[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 90 (Monday, May 24, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3355-S3362]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 1946. Mr. GRAHAM submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to
amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. Schumer to the bill S. 1260, to
establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the
National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub
program, to require a strategy and report on economic security,
science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to
establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end, add the following:
DIVISION G--COMBATING CHINESE THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS
SEC. 7001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ``Combating Chinese
Purloining of Trade Secrets Act'' or the ``CCP Trade Secrets
Act''.
TITLE I--INCREASED PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 2512 OF TITLE
18, UNITED STATES CODE, INVOLVING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
SEC. 7101. MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, POSSESSION, AND
ADVERTISING OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTING DEVICES PROHIBITED.
(a) In General.--Section 2512 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(4) Any person who violates this section with the intent
to benefit any government of a foreign country (as defined in
section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 611)), agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28,
United States Code), or agent of a foreign principal (as
defined in section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938, as amended (22 U.S.C. 611)) shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or
both.''.
(b) Sentencing Enhancement for Foreign Involvement in
Violations of Section 2512 of Title 18, United States Code.--
Pursuant to its authority under section 994 of title 28,
United States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission
shall review and amend the Federal sentencing guidelines to
ensure that the guidelines provide an additional penalty
increase of not fewer than 4 offense levels if the defendant
violated section 2512 of title 18, United States Code, with
the intent to benefit any government of a foreign country,
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, or agent of a
foreign principal.
TITLE II--PROTECTING U.S. BUSINESSES FROM FOREIGN TRADE SECRET THEFT
SEC. 7201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Protecting U.S.
Businesses from Foreign Trade Secrets Theft Act of 2021''.
SEC. 7202. PROHIBITION ON MISAPPROPRIATING U.S. TRADE
SECRETS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 90 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 1840. Applicability to foreign persons
``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
[[Page S3356]]
``(1) the term `critical technology' has the meaning given
the term `critical technologies' in section 721 of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565);
``(2) the term `designated Federal agency' means--
``(A) the Department of Homeland Security;
``(B) U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
``(C) the Department of Commerce;
``(D) the Securities and Exchange Commission;
``(E) the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
``(F) the Department of State; and
``(G) the United States Patent and Trademark Office;
``(3) the term `foreign person' means a person that is not
a United States person;
``(4) the term `International Trade Commission' means the
United States International Trade Commission;
``(5) the term `offending foreign person' means a foreign
person--
``(A) who misappropriates a trade secret; and
``(B) with respect to whom a petition submitted under
subsection (b)(1) satisfies the requirements under that
subsection, as determined by the Attorney General;
``(6) the term `person' means--
``(A) an individual; and
``(B) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, or trust, any other nongovernmental entity,
organization, or group, and any governmental entity operating
as a business enterprise; and
``(7) the term `United States person' means--
``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States;
``(B) a corporation or other legal entity that is organized
under the laws of the United States, any State or territory
thereof, or the District of Columbia; and
``(C) a corporation or other legal entity--
``(i) organized under the laws of a jurisdiction outside of
the United States; and
``(ii) with respect to which a United States person
described in subparagraph (A) or (B)--
``(I) holds more than 50 percent of the equity interest by
vote or value;
``(II) holds a majority of seats on the board of directors;
or
``(III) otherwise controls the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions.
``(b) Petition for Relief.--
``(1) Demonstration of misappropriation.--If an owner of a
trade secret, who is a United States person, wishes to have
the Attorney General or the head of the applicable designated
Federal agency apply a penalty under subsection (c) to a
foreign person who has misappropriated the trade secret, the
owner shall submit to the Attorney General a petition
demonstrating that--
``(A)(i) a court has entered a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or final judgment under section 1836
of this title against the foreign person for misappropriating
a trade secret of the owner;
``(ii) the International Trade Commission has issued a
temporary exclusion order or final exclusion order under
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337)
against the foreign person for misappropriating a trade
secret of the owner; or
``(iii) an indictment has been issued under section 1831 or
1832 of this title against the foreign person for
misappropriating a trade secret of the owner;
``(B) the trade secret described in the applicable clause
of subparagraph (A) involves or is a component of critical
technology; and
``(C) the remedies available to the owner under section
1836 of this title or section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1337), as applicable, are unlikely to provide
complete relief to the owner because the foreign person has
used or is reasonably likely to use the misappropriated trade
secret in the home country of the foreign person or a third
country, such that activities of the foreign person relevant
to the determinations under subparagraph (A) take place
outside the United States.
``(2) Review.--Not later than 60 days after the date on
which an owner who is a United States person submits a
petition to the Attorney General under paragraph (1), the
Attorney General shall determine whether the petition
satisfies the requirements under that paragraph.
``(3) Notification.--If the Attorney General determines
under paragraph (2) that a petition satisfies the
requirements under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall
so notify the head of each designated Federal agency not
later than 30 days after the date of the determination.
``(4) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
if the Attorney General determines under paragraph (2) that a
petition relating to a foreign person satisfies the
requirements under paragraph (1), the Attorney General and
the head of each designated Federal agency should impose 1 or
more penalties on the foreign person under subsection (c), to
the extent that the penalties are applicable.
``(c) Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), not
later than 90 days after the date on which the Attorney
General provides notice to the head of each designated
Federal agency under subsection (b)(3) with respect to an
offending foreign person, the Attorney General or the head of
a designated Federal agency, as applicable, may impose 1 or
more of the following penalties on the offending foreign
person:
``(A) Import restriction.--The Commissioner of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection may exclude from entry into the United
States any articles produced by the offending foreign person.
``(B) Export licenses.--
``(i) Dual-use exports.--The Secretary of Commerce may
refuse to issue any specific license, or grant any other
specific permission or authority, for the export, reexport,
or in-country transfer of items to the offending foreign
person under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C.
4801 et seq.).
``(ii) Defense articles and defense services.--The
Secretary of State may refuse to issue any license or other
approval for the export of defense articles or defense
services to the offending foreign person under the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
``(C) Restricted parties.--
``(i) Commerce lists.--The Secretary of Commerce may add
the offending foreign person to one of the following lists
maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Secretary of the
Department of Commerce:
``(I) The Entity List set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part
744 of the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter
C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
``(II) The Denied Persons List maintained pursuant to
section 764.3 of the Export Administration Regulations.
``(ii) Treasury list.--The Secretary of the Treasury may
add the offending foreign person to the list of specially
designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury.
``(D) Securities reporting.--The Securities and Exchange
Commission may determine whether the use by the offending
foreign person of the misappropriated trade secret is a
reportable material condition in any filing by the offending
foreign person required under applicable securities laws of
the United States.
``(E) Patent protection.--The Under Secretary of Commerce
for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office may prohibit the offending
foreign person from applying for patent protection, being
listed as an inventor on a patent application, or continuing
a patent application under title 35, United States Code.
``(F) Export-import bank assistance for exports to foreign
person.--The Export-Import Bank of the United States may
refuse to approve the issuance of any guarantee, insurance,
extension of credit, or participation in the extension of
credit in connection with the export of any goods or services
to the offending foreign person.
``(G) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The Secretary of
State may deny a visa application, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security may deny an application for admission to
the United States, of any alien that the applicable Secretary
determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a
shareholder with a controlling interest in, the offending
foreign person.
``(H) Other penalties.--The Attorney General or the head of
a designated Federal agency--
``(i) may not procure, or enter into a contract for the
procurement of, any goods or services from the offending
foreign person;
``(ii) may prohibit, pursuant to notice issued by the
Attorney General, a United States person from knowingly
investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or
debt instruments of the offending foreign person;
``(iii) may impose on a principal executive officer of the
offending foreign person, or on an individual performing
similar functions and with similar authorities as such an
officer, any penalty under this subsection that could be
imposed on the offending foreign person; and
``(iv) may impose on the offending foreign person any other
penalty authorized under any provision of Federal law, as
determined appropriate.
``(2) Duration of penalties.--
``(A) Temporary penalty.--If a court enters a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction under section
1836 of this title against an offending foreign person for
misappropriating a trade secret, the International Trade
Commission issues a temporary exclusion order under section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337) against an
offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret,
or an indictment is issued under section 1831 or 1832 of this
title against an offending foreign person for
misappropriating a trade secret, the Attorney General or the
head of a designated Federal agency may impose a penalty
under paragraph (1) on the offending foreign person during
the period during which the temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, temporary exclusion order, or
indictment remains in effect.
``(B) Permanent penalty.--If a court enters a final
judgment under section 1836 of this title against an
offending foreign person for misappropriating a trade secret,
the International Trade Commission issues a final exclusion
order under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C.
1337) against an offending foreign person for
misappropriating a trade secret, or an offending foreign
person is convicted under section 1831or 1832 of this title
of misappropriating a trade secret, the Attorney General or
the head of a designated Federal agency may permanently
[[Page S3357]]
impose a penalty under paragraph (1) on the foreign person.
``(3) Petition for review.--
``(A) In general.--If the Attorney General or the head of a
designated Federal agency imposes a temporary penalty under
paragraph (2)(A) or a permanent penalty under paragraph
(2)(B) on an offending foreign person, the offending foreign
person may submit to the Attorney General or the head of the
designated Federal agency a petition for the revocation or
modification of the penalty--
``(i) not later 45 days after the date on which the penalty
is imposed; or
``(ii) in the case of a permanent penalty, if the final
judgment, final exclusion order, or conviction upon which the
permanent penalty is based is reversed on appeal or otherwise
vacated, not later than 45 days after the date of the
reversal or vacatur.
``(B) Contents of petition.--
``(i) In general.--An offending foreign person shall
include in a petition submitted under subparagraph (A) a full
written statement in support of the position of the offending
foreign person, including a precise statement of why--
``(I) an insufficient basis exists for the penalty; or
``(II) the circumstances resulting in the penalty no longer
apply.
``(ii) Remedial steps.--An offending foreign person may, in
a petition submitted under subparagraph (A), propose remedial
steps that would negate the basis for the penalty.
``(C) Determination.--The Attorney General or the head of a
designated Federal agency, as applicable, shall make a
determination with respect to a petition submitted under
subparagraph (A).
``(d) Report.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this section, and each year thereafter, the
Attorney General, in coordination with the head of each
designated Federal agency, shall submit to the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report that--
``(A) with respect to the preceding year--
``(i) identifies foreign countries, state-owned and state-
controlled entities, and other persons that engaged in the
misappropriation of trade secrets owned by United States
persons;
``(ii) describes any strategy used by a foreign country to
undertake misappropriation of trade secrets owned by United
States persons;
``(iii) identifies categories of technologies developed by,
or trade secrets owned by, United States persons that were
targeted for misappropriation;
``(iv) lists legal actions taken under section 1836 of this
title, section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C.
1337), or section 1831 or 1832 of this title--
``(I) against an offending foreign person who
misappropriated a trade secret owned by a United States
person; and
``(II) as a result of which the products of the offending
foreign person described in subclause (I) may never enter the
United States; and
``(v) describes progress made in decreasing the prevalence
of misappropriation of trade secrets owned by United States
persons; and
``(B) recommends strategies to the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives to decrease the misappropriation
by foreign persons of trade secrets owned by United States
persons.
``(2) Form of report.-- A report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.''.
(b) Table of Sections.--The table of sections for chapter
90 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``1840. Applicability to foreign persons.''.
TITLE III--COMBATING CYBERCRIME
SEC. 7301. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``International Cybercrime
Prevention Act''.
SEC. 7302. PREDICATE OFFENSES.
Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1956(c)(7)(D)--
(A) by striking ``or section 2339D'' and inserting
``section 2339D''; and
(B) by striking ``of this title, section 46502'' and
inserting ``, or section 2512 (relating to the manufacture,
distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or
electronic communication intercepting devices) of this title,
section 46502''; and
(2) in section 1961(1), by inserting ``section 1030
(relating to fraud and related activity in connection with
computers) if the act indictable under section 1030 is
felonious,'' before ``section 1084''.
SEC. 7303. FORFEITURE.
(a) In General.--Section 2513 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 2513. CONFISCATION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTING DEVICES AND OTHER
PROPERTY.
``(a) Criminal Forfeiture.--
``(1) In general.--The court, in imposing a sentence on any
person convicted of a violation of section 2511 or 2512, or
convicted of conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 2512,
shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and
irrespective of any provision of State law, that such person
forfeit to the United States--
``(A) such person's interest in any property, real or
personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or
to facilitate the commission of such violation; and
``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or
derived from any gross proceeds, or any property traceable to
such property, that such person obtained or retained directly
or indirectly as a result of such violation.
``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Pursuant to section 2461(c)
of title 28, the provisions of section 413 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d)
thereof, shall apply to criminal forfeitures under this
subsection.
``(b) Civil Forfeiture.--
``(1) In general.--The following shall be subject to
forfeiture to the United States in accordance with provisions
of chapter 46 and no property right shall exist in them:
``(A) Any property, real or personal, used or intended to
be used, in any manner, to commit, or facilitate the
commission of a violation of section 2511 or 2512, or a
conspiracy to violate section 2511 or 2512.
``(B) Any property, real or personal, constituting, or
traceable to the gross proceeds taken, obtained, or retained
in connection with or as a result of a violation of section
2511 or 2512, or a conspiracy to violate section 2511 or
2512.
``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures
under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of
chapter 46 relating to civil forfeitures, except that such
duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under
the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be
performed by such officers, agents, and other persons as may
be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
sections for chapter 119 is amended by striking the item
relating to section 2513 and inserting the following:
``2513. Confiscation of wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepting devices and other property.''.
SEC. 7304. SHUTTING DOWN BOTNETS.
(a) In General.--Section 1345 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in the heading, by inserting ``and abuse'' after
``fraud'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``or'' after the
semicolon; and
(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
``(D) violating or about to violate section 1030(a)(5) of
this title where such conduct has caused or would cause
damage (as defined in section 1030) without authorization to
100 or more protected computers (as defined in section 1030)
during any 1-year period, including by--
``(i) impairing the availability or integrity of the
protected computers without authorization; or
``(ii) installing or maintaining control over malicious
software on the protected computers that, without
authorization, has caused or would cause damage to the
protected computers;''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), in the matter preceding subparagraph
(A), by inserting ``, a violation described in subsection
(a)(1)(D),'' before ``or a Federal''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(c) A restraining order, prohibition, or other action
described in subsection (b), if issued in circumstances
described in subsection (a)(1)(D), may, upon application of
the Attorney General--
``(1) specify that no cause of action shall lie in any
court against a person for complying with the restraining
order, prohibition, or other action; and
``(2) provide that the United States shall pay to such
person a fee for reimbursement for such costs as are
reasonably necessary and which have been directly incurred in
complying with the restraining order, prohibition, or other
action.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
sections for chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by striking the item relating to section 1345 and
inserting the following:
``1345. Injunctions against fraud and abuse.''.
SEC. 7305. AGGRAVATED DAMAGE TO A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
COMPUTER.
(a) In General.--Chapter 47 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 1030 the
following:
``Sec. 1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure
computer
``(a) Offense.--It shall be unlawful, during and in
relation to a felony violation of section 1030, to knowingly
cause or attempt to cause damage to a critical infrastructure
computer, if such damage results in (or, in the case of an
attempted offense, would, if completed, have resulted in) the
substantial impairment--
``(1) of the operation of the critical infrastructure
computer; or
``(2) of the critical infrastructure associated with such
computer.
``(b) Penalty.--Any person who violates subsection (a)
shall, in addition to the term of punishment provided for the
felony violation of section 1030, be fined under this title,
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both.
[[Page S3358]]
``(c) Consecutive Sentence.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law--
``(1) a court shall not place any person convicted of a
violation of this section on probation;
``(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of
imprisonment imposed on a person under this section shall run
concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed on the
person under any other provision of law, including any term
of imprisonment imposed for the felony violation of section
1030;
``(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed
for the felony violation of section 1030, a court shall not
in any way reduce the term to be imposed for such violation
to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any
separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a
violation of this section; and
``(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a
violation of this section may, in the discretion of the
court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with
another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the court at
the same time on that person for an additional violation of
this section, if such discretion shall be exercised in
accordance with any applicable guidelines and policy
statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission
pursuant to section 994 of title 28.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the terms `computer' and `damage' have the meanings
given the terms in section 1030; and
``(2) the term `critical infrastructure' means systems and
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have catastrophic regional or national effects
on public health or safety, economic security, or national
security, including voter registration databases, voting
machines, and other communications systems that manage the
election process or report and display results on behalf of
State and local governments.''.
(b) Table of Sections.--The table of sections for chapter
47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 1030 the following:
``1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.''.
SEC. 7306. STOPPING TRAFFICKING IN BOTNETS; FRAUD AND RELATED
ACTIVITY IN CONNECTION WITH COMPUTERS.
(a) In General.--Section 1030 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2)(A) intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby
obtains information, if--
``(i) the conduct was undertaken in furtherance of any
felony violation of the laws of the United States or of any
State, unless an element of such violation would require
proof that the information was obtained without authorization
or in excess of authorization; or
``(ii) the protected computer is owned or operated by or on
behalf of a State or local governmental entity responsible
for the administration of justice, public health, or safety,
or owned or operated by or on behalf of the United States
Government; or
``(B) intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization, and thereby obtains information from any
protected computer;'';
(B) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
``(6) knowing such conduct to be wrongful, intentionally
traffics in any password or similar information, or any other
means of access, further knowing or having reason to know
that a protected computer would be accessed or damaged
without authorization in a manner prohibited by this section
as the result of such trafficking;'';
(C) in paragraph (7), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
(D) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
``(8) intentionally traffics in the means of access to a
protected computer, if--
``(A) the trafficker knows or has reason to know the
protected computer has been damaged in a manner prohibited by
this section; and
``(B) the promise or agreement to pay for the means of
access is made by, or on behalf of, a person the trafficker
knows or has reason to know intends to use the means of
access to--
``(i) damage a protected computer without authorization; or
``(ii) violate section 1037 or 1343;'';
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``, (a)(3), or (a)(6)''
each place it appears and inserting ``or (a)(3)'';
(B) in paragraph (3)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``(a)(4) or (a)(7)''
and inserting ``(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8)''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``(a)(4), or (a)(7)''
and inserting ``(a)(4), (a)(7), or (a)(8)''; and
(C) in paragraph (4)--
(i) in subparagraph (C)(i), by striking ``or an attempt to
commit an offense''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking clause (ii) and
inserting the following:
``(ii) an offense, or an attempt to commit an offense,
under subsection (a)(6);'';
(3) in subsection (e)--
(A) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
``(6) the term `exceeds authorized access' means--
``(A)(i) to access a computer with authorization and
thereby to knowingly obtain information from such computer
that the accessor is not entitled to obtain; or
``(ii) to knowingly obtain any information from such
computer for a purpose that is prohibited by the computer
owner; and
``(B) provided that the limitation on access to or use of
the information is not based solely on the terms governing
use of an online service by customers or subscribers thereof,
including terms set forth in an acceptable use policy or
terms of service;'';
(B) by striking paragraph (10);
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (11) and (12) as paragraphs
(10) and (11), respectively;
(D) in paragraph (10), as so resdesignated, by striking
``and'';
(E) in paragraph (11), as so redesignated, by striking the
period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(F) by adding at the end the following:
``(12) the term `online service'--
``(A) means an electronic communication service (as defined
in section 2510) to the public, a remote computing service
(as defined in section 2711), or other service that provides
content or computing services to the public over the
Internet; and
``(B) does not include an enterprise service;
``(13) the term `enterprise service' means any electronic
communication service (as defined in section 2510) to the
public, remote computing service (as defined in section
2711), or other service that provides content or computing
services to the public for which the user, customer, or
subscriber has paid, or on whose behalf has been paid, more
than $10,000 in a calendar year in exchange for the right to
access or use the service; and
``(14) the term `traffic', except as provided in subsection
(a)(6), means transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another
as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for
a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary
value.'';
(4) in subsection (g), in the first sentence, by inserting
``, except for a violation of subsection (a)(6),'' after ``of
this section''; and
(5) by striking subsections (i) and (j) and inserting the
following:
``(i) Criminal Forfeiture.--
``(1) In general.--The court, in imposing a sentence on any
person convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted
of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of
any provision of State law, that such person forfeit to the
United States--
``(A) such person's interest in any property, real or
personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or
to facilitate the commission of such violation; and
``(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or
derived from any gross proceeds, or any property traceable to
such property, that such person obtained or retained,
directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.
``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Pursuant to section 2461(c)
of title 28, the provisions of section 413 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d)
thereof, shall apply to criminal forfeitures under this
subsection.
``(j) Civil Forfeiture.--
``(1) In general.--The following shall be subject to
forfeiture to the United States in accordance with chapter
46, and no property right shall exist in them:
``(A) Any property, real or personal, used or intended to
be used, in any manner--
``(i) to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this section; or
``(ii) in a conspiracy to violate this section.
``(B) Any property, real or personal, constituting or
traceable to the gross proceeds taken, obtained, or retained
in connection with or as a result of--
``(i) a violation of this section; or
``(ii) a conspiracy to violate this section.
``(2) Forfeiture procedures.--Seizures and forfeitures
under this subsection shall be governed by the provisions of
chapter 46 that apply to civil forfeitures, except that such
duties as are imposed on the Secretary of the Treasury under
the customs laws described in section 981(d) shall be
performed by such officers, agents, and other persons as may
be designated for that purpose by the Secretary of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 7431(e)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking
``subparagraph (B)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (B)(iii)''.
TITLE IV--ESPIONAGE, THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS, AND IMPROPER INTERFERENCE
IN UNITED STATES ELECTIONS
SEC. 7401. ESPIONAGE, THEFT OF TRADE SECRETS, THEFT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INVOLVEMENT IN
COMMERCIAL FRAUD SCHEMES, AND IMPROPER
INTERFERENCE IN UNITED STATES ELECTIONS.
(a) Definitions.--Section 101(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(53)(A) The term `espionage' means conduct--
``(i) in violation of--
``(I) the Act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 217, chapter 30)
(commonly known as the `Espionage Act of 1917');
``(II) chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code (commonly
known as the `Economic Espionage Act of 1996'); or
[[Page S3359]]
``(III) any other Federal criminal law relating to an
activity described in clause (ii); or
``(ii)(I) by an alien who is under the direction of--
``(aa) a foreign government; or
``(bb) an intermediary individual or entity that seeks to
serve, support, or benefit a foreign government; and
``(II) with respect to confidential information, that
constitutes--
``(aa) stealing or, without authorization, appropriating,
taking, carrying away, concealing, or, by fraud, artifice, or
deception, obtaining such information;
``(bb) without authorization, copying, duplicating,
sketching, drawing, photographing, downloading, uploading,
altering, destroying, photocopying, replicating,
transmitting, delivering, sending, mailing, communicating, or
conveying such information; or
``(cc) receiving, buying, or possessing such information,
knowing that the information has been stolen or appropriated,
obtained, or converted without authorization.
``(B) The term `espionage' includes economic espionage.
``(54) The term `improper interference in a United States
election' means conduct by an alien that--
``(A)(i) violates Federal criminal, voting rights, or
campaign finance law; or
``(ii) is under the direction of--
``(I) a foreign government; or
``(II) an intermediary individual or entity that seeks to
serve, support, or benefit a foreign government; and
``(B) interferes with a general or primary Federal, State,
or local election or caucus, including--
``(i) the campaign of a candidate; and
``(ii) a ballot measure, including--
``(I) an amendment;
``(II) a bond issue;
``(III) an initiative;
``(IV) a recall;
``(V) a referral; and
``(VI) a referendum.
``(55) The term `theft of a trade secret' means conduct--
``(A) in violation of--
``(i) chapter 90 of title 18, United States Code (commonly
known as the `Economic Espionage Act of 1996'); or
``(ii) any other Federal criminal law relating to an
activity described in subparagraph (B); or
``(B)(i) by an alien who is under the direction of--
``(I) a foreign government; or
``(II) an intermediary individual or entity that seeks to
serve, support, or benefit a foreign government; and
``(ii) with respect to a trade secret relating to a product
or service used or intended for use in interstate or foreign
commerce, that constitutes--
``(I) stealing or, without authorization, appropriating,
taking, carrying away, concealing, or, by fraud, artifice, or
deception, obtaining such trade secret for the economic
benefit of any person other than the owner of the trade
secret;
``(II) without authorization, copying, duplicating,
sketching, drawing, photographing, downloading, uploading,
altering, destroying, photocopying, replicating,
transmitting, delivering, sending, mailing, communicating, or
conveying such trade secret; or
``(III) receiving, buying, or possessing such trade secret,
knowing that the trade secret has been stolen or
appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization.''.
(b) Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(H) Espionage and theft of trade secrets.--An alien is
inadmissible if a consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney General
knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe--
``(i) the alien is seeking admission or sought admission to
the United States to engage in espionage or theft of a trade
secret;
``(ii) the alien has engaged or intends to engage in
espionage or theft of a trade secret; or
``(iii) the affiliation or activities of the alien with, or
the control of the alien by, an individual, an entity, or a
funding mechanism known or reasonably believed to be engaged
in, or to have the intention of engaging in, espionage or
theft of a trade secret.
``(I) Improper interference in a united states election.--
Any alien who a consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Secretary of State, or the Attorney General
knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, is seeking
admission to the United States to engage in improper
interference in a United States election, or who has engaged
in improper interference in a United States election, is
inadmissible.''.
(c) Deportability.--Section 237(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(8) Espionage and theft of trade secrets.--Any alien who
has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission
engages in espionage or theft of a trade secret is
deportable.
``(9) Improper interference in a united states election.--
Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after
admission engages in improper interference in a United States
election is deportable.''.
SEC. 7402. VISA AND NONIMMIGRANT STATUS RESTRICTIONS.
(a) Period of Authorized Stay for Certain Citizens and
Nationals of the People's Republic of China.--Section
214(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1184(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(C)(i) The period of authorized stay for a citizen or
national of the People's Republic of China who seeks
admission to the United States as a nonimmigrant described in
subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section 101(a)(15) to study,
research, teach, or work in any field described in the most
recent technology alert list of the Department of State or in
section 221(j)(1)--
``(I) shall be--
``(aa) a fixed period of not more than 4 years; or
``(bb) the length of the program identified on the Form I-
20, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student
Status, or the Form DS-2019, Certificate of Eligibility for
Exchange Visitor Status, as applicable, of such citizen or
national of the People's Republic of China; and
``(II) may be extended by the Secretary of Homeland
Security for 1 or more additional periods of not more than 2
years.
``(ii) This subparagraph shall not apply to any national of
Hong Kong or Macau.''.
(b) Prohibition on Issuance of Visas to Certain Citizens
and Nationals of the People's Republic of China.--Section 221
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(j) Prohibition on Issuance of Visas to Certain Citizens
and Nationals of the People's Republic of China.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa
to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall not admit
into the United States, or grant a change of nonimmigrant
status to, an alien who is a citizen or national of the
People's Republic of China if the Secretary of State or the
Secretary of Homeland Security determines that the alien--
``(A) presents a risk to national security; or
``(B) otherwise seeks to enter the United States to
participate in graduate-level coursework or research at an
institution of higher education (as defined in section 101(a)
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) in a
field described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Fields described.--The fields described in this
paragraph are--
``(A) the military or intelligence sector;
``(B) the energy sector;
``(C) nuclear science or nuclear engineering;
``(D) high-end numerical control machinery and robotics;
``(E) autonomous systems or machine learning;
``(F) artificial intelligence;
``(G) production and application of high-performance
medical devices;
``(H) semiconductors;
``(I) new energy vehicles;
``(J) mobile phone technology;
``(K) next-generation information technology;
``(L) aviation, aeronautics, or space;
``(M) biomedicine; and
``(N) any related field, as determined by the Secretary of
State or the Secretary of Homeland Security.
``(3) Termination of status.--
``(A) In general.--With respect to an alien who is a
citizen or national of the People's Republic of China who has
been admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant
described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of section
101(a)(15), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
terminate the status and employment authorization of, and
revoke any petition approval of or on behalf of, the alien if
the Secretary determines that after such admission the
alien--
``(i) has engaged in an activity or affiliation that
presents a risk to national security; or
``(ii) has changed his or her program, course of study,
research, or employment to graduate-level coursework or
research at an institution of higher education in a field
described in paragraph (2).
``(B) Failure to maintain nonimmigrant status.--Any change
or attempted change described in subparagraph (A) shall be
considered to be a failure to maintain nonimmigrant status
under this Act.
``(4) Inapplicability to nationals of hong kong and
macau.--This subsection shall not apply to any national of
Hong Kong or Macau.''.
(c) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to--
(1) any visa application filed on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act; and
(2) the status of any alien, except for a national of Hong
Kong or Macau, who--
(A) is a citizen or national of the People's Republic of
China, regardless of the country of the passport presented
by, or the country of residence of, the alien;
(B) before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this
Act, has been or is admitted to the United States as a
nonimmigrant described in subparagraph (F), (J), or (M) of
section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)); and
(C) has changed or changes his or her program, course of
study, research, or employment to graduate-level coursework
or research at an institution of higher education (as defined
in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1001(a))) in a
[[Page S3360]]
field described in section 221(j)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (as added by subsection (b)).
TITLE V--GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS
SEC. 7501. FINDINGS.
Congress find the following:
(1) The People's Republic of China (referred to in this
subsection as ``the PRC'' or ``China'') poses an existential
threat to the economic interests and national security of the
United States, in part due to the continued efforts of the
PRC to steal sensitive technology and proprietary information
from companies, academic institutions, and other
organizations of the United States through economic espionage
and other forms of nontraditional espionage.
(2) The PRC, through the Chinese Communist Party (referred
to in this subsection as the ``CCP''), has long had an
interest in replacing the United States as the world's
foremost superpower. China takes a holistic approach towards
achieving its long-term goals, which are rooted in the
concept of a comprehensive national power, including
achieving dominance in economics, military affairs, science
and technology, education, and global influence.
(3) Nontraditional forms of espionage serve as primary
tools to further the goals of the CCP. Those tools include
talent recruitment programs designed to recruit Chinese
nationals to acquire knowledge about--and, often, steal--
valuable and sensitive research at universities and research
institutions abroad, and to lure foreign experts to China to
work on key strategic programs. More broadly, the PRC uses
mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures as a means to gain
access to high-level technology, uses cyber intrusions to
steal information, and uses front companies for PRC-related
entities to acquire export-controlled technology.
(4) In 2015, President Xi Jinping of the PRC released the
``Made in China 2025'' initiative, a 10-year plan to update
the manufacturing base of China by developing the following
10 high-tech industries:
(A) Electric cars and other new energy vehicles.
(B) Next-generation information technology and
telecommunications.
(C) Advanced robotics and artificial intelligence.
(D) Aerospace equipment.
(E) Bio-medicine and high-end medical equipment.
(F) Ocean engineering equipment and high-end vessels.
(G) High-end rail transportation equipment.
(H) Electrical equipment.
(I) Farming machines.
(J) New materials, such as polymers.
(5) In attempting to overtake the United States and achieve
its Made in China 2025 goals, China has systematically sought
to identify areas of American innovation, education, and
technology that could be replicated, stolen, or appropriated.
(6) The very nature of the open society of the United
States--a free market economy that incentivizes creativity
and ingenuity and promotes the free flow of capital and
ideas, a higher education system and scientific research
community that encourages collaboration domestically and
internationally, and a liberal democratic government that
lacks a top-down, authoritarian structure--creates
opportunities for the PRC to target the United States in ways
that are either not adequately protected or not even
anticipated as possible threats.
(7) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
assessed that ``there's no country that's even close'' to the
PRC when it comes to foreign espionage, in traditional or
nontraditional forms.
(8) As the 2018 Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace
report of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center (commonly known as the ``NCSC'') stated, China has
expansive efforts in place to acquire United States
technology, including sensitive trade secrets and proprietary
information. China continues to use cyber espionage to
support its strategic development goals--science and
technology advancement, military modernization, and economic
policy objectives. Chinese companies and individuals often
acquire United States technology for commercial and
scientific purposes.
(9) In April 2020, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (referred to in this subsection as the
``USTR'') issued its annual Special 301 Report, in which the
USTR reviews the state of intellectual property protection
and enforcement in trading partners of the United States
around the world. The USTR continues to place China on the
Priority Watch List, which reflects ``United States concerns
with China's system of pressuring and coercing technology
transfer, and the continued need for fundamental structural
changes to strengthen IP protection and enforcement,
including as to trade secret theft, obstacles to protecting
trademarks, online piracy and counterfeiting, the high-volume
manufacturing and export of counterfeit goods, and
impediments to pharmaceutical innovation.''.
(10) The theft of intellectual property, trade secrets,
sensitive technology, and scientific and other academic
research all contribute to China's goal of achieving
preeminent superpower status. China's failure to respect
intellectual property rights, failure to adhere to the rule
of law, and efforts to obtain intellectual property, trade
secrets, technology, and research through improper or illicit
means all pose a significant economic and national security
threat to the United States.
(11) In recent years, China has increased its use of
nontraditional espionage to target colleges and universities
in the United States, particularly with respect to cutting
edge research and technologies being developed by such
universities, including technology that has military
applications.
(12) The universities of the United States provide fertile
ground for nontraditional espionage given the open,
international, and collaborative nature of most university
research and the legitimate interest of universities in
encouraging international collaboration.
(13) While the United States benefits from attracting the
top research talent from around the world, universities
nevertheless must take appropriate measures to ensure that
China is not able to use academic collaboration to steal
United States intellectual property or engage in other
activities that might harm the national security of the
United States.
(14) In response to the increased wave of nontraditional
espionage over recent years, the Department of Justice
launched a China Initiative in 2018. The goal of the China
Initiative is to identify and prosecute individuals and
entities engaged in economic and other nontraditional
espionage, trade secret theft, hacking, and other crimes,
while protecting critical infrastructure against external
threats and combating covert efforts to influence the
American public.
(15) Several recent criminal and civil enforcement actions
taken by the Department of Justice highlight China's
pervasive and illegal targeting of intellectual property and
valuable research from United States universities, including
the following:
(A) Dr. Qing Wang was a former employee of the Cleveland
Clinic Foundation. He had received more than $3,000,000 in
grant funding from the National Institutes of Health
(commonly known as ``NIH''). Dr. Wang was charged in a
criminal complaint with knowingly failing to disclose to NIH
that he was Dean of the College of Life Sciences and
Technology at the Huazhong University of Science and
Technology (referred to in this subparagraph as ``HUST'') and
received grant funds from the National Natural Science
Foundation of China for some of the same scientific research
funded by NIH. Dr. Wang also allegedly participated in the
Thousand Talents Program, for which China provided $3,000,000
in research support to enhance the facilities and operations
at HUST. Federal law enforcement agencies arrested Dr. Wang
in May 2020.
(B) Dr. James Patrick Lewis was a tenured professor at West
Virginia University in the physics department from 2006 to
2019. In July 2017, Dr. Lewis entered into a contract of
employment with the PRC through its Global Experts Thousand
Talents Plan. In March 2020, Dr. Lewis pled guilty to 1 count
of Federal program fraud.
(C) Anming Hu, an Associate Professor in the Department of
Mechanical, Aerospace, and Biomedical Engineering at the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville (commonly known as
``UT''), allegedly engaged in a scheme to defraud the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (commonly known
as ``NASA'') by concealing his affiliation with Beijing
University of Technology (referred to in this subparagraph as
``BJUT''). Hu's false representations to UT about his
affiliation with BJUT caused UT to falsely certify to NASA
that UT was in compliance with Federal law. In February 2020,
Mr. Hu was indicted on Federal charges of wire fraud and
false statements.
(D) Dr. Charles Lieber served as the Principal Investigator
of the Lieber Research Group at Harvard University, which
specialized in the area of nanoscience. Dr. Lieber had
received more than $15,000,000 in grant funding from NIH and
the Department of Defense since 2008. Unbeknownst to Harvard
University, beginning in 2011, Lieber allegedly became a
``Strategic Scientist'' at Wuhan University of Technology in
China (referred to in this subparagraph as ``WUT'') and was a
contractual participant in the Thousand Talents Plan from
2012 to 2017. Under the terms of the Thousand Talents
contract, WUT paid Lieber $50,000 per month, paid him living
expenses of up to approximately $158,000, and awarded him
more than $1,500,000 to establish a research lab at WUT. In
return, Lieber was obligated to work for WUT for 9 months per
year. Lieber lied about his involvement with WUT to both
Harvard University and Federal investigators. In January
2020, Lieber was arrested and charged with making a
materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement.
(E) In January 2020, Yanqing Ye, a Chinese national,
Lieutenant of the People's Liberation Army (referred to in
this subparagraph as the ``PLA''), and member of the CCP, was
indicted on visa fraud, false statements, and acting as an
agent of a foreign power without prior notification. Ye
allegedly falsely identified as a student and lied about her
ongoing military service at the National University of
Defense Technology. While studying at Boston University's
Department of Physics, Chemistry, and Biomedical Engineering,
Ye continued to work as a PLA Lieutenant and completed
assignments from PLA officers, including conducting research,
assessing United States military websites, and sending United
States documents and information to China.
[[Page S3361]]
(F) In January 2020, Zaoson Zheng, a Chinese national, was
arrested at Logan Airport in Boston and charged with
attempting to smuggle 21 vials of biological research to
China. Zheng had allegedly entered the United States in 2018
on a J-1 visa and conducted cancer cell research at Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. Zheng admitted he
stole the vials from a lab at Beth Israel, and that he
intended to bring the vials to China, use them to conduct
research in his own laboratory, and publish the results under
his own name.
(G) In December 2019, the Van Andel Research Institute
(referred to in this subparagraph as ``VARI'') reached a
settlement with the Department of Justice to pay $5,500,000
to resolve allegations that it violated the law commonly
known as the False Claims Act (section 3729 through 3733 of
title 31, United States Code) by failing to disclose, in
Federal grant applications and progress reports submitted to
NIH, that the Chinese government funded 2 VARI researchers
through grants. The VARI researchers were receiving research
funding from Chinese sources while VARI was applying for and
receiving NIH funding on their behalf.
(H) In September 2019, Yu Zhou and Li Chen were charged
with crimes related to stealing exosome-related trade
secrets. Zhou and Chen, spouses who worked in separate
medical research labs at the Nationwide Children's Hospital
Research Institute, conspired to steal scientific trade
secrets related to exosomes and exosome isolation from the
Research Institute. The couple allegedly founded a company in
China without the hospital's knowledge. While employed at the
Research Institute, they marketed products and services
related to exosome isolation through their Chinese company.
They also founded an American biotechnology company
advertising products and services related to exosomes
isolation, including a kit developed from a trade secret
created at a Nationwide Children's research lab. They
eventually received more than $876,000 and stock related to
an asset purchase agreement involving the American company.
(I) In August 2019, Feng Tao, an associate professor at
Kansas University, was indicted on Federal charges for
concealing the fact that he was a full-time employee for
Fuzhou University in China while doing research at Kansas
University funded by the United States Government. Tao
allegedly defrauded the United States Government by
unlawfully receiving Federal grant money at the same time
that he was employed and paid by a Chinese research
university.
(J) Weiqiang Zhang, a Chinese national and United States
legal permanent resident, acquired, without authorization,
hundreds of rice seeds produced by his employer, Ventria
Bioscience. Ventria is a Kansas biopharmaceutical research
facility that develops genetically programmed rice to express
recombinant human proteins, which are then extracted for use
in the therapeutic and medical fields. Ventria spent millions
of dollars and years of research developing its seeds and
cost-effective methods to extract the proteins. Ventria used
locked doors with magnetic card readers to restrict access to
the temperature-controlled environment where the seeds were
stored and processed. Zhang worked as a rice breeder for
Ventria. In 2013, personnel from a crop research institute in
China visited Zhang at his home in Kansas. Zhang drove the
visitors to tour facilities in several States. United States
Customs and Border Protection officers found seeds belonging
to Ventria in the luggage of Zhang's visitors as they
prepared to leave the United States for China. In April 2018,
Zhang was sentenced to 121 months in a Federal prison after
having been convicted in February 2017 of 1 count of
conspiracy to steal trade secrets, 1 count of conspiracy to
commit interstate transportation of stolen property, and 1
count of interstate transportation of stolen property.
(16) It remains a national security priority for the United
States to protect the research and innovation developed in
United States colleges and universities from misappropriation
by any country, including the PRC.
SEC. 7502. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'', with respect to
a covered research project, means the head of the covered
agency providing the funding for the covered research
project.
(2) Covered agency.--The term ``covered agency'' means--
(A) the Department of Defense;
(B) the Department of Energy; and
(C) an element of the intelligence community, as defined in
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3003).
(3) Covered country.--The term ``covered country'' means--
(A) the People's Republic of China; and
(B) any other country designated by the Director, based on
findings similar to the findings under subsection (a), which
shall include consideration of--
(i) whether the country poses an existential threat to the
economic interests and national security of the United
States;
(ii) whether the country engages in persistent efforts to
steal sensitive technology and proprietary information from
companies, academic institutions, and other organizations of
the United States through economic espionage and other forms
of nontraditional espionage;
(iii) whether nontraditional forms of espionage serve as
primary tools to further the goals of the country;
(iv) whether the nontraditional forms of espionage
described in clause (iii) include--
(I) talent recruitment programs designed to recruit the
country's nationals to acquire knowledge about--and, often,
steal--valuable and sensitive research at universities and
research institutions abroad;
(II) luring foreign experts to the country to work on key
strategic programs;
(III) using mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures as a
means to gain access to high-level technology;
(IV) using cyber intrusions to steal information; and
(V) using front companies for state-affiliated entities to
acquire export-controlled technology;
(v) whether the country has systematically sought to
identify areas of United States innovation, education, and
technology that could be replicated, stolen, or appropriated;
and
(vi) whether the Office of the United States Trade
Representative has placed the country on the Priority Watch
List.
(4) Covered person.--The term ``covered person'' means an
individual or institution of higher education that has a
financial relationship with--
(A) a covered country;
(B) a political party within a covered country;
(C) a person who acts as an agent, representative,
employee, or servant of a covered country; or
(D) a person who acts in any other capacity at the order or
request, or under the direction or control, of a covered
country.
(5) Covered research project.--The term ``covered research
project'' means a research project at an institution of
higher education--
(A) that is funded in whole or in part by a covered agency;
and
(B) the subject of which is--
(i) an item subject to the Export Control Reform Act of
2018 (20 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.);
(ii) an item listed on the Commerce Control List (commonly
known as the ``CCL'') set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part
774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; or
(iii) an item listed on the United States Munitions List
under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
(6) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
National Intelligence.
(7) Financial relationship.--The term ``financial
relationship'' means--
(A) any arrangement under which compensation is provided,
directly or indirectly, by a covered country, or another
entity or person described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D)
of paragraph (4), to--
(i) a covered person; or
(ii) an institution of higher education; or
(B) any direct or indirect ownership or investment interest
by a covered country, or another entity or person described
in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (4), in an
institution of higher education.
(8) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the
term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).
SEC. 7503. APPROVAL OF COVERED PERSONS IN SENSITIVE
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED RESEARCH PROJECTS.
(a) Approval Required.--
(1) In general.--A covered person may not participate in a
covered research project unless the covered person applies
for and receives approval from the agency head to
participate.
(2) Requirements.--An agency head may not approve a covered
person to participate in a covered research project unless
the agency head--
(A) performs a background check on the covered person in
consultation with the Director; and
(B) collects any other relevant information about the
covered person that the agency head determines appropriate,
except any information pertaining to United States persons
that the agency head is prohibited by law from collecting.
(b) Penalty.--If an agency head determines that a covered
person participating in a covered research project commenced
on the date of enactment of this section has violated
subsection (a), the agency head may--
(1) impose a probationary period, not to exceed 6 months,
on the head of the project or the project;
(2) reduce, limit, or eliminate the funding for the project
until the violation is remedied;
(3) permanently eliminate the funding for the project; or
(4) take any other action determined appropriate by the
agency head.
SEC. 7504. DISCLOSURE OF RESEARCH ASSISTANCE FROM FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 45 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 951 the
following:
``Sec. 951A. Disclosure of research assistance from foreign
governments
``(a) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the terms `agent of a foreign principal' and `foreign
principal' have the meanings given those terms in section 1
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended
(22 U.S.C. 611);
``(2) the term `covered research project' has the meaning
given the term in section 7502 of the Combating Chinese
Purloining of Trade Secrets Act; and
[[Page S3362]]
``(3) the term `institution of higher education' has the
meaning given the term in section 101 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
``(b) Funding and Other Assistance.--
``(1) Failure to disclose foreign funding.--
``(A) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for a person, while
applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an
agency of the United States for a covered research project,
to knowingly and willfully fail to disclose to the agency any
grant or other funding that the person has received or will
receive for the same project from a foreign principal or an
agent of a foreign principal, including through an
intermediary.
``(B) Penalty.--Any person who violates subparagraph (A)
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than
3 years, or both.
``(2) Failure to disclose material facts.--
``(A) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for a person, while
applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an
agency of the United States for a covered research project,
to knowingly and willfully fail to disclose to the agency a
material fact relating to a connection between a foreign
country and the project that might substantially impact the
decision of the agency to provide funding to the project,
including the fact that a person providing any assistance,
including financial assistance, to the project is--
``(i) a national of a foreign country;
``(ii) affiliated with an institution comparable to an
institution of higher education of higher learning, or
another organization, that is headquartered in or
substantially funded by a foreign country; or
``(iii) engaging in research activities for the project in
a foreign country.
``(B) Penalty.--Any person who violates subparagraph (A)
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than
1 year, or both.
``(3) Institutions of higher education.--Any institution of
higher education that knowingly and willfully fails to
disclose to the appropriate agency of the United States that
an officer, agent, or employee of the institution of higher
education violated this subsection shall be fined not more
than $1,000,000 for each such violation.
``(c) Transmission of Information.--
``(1) Offense.--It shall be unlawful for any person, while
applying for or accepting a grant or other funding from an
agency of the United States for a covered research project,
to knowingly transmit or attempt to transmit information
gained in violation of a contract to which the person is a
party, including a contract regarding nondisclosure of
information, employment, or the provision of goods or
services, intending or knowing that the transmission will
benefit a foreign principal or an agent of a foreign
principal.
``(2) Penalty.--Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall
be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10
years, or both.''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of
sections for chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 950
the following:
``951A. Disclosure of research assistance from foreign governments.''.
______