[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 19, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3100-S3110]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 1577. Mr. MANCHIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed 
to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. Schumer to the bill S. 1260, to 
establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the 
National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub 
program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, 
science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to 
establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other 
purposes;

[[Page S3101]]

which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

        Beginning on page 683, strike line 1 and all that follows 
     through ``as applicable'' on page 776, line 1, and insert the 
     following:
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
     Resources of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
     the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 3112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY 
                   INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should initiate collaboration among 
     governments, the private sector, and civil society to 
     encourage the adoption of the standards for quality global 
     infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 
     2018, including with respect to the following issues:
       (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which 
     infrastructure investments are made.
       (2) Anti-corruption.
       (3) Rule of law.
       (4) Human rights and labor rights.
       (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
       (6) Social and governance safeguards.
       (7) Transparency.
       (8) Environmental and energy standards.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should launch a series of fora around the 
     world showcasing the commitment of the United States and 
     partners of the United States to high-quality development 
     cooperation, including with respect to the issues described 
     in subsection (a).

     SEC. 3113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.

       (a) Findings.--The Global Infrastructure Coordinating 
     Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of 
     the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the 
     Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the 
     Department of Transportation, the United States Agency for 
     International Development, the United States Trade and 
     Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, the 
     Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other agencies 
     to catalyze private sector investments around the world and 
     to coordinate the deployment of United States Government 
     technical assistance and development finance tools, including 
     project preparation services and commercial advocacy.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the world's infrastructure needs, including in the 
     transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and growing;
       (2) total or partial ownership or acquisition of, or a 
     significant financial stake or physical presence in, certain 
     types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G 
     telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide 
     an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and 
     values of the United States and its allies and partners, and 
     could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of 
     the United States and its allies and partners;
       (3) the United States must continue to prioritize support 
     for infrastructure projects that are physically secure, 
     financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially 
     responsible;
       (4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph (3) 
     requires the coordination of all United States Government 
     economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are 
     deployed in a way to maximize United States interests and 
     that of its allies and partners;
       (5) the GICC represents an important and concrete step 
     towards better communication and coordination across the 
     United States Government of economic tools relevant to 
     supporting infrastructure that is physically secure, 
     financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially 
     responsible, and should be continued; and
       (6) the executive branch and Congress should have 
     consistent consultations on United States support for 
     strategic infrastructure projects, including how Congress can 
     support such initiatives in the future.
       (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually 
     thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with other Federal agencies that participate in 
     the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report that identifies--
       (1) current, pending, and future infrastructure projects, 
     particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, 
     that the United States is supporting or will support through 
     financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other 
     means;
       (2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner 
     country interests served by the United States providing 
     support to such projects; and
       (3) a detailed description of any support provided by other 
     United States allies and partners to such projects.
       (d) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 3114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.

       (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
     establish an initiative, to be known as the ``Infrastructure 
     Transaction and Assistance Network'', under which the 
     Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant 
     Federal agencies, including those represented on the Global 
     Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may carry out various 
     programs to advance the development of sustainable, 
     transparent, and high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-
     Pacific region by--
       (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve 
     project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement 
     environments, and project preparation capacity of countries 
     that are partners of the United States in such development;
       (2) providing transaction advisory services and project 
     preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; 
     and
       (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance 
     for the development of infrastructure, including 
     infrastructure that utilizes United States-manufactured goods 
     and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private 
     sector.
       (b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the 
     ``Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network'' 
     described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is 
     authorized to provide support, including through the 
     Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help 
     boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts 
     and assess the financial and environmental impacts of 
     potential infrastructure projects, including through 
     providing services such as--
       (1) legal services;
       (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
       (3) debt sustainability analyses;
       (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
       (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of 
     sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
       (c) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.----
       (1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
     Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under 
     subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to 
     provide support, including through the Strategic 
     Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project 
     preparation, pipeline development, and other infrastructure 
     project support.
       (2) Joint infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized for 
     the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in 
     coordination with the Department of Defense, the 
     International Development Finance Corporation, like-minded 
     donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to 
     support joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific 
     region.
       (3) Strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized 
     for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to 
     support strategic infrastructure projects that are in the 
     national security interest of the United States and 
     vulnerable to strategic competitors.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, 
     $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance 
     Network, of which $20,000,000 is to be provided for the 
     Transaction Advisory Fund.

     SEC. 3115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY 
                   INFRASTRUCTURE.

       (a) In General.--The President shall direct a 
     comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in 
     consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory 
     lending and financing by the Government of the People's 
     Republic of China, including support to companies 
     incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in 
     the energy sectors of developing countries.
       (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs 
     and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the 
     presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and 
     other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals 
     providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including 
     direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial 
     institutions, or direct state support to state-owned 
     enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
       (2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, 
     and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand 
     the development and deployment of advanced energy 
     technologies in developing countries;
       (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other 
     financial products on terms that advance domestic economic 
     and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy 
     technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when 
     appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending 
     products as alternatives to the predatory lending tools 
     offered by Chinese financial institutions;
       (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international 
     financial and multilateral institutions to leverage 
     investment in advanced energy technologies in developing 
     countries; and
       (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
     cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with 
     countries of strategic significance, particularly in the 
     Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy 
     engagement by the PRC through predatory lending or other 
     actions that negatively impact other countries.
       (c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of

[[Page S3102]]

     State and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a United States 
     Government strategy to increase United States exports of 
     advanced energy technologies to--
       (1) improve energy security in allied and developing 
     countries;
       (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent 
     energy markets;
       (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading 
     relationships; and
       (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

     SEC. 3116. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S 
                   INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

       (a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five 
     years, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
     International Development, in consultation with the Secretary 
     of State through the Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources 
     and the Assistant Secretary for the Office of International 
     Affairs of the Department of Energy, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that--
       (1) identifies priority countries for deepening United 
     States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the 
     economic and national security interests of the United States 
     and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
       (2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and 
     companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, 
     operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation 
     facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources 
     in the countries identified in paragraph (1);
       (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
     implications for United States national interests and the 
     interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with 
     respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing 
     country energy production or transmission; and
       (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United 
     States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph 
     (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between 
     the United States and such countries.
       (b) Publication.--The assessment required in subsection (a) 
     shall be published on the United States Agency for 
     International Development's website.

            Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity

     SEC. 3121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

       (a) Leadership in International Standards Setting.--It is 
     the sense of Congress that the United States must lead in 
     international bodies that set the governance norms and rules 
     for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to 
     ensure that these technologies operate within a free, secure, 
     interoperable, and stable digital domain.
       (b) Countering Digital Authoritarianism.--It is the sense 
     of Congress that the United States, along with allies and 
     partners, should lead an international effort that utilizes 
     all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to 
     combat the expanding use of information and communications 
     technology products and services to surveil, repress, and 
     manipulate populations (also known as ``digital 
     authoritarianism'').
       (c) Negotiations for Digital Trade Agreements or 
     Arrangements.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
     States Trade Representative should negotiate bilateral and 
     plurilateral agreements or arrangements relating to digital 
     goods with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member 
     countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and 
     other nations, as appropriate.
       (d) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the 
     sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global 
     effort to ensure that freedom of information, including the 
     ability to safely consume or publish information without fear 
     of undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain 
     becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for communication.
       (e) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not 
     Threaten Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the 
     sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global 
     effort to develop and adopt a set of common principles and 
     standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of 
     such technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether 
     they are governments or other entities, and that they do not 
     threaten democratic governance or human rights.
       (f) Formation of Digital Technology Trade Alliance.--It is 
     the sense of Congress that the United States should examine 
     opportunities for diplomatic negotiations regarding the 
     formation of mutually beneficial alliances relating to 
     digitally-enabled technologies and services.

     SEC. 3122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 
                   PARTNERSHIP.

       (a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--
     The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, 
     to be known as the ``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity 
     Partnership'' to help foreign countries--
       (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital 
     infrastructure in emerging markets;
       (2) protect technological assets, including data;
       (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and 
     encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, 
     the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet 
     governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and 
     communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;
       (4) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services 
     and increase United States company market share in target 
     markets;
       (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply 
     chain services to be less reliant on PRC imports; and
       (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, 
     and promote best practices for a national approach to 
     cybersecurity.
       (b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an 
     implementation plan for the coming year to advance the goals 
     identified in subsection (a).
       (c) Consultation.--In developing the action plan required 
     by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult 
     with--
       (1) the appropriate congressional committees;
       (2) leaders of the United States industry;
       (3) other relevant technology experts, including the Open 
     Technology Fund;
       (4) representatives from relevant United States Government 
     agencies; and
       (5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
       (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall 
     provide the appropriate congressional committees a briefing 
     on the implementation of the plan required by subsection (b).
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
     through 2026 to carry out this section.

     SEC. 3123. STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES 
                   INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the United States International 
     Development Finance Corporation, in consultation with the 
     Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
     Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a strategy for support of private sector digital 
     investment that--
       (1) includes support for information-connectivity projects, 
     including projects relating to telecommunications equipment, 
     mobile payments, smart cities, and undersea cables;
       (2) in providing such support, prioritizes private sector 
     projects--
       (A) of strategic value to the United States;
       (B) of mutual strategic value to the United States and 
     allies and partners of the United States; and
       (C) that will advance broader development priorities of the 
     United States;
       (3) helps to bridge the digital gap in less developed 
     countries and among women and minority communities within 
     those countries;
       (4) facilitates coordination, where appropriate, with 
     multilateral development banks and development finance 
     institutions of other countries with respect to projects 
     described in paragraph (1), including through the provision 
     of co-financing and co-guarantees; and
       (5) identifies the human and financial resources available 
     to dedicate to such projects and assesses any constraints to 
     implementing such projects.
       (b) Limitation.--
       (1) In general.--The Corporation may not provide support 
     for projects in which entities described in paragraph (2) 
     participate.
       (2) Entities described.--An entity described in this 
     subparagraph is an entity based in, or owned or controlled by 
     the government of, a country, including the People's Republic 
     of China, that does not protect internet freedom of 
     expression and privacy.

    Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence

     SECTION 3131. SHORT TITLE.

       This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering Chinese 
     Communist Party Malign Influence Act''.

     SEC. 3132. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING 
                   CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.

       (a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
     through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to 
     counter the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party 
     globally. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization 
     are authorized to remain available until expended and shall 
     be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be 
     appropriated to counter such influence.
       (b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds 
     appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the 
     malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally 
     shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent 
     with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

[[Page S3103]]

       (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
       (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
     existing senior official of the Department at the rank of 
     Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, 
     coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds 
     authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
       (2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
       (A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific 
     strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by subsection (a), such as geographic areas of 
     focus or functional categories of programming that funds are 
     to be concentrated within, consistent with the national 
     interests of the United States and the purposes of this 
     division;
       (B) the coordination and approval of all programming 
     conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
     subsection (a), based on a determination that such 
     programming directly counters the malign influence of the 
     Chinese Communist Party, including specific activities or 
     policies advanced by the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to 
     the strategic objectives of the United States, as established 
     in the 2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National 
     Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and regional 
     strategies as appropriate;
       (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a 
     sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese 
     Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres to 
     the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and
       (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the 
     effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure 
     that it advances United States interests and degrades the 
     ability of the Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities 
     that align with subsection (d) of this section.
       (3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official 
     designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating 
     and approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek 
     to--
       (A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; and
       (B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all 
     approved programming functions in concert with other Federal 
     activities to counter the malign influence and activities of 
     the Chinese Communist Party.
       (4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United 
     States Agency for International Development shall designate a 
     senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or 
     above to assist and consult with the senior official 
     designated pursuant to paragraph (1).
       (d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign 
     influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party 
     should be construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese 
     Communist Party or entities acting on its behalf that--
       (1) undermine a free and open international order;
       (2) advance an alternative, repressive international order 
     that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic 
     ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency;
       (3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the 
     United States or other countries; or
       (4) undermine the economic security of the United States or 
     other countries, including by promoting corruption.
       (e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section, 
     countering malign influence through the use of funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall include 
     efforts to--
       (1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce 
     corruption, including in governance structures targeted by 
     the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;
       (2) support civil society and independent media to raise 
     awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative 
     impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative 
     and associated initiatives;
       (3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, 
     or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese 
     Communist Party;
       (4) encourage economic development structures that help 
     protect against predatory lending schemes, including support 
     for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such 
     as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
       (5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the 
     security forces of the People's Republic of China;
       (6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese 
     Communist Party's propaganda, including through programs 
     carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and
       (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to 
     legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance 
     models.

     SEC. 3133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE AND MALIGN 
                   INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In the report to Congress required under section 
     1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), the President 
     laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China and its agents 
     and entities, including--
       (A) propaganda and disinformation, in which ``Beijing 
     communicates its narrative through state-run television, 
     print, radio, and online organizations whose presence is 
     proliferating in the United States and around the world'';
       (B) malign political influence operations, particularly 
     ``front organizations and agents which target businesses, 
     universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local 
     state and Federal officials in the United States and around 
     the world, attempting to influence discourse''; and
       (C) malign financial influence operations, characterized as 
     the ``misappropriation of technology and intellectual 
     property, failure to appropriately disclose relationships 
     with foreign government sponsored entities, breaches of 
     contract and confidentiality, and manipulation of processes 
     for fair and merit-based allocation of Federal research and 
     development funding''.
       (2) Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
     operations are ongoing. In January 2019, then-Director of 
     National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, ``China will 
     continue to use legal, political, and economic levers--such 
     as the lure of Chinese markets--to shape the information 
     environment. It is also capable of using cyber attacks 
     against systems in the United States to censor or suppress 
     viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.''.
       (3) In February 2020, then-Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     that the People's Republic of China has ``very active 
     [malign] foreign influence efforts in this country,'' with 
     the goal of ``trying to shift our policy and our public 
     opinion to be more pro-China on a variety of issues''.
       (4) The PRC's information warfare and malign influence 
     operations continue to adopt new tactics and evolve in 
     sophistication. In May 2020, then-Special Envoy and 
     Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea 
     Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian and 
     Chinese narratives surrounding COVID-19 and that the GEC had 
     ``uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts'' 
     that it assessed was ``created with the intent to amplify 
     Chinese propaganda and disinformation''. In June 2020, Google 
     reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email 
     accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential candidate.
       (5) Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
     operations are a threat to the national security, democracy, 
     and economic systems of the United States and its allies and 
     partners. In October 2018, Vice President Michael R. Pence 
     warned that ``Beijing is employing a whole-of-government 
     approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as 
     well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its 
     interests in the United States.''.
       (6) In February 2018, then-Director of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People's 
     Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the 
     open research and development environments of United States 
     institutions of higher education to utilize ``professors, 
     scientists and students'' as ``nontraditional collectors'' of 
     information.
       (b) Presidential Duties.--The President shall--
       (1) protect our democratic institutions and processes from 
     malign influence from the People's Republic of China and 
     other foreign adversaries; and
       (2) consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1), 
     direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and 
     agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter 
     PRC and other foreign information warfare and malign 
     influence operations without delay, including--
       (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), 
     which authorizes a coordinator position within the National 
     Security Council for countering malign foreign influence 
     operations and campaigns;
       (B) section 228 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92), which authorizes 
     additional research of foreign malign influence operations on 
     social media platforms;
       (C) section 847 of such Act, which requires the Secretary 
     of Defense to modify contracting regulations regarding 
     vetting for foreign ownership, control and influence in order 
     to mitigate risks from malign foreign influence;
       (D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires an update of 
     the comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of malign 
     influence to include the People's Republic of China;
       (E) section 5323 of such Act, which authorizes the Director 
     of National Intelligence to facilitate the establishment of 
     Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center to detect and 
     study information warfare and malign influence operations 
     across social media platforms; and
       (F) section 119C of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the establishment of a Foreign 
     Malign Influence Response Center inside the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence.

[[Page S3104]]

  


     SEC. 3134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-
                   HAYS PROGRAM.

       There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year 
     period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote 
     education, training, research, and foreign language skills 
     through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with 
     section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural 
     Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

     SEC. 3135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND 
                   DISCRIMINATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and 
     discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have 
     risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations 
     Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic 
     continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 
     scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to 
     ``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against 
     the virus of hate''.
       (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make 
     up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines 
     of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all 
     essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI 
     workers also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 
     percent based on sector--of the biomedical field.
       (3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian 
     descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States 
     population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
     growing racial group in the United States, projected to 
     represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent 
     and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in 
     the United States and around the world have no place in a 
     peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
       (2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud 
     tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of 
     the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic 
     backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian 
     Americans and Pacific Islanders;
       (3) the United States Government should encourage other 
     foreign governments to use the official and scientific names 
     for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health 
     Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and 
     Prevention; and
       (4) the United States Government and other governments 
     around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, 
     and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the 
     spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

     SEC. 3136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING 
                   DISINFORMATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The PRC is increasing its spending on public diplomacy 
     including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments 
     into state-sponsored media publications outside of the PRC. 
     These include, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in 
     foreign direct investment in communications infrastructure, 
     platforms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to 
     the PRC for training programs.
       (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the United Front 
     Work Department (UFWD), and UFWD's many affiliates and 
     proxies, has obtained unfettered access to radio, television, 
     and digital dissemination platforms in numerous languages 
     targeted at citizens in other regions where the PRC has an 
     interest in promoting public sentiment in support of the 
     Chinese Communist Party and expanding the reach of its 
     misleading narratives and propaganda.
       (3) Even in Western democracies, the PRC spends extensively 
     on influence operations, such as a $500,000,000 advertising 
     campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and a more 
     than $20,000,000 campaign to influence United States public 
     opinion via the China Daily newspaper supplement.
       (4) Radio Free Asia (referred to in this subsection as 
     ``RFA''), a private nonprofit multimedia news corporation, 
     which broadcasts in 9 East Asian languages including 
     Mandarin, Uyghur, Cantonese, and Tibetan, has succeeded in 
     its mission to reach audiences in China and in the Central 
     Asia region despite the Chinese Government's--
       (A) efforts to practice ``media sovereignty,'' which 
     restricts access to the free press within China; and
       (B) campaign to spread disinformation to countries abroad.
       (5) In 2019, RFA's Uyghur Service alerted the world to the 
     human rights abuses of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in 
     China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
       (6) Gulchehra Hoja, a Uyghur journalist for RFA, received 
     the International Women's Media Foundation's Courage in 
     Journalism Award and a 2019 Magnitsky Human Rights Award for 
     her coverage of Xinjiang, while the Chinese Government 
     detained and harassed Ms. Hoja's China-based family and the 
     families of 7 other RFA journalists in retaliation for their 
     role in exposing abuses.
       (7) In 2019 and 2020, RFA provided widely disseminated 
     print and digital coverage of the decline in freedom in Hong 
     Kong and the student-led protests of the extradition law.
       (8) In March 2020, RFA exposed efforts by the Chinese 
     Government to underreport the number of fatalities from the 
     novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan Province, China.
       (b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United 
     States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal 
     and non-Federal entities shall undertake the following 
     actions to support independent journalism, counter 
     disinformation, and combat surveillance in countries where 
     the Chinese Communist Party and other malign actors are 
     promoting disinformation, propaganda, and manipulated media 
     markets:
       (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand domestic coverage 
     and digital programming for all RFA China services and other 
     affiliate language broadcasting services.
       (2) USAGM shall increase funding for RFA's Mandarin, 
     Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language services.
       (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time 
     disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian 
     language propaganda and misinformation.
       (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership 
     programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative 
     reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help 
     expose and counter false CCP narratives.
       (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and expand its 
     work to support tools and technology to circumvent censorship 
     and surveillance by the CCP, both inside the PRC as well as 
     abroad where the PRC has exported censorship technology, and 
     increase secure peer-to-peer connectivity and privacy tools.
       (6) Voice of America shall continue and review 
     opportunities to expand its mission of providing timely, 
     accurate, and reliable news, programming, and content about 
     the United States, including news, culture, and values.
       (7) The networks and grantees of the United States Agency 
     for Global Media shall continue their mission of providing 
     credible and timely news coverage inclusive of the People's 
     Republic of China's activities in Xinjiang, including China's 
     ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity with respect to 
     Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including through strategic 
     amplification of Radio Free Asia's coverage, in its news 
     programming in majority-Muslim countries.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
     2026 for the United States Agency for Global Media, 
     $100,000,000 for ongoing and new programs to support local 
     media, build independent media, combat Chinese disinformation 
     inside and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert 
     censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs, of 
     which--
       (1) not less than $70,000,000 shall be directed to a grant 
     to Radio Free Asia language services;
       (2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be used to serve 
     populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and 
     Tibetan language services; and
       (3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be used for digital 
     media services--
       (A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese populations in 
     foreign countries; and
       (B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in China 
     through ``Global Mandarin'' programming.
       (d) Reporting Requirement.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
     years, the Chief Executive Office of the United States Agency 
     for Global Media, in consultation with the President of the 
     Open Technology Fund, shall submit a report to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that outlines--
       (A) the amount of funding appropriated pursuant to 
     subsection (c) that was provided to the Open Technology Fund 
     for purposes of circumventing Chinese Communist Party 
     censorship of the internet within the borders of the People's 
     Republic of China;
       (B) the progress that has been made in developing the 
     technology referred to in subparagraph (A), including an 
     assessment of whether the funding provided was sufficient to 
     achieve meaningful penetration of People's Republic of 
     China's censors; and
       (C) the impact of Open Technology Fund tools on piercing 
     Chinese Communist Party internet censorship efforts, 
     including the metrics used to measure that impact and the 
     trajectory of that impact over the previous 5 years.
       (2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.
       (e) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, 
     acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for 
     Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination with 
     the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
     International Development, shall support and train 
     journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure 
     public accountability related to the Belt and Road 
     Initiative, the PRC's surveillance and digital export of 
     technology, and other influence operations abroad direct or 
     directly supported by the Communist Party or the Chinese 
     government.
       (f) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, 
     Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet 
     freedom programs.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated to the

[[Page S3105]]

     Department of State, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
     2026, $170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of 
     press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

     SEC. 3137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

       (a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement 
     Center to ``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the 
     Federal Government to ``recognize, understand, expose, and 
     counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and 
     disinformation globally''.
       (b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) 
     is amended by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting ``December 
     31, 2027''.
       (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating 
     capacity through the exchange of liaison officers with 
     Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of 
     identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including 
     the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the 
     Director of National Intelligence and from combatant 
     commands.
       (d) Hiring Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Secretary of State, during the five year period 
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and solely 
     to carry out functions of the Global Engagement Center, may--
       (1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of 
     title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the 
     competitive service; and
       (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without 
     regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such 
     title regarding classification and General Schedule pay 
     rates.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the 
     Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-
     state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.

     SEC. 3138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
                   UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND 
                   CONTRACTS WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER 
                   EDUCATION.

       (a) Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950.--
       (1) Definition of covered transaction.--Subsection (a)(4) 
     of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 
     U.S.C. 4565) is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) in clause (i), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iii) any transaction described in subparagraph (B)(vi) 
     proposed or pending after the date of the enactment of the 
     China Strategic Competition Act of 2021.'';
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(vi) Any gift to an institution of higher education from 
     a foreign person, or the entry into a contract by such an 
     institution with a foreign person, if--

       ``(I)(aa) the value of the gift or contract equals or 
     exceeds $1,000,000; or
       ``(bb) the institution receives, directly or indirectly, 
     more than one gift from or enters into more than one 
     contract, directly or indirectly, with the same foreign 
     person for the same purpose the aggregate value of which, 
     during the period of 2 consecutive calendar years, equals or 
     exceeds $1,000,000; and
       ``(II) the gift or contract--

       ``(aa) relates to research, development, or production of 
     critical technologies and provides the foreign person 
     potential access to any material nonpublic technical 
     information (as defined in subparagraph (D)(ii)) in the 
     possession of the institution; or
       ``(bb) is a restricted or conditional gift or contract (as 
     defined in section 117(h) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
     (20 U.S.C. 1011f(h))) that establishes control.''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(G) Foreign gifts to and contracts with institutions of 
     higher education.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):
       ``(i) Contract.--The term `contract' means any agreement 
     for the acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of property 
     or services by a foreign person, for the direct benefit or 
     use of either of the parties.
       ``(ii) Gift.--The term `gift' means any gift of money or 
     property.
       ``(iii) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     `institution of higher education' means any institution, 
     public or private, or, if a multicampus institution, any 
     single campus of such institution, in any State--

       ``(I) that is legally authorized within such State to 
     provide a program of education beyond secondary school;
       ``(II) that provides a program for which the institution 
     awards a bachelor's degree (or provides not less than a 2-
     year program which is acceptable for full credit toward such 
     a degree) or a more advanced degree;
       ``(III) that is accredited by a nationally recognized 
     accrediting agency or association; and
       ``(IV) to which the Federal Government extends Federal 
     financial assistance (directly or indirectly through another 
     entity or person), or that receives support from the 
     extension of Federal financial assistance to any of the 
     institution's subunits.''.

       (2) Mandatory declarations.--Subsection 
     (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at 
     the end the following: ``Such regulations shall require a 
     declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered 
     transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).''.
       (3) Factors to be considered.--Subsection (f) of such 
     section is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (10), by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
     a semicolon;
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph (12); and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the following:
       ``(11) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to 
     covered transactions described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi), 
     the importance of academic freedom at institutions of higher 
     education in the United States; and''.
       (4) Membership of cfius.--Subsection (k) of such section is 
     amended--
       (A) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), (I), and (J) as 
     subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K), respectively; and
       (ii) by inserting after subparagraph (G) the following:
       ``(H) In the case of a covered transaction involving an 
     institution of higher education (as defined in subsection 
     (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of Education.''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(8) Inclusion of other agencies on committee.--In 
     considering including on the Committee under paragraph (2)(K) 
     the heads of other executive departments, agencies, or 
     offices, the President shall give due consideration to the 
     heads of relevant research and science agencies, departments, 
     and offices, including the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, 
     and the Director of the National Science Foundation.''.
       (5) Contents of annual report relating to critical 
     technologies.--Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) an evaluation of whether there are foreign malign 
     influence or espionage activities directed or directly 
     assisted by foreign governments against institutions of 
     higher education (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed 
     at obtaining research and development methods or secrets 
     related to critical technologies; and
       ``(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation for any changes 
     to, reviews conducted under this section that relate to 
     institutions of higher education, based on an analysis of 
     disclosure reports submitted to the chairperson under section 
     117(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     1011f(a)).''.
       (b) Inclusion of CFIUS in Reporting on Foreign Gifts Under 
     Higher Education Act of 1965.--Section 117 of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after ``the Secretary'' 
     the following: ``and the Secretary of the Treasury (in the 
     capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the Committee 
     on Foreign Investment in the United States under section 
     721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
     4565(k)(3)))''; and
       (2) in subsection (d)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``with the Secretary'' and inserting ``with 
     the Secretary and the Secretary of the Treasury''; and
       (ii) by striking ``to the Secretary'' and inserting ``to 
     each such Secretary''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``with the Secretary'' 
     and inserting ``with the Secretary and the Secretary of the 
     Treasury''.
       (c) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendments made by 
     subsection (a) shall--
       (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and (e); and
       (2) apply with respect to any covered transaction the 
     review or investigation of which is initiated under section 
     721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after the 
     date that is 30 days after the publication in the Federal 
     Register of the notice required under subsection (e)(2).
       (d) Regulations.--
       (1) In general.--The Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
     United States (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Committee''), which shall include the Secretary of 
     Education for purposes of this subsection, shall prescribe 
     regulations as necessary and appropriate to implement the 
     amendments made by subsection (a).
       (2) Elements.--The regulations prescribed under paragraph 
     (1) shall include--
       (A) regulations accounting for the burden on institutions 
     of higher education likely to result from compliance with the 
     amendments made by subsection (a), including structuring 
     penalties and filing fees to reduce such burdens, shortening 
     timelines for reviews and investigations, allowing for 
     simplified and streamlined declaration and notice 
     requirements, and implementing any procedures necessary to 
     protect academic freedom; and
       (B) guidance with respect to--
       (i) which gifts and contracts described in described in 
     clause (vi)(II)(aa) of subsection (a)(4)(B) of section 721 of 
     the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection 
     (a)(1), would be subject to filing mandatory declarations 
     under subsection (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV) of that section; and
       (ii) the meaning of ``control'', as defined in subsection 
     (a) of that section, as that term applies to covered 
     transactions described in

[[Page S3106]]

     clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that section, as added by 
     subsection (a)(1).
       (3) Issuance of final rule.--The Committee shall issue a 
     final rule to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a) 
     after assessing the findings of the pilot program required by 
     subsection (e).
       (e) Pilot Program.--
       (1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is 30 days 
     after the publication in the Federal Register of the matter 
     required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 570 
     days thereafter, the Committee shall conduct a pilot program 
     to assess methods for implementing the review of covered 
     transactions described in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) 
     of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection 
     (a)(1).
       (2) Proposed determination.--Not later than 270 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee shall, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish in 
     the Federal Register--
       (A) a proposed determination of the scope of and procedures 
     for the pilot program required by paragraph (1);
       (B) an assessment of the burden on institutions of higher 
     education likely to result from compliance with the pilot 
     program;
       (C) recommendations for addressing any such burdens, 
     including shortening timelines for reviews and 
     investigations, structuring penalties and filing fees, and 
     simplifying and streamlining declaration and notice 
     requirements to reduce such burdens; and
       (D) any procedures necessary to ensure that the pilot 
     program does not infringe upon academic freedom.
       (3) Report on findings.--Upon conclusion of the pilot 
     program required by paragraph (1), the Committee shall submit 
     to Congress a report on the findings of that pilot program 
     that includes--
       (A) a summary of the reviews conducted by the Committee 
     under the pilot program and the outcome of such reviews;
       (B) an assessment of any additional resources required by 
     the Committee to carry out this section or the amendments 
     made by subsection (a);
       (C) findings regarding the additional burden on 
     institutions of higher education likely to result from 
     compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a) and any 
     additional recommended steps to reduce those burdens; and
       (D) any recommendations for Congress to consider regarding 
     the scope or procedures described in this section or the 
     amendments made by subsection (a).

     SEC. 3139. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SENATE-CONFIRMED 
                   OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) Congress and the executive branch have recognized the 
     importance of preventing and mitigating the potential for 
     conflicts of interest following government service, including 
     with respect to senior United States officials working on 
     behalf of foreign governments; and
       (2) Congress and the executive branch should jointly 
     evaluate the status and scope of post-employment 
     restrictions.
       (b) Restrictions.--Section 841 of the State Department 
     Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) Extended Post-employment Restrictions for Certain 
     Senate-confirmed Officials.--
       ``(1) Secretary of state and deputy secretary of state.--
     With respect to a person serving as the Secretary of State or 
     Deputy Secretary of State, the restrictions described in 
     section 207(f)(1) of title 18, United States Code, shall 
     apply to representing, aiding, or advising a foreign 
     governmental entity before an officer or employee of the 
     executive branch of the United States at any time after the 
     termination of that person's service as Secretary or Deputy 
     Secretary.
       ``(2) Under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and 
     ambassadors.--With respect to a person serving as an Under 
     Secretary, Assistant Secretary, or Ambassador at the 
     Department of State or the United States Permanent 
     Representative to the United Nations, the restrictions 
     described in section 207(f)(1) of title 18, United States 
     Code, shall apply to representing, aiding, or advising a 
     foreign governmental entity before an officer or employee of 
     the executive branch of the United States for 3 years after 
     the termination of that person's service in a position 
     described in this paragraph, or the duration of the term or 
     terms of the President who appointed that person to their 
     position, whichever is longer.
       ``(3) Penalties and injunctions.--Any violations of the 
     restrictions in paragraphs (1) or (2) shall be subject to the 
     penalties and injunctions provided for under section 216 of 
     title 18, United States Code.
       ``(4) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       `` ``(A) The term `foreign governmental entity' includes 
     any person employed by--
       ``(i) any department, agency, or other entity of a foreign 
     government at the national, regional, or local level;
       ``(ii) any governing party or coalition of a foreign 
     government at the national, regional, or local level; or
       ``(iii) any entity majority-owned or majority-controlled by 
     a foreign government at the national, regional, or local 
     level.
       ``(B) The term `representation' does not include 
     representation by an attorney, who is duly licensed and 
     authorized to provide legal advice in a United States 
     jurisdiction, of a person or entity in a legal capacity or 
     for the purposes of rendering legal advice.
       ``(5) Effective date.--The restrictions in this subsection 
     shall apply only to persons who are appointed by the 
     President to the positions referenced in this subsection on 
     or after 120 days after the date of the enactment of the 
     Strategic Competition Act of 2021.
       ``(6) Notice of restrictions.--Any person subject to the 
     restrictions of this subsection shall be provided notice of 
     these restrictions by the Department of State upon 
     appointment by the President, and subsequently upon 
     termination of service with the Department of State.''.

     SEC. 3140. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITIZING NOMINATION OF 
                   QUALIFIED AMBASSADORS TO ENSURE PROPER 
                   DIPLOMATIC POSITIONING TO COUNTER CHINESE 
                   INFLUENCE.

       It is the sense of Congress that it is critically important 
     for the President to nominate qualified ambassadors as 
     quickly as possible, especially for countries in Central and 
     South America, to ensure that the United States is 
     diplomatically positioned to counter Chinese influence 
     efforts in foreign countries.

     SEC. 3141. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Qualified research entity.--The term ``qualified 
     research entity'' means an entity that--
       (A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a federally 
     funded research and development center;
       (B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability to 
     write the report required under subsection (c); and
       (C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other 
     entanglements, which could undermine the independence of such 
     report or create a conflict of interest or the appearance of 
     a conflict of interest, with--
       (i) the Government of the People's Republic of China;
       (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
       (iii) any company incorporated in the People's Republic of 
     China or a subsidiary of such company; or
       (iv) any company or entity incorporated outside of the 
     People's Republic of China that is believed to have a 
     substantial financial or commercial interest in the People's 
     Republic of China.
       (2) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.
       (b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
     interagency task force, which shall be known as the ``China 
     Censorship Monitor and Action Group'' (referred to in this 
     subsection as the ``Task Force'').
       (2) Membership.--The President shall--
       (A) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the 
     staff of the National Security Council;
       (B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the 
     staff of the National Economic Council; and
       (C) direct the head of each of the following executive 
     branch agencies to appoint personnel to participate in the 
     Task Force:
       (i) The Department of State.
       (ii) The Department of Commerce.
       (iii) The Department of the Treasury.
       (iv) The Department of Justice.
       (v) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.
       (vi) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
     and other appropriate elements of the intelligence community 
     (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
       (vii) The Federal Communications Commission.
       (viii) The United States Agency for Global Media.
       (ix) Other agencies designated by the President.
       (3) Responsibilities.--The Task Force shall--
       (A) oversee the development and execution of an integrated 
     Federal Government strategy to monitor and address the 
     impacts of efforts directed, or directly supported, by the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China to censor or 
     intimidate, in the United States or in any of its possessions 
     or territories, any United States person, including United 
     States companies that conduct business in the People's 
     Republic of China, which are exercising their right to 
     freedom of speech; and
       (B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subparagraph 
     (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not later 
     than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (4) Meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not less 
     frequently than twice per year.
       (5) Consultations.--The Task Force should regularly 
     consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with--
       (A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the Task 
     Force;
       (B) independent agencies of the United States Government 
     that are not represented on the Task Force;
       (C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and the 
     media; and

[[Page S3107]]

       (D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies and 
     partners facing similar challenges related to censorship or 
     intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (6) Reporting requirements.--
       (A) Annual report.--The Task Force shall submit an annual 
     report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
     describes, with respect to the reporting period--
       (i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued by the 
     Task Force to address the challenges of censorship and 
     intimidation of United States persons while in the United 
     States or any of its possessions or territories, which is 
     directed or directly supported by the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China;
       (ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in support 
     of the strategic objectives and policies referred to in 
     clause (i); and
       (iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause 
     (ii) and the impact of such activities on the national 
     interests of the United States.
       (B) Form of report.--Each report submitted pursuant to 
     subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (C) Congressional briefings.--Not later than 90 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
     thereafter, the Task Force shall provide briefings to the 
     appropriate congressional committees regarding the activities 
     of the Task Force to execute the strategy developed pursuant 
     to paragraph (3)(A).
       (c) Report on Censorship and Intimidation of United States 
     Persons by the Government of the People's Republic of 
     China.--
       (1) Report.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     select and seek to enter into an agreement with a qualified 
     research entity that is independent of the Department of 
     State to write a report on censorship and intimidation in the 
     United States and its possessions and territories of United 
     States persons, including United States companies that 
     conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which is 
     directed or directly supported by the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China.
       (B) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
     subparagraph (A) shall--
       (i) assess major trends, patterns, and methods of the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China's efforts to 
     direct or directly support censorship and intimidation of 
     United States persons, including United States companies that 
     conduct business in the People's Republic of China, which are 
     exercising their right to freedom of speech;
       (ii) assess, including through the use of illustrative 
     examples, as appropriate, the impact on and consequences for 
     United States persons, including United States companies that 
     conduct business in the People's Republic of China, that 
     criticize--

       (I) the Chinese Communist Party;
       (II) the Government of the People's Republic of China;
       (III) the authoritarian model of government of the People's 
     Republic of China; or
       (IV) a particular policy advanced by the Chinese Communist 
     Party or the Government of the People's Republic of China;

       (iii) identify the implications for the United States of 
     the matters described in clauses (i) and (ii);
       (iv) assess the methods and evaluate the efficacy of the 
     efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
     to limit freedom of expression in the private sector, 
     including media, social media, film, education, travel, 
     financial services, sports and entertainment, technology, 
     telecommunication, and internet infrastructure interests;
       (v) include policy recommendations for the United States 
     Government, including recommendations regarding collaboration 
     with United States allies and partners, to address censorship 
     and intimidation by the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China; and
       (vi) include policy recommendations for United States 
     persons, including United States companies that conduct 
     business in China, to address censorship and intimidation by 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China.
       (C) Applicability to united states allies and partners.--To 
     the extent practicable, the report required under 
     subparagraph (A) should identify implications and policy 
     recommendations that are relevant to United States allies and 
     partners facing censorship and intimidation directed or 
     directly supported by the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China.
       (2) Submission of report.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     submit the report written by the qualified research entity 
     selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate 
     congressional committees.
       (B) Publication.--The report referred to in subparagraph 
     (A) shall be made accessible to the public online through 
     relevant United States Government websites.
       (3) Federal government support.--The Secretary of State and 
     other Federal agencies selected by the President shall 
     provide the qualified research entity selected pursuant to 
     paragraph (1)(A) with timely access to appropriate 
     information, data, resources, and analyses necessary for such 
     entity to write the report described in paragraph (1)(A) in a 
     thorough and independent manner.
       (d) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the date that 
     is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

     SEC. 3201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

       In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of 
     Congress'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 3202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES 
                   AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific 
     provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and 
     are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the 
     United States to advance its vital national interests, defend 
     its territory, expand its economy through international trade 
     and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-
     minded countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific 
     and its surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power 
     or powers, and deter potential aggressors;
       (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the 
     Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
     are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the 
     Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of 
     purpose, and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of 
     shared interest in areas such as defense and security, 
     economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and 
     fundamental freedoms;
       (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in 
     the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, 
     Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as 
     regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of 
     Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific 
     Economic Community (APEC), which are essential to further 
     shared interests;
       (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands 
     consistent United States and allied commitment to 
     strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are 
     postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained 
     political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, 
     and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible 
     commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on 
     matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in 
     the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied 
     defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of 
     political, economic, or military coercion;
       (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships 
     and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken 
     collective ability to advance shared interests;
       (6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize 
     human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
       (7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert 
     Group of the International Military Council on Climate and 
     Security (IMCCS), titled ``Climate and Security in the Indo-
     Asia Pacific'' noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the 
     regions most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former 
     Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
     Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, 
     noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-
     Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and 
     impacting security throughout the region as sea levels rise, 
     fishing patterns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms 
     grow stronger and more frequent;
       (8) the United State should continue to engage on and 
     deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United 
     States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia 
     Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas 
     of--
       (A) forecasting environmental challenges;
       (B) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable 
     uses of forest and water resources with the goal of 
     preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking water;
       (C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
       (D) meeting environmental challenges and developing 
     resilience; and
       (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United 
     States Agency for International Development, should 
     facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate 
     resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on internal and 
     external actions needed--
       (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk reduction, 
     and resilience to weather-related impacts on strategic 
     interests of the United States and partners and allies of the 
     United States in the region; and
       (B) to address humanitarian and food security impacts of 
     weather-related changes in the region.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States--
       (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
     cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the 
     Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 
     including through diplomatic engagement, regional 
     development, energy security and development, scientific and 
     health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, 
     missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space,

[[Page S3108]]

     cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
       (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty 
     obligations, including--
       (A) defending Japan, including all areas under the 
     administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty of 
     Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of 
     America and Japan;
       (B) defending the Republic of Korea under article III of 
     the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the 
     Republic of Korea;
       (C) defending the Philippines under article IV of the 
     Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the 
     Republic of the Philippines;
       (D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact and the 
     Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and
       (E) defending Australia under article IV of the Australia, 
     New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;
       (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States' bilateral 
     and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, 
     ASEAN, and New Zealand;
       (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
     Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human 
     rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora 
     and pacts; and
       (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and 
     security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, 
     Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

     SEC. 3203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States should reaffirm our commitment to 
     quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and 
     the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and implement a 
     shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to 
     promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-
     Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of law, and 
     market-driven economic growth, and is free from undue 
     influence and coercion;
       (2) the United States should seek to expand sustained 
     dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 
     partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation 
     and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic 
     values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and 
     prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience;
       (3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of 
     cooperation with the Quad, including more regular military-
     to-military dialogues, joint exercises, and coordinated 
     policies related to shared interests such as protecting 
     cyberspace and advancing maritime security;
       (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders 
     meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and 
     health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, 
     affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable 
     access, and to address shared challenges, including in 
     cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality 
     infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and 
     disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further 
     advances the important cooperation among Quad nations that is 
     so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
       (5) building upon their partnership to help finance 
     1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 
     for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States 
     International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan 
     International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for 
     International Cooperation, including through partnerships 
     with other multilateral development banks, should also 
     venture to finance development and infrastructure projects in 
     the Indo-Pacific region that are sustainable and offer a 
     viable alternative to the investments of the People's 
     Republic of China in that region under the Belt and Road 
     Initiative;
       (6) in consultation with other Quad countries, the 
     President should establish clear deliverables for the 3 new 
     Quad Working Groups established on March 12, 2021, which 
     are--
       (A) the Quad Vaccine Experts Working Group;
       (B) the Quad Climate Working Group; and
       (C) the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working 
     Group; and
       (7) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working 
     Group could--
       (A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior officials 
     of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of issues; and
       (B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing 
     bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United 
     States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as 
     other formal and informal parliamentary exchanges.

     SEC. 3204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING 
                   GROUP.

       (a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     seek to enter into negotiations with the governments of 
     Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the United 
     States, known as the ``Quad'') with the goal of reaching a 
     written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-Parliamentary 
     Working Group for the purpose of acting on the 
     recommendations of the Quad Working Groups described in 
     section 203(6) and to facilitate closer cooperation on shared 
     interests and values.
       (b) United States Group.--
       (1) In general.--At such time as the governments of the 
     Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in 
     subsection (a), there shall be established a United States 
     Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad 
     Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
       (2) Membership.--
       (A) In general.--The United States Group shall be comprised 
     of not more than 24 Members of Congress.
       (B) Appointment.--Of the Members of Congress appointed to 
     the United States Group under subparagraph (A)--
       (i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives from among Members of the House, not less 
     than 4 of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs; and
       (ii) half shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore 
     of the Senate, based on recommendations of the majority 
     leader and minority leader of the Senate, from among Members 
     of the Senate, not less than 4 of whom shall be members of 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the majority 
     leader and minority leader determine otherwise).
       (3) Meetings.--
       (A) In general.--The United States Group shall seek to meet 
     not less frequently than annually with representatives and 
     appropriate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, 
     and India, and any other country invited by mutual agreement 
     of the Quad countries.
       (B) Limitation.--A meeting described in subparagraph (A) 
     may be held--
       (i) in the United States;
       (ii) in another Quad country during periods when Congress 
     is not in session; or
       (iii) virtually.
       (4) Chairperson and vice chairperson.--
       (A) House delegation.--The Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice 
     chairperson of the delegation of the United States Group from 
     the House from among members of the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs.
       (B) Senate delegation.--The President Pro Tempore of the 
     Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of 
     the delegation of the United States Group from the Senate 
     from among members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
       (5) Authorization of appropriations.--
       (A) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2025 for 
     the United States Group.
       (B) Distribution of appropriations.--
       (i) In general.--For each fiscal year for which an 
     appropriation is made for the United States Group, half of 
     the amount appropriated shall be available to the delegation 
     from the House of Representatives and half of the amount 
     shall be available to the delegation from the Senate.
       (ii) Method of distribution.--The amounts available to the 
     delegations of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
     under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouchers to be 
     approved by the chairperson of the delegation from the House 
     of Representatives and the chairperson of the delegation from 
     the Senate, respectively.
       (6) Private sources.--The United States Group may accept 
     gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the 
     review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on 
     Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Ethics of the Senate.
       (7) Certification of expenditures.--The certificate of the 
     chairperson of the delegation from the House of 
     Representatives or the chairperson of the delegation from the 
     Senate of the United States Group shall be final and 
     conclusive upon the accounting officers in the auditing of 
     the accounts of the United States Group.
       (8) Annual report.--The United States Group shall submit to 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an 
     appropriation is made for the United States Group, which 
     shall include a description of its expenditures under such 
     appropriation.

     SEC. 3205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

       It is the policy of the United States to--
       (1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast 
     Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support 
     greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and 
     respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
       (2) support high-level United States participation in the 
     annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
       (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic 
     engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
     border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's 
     (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable 
     long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United 
     States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building 
     efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food 
     security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly 
     for ASEAN's poorest countries;
       (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
     integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as 
     to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN 
     economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, 
     the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, 
     and India;
       (5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives 
     like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a 
     commitment

[[Page S3109]]

     to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic relationships 
     in the region;
       (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and 
     territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing 
     claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, 
     legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, 
     consistent with international law, including through the 
     adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that 
     represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace 
     and stability in the region;
       (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
     territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including 
     the Government of the People's Republic of China--
       (A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking 
     any actions in the future, that undermine stability, or 
     complicate or escalate disputes through the use of coercion, 
     intimidation, or military force;
       (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other 
     features, and refrain from new efforts to militarize, 
     including the construction of new garrisons and facilities 
     and the relocation of additional military personnel, 
     material, or equipment;
       (C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other 
     countries from exercising their sovereign rights to the 
     resources in their exclusive economic zones and continental 
     shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the South China 
     Sea that lack support in international law; and
       (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and 
     military districts in contested areas in the South China Sea;
       (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that 
     cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and 
     support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
     Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address 
     the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 
     region;
       (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
     to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
     Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the 
     Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of 
     China's excessive maritime claims;
       (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to 
     continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and 
     trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and 
     strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and 
     support to refugees and migrants;
       (11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
       (12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN 
     countries, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities 
     Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the 
     United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-
     ASEAN Health Futures;
       (13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN 
     leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open 
     and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and 
     protecting human rights, including releasing political 
     prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and 
     arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, 
     freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
     speech and expression;
       (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address 
     corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
     bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the 
     private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency 
     through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the 
     South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
       (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
     as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides 
     skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation 
     that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border 
     cooperation and partnerships, and rise to address the 
     regional and global challenges of the future;
       (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the 
     Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of 
     the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with 
     an emphasis on civil society leaders;
       (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully 
     upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions and international agreements with respect to the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic 
     missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to 
     do the same; and
       (18) allocate appropriate resources across the United 
     States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific 
     strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality and 
     supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
     solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

     SEC. 3206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-ASEAN 
                   COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT 
                   TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint 
     analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment 
     critical to strategic technologies and critical 
     infrastructure;
       (2) the United States and ASEAN should share information 
     about and collaborate on screening Chinese investments in 
     strategic technology sectors and critical infrastructure;
       (3) the United States and ASEAN should work together on 
     appropriate import restriction regimes regarding Chinese 
     exports of surveillance technologies;
       (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March 
     2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;
       (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the 
     September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries regarding 
     ``Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace'', a set 
     of commitments that support the ``rules-based international 
     order, affirm the applicability of international law to 
     state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of 
     responsible state behavior in peacetime, and the development 
     and implementation of practical confidence building measures 
     to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber 
     incidents''; and
       (6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese 
     investments in critical technology, including artificial 
     intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the 
     coming decades.

     SEC. 3207. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
                   ORGANIZATIONS.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
     coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a 
     report on the expanded influence of the Government of the 
     People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in 
     international organizations.
       (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include analysis of the following:
       (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist Party in 
     international organizations and how that influence has 
     expanded over the last 10 years, including--
       (A) tracking countries' voting patterns that align with 
     Chinese government voting patterns;
       (B) the number of PRC nationals in leadership positions at 
     the D-1 level or higher;
       (C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory funding by 
     organization;
       (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party phrases and 
     initiatives in international organization language and 
     programming;
       (E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy for its own 
     foreign policy initiatives, including the Belt and Road 
     Initiative;
       (F) the number of Junior Professional Officers that the 
     Government of the People's Republic of China has funded by 
     organization;
       (G) tactics used by the Government of the People's Republic 
     of China or the CCP to manipulate secret or otherwise non-
     public voting measures, voting bodies, or votes;
       (H) the extent to which technology companies incorporated 
     in the PRC, or which have PRC or CCP ownership interests, 
     provide equipment and services to international 
     organizations; and
       (I) efforts by the PRC's United Nations Mission to generate 
     criticism of the United States in the United Nations, 
     including any efforts to highlight delayed United States 
     payments or to misrepresent total United States voluntary and 
     assessed financial contributions to the United Nations and 
     its specialized agencies and programs.
       (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded 
     influence of the PRC government and the Chinese Communist 
     Party in international organizations, including an analysis 
     of PRC Government and Chinese Communist Party strategic 
     documents and rhetoric.
       (3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC government 
     and the Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence 
     in international organizations, including--
       (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals to join and run 
     for leadership positions in international organizations;
       (B) coercive economic and other practices against other 
     members in the organization; and
       (C) economic or other incentives provided to international 
     organizations, including donations of technologies or goods.
       (4) The successes and failures of the PRC government and 
     Chinese Communist Party influence efforts in international 
     organizations, especially those related to human rights, 
     ``internet sovereignty'', the development of norms on 
     artificial intelligence, labor, international standards 
     setting, and freedom of navigation.
       (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international 
     organizations'' includes the following:
       (1) The African Development Bank.
       (2) The Asian Development Bank.
       (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
       (4) The Bank of International Settlements.
       (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.
       (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.
       (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development.
       (9) The International Bureau of Weights and Measures.
       (10) The International Chamber of Commerce.
       (11) The International Civil Aviation Organization.
       (12) The International Criminal Police Organization.

[[Page S3110]]

       (13) The International Finance Corporation.
       (14) The International Fund for Agricultural Development.
       (15) The International Hydrographic Organization.
       (16) The International Labor Organization.
       (17) The International Maritime Organization.
       (18) The International Monetary Fund.
       (19) The International Olympic Committee.
       (20) The International Organization for Migration.
       (21) The International Organization for Standardization.
       (22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.
       (23) The International Telecommunications Union.
       (24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
     Development.
       (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
     Weapons.
       (26) The United Nations.
       (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
     Development.
       (28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
     Cultural Organization.
       (29) The United Nations Industrial Development 
     Organization.
       (30) The United Nations Institute for Training and 
     Research.
       (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
       (32) The Universal Postal Union.
       (33) The World Customs Organization.
       (34) The World Health Organization.
       (35) The World Intellectual Property Organization.
       (36) The World Meteorological Organization.
       (37) The World Organization for Animal Health.
       (38) The World Tourism Organization.
       (39) The World Trade Organization.
       (40) The World Bank Group.

     SEC. 3208. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
     with the heads of other participating executive branch 
     agencies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate 
     and encourage regular dialogues between United States 
     Government regulatory and technical agencies and their 
     counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, 
     both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions 
     and organizations--
       (1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and 
     implementation;
       (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes 
     based on scientific, technical, and other relevant 
     principles;
       (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of 
     regulations and regulatory practices;
       (4) to build consensus around industry and technical 
     standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global 
     economic growth and commerce; and
       (5) to promote United States standards regarding 
     environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in 
     regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the 
     values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
       (b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert 
     exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall 
     prioritize--
       (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries 
     where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of 
     standards, or communication and dialogue between technical 
     agencies is achievable and best advances the economic and 
     national security interests of the United States;
       (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where 
     greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or 
     dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable 
     and best advances the economic and national security 
     interests of the United States, including with--
       (A) the European Union;
       (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
       (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);
       (D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
     Development (OECD); and
       (E) multilateral development banks; and
       (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies 
     focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
       (c) Participation by Non-governmental Entities.--With 
     regard to the program described in subsection (a), the 
     Secretary of State may facilitate, including through the use 
     of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (e), the 
     participation of private sector representatives, and other 
     relevant organizations and individuals with relevant 
     expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such 
     participation advances the goals of such program.
       (d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The 
     Secretary of State is authorized to delegate the 
     responsibilities described in this section to the Under 
     Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
     Environment.
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to 
     carry out this section.
       (2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may make available amounts 
     appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that--
       (A) facilitates participation by representatives from 
     technical agencies within the United States Government and 
     their counterparts; and
       (B) complies with applicable procedural requirements under 
     the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 
     2651a et seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

     SEC. 3209. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   STATE.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States to lead new technology policy partnerships 
     focused on the shared interests of the world's technology-
     leading democracies.
       (b) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
     an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office 
     (referred to in this section as the ``Office''), which shall 
     be housed in the Department of State.
       (c) Leadership.--
       (1) Ambassador-at-large.--The Office shall be headed by an 
     Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall--
       (A) be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate;
       (B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
       (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless otherwise 
     directed.
       (2) Office liaisons.--The Secretary of Commerce, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Energy shall 
     each appoint, from within their respective departments at the 
     level of GS-14 or higher, liaisons between the Office and the 
     Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, or 
     the Department of Energy, as applicable
                                 ______