[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 48 (Monday, March 15, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Page S1515]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                          Information Sharing

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, today, I am going to discuss a very 
important issue that I started to investigate during the last Congress, 
and it is an issue that the executive branch must continue to improve 
upon. The subject is information sharing between the intelligence 
community and the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
connection between those two entities is a critical information sharing 
data point, and it must last beyond the current pandemic.
  To state the obvious, the healthcare landscape has evolved 
considerably in the past several decades. More specifically, the 
healthcare landscape has changed considerably in just the last year 
because of the COVID pandemic. Threats to healthcare now include cyber, 
intelligence, and counterintelligence threats.
  For example, we know the Chinese Government engaged in cyber attacks 
to steal American COVID-related research. The Communist Chinese 
Government will stop at nothing to steal our hard-earned work product. 
They know, as does the world, that the best of the best is still right 
here in America.
  Last Congress, as chairman of the Finance Committee, I focused a good 
deal of my oversight efforts on the Department of Health and Human 
Services' Office of National Security. For example, in June of 2019, I 
held a hearing on foreign threats to taxpayer-funded research, where 
the Office of National Security was one of the government witnesses. 
After the hearing, I then held a classified committee briefing with all 
the government witnesses to further discuss the foreign threats that we 
face.
  That office is the Department's connection, then, to the intelligence 
community and, accordingly, it plays a critical role in the Department 
of HHS's overall mission. That mission includes pandemic response and 
countering national security threats
  To fully perform its function, HHS needs access to intelligence 
community products and databases. So with that access, they would have 
information that is vital to mitigating threats to the Department, its 
funded partners, and its interagency colleagues. So, as part of my 
oversight efforts and before the pandemic even started, I worked to get 
that process done.
  I noted my concerns to the Trump administration that the Office of 
National Security hadn't been adequately incorporated into the 
intelligence community. To their credit, the Trump administration 
rightly and quickly resolved many of these issues. The Trump 
administration created links and information sharing between the 
intelligence community and the Department of Health and Human Services 
where that cooperation hadn't existed before.
  Those links should have existed many years ago, but prior 
administrations, like the Obama-Biden administration, failed to see 
around the corner and get the job done. Just as an example, even with 
the swine flu and outbreaks across the globe, the Obama-Biden 
administration failed to plug the Department of Health and Human 
Services into the intelligence community the way that it should have 
been done. The current pandemic exemplifies the need to have a robust 
intelligence operation that includes the Department of Health and Human 
Services.
  As pathogenic threats to our homeland and our people increase and 
become more complex, the Federal Government must prepare well in 
advance for a very quick response. In order to accomplish that task, 
the government must focus on the seamless communication that must exist 
between and among the various Departments and Agencies. The Federal 
Government must take a whole-of-government approach.
  One serious barrier to that seamless communication is 
overclassification. That is a serious barrier we find too much in 
government. But, particularly when it deals with the pandemic, it 
becomes a problem that can cost a lot of lives.
  In January of 2020 when reports began to circulate about COVID, I 
instructed my oversight and investigative staff to get a classified 
briefing from the Office of National Security. After that briefing, I 
made clear in a public way that overclassification during a public 
health emergency could have deadly consequences.
  If a certain intelligence work product is classified in a certain 
way, sometimes other government Agencies won't then have access. The 
Federal Government must guard against this type of overclassification, 
and that is especially important during emergency situations that 
demand quick action.
  To the extent that disagreements exist between Agencies, which they 
often do in complex and ever-changing fact patterns, discussion must be 
had between and among the government. From that, the facts will bear 
out, and the best decisions can then be made. That process can't take 
place if the government puts information in silos that Federal health 
Agencies are unable to access.
  Overclassification is more of a problem when China's Government 
refuses to share relevant data with researchers. At least this 
government--the United States Government--can and should share 
information between and among its Agencies.
  This administration must advance and improve upon the cooperative 
gains created by the Trump administration and make sure that the left 
hand continues to communicate with the right hand. The last thing that 
we should do is to revert to the lack of cooperation that existed 
before, especially in light of the current pandemic and the lessons 
that have been learned from this pandemic.
  The cooperation between Federal health Agencies and the intelligence 
community will strengthen ties between them for decades to come, and 
the American people will be better served by the increased 
communication. Simply put, increased communication will save lives.