[Congressional Record Volume 167, Number 16 (Wednesday, January 27, 2021)]
[Senate]
[Pages S163-S164]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                               NEW START

  Mr. CORNYN. Madam President, we know it has been the tradition of the 
Senate to prioritize nominees for national security positions, and 
there has never been a more critical time to ensure that President 
Biden is surrounded by an experienced and capable team. From the 
threats posed by an increasingly hostile Iran to those by an 
unpredictable North Korea, there are many, many challenges on the 
horizon.
  One of the first the administration must confront is the expiration 
of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as New START. 
This is the only remaining bilateral strategic arms agreement between 
the United States and Russia, which are the world's most powerful 
nuclear states, and it is set to expire in a matter of days.
  Last fall, the Trump administration advocated for a 1-year extension 
of New START, with the condition that both countries would cap nuclear 
weapons--nuclear warheads during that period.
  Unsurprisingly, Russia preferred a clean, 5-year extension with no 
warhead limitations. President Putin delayed the final stages of talks 
in the hopes that the potential Biden administration would strike a 
deal more favorable to Russia. And it appears now, at least as things 
stand today, that President Putin has hedged his bets correctly.
  Following a call yesterday between President Biden and President 
Putin, the White House announced that the United States and Russia are 
set to extend New START for 5 years, with no conditions attached. This 
was President Biden's first major foreign policy test, and, 
unfortunately, he played right into Russia's hand.
  For starters, it is no secret that New START was deeply flawed from 
the beginning. And it is no secret that Russia cheats, which is why 
verification is so essential.
  The counting mechanisms in New START don't effectively keep our 
countries on a level playing field, which is the primary goal of any 
arms treaty because it promotes mutual deterrents. The treaty limits 
the number of bombers each nation could possess but places no limit on 
the number of warheads each bomber can support. Making matters worse, 
the limits only apply to strategic, not tactical, nuclear weapons. 
Russia has taken advantage of this loophole in New START, amassing some 
2,000 tactical nuclear weapons compared to only 500 for the United 
States.
  Russia's nuclear doctrine signals its increasing willingness to use 
those tactical nuclear weapons in a conflict, particularly in Europe, 
as it warily eyes NATO. Another 5 years under New START will allow 
Russia to continue growing its arsenal of tactical weapons and cement 
its advantage over the United States, perhaps permanently.
  Once that happens, the likelihood of Russia deploying and ultimately 
using these weapons goes higher. These treaties ought to make the world 
safer, not a more dangerous place due to imbalances, the potential for 
mistakes, or miscalculation.
  Beyond sheer numbers, there is also the question of trust or, I 
should say, of verification, because it is hardly controversial to say 
Russia isn't the most trustworthy partner. Last fall,

[[Page S164]]

the Kremlin attempted to poison a Putin opponent using a nerve agent. 
Russia has launched massive cyber attacks against private companies and 
government agencies here in the United States, the latest being the 
SolarWinds hack. And last year, it attempted to steal coronavirus 
vaccine data from the United States and some of our closest allies.
  In short, Russia does not play by the rules, and New START does 
little to prevent further cheating. By granting Putin's request for a 
clean 5-year extension of New START, the Biden administration will not 
only be rewarding Russia for its hostile actions against the United 
States and our allies but also enabling Russia and other nuclear states 
to continue growing their stockpiles while the United States plays by 
outdated rules: no cap on nuclear warheads, no enhanced verification 
measures--in short, no need for assurances for Russia to follow the 
rules laid out in New START.
  The expected treaty extension by the Biden administration wouldn't 
address any of those blinking red lights. The biggest failure of a 
clean, 5-year extension, though, is relinquishing the leverage we 
currently have to take a more comprehensive approach to nuclear 
disarmament.
  As I said, the United States and Russia are the most powerful nuclear 
states in the world, but together we account for only two of the five 
nuclear armed states recognized by the nonproliferation treaty. Two of 
the other countries, the United Kingdom and France--both of whom 
provide regular information about the size and makeup of their nuclear 
arsenal--are not a problem.
  The fifth and final power is China, one of the world's biggest secret 
keepers. It is a police state and opaque, as we learned once again when 
it came to the virus from Wuhan Province.
  As if we needed a reminder of the critical information China withheld 
from the rest of the world, all we need to do is look at the COVID-19 
pandemic. The first cases of COVID-19 appeared in China as early as 
November of 2019, and the Communist Party of China willfully withheld 
the information from the rest of the world, and it sought to downplay 
the potential impact of the virus. China repeatedly silenced the brave 
men and women of its own country who tried to sound the alarm, and, as 
a result, countries around the world were ill-prepared for these 
critical early stages of the fight against COVID-19. Now, more than 2.1 
million people have died from this virus, including more than 420,000 
Americans.
  It is impossible to gauge how many of those lives could have been 
saved by earlier intervention, but this should serve as a cautionary 
tale when it comes to managing threats from China. We cannot allow 
China to continue sitting on the sidelines while the four other nuclear 
states play by the rules as we hope they will. The administration must 
push to get China to the negotiating table--at the negotiating table.
  The thick cloak of secrecy surrounding the Chinese Communist Party 
has made it nearly impossible to verify information about the breadth 
and the depth of China's nuclear capabilities. What we do know is that 
China continues to pursue a nuclear triad, and experts estimate China 
to have about 300 nuclear weapons.
  Assuming that figure is correct, it puts China slightly ahead of 
France and the United Kingdom in terms of raw numbers. That would make 
China the third most powerful nuclear state in the world, and we have 
every reason to believe that the size of its arsenal will continue to 
grow.
  In May of 2019, then-Director for the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
GEN Robert Ashley, said China is likely to at least double the size of 
its nuclear stockpile over the next decade. He referred to this effort 
as ``the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear 
arsenal in China's history.''
  Despite this already large and constantly growing nuclear threat, 
there are virtually no measures in place to hold China accountable or 
to bring them to the table. A simple extension of the New START leaves 
in place a framework in which the Russians cheat, the Chinese are not 
at the table, and the United States is playing by the rules of a bygone 
era.
  This must change. It must change. If you think about the fact that 
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have not been used on 
this planet, it is a result of tough negotiations and a system of 
mutual deterrence because we know, were nuclear weapons to be used, 
that it could result in the extermination of the planet.
  So that is why deterrence is so important. That is why reciprocity 
and transparency are so important. The Cold War-era approach to nuclear 
disarmament does not make sense in the modern world. Rather than enter 
a 5-year extension of New START, the administration should use its 
leverage to convene multilateral talks. America should invite the other 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty states--Russia, China, France, and the 
UK--to the negotiating table and encourage multilateral talks aimed at 
limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals globally.
  There is far too much at stake to merely cave in to the demands of 
President Putin in Moscow and cave in as well to the recalcitrance of 
Beijing to come to the table. The administration must pursue a 
multilateral, comprehensive approach. It is the only practical and 
workable solution to the vast nuclear threats posed by both China and 
Russia.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hickenlooper). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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