[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 112 (Wednesday, June 17, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3057-S3059]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE DECLINE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I would like to call the Senate's attention
to a letter published by my friend Sir Peter
[[Page S3058]]
Westmacott, on the occasion of what would have been the meeting of the
G7 at Camp David. Peter is the former U.K. ambassador to the United
States and a thoughtful diplomat if there ever was one. He previously
served as ambassador to France and ambassador to Turkey. Unburdened by
the self-consciousness that sometimes plagues American policymakers
critical of the Trump administration, he writes honestly and
insightfully to a British Prime Minister of the ways President Trump
has weakened America's standing as an international leader and how
others stand to capitalize from our diminished role. In the midst of a
global pandemic compounded by climate change, multiple armed conflicts
and humanitarian crises, Russian aggression and expanding Chinese
influence, when global leadership and cooperation are needed more than
ever, the incoherence and isolationism of this White House are
appalling.
Over many years, I have worked with Senators of both parties, with
Republican and Democratic administrations, and with foreign leaders. I
disagreed with, as well as those with whom we have much in common. The
most successful makers of foreign policy share an adherence to the
truth, objectively and uniformly acknowledged; a recognition of the
importance of engagement with the rest of the world; and the goal of
seeking common ground to make progress on shared interests.
Unfortunately, President Trump fails on each of these counts. As Sir
Peter describes, he disregards facts for his preferred fictitious
narratives. He turns away from our allies and picks fights with our
trading partners. He impulsively withdraws from international
agreements that took years to negotiate because he does not stand to
benefit personally or politically from them. He has abandoned our role
as a moral and strategic leader. He crafts foreign policy by tweet. It
is a disgrace, and foreign diplomats and heads of state, with the
exception of our adversaries and autocrats who stand to benefit by
mimicking President Trump, are confused, worried, and appalled.
Sir Peter aptly describes this sorry state of affairs and what it
means for our country and the world.
I ask unanimous consent that Sir Peter Westmacott's letter be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[June 10, 2020]
An Ex-Ambassador's View of a World Without Political Leadership
(By Peter Westmacott)
Dear Prime Minister: This week you should have been meeting
up with your G7 colleagues at Camp David. Covid-19 has
stopped that happening but there is so much going on that I
thought I should send you my briefing note anyway.
President Trump was delighted to be host. He always likes
to be centre stage but the summit would have been a welcome
distraction from his slow and confused response to the
pandemic and from how, in marked contrast to his predecessor,
he made things worse not better when Americans took the
streets following the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis.
Every judgement he makes from now until 3 November will be
viewed through the prism of whether it helps him win a second
term.
That is currently looking less likely than before the
pandemic. Trump's base is holding up--he has delivered
hundreds of conservative judges, sided with white
supremacists, stood up for the gun lobby and given tax cuts
to the wealthy. His attempts to smear his opponent Joe Biden
don't currently seem to be working but much will depend on
whether there are signs of an economic bounce-back before
election day; and on turn-out, especially in the six critical
swing states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin where
Trump sealed it last time, plus Florida, North Carolina and
Arizona. Democrats I talk to currently point to the betting
spreads--not just the polls--slightly favouring Biden and
dare to hope for a clean sweep of White House and Senate (not
even Republicans expect the Democrats to lose the House).
The summit would have taken place against a background of
failure of the global institutions, including the G7--to
organise a meaningful collective response to the C19 crisis.
Everyone knows that the WHO chose to praise rather than
lambast China for its performance in the early stages of the
outbreak, in the hope of eliciting a more honest and
transparent response. But your counterparts are clear that
Trump's decision to walk away from the WHO had more to do
with pointing the finger of blame before the US elections
than with improving our ability to act collectively.
This is symptomatic of a wider problem--the disappearance
of US moral and strategic leadership under Trump. The causes
are legion: take for example his protectionist focus on
`America First', the trade wars with China and the EU, the
undermining of NATO, the renunciation of international arms
control agreements, of the Iran nuclear deal, his trashing of
the Middle East Peace Process, his vainglorious but failed
attempt to denuclearise North Korea, his abandonment of the
Paris climate accords, and his unique contribution to the
creation of a posttruth world in which the West has largely
forfeited the right to call out others for bad behaviour.
Crises accelerate trends more than they create new ones.
When Covid-19 hit us, the free world was already rethinking
its attitude towards the rise of a China more interested in
consolidating the power of the communist party and its
leader, Xi Jinping, than in the welfare of its people or
engagement with the rest of the world on any other than its
own terms.
You will recall coming under heavy US pressure in January
to exclude Huawei from Britain's 5G telecoms infrastructure.
Allies and friends in South East Asia were already very
exercised about China's militarisation programme and
disregard of the findings of the UN Law of the Sea Convention
rejecting its territorial claims. Taiwan was feeling
threatened while China's attempt last year to impose an
extradition treaty on Hong Kong was a foretaste of its
attempt now, under cover of the pandemic crisis, further
to undermine ``one country, two systems'' with new
national security laws jeopardising the territory's
fundamental freedoms.
Covid-19 has also accelerated the concern of China's
trading partners about the resilience of their supply chains.
Early in the crisis, Jaguar Land Rover had to halt production
because of a lack of components made in Wuhan. Companies the
world over are now looking again at whether `just-in-time'
deliveries from far away Chinese suppliers need supplementing
with `just-in-case' arrangements nearer home.
Your own launch of Project Defend designed to improve the
resilience of strategically important firms is being matched
by similar rethinking elsewhere in Europe, where Macron and
Merkel have joined forces to press for greater EU
sovereignty. That in turn followed the EU's decision last
year to designate China as ``a systemic rival promoting
alternative systems of governance'', as concern has grown
around China's increasingly apparent agenda of seeing the
Western model of individual liberty, freedom of expression
and democracy replaced by acceptance of authoritarianism and
the party-state.
China likes to pick off individual countries, as we in the
UK have seen in the past. After Australia called for an
independent investigation of the Covid-19 outbreak, China
imposed an 80% tariff on its imports of Australian barley. So
it will be important to forge a common approach. It was
unfortunate that in March US Secretary of State Pompeo
blocked a G-7 statement on the pandemic because other
governments would not agree to describing it as ``the Wuhan
virus''. But Dominic Raab's call with the foreign ministers
of our Five Eyes intelligence partners on 2 June to discuss
Hong Kong was a good start.
As far as possible, however, we should aim to work with
rather than against China. It is heavily invested in the
global economy and has vast trade surpluses with the rest of
the world. It has also begun to move in the right direction
on imports and inward investment--if not yet on protection of
intellectual property. But as you have made clear with your
offer of a path to citizenship for Hong Kong's British
passport holders, that cannot be at the cost of surrendering
fundamental principles or reneging on our international
commitments.
Trump has said he thinks Putin should be invited to the
next G7 summit, whenever it takes place. You have said firmly
that you don't agree, for the very good reason that there has
not been the improvement in Russian behaviour in Ukraine
required by the Minsk agreements. Trump is close to Putin,
and his business dealings with Russia go back many years. So
he may try again, perhaps with the support of Macron who
wants to ``re-engage'' with Russia.
In Putin's playbook, compromise is weakness so you may need
to remind your colleagues of his mission to recover the
ground he thinks Russia lost in what he has called the
``greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th Century'' when
the Soviet Union imploded; of Russia's role in systematically
undermining elections in free countries; and of the Kremlin's
nasty habit of trying to murder its critics and opponents on
the streets of British cities.
Your European counterparts are likely to raise their
concerns at the current state of Brexit negotiations. They
have understood that you won't be asking to extend the
transition period beyond the end of the year. They would like
a deal to be reached in the remaining six months since they
too will be losers if there isn't one. But just as your team
argue that the Commission are being unreasonable, and have
moved the goalposts, so Barnier & Co think we have changed
our position since you concluded the Withdrawal Agreement and
political declaration last year and that the bespoke
arrangement we are asking for is much more than the simple
Canada-style agreement we say we want. Waiting for, or
provoking, a breakdown, in
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the hope that political leaders will come to the rescue is
unlikely to work: we should be preparing for either stop-the-
clock at the end of December while a last-minute fudge is
worked out, or no deal at all.
Beyond those detailed negotiations lie some big issues
related to Britain's place in the world and our global
influence. The E3 arrangement between France, Germany and the
UK still functions, and is helping to manage the fall-out
from Trump's abandonment of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.
More generally, on many of the big international issues the
UK is more naturally aligned these days with its European
partners than with the US. But there is still a sense that we
currently have little bandwidth or inclination to play the
kind of substantive foreign policy role we have played in the
past, and disappointment in EU capitals that we don't want to
include foreign and security policy in the structure of our
new post-Brexit relationship. I would say this, wouldn't I,
but we need to guard against the risk that, despite the talk
of Global Britain, we find ourselves unable to exercise as
much influence outside the EU as we did inside it--a concern
shared by foreign policy experts in Washington.
So at some point you might want to consider boosting our
soft and hard power alike by bringing together the
substantial resources of our defence, international
development, international trade and foreign ministries in
more joined-up fashion to restore the UK's global
credibility, trust and diplomatic clout. Our friends feel we
have left the stage and want us back. We have in the past
come up with original ideas, built bridges and helped solve
problems. We should aspire to do so again.
Yours,
Peter.
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