[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 81 (Tuesday, May 11, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2460-S2462]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                          ALLIES AND PARTNERS

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, Winston Churchill famously said: ``There 
is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting 
without them.''
  Republicans and Democrats agree: Strong alliances and partnerships 
are key to the asymmetric advantage that the United States has over our 
strategic competitors.
  Like every President before him, President Biden has rightly made 
America's alliances and partnerships a cornerstone of his 
administration. It is a national security policy.
  Alliances and partnerships are not a substitute for a strong American 
military. A strong military is the foundation of our alliances. 
Military power creates leverage and credibility for our diplomats, and 
just as importantly, it creates a deterrent.
  Real deterrence cannot be achieved unless it is credible, and it 
cannot be credible unless we properly fund our military and have our 
allies and partners with us. It has to be both. You can't have one or 
the other. Why? Because our partnerships are two-way streets. Alliances 
aren't just for show. They are not just empty statements that we are 
blindly sending money to support vague goals. These relationships are 
built on mutual interests. They benefit us just as much as they benefit 
other countries. Look at the billions of dollars that some of our 
allies have contributed to U.S. bases in their countries.
  ``National Defense Strategy''--this book is the one that was put 
together in 2018. It was put together by 12 people, 6 Republicans and 6 
Democrats, all experts in their field. In fact, one of them just this 
morning was in a committee hearing before our committee. This document 
has been our blueprint for a long period of time, so this is what we 
have, and this is what we feel is going to be something that will stay 
with us for a long time.
  In this book, it states that--and I am quoting from it now--
``mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are

[[Page S2461]]

crucial to our strategy, providing a durable, asymmetric strategic 
advantage that no competitor or rival can match.'' But maintaining that 
asymmetrical advantage requires much more than simply saying nice 
things about our allies and partners.
  The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission report, written 
by six Democrats and six Republicans, makes this very clear. They talk 
about how ``these alliances and partnerships . . . have ultimately 
rested on a foundation of military strength.'' So when President Biden 
says that ``America's alliances are our greatest asset'' and then goes 
to underfund the military, it defies common sense. Underfunding the 
military threatens that very foundation that underwrites the 
effectiveness of our alliances and partnerships.
  Let me explain a little bit of how it works. We will start with 
nuclear modernization.
  The United States maintains a safe and effective nuclear arsenal to 
protect American families but also to protect our partners and allies. 
Our nuclear umbrella has three benefits.
  First, it makes clear to China and Russia which countries stand with 
us. You know, they don't know otherwise, and they have a terrible 
practice of lying about which countries are with us or are with them. 
So this makes it very clear. It is on the dotted line.
  Second, it has the benefit of giving those countries the security of 
relying on our deterrence rather than feeling like they have to develop 
their own nuclear weapons.
  Thirdly, our umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence is a pillar of 
our goal of global nuclear nonproliferation. If we cut back our own 
nuclear deterrent and take away that umbrella, which is what would 
happen if we reduce our defense budget, it is likely that nuclear 
weapons will become more common, not less.
  President Biden has said nuclear nonproliferation is one of his 
priorities. Do you see the disconnect here? That is why it is so 
concerning to me that some administration officials--now I am talking 
about the current administration--some of those officials are talking 
about drastically reducing our nuclear modernization efforts.
  I am also concerned that some in the administration and in Congress 
are targeting our fifth-generation stealth air power. Don't get me 
wrong--the F-35 has had its problems. We all understand that. But it is 
the cornerstone of our ability to operate with allies and our partners.
  The F-35 program--that is our program--has 21 allies and partners in 
it. For many, it is their main capability and will be their primary 
contribution to any kind of a high-end problem that should come 
forward. When we talk about cutting the program or moving away from it, 
their governments question our commitment. There is no substitute 
aircraft or capability for these countries. We want our allies and 
partners to fight along with us; there is no question about that.
  Let's remember what happened. First of all, the F-35 is a fifth-
generation vehicle, and we only had one other one, and that was the F-
22. I remember so well, just a few years ago, at that time we were 
going to have 700 F-22 aircraft, but we only ended up with 187 of them 
because at the last minute, they were talking like they are talking 
today, a lot of people in the administration, saying maybe we don't 
need to have as many F-35s. Well, we absolutely do need to have them. 
We don't want to make the same mistake now that we made several years 
ago with the F-22
  Our combatant commanders have already told us that we will be 
outnumbered in terms of stealth fighters in the western Pacific by 
2025, and it will be even worse if American F-35 cuts lead--because you 
know that other countries, like our allies in Australia and Japan, they 
would be cutting theirs if we cut ours.
  That is just one of the many serious problems we have in the Indo-
Pacific.
  Our partners and allies are worried about U.S. force posture and our 
ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat China's use of military 
force. I heard that for myself way back in 2018 when I was in that area 
of the South China Sea. Many of our allies and partners in that 
region--they were clear. They saw firsthand how China was preparing to 
swiftly defeat our forces in the Pacific. They were trying to figure 
out how--if we would be there for them when that happened or if they 
would be needing to start cozying up to China. They are not going to 
sit around and wait for us to perform. They are going to have to know 
that we are going to be there for them.
  Our competition out there in that area is clearly China. We know what 
they are doing, we know what their plans are, and we are concerned 
about it. Fortunately, our significant investment in the military under 
President Trump was an encouraging sign to our allies and partners. 
They were all very proud of us. But after watching China's Communist 
Party dismantle democracy in Hong Kong and commit genocide on the 
Uighurs in northwest China, our partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific 
are now worried that China will try to invade and annex Taiwan. How 
many years have we been talking about that? Now they are really 
concerned about it.
  General McMaster testified that Taiwan is ``the most significant 
flashpoint that could lead to large scale war,'' saying that China 
would take military action against Taiwan as soon as 2022. The former 
and current commanders of INDOPACOM both emphasized the near-term 
threat. It is a real threat. It is out there.
  This is the primary reason why the Armed Services Committee with 
overwhelmingly bipartisan support has put in place our Pacific 
Deterrent Initiative. We call it the PDI. The PDI is intended to 
bolster our degraded force posture in the Indo-Pacific to counter 
China's military buildup. We have to restore the favorable balance of 
power in the region where the problem is the most acute, and that is 
west of the international date line, where our partners and allies are 
most immediately threatened by Chinese aggression.
  PDI is fundamentally about building basic infrastructure so that we 
can operate with our allies and partners. It will mean more distributed 
and smaller bases, maybe hardened communications, as well as increased 
and more realistic exercises with allies and partners.
  If we want PDI to succeed, we need to resource it properly. Both 
Admirals Davidson and Aquilino told the Armed Services Committee that 
much just last week in a hearing we had in our committee.
  After the hollow promises of the Obama administration to ``Pivot to 
the Pacific'' and after almost no change in the U.S. military posture 
in the region over the last two decades, our partners and allies in the 
Indo-Pacific are worried, and justly so. They want to see sustained 
investment matching sustained commitments, especially after President 
Trump rightfully pushed them to step up their own investments. They 
answered the call. But President Biden will create a credibility 
problem if we don't continue to invest as well. We want them to do 
that. This is the case. We are going to have to get this done.
  Our INDOPACOM allies and partners throughout that region are watching 
closely to see what we do with the defense budget top line and with 
PDI. What they see is that President Biden's defense budget does not 
even keep up with inflation. We are talking about the defense budget 
that he came out with just a couple of weeks ago. That actually had a 
reduction. It didn't even beat inflation at that time and didn't come 
close to what was really recommended by this document that we are 
supposed to be using--it is a bipartisan document--let alone matching 
the real growth we need to implement the National Defense Strategy.
  So over in Europe, Biden proclaimed, ``America is back,'' and that 
sounds good, claiming a reversal from the previous administration. It 
is just not true. Again, actions are not matching words. Rhetoric 
without resources will devastate our credibility and undermine our 
alliances here too.
  If defense cuts impact the European Deterrence Initiative, it will 
serve to weaken our European posture and make our allies and partners 
more susceptible to Russian aggression. Without a strong defense 
budget, the Biden administration's goal and pledge to support NATO and 
deter Russia will ring hollow for our European allies and partners.
  Sharing the burden is a key benefit of our international alliances 
and partnerships, but our NATO alliances

[[Page S2462]]

might see the administration's military reductions as a signal that 
they no longer need to meet their commitments to spend 2 percent of 
their GDP. Now, remember when the previous President, President Trump, 
talked to our allies to start bellying up and participating. NATO--
those nations are our friends, but they are not coming to the level 
that they are going to have to do to carry their end of it.
  Don't forget--whether we are facing Russia, China, or other 
adversaries in other parts of the world, operating jointly with our 
allies and partners is a core part of our ability to deter conflict in 
multiple theaters, but it requires investment.
  Take the refueling support we provided for our French allies in 
Mali--6 million pounds of fuel to allow the French to take on that 
critical counterterrorism mission and support their troops on the 
ground. It would have cost us billions to do this mission by ourselves. 
That is why we need the allies. The same goes for Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere. A good portion of our defense budget 
pays for our military to support our allies and partners so that we 
don't have to send our own troops over there and our allies can do it 
for us. It gives us insight into its operations.
  So do you see what would happen if our military's ability to posture 
forward and stay ready is choked by inadequate defense spending? Our 
allies and partners would suffer, not improve, and the United States 
would end up spending more money for less security. This goes directly 
against the Biden administration's stated goals.
  Thinking that alliances and partnerships can substitute for U.S. 
military capability and capacity is wishful thinking. It is illogical. 
That strategy will harm our national security. As former Defense 
Secretary Jim Mattis said, ``Throughout history, we see nations with 
allies thrive and nations without allies wither.'' If we want to win 
against our strategic competitors, it will take both a strong, fully 
resourced military, as well as strong alliances and partnerships. Let's 
be clear. One is not an alternative for the other. You got to have 
both.

  So it is clear then that we need our allies. So how do we maintain 
this mutual relationship with robust defense spending of 3 to 5 percent 
real growth? That is what it calls for right here. This year, we should 
have a 3- to 5-percent increase, and the President's budget actually 
came out with a net decrease. That is why this whole thing is so 
important.
  Just this morning, we had a hearing, and we had one of the authors of 
this book. I asked him the same question. I said: This was put together 
back in 2018. Is it still accurate today? He said: Yes, it is. And it 
doesn't even increase enough to keep up with inflation.
  So Eric Edelman--he is one of the cosponsors of the NDS that we are 
referring to here that has been our blueprint for 5 years now. The 
report said it best in an article this week by Eric Edelman. He said in 
this article:

       [I]t remains a fact that allies and adversaries will see 
     the U.S. commitment to defense as a crucial benchmark for 
     assessing U.S. willingness and ability to succeed at long-
     term competition with its authoritarian adversaries.

  He continued, and this is Eric Edelman:

       A tough declaratory policy without adequate military means 
     to reinforce it is a recipe for disaster, particularly in the 
     Indo-Pacific region.

  So I would just say this: President Biden walks the walk, but when it 
comes to supporting our allies, they don't do it, and I and many others 
know that it is meaningless without a strong defense budget to back it 
up.
  And we need a higher topline. We need a higher topline. It is going 
to have to be somewhere in the range that was put together by a group 
of Democrats and Republicans that outlined what we have to do for 
America to survive. So we need a higher topline, and we are going to 
end up getting a higher topline.
  With that, I yield the floor.

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