[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 114 (Monday, June 22, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3121-S3122]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                   State Department Inspector General

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have a 
letter printed in the Record
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                    Washington, DC, June 12, 2020.
     Hon. Chuck Grassley,
     Chairman, Committee on Finance,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Grassley: Your May 18 letter to the President 
     concerning his removal of the Inspector General of the 
     Department of State has been referred to the Department.
       In order to address your concerns as they relate to the 
     Department, the Department is prepared to provide you a 
     briefing with a senior official at your earliest convenience. 
     Additionally, the Department is enclosing its recent letter, 
     on which you were copied, which addresses the reasons for 
     Secretary Pompeo's recommendation to remove the State 
     Department Inspector General.
           Sincerely,

                                        Mary Elizabeth Taylor,

                                     Assistant Secretary of State,
                                    Bureau of Legislative Affairs.
       Enclosure: As stated.
                                  ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                     Washington, DC, June 8, 2020.
     Hon. Michael E. Horowitz,
     Chair, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
         Efficiency, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chair Horowitz: In light of new information disclosed 
     to the State Department for the first time on June 2, 2020, 
     the Department is writing to formally request that the 
     Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
     (CIGIE) examine a series of questions related to the conduct 
     of former State Department Inspector General Steve Linick. 
     Specifically, the Department has become aware that Mr. Linick 
     may have hand-selected a potentially-conflicted investigator 
     to look into possible misconduct by his own office and then 
     withheld the resulting report, which noted his own apparent 
     non-compliance with State Department Office of Inspector 
     General (OIG) email policies, from State Department 
     leadership, despite repeated requests for a copy of the 
     report.
       In short, the events described below suggest that there may 
     have been a significant breakdown in the typically-rigorous 
     standards of an IG investigation, warranting CIGIE review.
       Mr. Linick had served as Inspector General of the State 
     Department since September 2013. On May 15, 2020, President 
     Trump decided to remove Mr. Linick from that position and 
     placed him on 30 days of administrative leave. As described 
     in the attached letter to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
     dated June 1 (Tab 1), the President's decision to remove Mr. 
     Linick from this position was made upon the Secretary of 
     State's recommendation. This recommendation was based, in 
     part, on concerns related to Mr. Linick's failure to formally 
     refer to CIGIE--as agreed with senior Department leadership 
     in the fall of 2019--the investigation of a leak of a highly-
     sensitive draft report to the media on September 13, 2019, 
     which was attributed to ``two government sources involved in 
     carrying out the investigation.'' State IG Set to Recommend 
     Discipline for Trump's Top Iran Hand, The Daily Beast, Sept. 
     13, 2019.
       As described in the Department's attached letter, and 
     contrary to that fall 2019 agreement, Mr. Linick instead 
     referred the matter for review by the Department of Defense's 
     (DOD's) Acting Inspector General--without informing State 
     Department leadership that he was taking a different course. 
     Only after the DOD IG provided its initial findings directly 
     to Mr. Linick in late 2019 or early 2020 did Department 
     leadership become aware that Mr. Linick had hand-selected his 
     own investigator for the matter, outside of the CIGIE 
     process. Mr. Linick then refused multiple requests by 
     Department leadership for a copy of the resulting report. 
     Notwithstanding these repeated requests to Mr. Linick, who 
     reports by law to the Secretary of State, the Department was, 
     for the first time, provided a copy of the March 17, 2020 DOD 
     OIG report on June 2, 2020 (Tab 2) as a result of a request 
     by Congress, nearly two weeks after the President removed Mr. 
     Linick from his position.
       Beyond the concerning process that led to the DOD IG 
     reviewing this matter, the DOD IG report itself raises a 
     number of new questions that, together with the Department's 
     original concerns, further substantiate the Department's 
     misgivings with Mr. Linick's performance as Inspector General 
     and merit a review by an independent investigatory body. As 
     we did originally with Mr. Linick, the Department renews its 
     request that CIGIE review these questions.
       Breach of Agreed Steps for Investigating a Potential Leak 
     from OIG. Last fall, State Department leadership asked Mr. 
     Linick to refer for review by CIGIE the unauthorized 
     disclosure of a draft inspector general report, which the 
     media attributed to ``two government sources involved in 
     carrying out the investigation''. State IG Set to Recommend 
     Discipline for Trump's Top Iran Hand, The Daily Beast, Sept. 
     13, 2019. It was natural to assume that sources involved in 
     ``carrying out the investigation'' may refer to sources 
     within the State OIG, which--if true--would undermine 
     confidence in the professionalism and integrity of the OIG. 
     Mr. Linick agreed to the request, but the Department learned 
     months later that, instead of formally referring the matter 
     to CIGIE, Mr. Linick asked the DOD Acting Inspector General 
     to review the issue. In other words, Mr. Linick failed to 
     inform Department leadership that he had hand-picked another 
     IG to investigate potential misconduct by his office and that 
     he had deviated from the clear course agreed upon with 
     leadership.
       Following the completion of a draft report by the DOD 
     Acting Inspector General in late 2019 or early 2020, Mr. 
     Linick briefed Department leadership on certain findings but 
     refused to provide the written report, or even a written 
     summary, to Department leadership for review, raising further 
     concerns about the fairness of the process followed. As of 
     the time of Mr. Linick's removal, the Department had still 
     not received any documented findings on the matter. By 
     contrast, an appropriate referral to CIGIE would have 
     produced a final report that Department leadership could 
     review and assess whether there may have been inappropriate 
     conduct in Mr. Linick's office.
       Potential Conflict of Interest in Choice of Investigator. 
     The person whom Mr. Linick asked to review the matter, 
     outside of the CIGIE process, was then-DOD Principal Deputy 
     Inspector General Glenn Fine, who at the time was the DOD's 
     Acting Inspector General. This was an unusual choice because 
     Mr. Fine appears to have been a fact witness, potentially one 
     with knowledge of information relevant to the subject of the 
     investigation described in the report. Specifically, the DOD 
     OIG report notes that Mr. Linick said that he ``spoke about 
     the evaluation report'' with Mr. Fine before the media leak 
     occurred. If Mr. Fine himself had confidential information 
     about the draft report before it was leaked, it raises 
     serious questions as to whether it was appropriate for him to 
     lead the investigation into the subsequent leak. It is 
     unclear whether Mr. Fine was even interviewed in the 
     course of the investigation. Allowing a fact witness to an 
     investigation to shape the terms of the investigation--let 
     alone lead the investigation--seems inappropriate. At a 
     minimum, the choice of investigator in this case raises 
     material concerns about whether the report itself 
     represents a complete and adequate investigation of 
     potential misconduct within the State Department Office of 
     Inspector General.
       Limited Investigation. As noted above, the Department 
     finally received a copy of the DOD Acting Inspector General's 
     report on June 2, 2020, and following the Department's 
     review, the Department has identified a number of concerns as 
     to its scope. For example, the report notes that Mr. Linick 
     himself ``asked the DoD OIG to conduct a limited inquiry into 
     whether any DOS OIG employee was the source of the 
     unauthorized disclosure.'' (emphasis added). The DOD OIG 
     conducted personal interviews, in which all interviewed 
     staffers ``said they did not release any information in the 
     report to the media.'' The DOD OIG also reviewed official 
     email accounts and found that no employee directly sent an 
     email from their State Department email address to the news 
     media, other than the communications director.
       However, the scope of this review appears to have been 
     exceedingly cursory, and the report itself indicates that the 
     scope of the investigation was by design ``limited.'' It is 
     also unclear whether it was appropriate for Mr. Linick, as a 
     fact witness to the investigation, to dictate the ``limited'' 
     scope (rather than a ``full'' scope) given the significance 
     of the leak. It is hard to imagine that an OIG or CIGIE 
     would, in the course of its normal investigations, allow 
     possible fact witnesses or interviewees to influence the 
     scope of the investigation. Moreover, merely asking an 
     interviewee if he/she directly transmitted the leaked 
     documents and asking only about emails from official accounts 
     would catch only the most blatant mishandling of information 
     and would fail to uncover any person who disclosed the draft 
     through an intermediary or sent the report from a personal 
     email address. Further, the DOD IG does not appear to have 
     questioned whether any interviewee had knowledge of who may 
     have improperly disclosed the report or engaged in other 
     questioning aimed at discovering the true source of the leak.
       Use and Concealment of Improper Email Practice. The DOD OIG 
     report identifies a concerning email practice used by Mr. 
     Linick. The DOD OIG found: ``IG Linick sent a password-
     protected, draft version of the evaluation report in question 
     to his Gmail account eight times over six days in August 
     2019. On one occasion, he emailed a password-protected draft 
     of the evaluation report from his Gmail email account to his 
     government email account.'' As the DOD OIG report notes, this 
     usage appeared to contravene the State Department OIG's own 
     policy: ``Use OIG provided equipment and systems/applications 
     at all times, including OIG email, to conduct official OIG 
     business. The use of corporate or personal equipment, 
     systems/applications, to include to email, or other file 
     storage sites to store, process, or transmit OIG or 
     Department data is prohibited.'' State OIG Information 
     Systems Rules of Behavior. Mr. Linick clearly should have 
     followed his own organization's specific information security 
     policies--particularly involving a draft report on a highly-
     sensitive personnel issue.

[[Page S3122]]

       We understand that Mr. Linick may have received the initial 
     report noting his improper usage of personal email as early 
     as late 2019 or early 2020, and it is the Department's 
     understanding that he never shared the written report with 
     any person at the State Department (including in his own 
     office), despite repeated requests by Department leadership 
     for a copy of the report. Likewise, he never informed State 
     Department leadership that the report found that he did not 
     comply with OIG email practices. Allowing the head of an 
     investigated office to determine the manner and scope of the 
     release of a report that addresses his own conduct is 
     inappropriate, which is presumably why CIGIE's own guidelines 
     would have required the results of a CIGIE review to be 
     shared with appropriate officials in his supervisory chain.
       OIG Launches Questionable Parallel Investigation Under a 
     Possible Conflict of Interest. At the same time that the DOD 
     IG was conducting its review, Mr. Linick reportedly opened a 
     parallel investigation of other State Department employees 
     for the same potential misconduct for which his own office 
     was being investigated. See Kylie Atwood, Fired State 
     Department inspector general was cleared in leak inquiry 
     prior to his removal, sources say, CNN, May 28, 2020. This 
     decision, if accurately reported, seems unusual because the 
     September 2019 media leak was specifically attributed to 
     ``two government sources involved in carrying out the 
     investigation'' (emphasis added), not to Department employees 
     who may have been fact witnesses (and were clearly not 
     responsible for ``carrying out'' any investigation).
       Mr. Linick's decision also raises the question of whether 
     this parallel investigation was intended to divert attention 
     from the DOD IG's own investigation into the State OIG. 
     Indeed, public reporting suggests that State OIG was 
     continuing its own investigations of other Department 
     employees before the DOD OIG report was even finalized. See 
     id. It should have been obvious to Mr. Linick that launching 
     a parallel investigation into the same misconduct for which 
     he and his own office were being investigated created both a 
     real and apparent conflict of interest and risked interfering 
     with the DOD OIG investigation into his own office. An 
     investigator who is still working to clear his or her own 
     name has a motive to shift the blame to another person.
       Inappropriate Contacts with OIG Staff in an Apparent 
     Attempt to Obtain Department Records, Contrary to 
     Instruction. When Mr. Linick was removed from his position on 
     May 15 and placed on administrative leave, his physical 
     access was terminated, and he was clearly instructed by 
     Department officials not to contact OIG staff members about 
     official matters or return to his former office, without 
     authorization by Department officials, who would facilitate 
     any such contacts.
       However, it has come to the Department's attention that he 
     has violated these instructions on multiple occasions while 
     he was on administrative leave. For example, we understand 
     that, in the days before his Congressional testimony, he sent 
     a text message to the Deputy Inspector General, Diana Shaw, 
     requesting a copy of the DOD IG report. Without informing her 
     own chain of command, we understand that Ms. Shaw then 
     contacted the DOD Office of Inspector General to request a 
     copy of the report on Mr. Linick's behalf. It is not clear 
     what Mr. Linick's motivation was, but it was not his decision 
     (nor his former Deputy's) to make this request for release 
     given that he was, at the time, on administrative leave 
     pursuant to the President's decision with a new Acting 
     Inspector General in place. We understand that Mr. Linick has 
     repeatedly returned to his former office without seeking 
     authorization from his Department superiors, also contrary to 
     the clear instructions he received. Mr. Linick should follow 
     the same rules that apply to other government officials who 
     are placed on administrative leave in such circumstances; he 
     is not entitled to a different set of rules.
       A Pattern of Leaks Continues. Even though no one at the 
     State Department other than Mr. Linick appears to have had a 
     copy of the DOD Inspector General's report (not even his 
     Deputy) before June 2, 2020, CNN ran a story on May 28, 2020 
     that the DOD OIG report had exonerated Mr. Linick of leaking. 
     Kylie Atwood, Fired State Department inspector general was 
     cleared in leak inquiry prior to his removal, sources say, 
     CNN, May 28, 2020. These reports raise additional concerns as 
     to this disturbing pattern of leaks, further warranting CIGIE 
     review.
       Last fall, the Department had serious concerns with the 
     leak of a draft State Department OIG report and recommended 
     that review by CIGIE was the appropriate step for an 
     independent review. Unfortunately, Mr. Linick's failure to 
     follow through on that course--or to seek agreement from his 
     reporting chain on any change in course--has only confirmed 
     the Department's recommendation and has raised even further 
     concerns about Mr. Linick's judgment and conduct.
       Therefore, we ask CIGIE to investigate not only the 
     original unauthorized disclosure, but the conduct described 
     in this letter.
           Sincerely,

                                                Brian Bulatao,

                                   Under Secretary for Management,
                                         U.S. Department of State.