[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 67 (Monday, April 19, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2013-S2038]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION
By Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Cardin, Mrs.
Shaheen, Mr. Merkley, Mr. Schatz, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Kaine, Mr.
Markey, Mr. Booker, and Mr. Van Hollen):
S. 1201. A bill to restore the United States' international
leadership on climate change and clean energy, and for other purposes;
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the United
States Climate Leadership on International Mitigation, Adaptation, and
Technology Enhancement Act of 2021--the U.S. CLIMATE Act. Mr.
President, climate change represents a clear and present threat to the
stability, security and prosperity of nations around the world,
including the United States. The cost of climate-induced disasters
becomes more indisputable and devastating with every passing year.
Barring swift and ambitious action, the situation will only worsen.
We've all seen the devastating impacts of climate change. For years,
unprecedented tropical storms have destroyed communities in Mozambique,
Central America, and the United States, including communities in my
home state of New Jersey. This past February, incredibly abnormal and
brutal winter weather, exacerbated by climatic disruption to the
Arctic's polar vortex, killed eleven people and left thousands in Texas
without power and water. Less than a year prior, deadly wildfires,
exacerbated by climate change engulfed California, killing 31 people,
and Australia, killing 34 people, and forced thousands to flee their
homes and lose their livelihoods. And yet, while hurricanes and storm
surges are horrific, climate change is also increasing the intensity,
length and geographic expanse of droughts around the world contributing
to food insecurity, natural resource scarcity and desertification.
Likewise, intensifying effects of climate change pose an existential
threat to hundreds of millions of people and exacerbate global forced
migration. Nations like Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia are incredibly
vulnerable to mass displacement due to rising sea levels. Island
nations like Tuvalu, Seychelles, the Republic of the Marshall Islands
and Kiribati are already managing internal migration due to climate
change induced sea-level rise. Without ambitious action to both keep
global leverage temperatures well below an increase of two degrees
Celsius above preindustrial levels it is forecasted that the entirety
of certain nations may become uninhabitable within my grandchildren's
lifetime. It is a moral imperative for the Senators in this body, and
humanity, to act to ensure that is not the world we leave for the
generations that will come after us. Today's generations are the first
people to personally and regularly experience the effects of climate
change on the natural world and its impact on humanity . . . and we are
also the last generations that can, and must, act to prevent the worst
forecasts from becoming reality.
Changing climate and weather patterns intensification of global food
insecurity and resource scarcity especially threaten the lives and
security of the world's most vulnerable populations. For months, heavy
rainfall and warmer temperatures have triggered a locust plague in East
Africa that has lasted more than an entire year. This historic locust
plague--triggered by conditions exacerbated by climate change--has
threatened agricultural and pastoral livelihoods and worsened already
acute food insecurity in the region. At the same time, similar extreme
weather patterns are expected to expand and shift the ranges of life-
threatening diseases like malaria, West Nile Virus, cholera, and
others. Beyond the palpable destruction and devastation of climate-
induced crises, climate change is a ``threat multiplier,'' a term
coined by the CNA Corporation's Military Advisory Board in 2007 to
express the way in which climate change exacerbates instability;
conflict and subsequent displacement; terrorism; and other vital
security matters.
Clearly, climate change does not begin nor end at any nation's
borders. No one is immune to the effects of climate change--which is
why we must not only work with the rest of the
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world to combat this crisis, but lead the charge. It is simply not
enough to enact robust domestic policies--this is a global problem that
requires internationally collaborative solutions. What's more, our
leadership and renewed international engagement can generate
opportunities for Americans. By committing to international agreements
and adhering to emerging international production norms, we are opening
the global markets for the innovation, ingenuity, and leadership of the
American private sector.
I commend the Biden administration's commitment to returning the
United States to the global stage, thereby granting us the capacity to
reengage and lead the international community in tackling the greatest
threat of our time. President Biden's Executive Order on Tackling the
Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad has designated climate action as a
core tenant of U.S. diplomacy and national security planning. He has
appointed former Secretary of State John Kerry as Special Presidential
Envoy for Climate, ensuring that climate considerations have a strong
advocate where important decisions are being made. And, under the
leadership of President Biden, the United States has officially
rejoined the Paris Agreement.
The time for debate and discussion on why and how we must tackle this
crisis is over. The science is clear: we must achieve net zero
emissions by 2050 in order to ensure a safe and prosperous future for
ourselves and our posterity. Now is the time for action and
implementation of crucial efforts to save our planet.
Congress can and must do more to support the restoration of the
United States' climate diplomacy and leadership. That is why I am
introducing the United States Climate Leadership in International
Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technological Enhancement Act, or the U.S.
CLIMATE Act, of 2021, a comprehensive piece of legislation to bolster
President Biden's bold commitment to U.S. climate leadership by
providing resources, programs and policy to support and expedite the
realization of United States action that will be essential to regaining
the international community's trust and partnership with the U.S. in
the global climate fight. It represents a bold course of action that
Congress should take to support forward-looking leadership in the White
House in their commitment to preventing the worst-case scenarios of
climate change from becoming reality.
Title I of the bill establishes climate change as a cross-cutting
imperative at the State Department. It also calls for the integration
of climate models and forecasting into national security planning
across all federal agencies and features directives on protecting our
security and environmental interests in the Arctic.
Title II declares support for U.S. cooperation and engagement in
international agreements. This includes directives on re-entry into the
Paris Agreements; ratification of the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal
Protocols; compliance with environmental initiatives of the
International Civil Aviation Organization; and the establishment of new
international efforts to mitigate transportation sector and greenhouse
gas emissions.
Title III integrates climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts
into a range of tools and initiatives at USAID, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of State, the DFC, and the United Nations.
Title IV incorporates a clean energy mandate into the United States'
diplomatic and development efforts, thereby protecting our own energy
security interests and promoting responsible global energy production.
Title V of the bill addresses the United States' bilateral and
multilateral engagement on climate change, encouraging U.S. cooperation
with China, India, the European Union and other key partners.
Title VI of the U.S. CLIMATE Act integrates our colleague from
Hawai'i, Senator Hirono's Women and Climate Change Act, which
acknowledges and addresses the disproportionate effects of climate
change on women and girls around the world.
The science is clear: we are running out of time to stave off the
most devastating effects of climate change that will directly impact
our children and our children's children. After four years of being
absent from the conversation, it is time for the United States to not
only return to the table, but lead the charge to protect our shared
home. We cannot solve this crisis alone--this is not an American
problem, this is a global crisis that can only be combatted with
coordinated, international action. The U.S. CLIMATE Act of 2021
provides the essential resources, programs, and support for the United
States to lead the world forward in the existential fight to save our
planet. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the
legislation be printed in the Record following my remarks, I yield the
floor and note the absence of a quorum.
So ordered.
S. 1201
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United
States Climate Leadership in International Mitigation,
Adaptation, and Technology Enhancement Act of 2021''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 3. Purpose.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
TITLE I--CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Sec. 101. Climate diplomacy.
Sec. 102. Enhancing United States security considerations for global
climate disruptions.
Sec. 103. Arctic diplomacy.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress in support of the United States returning
to the Paris Agreement.
Sec. 202. Enhanced United States commitment to the Paris Agreement.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress regarding ratification of the Kigali
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
Sec. 204. Compliance with the carbon offset and reduction scheme for
international aviation.
Sec. 205. Short-lived climate pollutants.
Sec. 206. International cooperation regarding clean transportation and
sustainable land use and community development.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States reengagement with the
Group of Seven and the Group of Twenty on climate action.
TITLE III--CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT
Sec. 301. International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and
Security Program.
Sec. 302. United States contributions to the Green Climate Fund.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on United States engagements at the World
Economic Forum.
Sec. 304. Clean energy and the United States International Development
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 305. Consistency in United States policy on development finance
and climate change.
TITLE IV--CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Sec. 401. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.
Sec. 402. Department of State primacy for energy diplomacy.
Sec. 403. Reports on United States participation in Mission Innovation
and the Clean Energy Ministerial.
Sec. 404. Reduced deforestation.
TITLE V--BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND
COOPERATION
Sec. 501. North American Strategy.
Sec. 502. Accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 503. United States and European Union cooperation on climate
finance for developing countries.
Sec. 504. Sense of Congress on clean energy cooperation with India.
Sec. 505. Power Africa.
Sec. 506. Caribbean Energy Initiative.
Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on conservation of the Amazon River basin.
Sec. 508. Sense of Congress regarding renewable energy in Indonesia.
TITLE VI--WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACT
Sec. 601. Short title.
Sec. 602. Findings.
Sec. 603. Definitions.
Sec. 604. Statement of policy.
Sec. 605. Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate
Change.
Sec. 606. Development and implementation of strategy and policies to
prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on
women globally.
Sec. 607. Climate Change within the Office of Global Women's Issues.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
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(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5C, published
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on October
8, 2018, and the Fourth National Climate Assessment, first
published by the United States Global Change Research Program
in 2018, concluded that--
(A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, most notably
the combustion of fossil fuels and the degradation of natural
resources that absorb atmospheric carbon from human activity,
are the dominant causes of climate change during the past
century;
(B) changes in the Earth's climate are--
(i) causing sea levels to rise;
(ii) increasing the global average temperature of the
Earth;
(iii) increasing the incidence and severity of wildfires;
and
(iv) intensifying the severity of extreme weather,
including hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, flooding, droughts,
and other disasters that threaten human life, healthy
communities, and critical infrastructure.
(2) An increase in the global average temperature of 2
degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrialized levels would
cause--
(A)(i) the displacement, and the forced internal migration,
of an estimated 143,000,000 people in Latin America, South
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action
is taken (according to the World Bank); and
(ii) the displacement of an average of 17,800,000 people
worldwide by floods every year (according to the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating
effects of climate change;
(B)(i) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost annual economic
output in the United States (a 10 percent contraction from
2018 levels) by 2100 (according to the Fourth National
Climate Assessment); and
(ii) an additional 100,000,000 people worldwide to be
driven into poverty by 2030 (according to the World Bank);
(C)(i) greater food insecurity and decreased agricultural
production due to climate change's effects on the increased
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events; and
(ii) the proliferation of agricultural pests and crop
diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading ecosystems, and
water scarcity (according to the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization); and
(D) more than 350,000,000 additional people worldwide to be
exposed to deadly heat stress by 2050.
(3) According to the International Monetary Fund, a
persistent annual increase in average global temperature of
.04 degrees Celsius would reduce global real gross domestic
product per capita by 7.22 percent by 2100.
(4) According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
climate change is exacerbating unusual regional weather
conditions, which is driving the current and prolonged desert
locust outbreak that is threatening food security across East
Africa and Southeast Asia.
(5) According to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services--
(A) an increase in the global average temperature of
between 1.5 and 2 degrees Celsius will result in a
significant reduction in the worldwide number of land
species;
(B) an increase in the global average temperature of 2
degrees Celsius--
(i) will place 5 percent of world's species at risk of
extinction; and
(ii) will result in the destruction of more than 99 percent
of all coral reefs worldwide; and
(C) an increase in the global average temperature of 4.3
degrees Celsius will place 16 percent of world's terrestrial
species at risk of extinction.
(6) According to the International Energy Agency, the
United States, China, India, and the European Union
(including the United Kingdom) account for more than 58
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.
(7) China, which is the world's top greenhouse gases
emitter and has an outsized impact on the United States' core
interest in climate stability--
(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions mitigation
pledge to the Paris Agreement, contained in its 2015
nationally determined contribution, to ``peak'' emissions
around 2030 ahead of schedule;
(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, a pledge to achieve
carbon neutrality by 2060; and
(C) has yet to announce an updated nationally determined
contribution.
(8) On October 26, 2020, Japan, the world's third largest
economy and fifth greatest carbon emitter, announced a pledge
to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Despite apprehension
about growing nuclear energy sources, Japan aims to increase
its share of renewable and nuclear energy following new
targets unveiled next year.
(9) India has met its growing energy demands by becoming a
global leader in renewable energy generation. Despite
significant investments in renewable energy, and the
implementation of strong national greenhouse gas mitigation
policies, India continues to operate some of the world's
dirtiest fossil fuel power plants and has high emissions
generated from its transportation sector. India is a critical
market for foreign investment and will be a major competitor
in international clean energy development futures.
(10) India's leadership within the Clean Energy
Ministerial, the Mission Innovation initiative, and the
International Solar Alliance has put India at the forefront
of renewable energy development and helped India achieve a
top 5 global rank among clean energy producers. Installed
electricity capacity from renewables in India grew by 144
percent between 2014 and 2020. Approximately $42,000,000,000
was invested into India's renewable energy sector between
2014 and 2019.
(11) The European Union demonstrated its strong commitment
to climate action by making the ambitious pledge to reduce
the collective greenhouse gas emissions of its 27 member
nations by at least 55 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990
levels) and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The
European Parliament went even further, voting to reduce its
collective economy wide greenhouse gas emissions by 60
percent by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels). These commitments
represent substantial improvements from the previous goal of
a 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.
(12) The European Union's member nations have also provided
the equivalent of approximately $120,000,000,000 between 2014
and 2020 in support and financing to build climate change
resilience and develop low carbon energy capacity throughout
the developing world.
(13) The European Union has traditionally been a steadfast
partner with United States in the United Nation's Framework
Convention on Climate Change by pushing for improved
accountability, transparency, and shared responsibility among
parties in mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions. As the
United State Government's executive branch has pulled away
from climate action commitments, the European Union has
increased its cooperation with coalitions of States through
partnerships such as the United States Climate Alliance.
(14) Among the world's top greenhouse gas emitters, the
United States is the only country that--
(A) has rescinded national policies to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions;
(B) has advanced policies aimed at bolstering fossil fuel
consumption and extraction, including through the removal of
Federal protections of public lands that are critical
wilderness areas vital to maintaining healthy natural
ecosystems; and
(C) has abstained or withdrawn itself from several global
cooperative efforts acknowledging and addressing the climate
crisis.
(15) United States leadership during deliberations over the
Paris Agreement--
(A) was exemplified by--
(i) its commitment to reduce national emissions by 26 to 28
percent below 2005 levels;
(ii) its leadership in the ``Umbrella Group'' and its role
as cofounder of the ``High Ambition Coalition'';
(iii) its co-facilitation of the UNFCCC;
(iv) its work with the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris
Agreement on agenda item 5: Modalities, procedures and
guidelines for the transparency framework for action; and
(v) its support for the enhanced transparency framework for
action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris
Agreement;
(vi) its pledge of $3,000,000,000 to the Green Climate Fund
(of which the United States still owed $2,000,000,000) in
support of developing countries' efforts to adapt to climate
change and to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; and
(vii) the development of critical bilateral climate action
cooperation initiatives with China and India; and
(B) established the United States as essential to uniting
the world in climate action cooperation.
(16) The United States' reversal on nearly all climate
action policies since 2017, including repealing the Clean
Power Plan (announced by President Obama in August 2015),
cancelling contributions to the United Nation's Green Climate
Fund, abstaining from all G7 and G20 climate action
communiques, and withdrawing the United States from the Paris
Agreement--
(A) undermines the viability of the Paris Agreement;
(B) harms American diplomacy;
(C) disadvantages the ability of the United State private
sector to compete in a clean energy global economy, for which
the International Finance Corporation estimates that
investments spurred by the Paris Agreement will creates up to
$23,000,000,000,000 in new investment opportunities;
(D) erodes the United States' leadership, standing, and
trust within the international community; and
(E) concedes leadership and economic opportunity to foreign
governments keen on taking advantage of the United States'
absence from international climate action initiatives.
(17) The Paris Agreement's central aim is--
(A) to strengthen the global response to the threat of
climate change by maintaining the global temperature rise
well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; and
(B) to pursue efforts to further limit the temperature
increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
(18) The Paris Agreement--
(A) specifies the need for a strong global response to
climate change;
(B) acknowledges that all ``[p]arties should, when taking
action to address climate change, respect, promote and
consider their respective obligations on human rights, the
right to health, the rights of indigenous
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peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with
disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the
right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment
of women and intergenerational equity'';
(C) notes the importance of ``climate justice'' when
mitigating and adapting to climate change;
(D) recognizes ``the need for an effective and progressive
response to the urgent threat of climate change'';
(E) requires all parties to put forward their best efforts
through nationally determined contributions and to strengthen
these efforts in the future;
(F) requires each party to update its nationally determined
contribution every 5 years, with each successive nationally
determined contribution representing a progression beyond the
previous nationally determined contribution, and reflecting
the party's highest possible ambition;
(G) recognizes that marine ecosystems covering more than 70
percent of the Earth's surface have an integral role in
climate balance; and
(H) was developed under the UNFCCC, an international
environmental treaty which the United States ratified, with
the advice and consent of the Senate on October 15, 1992.
(19) Seventy percent of the Paris Agreement signatories'
nationally determined contributions in support of the goals
of the Paris Agreement are ocean-inclusive, and 39 Paris
Agreement signatories are focused on the inclusion of ocean
action in nationally determined contributions through the
Because the Ocean initiative.
(20) The United States communicated its nationally
determined contribution--
(A) to achieve, by 2025, an economy-wide target of reducing
its greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 percent below its
2005 level; and
(B) to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28
percent.
(21) A thriving clean energy industry in the United States,
which employs more than 500,000 Americans, is essential in
achieving these targets.
(22) A number of existing laws and regulations in the
United States also are relevant to achieving this target,
including--
(A) the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.);
(B) the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-486); and
(C) the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
(Public Law 110-140).
(23) On November 4, 2020, the United States withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement became effective, which at the time
resulted in the United States being the only state party (out
of 197 parties) to the UNFCCC that is not a party to the
Paris Agreement.
(24) On January 20, 2021, President Biden initiated the
process for reentering the United States into the Paris
Agreement. On February 19, 2021, the United States officially
rejoined the Paris Agreement.
(25) Article 8 of the Paris Agreement states, ``Parties
recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and
addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse
effects of climate change, including extreme weather events
and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable
development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.'' Such
adverse effects include strong winds from hurricanes and
tropical storms, and flooding from storm surges and heavy
rain, that inflict losses on various sectors of the United
States economy.
(26) The Paris Agreement requires that parties ``should
strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on
adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation
Framework'', which includes measures to enhance
understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to
climate change induced displacement, migration and planned
relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and
international levels.
(27) The Paris Agreement is an example of the multilateral,
international cooperation needed to overcome climate change-
related challenges facing the global community, such as
reducing emissions, promoting economic growth, and deploying
clean energy technologies.
(28) The Paris Agreement recognizes ``the fundamental
priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and
the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to
the adverse impacts of climate change.''.
(29) The Paris Agreement recognizes that--
(A) adaptation is a global challenge facing all countries,
with local, subnational, national, regional, and
international dimensions; and
(B) adapting to the effects of climate change is a key
component of the long-term global response to climate change
to protect people, livelihoods, and ecosystems.
(30) American leadership during the Paris Agreement
negotiations encouraged widespread international
participation in the Paris Agreement.
(31) American States, cities, and businesses are stepping
up and pledging to meet the Paris Agreement goals in the wake
of absent and uncertain leadership by the President.
(32) The Paris Agreement--
(A) has driven innovation in developing cleaner, more
reliable, and more affordable forms of energy;
(B) has demonstrated that addressing climate change and
providing affordable energy to American consumers are not
mutually exclusive; and
(C) has encouraged the United States to develop the Mid-
Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization, which--
(i) was released on November 16, 2016; and
(ii) states, ``Energy efficiency improvements enable the
energy system to provide the services we need with fewer
resources and emissions. Over the past several years, the
United States has demonstrated that programs and standards to
improve the energy efficiency of buildings, appliances and
vehicles can cost-effectively cut carbon pollution and lower
energy bills, while maintaining significant support from U.S.
industry and consumers.''.
(33) Global temperatures must be kept below 1.5 degrees
Celsius above pre-industrialized levels to avoid the most
severe impacts of a changing climate, which will require--
(A) global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from
human sources of 40 to 60 percent from 2010 levels by 2030;
and
(B) net-zero global emissions by 2050;
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) when the United States proffers a strong commitment and
focused leadership on climate action, the rest of the world
will likely follow its example;
(2) when the United States abdicates leadership on such
matters, other countries are likely to waiver on their
commitments to action and retract to insular posturing on
matters that require cooperation; and
(3) in order to avert the worst impacts of climate change,
which is in the core national interest of the United States,
the United States should--
(A) prioritize climate change in its foreign policy, and
ensure that climate change is taken into account in all
foreign policy decision making;
(B) set the standard for ambition on climate action;
(C) use its diplomatic leverage to create incentives for
other countries to take strong action on climate change;
(D) broker, with other world powers, bilateral commitments
on emissions reductions and climate finance and support for
developing countries, which are critical for--
(i) building trust and consensus around global cooperation
on climate action; and
(ii) sending important investment signals to private
finance and private industry on investment and development
trends;
(E) be transparent in how the United States is delivering
on its commitments;
(F) ensure it is adopting and implementing consistent
policies and practices with respect to climate change across
bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions;
(G) hold other world powers accountable for making and
meeting strong commitments;
(H) call for reciprocal standards of transparency; and
(I) support developing countries, in an inclusive manner--
(i) to expand deployment and access to clean energy;
(ii) to plan and invest in climate change adaptation
solutions;
(iii) to improve climate change resilience capacities; and
(iv) to promote--
(I) sustainable agriculture practices;
(II) food security; and
(III) natural resource conservation.
SEC. 3. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to provide authorities,
resources, policies, and recommended administrative actions--
(1) to restore United States global leadership on
addressing the climate crisis and make United States climate
action and climate diplomacy a more central tenet of United
States foreign policy;
(2) to improve the United States' commitment to taking more
ambitious action to help mitigate global greenhouse gas
emission and improve developing countries' resilience and
adaptation capacities to the effects of climate change;
(3) to reclaim, accept, and fully engage diplomacy within a
variety of current and outstanding multilateral institutions
that the United States has withdrawn, withheld support, or
diminished meaningful engagement from in recent years;
(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral cooperation
agreements with other world powers on initiatives to advance
global clean energy innovation and deployment and other
measures to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions and
improve climate change adaptation capacities;
(5) to ensure that the United States' national security
apparatus integrates critically important data on the
compounding effects that climate change is having on global
security risks by enhancing our understanding of how, where,
and when such effects are destabilizing countries and regions
in ways that may motivate conflict, displacement, and other
drivers of insecurity; and
(6) to authorize funding and programs to support a
reaffirmation of the United States' commitments to
international cooperation and support for developing and
vulnerable countries to take climate action.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
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(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Clean energy.--The term ``clean energy'' means--
(A) renewable energy and energy from systems;
(B) energy production processes that emit zero greenhouse
gas emissions, including nuclear power;
(C) systems and processes that capture and permanently
store greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel production
and electricity generation units;
(D) products, processes, facilities, or systems designed to
retrofit and improve the energy efficiency and electricity
generated from electrical generation units, while using less
fuel, less or fewer power production resources, or less
feedstocks; and
(E) zero emission vehicles.
(3) Climate action.--The term ``climate action'' means
enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-
induced impacts, including--
(A) climate-related hazards in all countries;
(B) integrating climate change measures into national
policies, strategies and planning; and
(C) improving education, awareness-raising, and human and
institutional capacity with respect to climate change
mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction, and early warning.
(4) Climate crisis.--The term ``climate crisis'' means the
social, economic, health, safety, and security impacts on
people, and the threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystem
health, which are attributable to the wide-variety of effects
on global environmental and atmospheric conditions as a
result of disruptions to the Earth's climate from
anthropogenic activities that generate greenhouse gas
emissions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb and
regulate atmospheric carbon.
(5) Climate diplomacy.--The term ``climate diplomacy''
means methods of influencing the decisions and behavior of
foreign governments and peoples through dialogue,
negotiation, cooperation and other measures short of war or
violence around issues related to addressing global climate
change, including--
(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of scientific data
and information on the cause and effects of climate change;
(C) the security, social, economic, and political
instability risks associated with the effects of climate
change;
(D) economic cooperation efforts and trade matters that are
related to or associated with climate change and greenhouse
gas mitigation from the global economy;
(E) building resilience capacities and adapting to the
effects of change;
(F) sustainable land use and natural resource conservation;
(G) accounting for loss and damage attributed to the
effects of climate change;
(H) just transition of carbon intense economies to low or
zero carbon economies and accounting for laborers within
affected economies; and
(I) technological innovations that reduce or eliminate
carbon emissions.
(6) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' means
the effects of climate change on--
(A) United States national security concerns and
subnational, national, and regional political stability; and
(B) overseas security and conflict situations that are
potentially exacerbated by dynamic environmental factors and
events, including--
(i) the intensification and frequency of droughts, floods,
wildfires, tropical storms, and other extreme weather events;
(ii) changes in historical severe weather, drought, and
wildfire patterns;
(iii) the expansion of geographical ranges of droughts,
floods, and wildfires into regions that had not regularly
experienced such phenomena;
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and the expansion of
geographical ranges affected by drought; and
(v) changes in marine environments that effect critical
geostrategic waterways, such as the Arctic Ocean, the South
China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the
Beaufort Sea.
(7) Nationally determined contribution.--The term
``nationally determined contribution'' means a country's
pledged efforts to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions
and adapt to the effects of climate change, which may include
a financial pledge of support or financing to assist
developing countries achieve their climate action goals, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Paris
Agreement, which requires each Party--
(A) to ``prepare, communicate and maintain successive
nationally determined contributions that it intends to
achieve''; and
(B) to ``pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim
of achieving the objectives of such contributions''.
(8) Natural climate solutions.--The term ``natural climate
solutions'' mean actions to protect, sustainably manage, and
restore natural or modified ecosystems that--
(A) address climate change effectively and adaptively; and
(B) simultaneously provide human well-being and
environmental benefits.
(9) Natural resources.--The term ``natural resources''
means the terrestrial, freshwater, estuarine, and marine
fish, wildlife, plants, land, air, water, habitats, and
ecosystems.
(10) Net zero greenhouse gas emissions.--The term ``net
zero greenhouse gas emissions'' means that any anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions are balanced or offset by deliberate
activities that absorb or capture and permanently store
equivalent amounts of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
(11) Paris agreement.--The term ``Paris Agreement'' means
the international agreement adopted by parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's 21st
Conference of Parties in Paris, France on December 12, 2015.
(12) Renewable energy.--The term ``renewable energy'' means
all forms of energy produced from sources that naturally
occur or are replenished in nature in a sustainable manner,
including bioenergy, geothermal energy, hydropower, ocean
energy, solar energy, and wind energy.
(13) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability
of human made and natural systems (including their component
parts) to anticipate, absorb, cope, accommodate, or recover
from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and
efficient manner, including through ensuring the
preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential
basic structures and functions.
(14) UNFCCC.--The term ``UNFCCC'' means the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New York May
9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(15) United states-mexico-canada agreement; usmca.--The
terms ``United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement'' and ``USMCA''
mean the Agreement between the United States of America, the
United Mexican States, and Canada, done at Buenos Aires
November 30, 2018.
TITLE I--CLIMATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SEC. 101. CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.
(a) In General.--The President and the Secretary of State
shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy in
United States foreign policy by--
(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and interagency
coordination for bilateral and multilateral actions to
address the climate crisis; and
(2) improving coordination and integration of climate
action across all bureaus and United States missions abroad.
(b) Climate Action Integration.--The Secretary of State,
through the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth,
Energy, and the Environment and any other designees, shall--
(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy within the
bureaus and offices under the leadership of the Under
Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment;
(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are coordinating
with other bureaus of the Department of State regarding the
integration of climate action and climate diplomacy as a
cross-cutting imperative across the Department of State;
(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State--
(A) to assess how issues related to climate change and
United States climate action are integrated into their
operations and programs;
(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and diplomatic
efforts that relate to climate action; and
(C) to make available the technical assistance and
resources of the bureaus and offices with relevant expertise
to provide technical assistance and expert support to other
bureaus within the Department of State regarding climate
action, clean energy development, and climate diplomacy;
(4) manage the integration of scientific data on the
current and anticipated effects of climate change into
applied strategies and diplomatic engagements across
programmatic and regional bureaus of the Department of State
and into the Department of State's decision making processes;
(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices provide
appropriate technical support and resources--
(A) to the President, the Secretary of State, and their
respective designees charged with addressing climate change
and associated issues;
(B) to United States diplomats advancing United States
foreign policy related to climate action; and
(C) for the appropriate engagement and integration of
relevant domestic agencies in international climate change
affairs, including United States participation in
multilateral fora; and
(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the
Secretary of State, that advance United States climate-
related foreign policy objectives, including global
greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation
activities, and global climate security.
(c) Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs.--The Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs shall ensure that all foreign missions
are--
(1) advancing United States bilateral climate diplomacy;
[[Page S2018]]
(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for bilateral
climate action cooperation with foreign governments; and
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordinating
adequately with the bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary
of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment.
(d) Report.--Not later than 200 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in cooperation
with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that--
(1) assesses how climate action and United States climate
diplomacy is integrated across the Bureaus of the Department
of State; and
(2) includes recommendations on strategies to improve cross
bureau coordination and understanding of United States
climate action and climate diplomacy.
(e) Effect of Elimination of Positions.--If the positions
of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and
the Environment and the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs are eliminated or undergo name changes, the
responsibilities of such Under Secretaries under this section
shall be reassigned to other Under Secretaries of State, as
appropriate.
(f) Climate Change Experts in Key Embassies.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that--
(1) identifies the number of personnel of the Department of
State and the United States Agency for International
Development who--
(A) dedicate a significant portion of their work to climate
change mitigation, climate change adaptation, food security,
or clean energy matters; and
(B) are stationed at United States missions in countries
that are highly vulnerable to the effects or major greenhouse
gas emitters;
(2) analyzes the need for Federal climate change policy
specialist personnel in United States embassies, United
States Agency for International Development missions, and
other United States diplomatic and international development
missions; and
(3) includes--
(A) recommendations for increasing climate change expertise
within United States missions abroad among foreign service
officers; and
(B) options for assigning to such missions climate change
attaches from the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Energy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department
of Interior, or other relevant Federal agencies.
(g) Climate Change Advisors.--The Secretary of State, or
the Secretary's designee, shall have primary responsibility
for the management and execution of United States climate
diplomacy and related foreign policy and shall make
appropriate arrangements with the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, and other relevant Federal agencies
and departments to assign personnel from such agencies and
departments to serve as dedicated advisors on climate change
matters in embassies of the United States or in other United
States diplomatic or international development missions.
(h) Climate Change Support and Financing.--The Secretary of
State shall facilitate the coordination among the Department
of State and other relevant departments and agencies,
including the United States Agency for International
Development, the Department of the Treasury, the United
States Trade and Development Agency, and the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, of
contributing development finance or foreign assistance
relevant to United States international climate action and in
support of United States climate diplomacy.
(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out
this section.
SEC. 102. ENHANCING UNITED STATES SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with other relevant agencies, shall conduct biennial
comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing disruptions
to the global climate system, including--
(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of natural
disasters;
(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, including
fresh water;
(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities;
(4) conditions that contribute to--
(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts;
(B) foreign political and economic instability;
(C) international migration of vulnerable and underserved
populations;
(D) the failure of national governments; and
(E) gender-based violence; and
(5) United States and allied military readiness,
operations, and strategy.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the evaluations conducted
under subsection (a) are--
(1) to support the practical application of scientific data
and research on climate change's dynamic effects around the
world to improve resilience, adaptability, security, and
stability despite growing global environmental risks and
changes;
(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and mission
execution of United States international development and
diplomatic missions adequately account for heightened and
dynamic risks and challenges associated with the effects of
climate change;
(3) to improve coordination between United States science
agencies conducting research and forecasts on the causes and
effects of climate change and United States national security
agencies;
(4) to better understand the disproportionate effects of
global climate disruptions on women, girls, indigenous
communities, and other historically marginalized populations;
and
(5) to inform the development of the climate security
strategy described in subsection (d).
(c) Scope.--The evaluations conducted under subsection (a)
shall--
(1) examine developing countries' vulnerabilities and risks
associated with global, regional, and localized effects of
climate change; and
(2) assess and make recommendations on necessary measures
to mitigate risks and reduce vulnerabilities associated with
effects, including--
(A) sea level rise;
(B) freshwater resource scarcity;
(C) wildfires; and
(D) increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather
conditions and events, such as flooding, drought, and extreme
storm events, including tropical cyclones.
(d) Climate Security Strategy.--The Secretary shall use the
evaluations required under subsection (a)--
(1) to inform the development and implementation of a
climate security strategy for the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, embassies, consulates, regional bureaus, and other
offices and programs operating chief of mission authority,
including those with roles in conflict avoidance, prevention
and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response,
prevention, and assistance; and
(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, develop,
budget for, and (upon approval) implement plans, policies,
and actions--
(A) to account for the impacts of climate change to global
human health, safety, governance, oceans, food production,
fresh water and other critical natural resources,
settlements, infrastructure, marginalized groups, and
economic activity;
(B) to evaluate the climate change vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and
non-defense assets abroad.;
(C) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk
and vulnerability assessments into all foreign policy and
security decision-making processes, including awarding
foreign assistance;
(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain regions and
countries that are--
(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(ii) strategically significant to the United States;
(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of foreign
countries to the effects of climate change as a means of
reducing the risks of conflict and instability;
(F) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging
foreign governments, particularly nations that are least
capable of coping with the effects of climate change--
(i) to conduct climate security evaluations; and
(ii) to facilitate the development of climate security
action plans to ensure stability and public safety in
disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion;
(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and
nondefense assets abroad;
(H) to build international institutional capacity to
address climate security implications and to advance United
States interests, regional stability, and global security;
and
(I) other activities that advance -
(i) the utilization and integration of climate science in
national security planning; and
(ii) the clear understanding of how the effects of climate
change can exacerbate security risks and threats.
SEC. 103. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
(A) creates new national and regional security challenges
due to increased military activity in the Arctic;
(B) heightens the risks of potential conflicts spilling
over into the Arctic region from interventions and theaters
of tension in other regions of the world;
(C) threatens maritime safety due to inadequate regional
resource capacity to patrol the increase in vessel traffic
this remote region is experiencing from the growing expanses
of open Arctic water from diminished annual levels of sea
ice;
[[Page S2019]]
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity
in the Arctic region where search and rescue capacity remains
very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile and
historically pristine environment and the unique and highly
sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and
terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences
outlined in paragraph (1) by--
(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and extremely
dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in the
Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations for
mitigating and responding to threats and risks in the Arctic;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction
Capability to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice
predictions on time scales necessary for ensuring regional
security and trans-Arctic shipping;
(D) investing in resources, including a significantly
expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that the United States
has adequate capacity to prevent and respond to security
threats in the Arctic region; and
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all nations in the
Arctic region to reach an agreement for--
(i) maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region;
and
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety
initiatives in the Arctic region.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Arctic nations.--The term ``Arctic Nations'' means the
8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that
extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the
equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
(2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the
geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude
north of the equator.
(c) Designation.--The Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
shall designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within
the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs as ``Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic
Affairs'', who shall be responsible for affairs in the Arctic
Region.
(d) Duties.-- The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic
Affairs shall--
(1) facilitate the development and coordination of United
States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to--
(A) meeting national security needs;
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its
biological resources;
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural resource
management and economic development;
(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the
Arctic Nations;
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that
affect them; and
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local,
regional, and global environmental issues;
(2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives, and, as
appropriate, represent the United States within multilateral
fora that address international cooperation and foreign
policy matters in the Arctic Region;
(3) help inform transnational commerce and commercial
maritime transit in the Arctic Region;
(4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the
current and projected effects of climate change on the Arctic
Region and ensure that such data is applied to the
development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
(5) make available the methods and approaches on the
integration of climate science to other regional security
planning programs in the Department of State to better ensure
that broader decision making processes may more adequately
account for the effects of climate change;
(6) serve as a key point of contact for other Federal
agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department
of the Interior, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Intelligence Community, on Arctic Region security issues;
(7) develop and facilitate the implementation of an Arctic
Region Security Policy in accordance with subsection (f);
(8) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
to encourage other countries and international multilateral
organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region
Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and
(9) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as
the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs and the Secretary of
State shall prescribe.
(e) Rank and Status.--The Secretary of State may change the
title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs
designated under subsection (c) to Special Representative or
Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador if--
(1) the President nominates the person so designated to
that rank and status; and
(2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and
status.
(f) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Arctic Region
Security Policy shall include requirements for the Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs, embassies, regional bureaus, and
other offices with a role in conflict avoidance, prevention
and security assistance, or humanitarian disaster response,
prevention, and assistance to assess, develop, budget for,
and implement plans, policies, and actions--
(1) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic Nations
to the effects of climate change and increased civilian and
military activity from Arctic Nations and other nations that
may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region
due to decreased sea ice, warmer ambient air temperatures and
other effects of climate change, as a means of reducing the
risk of conflict and instability;
(2) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and
Arctic Nations that--
(A) are vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United States;
(3) to account for the impacts on human health, safety,
stresses, reliability, food production, fresh water and other
critical natural resources, and economic activity;
(4) to coordinate the integration of climate change risk
and vulnerability assessments into the decision making
process on foreign assistance awards to Arctic Nations;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging
and cooperating with Arctic Nations on collaborative
approaches--
(A) to sustainably manage natural resources in the Arctic
Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the
Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by
mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies
among Arctic Nations on the management of maritime transit
routes through the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on
the transit policies for access to and transit in the Arctic
Region by non-Arctic Nations; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security
Action Plans to ensure stability and public safety in
disaster situations in a humane and responsible fashion; and
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security,
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States interests and
nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS
SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
RETURNING TO THE PARIS AGREEMENT.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) President Trump's decision to withdraw the United
States from the Paris Agreement was a mistake that harmed the
leadership, economic, national security, and diplomatic
interests of the United States; and
(2) the United States' expeditious return to the Paris
Agreement is a critical first step to restoring United States
leadership among, and in cooperation with, the international
community;
(3) resuming United States' global leadership in the Paris
Agreement's implementation process is critical to ensuring
that the rules and procedures for implementing the Paris
Agreement achieve maximum benefits for the United States;
(4) prioritizing the immediate preparation and
communication of an updated United States' nationally
determined contribution in support of the Paris Agreement
will demonstrate a renewed and increasingly ambitious United
States' commitment to climate action, which should
incorporate--
(A) strategies for achieving domestic greenhouse gas
emissions reductions that achieve the United States' 2015
national determined contribution to the Paris Agreement;
(B) an ambitious 2030 mitigation target representing a mid-
term goal that signifies the emission reductions trajectory
the United States needs to be on to achieve net-zero
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(C) commitments to engage constructively with parties to
the Paris Agreement regarding the development of strategies
to secure ambitious commitments from all parties and to
ensure adequate progress on mitigating greenhouses
sufficiently to prevent 1.5 degree Celsius increase of
warming;
(D) announced intentions of the United States' to accept
and fulfill United States obligations to other international
agreements to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions,
including the International Civil Aviation Organization's
Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
and the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol;
(E) an intention to resume the United States' cooperation
and support for cooperative climate action detailed and
announced in various climate change communiques produced by
the G7, the G20, the Arctic Council, the United Nations, and
others for which the United States has recently abstained;
(F) a platform and policy incentives for the United States
private sector, and State and local governments to accurately
account for their contributions to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions;
(G) a new, increased contribution pledge to the Green
Climate Fund, and contributions to other complementary
multilateral funds;
(H) a commitment to resume a leadership role within the
Green Climate Fund to achieve accountability, transparency,
and management reforms; and
[[Page S2020]]
(I) other activities that advance United States climate-
related foreign policy objectives, including global
greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation
activities, and global climate security;
(5) United States collaboration with other nations,
especially developing countries most impacted by the need to
transition carbon intensive industrial sectors, and the
workforces of these affected industries, on the global
transition to environmentally sustainable economies and
societies to ensure workers benefit from opportunities that
arise in a transition to economies powered by clean energy,
including engagements on--
(A) realizing the potential to create significant net gains
in employment opportunities through increases in the number
of decent jobs through investments in environmentally
sustainable production and consumption and management of
natural resources;
(B) improving the quality of jobs and increased incomes on
a large scale from more productive processes, and
environmentally sustainable products and services in sectors
such as agriculture, renewable energy, transport,
construction, recycling, and tourism;
(C) social inclusion through improved access to affordable,
environmentally sustainable energy and payments for
environmental services, which are of particular relevance to
women and residents in rural areas who face more economic
challenges;
(D) protections from the effects of economic restructuring
that would otherwise result in the displacement of workers
and possible job losses;
(E) training and access to new job opportunities
attributable to new environmentally sustainable and clean
energy powered enterprises and workplaces;
(F) attracting new environmentally sustainable and clean
energy powered enterprises and workplaces to communities
transitioning to low carbon economies and assist with
adapting to climate change to avoid loss of assets and
livelihoods and involuntary migration; and
(G) avoiding adverse effects on the incomes of poor
households from higher energy and commodity prices; and
(6) the United States should communicate its intention to
achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.
SEC. 202. ENHANCED UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO THE PARIS
AGREEMENT.
(a) Sense of Congress Regarding Need for Updated United
States Nationally Determined Contribution.--It is the sense
of Congress that--
(1) all parties determine their voluntary contributions to
the Paris Agreement, in accordance with Article 4.2 of the
Paris Agreement;
(2) the development and submission of a new United States'
nationally determined contribution should be prioritized, in
accordance with Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement;
(3) the new United States' nationally determined
contribution should--
(A) represent an ambitious 2030 target, in accordance with
Articles 4.2 and 4.3 of the Paris Agreement; and
(B) put the United States on an appropriate trajectory
towards achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
and
(4) the plan required under subsection (b) should--
(A) be developed in accordance with Article 4.13 of the
Paris Agreement;
(B) inform United States' obligations under Article 13.7 of
the Paris Agreement; and
(C) clearly demonstrate how the United States will achieve
the target referred to in paragraph (3).
(b) Plan for Developing the United States' Nationally
Determined Contribution.--At least 20 days before the United
States submits a new or provisional nationally determined
contribution, the President shall consult with, and provide
embargoed drafts of the nationally determined contribution
to, the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Public Transparency.--The President shall make
available to the public a plan for the United States to meet
its nationally determined contribution, which shall include--
(1) ambitious, economy-wide, short-term greenhouse gas
emissions reductions targets for 2025 and 2030, with relevant
addenda to the plan following its initial submission;
(2) considerations made for populations, regions,
industries, and constituencies that could be affected by
actions to meet the targets described in paragraph (1) and
the failure to meet such targets, including the effect of
such actions on--
(A) United States' jobs, wages, and pay;
(B) the cost of energy (such as electricity and gasoline)
for consumers; and
(C) the ability to develop and deploy new, innovative,
domestically produced technologies;
(3) a description of how the United States may use--
(A) multilateral and bilateral diplomatic tools, in
addition to the expert committee established under Article 15
of the Paris Agreement, to encourage and assist other parties
to the Paris Agreement to fulfill their announced
contributions; and
(B) the mechanisms under Articles 12 and 13 of the Paris
Agreement to urge enhanced actions from other parties to
achieve the overall objectives of the Paris Agreement;
(4) a description of how the Paris Agreement's loss and
damage provisions would affect infrastructure resiliency in
the United States;
(5) a coherent and stable policy framework for sustainable
enterprise development and decent work opportunities for all
United States residents that--
(A) is developed through engagement in social dialogue,
particularly in--
(i) communities that have historically experienced
environmental injustice; and
(ii) communities with economies that are heavily dependent
on fossil fuel production or consumption; and
(B) maintains such social dialogue, in line with
international labor standards--
(i) at all stages, from policy design to implementation and
evaluation; and
(ii) at all levels, from the national level to the
enterprise; and
(6) an accounting of other relevant activities that advance
United States foreign policy objectives of--
(A) advancing global greenhouse gas mitigation;
(B) supporting climate change adaptation activities; and
(C) improving global climate security.
(d) Education and Public Awareness.--
(1) In general.--The plan developed under subsection (c)
shall be consistent with Article 12 of the Paris Agreement,
which states ``Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as
appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training,
public awareness, public participation and public access to
information, recognizing the importance of these steps with
respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.''.
(2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this Act may be
construed to require or prohibit the President from including
in the plan developed under subsection (b), consistent with
the prohibition described in section 438 of the General
Education Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232a), recommendations
to support State and local educational agencies, in
integrating instruction on human-caused climate change and
the societal, environmental, and economic effects of such
climate change into curricula taught in elementary and
secondary schools under the control of such State and local
educational agencies, in order to meet the goals and
ambitions of the Paris Agreement to ensure climate education
and awareness in schools.
(e) Sense of Congress Regarding the Accountability of
Parties to the Paris Agreement.--It is the sense of Congress
that the United States shall use its diplomatic leverage and
the mechanisms of the Paris Agreement that promote
transparency, reporting, and accountability among parties to
seek to play critical leadership roles on the Paris
Agreement's critical working groups, subsidiary bodies, and
constituted bodies--
(1) to maximize the United States' ability to hold other
parties accountable for meeting the commitments to the Paris
Agreement; and
(2) to ensure that all parties commit to and meet ambitious
greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets.
SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RATIFICATION OF THE
KIGALI AMENDMENT TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The chemical refrigerant alternative, hydrofluorocarbon
(HFC), and its chemical derivatives identified in Annex F of
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, done at Montreal September 16, 1987, which replaced
hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC),
are short-lived and highly potent greenhouse gases.
(2) Some HFCs are 4,000 times more potent greenhouse gases
than carbon dioxide. The expansion of mass production and
worldwide use of HFCs have significantly contributed to the
recent worsening of the global climate crisis.
(3) In October 15, 2016, the parties at the 28th Meeting of
Parties to the Montreal Protocol, with the support of the
United States, adopted an amendment (referred to in the Act
as the ``Kigali Amendment'') to the Montreal Protocol to
globally phase down the production and application of
hydrofluorocarbons, most commonly used as refrigerants in air
conditioners and for cold storage.
(4) The Kigali Amendment calls for parties to cut the
production and consumption of HFCs by more than 80 percent
during a 30-year period--
(A) to eliminate an estimated 80,000,000,000 metric tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by 2050; and
(B) to avoid up to 0.5 degree Celsius warming by the end of
the century, while continuing to protect the ozone layer.
(5) United States' ratification of the Kigali Amendment
will require the advice and consent of the Senate. There is
broad bipartisan support for the Kigali Amendment in the
Senate, as evidenced by a letter sent by 13 Republican
senators to the President on June 4, 2018, urging the
President to submit the Kigali Amendment to the Senate for
advice and consent.
(6) The Environmental Protection Agency received sufficient
domestic legal authority to comply with the international
obligations of the Kigali Amendment under title II of the
Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2021 (division G of Public Law 116-260),
which was enacted on December 27, 2020.
(7) As of the date of the introduction of the Act, the
President has not submitted the Kigali Amendment to the
Senate for advice
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and consent and the United States Government has neither
ratified nor implemented policies to comply with the Kigali
Amendment.
(8) The Kigali Amendment, which has been ratified by 100
parties, entered into force on January 1, 2019.
(9) Adoption of the Kigali Amendment and United States'
ratification of and compliance with the Kigali Amendment is
supported broadly by affected industry stakeholders and
environmental public interest organizations.
(10) Industries in the United States that use and produce
fluorocarbons--
(A) contribute more than $158,000,000,000 annually in goods
and services to the economy of the United States; and
(B) employ more than 700,000 individuals, with an annual
industry-wide payroll of more than $32,000,000,000.
(11) Foreign competitors to United States chemical
refrigerant and refrigeration equipment based and operating
in countries that have ratified the Kigali Amendment and are
implementing policies in compliance with the Kigali Amendment
are gaining an advantage on United States based industries in
the manufacturing and used of next-generation chemicals and
equipment.
(12) The United States' ratification of the Kigali
Amendment--
(A) would support and promote the technological leadership
of the United States' industries to lead global production
and marketing of replacement refrigerants and equipment in
compliance with the Kigali Amendment; and
(B) according to industry analysis, would potentially
create approximately 33,000 new manufacturing jobs in the
United States and add approximately $12,500,000,000 per year
to the economy of the United States.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should immediately submit the Kigali
Amendment to the Senate for advice and consent; and
(2) the Senate should promptly provide its advice and
consent on the Kigali Amendment.
SEC. 204. COMPLIANCE WITH THE CARBON OFFSET AND REDUCTION
SCHEME FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall promulgate regulations establishing uniform policies
and take other necessary actions to implement the terms of
the Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International
Aviation (commonly known as ``CORSIA''), which was adopted by
International Civil Aviation Organization in October 2016 as
Assembly Resolution A39-3, and any amendments to such
Resolution with which the United States concurs, as means to
secure a single global carbon emissions market-based
mechanism to facilitate the participation of operators of
civil aircraft of the United States in international
aviation.
SEC. 205. SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) High-GWP hfc.--The term ``high-GWP HFC'' means newly
manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a global warming
potential calculated over a 100-year period of greater than
150, as described in the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(2) Short-lived climate pollutants.--The term ``short-lived
climate pollutants'' means--
(A) black carbon;
(B) methane; and
(C) high-GWP HFC.
(b) In General.--The President shall direct the United
States representatives to appropriate international bodies
and conferences (including the United Nations Environment
Programme, the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the Arctic
Council, the Group of 7, the Group of 20, the Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation, the Arctic Council, the Climate and
Clean Air Coalition on Short-Lived Climate Pollutants, and
the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture) to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States, consistent
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to
advocate that each such body or conference--
(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to reduce
short-lived climate pollutants;
(2) invest in and develop alternative energy sources,
industrial and agricultural processes, appliances, and
products to replace sources of short-lived climate
pollutants;
(3) enhance coordination with the private sector--
(A) to increase production and distribution of clean energy
alternatives, industrial processes, and products that will
replace sources of short-lived climate pollutants;
(B) to develop action plans to mitigate short-lived climate
pollutants from various private sector operations;
(C) to encourage best technology, methods, and management
practices for reducing short-lived climate pollutants;
(D) to craft specific financing mechanisms for the
incremental costs associated with mitigating short-live
climate pollutants; and
(E) to grow economic opportunities and develop markets, as
appropriate, for short-lived climate pollutants trading,
capture, and other efforts that support economic growth using
low and zero carbon energy sources;
(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory
authorities and governments to remove unnecessary barriers to
investment in short-lived climate mitigation solutions,
including--
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean energy;
(B) the implementation of policies requiring industrial and
agricultural best practices for capturing or mitigating the
release of methane from extractive, agricultural, and
industrial processes; and
(C) climate assessment, scientific research, monitoring,
and technological development activities;
(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, and metric-
based targets to measure the effectiveness of projects
described in paragraph (4); and
(6) engage international partners in an existing
multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through an
international agreement a new multilateral forum) to improve
global cooperation for--
(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating efforts to
reduce short-lived climate pollutants;
(B) developing and implementing best practices for phasing
out sources of short-lived climate pollutants, including
expanding capacity for innovative instruments to mitigate
short-lived climate pollutants at the national and
subnational levels of foreign countries, particularly
countries with little capacity to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and deploy clean energy facilities, and countries
that lack sufficient policies to advance such development;
(C) encouraging the development of standards and practices,
and increasing transparency and accountability efforts for
the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants;
(D) integrating tracking and monitoring systems into
industrial processes;
(E) fostering research to improve scientific understanding
of--
(i) how high concentrations of short-lived climate
pollutants affect human health, safety, and our climate;
(ii) changes in the amount and regional concentrations of
black carbon and methane emissions, based on scientific
modeling and forecasting;
(iii) effective means to sequester short-lived climate
pollutants; and
(iv) other related areas of research the United States
representatives deem necessary;
(F) encouraging the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and other international finance organizations--
(i) to prioritize efforts to combat short-lived climate
pollutants; and
(ii) to enhance transparency by providing sufficient and
adequate information to facilitate independent verification
of their climate finance reporting;
(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic Council (including
India and China) to adopt mitigation plans consistent with
the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Council's
Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane;
(H) collaborating on technological advances in short-lived
climate pollutant mitigation, sequestration and reduction
technologies; and
(I) advising foreign countries, at both the national and
subnational levels, regarding the development and execution
of regulatory policies, services, and laws pertaining to
reducing the creation and the collection and safe management
of short-lived climate pollutants.
(c) Enhancing International Outreach and Partnership of
United States Agencies Involved in Greenhouse Gas
Reductions.--
(1) Finding.--Congress recognizes the success of the United
States Climate Alliance and the greenhouse gas reduction
programs and strategies established by the Environmental
Protection Agency's Center for Corporate Climate Leadership.
(2) Authorization of efforts to build foreign
partnerships.--The Secretary of State shall work with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to build
partnerships, as appropriate, with the governments of foreign
countries and to support international efforts to reduce
short-lived climate pollutants and combat climate change.
(d) Negotiation of New International Agreements and
Reassertion of Targets in Existing Agreements.--Not later
than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State shall submit a report to Congress that--
(1) assesses the potential for negotiating new
international agreements, new targets within existing
international agreements or cooperative bodies, and the
creation of a new international forum to mitigate globally
short-lived climate pollutants to support the efforts
described in subsection (b);
(2) describes the provisions that could be included in such
agreements;
(3) assesses potential parties to such agreements;
(4) describes a process for reengaging with Canada and
Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed to at the 2016
North American Leaders' Summit; and
(5) describes a process for reengaging with the countries
of the Arctic Council regarding the methane and black carbon
targets that were negotiated in 2015 through the Framework
for Action.
(e) Consideration of Short-lived Climate Pollutants in
Negotiating International Agreements.--In negotiating any
relevant
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international agreement with any country or countries after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(1) consider the impact short-lived climate pollutants are
having on the increase in global average temperatures and the
resulting global climate change;
(2) consider the effects that climate change is having on
the environment; and
(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts to
eliminate short-lived climate pollutants from such country or
countries.
SEC. 206. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING CLEAN
TRANSPORTATION AND SUSTAINABLE LAND USE AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Agriculture, forestry, and other land use accounted for
24 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions during 2010,
which--
(A) is caused primarily from agriculture (cultivation of
crops and livestock) and deforestation; and
(B) does not take into account the carbon dioxide that
ecosystems remove from the atmosphere by sequestering carbon
in biomass, dead organic matter, and soils, which offset
approximately 20 percent of emissions from this sector.
(2) The transportation sector accounts for 14 percent of
global gas emissions and 28 percent of the United States'
greenhouse gas emissions.
(3) According to the National Center for Biotechnology
Information's report, ``National Mitigation Potential from
Natural Climate Solutions in the Tropics''--
(A) better land stewardship is needed to achieve the Paris
Agreement's temperature goal of holding the increase of
global average temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius,
particularly in the tropics;
(B) as countries enhance their nationally determined
contributions, confusion persists about the potential
contribution of better land stewardship to meeting such goal;
(C) in 50 percent of the tropical countries, cost-effective
natural climate solutions could mitigate more than 50 percent
of national emissions;
(D) in more than 25 percent of the tropical countries, cost
effective natural climate solutions potential is greater than
national emissions; and
(E) natural climate solutions can transform national
economies and contribute to sustainable development goals.
(4) According to the International Energy Agency--
(A) global transport emissions increased by less than 0.5
percent in 2019 (compared with an average annual increase of
1.9 percent since 2000), owing to efficiency improvements,
electrification, and greater use of biofuels;
(B) transportation is responsible for 24 percent of direct
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion;
(C) electric car deployment has grown rapidly since 2010,
with the global stock of electric passenger cars passing
5,000,000 in 2018 (an increase of 63 percent from the
previous year);
(D) in 2018--
(i) approximately 45 percent of all electric cars on the
road were in China;
(ii) approximately 24 percent of such cars were in Europe;
and
(iii) approximately 22 percent of such cars were in the
United States;
(E) existing measures to increase efficiency and reduce
energy demand must be deepened and extended for compliance
with the Sustainable Development Scenario of the
International Energy Agency's World Energy Model;
(F) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, emissions from aviation
and shipping were increasing faster than all other
transportation modes; and
(G) energy demand and emissions have continued to rise in
all modes of road transport (cars, trucks, buses, and 2- and
3-wheelers), particularly in heavy-duty road freight
transport, which account for 75 percent of global
transportation sector emissions.
(5) The worldwide market share of sport utility vehicles
rose 15 percentage points between 2014 and 2019, and now
comprises 40 percent of the global light-duty vehicle market.
(6) China is the world's largest automobile market, with
more than 23,700,000 light vehicles sold in China in 2018. As
China's road network rapidly continues to expand, the number
of vehicle miles traveled per capita will most likely lead to
growth in China's transportation sector carbon dioxide
emissions.
(7) Even with India's advancement of policies to promote
electric vehicles and biofuels--
(A) India relies heavily on oil, and comprises 29 percent
of India's total energy consumption;
(B) prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, India was the world's
fastest growing aviation market, with passenger numbers for
domestic and international flights doubling since 2010;
(C) India is planning to build 100 new airports between
2020 and 2035, and industry analysts have projected up to
520,000,000 Indian air travelers annually by 2037; and
(D) the World Health Organization reports that 15 of the
cities worldwide with the worst air pollution are in India,
largely due to urban vehicle emissions.
(8) In 2013, Mexico became the first vehicle market in
Latin America to establish fuel economy or carbon dioxide
emissions standards.
(9) The Department of State, the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, and the Environmental Protection
Agency do not have a program in place to encourage other
countries to adopt standards that are compatible with United
States fuel economy and emissions standards.
(10) Many countries adopt European emissions standards
rather than United States standards, in part because of
European diplomatic engagement, disadvantaging United States
automakers in international markets.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to partner, consult, and coordinate with foreign
governments, civil society, international financial
institutions, subnational communities, agribusiness and
automobile industry leaders, and the private sector in a
concerted effort--
(1) to raise awareness of--
(A) the greenhouse gas emission contributions from
agriculture, forestry, other land uses, and the
transportation sector to the annual total of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions globally; and
(B) the importance of working cooperatively on the
development of multi-faceted and country specific policies
and strategies--
(i) to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
agriculture, forestry, other land uses, and the
transportation sector; and
(ii) to promote economic growth, opportunities, sustainable
land management, and equitable access to mobility,
transportation services, and resources among all populations;
(2) to mitigate land use sector emissions through enhanced
land use planning, sustainable agriculture practices,
sustainable forest management, and community-led conservation
and development and other natural climate solutions;
(3) to use the voice and vote of the United States in
multilateral institutions to advance international efforts to
advance sustainable land-use planning, climate-smart
agriculture, sustainable forest management, and community-led
conservation and development;
(4) to improve the reliability and sustainability of
transportation systems, particularly in developing countries,
through a focus on mitigating carbon emissions, improving
health and safety outcomes through improved land use and
community design, and improved mobility for all populations;
(5) to promote collaboration regarding international
research and development in--
(A) zero-emission vehicles;
(B) sustainable urban development and smart growth; and
(C) advanced low carbon biofuels for transportation;
(6) to facilitate and support the ability of parties to the
Paris Agreement to more accurately monitor, record, and
report transportation sector emissions;
(7) to develop greater cooperation among parties for
strengthening the rules and ambition of the Paris Agreement's
mitigation targets for transportation sector emissions;
(8) to improve the structural integrity of critical
transportation infrastructure to withstand current and
forecasted effects of climate change and support community
resilience, improved access to jobs, and adaptability to the
effects of climate change; and
(9) to explore new opportunities or seek enhanced
initiatives within existing multilateral and bilateral
agreements to develop mechanisms and policies for reducing
transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions.
(c) International Cooperation.--In implementing the policy
described in subsection (b), the President should direct the
United States representatives to appropriate international
bodies to use the influence of the United States, consistent
with the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, to
advocate that each such body--
(1) promote transportation sector investment in--
(A) electric vehicles and other low and zero carbon
transportation technologies; and
(B) sustainable land use development that incorporates--
(i) multi-modal transportation designs aimed at reducing--
(I) traffic congestion;
(II) carbon emissions from motor vehicles;
(III) travel times between high volume destinations within
a community;
(IV) vehicle crashes and other threats to motorist and
pedestrian safety; and
(V) stormwater runoff from impervious road surfaces,
vehicle conflicts with wildlife, habitat destruction, and
other forms of environmental degradation commonly associated
with roads and motor vehicles;
(ii) multi-use community designs and dense development that
accounts for locating residential development near essential
goods, services, and job opportunities (to reduce individual
reliance of motorized personal transportation);
(iii) transportation systems designed--
(I) to maximize the safety of all users; and
(II) to reduce the probability of motorized vehicle
crashes, including motorized vehicle crashes that injure or
kill pedestrians and bicyclists;
(2) strive to improve mobility by advancing equitable
access to transportation services among all populations,
particularly historically underserved or marginalized
populations and communities;
(3) improve environmental quality and community health
outcomes through--
[[Page S2023]]
(A) safer and more efficient multi-modal transportation
systems that reduce vehicle pollution and congestion;
(B) reductions in the amount of impervious surfaces; and
(C) integration of safe pedestrian and bicycling
infrastructure;
(4) addresses unique transportation and economic needs of
countries' diverse populations and communities in ways that
also support a country's achievement of ambitious greenhouse
gas mitigation commitments;
(5) enhance coordination and engagement with private sector
stakeholders;
(6) provide technical assistance to foreign regulatory
authorities and governments to remove barriers to investment
in transportation systems, infrastructure and electric
vehicles and low and zero carbon fuels; and
(7) use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to
measure the effectiveness of such projects.
(d) Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO2 Emissions
Diplomacy Initiative.--
(1) Development.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Transportation, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall
develop a Vehicle Fuel Economy and CO2 Emissions
Diplomacy Initiative to promote the worldwide adoption of
vehicle fuel economy and vehicle carbon dioxide emissions
standards that are compatible with United States standards.
(2) Responsibilities and duties.--
(A) Diplomatic efforts.--The Secretary of State shall lead
diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to adopt
vehicle fuel economy standards and vehicle carbon dioxide
emissions standards.
(B) Technical assistance.--The Administrator of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall
provide technical assistance to other countries to help such
countries to develop new standards, testing regimes, and
compliance strategies.
(3) Program scope.--The Vehicle Fuel Economy and
CO2 Emissions Diplomacy Initiative should--
(A) have the goal of reducing oil consumption by at least
2,000,000 barrels per day by 2030, in addition to the
reduction anticipated by the implementation of standards in
existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
(B) include input in developing the program from leaders in
United States industry; and
(C) focus special attention on Latin America.
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES REENGAGEMENT
WITH THE GROUP OF SEVEN AND THE GROUP OF TWENTY
ON CLIMATE ACTION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) President Trump has abstained from several heads of
state meetings on climate action and cooperation with the
heads of state from countries comprising the Group of Seven
(referred to in this section as the ``G7'') and the Group of
Twenty (referred to in this section as the ``G20'').
(2) The G7 summit held in Charlevoix, Quebec in June 2018
produced a climate action communique that was signed by the
heads of state from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the United Kingdom, but was not signed by the United
States.
(3) The G7 climate action communique states, ``Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
European Union reaffirm their strong commitment to implement
the Paris Agreement, through ambitious climate action, in
particular through reducing emissions while stimulating
innovation, enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening and
financing resilience and reducing vulnerability; as well as
ensuring a just transition, including increasing efforts to
mobilize climate finance from a wide variety of sources.''.
(4) In 2019, the United States blocked the G7 from making
any new or additional commitments on climate change, to the
expressed disappointment and frustration of the other six
heads of state.
(5) The G7, without the active participation of the United
States, continues to work together to fulfill clean energy
commitments on initiatives such as the 2014 Rome Initiative
for Energy Security, the 2015 Hamburg Initiative for
Sustainable Energy Security, the 2016 Kitakyushu Initiative
on Energy Security for Global Growth, and the Africa
Renewable Energy Initiative. However, United States
objections to global cooperative climate action have
prevented the G7 from undertaking new clean energy and
climate action initiatives in recent years.
(6) The 2018 Buenos Aires Leaders Declaration by the G20--
(A) recognizes the risks that climate change poses to
global security, global health, and economic development; and
(B) affirms the significance of the Paris Agreement.
(7) The United States insisted on the inclusion of a
statement in the G20 Buenos Aires Leaders Declaration, for
which the United States was the only subscriber, expressing
dissenting opinions on international climate action
cooperation and equivocation on ``utilizing all energy
sources and technologies, while protecting the environment''.
(8) In 2019, the G20 narrowly avoided concluding without a
leaders' declaration, when the President unsuccessfully tried
to pressure the other 19 heads of state to weaken commitments
on combating climate change in the 2019 G20 Osaka Leaders
Declaration, leaving the United States to provide a
dissenting provision articulating its outlier position on
climate action in the Declaration.
(b) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the
Secretary of State, shall initiate a China-focused agenda at
the G7, with respect to--
(1) trade and investment issues and enforcement;
(2) establishing and promulgating international
infrastructure standards;
(3) the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong;
(4) human rights concerns in Xinjiang, Tibet, and other
areas in the People's Republic of China;
(5) the security of 5G telecommunications;
(6) anti-competitive behavior;
(7) coercive and indentured international finance and
conditional provision of foreign assistance;
(8) international influence campaigns;
(9) climate change;
(10) China's domestic and international investments in new
coal power plants;
(11) environmental standards; and
(12) coordination with like-minded regional partners,
including the Republic of Korea and Australia.
(c) Briefing on Progress of Negotiations.--Not later than 1
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall provide a briefing to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the
progress of any negotiations described in subsection (b).
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should--
(1) in the next G7 communique and G20 Leaders'
Declaration--
(A) renounce the United States contrarian positions on
climate change expressed in the 2018 and 2019 official
documents of the G7 and G20 summits;
(B) renew its commitment to climate cooperation and support
for fulfilling the goals of the Paris Agreement in the
context of the G7 and the G20;
(C) lead efforts to formalize new mechanisms and
commitments to climate action cooperation between the heads
of state of the G7 and of the G20, which are aimed at--
(i) increasing ambition on greenhouse gas mitigation; and
(ii) strengthening support for climate finance in
developing countries, particularly countries that are most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change; and
(D) challenge the heads of state of the G7 and the G20 to
leverage private financing and increase grants and official
development assistance in clean energy and sustainable
development projects in their own countries and in developing
countries, especially countries that are most vulnerable to
the effects of climate change; and
(2) initiate the China-focused agenda described in
subsection (b) at the G7.
TITLE III--CLIMATE CHANGE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND SUPPORT
SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION,
MITIGATION, AND SECURITY PROGRAM.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Convention.--The term ``Convention'' means the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at New
York May 9, 1992, and entered into force March 21, 1994.
(2) Most vulnerable communities and populations.--The term
``most vulnerable communities and populations'' means
communities and populations that are at risk of substantial
adverse effects of climate change and have limited capacity
to respond to such effects, including women, impoverished
communities, children, indigenous peoples, and formal and
informal workers.
(3) Most vulnerable developing countries.--The term ``most
vulnerable developing countries'' means, as determined by the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, developing countries that are at risk of
substantial adverse effects of climate change and have
limited capacity to respond to such effects, considering the
approaches included in any international treaties and
agreements.
(4) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the International
Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program
established pursuant to subsection (c).
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to provide
authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing
bilateral and regional international development assistance,
and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, in
support of host country driven projects, planning, policies,
and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host
countries--
(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable energy and
reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from the power sector
while facilitating the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost
clean energy sources, in a manner that is equitable for
workers and communities;
(2) to adapt and become more resilient to current and
forecasted effects of climate change; and
(3) to employ--
(A) sustainable land use practices that mitigate
desertification and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation; and
[[Page S2024]]
(B) agricultural production practices that reduce poverty
while improving soil health, protecting water quality, and
increasing food security and nutrition.
(c) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall establish a program, to be known as the
``International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and
Security Program'', to provide bilateral and regional
assistance to developing countries for programs, projects,
and activities described in subsection (e).
(d) Supplement Not Supplant.--Assistance provided under
this section shall be used to supplement, and not to
supplant, any other Federal, State, or local resources
available to carry out activities that fit the
characteristics of the Program.
(e) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States to
ensure that the Program provides resources to developing
countries, particularly the most vulnerable communities and
populations in such countries, to support the development and
implementation of programs, projects, and activities that--
(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the integration
and deployment of clean energy, which may include
transmission, distribution, and interconnections to renewable
energy, while facilitating the transition in key global
markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to
low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is
equitable for workers and communities;
(2) advance the use of clean energy technologies facing
financial or other barriers to widespread deployment that
could be addressed through support under the Program to
reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions;
(3) improve the availability, viability, and accessibility
of zero emission vehicles, including support for design and
development of transportation networks and land use practices
that mitigate carbon emissions in the transportation sector;
(4) support building capacities that may include--
(A) developing and implementing methodologies and programs
for measuring and quantifying greenhouse gas emissions and
verifying emissions mitigation, including building capacities
to conduct emissions inventories and meet reporting
requirements under the Paris Agreement;
(B) assessing, developing, and implementing technology and
policy options for greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and
avoidance of future emissions, including sector-based and
cross-sector mitigation strategies;
(C) enhancing the technical capacity of regulatory
authorities, planning agencies, and related institutions in
developing countries to improve the deployment of clean
energy technologies and practices, including through
increased transparency;
(D) training and instruction regarding the installation and
maintenance of renewable energy technologies; and
(E) activities that support the development and
implementation of frameworks for intellectual property rights
in developing countries;
(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic growth, and
adaptation capacities in response to and in spite of the
effects of climate change;
(6) promote appropriate job training and access to new job
opportunities in new economic sectors and industries that
emerge due to the transition from fossil fuel energy to clean
energy, with full labor protections in accordance with
international labor standards;
(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience
capacities of communities to the effects of climate change,
including effects on--
(A) water availability;
(B) agricultural productivity and food security;
(C) flood risk;
(D) coastal resources;
(E) biodiversity;
(F) economic livelihoods;
(G) health and diseases;
(H) housing and shelter; and
(I) human migration;
(8) help countries and communities adapt to changes in the
environment through enhanced community planning,
preparedness, and growth strategies that take into account
current and forecasted regional and localized effects of
climate change;
(9) conserve and restore natural resources, ecosystems, and
biodiversity threatened by the effects of climate change to
ensure such resources, ecosystems, and biodiversity are
healthy and continue to provide natural protections from the
effects of climate change such as extreme weather;
(10) provide resources, information, scientific data and
modeling, innovative best practices, and technical assistance
to support vulnerable developing countries and communities
adapt their economies, communities, and security planning
efforts to the effects of climate change;
(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies,
including through improvements to make critical
infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of climate
change;
(12) encourage the adoption of policies and measures,
including sector-based and cross-sector policies and
measures, that substantially reduce, sequester, or avoid
greenhouse gas emissions from the domestic energy and
transportation sectors of developing countries;
(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and implement sustainable forestry
practices;
(14) promote sustainable land use activities, including
supporting development planning, design, and construction
with respect to transportation systems and land use that
incorporates--
(A) multi-modal transportation designs aimed at reducing--
(i) traffic congestion;
(ii) carbon emissions from motor vehicles;
(iii) travel times between high volume destinations within
a community;
(iv) motor vehicle crashes and other threats to motorist
and pedestrian safety; and
(v) stormwater runoff from impervious road surfaces, motor
vehicle conflicts with wildlife, habitat destruction, and
other forms of environmental degradation commonly associated
with roads and motor vehicles;
(B) multi-use community designs and dense development that
account for locating residential development near essential
goods, services, and job opportunities to reduce individual
reliance on motorized personal transportation;
(C) transportation systems designed to--
(i) maximize the safety of all users;
(ii) improve mobility by advancing equitable access to
transportation services among all populations, particularly
historically underserved or marginalized populations and
communities; and
(iii) reduce the probability of vehicle crashes and
pedestrian and bicyclist injuries and mortalities;
(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices that
mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and improve food
and water security of communities;
(16) foster partnerships with private sector entities and
nongovernmental international development organizations to
assist with developing solutions and economic opportunities
that support projects, planning, policies, and initiatives
described in subsection (b);
(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen capacities
of developing countries to meet the goals of the conditional
nationally determined contributions of those countries;
(18) establish investment channels designed to leverage
private sector financing in--
(A) clean energy;
(B) sustainable agriculture and natural resource
management; and
(C) the transportation sector as described in paragraph
(3); and
(19) provide technical assistance and support for non-
extractive activities that provide alternative economic
growth opportunities while preserving critical habitats and
natural carbon sinks.
(f) Provision of Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, under the direction of
the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall
provide assistance under the Program--
(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pursuant to the
requirements under subsection (g);
(B) to multilateral funds or international institutions
with programs for climate mitigation or adaptation in
developing countries consistent with the policy described in
subsection (e); or
(C) through a combination of the mechanisms specified in
subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(2) Limitation.--
(A) Conditional distribution to multilateral funds or
international institutions.--In any fiscal year, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, under the direction of the Secretary of State,
may provide up to 40 percent of the assistance available to
carry out the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or
international institutions that meet the requirements of
subparagraph (B).
(B) Multilateral fund or international institution
eligibility.--A multilateral fund or international
institution is eligible to receive assistance under
subparagraph (A)--
(i) if--
(I) such fund or institution is established pursuant to--
(aa) the Convention; or
(bb) an agreement negotiated under the Convention; or
(II) the assistance is directed to 1 or more multilateral
funds or international development institutions, pursuant to
an agreement negotiated under the Convention; and
(ii) if such fund or institution--
(I) specifies the terms and conditions under which the
United States is to provide assistance to the fund or
institution, and under which the fund or institution is to
provide assistance to recipient countries;
(II) ensures that assistance from the United States to the
fund or institution and the principal and income of the fund
or institution are disbursed only--
(aa) to support projects, planning, policies, and
initiatives described in subsection (b);
(bb) consistent with the policy described in subsection
(e); and
[[Page S2025]]
(cc) in regular consultation with relevant governing bodies
of the fund or institution that--
(AA) include representation from countries among the most
vulnerable developing countries; and
(BB) provide public access.
(C) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State,
the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, or the Secretary of the Treasury
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not
later than 15 days before providing assistance to a
multilateral fund or international institution under this
subsection.
(3) Local consultations.--Programs, projects, and
activities supported by assistance provided under this
subsection shall require consultations with local
communities, particularly the most vulnerable communities and
populations in such communities, and indigenous peoples in
areas in which any programs, projects, or activities are
planned to engage such communities and peoples through
adequate disclosure of information, public participation,
consultation, and the free prior and informed consent of such
peoples, including full consideration of the interdependence
of vulnerable communities and ecosystems to promote the
resilience of local communities.
(g) Bilateral Assistance.--
(1) In general.--Except to the extent inconsistent with
this subsection, the administrative authorities under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall
apply to the implementation of this subsection to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to
the implementation of such Act in order to provide the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development with the authority to provide assistance to
countries, including the most vulnerable developing
countries, for programs, projects, and activities consistent
with the purposes described in subsection (b) and the policy
described in subsection (e).
(2) Considerations.--In carrying out this subsection, the
Administrator shall ensure that--
(A) the environmental impact of proposed programs,
projects, and activities is assessed through adequate
consultation, public participation, and disclosure of
information; and
(B) programs, projects, and activities under this
subsection--
(i) avoid environmental degradation, to the maximum extent
practicable; and
(ii) are aligned, to the maximum extent practicable, with
broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural resource
management objectives and initiatives in the recipient
country.
(3) Community engagement.--The Administrator shall seek to
ensure that--
(A) local communities, particularly the most vulnerable
communities and populations in areas in which any programs,
projects, or activities are carried out under this
subsection, are engaged in the design, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of such programs, projects, and
activities through disclosure of information, public
participation, and consultation; and
(B) the needs and interests of the most vulnerable
communities and populations are addressed in national or
regional climate change adaptation plans.
(4) Consultation and disclosure.--For each country
receiving assistance under this subsection, the Administrator
shall establish a process for consultation with, and
disclosure of information to, local, national, and
international stakeholders regarding any programs, projects,
or activities carried out under this subsection.
(h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000,000
for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter.
SEC. 302. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GREEN CLIMATE
FUND.
(a) United States Contributions.--On behalf of the United
States, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of
State--
(1) shall jointly coordinate contributions to the Green
Climate Fund; and
(2) may contribute to the Green Climate Fund, in addition
to the amounts authorized under subsection (d), additional
amounts from other relevant foreign assistance accounts.
(b) Limits on Country Access.--The Secretary of the
Treasury shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States to ensure that--
(1) the Fund does not provide more than approximately 15
percent of the resources of the Fund to any one country;
(2) each country that receives amounts from the Fund
submits to the governing body of the Fund an investment plan
that describes how--
(A) energy efficiency or production projects will achieve
significant and lasting reductions in national-level
greenhouse gas emissions; and
(B) adaptation projects will--
(i) provide long-term enhancements to national and food
security;
(ii) protect lives and livelihoods;
(iii) ensure lasting access to freshwater resources; or
(iv) advance public health outcomes; and
(3) in the case of a country that is not classified by the
World Bank as having a low-income economy, provides for not
less than 15 percent of the total cost of the plan to be
contributed from the public funds of the country.
(c) Project and Program Requirements.--The Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to
ensure that support from the Fund is used exclusively to
support the deployment by developing countries of clean
energy technologies and the development of projects that
improve the resilience capacities and ability of countries to
adapt to the effects of climate change, including, as
appropriate, through the provision of technical support or
support for policy or institutional reforms.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to the
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 301(h),
there are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to
the Green Climate Fund--
(1) $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
(2) $4,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(3) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; and
(4) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2025.
(e) Report to Congress.--Not later than 240 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report describing--
(1) the purpose of and progress on each project supported
by the Fund; and
(2) how each such project furthers the investment plan
described in subsection (b)(2) of each country in which the
project is implemented.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENTS AT
THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In 2020, the World Economic Forum (referred to in this
section as the ``WEF'') in Davos, Switzerland, put addressing
the climate crisis at the top of its agenda. World and
business leaders reinforced the need for urgent action to
avoid human destruction from the clear and present climate
crisis.
(2) At the 2020 annual meeting of the WEF, the President,
accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, delivered a
contrarian message, claiming, ``To embrace the possibilities
of tomorrow, we must reject the perennial prophets of doom
and their predictions of the apocalypse.''.
(3) Nevertheless, the WEF, without support from the United
States, announced climate initiatives on sustainable markets,
reaching carbon neutrality on insurance investment
portfolios, decarbonizing the automotive sector through
circular economies, and transitioning to healthier, more
sustainable food systems.
(4) The one initiative the United States did agree to join
is the Trillion Tree Campaign, which aims to grow, restore,
and conserve 1 trillion trees by 2030.
(5) The President's dismissal of the threat climate change
poses to economic growth and global security has isolated the
United States from the 117 represented countries at the WEF
that support its climate agenda and are accelerating their
national commitments in other international fora to address
climate change.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that at
the 2021 WEF, or at an appropriate time and venue as early as
possible in 2021--
(1) the Secretary of State should commit to restoring
diplomatic engagement and cooperation on mobilizing
investment and support for growing the global economy while
achieving net zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(2) the Secretary of the Treasury should announce--
(A) the intention of the United States Government to divest
from future investment and support for fossil fuel energy and
extraction projects in developing countries; and
(B) the establishment of an international clean energy
private finance fund to support the development of large-
scale renewable energy projects in middle income countries;
(3) the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation should commit
to--
(A) divesting the United States International Development
Finance Corporation from future fossil fuel energy
development and extraction projects; and
(B) investing a significant portion of the annual portfolio
of the United States International Development Finance
Corporation in clean energy development projects; and
(4) the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development should commit to prioritizing
building resilience and adaption capacities in the most
climate-vulnerable countries.
SEC. 304. CLEAN ENERGY AND THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
(a) In General.--Section 1451 of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
9671) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(j) Clean Energy.--
``(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this subsection, the Chief Executive
Officer of the Corporation shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report--
``(A) highlighting the substantial commitment of the
Corporation to invest in renewable and other clean energy
technologies;
``(B) setting forth--
``(i) a plan to significantly reduce greenhouse gas
emissions associated with projects
[[Page S2026]]
and subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio, as
required by paragraph (2); and
``(ii) a plan for facilitating the transition in key global
markets from electricity generated from fossil fuel power to
clean, low-cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is
equitable for workers and communities, as required by
paragraph (3); and
``(C) detailing the efforts of the Corporation to reduce
all greenhouse gas emissions associated with projects and
subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio, including a
full accounting of the reductions, achieved in accordance
with the plan described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.--
``(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, the Corporation shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a climate
change mitigation plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
associated with projects and subprojects within the
Corporation's portfolio by, relative to October 1, 2020--
``(i) not less than 60 percent by 2025; and
``(ii) 100 percent by 2028.
``(B) Implementation.--The Corporation shall begin
implementation of the plan required by subparagraph (A) not
later than 20 days after submitting the plan to the
appropriate congressional committees.
``(C) Report required.--Not later than one year after the
date on which the Corporation begins implementation under
subparagraph (B) of the plan required by subparagraph (A),
and every 2 years thereafter until the Corporation achieves
the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with
projects and subprojects within the Corporation's portfolio
by 100 percent, the Corporation shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees on the Corporation's
progress and efforts to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions
reductions goals of the plan.
``(3) Clean electricity transition.--The Corporation shall
seek, in providing support for projects under title II, to
facilitate the transition in key global markets from
electricity generated from fossil fuel power to clean, low-
cost renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equitable
for workers and communities, by--
``(A) enabling the phase-out of uneconomic coal-fired power
plants that are shielded from competition from renewable
energy sources by noncompetitive market structures such as
long-term contracts and regulated tariffs;
``(B) using low-cost capital--
``(i) to refinance existing debt on uneconomic coal-fired
power plants;
``(ii) to reinvest in renewable energy sources to replace
such plants;
``(iii) to support a just transition to renewable energy
for affected workers and communities by generating decent
jobs that adhere to international labor standards all along
the renewable energy supply chain; and
``(iv) to support the upgrading of jobs and skills as well
as job creation and improved productivity in more labor-
intensive industries that offer employment opportunities on a
wide scale; and
``(C) considering--
``(i) competitive approaches, like reverse auctions, to
ensure the best value in investing in renewable energy
sources; and
``(ii) partnering, as appropriate, with--
``(I) the United States Agency for International
Development; and
``(II) the Department of the Treasury with respect to
efforts by multilateral development banks (as defined in
section 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions
Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c))).''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 7079(b) of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-117; 123 Stat. 3396)
is amended by striking ``comment:'' and all that follows and
inserting ``comment.''.
SEC. 305. CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT
FINANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the strength and credibility of United States climate policy
is undermined when there is a lack of consistency between the
policies and practices implemented at the United States
International Development Finance Corporation and the
policies and practices the Corporation promotes at the
international financial institutions.
(b) Enhancing Transparency at Multilateral Development
Banks.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the
United States executive director of each international
financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United
States to advocate for enhancing transparency by providing
sufficient and adequate information to facilitate independent
verification of the climate finance reporting of the
institution.
(c) Policy Alignment.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
instruct the United States executive director of each
international financial institution to use the voice and vote
of the United States--
(1) to challenge policy-based loans or lending through
financial intermediaries that directly or indirectly supports
fossil fuels; and
(2) to seek to ensure that all loans, grants, policies, and
strategies of the institution are aligned with the objectives
of the Paris Agreement.
(d) Prohibition.--Section 1451 of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
9671), as amended by section 304, is further amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(k) Consistency in Environmental and Social Policies.--
The Corporation may not adopt any environmental or social
policy that provides less protection for communities and the
environment than the level of protection required under title
XIII of the International Financial Institutions Act (22
U.S.C. 262m et seq.).''.
(e) International Financial Institution Defined.--In this
section, the term ``international financial institution'' has
the meaning given that term in section 1701(c) of the
International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
TITLE IV--CLEAN ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SEC. 401. ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
(a) Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources.--
Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) Assistant secretary of state for energy resources.--
``(A) Authorization for assistant secretary.--Subject to
the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1), there is
authorized to be established in the Department of State an
Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources.
``(B) Personnel.--The Secretary of State, in collaboration
with the Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources,
and in accordance with the authorization under subparagraph
(A), shall ensure that sufficient personnel are dedicated to
energy matters within the Bureau of Energy Resources in
order--
``(i) to formulate and implement international policies, in
coordination with the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate,
aimed at protecting and advancing United States energy
security interests and international energy development and
access to electricity, in accordance with the United Nation's
sustainable development goals in ways that ensure responsible
development of global energy resources by effectively
managing United States bilateral and multilateral relations;
``(ii) to ensure that analyses of public health and
national security implications of global energy and
environmental developments are reflected in the decision-
making process within the Department of State;
``(iii) to incorporate energy security and clean energy
development priorities into the activities of the Department
related to matters involving global energy development,
accounting for the effects global energy development has on--
``(I) United States national security;
``(II) quality of life and public health of people,
households, and communities, particularly vulnerable and
underserved populations affected by, or proximate to, energy
development, transmission, and distribution projects;
``(III) United States economic interests;
``(IV) emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to
global climate change; and
``(V) local and regional land use, air and water quality,
and risks to public health of communities described in
subclause (II);
``(iv) to coordinate energy activities within the
Department of State and with relevant Federal departments and
agencies;
``(v) to work internationally--
``(I) to support socially and environmentally responsible
development of energy resources that mitigate carbon
emissions, and the distribution of such resources for the
benefit of the United States and United States allies and
trading partners for their energy security, climate security,
and economic development needs;
``(II) to promote--
``(aa) the availability of clean energy technologies,
including carbon capture and storage;
``(bb) energy sector innovation;
``(cc) well-functioning global markets for clean energy
resources and technologies;
``(dd) expertise for the benefit of the United States and
United States allies and trading partners;
``(III) to resolve international disputes regarding the
exploration, development, production, or distribution of
energy resources;
``(IV) to support the economic, security, and commercial
interests of United States persons operating in the energy
markets of foreign countries; and
``(V) to support and coordinate international efforts--
``(aa) to alleviate energy poverty;
``(bb) to protect vulnerable, exploited, and underserved
populations that are affected or displaced by energy
development projects;
``(cc) to account for and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions
from energy development projects;
``(dd) to promote fair labor practices, labor protections
for workers, and training for and access to good-paying jobs
within the clean energy sector; and
``(ee) to increase access to clean energy for vulnerable
and underserved communities;
``(vi) to lead the United States commitment to the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; and
``(vii) to coordinate energy security and climate security
and other relevant functions within the Department of State
undertaken as of the date of the enactment of this paragraph
by--
[[Page S2027]]
``(I) the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs;
``(II) the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs; and
``(III) other offices within the Department of State.''.
(b) Elimination of Authority for Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs.--Section 931 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17371) is
amended--
(1) by striking subsections (a) and (b); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively.
SEC. 402. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIMACY FOR ENERGY DIPLOMACY.
(a) In General.--The Department of State shall have primacy
for all United States diplomatic engagements with regard to
international energy affairs.
(b) Interagency Coordination.--The Secretary of State, as
appropriate, shall coordinate with and use the technical
expertise and resources of the Department of Energy, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the
Interior, and other relevant Federal agencies and departments
in the planning and execution of United States foreign policy
goals and objectives related to international energy affairs.
SEC. 403. REPORTS ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN MISSION
INNOVATION AND THE CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL.
(a) Mission Innovation.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that
details the scope and nature of United States participation
in Mission Innovation, including--
(1) who in the United States Government serves as the lead
for Mission Innovation;
(2) what objectives the United States has used Mission
Innovation to advance;
(3) what partnerships the United States has established
through Mission Innovation and the date on which any
partnerships the United States brokered were announced;
(4) how the United States has leveraged Mission Innovation
to engage in technology transfer arrangements with foreign
governments;
(5) how the United States has attracted private sector
entities to contribute to and participate in Mission
Innovation;
(6) the total amount of funding provided by the United
States Government to Mission Innovation each year since the
establishment of Mission Innovation; and
(7) the outline of a strategic engagement plan and
objectives for delivering new energy technology innovation
outcomes through Mission Innovation.
(b) Clean Energy Ministerial.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Energy shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
a report that details the scope and nature of United States
participation in the Clean Energy Ministerial, including--
(1) the number of Clean Energy Ministerial meetings that
the Secretary of Energy has participated in;
(2) the diplomatic objectives, including with respect to
energy technologies and private sector entities, that the
United States has aimed to promote within the Clean Energy
Ministerial;
(3) the consensus initiatives, if any, among the chiefs of
party to the Clean Energy Ministerial that the United States
objected to, refused to join, or refrained from contributing
to the development of; and
(4) a plan for restoring United States leadership in using
the Clean Energy Ministerial to promote the development and
deployment of renewable energy and carbon mitigation
technologies from the energy and transportation sectors.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the
Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 404. REDUCED DEFORESTATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Administrator.--Except as otherwise expressly provided,
the term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development.
(2) Deforestation.--The term ``deforestation'' means a
change in land use from a forest (including peatlands) to any
other land use.
(3) Developing country.--The term ``developing country''
means a country eligible to receive official development
assistance according to the income guidelines of the
Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
(4) Emissions reductions.--The term ``emissions
reductions'' means greenhouse gas emissions reductions
achieved from reduced or avoided deforestation under this
section.
(5) Forest.--
(A) In general.--The term ``forest'' means a terrestrial
ecosystem, including wetland forests, comprised of native
tree species generated and maintained primarily through
natural ecological and evolutionary processes.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``forest'' does not include
plantations, such as crops of trees planted by humans
primarily for the purposes of harvesting.
(6) Forest degradation.--The term ``forest degradation'' is
any reduction in the carbon stock of a forest due to the
effects of human land-use activities, including such land-use
activities on peatlands.
(7) Human rights defender.--The term ``human rights
defender'' means an individual, group, or association that
peacefully contributes to the effective elimination of all
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
peoples and individuals, including in relation to mass,
flagrant, or systematic such violations, such as those
resulting from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination,
colonialism, foreign domination or occupation, aggression or
threats to national sovereignty, national unity, or
territorial integrity, and the refusal to recognize the right
of peoples to self-determination and the right of every
people to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and
natural resources.
(8) Intact forest.--The term ``intact forest'' means an
unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems within the global
extent of forest cover that--
(A) covers an area of at least 500 square kilometers and is
at least 10 kilometers in each direction; and
(B) contains forest and non-forest ecosystems minimally
influenced by human economic activity and large enough that
all native biodiversity, including viable populations of
wide-ranging species, could be maintained.
(9) Leakage.--The term ``leakage'' means the unexpected
loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to the displacement
of activities in a project area to areas outside the project,
resulting in carbon emissions.
(10) Leakage prevention activities.--The term ``leakage
prevention activities'' means activities in developing
countries that are directed at preserving existing forest
carbon stocks, including forested wetlands and peatlands that
might, absent such activities, be lost through leakage.
(11) National deforestation reduction activities.--The term
``national deforestation reduction activities'' means
activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation that is
calculated by measuring actual emissions against a national
deforestation baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs
(B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4).
(12) Subnational deforestation and forest degradation
reduction activities.--The term ``subnational deforestation
and forest degradation reduction activities'' means
activities in developing countries that reduce a quantity of
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation that is calculated by measuring actual emissions
using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative determined
under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established by the
Administrator at the State or provincial level.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to provide
United States assistance to developing countries to develop,
implement, and improve actions that reduce deforestation and
forest degradation or conserve or restore forest ecosystems--
(1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with respect
to permanent carbon capture and sequestration in a manner in
which such value is measurable, reportable, and verifiable;
and
(2) in a manner that--
(A) is consistent with and enhances the implementation of
complementary United States policies that support the good
governance of forests, biodiversity conservation, and
environmentally sustainable development;
(B) takes into consideration the views and participation of
local communities and most vulnerable communities and
populations (as defined in section 301(a)), particularly
forest-dependent communities; and
(C) incorporates the right to free prior and informed
consent of indigenous peoples.
(c) Emissions Reductions Through Reduced Deforestation.--
(1) Establishment of program.--Not later than 1 year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in
consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head
of any other appropriate agency, shall establish a program to
provide assistance to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
deforestation in developing countries, in accordance with
this section.
(2) Objectives.--The objectives of the program established
under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) to achieve--
(i) emissions reductions of at least 7,000,000,000 tons of
carbon dioxide equivalent in 2025;
(ii) cumulative emissions reductions of at least
11,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent by December
31, 2030; and
(iii) additional emissions reductions in subsequent years;
(B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation at a national
level in developing countries experiencing deforestation,
which may include--
(i) preparing developing countries to participate in
international markets for international offset credits for
reduced emissions from deforestation; and
[[Page S2028]]
(ii) supporting the development of domestic policy
frameworks to ensure effective, efficient, and equitable
benefit-sharing of the proceeds of such credits issued by
national and subnational governments;
(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in countries where
such forest carbon may be vulnerable to leakage, particularly
in developing countries with largely intact native forests;
(D) to build the scientific knowledge and institutional
capacity to help developing countries--
(i) monitor the effects of climate change on their forests;
(ii) develop and implement strategies to conserve their
forests; and
(iii) support forest-dependent communities adapt to climate
change; and
(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce deforestation in
ways that reduce the vulnerability and increase the
resilience to climate effects for forests and forest-
dependent communities.
(d) Requirements for International Deforestation Reduction
Program.--
(1) Eligible countries.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the Administrator may provide assistance under this section
only with respect to a developing country that--
(i) the Administrator, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Secretary of Agriculture, determines--
(I) is experiencing deforestation or forest degradation; or
(II) has standing forest carbon stocks that may be at risk
of deforestation or degradation;
(ii) has the legal regimes, standards, and safeguards to
ensure that the rights and interests of indigenous peoples
and forest-dependent communities are protected in accordance
with the standards established under paragraph (4); and
(iii) has entered into a bilateral or multilateral
agreement or arrangement with the United States, or is part
of an international program supported by the United States to
prevent deforestation, that establishes the conditions of
participation by the country in the program established under
this section, which shall include an agreement to meet the
standards established under paragraph (4) for the activities
to which such standards apply.
(B) Exception.--A developing country that does not meet the
requirement described in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive
assistance under this section for the purpose of building
capacity to meet such requirement.
(2) Authorized activities.--Subject to the requirements of
this section, in providing assistance under this section, the
Administrator may support activities to achieve the
objectives described in subsection (c)(2), including
activities such as--
(A) national deforestation reduction activities;
(B) subnational deforestation and forest degradation
reduction activities, including pilot activities, policies,
and measures that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and are
subject to significant uncertainty;
(C) activities to measure, monitor, and verify
deforestation, avoided deforestation, and rates of
deforestation, including, if applicable, spatially explicit
land use plans that identify intact and primary forest areas
and managed forest areas;
(D) leakage prevention activities;
(E) the development and implementation of measurement,
monitoring, reporting, and verification capacities and
governance structures, including legal regimes, standards,
processes, and safeguards, as established under paragraph
(4), to enable a country to quantify emissions reductions for
purposes of purchasing or trading subnational emissions
reduction credits in carbon markets;
(F) the identification of, and actions to address, the
drivers of land use emissions;
(G) programs that would exclude from the United States
illegally harvested timber or products made from illegally
harvested timber, in accordance with and consistent with the
objectives of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C.
3371 et seq.);
(H) the development and strengthening of governance
capacities to reduce deforestation and other land use
emissions and to combat illegal logging and associated trade,
including the development of systems for independent
monitoring of the efficacy of forest law enforcement and
increased enforcement cooperation, including joint efforts
with Federal agencies, to enforce the Lacey Act Amendments of
1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.);
(I) the provision of incentives for policy reforms to
achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2);
(J) the development of pilot projects--
(i) to examine where mitigation and adaptation activities
in forest ecosystems coincide; and
(ii) to explore means for enhancing the resilience of
forest ecosystems and forest-dependent communities;
(K) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver resources for
local action and to address the needs, rights, interests, and
participation of local and indigenous communities; and
(L) monitoring and evaluation of the results of the
activities conducted under this section.
(3) Mechanisms.--The Administrator shall apply the
administrative authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), except to the extent
inconsistent with the provisions of this section, to the same
extent and in the same manner as such authorities apply to
the implementation of such Act in order to support activities
to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by--
(A) developing and implementing programs and project-level
activities that achieve such objectives;
(B) to the extent practicable, giving priority in any
review process to activities under paragraph (2)(A); and
(C) as appropriate, considering multi-year funding
arrangements in carrying out the purposes of this section.
(4) Standards.--The Administrator, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall establish program standards
that--
(A) ensure that emissions reductions achieved through
supported activities--
(i) are additional, measurable, verifiable, and monitored;
(ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, and permanence; and
(iii) at a minimum, meet the standards established under
the emissions unit criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)
developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO);
(B) require--
(i) the establishment of a national deforestation baseline
for each country with national deforestation reduction
activities that is used to account for reductions achieved
from such activities; or
(ii) if a developing country has established policies and
taken measures to reduce emissions from disturbed peatlands,
deforestation, or forest degradation, but has not established
a national baseline, the provision of a credible,
transparent, accurate, and conservative alternative for
quantifying emissions;
(C) provide that each national deforestation baseline
established under subparagraph (B)(i)--
(i) is national, or subnational on an interim basis, in
scope; and
(ii) is consistent with nationally appropriate mitigation
commitments or actions with respect to deforestation, taking
into consideration--
(I) the average annual historical deforestation rates of
the country during a period of at least 5 years; and
(II) the applicable drivers of deforestation and other
factors to ensure additionality;
(iii) establishes a trajectory that would result in zero
net deforestation by not later than 20 years after the date
on which the baseline is established;
(iv) is adjusted over time to account for changing national
circumstances; and
(v) is designed to account for all significant sources of
greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation in the country;
(D) with respect to assistance provided for activities
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2),
require emissions reductions to be achieved and verified
before the provision of any assistance under this section;
(E) with respect to accounting for subnational
deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities
that lack the standardized or precise measurement and
monitoring techniques needed for a full accounting of changes
in emissions or baselines, or are subject to other sources of
uncertainty, apply a conservative discount factor to reflect
the uncertainty regarding the levels of reductions achieved;
(F) ensure that activities under this section are designed,
carried out, and managed--
(i) using forest management practices that, in an open and
transparent process--
(I) improve the livelihoods of forest communities in a
manner that promotes the maintenance of intact forests,
protects associated biodiversity, and restores native forest
species and ecosystems while avoiding the introduction of
invasive nonnative species;
(II) maintain natural biodiversity, resilience, and carbon
storage capacity of forests;
(III) to the extent practicable, do not adversely affect
the permanence of forest carbon stocks or emissions
reductions;
(IV) include broad stakeholder participation and the free
prior and informed consent of affected indigenous peoples;
and
(V) take into account the needs and interests of local
communities, forest-dependent communities, indigenous
peoples, and vulnerable social groups;
(ii) in consultation with, and with the full and effective
participation of, local communities, indigenous peoples, and
forest-dependent communities in affected areas, as partners
and primary stakeholders, before and during the design,
planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of
activities; and
(iii) with equitable sharing of profits and benefits
derived from the activities with local communities,
indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities; and
(G) with respect to assistance for all activities under
this section, seek to ensure the establishment and
enforcement of legal regimes, standards, processes, and
safeguards by the country in which the activities are
conducted, as a condition of such assistance or as a proposed
activity for which such assistance may be provided, which--
[[Page S2029]]
(i) protect the rights and interests of local communities,
indigenous peoples, forest-dependent communities, human
rights defenders, and vulnerable social groups; and
(ii) promote consultations with local communities,
indigenous peoples, and forest-dependent communities in
affected areas, as partners and primary stakeholders, before
and during the design, planning, implementation, monitoring,
and evaluation of activities under this section; and
(iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits and benefits from
incentives for emissions reductions or leakage prevention
with local communities, indigenous peoples, and forest-
dependent communities.
(5) Scope.--
(A) Reduced emissions.--The Administrator shall include
reduced emissions from forest degradation and disturbance of
peatlands within the scope of activities under this section.
(B) Expansion of authorized activities.--If the
Administrator determines, in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Secretary of Agriculture, that sufficient methodologies and
technical capacities exist to measure, monitor, and account
for the emissions referred to in subparagraph (A), the
Administrator may expand the authorized activities under this
section, as appropriate, to include reduced soil carbon-
derived emissions associated with deforestation and
degradation of forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent
with a comprehensive approach to maintaining and enhancing
forests, increasing climate resiliency, reducing emissions,
and increasing removals of greenhouse gases.
(6) Accounting.--The Administrator shall use a publicly
accessible registry to account for and register the emissions
reductions achieved through assistance provided under this
section each year, after appropriately discounting for
uncertainty and other relevant factors as required by the
standards established under paragraph (4).
(7) International deforestation reduction program insurance
account for noncompletion or reversal.--In furtherance of the
objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator
shall develop and implement a program that--
(A) addresses noncompletion or reversal with respect to any
greenhouse gas emissions that were not, or are no longer,
sequestered; and
(B) may include a mechanism to hold in reserve a portion of
the amount allocated for projects to support the program.
(8) Extension of assistance.--
(A) In general.--The Administrator may extend, for an
additional 5 years, the period during which assistance is
authorized for activities supported by assistance under this
section, if the Administrator determines that--
(i) the country in which the activities are conducted is
making substantial progress toward adopting and implementing
a program to achieve reductions in deforestation measured
against a national baseline;
(ii) the greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved as a
result of the activities are not resulting in significant
leakage;
(iii) such greenhouse gas emissions reductions are being
appropriately discounted to account for any leakage that is
occurring; and
(iv) such extension would further advance or ensure
achievement of the objectives of the activities.
(B) Assistance for subnational deforestation and forest
degradation reduction activities.--
(i) In general.--If the Administrator extends the period
during which assistance is authorized for activities under
subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall determine, based on
the criteria specified that subparagraph, whether such
assistance should include assistance for subnational
deforestation and forest degradation reduction activities.
(ii) Continued assistance.--The Administrator may extend
the period during which assistance is authorized for
subnational deforestation and forest degradation reduction
activities beyond the 5-year period described in subparagraph
(A) in order to further the objectives described in
subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection (c)(2).
(9) Coordination with foreign assistance.--Subject to the
direction of the President, the Administrator shall, to the
extent practicable and consistent with the objectives
described in subsection (c)(2), seek to align activities
under this section with broader development, poverty
alleviation, or natural resource management objectives and
initiatives in countries receiving assistance under this
section.
(10) Assistance as supplement.--The provision of assistance
for activities under this section shall be used to
supplement, and not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or
local support available to carry out activities under this
section.
(11) Funding limitation.--Of the funds made available to
carry out this section in any fiscal year, not more than 7
percent may be used for the administrative expenses of the
United States Agency for International Development in support
of activities described in paragraph (2). Such amount shall
be in addition to other amounts otherwise available for such
purposes.
(12) Indonesia.--Not less than 10 percent of the funds made
available in any fiscal year to carry out this section shall
be used for activities described in paragraph (2) in
Indonesia.
(e) Legal Effect.--
(1) In general.--Nothing in this section may be construed
to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect any restriction
imposed by Federal law (including regulations) on any
interaction between an entity located in the United States
and an entity located in a foreign country.
(2) Role of the secretary of state.--Nothing in this
section may be construed to affect the role of the Secretary
of State or the responsibilities of the Secretary under
section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2382(c)).
(f) International Financial Institutions.--The President
shall direct the United States representatives to the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other
international financial institutions (as defined in section
1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22
U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to combat
deforestation.
TITLE V--BILATERAL AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND
COOPERATION
SEC. 501. NORTH AMERICAN STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--The President shall develop a strategy to
seek opportunities for trilateral cooperation between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada--
(1) to support increased ambition on reducing greenhouse
gas emissions among these countries; and
(2) to advance collaboration on the development and
promotion of shared climate action goals and interests within
multilateral bodies and conferences, including aligning, to
the extent possible, the voices, votes, and influence,
consistent with the broad foreign policy goals of the United
States, to address issues related to climate change and clean
energy development.
(b) Elements and Priorities.--The strategy described in
subsection (a) shall include efforts--
(1) to ensure that potential projects and investments
pursued under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement--
(A) are compatible with long-term climate goals and the
collective targets established under the Paris Agreement; and
(B) meet all environmental and social responsibility
standards required under the USMCA;
(2) to explore shared and common interests and cooperative
actions to promote clean energy development, climate
security, and climate change mitigation strategies within
institutions (such as the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, the
Green Climate Fund, the Group of Twenty and the United
Nations) with programs, initiatives and actions to address
the climate crisis that may include--
(A) providing support in developing mid-century low-carbon
strategies;
(B) extending coal finance restrictions to coal mining
operations; and
(C) strengthening and expanding carbon pricing by--
(i) considering the cost of carbon in long-term decision
making;
(ii) supporting the development of national or subnational
systems;
(iii) sharing technical expertise; and
(iv) making efforts to align pricing instruments where
feasible;
(3) to commit to a methane reduction goal and cooperate to
reduce black carbon and to recommit to the formal agreement
reached at the June 2016 North American Leaders Summit in
Ottawa to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas
sector by 40 to 45 percent by 2025, and to work to develop a
new, more ambitious target for 2030;
(4) develop and implement a North American strategy for
sustainable transportation--
(A) to encourage State and provincial leaders to negotiate
interstate and interprovincial sustainable transportation
agreements between Mexican, American, and Canadian
jurisdictions;
(B) to expand the West Coast Electric Highway between
Canada, the United States, and Mexico; and
(C) to work with automakers to standardize charging
infrastructure;
(5) develop and implement coordinated forest and land use
strategies to further contribute to emissions mitigation
through the adoption of practices and policies that increase
carbon sequestration in new and existing forests and reduce
emissions from forest conversion to other land uses;
(6) strengthen resilience and equity among low-income and
indigenous communities; and
(7) engage international partners in an existing
multilateral forum or, if necessary, establish a new
multilateral forum to improve global cooperation by--
(A) encouraging the adoption of an emissions reduction
target by the International Maritime Organization; and
(B) collaborating with the International Civil Aviation
Organization to establish a market-based measure to reduce
aviation emissions.
SEC. 502. ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas
emissions to sufficiently avoid the worst forecasted effects
of climate change requires global cooperation and
coordination of efforts;
(2) all other countries look towards the United States and
China, as the world's largest emitters and largest economies,
for leadership by example to effectively mitigate
[[Page S2030]]
greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy energy
generation technologies, and integrate sustainable adaptation
solutions to the inevitable effects of climate change;
(3) given the volume of China's greenhouse gas emissions
and the scientific imperative to swiftly reduce global
greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emissions around 2050,
China should--
(A) revise its long-term pledge;
(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions;
(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
significantly to meet a more ambitious long-term 2050
reductions target; and
(D) update its nationally determined contribution along a
trajectory that aligns with achieving a more ambitious net-
zero by 2050 emissions target;
(4) it is in the United States' national interest to
prioritize climate change in its bilateral engagement with
China, as global climate risks cannot be mitigated without a
significant reduction in Chinese domestic and overseas
emissions;
(5) the United States and China, to the extent practicable,
should coordinate on making and delivering ambitious pledges
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with aspirations towards
achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050;
(6) the United States and its allies should work together,
using diplomatic and economic tools, to hold China
accountable for any failure by China--
(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nationally determined
contribution, in line with net zero greenhouse gas emissions
by 2050 before the 26th Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and meeting a more
ambitious nationally determined contribution;
(B) to work faithfully to uphold the principles, goals, and
rules of the Paris Agreement;
(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to undermine or devolve
the Paris Agreement's rule or underlying framework,
particularly within areas of accountability transparency, and
shared responsibility among all parties;
(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive projects from
China's Belt and Road Initiative and other overseas
investments, including--
(i) working with allies and partners of the United States
to eliminate support for coal power production projects in
China's Belt and Road Initiative;
(ii) providing financing and project support for cleaner
and less risky alternatives; and
(iii) undertaking ``parallel initiatives'' to enhance
capacity building programs and overseas sustainable
investment criteria, including in areas such as integrated
energy planning, power sector reform, just transition,
distributed generation, procurement, transparency, and
standards to support low-emissions growth in developing
countries; and
(E) to phase out existing coal power plants and reduce net
coal power production;
(7) the United States should pursue confidence-building
opportunities for the United States and China to undertake
``parallel initiatives'' on clean energy research,
development, finance, and deployment, including through
economic and stimulus measures with clear, mutually agreed
upon rules and policies to protect intellectual property,
ensure equitable, nonpunitive provision of support, and
verify implementation, which would provide catalytic progress
towards delivering a global clean energy transformation that
benefits all people; and
(8) the United States should pursue cooperative initiatives
to shift toward the import and consummation of forest and
agricultural commodities that are produced in a manner that
does not contribute to deforestation.
SEC. 503. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION ON
CLIMATE FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is--
(1) to restore the historic alliance between the United
States and countries of the European Union on climate action;
and
(2) to renew the United States' commitment to advancing
global cooperation on addressing climate change and achieving
the goals of the Paris Agreement.
(b) Sense of Congress Regarding the United States-European
Union Security and Development Dialogue.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States should restart the United
States-European Union Security and Development Dialogue to
focus specifically on climate action, climate security, and
clean energy cooperation, including--
(1) partnering and formulating strategies to counter
efforts to weaken or change critical elements of the
implementation of the Paris Agreement that would disadvantage
the United States or the European Union;
(2) building coalitions of like-minded parties committed to
achieving large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions under
the Paris Agreement and putting pressure on all parties to do
the same;
(3) coordination on joint strategies to promote climate
action by the People's Republic of China, and deter Chinese
domestic and international investment in high carbon
infrastructure;
(4) finding opportunities to engage and facilitate private
sector collaboration regarding clean energy and innovations
on greenhouse gas emissions reductions;
(5) exploring the creation of United States-European Union
clean energy and climate adaptation, development, and finance
mechanisms to support and leverage private sector investment
in projects and activities to improve developing countries'
resilience capacities, ability to adapt and thrive in the
face of the effects of climate change and clean energy
development;
(6) scientific research, modeling, forecasting, and data
collaboration to improve global understanding and preparation
for the compounding effects of climate change; and
(7) intelligence sharing.
(c) Development Finance Cooperation.--
(1) In general.--The President should seek opportunities to
partner with European Development Finance Institutions to
develop financing tools based on shared development finance
criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing
countries that support low carbon economic development and
promote climate change resiliency and adaptation
(2) Partnership fund.--The Chief Executive Officer of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation
should partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to create a fund or multilateral financing
mechanism to support clean energy development and climate
change adaptation and resilience activities in developing
countries.
(3) Response to the people's republic of china's belt and
road initiative.--The President shall work with European
counterparts to establish a formal United States-European
Commission Working Group to develop a comprehensive strategy
to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative established by the
Government of the People's Republic of China. United States
participants in this proposed working group shall seek to
integrate existing efforts into the strategy, including--
(A) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and
Asia;
(B) the Three Seas Initiative;
(C) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan,
and Australia;
(D) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged
$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes
transparency standards; and
(E) efforts to address the Government of the People's
Republic of China's use of the United Nations to advance the
Belt and Road Initiative, including the proliferation of
memoranda of understanding between the People's Republic of
China and United Nations funds and programs on the
implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.
(4) Co-financing of infrastructure projects.--
(A) Authorization of appropriations.--Subject to
subparagraph (B), there are authorized to be appropriated
such sums as may be necessary to co-finance infrastructure
projects that could otherwise be included within China's Belt
and Road Initiative.
(B) Conditions.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
subparagraph (A) may not be expended unless--
(i) the United States can leverage existing and future
projects that have entered into contracts with the Belt and
Road Initiative to further promote transparency and debt
sustainability; and
(ii) the projects to be financed--
(I) promote the public good;
(II) will not promote the use of fossil fuels; and
(III) will have substantially lower greenhouse gas
intensity than the proposed Belt and Road Initiative
alternative.
(d) Support for Eastern European Democracy Act.--Section 2
of the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act (22 U.S.C.
5401) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2)--
(A) in subparagraph (H), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (I), by adding ``and'' at the end; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(J) helping workers and communities in countries most
dependent on fossil fuel energy that may be vulnerable to
socioeconomic changes due to the European Union's transition
to net zero greenhouse gas emissions.''; and
(2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
``(26) Just transition assistance.--Assistance to support
workers and communities in countries most dependent on fossil
fuel energy and most vulnerable to socioeconomic changes due
to the European Union's transition to net zero greenhouse gas
emissions.''.
SEC. 504. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CLEAN ENERGY COOPERATION WITH
INDIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should support efforts to strengthen
India's resilience capacities that ensure people, households,
communities, institutions, and systems can assess,
anticipate, prevent, adapt to, cope with, and recover from
shocks and stresses associated with the effects of climate
change;
(2) the United States, through the Bureau of Energy
Resources of the Department of State, the United States
Agency for International Development, the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, the Department
of Energy, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and
the International Trade Administration, should encourage
private sector investment in, and financing for, the
development and deployment of clean energy and climate
mitigation technologies in India;
[[Page S2031]]
(3) robust cooperation between the United States and India
to develop and deploy clean energy technologies, including
private sector cooperation, should be a top bilateral energy
diplomacy priority and the top priority in the countries'
energy diplomacy and should include--
(A) clean energy;
(B) electric vehicles and expansive charging station
networks;
(C) next-generation refrigeration equipment and
refrigerants; and
(D) other technologies and chemicals that are in the
interest of United States industry leaders in the
refrigeration and chemical coolant industries that are
compliant with the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol;
(4) the collaboration between the United States and India
on the development and deployment of clean energy
technologies has resulted in innovative new technologies that
have helped significantly lower the carbon emissions of the
power sector in India; and
(5) since demand for energy in India will increase with the
expansion of the economy and middle class of India, it is in
the interest of United States national security and global
security for the United States to support India in growing
the energy sector of India in environmentally and socially
responsible ways that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and
improve the climate security of India.
SEC. 505. POWER AFRICA.
The Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-121; 22
U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended--
(1) in section 3--
(A) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``mitigate and lower
carbon emissions from energy production,'' after
``development,'';
(B) in paragraph (7), by adding ``and'' at the end;
(C) by striking paragraph (8); and
(D) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (8);
(2) in section 4--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``an appropriate mix of
power solutions to provide access to sufficient reliable,
affordable, and sustainable power in order to reduce
poverty'' and inserting ``power solutions to provide access
to sufficient, reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in
order to reduce poverty and energy sector carbon emissions'';
and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and technological''
and inserting ``, advances a country's mitigation commitments
(or conditional mitigation commitments) in accordance with a
country's nationally determined contribution, and supports
technological'';
(B) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (2)--
(I) in subparagraph (F), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(II) in subparagraph (G), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(III) by adding at the end the following:
``(H) reduce carbon emissions from the energy sector.'';
(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking ``the use of a broad
power mix, including fossil fuel and'';
(3) in section 5--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(ii) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and
(iii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
``(7) deploying renewable energy; and''; and
(B) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:
``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated $750,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 to provide assistance in
accordance with subsection (a) and section 3.'';
(4) in section 7(a)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting
``and every 2 years thereafter,'' after ``Act,''; and
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``power generation'' each
place such term appears and inserting ``renewable energy
generation''; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 8. COORDINATOR FOR POWER AFRICA.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the United States Climate Leadership in
International Mitigation, Adaptation, and Technology
Enhancement Act of 2021, the Administrator for the United
States Agency for International Development, under the
direction of the Secretary of State, shall appoint a
Coordinator for Power Africa, who shall serve in the Bureau
Economic Growth, Education, and the Environment of the United
States Agency for International Development.
``(b) Duties.--The Coordinator for Power Africa shall--
``(1) be primarily located at a mission in sub-Saharan
Africa;
``(2) lead--
``(A) the execution of the Power Africa Initiative in
accordance with the purpose and policies set forth in
sections 2 and 3; and
``(B) the development and execution of the strategy
established under section 4;
``(3) coordinate the Interagency Working Group established
under section 4(c);
``(4) manage the funding appropriated for the Power Africa
Initiative by Congress; and
``(5) execute the directives described in sections 5 and
6.''.
SEC. 506. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon
imported oil to provide for approximately 90 percent of their
energy production.
(2) The level of dependence is even higher including--
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent of its
electricity;
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of its
electricity;
(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for nearly 100
percent of its electricity; and
(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent of its
electricity.
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a
detrimental effect on economic development, growth, and
competitiveness in the Caribbean.
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral
reefs have been lost due to coastal development and
pollution. Soot particulates and climate change caused by
burning fossil fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs,
which are a significant source of tourism dollars, fishing,
biodiversity, and natural beauty.
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity--
(A) has serious health impacts in the form of higher rates
of asthma and other lung ailments; and
(B) can also exacerbate climate change.
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea
level rise and stronger storms
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries
of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led
Petrocaribe oil alliance, which--
(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent of their
energy production needs.
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political
turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Government of Venezuela
to retract its commitments to the Petrocaribe oil alliance
and step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still receives
preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from
Venezuela, while other Petrocaribe member countries are
experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy
projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the majority of
this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also been
the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a
decade.
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need
$12,000,000,000 in power investments through 2035.
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased
dramatically in recent years, offering a more viable economic
alternative for energy production. Solar energy prices have
fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market
growth, and according to data released by the International
Renewable Energy Agency, 1/3 of global power capacity is
based in renewable energy.
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated
that transportation accounted for 36 percent of the total
primary energy consumed in the Caribbean subregion.
(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
Latin America and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings
of $621,000,000,000 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of
CO2 by 2050 if the region's energy and transport sectors
reach net zero emissions.
(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore
resources needed for renewable energy, including sun, wind,
geothermal, and some hydropower production capacity.
(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in
providing technical and policy assistance to countries of the
Caribbean on energy issues through--
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas;
(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
(C) bilateral assistance programs.
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders'
Summit, President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
of Canada, and President Enrique Pena Nieto of Mexico
reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reliable,
and increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while
opening wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative, which would partner
with individual countries--
(A) to transform its energy sector;
(B) to work to increase access to finance, good governance,
and diversification; and
(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor effects.
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central
American Energy Summit, the energy security task force
formally launched the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap
and Strategy (C-SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional
coordination and action on energy security and agreed to
expand the regional market and transmission system.
(19) The United States has an important opportunity--
(A) to deepen this engagement;
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries on a more
regional and coordinated basis;
(C) to help ease the region's dependence on imported oil;
and
[[Page S2032]]
(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of energy.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Caribbean countries.--The term ``Caribbean countries''
means countries in the Caribbean region, but does not
including Cuba or Venezuela.
(2) Caribbean governments.--The term ``Caribbean
governments'' means the national governments of the Caribbean
countries.
(c) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to help
Caribbean countries--
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic
energy resource mobilization;
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other
petroleum products, and coal for the generation of
electricity;
(4) increase production of renewable energy; and
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their
national determined contributions to the Paris Agreement.
(d) Strategy.--
(1) Submission.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives that describes how the
Department of State will promote regional cooperation with
Caribbean countries--
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow domestic
clean energy production in the region, strengthen regional
energy security, and lower energy sector greenhouse gas
emissions;
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the transportation
sector;
(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy conservation, and
investment in alternatives to imported fuels;
(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize electricity
transmission networks;
(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions to expand
community and individuals' access to electricity;
(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good
regulatory governance and to promote a climate of private
sector investment; and
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the energy
and transportation sector.
(2) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a thorough review and inventory of United States
Government activities that are being carried out bilaterally,
regionally, and in coordination with multilateral
institutions--
(i) to promote energy and climate security in the Caribbean
region; and
(ii) to reduce the region's reliance on oil for electricity
generation;
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional cooperation--
(i) to overcome market barriers resulting from the small
size of Caribbean energy markets;
(ii) to address the high transportation and infrastructure
costs faced by Caribbean countries;
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination between
governments, multilateral institutions, multilateral banks,
and private investors; and
(iv) to expand regional financing opportunities to allow
for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;
(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean government has--
(i) an independent utility regulator or equivalent;
(ii) affordable access by third party investors to its
electrical grid with minimal regulatory interference;
(iii) effective energy efficiency and energy conservation;
(iv) programs to address technical and nontechnical issues;
(v) a plan to eliminate major market distortions;
(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean energy solutions;
and
(D) recommendations for how United States policy,
technical, and economic assistance can be used in the
Caribbean region--
(i) to advance renewable energy development and the
incorporation of renewable technologies into existing energy
grids and the development and deployment of micro-grids where
appropriate and feasible to boost energy security and
reliability, particularly to underserved communities;
(ii) to increase the generation of clean energy
sufficiently to replace and allow for the retirement of
obsolete fossil fuel energy generation units in Caribbean
countries;
(iii) to create regional financing opportunities to allow
for lower cost energy entrepreneurship;
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the region to help
attract private investment and break down any market or
regulatory barriers; and
(v) to establish a mechanism for each host government to
have access to independent legal advice--
(I) to speed the development of energy-related contracts;
and
(II) to better protect the interests of Caribbean
governments and citizens.
(3) Consultation.--In devising the strategy under this
subsection, the Secretary of State shall work with the
Secretary of Energy and shall consult with--
(A) the Secretary of the Interior;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the
United States;
(E) the Board of Directors of the Development Finance
Corporation;
(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development;
(G) the Caribbean governments;
(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
(I) the World Bank Group; and
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation.
SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSERVATION OF THE AMAZON
RIVER BASIN.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Amazon River basin and the Amazon rainforest, often
referred to as Amazonia--
(A) covers more than 2,670,000 square miles in Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Peru,
Suriname, and Venezuela; and
(B) is home to more species of plants and animals than any
other terrestrial ecosystem on the planet, housing nearly 30
percent of the world's species, which apart from their
intrinsic value as living organisms, have potential value in
the form of medicine, research, textiles, food, and other
products for the region's population.
(2) Tens of millions of people depend on services afforded
by the Amazon forest, including--
(A) the use of rivers for transportation;
(B) reliance on logging and collection of non-timber forest
products as major industries for employment; and
(C) the cultivation of nutrients in floodplain areas for
agriculture and areas for which the Amazon Basin is a
watershed.
(3) The Amazon River has long been recognized as an
important repository of biodiversity and natural resources,
not only for local peoples and indigenous communities, but
also for the rest of the world due to--
(A) its fresh water, which provides countless services for
humans in the form of water agriculture, transportation, and
food and serves as an important habitat for countless
species, including over 2,500 species of fish and river
dolphins;
(B) its medicinal plants, which are continually used by
local peoples to treat traditional diseases, including
malaria (one of the most lethal diseases in the tropics), and
which constitute 70 percent of the plant species in the world
found to have anti-cancer properties;
(C) its important role as an oxygen source, producing 20
percent of the Earth's oxygen and earning the Amazon forest
the nickname ``lungs of our Earth'' for its role in taking in
enormous amounts of the carbon dioxide emitted by human
activity and the burning of fossil fuels and replacing it
with the oxygen we breathe through the process of
photosynthesis;
(D) its food supply, which is associated with rainforests,
including coffee, rice, chocolate, tomatoes, potatoes,
bananas, black pepper, pineapples, and corn;
(E) its role in climate control caused by its exchange of
enormous quantities of water and energy with the surrounding
atmosphere, which is estimated as being responsible for
creating 75 percent of its own rainfall, which feeds the
nearby rivers through evapotranspiration before flowing
directly into the ocean and influencing the currents that
impact the climate; and
(F) ecotourism, which produces annual profits of more than
$11,600,000, which benefits the local economy, enhances the
quality of living through securing more jobs, and educates
global citizens regarding the importance of maintaining the
world's natural spaces.
(4) Public opinion research, conducted by the Brazilian
polling firm Datafolha in 2020, found that--
(A) 87 percent of the respondents felt strongly that
conservation of the Amazon is very important;
(B) 73 percent of the respondents are concerned with the
rate of increased deforestation in the Amazon basin;
(C) 77 percent of the respondents believed strongly that
the conduct and policies of the ministries responsible for
management and conservation of the Amazon have contributed to
deforestation in the Amazon;
(D) 92.5 percent of the respondents believe Brazil should
prioritize the pursuit of economic activities in the Amazon
basin that do not contribute to deforestation; and
(E) only 5.6 percent of the respondents think that forests
need to be cut down to promote economic growth in the region.
(5) The recent 8,850 square kilometer reduction of the
Amazon forest, exacerbated by climate change, has resulted in
a significant decrease in the ample benefits described in
paragraph (3), in addition to the displacement of many
indigenous peoples due to the lessened economic opportunity.
(6) Clear cutting has disrupted the habitat for plants and
animals in the region, fracturing the fragile forest ecology
by causing species to migrate and sometimes disappear.
(7) As of September 2020, Brazil's National Institute for
Space Research reported that 45,067 fires have burned in the
Amazon River basin and more than 63,000 fires have burned in
all of Brazil in 2020.
(8) The removal of trees from the Amazon River basin has
decreased water and nutrient uptake, while increasing runoff
with greater
[[Page S2033]]
loads of both nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations,
deteriorating the quality of fresh water, and putting the
environment at greater risk for disasters like flooding and
landslides.
(9) The Government of Brazil has historically recognized
the negative repercussions of deforestation via processes
like clear cutting, which had facilitated Brazil's
establishment and maintenance of numerous successful
conservation policies and payments for environmental service
programs, such as--
(A) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation projects, such as the Juma project in Amazonas
and the Surui project in Acre and subnational-scale program
in Acre and Mato Grosso, which seek to reduce global warming
by stopping emissions related to deforestation;
(B) jurisdictional programs involving the collaboration of
several groups, including farmers, government officials,
businesses, and nongovernmental organizations, to achieve
consensus on sustainability milestones;
(C) the Amazon Fund, which is primarily funded by the
Government of Norway to implement payments for forest
conservation activities; and
(D) the Bolsa Floresta program in the Brazilian state of
Amazonas, which pays landowners and communities to help
protect forest areas.
(10) United States and multilateral cooperation efforts to
protect and restore the Amazon have yielded significant
beneficial impacts, such as--
(A) the reduction of deforestation by more than 80 percent;
and
(B) the World Bank's establishment of more than 25 percent
of the areas protected from correspondence.
(11) The UNESCO World Heritage site verifies the importance
of the Amazon River basin being one of the richest areas in
the planet in terms of biodiversity, ecological and
biological processes. Deforestation and potential new
policies could harmfully limit its natural resources if their
benefits are not taken into serious consideration.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President should--
(A) engage with the Government of Brazil, through bilateral
and multilateral efforts, on its Amazon development and
deforestation policies, in support of the Brazilian people's
and the private sector's interest in conserving the Amazon
rainforest;
(B) promote stewardship and conservation policies that
support sustainable economic growth activities in the Amazon
River basin;
(C) consider the Government of Brazil's management and land
use conversion of the Amazon River basin policies when
assessing, negotiating, or developing new bilateral
agreements with Brazil, including trade agreements, or
engaging in relevant international forums;
(D) in the spirit of Brazil's leadership hosting the 1992
Rio Summit, which led to the establishment of the UNFCCC,
urge the Government of Brazil to enhance the ambition of
Brazil's efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; and
(E) encourage the Government of Brazil, through bilateral
and multilateral efforts, to immediately work proactively to
address climate change and to promote low carbon and
sustainable economic development;
(2) the United States Ambassador to Brazil should
immediately engage with the Government of Brazil to support
improvements to stewardship efforts of the Amazon rainforest
and to assist with urgent efforts to combat fires burning
across the Amazon River basin by--
(A) amplifying the Brazilian people's concerns--
(i) about climate change and seeking opportunities for
cooperative climate action through the United States-Brazil
bilateral relationship; and
(ii) with Brazil's management and land use conversion
policies affecting the Amazon River basin;
(B) reinforcing United States' support for the important
role civil society is playing to keep the public informed
about the importance of Amazon conservation, particularly as
it relates to regulating carbon in the Earth's atmosphere;
and
(C) offering support for efforts to combat fires in the
Amazon River basin that are exacerbating Brazil's
environmental crisis; and
(3) the Secretary of the Treasury should provide financial
and technical assistance to combat wildfires burning across
the Brazil, including in the Amazon River basin.
(c) Policy Statement.--The Secretary of State shall elevate
bilateral engagements around cooperation and peer-to-peer
accountability on Brazil's climate action commitments by--
(1) supporting the efforts of the Government of Brazil to
increase sustainable development of the Amazon region,
including by strengthening environmental enforcement and
ending illegal deforestation;
(2) encouraging the Government of Brazil to enforce its
conservation laws, which include--
(A) restoring the responsibility of managing indigenous
reserves and the demarcation of lands back to indigenous
peoples;
(B) deescalating violence against indigenous peoples,
prosecuting individuals and entities that threaten or harm
indigenous peoples or communities, and maintain the National
Indian Foundation;
(C) addressing activities that increase deforestation rates
in the Amazon basin, which include--
(i) curtailing indigenous people's land rights; and
(ii) unsustainable cattle ranching, soy bean farming,
mining, hydropower dam construction, and highway construction
activities;
(D) threatening to degrade Brazil's carbon emissions
reductions commitments that are heavily based upon the
conservation of Brazil's rainforests; and
(E) addressing challenges for civil society to operate,
oversee, and advocate for the continued conservation and
restoration of the Amazon River basin;
(3) encouraging, to the maximum extent practicable, the
Government of Brazil to develop and deliver ambitious pledges
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement,
while holding Brazil accountable for delivering on its
commitments;
(4) supporting the voice of Brazilian civil society and the
role civil society plays in advancing civil society's efforts
to protect Brazil's natural resources and helping ensure
civil society's abilities to operate, oversee, and advocate
for the continued conservation and restoration of the Amazon
River basin;
(5) advancing the rights and protections of indigenous
peoples whose communities, well-being, and opportunities for
economic growth are frequently put at risk by deforestation,
extractive industries, commercial scale agriculture, and
hydropower dam construction;
(6) listening to and engaging with the people of Brazil on
their country's commitments to advancing conservation efforts
in the Amazon River basin that allow for sustainable economic
growth, while protecting the Amazon rainforest and Amazon
River basin's important and unique resources despite the
proposed changes;
(7) renewing support for programs that support Amazonian
nations, civil society, and local leaders, including
indigenous communities, in maintaining critically important
conservation efforts to protect and restore the Amazon River
basin ecosystem; and
(8) supporting efforts by subnational governments and the
private sector to advance sustainable development and reduce
deforestation in the Amazon region.
SEC. 508. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING RENEWABLE ENERGY IN
INDONESIA.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) cooperation on the development and deployment of
renewable energy technologies should be a priority in
relations between the United States and Indonesia and the top
priority in the countries' energy diplomacy;
(2) it is in the interest of United States to support the
growth of Indonesia's renewable energy sector in
environmentally and socially responsible ways that--
(A) reduce reliance on fossil fuels in ways that do not
increase pressure on the land sector or increase land-based
emissions;
(B) mitigate greenhouse gas emissions;
(C) provide economic opportunities; and
(D) improve the climate security of Indonesia;
(3) the United States, through the Bureau of Energy
Resources of the Department of State, the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, the Department
of Energy, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the
International Trade Administration, and the United States
Agency for International Development, should encourage
private sector investment in and financing for the
development and deployment of renewable power sources in
Indonesia;
(4) the United States should--
(A) support and encourage Indonesia to pursue ambitious
growth from solar and wind sources of energy generation; and
(B) provide technical assistance to the Government of
Indonesia and subnational authorities on regulatory reforms
and addressing other barriers to deployment of renewable
energy; and
(5) it is in the interest of United States refrigeration
and refrigerant production industries to help serve
Indonesia's increased demand for refrigeration and air
conditioning, and the adoption of the Kigali Amendment to the
Montreal Protocol, is driving innovation and investments in
next-generation refrigeration equipment and refrigerants in
Indonesia.
TITLE VI--WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE ACT
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Women and Climate Change
Act''.
SEC. 602. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Women in the United States and around the world are--
(A) the linchpin of families and communities; and
(B) often the first to feel the immediate and adverse
effects of social, environmental, and economic stresses on
their families and communities.
(2) The United Nations has recognized, as a central
organizing principle for its work, that ``no enduring
solution to society's most threatening social, economic and
political problems can be found without the full
participation, and the full empowerment, of the world's
women.''.
(3) The United Nations Development Programme's Human
Development Report 2013 predicted that the number of people
living in extreme poverty could increase by up to
[[Page S2034]]
3,000,000,000 by 2050 unless environmental disasters are
averted by coordinated global action.
(4) Climate change is already forcing the most vulnerable
communities and populations in developing countries to face
unprecedented climate stress, including--
(A) slow onset effects of climate change, such as sea level
rise, increasing temperatures, water scarcity, and drought;
and
(B) severe weather events and floods, which can lead to
reduced agricultural productivity, food insecurity, and
increased disease.
(5) Climate change--
(A) exacerbates issues of resource scarcity and lack of
accessibility to primary natural resources, forest resources,
and arable land for food production;
(B) contributes to increased tension and instability,
particularly in countries and regions with poor or weak
governance systems; and
(C) increases the workload and stresses on women farmers,
who are estimated to produce nearly 50 percent of the food
consumed in most developing countries, which exacerbates food
insecurity.
(6) Women will disproportionately face harmful impacts from
climate change, particularly in poor and developing countries
in which women regularly assume increased responsibility
for--
(A) growing the family's food;
(B) collecting water, fuel, and other resources;
(C) earning money; and
(D) sending remittances.
(7) Epidemics, such as malaria and Zika, are expected to
worsen and spread due to variations in climate, putting women
and girls (especially those who are pregnant, who are
lactating, or who hope to become pregnant) and children
without access to prevention and medical services at risk.
(8) The direct and indirect effects of climate change have
a disproportionate impact on marginalized women, including
refugees, displaced persons, migrants, religious, racial, or
ethnic minorities, adolescent girls, lesbian and trans women,
women living in poverty, and women and girls with
disabilities and those infected with HIV.
(9) Conflict has a disproportionate impact on the most
vulnerable communities and populations, including women, and
can be exacerbated in regions of the world with changing or
harsher climates, leading to migration, forced displacement,
and conflicts over scarce natural resources, including land
and water.
(10) Internally displaced, refugee, and stateless women and
girls face extreme violence and threats, including--
(A) being forced to exchange sex for food and humanitarian
supplies;
(B) being at increased risk of gender-based violence,
sexual exploitation, and abuse;
(C) reduced access to services and care; and
(D) increased risk for contracting HIV or sexually-
transmitted infections, having an unplanned pregnancy, and
experiencing poor reproductive health
(11) Climate change is predicted to lead to increasing
frequency and intensity of extreme weather conditions,
precipitating the occurrence of natural disasters around the
globe.
(12) The relocation and death of women as a result of
climate change-related disasters often has devastating
impacts on social support networks, family ties, and the
coping capacity of families and communities.
(13) The ability of women to adapt to climate change is
constrained by underlying gender inequality, including a lack
of--
(A) economic freedoms;
(B) property, land tenure, and inheritance rights;
(C) access to financial resources, education, family
planning, and reproductive healthcare services; and
(D) quality tools, equipment, and technology that support
economic opportunity and independence.
(14) Despite having unique capabilities and knowledge to
promote, plan, and execute activities to enhance communities'
climate change adaption and resilience capacities, women
often have insufficient resources, are not empowered to take
such actions, and are often excluded from leadership and
decision-making processes.
(15) Women have a multiplier effect because women use their
income and resources, when given the necessary tools, to
increase the well-being of their children and families,
playing a critical role in reducing food insecurity, poverty,
and socioeconomic effects of climate change.
(16) Women are often underrepresented in the development
and formulation of policy regarding mitigation and adaptation
to climate change, even though women are often in the best
position to provide and consult on adaptive strategies.
SEC. 603. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Ambassador-at-large.--The term ``Ambassador-at-Large''
means the Ambassador-at-Large for the Office of Global
Women's Issues of the Department of State.
(2) Climate-displaced person.--The term ``climate-displaced
person'' means any person who, for reasons of sudden or
progressive change in the environment that adversely affects
his or her life or living conditions--
(A) is obliged to leave his or her habitual home, either
within his or her country of nationality or in another
country;
(B) is in need of a durable resettlement solution; and
(C) whose government cannot or will not provide such
durable resettlement solution.
(3) Disparate impact.--The term ``disparate impact'' refers
to the historical and ongoing impacts of the pattern and
practice of discrimination in employment, education, housing,
banking, health, and nearly every other aspect of life in the
economy, society, or culture that have an adverse impact on
minorities, women, or other protected groups, regardless of
whether such practices were motivated by discriminatory
intent.
(4) Environmental disasters.--The term ``environmental
disasters'' means specific events caused by human activity
that result in seriously negative effects on the environment.
(5) Special coordinator.--The term ``Special Coordinator''
means the senior coordinator appointed pursuant to section
607(c).
(6) Working group.--The term ``Working Group'' means the
Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and Climate Change
established under section 605.
SEC. 604. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States, in
partnership with affected countries, donor country
governments, international financial institutions,
international nongovernmental organizations, multilateral
organizations, and civil society groups, especially those led
by women--
(1) to combat the leading causes of climate change;
(2) to mitigate the effects of climate change on women and
girls; and
(3) to elevate the participation of women in policy,
program, and community decision-making processes with respect
to climate change.
(b) Implementation.--The policy described in subsection (a)
shall be carried out by--
(1) establishing the Federal Interagency Working Group on
Women and Climate Change to prevent and respond to the
effects of climate change on women globally; and
(2) implementing a coordinated, integrated, evidence-based,
and comprehensive strategy on women and climate change
through United States policies.
SEC. 605. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON WOMEN AND
CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established in the Department
of State the Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and
Climate Change.
(b) Chairperson.--The Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special
Coordinator, shall serve as the chairperson of the Working
Group.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The Working Group shall be composed of a
senior-level representative from each of the Federal agencies
and bureaus and offices of the Department of State described
in paragraph (2), as selected by the head of the respective
agency or subagency.
(2) Federal agencies.--The Federal agencies and bureaus and
offices of the Department of State described in this
paragraph are--
(A) the Department of State, including--
(i) the Office of Global Women's Issues;
(ii) the Office of Civil Rights;
(iii) the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs;
(iv) the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration;
(v) the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and
(vi) the Bureau of International Organization Affairs;
(B) the United States Agency for International Development;
(C) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
(D) the Environmental Protection Agency;
(E) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
(F) the National Institutes of Health;
(G) the National Science Foundation;
(H) the Council on Environmental Quality; and
(I) the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
(3) Representatives of additional agencies.--The
Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator, may request
the participation of representatives of other relevant
agencies or departments on a limited-time basis.
(d) Functions.--The Working Group shall--
(1) coordinate and integrate the development of all
policies and activities of the Federal Government relating
to--
(A) combating the effects of climate change on women in the
national and international sphere; and
(B) improving the response and strategy of the Federal
Government to fight climate change for the security of the
United States and the international community;
(2) allow each member of the Working Group to act as a
representative for the Working Group within the Federal
department or agency of such member to facilitate
implementation of the Working Group policies within such
department or agency;
(3) ensure that all relevant Federal departments and
agencies comply with appropriate guidelines, policies, and
directives from the Working Group pertaining to issues and
responsibilities related to climate change and women;
(4) ensure that Federal departments or agencies, State
governments, and relevant congressional committees, in
consultation with nongovernmental organizations and policy
experts in the field and State and local government officials
who administer or
[[Page S2035]]
direct policy for programs relating to climate change and
women--
(A) have access to, receive, and appropriately disseminate
best practices in the administration of such programs;
(B) have adequate resources to maximize the public
awareness of such programs;
(C) increase the reach of such programs;
(D) collect and share relevant data, including sex and age
disaggregated data; and
(E) issue relevant guidance; and
(5) identify and disseminate best practices to each
relevant Federal department and agency regarding how to
improve the collection of data relevant to the disparate
impact of climate change on women (especially marginalized
women), including--
(A) unpaid and paid care work;
(B) access to decent work opportunities;
(C) community advocacy, activism, and representation;
(D) access to education for women and girls;
(E) access to comprehensive health care, including
reproductive health and rights;
(F) participation in professional trades, including
agriculture;
(G) rights and access to resources, such as land, financial
services and credit, training, and tools and equipment;
(H) abilities to achieve durable solutions to displacement,
including integration, return, or resettlement;
(I) food insecurity and desertification;
(J) community infrastructure, multilevel government
adaptability, and climate resilience;
(K) climate and weather-related crisis response, including
safety from gender-based violence; and
(L) women's involvement and leadership in the development
of frameworks and policies for climate resilience.
(e) Consultation.--The Working Group may consult and obtain
recommendations from such independent nongovernmental policy
experts, State and local government officials, independent
groups and organizations, or other groups or organizations as
the Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator,
determines will assist in carrying out the mission of the
Working Group.
(f) Frequency of Meetings.--The Working Group shall meet
not less frequently than quarterly to discuss and develop
policies, projects, and programs referred to in subsection
(d).
SEC. 606. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY AND
POLICIES TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO THE EFFECTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON WOMEN GLOBALLY.
(a) Initial Strategy Required.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Ambassador-
at-Large, or the Special Coordinator, in consultation with
the Working Group, shall develop and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a United States National
and International Strategy to prevent and respond to the
effects of climate change on women.
(b) Contents.--The strategy submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) recognizing the disparate impacts of climate change on
women and the efforts of women globally to address climate
change;
(2) taking effective action--
(A) to prevent and respond to climate change and mitigate
the effects of climate change on women around the world; and
(B) to promote gender equality, economic growth, public
health, racial justice, principled humanitarian access, and
human rights;
(3) implementing the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals listed in subsection (f) through and beyond 2030 to
prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on women
globally;
(4) implementing balanced gender participation to avoid
reinforcing binary roles, especially among individuals from
the communities most impacted, in climate change adaptation
and mitigation efforts, including in governance and
diplomatic positions within the United States Government;
(5) working at the local, national, and international
levels, including with individuals, families, and
communities, to prevent and respond to the effects of climate
change on women;
(6) systematically integrating and coordinating efforts to
prevent and respond to the effects of climate change on women
internationally into United States foreign policy and foreign
assistance programs;
(7) investing in research on climate change through
appropriate Federal departments or agencies and funding of
university and independent research groups on the various
causes and effects of climate change;
(8) developing and implementing gender-sensitive frameworks
in policies to address climate change that account for the
specific impacts of climate change on women;
(9) developing policies to support women who are
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change to
prepare for, build their resilience to, and adapt to such
impacts, including a commitment to increase education and
training opportunities for women to develop local resilience
plans to address the effects of climate change;
(10) developing and investing in programs, in coordination
with the diplomatic missions of other countries, that--
(A) educate and empower women and girls in the United
States and around the world;
(B) gather information on how climate change is affecting
their lives; and
(C) provide guidance on the needs of their families and
communities in the face of climate change;
(11) consulting with representatives of civil society,
including nongovernmental organizations, community and faith-
based organizations, multilateral organizations, local and
international civil society groups, and local climate change
organizations and their beneficiaries, that have demonstrated
experience in preventing and responding to the effects of
climate change on women;
(12) supporting and building local capacity in developing
countries, including in governments at all levels and in
nongovernmental organizations (especially women-led
organizations), to prevent and respond to the effects of
climate change on women;
(13) developing programs to empower women in communities to
meaningfully engage in the planning, design, implementation,
and evaluation of strategies to address climate change while
taking into account their roles and resources;
(14) including women in economic development planning,
policies, and practices that directly improve conditions that
result from climate change;
(15) integrating gender analysis in all policies and
programs in the United States that are globally related to
climate change; and
(16) ensuring that such policies and programs support women
globally to prepare for, build resilience for, and adapt to,
climate change.
(c) Updates.--The Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special
Coordinator, shall--
(1) consult with the Working Group to collect information
and feedback; and
(2) update the strategy and programs to prevent and respond
to the effects of climate change on women globally, as the
Ambassador-at-Large, or the Special Coordinator, considers
appropriate.
(d) Implementation Plan and Budget Required.--Not later
than 60 days after the submission of the strategy under
subsection (a), the Senior Coordinator shall submit an
implementation plan and budget for the strategy to the
appropriate congressional committees.
(e) Assistance and Consultation.--The Senior Coordinator
shall assist and provide consultation to the Secretary of
State in preventing and responding to the effects of climate
change on women globally.
(f) United Nations Sustainable Development Goals Through
and Beyond 2030.--The United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals listed in this subsection are--
(1) ending poverty in all its forms everywhere;
(2) ending hunger, achieving food security and improved
nutrition, and promoting sustainable agriculture;
(3) ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all
and at all ages;
(4) ensuring inclusive, equitable, and quality education
and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all;
(5) achieving gender equality and empowering all women and
girls;
(6) ensuring the availability and sustainable management of
water and sanitation for all;
(7) ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable,
and modern energy for all;
(8) promoting sustained, inclusive, and sustainable
economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent
work for all;
(9) building resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive
and sustainable industrialization, and fostering innovation;
(10) reducing inequality within and among countries;
(11) making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe,
resilient, and sustainable;
(12) ensuring sustainable consumption and production
patterns;
(13) taking urgent action to combat climate change and its
impacts;
(14) conserving and sustainably using the oceans, seas, and
marine resources for sustainable development;
(15) protecting, restoring, and promoting sustainable use
of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably managing forests,
combating desertification, and halting and reversing land
degradation and biodiversity loss;
(16) promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for
sustainable development, providing access to justice for all,
and building effective, accountable and inclusive
institutions at all levels; and
(17) strengthening the means of policy implementation and
revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable
development.
SEC. 607. CLIMATE CHANGE WITHIN THE OFFICE OF GLOBAL WOMEN'S
ISSUES.
(a) Establishment.--The Ambassador-at-Large for the Office
of Global Women's Issues of the Department of State shall
chair the Federal Interagency Working Group on Women and
Climate Change.
(b) Functions.--The Ambassador-at-Large shall--
(1) direct the activities, policies, programs, and funding
of the Department of State relating to the effects of climate
change on women, including with respect to efforts to prevent
and respond to those effects;
(2) coordinate closely with the Climate Security
Coordinator appointed pursuant to section 1(g) of the State
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by section
102, regarding matters related to climate change's effects on
women and related security and diplomatic matters and
engagements;
(3) advise the Secretary of State, the relevant heads of
other Federal departments and independent agencies, and other
entities within the Executive Office of the President,
regarding the establishment of--
[[Page S2036]]
(A) policies, goals, objectives, and priorities for
addressing and combating the effects of climate change on
women; and
(B) mechanisms to improve the effectiveness, coordination,
impact, and outcomes of programs relating to addressing and
combating the effects of climate change on women, in
coordination with experts in the field, nongovernmental
organizations, and foreign governments; and
(4) identify and assist in the resolution of any disputes
that arise between Federal agencies relating to policies and
programs to address and combat the effects of climate change
on women or other matters within the responsibility of the
Office of Global Women's Issues.
(c) Special Coordinator.--The Ambassador-at-Large may
appoint a senior coordinator as the designee responsible for
carrying out the functions described in subsection (b).
(d) Briefing and Report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
the Ambassador-at-Large shall--
(1) brief the appropriate congressional committees
regarding--
(A) the effects of climate change on women; and
(B) the prevention and response strategies, programming,
and associated outcomes with respect to climate change; and
(2) submit an assessment of the human and financial
resources necessary to carry out this title to the
appropriate congressional committees.
______
By Mr. CARPER (for himself, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Cardin, Mrs.
Gillibrand, Mr. Padilla, Mr. Warnock, Mr. Markey, Mr. Schumer,
and Mr. Coons):
S. 1202. A bill to establish a program to improve community
connectivity by identifying and removing or mitigating infrastructural
barriers that create obstacles to mobility or economic development or
expose the community to pollution and other health and safety risks,
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Environment and Public
Works.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I want to share with my colleagues some
information regarding the Reconnecting Communities Act, a bill that I
have introduced today along with my colleagues Mr. Van Hollen, Mr.
Cardin, Mrs. Gillibrand, Mr. Padilla, Mr. Warnock, Mr. Schumer and Mr.
Coons. This legislation would address the legacy of highway
construction built through communities, especially through low-income
communities and communities of color, which divided neighborhoods and
erected barriers to mobility and opportunity. This legislation
implements a central piece of President Biden's American Jobs Plan,
which calls for new Federal funding to address the need to remove
infrastructure barriers in communities that have been historically
disadvantaged and disconnected.
The construction of our interstate highway system throughout the 20th
Century had many positive aspects. It facilitated commerce and travel
from coast to coast and connected our urban, suburban and rural areas.
However, the construction of highways through established neighborhoods
and cities also had a detrimental impact on the people who called those
places home.
Blocks of homes were torn down and vibrant commercial streets razed
to make way for new highway construction, often without any input from
the people who actually lived, worked, and owned businesses there. Many
of these neighborhoods never fully recovered, and the highways divided
cities, making it difficult to get from one side to the other. This
stifled economic development and opportunity for those who were left
behind.
In the 1950s and 60s, the construction of I-95 through Wilmington,
Delaware resulted in the demolition of homes, churches, and businesses,
and cut off neighbors from each other. The ability to easily walk to
the store or to church, or to have a sense of community that living in
a vibrant city brings, was destroyed for many people who lived near
that path of the interstate. And this is not unique to Wilmington. From
Baltimore to New Orleans, cities across the country are grappling with
what to do with aging interstates blighting their neighborhoods.
The Reconnecting Communities Act is designed to address this legacy
of our highway system by funding projects that would remove or
reimagine infrastructure barriers, including elevated highway
overpasses and highways that were built below grade. The bill would
authorize $15 billion over the next five years to establish a new
federal grant program at the Department of Transportation to help
States and local entities with planning, construction and local
capacity building. Specifically, it would do the following:
First, the bill would provide grants to local and Tribal governments,
Metropolitan Planning Organizations and non-profits, to help foster a
greater capacity for local communities to participate in the planning
and decision-making process for transportation and economic development
projects. This would help to ensure that new projects meet local needs.
Second, it would provide grants for planning and feasibility studies,
including studies to look at the effect of a project on traffic and
congestion, accessibility and equity.
Third, it would provide grants to carry out construction projects
that would either remove a highway infrastructure barrier, or re-
envision or retrofit the existing structure to improve mobility across
it. This includes capping a highway like I-95 in Wilmington. or
transforming a highway into an at-grade roadway as has been envisioned
in other States.
As communities across the Nation are beginning to reimagine their
downtowns to provide more sustainable and equitable access, this bill
will support local efforts to reconnect and revitalize areas that were
harmed by the construction of the Interstate Highway System.
I would like to thank my colleagues who have joined me by
cosponsoring the Reconnecting Communities Act. In particular, I am
appreciative of the leadership of the junior senator from Maryland, Mr.
Van Hollen, who helped to bring this issue to the attention of the
Environment and Public Works Committee last Congress.
I hope that all of my colleagues will join us to advance this
important legislation, which I will be working to include in our
comprehensive surface transportation reauthorization bill this year.
______
By Mr. THUNE (for himself, Mr. Crapo, and Mr. Cornyn):
S. 1206. A bill to limit the authority of the Secretary of Labor to
modify the pandemic unemployment assistance program, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1206
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``PUA Eligibility
Clarification Act of 2021''.
SEC. 2. PANDEMIC UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.
(a) Amendments.--Section 2102(a)(3) of the CARES Act (15
U.S.C. 9021(a)(3)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)(ii)(I)--
(A) in item (ii), by adding ``or'' at the end; and
(B) by striking item (kk); and
(2) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``through (kk)''
and inserting ``through (jj)''.
(b) Repeal of Guidance.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Labor shall rescind the
guidance entitled, Expanded Eligibility Provisions for the
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) Program, issued on
February 25, 2021.
(2) Repayment not required.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), in
the case of an individual who received pandemic unemployment
assistance amounts pursuant to the guidance described in
paragraph (1) before the date of enactment of this Act, the
individual shall not be required to repay the amounts.
(B) Exception.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any
individual who, as of the date of enactment of this Act, was
approved to receive compensation amounts pursuant to the
guidance described in paragraph (1)(A) but had not yet
received the amounts.
______
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself and Ms. Duckworth):
S. 1211. A bill to establish the Cahokia Mounds Mississippian Culture
National Historic Park in Collinsville, Illinois, Monroe, Madison, and
St. Clair Counties, Illinois, and St. Louis City County, Missouri, and
for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
[[Page S2037]]
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1211
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Cahokia Mounds Mississippian
Culture National Historical Park Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Historical park.--The term ``historical park'' means
the Cahokia Mounds Mississippian Culture National Historical
Park established by section 3(a).
(2) Map.--The term ``map'' means the map entitled ``Cahokia
Mounds Mississippian Culture National Historical Park,
Boundary'', numbered CMMC-NHP-107, and dated 05-31-2019.
(3) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of the Interior.
(4) States.--The term ``States'' means the States of
Illinois and Missouri.
SEC. 3. CAHOKIA MOUNDS MISSISSIPPIAN CULTURE NATIONAL
HISTORICAL PARK, ILLINOIS AND MISSOURI.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), in order to
preserve and interpret for the benefit of present and future
generations the historical, cultural, and natural resources
associated with the life of the Mississippian Culture and to
preserve access for Native American spiritual practices and
expressions, there is established, as a unit of the National
Park System, the Cahokia Mounds Mississippian Culture
National Historical Park in--
(A) Collinsville, Illinois;
(B) Monroe, Madison, and St. Clair Counties, Illinois; and
(C) St. Louis City County, Missouri.
(2) Determination by secretary.--The historical park shall
not be established until the date on which the Secretary
determines that a sufficient quantity of land, or interests
in land, has been acquired in accordance with subsection (c)
to constitute a manageable unit.
(3) Notice.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which
the Secretary acquires sufficient land under subsection (c)
to achieve compliance with paragraph (2), the Secretary shall
publish in the Federal Register a notice of the establishment
of the historical park.
(4) Availability of map.--The map shall be on file and
available for public inspection in the appropriate offices of
the National Park Service.
(b) Boundary.--The boundary of the historical park shall be
the boundary as depicted on the map.
(c) Land Acquisition.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary
may acquire land and interests in land within the boundary of
the historical park by--
(A) donation;
(B) purchase from a willing seller with donated or
appropriated funds; or
(C) exchange.
(2) Limitation.--Any land owned by the States or a
political subdivision of 1 of the States may be acquired only
by donation.
(d) Administration.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary shall administer the
historical park in accordance with--
(A) this section; and
(B) the laws generally applicable to units of the National
Park System, including--
(i) sections 100101(a), 100751(a), 100752, 100753, and
102101 of title 54, United States Code; and
(ii) chapters 1003 and 3201 of title 54, United States
Code.
(2) Cooperative agreements.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary may enter into cooperative
agreements with the States and political subdivisions of the
States, institutions of higher education, nonprofit
organizations, Indian Tribes, and individuals--
(i) to identify, interpret, and restore nationally
significant historical or cultural and natural resources
relating to the life of the Mississippian Culture within the
boundaries of the historical park, subject to the condition
that such an agreement shall provide for reasonable public
access; and
(ii) to conduct research relating to the Mississippian
Culture.
(B) Cost-sharing.--
(i) Federal share.--The Federal share of the total cost of
any activity carried out under this paragraph shall be not
more than 50 percent.
(ii) Form of non-federal share.--The non-Federal share of
the cost of carrying out an activity under this paragraph may
be in the form of--
(I) in-kind contributions; or
(II) goods or services fairly valued.
(e) General Management Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 3 years after the date on
which funds are made available to carry out this section, the
Secretary shall prepare a general management plan for the
historical park in accordance with section 100502 of title
54, United States Code.
(2) Consultation.--In preparing the general management plan
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consult with--
(A) the States and political subdivisions of the States;
(B) institutions of higher education;
(C) nonprofit organizations;
(D) Indian Tribes; and
(E) other affected individuals and entities, including--
(i) the Illinois Department of Natural Resources;
(ii) the Osage Tribe; and
(iii) the HeartLands Conservancy.
______
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Warnock, and Ms. Cortez Masto):
S. 1212. A bill to address the needs of workers in industries likely
to be impacted by rapidly evolving technologies; to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1212
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Investing in Tomorrow's
Workforce Act of 2021''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 2014, the United States spent just 0.1 percent of
the Nation's Gross Domestic Product on labor market policies,
less than half of what the United States spent on labor
market policies 30 years ago.
(2) The number of workers receiving federally supported
training has declined in the past 3 decades as advances in
technology have simultaneously shifted labor market demand
over time.
(3) Job losses from automation are more likely to impact
women, people of color, and workers making less than $40,000
annually.
(4) The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated trends in
automation, with 43 percent of businesses in the World
Economic Forum's Future of Jobs survey indicating they plan
to reduce their workforce as a result of technology
integration.
(5) Strong Federal investment in expanding training
services for workers whose jobs may be lost due to automation
could prepare the United States workforce to better adapt to
changes in the labor market and enter into skilled positions
in technologically oriented occupations and industries.
(6) A focus on preparing the workforce of the United States
for jobs that utilize advanced technologies could grow wages,
increase economic productivity, and boost the competitiveness
of the United States.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Automation.--The term ``automation'' means a device,
process, or system that functions without continuous input
from an operator, including--
(A) advanced technologies, such as--
(i) data collection, classification processing, and
analytics; and
(ii) 3-D printing, digital design and simulation, and
digital manufacturing;
(B) robotics, including collaborative robotics, and worker
augmentation technology;
(C) autonomous vehicle technology; or
(D) autonomous machinery technology.
(2) Dislocated worker.--The term ``dislocated worker'' has
the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3102).
(3) In-demand industry sector or occupation.--The term
``in-demand industry sector or occupation'' has the meaning
given the term in section 3 of that Act.
(4) Integrated education and training.--The term
``integrated education and training'' has the meaning given
the term in section 203 of that Act (29 U.S.C. 3272).
(5) Eligible partnership.--The term ``eligible
partnership'' means an industry or sector partnership, as
defined in section 3 of that Act, except that--
(A) for purposes of applying paragraph (26)(A)(iii) of that
section, the term ``institution of higher education'' has the
meaning given the term in section 101 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001); and
(B) the partnership shall include, in addition to the
representatives described in clauses (i) through (iii) of
paragraph (26)(A) of that section, representatives of--
(i) a State workforce development board or a local
workforce development board; and
(ii) an economic development organization.
(6) GAO study on automation.--The term ``GAO study on
automation'' means the study on automation conducted by the
Comptroller General of the United States, as directed in
House Report 116-450 (incorporated in the explanatory
statement regarding the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
(Public Law 116-260) in accordance with section 4 of such
Act).
(7) Local and state workforce development boards.--The
terms ``local workforce development board'' and ``State
workforce development board'' have the meanings given the
terms ``local board'' and ``State board'', respectively, in
section 3 of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29
U.S.C. 3102).
(8) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Labor.
(9) Training services.--The term ``training services''
means training services described in section 134(c)(3)(D) of
that Act (29 U.S.C. 3174(c)(3)(D)).
SEC. 4. GRANTS TO IMPROVE TRAINING FOR WORKERS IMPACTED BY
AUTOMATION.
(a) Grants Authorized.--
[[Page S2038]]
(1) In general.--From the amounts appropriated under
subsection (g) and beginning after the earlier of the date of
submission of the GAO study on automation or October 1, 2022,
the Secretary of Labor shall award grants, on a competitive
basis, to eligible partnerships to support demonstration and
pilot projects relating to the training needs of workers who
are, or are likely to become, dislocated workers as a result
of automation.
(2) Duration.--A grant awarded under this section shall be
for a period not to exceed 4 years.
(3) Use of report.--The Secretary shall use the GAO study
on automation to inform the grant program carried out under
this section.
(b) Applications.--
(1) In general.--To be eligible to receive a grant under
this section, an eligible partnership shall submit an
application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner,
and containing such information as the Secretary shall
reasonably require.
(2) Contents.--Each application submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include a description of the demonstration or pilot
project to be completed with the grant funds, which
description shall include--
(A) a description of the members of the eligible
partnership who will be involved in the demonstration or
pilot program and the services each member will provide;
(B) a description of the training services that will be
available to individuals participating in the demonstration
or pilot project, which may include--
(i) a plan to train dislocated workers from industries
likely to be impacted by automation and transition the
workers into regionally in-demand industry sectors or
occupations; and
(ii) a plan to partner with local businesses to retrain,
upskill, and re-deploy workers within an industry as an
alternative to layoffs;
(C) a plan to provide workers with technology-based skills
training, which may include training to provide skills
related to coding, systems engineering, or information
technology security, in addition to other skills; and
(D) a description of the goals that the eligible
partnership intends to achieve to upskill workers and prepare
them for in-demand industry sectors or occupations.
(c) Priorities.--In awarding grants under this section, the
Secretary shall give priority to--
(1) eligible partnerships that are located in an area with
a high concentration of--
(A) industries with a higher likelihood of being impacted
by automation; or
(B) industries included in in-demand industry sectors, as
determined under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B) of section
3(23) of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29
U.S.C. 3102(23));
(2) eligible partnerships--
(A) with a plan to provide incumbent worker training--
(i) to assist workers in obtaining the skills necessary to
retain employment or avert layoffs; or
(ii) that allows a worker working for an employer to
acquire new skills that allow the worker to obtain a higher-
skilled or higher-paid position with such employer; and
(B) that partner with local employers that intend to
backfill the pre-training positions of the incumbent workers
by hiring new workers to fill those positions;
(3) eligible partnerships that will provide workers with a
transportation stipend, paid sick leave, paid family and
medical leave, access to child care services, or other
employment benefits; or
(4) eligible partnerships with a plan to develop a shared
training curriculum that can be used across local and
regional networks of employers and training providers.
(d) Use of Funds.--An eligible partnership that receives a
grant under this section shall use the grant funds for 1 or
more of the following:
(1) Providing training services under the demonstration or
pilot project, which may include training services that
prepare workers for in-demand industry sectors or
occupations.
(2) Providing assistance for employers in developing a
staff position for an individual who will be responsible for
supporting training services provided under the grant.
(3) Purchasing equipment or technology necessary for
training services provided under paragraph (1).
(4) Providing job search and other transitional assistance
to workers in industries with high rates of job loss.
(5) Providing a training stipend to workers for training
services.
(6) Providing integrated education and training.
(e) Report.--Not later than 1 year after an eligible
partnership's completion of a demonstration or pilot project
supported under this section, the eligible partnership shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary a report regarding--
(1) the number of workers who received training services
through the demonstration or pilot project, disaggregated by
type of training service and the age, gender, and race of the
workers;
(2) the number of such workers who successfully
transitioned into a new position following completion of the
training services;
(3) the number of individuals who successfully transitioned
into an in-demand industry sector or occupation following
completion of the training services;
(4) annual earnings data for individuals who have completed
training services through the demonstration or pilot project;
(5) the percentage of individuals described in paragraph
(4) who are in education or training activities, or in
employment, during the second quarter after exit from the
training services;
(6) the percentage of individuals described in paragraph
(4) who are in education or training activities, or in
employment, during the fourth quarter after exit from the
training services; and
(7) any practices used by the partnership that should be
considered best practices with respect to training workers in
industries that have, or are expected to have, high rates of
job loss as a result of automation.
(f) General Requirements.--An eligible partnership that
receives a grant under this section shall use the grant funds
in a manner that is consistent with the labor standards and
protections described in section 181 of the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3241) and
nondiscrimination provisions described in section 188 of such
Act (29 U.S.C. 3248).
(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section such sums as may
be necessary for the first 5 full fiscal years beginning
after the earlier of the date of submission of the GAO study
on automation or October 1, 2022.
SEC. 5. EXPANSION OF WORKER TRAINING SERVICES.
(a) Adult and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training.--
Section 134(d)(1)(A) of the Workforce Innovation and
Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3174(d)(1)(A)) is amended--
(1) in clause (xi), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in clause (xii), by striking the period and inserting
``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(xiii) training programs for individuals who are, or are
likely to become, dislocated workers as a result of
automation, including activities that prepare the individuals
for occupations in the technology sector.''.
(b) National Dislocated Worker Grants.--Section 170 of the
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (29 U.S.C. 3225) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)(A), by inserting ``advances in
automation technology,'' before ``plant closures,''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to any
funds reserved under section 132(a)(2)(A) to carry out this
section, there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out
this section $40,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026.''.
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