or more protected computers (as defined in section 1030) 
     during any 1-year period, including by--
       ``(i) impairing the availability or integrity of the 
     protected computers without authorization; or
       ``(ii) installing or maintaining control over malicious 
     software on the protected computers that, without 
     authorization, has caused or would cause damage to the 
     protected computers;''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding subparagraph 
     (A), by inserting ``, a violation described in subsection 
     (a)(1)(D),'' before ``or a Federal''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) A restraining order, prohibition, or other action 
     described in subsection (b), if issued in circumstances 
     described in subsection (a)(1)(D), may, upon application of 
     the Attorney General--
       ``(1) specify that no cause of action shall lie in any 
     court against a person for complying with the restraining 
     order, prohibition, or other action; and
       ``(2) provide that the United States shall pay to such 
     person a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are 
     reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in 
     complying with the restraining order, prohibition, or other 
     action.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 1345 and 
     inserting the following:

``1345. Injunctions against fraud and abuse.''.

     SEC. 7305. AGGRAVATED DAMAGE TO A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
                   COMPUTER.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 1030 the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure 
       computer

       ``(a) Offense.--It shall be unlawful, during and in 
     relation to a felony violation of section 1030, to knowingly 
     cause or attempt to cause damage to a critical infrastructure 
     computer, if such damage results in (or, in the case of an 
     attempted offense, would, if completed, have resulted in) the 
     substantial impairment--
       ``(1) of the operation of the critical infrastructure 
     computer; or
       ``(2) of the critical infrastructure associated with such 
     computer.
       ``(b) Penalty.--Any person who violates subsection (a) 
     shall, in addition to the term of punishment provided for the 
     felony violation of section 1030, be fined under this title, 
     imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.

[[Page S3358]]

       ``(c) Consecutive Sentence.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law--
       ``(1) a court shall not place any person convicted of a 
     violation of this section on probation;
       ``(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of 
     imprisonment imposed on a person under this section shall run 
     concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed on the 
     person under any other provision of law, including any term 
     of imprisonment imposed for the felony violation of section 
     1030;
       ``(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed 
     for the felony violation of section 1030, a court shall not 
     in any way reduce the term to be imposed for such violation 
     to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any 
     separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a 
     violation of this section; and
       ``(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a 
     violation of this section may, in the discretion of the 
     court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with 
     another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at 
     the same time on that person for an additional violation of 
     this section, if such discretion shall be exercised in 
     accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy 
     statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission 
     pursuant to section 994 of title 28.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the terms `computer' and `damage' have the meanings 
     given the terms in section 1030; and
       ``(2) the term `critical infrastructure' means systems and 
     assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
     States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
     assets would have catastrophic regional or national effects 
     on public health or safety, economic security, or national 
     security, including voter registration databases, voting 
     machines, and other communications systems that manage the 
     election process or report and display results on behalf of 
     State and local governments.''.
       (b) Table of Sections.--The table of sections for chapter 
     47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 1030 the following:

``1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.''.

     SEC. 7306. STOPPING TRAFFICKING IN BOTNETS; FRAUD AND RELATED 
                   ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 1030 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
       ``(2)(A) intentionally accesses a computer without 
     authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
     obtains information, if--
       ``(i) the conduct was undertaken in furtherance of any 
     felony violation of the laws of the United States or of any 
     State, unless an element of such violation would require 
     proof that the information was obtained without authorization 
     or in excess of authorization; or
       ``(ii) the protected computer is owned or operated by or on 
     behalf of a State or local governmental entity responsible 
     for the administration of justice, public health, or safety, 
     or owned or operated by or on behalf of the United States 
     Government; or
       ``(B) intentionally accesses a computer without 
     authorization, and thereby obtains information from any 
     protected computer;'';
       (B) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
       ``(6) knowing such conduct to be wrongful, intentionally 
     traffics in any password or similar information, or any other 
     means of access, further knowing or having reason to know 
     that a protected computer would be accessed or damaged 
     without authorization in a manner prohibited by this section 
     as the result of such trafficking;'';
       (C) in paragraph (7), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
       (D) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
       ``(8) intentionally traffics in the means of access to a 
     protected computer, if--
       ``(A) the trafficker knows or has reason to know the 
     protected computer has been damaged in a manner prohibited by 
     this section; and
       ``(B) the promise or agreement to pay for the means of 
     access is made by, or on behalf of, a person the trafficker 
     knows or has reason to know intends to use the means of 
     access to--
       ``(i) damage a protected computer without authorization; or
       ``(ii) violate section 1037 or 1343;'';
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``, (a)(3), or (a)(6)'' 
     each place it appears and inserting ``or (a)(3)'';
       (B) in paragraph (3)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(a)(4) or (a)(7)'' 
     and inserting ``(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8)''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``(a)(4), or (a)(7)'' 
     and inserting ``(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8)''; and
       (C) in paragraph (4)--
       (i) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking ``or an attempt to 
     commit an offense''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking clause (ii) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(ii) an offense, or an attempt to commit an offense, 
     under subsection (a)(6);'';
       (3) in subsection (e)--
       (A) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
       ``(6) the term `exceeds authorized access' means--
       ``(A)(i) to access a computer with authorization and 
     thereby to knowingly obtain information from such computer 
     that the accessor is not entitled to obtain; or
       ``(ii) to knowingly obtain any information from such 
     computer for a purpose that is prohibited by the computer 
     owner; and
       ``(B) provided that the limitation on access to or use of 
     the information is not based solely on the terms governing 
     use of an online service by customers or subscribers thereof, 
     including terms set forth in an acceptable use policy or 
     terms of service;'';
       (B) by striking paragraph (10);
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (11) and (12) as paragraphs 
     (10) and (11), respectively;
       (D) in paragraph (10), as so resdesignated, by striking 
     ``and'';
       (E) in paragraph (11), as so redesignated, by striking the 
     period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
       (F) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(12) the term `online service'--
       ``(A) means an electronic communication service (as defined 
     in section 2510) to the public, a remote computing service 
     (as defined in section 2711), or other service that provides 
     content or computing services to the public over the 
     Internet; and
       ``(B) does not include an enterprise service;
       ``(13) the term `enterprise service' means any electronic 
     communication service (as defined in section 2510) to the 
     public, remote computing service (as defined in section 
     2711), or other service that provides content or computing 
     services to the public for which the user, customer, or 
     subscriber has paid, or on whose behalf has been paid, more 
     than $10,000 in a calendar year in exchange for the right to 
     access or use the service; and
       ``(14) the term `traffic', except as provided in subsection 
     (a)(6), means transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another 
     as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for 
     a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary 
     value.'';
       (4) in subsection (g), in the first sentence, by inserting 
     ``, except for a violation of subsection (a)(6),'' after ``of 
     this section''; and
       (5) by striking subsections (i) and (j) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(i) Criminal Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) In general.--The court, in imposing a sentence on any 
     person convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted 
     of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in 
     addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of 
     any provision of State law, that such person forfeit to the 
     United States--
       ``(A) such person's interest in any property, real or 
     personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or 
     to facilitate the commission of such violation; and
       ``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or 
     derived from any gross proceeds, or any property traceable to 
     such property, that such person obtained or retained, 
     directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.
       ``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Pursuant to section 2461(c) 
     of title 28, the provisions of section 413 of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) 
     thereof, shall apply to criminal forfeitures under this 
     subsection.
       ``(j) Civil Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) In general.--The following shall be subject to 
     forfeiture to the United States in accordance with chapter 
     46, and no property right shall exist in them:
       ``(A) Any property, real or personal, used or intended to 
     be used, in any manner--
       ``(i) to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a 
     violation of this section; or
       ``(ii) in a conspiracy to violate this section.
       ``(B) Any property, real or personal, constituting or 
     traceable to the gross proceeds taken, obtained, or retained 
     in connection with or as a result of--
       ``(i) a violation of this section; or
       ``(ii) a conspiracy to violate this section.
       ``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures 
     under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of 
     chapter 46 that apply to civil forfeitures, except that such 
     duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under 
     the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be 
     performed by such officers, agents, and other persons as may 
     be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security or the Attorney General.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 7431(e)(3) 
     of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking 
     ``subparagraph (B)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (B)(iii)''.

TITLE IV--ESPIONAGE, THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS, AND IMPROPER INTERFERENCE 
                       IN UNITED STATES ELECTIONS

     SEC. 7401. ESPIONAGE, THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS, THEFT OF 
                   INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INVOLVEMENT IN 
                   COMMERCIAL FRAUD SCHEMES, AND IMPROPER 
                   INTERFERENCE IN UNITED STATES ELECTIONS.

       (a) Definitions.--Section 101(a) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(53)(A) The term `espionage' means conduct--
       ``(i) in violation of--

       ``(I) the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 217, chapter 30) 
     (commonly known as the `Espionage Act of 1917');
       ``(II) chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code (commonly 
     known as the `Economic Espionage Act of 1996'); or

[[Page S3359]]

       ``(III) any other Federal criminal law relating to an 
     activity described in clause (ii); or

       ``(ii)(I) by an alien who is under the direction of--

       ``(aa) a foreign government; or
       ``(bb) an intermediary individual or entity that seeks to 
     serve, support, or benefit a foreign government; and

       ``(II) with respect to confidential information, that 
     constitutes--

       ``(aa) stealing or, without authorization, appropriating, 
     taking, carrying away, concealing, or, by fraud, artifice, or 
     deception, obtaining such information;
       ``(bb) without authorization, copying, duplicating, 
     sketching, drawing, photographing, downloading, uploading, 
     altering, destroying, photocopying, replicating, 
     transmitting, delivering, sending, mailing, communicating, or 
     conveying such information; or
       ``(cc) receiving, buying, or possessing such information, 
     knowing that the information has been stolen or appropriated, 
     obtained, or converted without authorization.

       ``(B) The term `espionage' includes economic espionage.
       ``(54) The term `improper interference in a United States 
     election' means conduct by an alien that--
       ``(A)(i) violates Federal criminal, voting rights, or 
     campaign finance law; or
       ``(ii) is under the direction of--
       ``(I) a foreign government; or
       ``(II) an intermediary individual or entity that seeks to 
     serve, support, or benefit a foreign government; and
       ``(B) interferes with a general or primary Federal, State, 
     or local election or caucus, including--
       ``(i) the campaign of a candidate; and
       ``(ii) a ballot measure, including--

       ``(I) an amendment;
       ``(II) a bond issue;
       ``(III) an initiative;
       ``(IV) a recall;
       ``(V) a referral; and
       ``(VI) a referendum.

       ``(55) The term `theft of a trade secret' means conduct--
       ``(A) in violation of--
       ``(i) chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code (commonly 
     known as the `Economic Espionage Act of 1996'); or
       ``(ii) any other Federal criminal law relating to an 
     activity described in subparagraph (B); or
       ``(B)(i) by an alien who is under the direction of--
       ``(I) a foreign government; or
       ``(II) an intermediary individual or entity that seeks to 
     serve, support, or benefit a foreign government; and
       ``(ii) with respect to a trade secret relating to a product 
     or service used or intended for use in interstate or foreign 
     commerce, that constitutes--
       ``(I) stealing or, without authorization, appropriating, 
     taking, carrying away, concealing, or, by fraud, artifice, or 
     deception, obtaining such trade secret for the economic 
     benefit of any person other than the owner of the trade 
     secret;
       ``(II) without authorization, copying, duplicating, 
     sketching, drawing, photographing, downloading, uploading, 
     altering, destroying, photocopying, replicating, 
     transmitting, delivering, sending, mailing, communicating, or 
     conveying such trade secret; or
       ``(III) receiving, buying, or possessing such trade secret, 
     knowing that the trade secret has been stolen or 
     appropriated, obtained, or converted without 
     authorization.''.
       (b) Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(H) Espionage and theft of trade secrets.--An alien is 
     inadmissible if a consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney General 
     knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe--
       ``(i) the alien is seeking admission or sought admission to 
     the United States to engage in espionage or theft of a trade 
     secret;
       ``(ii) the alien has engaged or intends to engage in 
     espionage or theft of a trade secret; or
       ``(iii) the affiliation or activities of the alien with, or 
     the control of the alien by, an individual, an entity, or a 
     funding mechanism known or reasonably believed to be engaged 
     in, or to have the intention of engaging in, espionage or 
     theft of a trade secret.
       ``(I) Improper interference in a united states election.--
     Any alien who a consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney General 
     knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, is seeking 
     admission to the United States to engage in improper 
     interference in a United States election, or who has engaged 
     in improper interference in a United States election, is 
     inadmissible.''.
       (c) Deportability.--Section 237(a) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(8) Espionage and theft of trade secrets.--Any alien who 
     has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission 
     engages in espionage or theft of a trade secret is 
     deportable.
       ``(9) Improper interference in a united states election.--
     Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after 
     admission engages in improper interference in a United States 
     election is deportable.''.

     SEC. 7402. VISA AND NONIMMIGRANT STATUS RESTRICTIONS.

       (a) Period of Authorized Stay for Certain Citizens and 
     Nationals of the People's Republic of China.--Section 
     214(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1184(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C)(i) The period of authorized stay for a citizen or 
     national of the People's Republic of China who seeks 
     admission to the United States as a nonimmigrant described in 
     subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) to study, 
     research, teach, or work in any field described in the most 
     recent technology alert list of the Department of State or in 
     section 221(j)(1)--
       ``(I) shall be--
       ``(aa) a fixed period of not more than 4 years; or
       ``(bb) the length of the program identified on the Form I-
     20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student 
     Status, or the Form DS-2019, Certificate of Eligibility for 
     Exchange Visitor Status, as applicable, of such citizen or 
     national of the People's Republic of China; and
       ``(II) may be extended by the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for 1 or more additional periods of not more than 2 
     years.
       ``(ii) This subparagraph shall not apply to any national of 
     Hong Kong or Macau.''.
       (b) Prohibition on Issuance of Visas to Certain Citizens 
     and Nationals of the People's Republic of China.--Section 221 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(j) Prohibition on Issuance of Visas to Certain Citizens 
     and Nationals of the People's Republic of China.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa 
     to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall not admit 
     into the United States, or grant a change of nonimmigrant 
     status to, an alien who is a citizen or national of the 
     People's Republic of China if the Secretary of State or the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the alien--
       ``(A) presents a risk to national security; or
       ``(B) otherwise seeks to enter the United States to 
     participate in graduate-level coursework or research at an 
     institution of higher education (as defined in section 101(a) 
     of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) in a 
     field described in paragraph (2).
       ``(2) Fields described.--The fields described in this 
     paragraph are--
       ``(A) the military or intelligence sector;
       ``(B) the energy sector;
       ``(C) nuclear science or nuclear engineering;
       ``(D) high-end numerical control machinery and robotics;
       ``(E) autonomous systems or machine learning;
       ``(F) artificial intelligence;
       ``(G) production and application of high-performance 
     medical devices;
       ``(H) semiconductors;
       ``(I) new energy vehicles;
       ``(J) mobile phone technology;
       ``(K) next-generation information technology;
       ``(L) aviation, aeronautics, or space;
       ``(M) biomedicine; and
       ``(N) any related field, as determined by the Secretary of 
     State or the Secretary of Homeland Security.
       ``(3) Termination of status.--
       ``(A) In general.--With respect to an alien who is a 
     citizen or national of the People's Republic of China who has 
     been admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant 
     described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 
     101(a)(15), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     terminate the status and employment authorization of, and 
     revoke any petition approval of or on behalf of, the alien if 
     the Secretary determines that after such admission the 
     alien--
       ``(i) has engaged in an activity or affiliation that 
     presents a risk to national security; or
       ``(ii) has changed his or her program, course of study, 
     research, or employment to graduate-level coursework or 
     research at an institution of higher education in a field 
     described in paragraph (2).
       ``(B) Failure to maintain nonimmigrant status.--Any change 
     or attempted change described in subparagraph (A) shall be 
     considered to be a failure to maintain nonimmigrant status 
     under this Act.
       ``(4) Inapplicability to nationals of hong kong and 
     macau.--This subsection shall not apply to any national of 
     Hong Kong or Macau.''.
       (c) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply with respect to--
       (1) any visa application filed on or after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act; and
       (2) the status of any alien, except for a national of Hong 
     Kong or Macau, who--
       (A) is a citizen or national of the People's Republic of 
     China, regardless of the country of the passport presented 
     by, or the country of residence of, the alien;
       (B) before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, has been or is admitted to the United States as a 
     nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of 
     section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)); and
       (C) has changed or changes his or her program, course of 
     study, research, or employment to graduate-level coursework 
     or research at an institution of higher education (as defined 
     in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1001(a))) in a

[[Page S3360]]

     field described in section 221(j)(1) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (as added by subsection (b)).

              TITLE V--GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS

     SEC. 7501. FINDINGS.

        Congress find the following:
       (1) The People's Republic of China (referred to in this 
     subsection as ``the PRC'' or ``China'') poses an existential 
     threat to the economic interests and national security of the 
     United States, in part due to the continued efforts of the 
     PRC to steal sensitive technology and proprietary information 
     from companies, academic institutions, and other 
     organizations of the United States through economic espionage 
     and other forms of nontraditional espionage.
       (2) The PRC, through the Chinese Communist Party (referred 
     to in this subsection as the ``CCP''), has long had an 
     interest in replacing the United States as the world's 
     foremost superpower. China takes a holistic approach towards 
     achieving its long-term goals, which are rooted in the 
     concept of a comprehensive national power, including 
     achieving dominance in economics, military affairs, science 
     and technology, education, and global influence.
       (3) Nontraditional forms of espionage serve as primary 
     tools to further the goals of the CCP. Those tools include 
     talent recruitment programs designed to recruit Chinese 
     nationals to acquire knowledge about--and, often, steal--
     valuable and sensitive research at universities and research 
     institutions abroad, and to lure foreign experts to China to 
     work on key strategic programs. More broadly, the PRC uses 
     mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures as a means to gain 
     access to high-level technology, uses cyber intrusions to 
     steal information, and uses front companies for PRC-related 
     entities to acquire export-controlled technology.
       (4) In 2015, President Xi Jinping of the PRC released the 
     ``Made in China 2025'' initiative, a 10-year plan to update 
     the manufacturing base of China by developing the following 
     10 high-tech industries:
       (A) Electric cars and other new energy vehicles.
       (B) Next-generation information technology and 
     telecommunications.
       (C) Advanced robotics and artificial intelligence.
       (D) Aerospace equipment.
       (E) Bio-medicine and high-end medical equipment.
       (F) Ocean engineering equipment and high-end vessels.
       (G) High-end rail transportation equipment.
       (H) Electrical equipment.
       (I) Farming machines.
       (J) New materials, such as polymers.
       (5) In attempting to overtake the United States and achieve 
     its Made in China 2025 goals, China has systematically sought 
     to identify areas of American innovation, education, and 
     technology that could be replicated, stolen, or appropriated.
       (6) The very nature of the open society of the United 
     States--a free market economy that incentivizes creativity 
     and ingenuity and promotes the free flow of capital and 
     ideas, a higher education system and scientific research 
     community that encourages collaboration domestically and 
     internationally, and a liberal democratic government that 
     lacks a top-down, authoritarian structure--creates 
     opportunities for the PRC to target the United States in ways 
     that are either not adequately protected or not even 
     anticipated as possible threats.
       (7) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
     assessed that ``there's no country that's even close'' to the 
     PRC when it comes to foreign espionage, in traditional or 
     nontraditional forms.
       (8) As the 2018 Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace 
     report of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center (commonly known as the ``NCSC'') stated, China has 
     expansive efforts in place to acquire United States 
     technology, including sensitive trade secrets and proprietary 
     information. China continues to use cyber espionage to 
     support its strategic development goals--science and 
     technology advancement, military modernization, and economic 
     policy objectives. Chinese companies and individuals often 
     acquire United States technology for commercial and 
     scientific purposes.
       (9) In April 2020, the Office of the United States Trade 
     Representative (referred to in this subsection as the 
     ``USTR'') issued its annual Special 301 Report, in which the 
     USTR reviews the state of intellectual property protection 
     and enforcement in trading partners of the United States 
     around the world. The USTR continues to place China on the 
     Priority Watch List, which reflects ``United States concerns 
     with China's system of pressuring and coercing technology 
     transfer, and the continued need for fundamental structural 
     changes to strengthen IP protection and enforcement, 
     including as to trade secret theft, obstacles to protecting 
     trademarks, online piracy and counterfeiting, the high-volume 
     manufacturing and export of counterfeit goods, and 
     impediments to pharmaceutical innovation.''.
       (10) The theft of intellectual property, trade secrets, 
     sensitive technology, and scientific and other academic 
     research all contribute to China's goal of achieving 
     preeminent superpower status. China's failure to respect 
     intellectual property rights, failure to adhere to the rule 
     of law, and efforts to obtain intellectual property, trade 
     secrets, technology, and research through improper or illicit 
     means all pose a significant economic and national security 
     threat to the United States.
       (11) In recent years, China has increased its use of 
     nontraditional espionage to target colleges and universities 
     in the United States, particularly with respect to cutting 
     edge research and technologies being developed by such 
     universities, including technology that has military 
     applications.
       (12) The universities of the United States provide fertile 
     ground for nontraditional espionage given the open, 
     international, and collaborative nature of most university 
     research and the legitimate interest of universities in 
     encouraging international collaboration.
       (13) While the United States benefits from attracting the 
     top research talent from around the world, universities 
     nevertheless must take appropriate measures to ensure that 
     China is not able to use academic collaboration to steal 
     United States intellectual property or engage in other 
     activities that might harm the national security of the 
     United States.
       (14) In response to the increased wave of nontraditional 
     espionage over recent years, the Department of Justice 
     launched a China Initiative in 2018. The goal of the China 
     Initiative is to identify and prosecute individuals and 
     entities engaged in economic and other nontraditional 
     espionage, trade secret theft, hacking, and other crimes, 
     while protecting critical infrastructure against external 
     threats and combating covert efforts to influence the 
     American public.
       (15) Several recent criminal and civil enforcement actions 
     taken by the Department of Justice highlight China's 
     pervasive and illegal targeting of intellectual property and 
     valuable research from United States universities, including 
     the following:
       (A) Dr. Qing Wang was a former employee of the Cleveland 
     Clinic Foundation. He had received more than $3,000,000 in 
     grant funding from the National Institutes of Health 
     (commonly known as ``NIH''). Dr. Wang was charged in a 
     criminal complaint with knowingly failing to disclose to NIH 
     that he was Dean of the College of Life Sciences and 
     Technology at the Huazhong University of Science and 
     Technology (referred to in this subparagraph as ``HUST'') and 
     received grant funds from the National Natural Science 
     Foundation of China for some of the same scientific research 
     funded by NIH. Dr. Wang also allegedly participated in the 
     Thousand Talents Program, for which China provided $3,000,000 
     in research support to enhance the facilities and operations 
     at HUST. Federal law enforcement agencies arrested Dr. Wang 
     in May 2020.
       (B) Dr. James Patrick Lewis was a tenured professor at West 
     Virginia University in the physics department from 2006 to 
     2019. In July 2017, Dr. Lewis entered into a contract of 
     employment with the PRC through its Global Experts Thousand 
     Talents Plan. In March 2020, Dr. Lewis pled guilty to 1 count 
     of Federal program fraud.
       (C) Anming Hu, an Associate Professor in the Department of 
     Mechanical, Aerospace, and Biomedical Engineering at the 
     University of Tennessee, Knoxville (commonly known as 
     ``UT''), allegedly engaged in a scheme to defraud the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration (commonly known 
     as ``NASA'') by concealing his affiliation with Beijing 
     University of Technology (referred to in this subparagraph as 
     ``BJUT''). Hu's false representations to UT about his 
     affiliation with BJUT caused UT to falsely certify to NASA 
     that UT was in compliance with Federal law. In February 2020, 
     Mr. Hu was indicted on Federal charges of wire fraud and 
     false statements.
       (D) Dr. Charles Lieber served as the Principal Investigator 
     of the Lieber Research Group at Harvard University, which 
     specialized in the area of nanoscience. Dr. Lieber had 
     received more than $15,000,000 in grant funding from NIH and 
     the Department of Defense since 2008. Unbeknownst to Harvard 
     University, beginning in 2011, Lieber allegedly became a 
     ``Strategic Scientist'' at Wuhan University of Technology in 
     China (referred to in this subparagraph as ``WUT'') and was a 
     contractual participant in the Thousand Talents Plan from 
     2012 to 2017. Under the terms of the Thousand Talents 
     contract, WUT paid Lieber $50,000 per month, paid him living 
     expenses of up to approximately $158,000, and awarded him 
     more than $1,500,000 to establish a research lab at WUT. In 
     return, Lieber was obligated to work for WUT for 9 months per 
     year. Lieber lied about his involvement with WUT to both 
     Harvard University and Federal investigators. In January 
     2020, Lieber was arrested and charged with making a 
     materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement.
       (E) In January 2020, Yanqing Ye, a Chinese national, 
     Lieutenant of the People's Liberation Army (referred to in 
     this subparagraph as the ``PLA''), and member of the CCP, was 
     indicted on visa fraud, false statements, and acting as an 
     agent of a foreign power without prior notification. Ye 
     allegedly falsely identified as a student and lied about her 
     ongoing military service at the National University of 
     Defense Technology. While studying at Boston University's 
     Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Biomedical Engineering, 
     Ye continued to work as a PLA Lieutenant and completed 
     assignments from PLA officers, including conducting research, 
     assessing United States military websites, and sending United 
     States documents and information to China.

[[Page S3361]]

       (F) In January 2020, Zaoson Zheng, a Chinese national, was 
     arrested at Logan Airport in Boston and charged with 
     attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to 
     China. Zheng had allegedly entered the United States in 2018 
     on a J-1 visa and conducted cancer cell research at Beth 
     Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. Zheng admitted he 
     stole the vials from a lab at Beth Israel, and that he 
     intended to bring the vials to China, use them to conduct 
     research in his own laboratory, and publish the results under 
     his own name.
       (G) In December 2019, the Van Andel Research Institute 
     (referred to in this subparagraph as ``VARI'') reached a 
     settlement with the Department of Justice to pay $5,500,000 
     to resolve allegations that it violated the law commonly 
     known as the False Claims Act (section 3729 through 3733 of 
     title 31, United States Code) by failing to disclose, in 
     Federal grant applications and progress reports submitted to 
     NIH, that the Chinese government funded 2 VARI researchers 
     through grants. The VARI researchers were receiving research 
     funding from Chinese sources while VARI was applying for and 
     receiving NIH funding on their behalf.
       (H) In September 2019, Yu Zhou and Li Chen were charged 
     with crimes related to stealing exosome-related trade 
     secrets. Zhou and Chen, spouses who worked in separate 
     medical research labs at the Nationwide Children's Hospital 
     Research Institute, conspired to steal scientific trade 
     secrets related to exosomes and exosome isolation from the 
     Research Institute. The couple allegedly founded a company in 
     China without the hospital's knowledge. While employed at the 
     Research Institute, they marketed products and services 
     related to exosome isolation through their Chinese company. 
     They also founded an American biotechnology company 
     advertising products and services related to exosomes 
     isolation, including a kit developed from a trade secret 
     created at a Nationwide Children's research lab. They 
     eventually received more than $876,000 and stock related to 
     an asset purchase agreement involving the American company.
       (I) In August 2019, Feng Tao, an associate professor at 
     Kansas University, was indicted on Federal charges for 
     concealing the fact that he was a full-time employee for 
     Fuzhou University in China while doing research at Kansas 
     University funded by the United States Government. Tao 
     allegedly defrauded the United States Government by 
     unlawfully receiving Federal grant money at the same time 
     that he was employed and paid by a Chinese research 
     university.
       (J) Weiqiang Zhang, a Chinese national and United States 
     legal permanent resident, acquired, without authorization, 
     hundreds of rice seeds produced by his employer, Ventria 
     Bioscience. Ventria is a Kansas biopharmaceutical research 
     facility that develops genetically programmed rice to express 
     recombinant human proteins, which are then extracted for use 
     in the therapeutic and medical fields. Ventria spent millions 
     of dollars and years of research developing its seeds and 
     cost-effective methods to extract the proteins. Ventria used 
     locked doors with magnetic card readers to restrict access to 
     the temperature-controlled environment where the seeds were 
     stored and processed. Zhang worked as a rice breeder for 
     Ventria. In 2013, personnel from a crop research institute in 
     China visited Zhang at his home in Kansas. Zhang drove the 
     visitors to tour facilities in several States. United States 
     Customs and Border Protection officers found seeds belonging 
     to Ventria in the luggage of Zhang's visitors as they 
     prepared to leave the United States for China. In April 2018, 
     Zhang was sentenced to 121 months in a Federal prison after 
     having been convicted in February 2017 of 1 count of 
     conspiracy to steal trade secrets, 1 count of conspiracy to 
     commit interstate transportation of stolen property, and 1 
     count of interstate transportation of stolen property.
       (16) It remains a national security priority for the United 
     States to protect the research and innovation developed in 
     United States colleges and universities from misappropriation 
     by any country, including the PRC.

     SEC. 7502. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'', with respect to 
     a covered research project, means the head of the covered 
     agency providing the funding for the covered research 
     project.
       (2) Covered agency.--The term ``covered agency'' means--
       (A) the Department of Defense;
       (B) the Department of Energy; and
       (C) an element of the intelligence community, as defined in 
     section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3003).
       (3) Covered country.--The term ``covered country'' means--
       (A) the People's Republic of China; and
       (B) any other country designated by the Director, based on 
     findings similar to the findings under subsection (a), which 
     shall include consideration of--
       (i) whether the country poses an existential threat to the 
     economic interests and national security of the United 
     States;
       (ii) whether the country engages in persistent efforts to 
     steal sensitive technology and proprietary information from 
     companies, academic institutions, and other organizations of 
     the United States through economic espionage and other forms 
     of nontraditional espionage;
       (iii) whether nontraditional forms of espionage serve as 
     primary tools to further the goals of the country;
       (iv) whether the nontraditional forms of espionage 
     described in clause (iii) include--

       (I) talent recruitment programs designed to recruit the 
     country's nationals to acquire knowledge about--and, often, 
     steal--valuable and sensitive research at universities and 
     research institutions abroad;
       (II) luring foreign experts to the country to work on key 
     strategic programs;
       (III) using mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures as a 
     means to gain access to high-level technology;
       (IV) using cyber intrusions to steal information; and
       (V) using front companies for state-affiliated entities to 
     acquire export-controlled technology;

       (v) whether the country has systematically sought to 
     identify areas of United States innovation, education, and 
     technology that could be replicated, stolen, or appropriated; 
     and
       (vi) whether the Office of the United States Trade 
     Representative has placed the country on the Priority Watch 
     List.
       (4) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means an 
     individual or institution of higher education that has a 
     financial relationship with--
       (A) a covered country;
       (B) a political party within a covered country;
       (C) a person who acts as an agent, representative, 
     employee, or servant of a covered country; or
       (D) a person who acts in any other capacity at the order or 
     request, or under the direction or control, of a covered 
     country.
       (5) Covered research project.--The term ``covered research 
     project'' means a research project at an institution of 
     higher education--
       (A) that is funded in whole or in part by a covered agency; 
     and
       (B) the subject of which is--
       (i) an item subject to the Export Control Reform Act of 
     2018 (20 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.);
       (ii) an item listed on the Commerce Control List (commonly 
     known as the ``CCL'') set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 
     774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; or
       (iii) an item listed on the United States Munitions List 
     under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
     U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
       (6) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
     National Intelligence.
       (7) Financial relationship.--The term ``financial 
     relationship'' means--
       (A) any arrangement under which compensation is provided, 
     directly or indirectly, by a covered country, or another 
     entity or person described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) 
     of paragraph (4), to--
       (i) a covered person; or
       (ii) an institution of higher education; or
       (B) any direct or indirect ownership or investment interest 
     by a covered country, or another entity or person described 
     in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (4), in an 
     institution of higher education.
       (8) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
     (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).

     SEC. 7503. APPROVAL OF COVERED PERSONS IN SENSITIVE 
                   GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS.

       (a) Approval Required.--
       (1) In general.--A covered person may not participate in a 
     covered research project unless the covered person applies 
     for and receives approval from the agency head to 
     participate.
       (2) Requirements.--An agency head may not approve a covered 
     person to participate in a covered research project unless 
     the agency head--
       (A) performs a background check on the covered person in 
     consultation with the Director; and
       (B) collects any other relevant information about the 
     covered person that the agency head determines appropriate, 
     except any information pertaining to United States persons 
     that the agency head is prohibited by law from collecting.
       (b) Penalty.--If an agency head determines that a covered 
     person participating in a covered research project commenced 
     on the date of enactment of this section has violated 
     subsection (a), the agency head may--
       (1) impose a probationary period, not to exceed 6 months, 
     on the head of the project or the project;
       (2) reduce, limit, or eliminate the funding for the project 
     until the violation is remedied;
       (3) permanently eliminate the funding for the project; or
       (4) take any other action determined appropriate by the 
     agency head.

     SEC. 7504. DISCLOSURE OF RESEARCH ASSISTANCE FROM FOREIGN 
                   GOVERNMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 45 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 951 the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 951A. Disclosure of research assistance from foreign 
       governments

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the terms `agent of a foreign principal' and `foreign 
     principal' have the meanings given those terms in section 1 
     of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended 
     (22 U.S.C. 611);
       ``(2) the term `covered research project' has the meaning 
     given the term in section 7502 of the Combating Chinese 
     Purloining of Trade Secrets Act; and

[[Page S3362]]

       ``(3) the term `institution of higher education' has the 
     meaning given the term in section 101 of the Higher Education 
     Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
       ``(b) Funding and Other Assistance.--
       ``(1) Failure to disclose foreign funding.--
       ``(A) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for a person, while 
     applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an 
     agency of the United States for a covered research project, 
     to knowingly and willfully fail to disclose to the agency any 
     grant or other funding that the person has received or will 
     receive for the same project from a foreign principal or an 
     agent of a foreign principal, including through an 
     intermediary.
       ``(B) Penalty.--Any person who violates subparagraph (A) 
     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 
     3 years, or both.
       ``(2) Failure to disclose material facts.--
       ``(A) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for a person, while 
     applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an 
     agency of the United States for a covered research project, 
     to knowingly and willfully fail to disclose to the agency a 
     material fact relating to a connection between a foreign 
     country and the project that might substantially impact the 
     decision of the agency to provide funding to the project, 
     including the fact that a person providing any assistance, 
     including financial assistance, to the project is--
       ``(i) a national of a foreign country;
       ``(ii) affiliated with an institution comparable to an 
     institution of higher education of higher learning, or 
     another organization, that is headquartered in or 
     substantially funded by a foreign country; or
       ``(iii) engaging in research activities for the project in 
     a foreign country.
       ``(B) Penalty.--Any person who violates subparagraph (A) 
     shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 
     1 year, or both.
       ``(3) Institutions of higher education.--Any institution of 
     higher education that knowingly and willfully fails to 
     disclose to the appropriate agency of the United States that 
     an officer, agent, or employee of the institution of higher 
     education violated this subsection shall be fined not more 
     than $1,000,000 for each such violation.
       ``(c) Transmission of Information.--
       ``(1) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for any person, while 
     applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an 
     agency of the United States for a covered research project, 
     to knowingly transmit or attempt to transmit information 
     gained in violation of a contract to which the person is a 
     party, including a contract regarding nondisclosure of 
     information, employment, or the provision of goods or 
     services, intending or knowing that the transmission will 
     benefit a foreign principal or an agent of a foreign 
     principal.
       ``(2) Penalty.--Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall 
     be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 
     years, or both.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 950 
     the following:

``951A. Disclosure of research assistance from foreign governments.''.
                                 ______