[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 65 (Thursday, April 15, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1962-S1965]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                              Afghanistan

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, President Biden has decided to withdraw all 
forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. I believe this decision 
was one of the hardest President Biden will ever make.
  As Washington Post columnist David Ignatius pointed out, ``Biden's 
military and intelligence advisers had presented him with three 
unpleasant alternatives: leave May 1 as previously agreed, even though 
this would probably mean the fall of the Kabul government and a return 
to civil war; stay for a limited period, perhaps negotiated with the 
Taliban, which would delay its eventual takeover; or stay for an 
undefined period, which could mean a long continuation of what is 
already the United States longest war.''
  In effect, there were no good choices. The President exercised his 
best judgment to endorse a path that is most likely to protect the 
national security interests of the United States.
  I believe there were several factors over 20 years of conflict in 
Afghanistan that shaped the President's decision. The most critical 
miscalculation over the past 20 years was the Bush administration's 
decision to invade Iraq.
  We took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan at a crucial time and 
instead pursued a war of choice in Iraq. The attacks by al-Qaida on 
September 11 galvanized the world. The authorization for use of 
military force passed the Senate 98 to nothing, while the French 
newspaper Le Monde proclaimed, ``We are all Americans.'' Most notably, 
for the first time, NATO invoked article 5 of its charter, which calls 
upon its members to take action on behalf of any member nation which is 
attacked. The world was with us.
  But before we could really gain momentum in Afghanistan, the United 
States diverted to an unnecessary war of choice in Iraq. As journalist 
Steve Coll wrote in his definitive history of the war in Afghanistan, 
months after
9/11, ``On November 21, 2001, then Central Commander Tommy Franks, who 
was planning our operations against Tora Bora, took a call from Donald 
Rumsfeld, who ordered him to start working on the plan for the invasion 
of Iraq. Rumsfeld told him to have something ready within a week.''
  As a consequence, General Franks' attention was being forced 
elsewhere. As journalist Susan Glasser wrote in the Washington Post, in 
the Battle of Tora Bora, ``corrupt warlords allowed bin Laden to 
escape, while special forces pleaded with the Pentagon to let them get 
in the fight.'' As we now know, Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaida 
and the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was not captured for another 
decade. This decision wasted a period when the Taliban was routed and 
the Afghan population was welcoming.
  More recently, President Biden inherited a flawed agreement from the 
Trump administration. Known as the Doha agreement, it required the 
United States, its allies, and coalition partners to withdraw all 
military forces by May 1, 2021. Nondiplomatic civilian personnel, 
private security contractors, trainers, and advisers were also required 
to leave. In effect, the entire international presence that has been 
the foundation for almost two decades of the Afghanistan effort was to 
disappear on May 1. In exchange, the Taliban agreed not to attack the 
United States or its allies and promised not to allow ``other 
individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, to use the soil of 
Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its 
allies.''

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  The only really verifiable condition on the Taliban of the Trump 
agreement was that the Taliban would not attack the United States or 
its allies. The remaining conditions were unenforceable and very, very 
difficult to certify. As General McKenzie, the commander of Central 
Command, testified to the Armed Services Committee just a few weeks 
after the agreement was concluded: ``We don't need to trust them; we 
don't need to like them; we don't need to believe anything they say. We 
need to observe what they do.''
  What we have observed is alarming. While the Taliban may have adhered 
to one aspect of the deal by not attacking U.S. forces, they have 
violated the spirit of the agreement, as overall violence is on the 
rise.
  The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction assessed that 
enemy attacks against Afghan security forces and civilians increased by 
50 percent in the third quarter of 2020. Former Acting Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Laurel Miller described 
``an uptick in targeted assassinations [which] has sent shock waves 
through urban areas.'' In mid-March, Secretary of Defense Austin noted 
that, after meeting with Afghan President Ghani, ``It's obvious that 
the level of violence remains pretty high in the country.''
  Additionally, a United Nations report from last fall concluded that 
the relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban had not been 
substantially changed by the February 2020 agreement between the 
Taliban and the United States. The U.N. assessment noted, alarmingly, 
that ``al-Qaida has been operating covertly in Afghanistan while still 
maintaining close relations with the Taliban'' and that the group is, 
in their words, ``quietly gaining strength in Afghanistan while 
continuing to operate with the Taliban under their protection.''
  Beyond the substance of the Trump agreement, the manner in which it 
was concluded was also deeply flawed. To begin with, the Trump 
administration concluded a deal with the Taliban, a fundamentalist 
group using the name ``Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.'' Even though 
the agreement states that the United States does not recognize such a 
state, its very formulation is a propaganda boon for the Taliban.
  As former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani 
noted: ``Allowing the Taliban to refer to themselves as the Islamic 
Emirate, even in parentheses, allows them to build the narrative that 
they forced the U.S. to negotiate an exit from Afghanistan just as the 
mujahideen had forced the Soviets out. If the administration is eager 
to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, it would have done better to 
announce a no-deal exit than allowing the Taliban such a huge 
propaganda victory.''
  Additionally, the Trump agreement was completed exclusively between 
the Trump administration and the Taliban. There was no involvement of 
the Afghan Government, reversing the longstanding position of the 
United States, which prioritized an ``Afghan-led, Afghan-owned 
reconciliation process.'' Further, there was no visible involvement of 
our NATO allies who went into Afghanistan after we were attacked on 
September 11, 2001, when article 5 of the NATO charter was invoked for 
the first time.
  As the Afghan Study Group noted, the group led ably by General 
Dunford and our previous colleague Senator Ayotte: ``Our NATO allies in 
particular have been steadfast in their support and have shared the 
sacrifice; over 1,000 coalition troops have been killed since 2001.'' 
The Trump administration negotiated their exit without their say, 
without their involvement. There was no involvement either by regional 
partners despite potentially significant consequences for security in 
the region. As the Afghan Study Group further noted: ``An unstable 
Afghanistan risks destabilizing the region through continued trade in 
illicit drugs, the attraction of extremist ideologies and the possible 
exacerbation of the rivalry between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-
armed powers.''
  Trump's go-it-alone, rush-to-the-exits mentality led to a deal where 
the Taliban emerged as the key benefactor. The United States, its 
allies, and partners won very little from the Trump deal.
  Now, we are approaching 20 years of warfare in Afghanistan, spanning 
over three different Presidential administrations or, perhaps more 
accurately, 1 year of warfare repeated 20 times as we rotated troops in 
and out of Afghanistan. In addition to the disastrous pivot to Iraq and 
the flawed agreement with the Taliban, despite all our efforts over 
multiple administrations, we have been unable to build an 
effective fighting force that could defeat the Taliban and hold 
territory. Afghan soldiers have fought bravely despite continuing 
pressure and massive casualties, and several components have emerged as 
particularly capable, such as the Afghan special security forces, but 
after 20 years, this is not sufficient progress.

  As the Afghan Study Group assessed: ``The ongoing lack of capacity 
and inefficiency of the [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
or] ANDSF limit its strategic options against the Taliban. As a result, 
the ANDSF is generally on the defensive to provide security for much of 
the population.'' We were never able to change the ``checkpoint 
mentality'' of the Afghan forces. Their focus on static positions, as 
much for appearance as for tactical advantage, still persists today, 
making them extremely vulnerable to a more agile Taliban.
  Moreover, two decades later, the Afghan forces still have no organic 
logistical capabilities. An assessment by the Department of Defense 
from last June noted: ``All components of the Afghan National Defense 
and Security Forces will . . . continue to rely over the long term on 
contracted logistic support and on the United States for the vast 
majority of the funding needed to sustain combat operations.'' As I 
recall the agreement that the Trump administration negotiated, it 
requires the withdrawal of all contracted logistical support, and as 
Napoleon once commented, ``An army moves on its stomach.'' Without a 
logistical capability and without a tactically capable army, with few 
exceptions, the ability of the Government of Afghanistan and the 
military of Afghanistan to resist the Taliban is highly questionable. 
We should be looking seriously at ourselves because, for 20 years of 
efforts and billions of dollars, I would have hoped that we would have 
seen a credible, decisive, effective Afghan force.
  Another crucial factor contributing immensely to the Taliban's 
success has been the inability of the United States to eliminate the 
sanctuary the Taliban was granted in Pakistan. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies terrorism expert Seth Jones wrote in 2018: ``The 
Taliban['s] . . . sanctuary in Pakistan and state support from 
organizations like [Inter-Services Intelligence or] ISI have been 
essential to their war effort, and the U.S. failure to undermine this 
safe haven may be Washington's most significant mistake [of the war].'' 
As the Afghan Study Group notes, these ``sanctuaries are essential to 
the viability of the insurgency.''
  Additionally, Pakistan's ISI aided and abetted the Taliban while 
opportunistically cooperating with the United States. As Brookings 
scholar Vanda Felbab-Brown assessed in 2018: ``Pakistan provided direct 
military and intelligence aid . . . resulting in the deaths of U.S. 
soldiers, Afghan security personnel, and civilians, plus significant 
destabilization of Afghanistan.'' This support to the Taliban runs 
counter to Pakistani cooperation with the United States, including, as 
they have, allowing the use of airspace and other infrastructure for 
which the United States provided significant funding. As the Afghan 
Study Group noted: ``Pakistan has played both sides of the field.''
  These dynamics further play out against a complex environment in 
Pakistan, which has implications for the national security of the 
United States, its allies, and partners. Pakistan is simultaneously 
fragile and armed with nuclear weapons, making its vulnerability 
particularly dangerous. To add to this toxic mix, Pakistan is in a 
longstanding struggle with its neighbor, India, which is also armed 
with nuclear weapons. As Seth Jones described: ``Pakistan and India 
have long been involved in a balance-of-power struggle in South Asia. 
Both lay claim to the Kashmir region, and have fought three wars over 
Kashmir since 1947. Afghanistan is not the ultimate objective of either 
country but rather an arena for competition in what has

[[Page S1964]]

long been called the `great game.''' While bogged down politically and 
militarily in daily crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States, 
over multiple administrations, has been unable to focus the necessary 
attention on Pakistan. Therefore, these problems have only gotten 
worse.
  Another factor shaping the President's decision is that the United 
States and its coalition partners were never able to develop an Afghan 
Government that could gain the confidence of the people, especially 
beyond the cities, and provide basic services, including security, 
education, healthcare, and justice. A study by the World Bank in late 
2019 found that 55 percent of Afghans were living below the poverty 
line, with even basic civilian services underfunded. The lack of the 
government's ability to meet such needs erodes the people's support for 
the government.
  Afghanistan has also been undermined by profound corruption. The 
Afghan Study Group assessed that corruption has ``delegitimized the 
existing government and created grievances that are exploited by the 
Taliban to gain support and, at times, legitimacy.'' Corruption is a 
national security concern that further erodes the ability of the 
government to build faith and trust.
  Additionally, the leadership of the Afghan Government is seen as 
being removed from the populace. This makes it harder to understand the 
needs of the people and to govern effectively. A prime example of this 
conundrum is the current President, Ashraf Ghani. Ghani was reelected 
after a 5-month delay in the polling results and following a 
longstanding dispute with his political rival. While Ghani is a serious 
scholar and technocrat who literally wrote a book on fixing failed 
states, he appears unable to fix his own state. As the New York Times 
reported just last week, ``From most advantage points, Mr. Ghani--well 
qualified for his job and deeply credentialed, with Johns Hopkins, 
Berkeley, Columbia, the World Bank, and the United Nations in his 
background--is thoroughly isolated. A serious author with a first class 
intellect, he is dependent on the counsel of a handful, unwilling to 
even watch television news, those who know him say, and losing allies 
fast.''

  But even if President Ghani was a strong leader, it would likely not 
be enough. The instability of the central government, which has been 
fueled by rival factions seeking power resulting in inconclusive 
elections, has led to unwieldy power sharing arrangements. Beyond 
challenges between those political officials and technocrats who want 
to serve the government and may have competing visions, there is the 
fundamental tension between those trying to achieve the complex task of 
governing Afghanistan in Kabul and the Taliban, who have a single 
focus: ejecting foreign forces. There also appears to be a lack of 
willingness by the government to seriously negotiate with the Taliban 
and make tough choices that could have obtained, perhaps, a lasting 
peace deal.
  The Afghan Government also remains unable to generate revenue to fund 
its operations. Instead, it relies almost solely on foreign 
contributions. This includes an average of $5 billion in security 
assistance, along with $3.5 billion in civilian assistance from the 
United States and the international donors each year. The World Bank 
assessed in late 2019 that even if there was a peace agreement between 
the Afghan Government and the Taliban, Afghanistan would still need as 
much as $7 billion a year from foreign forces to sustain its most basic 
spending.
  With all of these complex dynamics at play, it underscores a further, 
albeit profoundly unsatisfactory conclusion facing the President. The 
alternative to withdrawal was not the status quo. More U.S. and NATO 
forces would have been required for self defense and especially if 
there was another attempt to ``surge'' forces to degrade the Taliban. 
It appears that the President concluded that more troops might buy more 
time and casualties, but more time would not create a government that 
could defeat the Taliban and effectively govern Afghanistan. As the old 
Afghan saying goes: ``You have all the watches; we have all the time.''
  It is important to emphasize, though, that the President's decision 
should be seen as a transition, not closure. We still have vital 
security interests in the region. Afghanistan is not in the rearview 
mirror. Pakistan is not in the rearview mirror. There is a high 
probability that without NATO and U.S. support, the Afghan security 
forces will degrade and collapse, which will ultimately cause the 
Afghan Government to collapse. The Trump administration's agreement 
with the Taliban included the departure of all security personnel, 
logisticians, and contractors, which means that when the United States 
leaves, the international presence that, again, is the foundation for 
Afghan resistance is removed. The intelligence community's Annual 
Threat Assessment for 2021 noted: ``The Afghan government will struggle 
to hold the Taliban at bay if the coalition withdraws support.'' And 
according to the New York Times, American intelligence agencies 
assessed that if U.S. troops leave before a peace deal is reached 
between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, Afghanistan ``could fall 
largely under the control of the Taliban within two or three years 
after the withdrawal of international forces.'' We have already seen 
evidence of this trend even prior to the full withdrawal. The 
International Crisis Group assessed that ``as U.S. force levels have 
fallen, battlefield dynamics have steadily shifted in the insurgents' 
favor.'' Dexter Filkins described: ``Since 2001, the main arena of 
conflict in Afghanistan has been the countryside: the government held 
the cities, while the Taliban fought to control the villages and the 
towns, particularly in the south, their heartland. But by early this 
year, the paradigm had begun to fall apart. The Taliban were entrenched 
across the north; their shadow government had begun to creep into the 
cities.''
  Another possibility, either in the interim or a permanent fact, is 
that the country could fracture with local warlords and the Taliban 
controlling different territory. This would further intensify conflict, 
increase instability, and create second order effects, such as the flow 
of internationally displaced persons and refugees. The International 
Crisis Group noted that the likelihood of fracture increases ``if U.S. 
and other funding declines'' and that it has the possibility of pulling 
Afghanistan's neighbors and other regional powers into backing proxies 
in a multisided struggle. Again, the Afghan Study Group warned: ``Any 
scenario in which the state collapses, as it did in 1992, will make it 
considerably more difficult for the United States to ensure its 
fundamental national security interests.''

  If the Taliban reestablishes its emirate in Afghanistan, it would 
likely result in erasing all the progress that has been made toward 
building democracy and particularly the rights of women and girls. As 
Seth Jones, again, wrote in a recent article published by the Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, ``The Taliban is in many ways a 
different organization from the one that governed Afghanistan in the 
1990s. Yet most of their leaders are nevertheless committed to an 
extreme interpretation of Islam that is not shared by many Afghans, an 
autocratic political system that eschews democracy, and the persistence 
of relations with terrorist groups like al-Qa`ida.''
  If NATO and the United States depart, another consequence is 
increasing pressure to limit or end international aid. Afghanistan 
cannot fund itself and, even under the best case scenario, would 
require $7 billion from international donors annually. It will be 
extremely difficult to administer programs and provide aid on the 
ground without oversight, and that, too, would very well lead to 
smaller international donations. Furthermore, the entire budget of the 
Afghan Ministry of Defense is paid for by international contributions. 
If soldiers are not getting paid, it would have a profound impact on 
national security.
  Another likely consequence of withdrawal, which has been previously 
discussed, is the creation of a vacuum that allows the resurgence of 
terrorist groups, including al-Qaida and ISIS of the Khorasan Province. 
As the Afghan Study Group also pointed out, these groups are ``for now 
limited by the military presence of the United States and its allies, 
which allows the threat to be monitored and, when necessary, disrupted, 
while also enabling Afghan Security Forces to continue to put

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pressure on these groups.'' However, the group warned: ``During its 
deliberations, the Study Group was advised that a complete U.S. 
withdrawal without a peace agreement would allow these groups to 
gradually rebuild their capabilities in the Afghanistan Pakistan region 
such that they might be able to attack the U.S. homeland within 
eighteen to thirty six months.'' This timeline is short, alarming, and 
has direct implications for our national security.
  Also, an immediate concern as the United States begins to withdraw is 
an increase in attacks from Afghan forces against the United States and 
coalition forces, commonly referred to as ``green on blue attacks.'' 
Finally, we must anticipate a flood of refugees as Afghans flee the 
chaos. In addition, we must do our part to aid those Afghans who have 
aided us.
  Given these facts and given the President's difficult decision to 
leave Afghanistan, I believe we must take serious actions to mitigate 
these threats. The withdrawal of U.S. forces should not mean an end to 
our counterterrorism efforts. Most importantly, we must ensure that 
Afghanistan will not be a source of planning, plotting, or projection 
of terrorist attacks around the globe, including against our homeland.
  Instead, we must transition to a new type of presence leaving the 
country but staying in the region in a meaningful capacity. We must 
build an anti terrorism infrastructure on the periphery of Afghanistan. 
We must continue to direct the proper level of attention, intelligence, 
and resources to evaluate the evolving terrorist threat in the region. 
This also includes closer cooperation with our allies and partners.
  We must continue to engage regional powers diplomatically, and the 
Biden administration has already begun to reinvigorate that process. We 
must use the power of our alliances and particularly those in the 
region who would endure severe consequences and instability from 
sharing a border with a failed Afghanistan. Working in cooperation, the 
United States and its allies and regional partners must be a check on 
potential instability.
  President Biden is committed to ensuring that this is not a forever 
war. But he has also made it clear he won't allow Afghanistan to become 
a safe haven for terrorism. Our mission to protect the homeland 
remains. Our duty to do so remains. As we go forward, this is a moment 
of transition, not of closure; this is a moment to do all we can to 
protect this country and hopefully ensure a safer region
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.