[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 208 (Wednesday, December 9, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7313-S7317]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MOTION TO DISCHARGE--S.J. RES. 78
Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose another massive
infusion of arms into the volatile Middle East.
Someone must ask the question: Can a lasting peace be purchased with
more weapons? Will selling sophisticated fighter jets and weaponized
drones bring more stability to the Middle East? Is it wise to pour fuel
on the fire that burns in the Middle East?
The Senate today is debating with these joint resolutions whether to
disapprove of the announced sale of 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones to
the United Arab Emirates, a country that has recently taken encouraging
steps specifically toward Israel, but with an overall record that
should give concern.
The primary questions we should be asking ourselves are: To what ends
has the UAE deployed its military and its military technology in recent
years? Does the UAE have a record that we can trust? What military
behavior are we encouraging and rewarding with this sale? Will the U.S.
bear responsibility if the UAE misuses these incredibly sophisticated
weapons?
The answers to these questions are far from clear. In fact, the UAE's
record should give us pause. The UAE is not a democracy. Their human
rights record is mixed, and their military activities in the region, as
a one-time member of the Saudi coalition, contributed to the bloodshed
and devastation in Yemen.
On human rights, let's look at some recent reported examples. In
2017, Ahmed Monsoor, a human rights activist, was given a 10-year
prison sentence based on his speech. Specifically, he was charged for
posting ``false information that harms national unity'' on social
media. The charges against him were based on a call for the release of
another activist who had been put in prison for political speech. Is
this the kind of democracy or lack of democracy and lack of speech that
should be rewarded with our most sophisticated weaponry?
In 2017, the UAE government also handed down a 10-year sentence to
Nasser bin-Ghaith, an economist, for his criticism of the UAE and
Egyptian Governments. Is this the kind of country that deserves our
most sophisticated weaponry?
In 2018, the UAE arrested Matthew Hedges, a British citizen and
doctoral student, and denied him access to legal counsel for 5 months.
They sentenced him to life in prison for spying charges based on a
confession that was obtained in an undisclosed location. They were
ultimately forced to pardon him after international outrage. Is this
the kind of country that we can trust with our most sophisticated
weaponry?
The fact that the UAE is willing to buy this technology is not in and
of itself justification for the sale. This is the time to carefully
study the situation in the region and to consider the effects of
accelerating the Middle Eastern arms race in the short-term and in the
long-term.
This is why our government shouldn't be rushing into approving this
sale; yet our government is moving at warp speed to approve this sale.
It is as if we intentionally don't want to consider all of these
issues.
The most frequently cited argument in favor of this sale is that the
UAE has taken encouraging steps in the last few months. They have
normalized relations with Israel, facilitated civilian travel, and
more. Great. I am all-in for that.
We should be encouraging peaceful relations between countries. I
support those efforts. But it is not clear that dropping advanced
military technology into the region is, in fact, encouraging peaceful
relations, given how these weapons have been used in recent times.
The UAE spent years bombing Yemen as part of a coalition with Saudi
Arabia to stop the Houthis. This bombing campaign was undisciplined and
sloppy. Civilians, residents, and other nonmilitary targets were often
destroyed. The U.N. reports approximately 7,000 civilians killed in
Yemen and over 10,000 wounded.
The Saudi-UAE coalition helped create a humanitarian crisis in Yemen.
Amid collapsing public services, the largest cholera epidemic on record
has affected at least 2 million people--probably more--and killed
almost 4,000. A lot of this is to be blamed on the civil war that had
been perpetuated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
At the height of the destruction, a Yemeni child would die of
starvation every 10 minutes. More than 50,000 children have been lost
to starvation.
I have argued for years that the United States should play no role in
worsening the crisis via an arms pipeline to the coalition that
perpetuates this war. American technology helped facilitate this crisis
and should be a real concern about sending more American bombs and
fighter planes into this region.
If they weren't used wisely in the most recent years in the Yemeni
war, will they be used differently in the future? Can we trust the
people who were part of a bombing campaign of civilians in Yemen to do
an act more wisely with weapons in the future?
Let's also not forget that a media investigation found that weapons
that we sent to the coalition--U.S. weapons that were sent to the
Saudi-UAE coalition--were lost, and, in some cases, handed over to
terrorists. That is right. Military equipment from the United States
was sent to the UAE, but it wound up in the hands of terrorists. The
Saudi-UAE coalition reportedly used U.S. weapons as currency to win the
approval of militias inside Yemen.
To be clear, these activities are against the terms of sale. We told
them: You can't give away our weapons. You can't use our weapons to
purchase the support of Sunni extremists in Yemen. But they did. This
should give us cause for concern. This should make us say: Whoa. Let's
stop, and let's pause before we send more weapons into this war.
Not only that, but Iranian proxies captured some of these weapons,
and, predictably, pointed them back at the Saudi-UAE coalition. Guns,
missiles, and vehicles ended up in the hands of terrorists--weapons
that we put on the ground in the Middle East.
The same investigation found Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicles, MRAPs, in the hands of Sunni allies of the UAE and Saudi
Arabia. But guess who some of these Sunni allies were. Al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula. We are talking about the remnants of al-Qaida in
Yemen were getting weapons that we were giving to the UAE in Saudi
Arabia. Does this sound like the kind of behavior we should reward with
more weapons?
One of the MRAPs still had the export label on it indicating that it
had been sent from Beaumont, TX, to the UAE before ultimately getting
illegally transferred to extremists in Yemen. Is this the kind of
behavior we should reward with more of our sophisticated technology?
The serial number on another MRAP in the possession of the Iranian-
backed Houthis was traced back to the 2014 sale of U.S. MRAPs to the
UAE. So the UAE not only was trading our weapons for support among
Sunni extremists, including al-Qaida-affiliated extremists in Yemen,
but they also were having their equipment taken by the Houthis. So on
both sides of the war in Yemen, we had U.S. weapons. Is it a good idea
to flood the Middle East with more of our weapons? Is it a good idea to
keep sending weapons that wind up in the hands of people who don't have
our best interests at heart?
Now, people say: Well, the UAE is doing better. They have stepped
back from the coalition. They are not, you know, fighting as vigorously
in the UAE. But there still are reports that UAE is still involved in
the civil war in Yemen and that they are still engaged.
[[Page S7314]]
The UAE has a very conflicted record on human rights. I mentioned a
few of those who have been in prison for 10 years to life for speech--
for speech against the government or even just speech the government
doesn't like. But flogging is also used as a form of punishment. There
is no true freedom of speech or press in the UAE. Is this the kind of
country we should give our most sophisticated technology to
Activists have been held in secret detention centers in the UAE.
Electric shocks have been used as a form of punishment in the UAE.
Social media statements against the government are criminalized. You
can be put in prison for text messages, and people have been put in
prison and/or deported for text messages.
The government has used mass trials against dissidents. Statements of
support for Qatar were made illegal during the region's diplomatic
standoff. Criticisms of government officials were made illegal by
decree. This is not an open society; this is not a democracy; and this
is decidedly not a country that we should be giving our most
sophisticated weaponry to.
Do we believe these arms sales will encourage or discourage bad
behavior from the UAE? We are clearly communicating to the UAE that
human rights take a backseat to arms sales.
Part of the consideration for these arms sales is the recent
developments from the UAE--most prominently, the UAE's normalizing
relations with Israel through the Abraham accords. It is a positive
development, without a doubt. I am all in favor of it. I am all in
favor of trading with the UAE. I am all in favor of Israel trading with
the UAE. I am all in favor of good diplomatic relations, but you can
also have diplomatic relations without flooding the region with our
most sophisticated armaments.
Outwardly, we are told by all involved that the F-35s are not a
condition for the Abraham accords, but if you ask whether it is a good
idea to send some of our most advanced weaponry to the UAE, we are
nonetheless told, if we don't, it might jeopardize the accords. Well,
which is it? They are either part of the accords or they are not.
I, frankly, think, if the weapons were not to go, that the advantages
to Israel-UAE having diplomatic relations in trade are so great that
they will continue. The assurance right now is that we will guarantee
what is called Israel's qualitative military edge in the region, even
after the sale of F-35s and Reaper drones to the UAE. So the message to
Israel is: Yes, we are giving the same advanced fighter jets to the
UAE, but we will give you even better jets in the future.
All I can say is, that is a big maybe. And people who accept, on the
face of that, that, oh, yes, we are going to guarantee something, but
we are giving this same equipment to people who have been on the other
side of virtually every other war in the Middle East, I think, is a
hopeful promise but not necessarily a guarantee.
The easiest way, if you favor protecting Israel's QME, or military
edge, is to stop sending military assets to other countries in the
region. We are competing with ourselves right now. We give advanced
weaponry to Israel, and then we say we are going to keep your
advantage. But then we give the advanced weaponry to the UAE, and so
Israel comes back and says we need more. Then we give more to them, and
the Saudis want more. And then once we give the weapons to the Saudis,
Israel wants more. It is a never-ending arms race between the so-called
countries that are actually getting along, not to mention the arms race
between those who are opposed to Iran in the region.
The easiest way to protect the qualitative military edge of Israel is
to quit sending more advanced weaponry into the region. We have
committed to protecting Israel's QME in response to these sales, but we
continue to obligate ourselves to increasingly large sales to offset
the large sales we have already approved to others, like the UAE and
Saudi Arabia.
There is another aspect to the qualitative military edge that is
rarely discussed. It is the QME that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
sheikdoms have over Iran. Saudi Arabia is the third biggest purchaser
of weapons and the third biggest spender on military of anyone in the
world now, but if you add Saudi Arabia's weapons to the Gulf sheikdoms'
weaponry, you find that they spend eight times more on their military
than Iran. So what kind of response would we imagine?
We may not like what Iran does, but we should at least think about
what they will do in response to what we do, and what in response to
what the Saudis do and the UAE does and Israel does. Exacerbating the
QME inevitably leads to pressure on Iran to further escalate the arms
race and becomes a never-ending destructive cycle of more and more
weapons.
People say--and this administration has said--we want an agreement
with Iran but not just a nuclear agreement. So we got out of the
nuclear agreement. We want an agreement on conventional weapons. But
how will that work? We asked Iran to limit their weapons, but we keep
piling weapons on the other side? Do you think Iran is going to agree
to limit their weapons if we keep piling more of our sophisticated
weapons into the hands of the Saudis and into the hands of the UAE and
others?
There is great concerns with this sale, and rushing it through is a
mistake. What happens if the F-35s are shot down? What if Russia or
China is able to access our sensitive stealth technology? How will the
need for contractors be handled in a secure fashion?
Some supporters of Israel are very worried about this. The Zionist
Organization of America, for example, has opposed the sale because it
jeopardizes Israel's qualitative military edge. It makes the
technologies on which Israel relies less secure.
This statement from the Zionist Organization of America is quite
clear: ``The security of both the U.S. and Israel is best served by
preventing any other countries from acquiring this advanced aircraft.''
They couldn't be clearer. Even many in Israel were initially, and
very vocally, opposed to this sale. Their Minister of Defense, Benny
Gantz, said absolutely it was a terrible idea. Their Minister of
Settlements, same thing.
I would urge my colleagues to consider the possible consequences of
this sale. We should not accelerate an arms race in the Middle East; we
should not jeopardize the security of our military technologies; and we
should not reward a decade-plus of undesirable behavior by the UAE. I
urge a vote in support of these resolutions of disapproval.
Madam President, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, I
move to discharge the Foreign Relations Committee from further
consideration of S.J. Res. 78, a joint resolution providing for
congressional disapproval of the proposed military sale to the United
Arab Emirates of certain defense articles and services.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Blackburn). The motion is pending
Mr. PAUL. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to
support these two resolutions of disapproval. I appreciate my
distinguished colleague from Kentucky and his support and advocacy here
in these particular arms sales to the United Arab Emirates.
Simply put, many aspects of this proposed sale remain conceptual--
conceptual. We are being asked to support a significant transfer of
advanced U.S. technology without clarity on a number of key details
regarding the sale or sufficient answers to critical national security
questions.
There are simply too many outstanding questions about the protection
of critical U.S. military technology and the broader implications of
these sales to U.S. national security regarding the UAE's
relationships, for example, with Russia and China as they exist today--
as they exist today.
I have heard some of my colleagues say: Well, aren't we concerned
that they will go to Russia--they have relationships with Russia and
China as it exists today in a military purchase context--and about the
long-term implications, of course, to the United States and to our
ally, the State of Israel, in terms of national security?
Now, it is disappointing that we are forced to discuss these issues
in such a public way through a formal congressional expression of
disapproval. That is not normally how we do this. However, the
administration left us no
[[Page S7315]]
choice because of the way that it attempted to rush through these sales
by completely subverting congressional oversight, and, it appears,
increasingly, the need for greater interagency review.
Now, the U.S. Congress has a unique legislative responsibility to
oversee U.S. arms sales abroad. This process allows Congress to engage
privately with relevant national security agencies and the intended
recipient countries in order to better understand the intricacies and
security implications of any proposed sale. But as it has done before,
the administration decided to ignore the congressional responsibilities
here and rush through with this sale. They blew right through that
period of review that the Congress has had normally for about 40 days.
Let me just say, the United Arab Emirates, from my view, has been an
important partner in the fight against terrorism and for other U.S.
national security priorities, and I will suspect it will continue to be
so after this. It is unfortunate, however, that we find ourselves in
this situation.
Following the historic Abraham accords, we started hearing that the
administration was planning to grant the UAE a longstanding request--
the sale of the most advanced U.S. stealth fighter jets. Both the
Emiratis--and I have spoken to their Foreign Minister and to their
Ambassador--and the U.S. administration continued to insist, however,
that there is no connection--none--between the Abraham accords and this
sale. So that is a red herring for those who are concerned that somehow
we are going to disrupt the Abraham accords.
While I join just about all of my colleagues in applauding the
advancement of diplomatic relations that builds upon years already of
Israeli and Emirati engagement, there is absolutely no reason to rush
through an arms sale of this magnitude, especially when we are being
told there is no connection.
Interagency review of such sales usually takes many months of careful
deliberation. The Departments of State, Defense, and others must assess
what capabilities are safe to sell, what technology security measures
are appropriate and necessary, what restrictions on use are imposed,
and how the sale will affect the national security of our friends and
allies in the region and elsewhere.
Once these deliberations have concluded, a sale of this magnitude
usually sits with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for an
informal review process that, by the State Department's own
requirement--the State Department's own requirement--would last 40
days.
Then, for reasons the administration has concealed, it completely
subverted this review process and officially started a statutory 30-day
review--all before any briefings were even given to staff, let alone
Senators and members of the committees of jurisdiction.
To date, we have yet to get a clear answer as to why the President
and the Secretary of State are trying to, again, circumvent the
congressional arms sales oversight process by rushing the sale of 50 of
the most advanced fighter jets in the world--technology that gives
Israel and the United State a critical military advantage over any
adversary.
Moreover, the administration wants to push through without any
congressional oversight the second largest ever sale of armed Reaper
drones to the UAE and over 14,000 additional aircraft munitions on top
of the 60,000 already sold to Abu Dhabi as part of the nonemergency
last year. I say ``nonemergency'' because they declared an emergency,
but there was no emergency to be justified.
Delivery of the most advanced features could take years. I say that
because, therefore, there is no reason that giving us a timeframe to do
what we normally do to determine whether this is the right sale in the
national security interests of the United States, not starting an arms
race in the Middle East, also dealing with Israel--is that too much to
answer when you are not even going to get any of this equipment for
years? These are major sales by any measure.
Part of this conversation is also, as my colleague has said, about
Israel's qualitative military edge that it currently has over its
neighbors and was expected to maintain with its own purchase of 50 F-
35s that are still in the process of being built and delivered.
Let me make it clear. I take a backseat to no one when it comes to
advancing U.S. policies to protect Israel's national security. I have
proven that time and again. But this sale is fundamentally about U.S.
national security, about the U.S. qualitative military edge, and about
our long-term national security. It is also about not wanting to start
and thinking about, at least, what does it mean in terms of an advanced
arms race in the region.
Unfortunately, particularly for Members who do not serve on national
security committees, there is much we cannot discuss in an open
setting, but let me assure all of my colleagues that these sales have
very real implications for their own technology security.
On October 9 of this year, Armed Services ranking member Senator Reed
and I sent a letter to former Secretary of Defense Esper and Secretary
of State Pompeo with 16 detailed questions about the F-35 sale. To
date, we have not received satisfactory answers to any or all of those
questions.
I ask unanimous consent to have that letter printed in the
Congressional Record
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Hon. Mike Pompeo,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
Hon. Mark Esper,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Esper: We write today
to seek clarity on public reporting and mixed messaging from
the Administration on a proposed sale of the F-35 aircraft to
the United Arab Emirates. As you well know, Congress has
statutory authority over foreign arms sales, but it appears
that the Administration is trying to rush through a
precedent-setting sale of the United States' most advanced
fighter aircraft to a country in a volatile region with
multiple ongoing conflicts. The Administration appears to be
ignoring long-standing, deliberative, internal U.S. processes
for considering whether selling such a sophisticated and
mission-critical military system abroad could compromise the
United States' national security interests--and in this case
Israel's--and instead is rushing to meet a political
deadline.
There are numerous questions as to how the national
security interests of both the U.S. and Israel will be
served, or undermined, by such a sale. We fear that the Trump
Administration's recklessly accelerated timeline will
preclude sufficient and comprehensive consideration of these
issues by the national security professionals in the
Departments of State and Defense, as well as by the Congress.
Emirati officials have publicly and privately declared that
their decision to normalize relations with Israel was not
dependent on getting the F-35; however, the Administration's
attempt to move at breakneck speed so close to this
announcement would give the appearance that it was.
Additionally, this sale seems more tied to the American
political calendar than to a sober deliberation about
regional security.
U.S. national security and the safety of American troops
could be seriously compromised by this sale. The F-35 is one
of the most advanced aircraft in the world, giving the United
States and its allies and partners a tremendous military
advantage. This therefore creates an immense
counterintelligence threat against this aircraft. Indeed,
assessing the risk to our own military advantage is a
critical part of the internal deliberations we must make
before agreeing to provide this aircraft, including any
recipient country's history of use of U.S. origin weapons and
its capacity and willingness to protect critical U.S.
technology. Indeed, given that the F-35 has been financed,
developed, produced, and sold to our security partners as
part of an international consortium, the sale has the risk of
undermining their security as well.
In light of these concerns, we have listed below a series
of vital questions that must be fully answered before this
sale is sent to Congress for review, as required by statute.
1) What precisely has the U.S. agreed to in terms of
selling the F-35 and other aircraft to the UAE?
How many?
On what timeline for delivery?
Has the U.S. received a formal Letter of Request from the
UAE for these aircraft?
2) Would the Emiratis have signed the Abraham Accords if
not for the promise of this sale? Were F-35s or any other
military sales discussed as part of deliberations related to
the Abraham Accords?
3) Has the UAE articulated a military threat necessitating
the acquisition of F-35 aircraft?
How would the UAE employ F-35s against that threat?
Are there other military or other means that could also
counter this threat or threats?
[[Page S7316]]
4) It has been reported that the U.S. and the UAE have
agreed to conclude a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for
the aircraft by December 2nd. This is an extremely
accelerated schedule for interagency review, consultation
with Congress, and preparation of the LOA and negotiation on
its terms with the UAE--a process that can take months, if
not longer.
Is this deadline correct?
If so, why did the Administration agree to this arbitrary
deadline in concluding an LOA?
How would such an accelerated timeline affect the
Congressional review and approval process?
5) It has traditionally taken months for a complete and
comprehensive interagency review of a proposed sale of this
importance and sensitivity.
Has the U.S. interagency reviewed and determined what
variant of the aircraft would be best to sell, in terms of
protecting the aircraft's technology and in terms of
protecting Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME)?
If not, when will that review commence and how long might
it take?
6) Has a determination been made that the sale of this
aircraft to the UAE will not jeopardize Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge?
If so, upon what basis was that determination made?
7) Will any aircraft sold to the UAE be reduced in
capabilities compared to comparable U.S. aircraft?
If so, how much less capable will these aircraft be
compared to Israeli and U.S. F-35 aircraft and other
aircraft?
Exactly which systems, software, and components will be
reduced in terms of operational capability in comparison with
Israeli and U.S. aircraft, and to what degree and with what
effect? Please provide a detailed written and graphic
comparison.
8) What anti-tamper measures will be incorporated into the
F-35 and other aircraft sold to the UAE to ensure that
critical or sensitive military technology and components
within such aircraft are not compromised, either in operation
or in terms of revealing classified information about such
technology and components?
9) Will the UAE be required to enter into binding
commitments not to employ such aircraft in situations that
might expose them to technological intelligence collection
efforts, such as exposure to advanced anti-aircraft radar
systems?
10) What secondary security measures will be put in place
to protect critical U.S. technology inherent in the F-35?
Will the U.S. require continuous U.S. presence on base to
monitor the security of the aircraft?
Will the U.S. be made aware of any proposed third-party
nationals to visit the base(s) where the F-35 aircraft are
based?
Will the U.S. be able to veto any physical presence of such
nationals if, in the opinion of U.S. personnel present in the
U.S. Embassy or in Washington, the close physical proximity
of such third-party nationals could constitute an
intelligence threat to sensitive technology in or of these
aircraft?
Will any automatic electronic security measures be employed
to protect U.S.-origin aircraft, manuals, and related
documents?
Will the maintenance and servicing of these aircraft be
performed solely by U.S. personnel, or in concert with
Emirati personnel?
11) What measures will be taken to counteract any reduction
in Israel's QME?
Will the U.S. shift from a Qualitative Military Edge
measurement to a Quantitative one, selling or providing more
aircraft and munitions meant to overwhelm the heightened
military threat to Israel?
If so, how will these additional arms to Israel be
financed? Will the U.S. need to increase Foreign Military
Finance levels in order to offset this sale to the UAE?
12) The UAE has taken an active role in supporting Khalifa
Haftar, who has continued a brutal military campaign in Libya
against the internationally recognized Libyan government.
According to recent reports, the UAE may even have violated
the U.N. arms embargo on Libya.
What will prevent the UAE from using F-35 aircraft in
conflicts where the United States and its allies are pressing
for a diplomatic solution?
Will the United States require any commitments from the UAE
that it will not employ such aircraft to the detriment of
Israel's security interests or the foreign policy and
national security interests of the United States, as
determined by the Israel and the U.S. respectively?
13) To what extent would this sale stimulate an arms race
in the region, both among the Gulf States and with Iran? With
the arms embargo against Iran in danger of expiring, would
this sale provide greater encouragement to China and Russia
to sell Tehran advanced fighter aircraft and advanced air
defense systems, in numbers and under more favorable
financial terms than would otherwise be the case?
14) In 2017, the UAE and Russia signed an agreement to
develop a fifth-generation fighter jet, along with a separate
UAE purchase of Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighters. In addition,
after being rebuffed in its attempts to purchase armed drones
from the United States, the UAE reportedly purchased Chinese
surveillance drones and outfitted them with targeting
systems. Other reports indicate that expatriates from
countries aligned with China operate some of the UAE's
weapons systems.
What is the status of the UAE's cooperation with Russia?
Would these efforts present security and counterintelligence
threats to the F-35?
What assurances and commitments, if any, has the UAE made
to the United States to safeguard U.S. technology from
Russian and Chinese personnel that may be involved in either
of these programs?
Has the UAE agreed to terminate all such cooperation and
purchases from Russia and China?
15) What are the Administration's thoughts regarding other
sales of the F-35 in the region?
16) Have you, or will you, consult with our partners about
these risks and their views of this potential sale to the UAE
concluding the sale?
Will you take their concerns into account during the
interagency review process to address their concerns?
We look forward to your immediate response.
Sincerely,
Robert Menendez,
U.S. Senator.
Jack Reed,
U.S. Senator.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I am not opposed to these sales if they make sense and
pose no threat to U.S. or Israel security in the short and the long
term. But these sales require and deserve careful and deliberate
consideration within the interagency process and by this Congress.
However, that simply has not happened.
A little while ago, my distinguished colleague from Missouri, Senator
Blunt, asked on the floor: Well, what do you have to do to be a trusted
partner? Let me try to answer that question.
Following a classified briefing with the administration--the details
of which I will not discuss here--there are a whole host of issues that
a trusted partner would ultimately have to agree to.
One, the United Arab Emirates has been building its military
relations with Russia and China. Just a few years ago, the Emiratis and
Russia signed an agreement to develop a fifth-generation fighter jet
and to purchase Russian Sukhois. Our own Department of Defense
inspector general recently indicated that they may be funding the
malicious Russian Wagner mercenary forces in Libya. So what is the
status of and what specific efforts are we taking to address the UAE's
current and future military relationship with China--where they are
talking about building an airbase outside the UAE's waters, on
artificial land--and Russia? There are no answers to that. Do we not
deserve, if we are going to send the most sophisticated equipment in
the world to the UAE, to make sure that there is a written commitment
that they are going to phase out those military engagements?
What specific steps and assurances are the United States taking to
safeguard U.S. military technology against sophisticated espionage, and
what specific commitments do we have from the Emiratis? There is no
answer to that question. A trusted partner would agree to those
safeguards.
Three, the UAE last year transferred U.S.-origin weapons to a
terrorist organization in Yemen that has a history of targeting
civilians. The Emiratis have been repeatedly accused, along with
others, of violating the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. Well, what
assurances do we have about how and where these new sophisticated
weapons would be used? There is no answer. A trusted partner would
agree to those limits.
Four, the long-term threat of a highly lethal arms race and the great
power competition implication this could set off across the region and
implications for future gulf cooperation--the Qataris have already
asked for their own F-35s. Is that what is next? Saudi Arabia--well,
they may say: We like the United Arab Emirates, but we can't be
inferior for our own national security.
What security threats would be posed when the entire region is armed
with the most sophisticated weapon we have to offer? There are no
satisfactory answers, if any, to these questions.
What guarantees do we have that these weapons will not be used
against the United States or Israel's national security in the future?
How will that be determined?
What might Israel need in the future to secure its qualitative
military edge? There is no clear answer to that.
What specific military threat have the Emiratis articulated that they
need the F-35s to address right now? If
[[Page S7317]]
they have specific needs, then we need to know that because if these
aren't going to come online for some time, maybe their needs are more
consequential and they need to be dealt with in a different way.
How might the Iranians react to the increase of stealth fighter
aircraft in their neighborhood? We have no analysis of that.
Finally, the timeline. When will the letters of offer and acceptance
be concluded? Why was there an initial artificial deadline? Why the
rush to cut short the normal, monthslong interagency review process by
the Congress and national security professionals? Why? Why? Are they
trying to lock in the sale before President-Elect Biden is inaugurated,
regardless of the possible cost to U.S. and Israeli national security?
We have no answer to that.
As I have said before, the United Arab Emirates has been an important
partner for critical U.S. interests, including the fight against
terrorism and in our efforts in Afghanistan. But according to the
United Nations and to the Department of Defense's own inspector
general, at the same time, the UAE also seems to be working against our
stated interests in other areas. A trusted partner would be in
collaboration and in cooperation with us.
Look, I wish we could have had these discussions in more appropriate
settings. That is what we normally would have done.
This is, of course, not the first time the administration has
subverted Congress's important oversight role in arms sales. Last May,
the administration notified more than $8 billion of weapons to Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It cited a bogus ``immediate''
threat from Iran, despite the fact that most of the sales, like these
F-35s, would take years--years--to reach their intended recipients.
So, colleagues, at the end of the day, we must assert our
congressional prerogative, not for the sake of prerogative in and of
itself but to safeguard the U.S. national security interests that we
are all collectively and individually entrusted to do.
We must demand answers to the very serious and very reasonable
questions many have of this sale. Perhaps with due diligence, we will
find that this sale will indeed bolster U.S. national security, but
right now, the truth is, we do not have clarity on that most
fundamental question.
Colleagues, do you really want a sale of this magnitude to go through
without the appropriate vetting measures?
Voting against these resolutions sends a message to the executive
branch--I don't care who is sitting there; the present occupant, a
future occupant--whoever is sitting in the White House, that we are
willing to give up our congressional responsibilities. It is hard to
bring that back once you let it go. It says that we will not stop arms
sales in the future that have not gone through the appropriate review
process.
For that reason, I urge all of our colleagues to support these
resolutions of disapproval so that we may have more time to assess for
ourselves the nuances of these sales and the repercussions they may
have in the region for decades to come, to ensure technology transfer
doesn't take place, and to ensure that the national security interests
of the United States are preserved. I urge you to support these
resolutions to stand up for those propositions. Both are critical to
protecting U.S. national security interests.
Vote on Motion to Discharge--S.J. Res. 77
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that all debate time on S.J.
Res. 77 and S.J. Res. 78 be yielded back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Under the previous order, the question occurs on agreeing to the
motion to discharge S.J. Res. 77.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator
from Georgia (Mrs. Loeffler), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Perdue),
and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Rounds).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Ms. Harris)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cramer). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 46, nays 50, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 261 Leg.]
YEAS--46
Baldwin
Bennet
Blumenthal
Booker
Brown
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Coons
Cortez Masto
Duckworth
Durbin
Feinstein
Gillibrand
Hassan
Heinrich
Hirono
Jones
Kaine
King
Klobuchar
Leahy
Manchin
Markey
Menendez
Merkley
Murphy
Murray
Paul
Peters
Reed
Rosen
Sanders
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Smith
Stabenow
Tester
Udall
Van Hollen
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wyden
NAYS--50
Alexander
Barrasso
Blackburn
Blunt
Boozman
Braun
Burr
Capito
Cassidy
Collins
Cornyn
Cotton
Cramer
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Ernst
Fischer
Gardner
Graham
Grassley
Hawley
Hoeven
Hyde-Smith
Inhofe
Johnson
Kelly
Kennedy
Lankford
Lee
McConnell
Moran
Murkowski
Portman
Risch
Roberts
Romney
Rubio
Sasse
Scott (FL)
Scott (SC)
Shelby
Sinema
Sullivan
Thune
Tillis
Toomey
Wicker
Young
NOT VOTING--4
Harris
Loeffler
Perdue
Rounds
The motion was rejected.
Vote On Motion To Discharge--S.J. Res. 78
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question occurs
on the motion to discharge S.J. Res. 78.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator
from Georgia (Mrs. Loeffler), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Perdue),
and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Rounds).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Ms. Harris)
is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 47, nays 49, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 262 Legislative]
YEAS--47
Baldwin
Bennet
Blumenthal
Booker
Brown
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Coons
Cortez Masto
Duckworth
Durbin
Feinstein
Gillibrand
Hassan
Heinrich
Hirono
Jones
Kaine
Kelly
King
Klobuchar
Leahy
Manchin
Markey
Menendez
Merkley
Murphy
Murray
Paul
Peters
Reed
Rosen
Sanders
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Smith
Stabenow
Tester
Udall
Van Hollen
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wyden
NAYS--49
Alexander
Barrasso
Blackburn
Blunt
Boozman
Braun
Burr
Capito
Cassidy
Collins
Cornyn
Cotton
Cramer
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Ernst
Fischer
Gardner
Graham
Grassley
Hawley
Hoeven
Hyde-Smith
Inhofe
Johnson
Kennedy
Lankford
Lee
McConnell
Moran
Murkowski
Portman
Risch
Roberts
Romney
Rubio
Sasse
Scott (FL)
Scott (SC)
Shelby
Sinema
Sullivan
Thune
Tillis
Toomey
Wicker
Young
NOT VOTING--4
Harris
Loeffler
Perdue
Rounds
The motion was rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
____________________