[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 208 (Wednesday, December 9, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7313-S7317]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   MOTION TO DISCHARGE--S.J. RES. 78

  Mr. PAUL. Mr. President, I rise today to oppose another massive 
infusion of arms into the volatile Middle East.
  Someone must ask the question: Can a lasting peace be purchased with 
more weapons? Will selling sophisticated fighter jets and weaponized 
drones bring more stability to the Middle East? Is it wise to pour fuel 
on the fire that burns in the Middle East?
  The Senate today is debating with these joint resolutions whether to 
disapprove of the announced sale of 50 F-35s and 18 Reaper Drones to 
the United Arab Emirates, a country that has recently taken encouraging 
steps specifically toward Israel, but with an overall record that 
should give concern.
  The primary questions we should be asking ourselves are: To what ends 
has the UAE deployed its military and its military technology in recent 
years? Does the UAE have a record that we can trust? What military 
behavior are we encouraging and rewarding with this sale? Will the U.S. 
bear responsibility if the UAE misuses these incredibly sophisticated 
weapons?
  The answers to these questions are far from clear. In fact, the UAE's 
record should give us pause. The UAE is not a democracy. Their human 
rights record is mixed, and their military activities in the region, as 
a one-time member of the Saudi coalition, contributed to the bloodshed 
and devastation in Yemen.
  On human rights, let's look at some recent reported examples. In 
2017, Ahmed Monsoor, a human rights activist, was given a 10-year 
prison sentence based on his speech. Specifically, he was charged for 
posting ``false information that harms national unity'' on social 
media. The charges against him were based on a call for the release of 
another activist who had been put in prison for political speech. Is 
this the kind of democracy or lack of democracy and lack of speech that 
should be rewarded with our most sophisticated weaponry?
  In 2017, the UAE government also handed down a 10-year sentence to 
Nasser bin-Ghaith, an economist, for his criticism of the UAE and 
Egyptian Governments. Is this the kind of country that deserves our 
most sophisticated weaponry?
  In 2018, the UAE arrested Matthew Hedges, a British citizen and 
doctoral student, and denied him access to legal counsel for 5 months. 
They sentenced him to life in prison for spying charges based on a 
confession that was obtained in an undisclosed location. They were 
ultimately forced to pardon him after international outrage. Is this 
the kind of country that we can trust with our most sophisticated 
weaponry?
  The fact that the UAE is willing to buy this technology is not in and 
of itself justification for the sale. This is the time to carefully 
study the situation in the region and to consider the effects of 
accelerating the Middle Eastern arms race in the short-term and in the 
long-term.
  This is why our government shouldn't be rushing into approving this 
sale; yet our government is moving at warp speed to approve this sale. 
It is as if we intentionally don't want to consider all of these 
issues.
  The most frequently cited argument in favor of this sale is that the 
UAE has taken encouraging steps in the last few months. They have 
normalized relations with Israel, facilitated civilian travel, and 
more. Great. I am all-in for that.
  We should be encouraging peaceful relations between countries. I 
support those efforts. But it is not clear that dropping advanced 
military technology into the region is, in fact, encouraging peaceful 
relations, given how these weapons have been used in recent times.
  The UAE spent years bombing Yemen as part of a coalition with Saudi 
Arabia to stop the Houthis. This bombing campaign was undisciplined and 
sloppy. Civilians, residents, and other nonmilitary targets were often 
destroyed. The U.N. reports approximately 7,000 civilians killed in 
Yemen and over 10,000 wounded.
  The Saudi-UAE coalition helped create a humanitarian crisis in Yemen. 
Amid collapsing public services, the largest cholera epidemic on record 
has affected at least 2 million people--probably more--and killed 
almost 4,000. A lot of this is to be blamed on the civil war that had 
been perpetuated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

  At the height of the destruction, a Yemeni child would die of 
starvation every 10 minutes. More than 50,000 children have been lost 
to starvation.
  I have argued for years that the United States should play no role in 
worsening the crisis via an arms pipeline to the coalition that 
perpetuates this war. American technology helped facilitate this crisis 
and should be a real concern about sending more American bombs and 
fighter planes into this region.
  If they weren't used wisely in the most recent years in the Yemeni 
war, will they be used differently in the future? Can we trust the 
people who were part of a bombing campaign of civilians in Yemen to do 
an act more wisely with weapons in the future?
  Let's also not forget that a media investigation found that weapons 
that we sent to the coalition--U.S. weapons that were sent to the 
Saudi-UAE coalition--were lost, and, in some cases, handed over to 
terrorists. That is right. Military equipment from the United States 
was sent to the UAE, but it wound up in the hands of terrorists. The 
Saudi-UAE coalition reportedly used U.S. weapons as currency to win the 
approval of militias inside Yemen.
  To be clear, these activities are against the terms of sale. We told 
them: You can't give away our weapons. You can't use our weapons to 
purchase the support of Sunni extremists in Yemen. But they did. This 
should give us cause for concern. This should make us say: Whoa. Let's 
stop, and let's pause before we send more weapons into this war.
  Not only that, but Iranian proxies captured some of these weapons, 
and, predictably, pointed them back at the Saudi-UAE coalition. Guns, 
missiles, and vehicles ended up in the hands of terrorists--weapons 
that we put on the ground in the Middle East.
  The same investigation found Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
Vehicles, MRAPs, in the hands of Sunni allies of the UAE and Saudi 
Arabia. But guess who some of these Sunni allies were. Al-Qaida in the 
Arabian Peninsula. We are talking about the remnants of al-Qaida in 
Yemen were getting weapons that we were giving to the UAE in Saudi 
Arabia. Does this sound like the kind of behavior we should reward with 
more weapons?
  One of the MRAPs still had the export label on it indicating that it 
had been sent from Beaumont, TX, to the UAE before ultimately getting 
illegally transferred to extremists in Yemen. Is this the kind of 
behavior we should reward with more of our sophisticated technology?
  The serial number on another MRAP in the possession of the Iranian-
backed Houthis was traced back to the 2014 sale of U.S. MRAPs to the 
UAE. So the UAE not only was trading our weapons for support among 
Sunni extremists, including al-Qaida-affiliated extremists in Yemen, 
but they also were having their equipment taken by the Houthis. So on 
both sides of the war in Yemen, we had U.S. weapons. Is it a good idea 
to flood the Middle East with more of our weapons? Is it a good idea to 
keep sending weapons that wind up in the hands of people who don't have 
our best interests at heart?
  Now, people say: Well, the UAE is doing better. They have stepped 
back from the coalition. They are not, you know, fighting as vigorously 
in the UAE. But there still are reports that UAE is still involved in 
the civil war in Yemen and that they are still engaged.

[[Page S7314]]

  The UAE has a very conflicted record on human rights. I mentioned a 
few of those who have been in prison for 10 years to life for speech--
for speech against the government or even just speech the government 
doesn't like. But flogging is also used as a form of punishment. There 
is no true freedom of speech or press in the UAE. Is this the kind of 
country we should give our most sophisticated technology to
  Activists have been held in secret detention centers in the UAE. 
Electric shocks have been used as a form of punishment in the UAE. 
Social media statements against the government are criminalized. You 
can be put in prison for text messages, and people have been put in 
prison and/or deported for text messages.
  The government has used mass trials against dissidents. Statements of 
support for Qatar were made illegal during the region's diplomatic 
standoff. Criticisms of government officials were made illegal by 
decree. This is not an open society; this is not a democracy; and this 
is decidedly not a country that we should be giving our most 
sophisticated weaponry to.
  Do we believe these arms sales will encourage or discourage bad 
behavior from the UAE? We are clearly communicating to the UAE that 
human rights take a backseat to arms sales.
  Part of the consideration for these arms sales is the recent 
developments from the UAE--most prominently, the UAE's normalizing 
relations with Israel through the Abraham accords. It is a positive 
development, without a doubt. I am all in favor of it. I am all in 
favor of trading with the UAE. I am all in favor of Israel trading with 
the UAE. I am all in favor of good diplomatic relations, but you can 
also have diplomatic relations without flooding the region with our 
most sophisticated armaments.
  Outwardly, we are told by all involved that the F-35s are not a 
condition for the Abraham accords, but if you ask whether it is a good 
idea to send some of our most advanced weaponry to the UAE, we are 
nonetheless told, if we don't, it might jeopardize the accords. Well, 
which is it? They are either part of the accords or they are not.
  I, frankly, think, if the weapons were not to go, that the advantages 
to Israel-UAE having diplomatic relations in trade are so great that 
they will continue. The assurance right now is that we will guarantee 
what is called Israel's qualitative military edge in the region, even 
after the sale of F-35s and Reaper drones to the UAE. So the message to 
Israel is: Yes, we are giving the same advanced fighter jets to the 
UAE, but we will give you even better jets in the future.
  All I can say is, that is a big maybe. And people who accept, on the 
face of that, that, oh, yes, we are going to guarantee something, but 
we are giving this same equipment to people who have been on the other 
side of virtually every other war in the Middle East, I think, is a 
hopeful promise but not necessarily a guarantee.
  The easiest way, if you favor protecting Israel's QME, or military 
edge, is to stop sending military assets to other countries in the 
region. We are competing with ourselves right now. We give advanced 
weaponry to Israel, and then we say we are going to keep your 
advantage. But then we give the advanced weaponry to the UAE, and so 
Israel comes back and says we need more. Then we give more to them, and 
the Saudis want more. And then once we give the weapons to the Saudis, 
Israel wants more. It is a never-ending arms race between the so-called 
countries that are actually getting along, not to mention the arms race 
between those who are opposed to Iran in the region.
  The easiest way to protect the qualitative military edge of Israel is 
to quit sending more advanced weaponry into the region. We have 
committed to protecting Israel's QME in response to these sales, but we 
continue to obligate ourselves to increasingly large sales to offset 
the large sales we have already approved to others, like the UAE and 
Saudi Arabia.
  There is another aspect to the qualitative military edge that is 
rarely discussed. It is the QME that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
sheikdoms have over Iran. Saudi Arabia is the third biggest purchaser 
of weapons and the third biggest spender on military of anyone in the 
world now, but if you add Saudi Arabia's weapons to the Gulf sheikdoms' 
weaponry, you find that they spend eight times more on their military 
than Iran. So what kind of response would we imagine?
  We may not like what Iran does, but we should at least think about 
what they will do in response to what we do, and what in response to 
what the Saudis do and the UAE does and Israel does. Exacerbating the 
QME inevitably leads to pressure on Iran to further escalate the arms 
race and becomes a never-ending destructive cycle of more and more 
weapons.
  People say--and this administration has said--we want an agreement 
with Iran but not just a nuclear agreement. So we got out of the 
nuclear agreement. We want an agreement on conventional weapons. But 
how will that work? We asked Iran to limit their weapons, but we keep 
piling weapons on the other side? Do you think Iran is going to agree 
to limit their weapons if we keep piling more of our sophisticated 
weapons into the hands of the Saudis and into the hands of the UAE and 
others?
  There is great concerns with this sale, and rushing it through is a 
mistake. What happens if the F-35s are shot down? What if Russia or 
China is able to access our sensitive stealth technology? How will the 
need for contractors be handled in a secure fashion?
  Some supporters of Israel are very worried about this. The Zionist 
Organization of America, for example, has opposed the sale because it 
jeopardizes Israel's qualitative military edge. It makes the 
technologies on which Israel relies less secure.
  This statement from the Zionist Organization of America is quite 
clear: ``The security of both the U.S. and Israel is best served by 
preventing any other countries from acquiring this advanced aircraft.''
  They couldn't be clearer. Even many in Israel were initially, and 
very vocally, opposed to this sale. Their Minister of Defense, Benny 
Gantz, said absolutely it was a terrible idea. Their Minister of 
Settlements, same thing.
  I would urge my colleagues to consider the possible consequences of 
this sale. We should not accelerate an arms race in the Middle East; we 
should not jeopardize the security of our military technologies; and we 
should not reward a decade-plus of undesirable behavior by the UAE. I 
urge a vote in support of these resolutions of disapproval.
  Madam President, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, I 
move to discharge the Foreign Relations Committee from further 
consideration of S.J. Res. 78, a joint resolution providing for 
congressional disapproval of the proposed military sale to the United 
Arab Emirates of certain defense articles and services.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Blackburn). The motion is pending
  Mr. PAUL. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
support these two resolutions of disapproval. I appreciate my 
distinguished colleague from Kentucky and his support and advocacy here 
in these particular arms sales to the United Arab Emirates.
  Simply put, many aspects of this proposed sale remain conceptual--
conceptual. We are being asked to support a significant transfer of 
advanced U.S. technology without clarity on a number of key details 
regarding the sale or sufficient answers to critical national security 
questions.
  There are simply too many outstanding questions about the protection 
of critical U.S. military technology and the broader implications of 
these sales to U.S. national security regarding the UAE's 
relationships, for example, with Russia and China as they exist today--
as they exist today.
  I have heard some of my colleagues say: Well, aren't we concerned 
that they will go to Russia--they have relationships with Russia and 
China as it exists today in a military purchase context--and about the 
long-term implications, of course, to the United States and to our 
ally, the State of Israel, in terms of national security?
  Now, it is disappointing that we are forced to discuss these issues 
in such a public way through a formal congressional expression of 
disapproval. That is not normally how we do this. However, the 
administration left us no

[[Page S7315]]

choice because of the way that it attempted to rush through these sales 
by completely subverting congressional oversight, and, it appears, 
increasingly, the need for greater interagency review.
  Now, the U.S. Congress has a unique legislative responsibility to 
oversee U.S. arms sales abroad. This process allows Congress to engage 
privately with relevant national security agencies and the intended 
recipient countries in order to better understand the intricacies and 
security implications of any proposed sale. But as it has done before, 
the administration decided to ignore the congressional responsibilities 
here and rush through with this sale. They blew right through that 
period of review that the Congress has had normally for about 40 days.
  Let me just say, the United Arab Emirates, from my view, has been an 
important partner in the fight against terrorism and for other U.S. 
national security priorities, and I will suspect it will continue to be 
so after this. It is unfortunate, however, that we find ourselves in 
this situation.
  Following the historic Abraham accords, we started hearing that the 
administration was planning to grant the UAE a longstanding request--
the sale of the most advanced U.S. stealth fighter jets. Both the 
Emiratis--and I have spoken to their Foreign Minister and to their 
Ambassador--and the U.S. administration continued to insist, however, 
that there is no connection--none--between the Abraham accords and this 
sale. So that is a red herring for those who are concerned that somehow 
we are going to disrupt the Abraham accords.
  While I join just about all of my colleagues in applauding the 
advancement of diplomatic relations that builds upon years already of 
Israeli and Emirati engagement, there is absolutely no reason to rush 
through an arms sale of this magnitude, especially when we are being 
told there is no connection.
  Interagency review of such sales usually takes many months of careful 
deliberation. The Departments of State, Defense, and others must assess 
what capabilities are safe to sell, what technology security measures 
are appropriate and necessary, what restrictions on use are imposed, 
and how the sale will affect the national security of our friends and 
allies in the region and elsewhere.
  Once these deliberations have concluded, a sale of this magnitude 
usually sits with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for an 
informal review process that, by the State Department's own 
requirement--the State Department's own requirement--would last 40 
days.
  Then, for reasons the administration has concealed, it completely 
subverted this review process and officially started a statutory 30-day 
review--all before any briefings were even given to staff, let alone 
Senators and members of the committees of jurisdiction.
  To date, we have yet to get a clear answer as to why the President 
and the Secretary of State are trying to, again, circumvent the 
congressional arms sales oversight process by rushing the sale of 50 of 
the most advanced fighter jets in the world--technology that gives 
Israel and the United State a critical military advantage over any 
adversary.
  Moreover, the administration wants to push through without any 
congressional oversight the second largest ever sale of armed Reaper 
drones to the UAE and over 14,000 additional aircraft munitions on top 
of the 60,000 already sold to Abu Dhabi as part of the nonemergency 
last year. I say ``nonemergency'' because they declared an emergency, 
but there was no emergency to be justified.
  Delivery of the most advanced features could take years. I say that 
because, therefore, there is no reason that giving us a timeframe to do 
what we normally do to determine whether this is the right sale in the 
national security interests of the United States, not starting an arms 
race in the Middle East, also dealing with Israel--is that too much to 
answer when you are not even going to get any of this equipment for 
years? These are major sales by any measure.
  Part of this conversation is also, as my colleague has said, about 
Israel's qualitative military edge that it currently has over its 
neighbors and was expected to maintain with its own purchase of 50 F-
35s that are still in the process of being built and delivered.
  Let me make it clear. I take a backseat to no one when it comes to 
advancing U.S. policies to protect Israel's national security. I have 
proven that time and again. But this sale is fundamentally about U.S. 
national security, about the U.S. qualitative military edge, and about 
our long-term national security. It is also about not wanting to start 
and thinking about, at least, what does it mean in terms of an advanced 
arms race in the region.
  Unfortunately, particularly for Members who do not serve on national 
security committees, there is much we cannot discuss in an open 
setting, but let me assure all of my colleagues that these sales have 
very real implications for their own technology security.
  On October 9 of this year, Armed Services ranking member Senator Reed 
and I sent a letter to former Secretary of Defense Esper and Secretary 
of State Pompeo with 16 detailed questions about the F-35 sale. To 
date, we have not received satisfactory answers to any or all of those 
questions.
  I ask unanimous consent to have that letter printed in the 
Congressional Record
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     Hon. Mike Pompeo,
     Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Mark Esper,
     Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Esper: We write today 
     to seek clarity on public reporting and mixed messaging from 
     the Administration on a proposed sale of the F-35 aircraft to 
     the United Arab Emirates. As you well know, Congress has 
     statutory authority over foreign arms sales, but it appears 
     that the Administration is trying to rush through a 
     precedent-setting sale of the United States' most advanced 
     fighter aircraft to a country in a volatile region with 
     multiple ongoing conflicts. The Administration appears to be 
     ignoring long-standing, deliberative, internal U.S. processes 
     for considering whether selling such a sophisticated and 
     mission-critical military system abroad could compromise the 
     United States' national security interests--and in this case 
     Israel's--and instead is rushing to meet a political 
     deadline.
       There are numerous questions as to how the national 
     security interests of both the U.S. and Israel will be 
     served, or undermined, by such a sale. We fear that the Trump 
     Administration's recklessly accelerated timeline will 
     preclude sufficient and comprehensive consideration of these 
     issues by the national security professionals in the 
     Departments of State and Defense, as well as by the Congress.
       Emirati officials have publicly and privately declared that 
     their decision to normalize relations with Israel was not 
     dependent on getting the F-35; however, the Administration's 
     attempt to move at breakneck speed so close to this 
     announcement would give the appearance that it was. 
     Additionally, this sale seems more tied to the American 
     political calendar than to a sober deliberation about 
     regional security.
       U.S. national security and the safety of American troops 
     could be seriously compromised by this sale. The F-35 is one 
     of the most advanced aircraft in the world, giving the United 
     States and its allies and partners a tremendous military 
     advantage. This therefore creates an immense 
     counterintelligence threat against this aircraft. Indeed, 
     assessing the risk to our own military advantage is a 
     critical part of the internal deliberations we must make 
     before agreeing to provide this aircraft, including any 
     recipient country's history of use of U.S. origin weapons and 
     its capacity and willingness to protect critical U.S. 
     technology. Indeed, given that the F-35 has been financed, 
     developed, produced, and sold to our security partners as 
     part of an international consortium, the sale has the risk of 
     undermining their security as well.
       In light of these concerns, we have listed below a series 
     of vital questions that must be fully answered before this 
     sale is sent to Congress for review, as required by statute.
       1) What precisely has the U.S. agreed to in terms of 
     selling the F-35 and other aircraft to the UAE?
       How many?
       On what timeline for delivery?
       Has the U.S. received a formal Letter of Request from the 
     UAE for these aircraft?
       2) Would the Emiratis have signed the Abraham Accords if 
     not for the promise of this sale? Were F-35s or any other 
     military sales discussed as part of deliberations related to 
     the Abraham Accords?
       3) Has the UAE articulated a military threat necessitating 
     the acquisition of F-35 aircraft?
       How would the UAE employ F-35s against that threat?
       Are there other military or other means that could also 
     counter this threat or threats?

[[Page S7316]]

       4) It has been reported that the U.S. and the UAE have 
     agreed to conclude a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for 
     the aircraft by December 2nd. This is an extremely 
     accelerated schedule for interagency review, consultation 
     with Congress, and preparation of the LOA and negotiation on 
     its terms with the UAE--a process that can take months, if 
     not longer.
       Is this deadline correct?
       If so, why did the Administration agree to this arbitrary 
     deadline in concluding an LOA?
       How would such an accelerated timeline affect the 
     Congressional review and approval process?
       5) It has traditionally taken months for a complete and 
     comprehensive interagency review of a proposed sale of this 
     importance and sensitivity.
       Has the U.S. interagency reviewed and determined what 
     variant of the aircraft would be best to sell, in terms of 
     protecting the aircraft's technology and in terms of 
     protecting Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME)?
       If not, when will that review commence and how long might 
     it take?
       6) Has a determination been made that the sale of this 
     aircraft to the UAE will not jeopardize Israel's Qualitative 
     Military Edge?
       If so, upon what basis was that determination made?
       7) Will any aircraft sold to the UAE be reduced in 
     capabilities compared to comparable U.S. aircraft?
       If so, how much less capable will these aircraft be 
     compared to Israeli and U.S. F-35 aircraft and other 
     aircraft?
       Exactly which systems, software, and components will be 
     reduced in terms of operational capability in comparison with 
     Israeli and U.S. aircraft, and to what degree and with what 
     effect? Please provide a detailed written and graphic 
     comparison.
       8) What anti-tamper measures will be incorporated into the 
     F-35 and other aircraft sold to the UAE to ensure that 
     critical or sensitive military technology and components 
     within such aircraft are not compromised, either in operation 
     or in terms of revealing classified information about such 
     technology and components?
       9) Will the UAE be required to enter into binding 
     commitments not to employ such aircraft in situations that 
     might expose them to technological intelligence collection 
     efforts, such as exposure to advanced anti-aircraft radar 
     systems?
       10) What secondary security measures will be put in place 
     to protect critical U.S. technology inherent in the F-35?
       Will the U.S. require continuous U.S. presence on base to 
     monitor the security of the aircraft?
       Will the U.S. be made aware of any proposed third-party 
     nationals to visit the base(s) where the F-35 aircraft are 
     based?
       Will the U.S. be able to veto any physical presence of such 
     nationals if, in the opinion of U.S. personnel present in the 
     U.S. Embassy or in Washington, the close physical proximity 
     of such third-party nationals could constitute an 
     intelligence threat to sensitive technology in or of these 
     aircraft?
       Will any automatic electronic security measures be employed 
     to protect U.S.-origin aircraft, manuals, and related 
     documents?
       Will the maintenance and servicing of these aircraft be 
     performed solely by U.S. personnel, or in concert with 
     Emirati personnel?
       11) What measures will be taken to counteract any reduction 
     in Israel's QME?
       Will the U.S. shift from a Qualitative Military Edge 
     measurement to a Quantitative one, selling or providing more 
     aircraft and munitions meant to overwhelm the heightened 
     military threat to Israel?
       If so, how will these additional arms to Israel be 
     financed? Will the U.S. need to increase Foreign Military 
     Finance levels in order to offset this sale to the UAE?
       12) The UAE has taken an active role in supporting Khalifa 
     Haftar, who has continued a brutal military campaign in Libya 
     against the internationally recognized Libyan government. 
     According to recent reports, the UAE may even have violated 
     the U.N. arms embargo on Libya.
       What will prevent the UAE from using F-35 aircraft in 
     conflicts where the United States and its allies are pressing 
     for a diplomatic solution?
       Will the United States require any commitments from the UAE 
     that it will not employ such aircraft to the detriment of 
     Israel's security interests or the foreign policy and 
     national security interests of the United States, as 
     determined by the Israel and the U.S. respectively?
       13) To what extent would this sale stimulate an arms race 
     in the region, both among the Gulf States and with Iran? With 
     the arms embargo against Iran in danger of expiring, would 
     this sale provide greater encouragement to China and Russia 
     to sell Tehran advanced fighter aircraft and advanced air 
     defense systems, in numbers and under more favorable 
     financial terms than would otherwise be the case?
       14) In 2017, the UAE and Russia signed an agreement to 
     develop a fifth-generation fighter jet, along with a separate 
     UAE purchase of Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighters. In addition, 
     after being rebuffed in its attempts to purchase armed drones 
     from the United States, the UAE reportedly purchased Chinese 
     surveillance drones and outfitted them with targeting 
     systems. Other reports indicate that expatriates from 
     countries aligned with China operate some of the UAE's 
     weapons systems.
       What is the status of the UAE's cooperation with Russia? 
     Would these efforts present security and counterintelligence 
     threats to the F-35?
       What assurances and commitments, if any, has the UAE made 
     to the United States to safeguard U.S. technology from 
     Russian and Chinese personnel that may be involved in either 
     of these programs?
       Has the UAE agreed to terminate all such cooperation and 
     purchases from Russia and China?
       15) What are the Administration's thoughts regarding other 
     sales of the F-35 in the region?
       16) Have you, or will you, consult with our partners about 
     these risks and their views of this potential sale to the UAE 
     concluding the sale?
       Will you take their concerns into account during the 
     interagency review process to address their concerns?
       We look forward to your immediate response.
           Sincerely,
     Robert Menendez,
       U.S. Senator.
     Jack Reed,
       U.S. Senator.

  Mr. MENENDEZ. I am not opposed to these sales if they make sense and 
pose no threat to U.S. or Israel security in the short and the long 
term. But these sales require and deserve careful and deliberate 
consideration within the interagency process and by this Congress. 
However, that simply has not happened.
  A little while ago, my distinguished colleague from Missouri, Senator 
Blunt, asked on the floor: Well, what do you have to do to be a trusted 
partner? Let me try to answer that question.
  Following a classified briefing with the administration--the details 
of which I will not discuss here--there are a whole host of issues that 
a trusted partner would ultimately have to agree to.
  One, the United Arab Emirates has been building its military 
relations with Russia and China. Just a few years ago, the Emiratis and 
Russia signed an agreement to develop a fifth-generation fighter jet 
and to purchase Russian Sukhois. Our own Department of Defense 
inspector general recently indicated that they may be funding the 
malicious Russian Wagner mercenary forces in Libya. So what is the 
status of and what specific efforts are we taking to address the UAE's 
current and future military relationship with China--where they are 
talking about building an airbase outside the UAE's waters, on 
artificial land--and Russia? There are no answers to that. Do we not 
deserve, if we are going to send the most sophisticated equipment in 
the world to the UAE, to make sure that there is a written commitment 
that they are going to phase out those military engagements?
  What specific steps and assurances are the United States taking to 
safeguard U.S. military technology against sophisticated espionage, and 
what specific commitments do we have from the Emiratis? There is no 
answer to that question. A trusted partner would agree to those 
safeguards.
  Three, the UAE last year transferred U.S.-origin weapons to a 
terrorist organization in Yemen that has a history of targeting 
civilians. The Emiratis have been repeatedly accused, along with 
others, of violating the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. Well, what 
assurances do we have about how and where these new sophisticated 
weapons would be used? There is no answer. A trusted partner would 
agree to those limits.
  Four, the long-term threat of a highly lethal arms race and the great 
power competition implication this could set off across the region and 
implications for future gulf cooperation--the Qataris have already 
asked for their own F-35s. Is that what is next? Saudi Arabia--well, 
they may say: We like the United Arab Emirates, but we can't be 
inferior for our own national security.
  What security threats would be posed when the entire region is armed 
with the most sophisticated weapon we have to offer? There are no 
satisfactory answers, if any, to these questions.
  What guarantees do we have that these weapons will not be used 
against the United States or Israel's national security in the future? 
How will that be determined?
  What might Israel need in the future to secure its qualitative 
military edge? There is no clear answer to that.
  What specific military threat have the Emiratis articulated that they 
need the F-35s to address right now? If

[[Page S7317]]

they have specific needs, then we need to know that because if these 
aren't going to come online for some time, maybe their needs are more 
consequential and they need to be dealt with in a different way.
  How might the Iranians react to the increase of stealth fighter 
aircraft in their neighborhood? We have no analysis of that.
  Finally, the timeline. When will the letters of offer and acceptance 
be concluded? Why was there an initial artificial deadline? Why the 
rush to cut short the normal, monthslong interagency review process by 
the Congress and national security professionals? Why? Why? Are they 
trying to lock in the sale before President-Elect Biden is inaugurated, 
regardless of the possible cost to U.S. and Israeli national security? 
We have no answer to that.
  As I have said before, the United Arab Emirates has been an important 
partner for critical U.S. interests, including the fight against 
terrorism and in our efforts in Afghanistan. But according to the 
United Nations and to the Department of Defense's own inspector 
general, at the same time, the UAE also seems to be working against our 
stated interests in other areas. A trusted partner would be in 
collaboration and in cooperation with us.
  Look, I wish we could have had these discussions in more appropriate 
settings. That is what we normally would have done.
  This is, of course, not the first time the administration has 
subverted Congress's important oversight role in arms sales. Last May, 
the administration notified more than $8 billion of weapons to Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It cited a bogus ``immediate'' 
threat from Iran, despite the fact that most of the sales, like these 
F-35s, would take years--years--to reach their intended recipients.
  So, colleagues, at the end of the day, we must assert our 
congressional prerogative, not for the sake of prerogative in and of 
itself but to safeguard the U.S. national security interests that we 
are all collectively and individually entrusted to do.
  We must demand answers to the very serious and very reasonable 
questions many have of this sale. Perhaps with due diligence, we will 
find that this sale will indeed bolster U.S. national security, but 
right now, the truth is, we do not have clarity on that most 
fundamental question.
  Colleagues, do you really want a sale of this magnitude to go through 
without the appropriate vetting measures?
  Voting against these resolutions sends a message to the executive 
branch--I don't care who is sitting there; the present occupant, a 
future occupant--whoever is sitting in the White House, that we are 
willing to give up our congressional responsibilities. It is hard to 
bring that back once you let it go. It says that we will not stop arms 
sales in the future that have not gone through the appropriate review 
process.
  For that reason, I urge all of our colleagues to support these 
resolutions of disapproval so that we may have more time to assess for 
ourselves the nuances of these sales and the repercussions they may 
have in the region for decades to come, to ensure technology transfer 
doesn't take place, and to ensure that the national security interests 
of the United States are preserved. I urge you to support these 
resolutions to stand up for those propositions. Both are critical to 
protecting U.S. national security interests.


               Vote on Motion to Discharge--S.J. Res. 77

  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that all debate time on S.J. 
Res. 77 and S.J. Res. 78 be yielded back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Under the previous order, the question occurs on agreeing to the 
motion to discharge S.J. Res. 77.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Georgia (Mrs. Loeffler), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Perdue), 
and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Rounds).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Ms. Harris) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cramer). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 46, nays 50, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 261 Leg.]

                                YEAS--46

     Baldwin
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Booker
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coons
     Cortez Masto
     Duckworth
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Gillibrand
     Hassan
     Heinrich
     Hirono
     Jones
     Kaine
     King
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Manchin
     Markey
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Murphy
     Murray
     Paul
     Peters
     Reed
     Rosen
     Sanders
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Smith
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--50

     Alexander
     Barrasso
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boozman
     Braun
     Burr
     Capito
     Cassidy
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Cramer
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Gardner
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hawley
     Hoeven
     Hyde-Smith
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Lankford
     Lee
     McConnell
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Portman
     Risch
     Roberts
     Romney
     Rubio
     Sasse
     Scott (FL)
     Scott (SC)
     Shelby
     Sinema
     Sullivan
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Wicker
     Young

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Harris
     Loeffler
     Perdue
     Rounds
  The motion was rejected.


               Vote On Motion To Discharge--S.J. Res. 78

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question occurs 
on the motion to discharge S.J. Res. 78.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Georgia (Mrs. Loeffler), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Perdue), 
and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Rounds).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from California (Ms. Harris) 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 47, nays 49, as follows:

                  [Rollcall Vote No. 262 Legislative]

                                YEAS--47

     Baldwin
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Booker
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coons
     Cortez Masto
     Duckworth
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Gillibrand
     Hassan
     Heinrich
     Hirono
     Jones
     Kaine
     Kelly
     King
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Manchin
     Markey
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Murphy
     Murray
     Paul
     Peters
     Reed
     Rosen
     Sanders
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Smith
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--49

     Alexander
     Barrasso
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boozman
     Braun
     Burr
     Capito
     Cassidy
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Cramer
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Gardner
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hawley
     Hoeven
     Hyde-Smith
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Lankford
     Lee
     McConnell
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Portman
     Risch
     Roberts
     Romney
     Rubio
     Sasse
     Scott (FL)
     Scott (SC)
     Shelby
     Sinema
     Sullivan
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Wicker
     Young

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Harris
     Loeffler
     Perdue
     Rounds
  The motion was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

                          ____________________