[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 140 (Thursday, August 6, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5287-S5288]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 SENATE RESOLUTION 673--AFFIRMING THAT THE NEW START TREATY EXTENSION 
     WILL COVER NEW DEPLOYED RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND 
SUPPORTING ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES TO ENGAGE CHINA THAT ADVANCE THE GOAL 
           OF CONCLUDING AN ARMS CONTROL TREATY OR AGREEMENT

  Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. Van Hollen, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Merkley, 
Mr. Durbin, Mrs. Gillibrand, Ms. Warren, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Coons, Ms. 
Baldwin, Mr. Wyden, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Leahy, Ms. Cantwell, 
Mr. Sanders, and Ms. Smith) submitted the following resolution; which 
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 673

       Whereas, on March 1, 2018, President Vladimir Putin of the 
     Russian Federation previewed five new Russian nuclear 
     delivery systems in his State of the Nation address;
       Whereas two of the new systems, the Sarmat intercontinental 
     ballistic missile (ICBM) and the Avangard hypersonic glide 
     vehicle, will count under the limits of the Treaty between 
     the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
     Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
     Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as the ``New 
     START Treaty''), as confirmed by Sergey Lavrov, Foreign 
     Minister of the Russian Federation;
       Whereas an additional pair of new systems, the Poseidon 
     nuclear-powered torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered 
     cruise missile, are not projected to be deployed during the 
     five-year extension of the New START Treaty to 2026, and even 
     if they were deployed, the United States is able to address 
     its concerns about those weapons through the Bilateral 
     Consultative Committee;
       Whereas the Russian Federation's fifth new system, the 
     Kinzhal short-range air-launched ballistic missile, is being 
     deployed as a theater-strike weapon on MiG-31 aircraft, 
     rather than on a heavy bomber, in which case it would be 
     automatically accountable under the New START Treaty;
       Whereas the advance timing of the Russian Federation's 
     nuclear modernization cycle may allow it to significantly 
     expand its strategic nuclear arsenal relative to the United 
     States in the event that the New START Treaty expires on 
     February 5, 2021;
       Whereas the 2020 Annual Report on the Implementation of the 
     new START Treaty concluded that the Russian Federation was 
     ``in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty'';
       Whereas the People's Republic of China has never entered 
     into a treaty or agreement with the United States or any 
     other party that places binding limits on its shorter-range, 
     intermediate-, or strategic-range ballistic missiles, 
     verified by National Technical Means and by on-site 
     inspections, as the United States and Russian Federation did 
     through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
     the START I and START II Treaties, and the New START Treaty, 
     each of which took multiple years to successfully negotiate;
       Whereas the People's Republic of China possesses 
     significantly fewer ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic 
     missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers than the Russian 
     Federation or the United States, and according to the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency (DIA), China's warhead stockpile is in 
     the ``the low couple of hundreds'', a fraction of the size of 
     the arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States; 
     and
       Whereas the People's Republic of China has repeatedly 
     declined invitations by the United States to enter into 
     trilateral negotiations on an arms control treaty or other 
     agreement regarding its nuclear arsenal: Now, therefore, be 
     it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) calls on the President to immediately extend the New 
     START Treaty until 2026;
       (2) affirms that, by extending the New START Treaty until 
     2026, the President of the United States can secure 
     limitations on two new types of Russian Federation strategic 
     weapons beyond those accountable when the Treaty entered into 
     force in 2011 or at any time thereafter;
       (3) calls on the Russian Federation to cease the 
     development of hazardous and provocative new weapons systems 
     including the Burevestnik cruise missile, which is powered by 
     a nuclear reactor and may violate the prohibition in numerous 
     treaties and military manuals against causing superfluous 
     injury and unnecessary suffering;
       (4) affirms the December 1987 statement by President Ronald 
     Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the 
     Soviet Union that ``a nuclear war cannot be won and must 
     never be fought'';
       (5) calls on the President to consider the views of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other United States 
     allies and partners who overwhelmingly back extension of the 
     New START Treaty; and
       (6) supports, following the extension of the New START 
     Treaty, a United States initiative to engage China in 
     negotiations towards the eventual conclusion of an arms 
     control treaty or agreement, starting with steps to reduce 
     the risk of strategic miscalculation and the threat of a 
     nuclear exchange, which may include--
       (A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials from the 
     People's Republic of China, and to each of the permanent 
     members of the United Nations Security Council, to observe a 
     United States-Russian Federation New START Treaty on-site 
     inspection in 2020 to demonstrate the security benefits of 
     transparency into strategic nuclear forces;

[[Page S5288]]

       (B) an agreement with the People's Republic of China that 
     allows for advance notifications of ballistic missile 
     launches, through the Hague Code of Conduct or other data 
     exchanges or doctrine discussions related to strategic 
     nuclear forces;
       (C) an agreement not to target or interfere in nuclear 
     command, control, and communications (commonly referred to as 
     ``NC3'') infrastructure; or
       (D) any other cooperative measure that benefits United 
     States-China strategic stability.

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