[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 23 (Monday, February 8, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S564-S565]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                            New START Treaty

  Mrs. FISCHER. Madam President, I come to the floor today to discuss 
the administration's decision to extend the New START treaty by 5 
years.
  Supporters hailed the move, with the New York Times reporting that 
the President's decision ``avoided a renewed arms race.'' Meanwhile, 
critics, who believed the question of extension had given the United 
States leverage to extract concessions from Russia, as well as China, 
described the move as a wasted opportunity and a giveaway to Putin.
  As the last bilateral arms control agreement between the United 
States and Russia, perhaps it shouldn't be surprising that the debate 
over extending New START took on outsized importance, with parties on 
both sides seeing it as the vehicle to accomplish all of their goals. 
Now, with the extension decided, it comes with an opportunity to regain 
our perspective and consider

[[Page S565]]

the way forward. This begins with a clearer understanding of what the 
New START treaty accomplishes and what it doesn't.
  To begin with, the New START treaty is not a panacea, and extending 
the agreement does not prevent an arms race with just the stroke of a 
pen; nor is it an unfair agreement that locks in Russian advantages. It 
is simply an agreement between the United States and Russia to limit 
some but not all of the categories of nuclear arms. China is not a 
party to this agreement.
  As critics have pointed out, the treaty's counting rules obscure the 
true number of deployed nuclear weapons, and it has not prevented 
Russia's buildup of other kinds of nuclear arms not covered by its 
limits. Some have described these as ``loopholes'' for Russia, but they 
are well-known limitations that also apply equally to both sides.
  Since the treaty was signed, the United States has chosen not to 
invest in new nuclear weapons outside of the treaty's limits. Well, 
Russia has done the opposite, and they continue to expand their nuclear 
arsenal. I disagree with my colleagues who see that as a failure of the 
treaty. It is a failure in the Russian Government for continuing to 
build up its nuclear arsenal instead of matching our restraint and 
lowering those tensions.
  But it would also be a failure on our part if we had assumed Russia 
would refrain from building these systems out of the goodness of their 
heart. Indeed, Russia's behavior since the New START treaty was signed 
reminds us that it continues to seek a competitive advantage, and in 
order to achieve its goals, it will go around the limits, as it has 
done with the New START treaty, or it will go straight through them, as 
it did with the INF Treaty.
  So Russia's nuclear capabilities continue to expand, as does China's 
buildup of nuclear arms. That New START hasn't prevented these from 
occurring reflects the fact that the New START treaty simply does not 
account for the full spectrum of nuclear challenges, and thus, with the 
agreement to extend the treaty in place, serious threats still remain 
that really demand our attention.
  The growth of both Russia's and China's arsenals must be addressed. 
Some have called for the Biden administration to immediately pursue 
talks to this end.
  While hurrying to convene another diplomatic summit may have a 
reassuring appearance to some, diplomacy is not an end unto itself. It 
is a means to an end.

  It is important to remember that negotiating limits on Russia's 
tactical weapons and bringing China into the arms control process have 
long been U.S. diplomatic objectives. Indeed, the Obama-Biden 
administration sought these goals, as did the Trump administration, 
which deserves credit for elevating them to the highest levels. 
However, the consistent refusal of both Russia and China to engage in 
serious talks demonstrates that neither nation feels sufficient 
incentive to negotiate. New attempts at negotiations without addressing 
this wouldn't achieve a different result.
  In truth, what is needed isn't another conference in a European 
capital; it is a serious effort here at home to create incentives for 
both Russia and China to halt their nuclear buildups and to have them 
choose a different path.
  Congress and the administration should work together to strengthen 
the hands of our negotiators. To that end, we can start by rejecting 
calls being made by some advocates to cut our nuclear forces 
unilaterally or allow them to age into obsolescence by delaying their 
much needed modernization. These calls are not new; however, our senior 
military leaders have consistently advised against such courses of 
action, and the past two administrations have rejected them as well. 
They should be rejected again.
  As most in this Chamber know, our nuclear forces have aged far beyond 
their designed lifetime. After delaying and deferring the modernization 
of our nuclear forces for decades, we are now at an inflection point. 
As Admiral Richard, the current STRATCOM commander, testified last 
year, ``Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary to 
ensure the deterrent's viability have zero schedule margin and are 
late-to-need.''
  His point is clear. Further delay will result in capabilities aging-
out with no replacements available. Our nuclear deterrent would 
literally wither on the vine. This would have a number of disastrous 
consequences for our security at a time when nuclear threats are 
growing, and it would also dramatically undermine future diplomatic 
efforts to negotiate limits with Russia and China on their arsenals. 
After all, why would either nation agree to new rounds of arms 
reductions if they knew that the United States was cutting its forces 
anyway, regardless of whether they agreed to do likewise?
  We must keep this in mind when we hear calls to dismantle the triad 
or cancel our modernization programs. Doing so would make our country 
less safe by cutting the forces needed to deter aggression, and it 
would make the world less safe by ensuring that the United States is 
never in a position again to push for real reductions to Russian and 
Chinese nuclear forces.
  Instead of reducing incentives for Russia and China to negotiate, 
Congress and the administration should work together to strengthen them 
and set the conditions for successful diplomatic efforts in the future.
  Thank you, Madam President.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.