[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 89 (Tuesday, May 12, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2369-S2374]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                   Federal Communications Commission

  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, by now, I think people are pretty much 
aware of something that happened about 2 weeks ago--an FCC approval of 
an application that was very, very significant. Yet not many people 
knew that it was going on.
  I think by now it shouldn't be a surprise to anyone that I oppose 
this decision by the Federal Communications Commission to approve an 
application by Ligado Networks. Ligado's plan would use Federal 
spectrum in a way that will interfere with GPS and satellite 
communications, and despite near-unanimous objection from the rest of 
the Federal Government, the Federal Communications Commission has just 
said OK.
  I said ``near-unanimous.'' It was nearly unanimous. A week before the 
decision was made by the FCC, they sent a letter outlining all of the 
reasons that everyone should be opposed to the application made by 
Ligado to the FCC. Their statement was that Ligado's proposal is not 
feasible, affordable, or technically executable. It goes on to say how 
destructive this would be, how the whole country uses this GPS, and how 
this would alter the GPS system so that it no longer could be used with 
predictability.
  When I say ``nearly everyone,'' it is not ``nearly''; it is everyone 
objected to it. I have never seen anything like this happen, to have 
something approved that was objected to by all of government. This 
letter objecting to this was signed by the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy, the Department of Commerce, NASA, the 
Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the National Science 
Foundation, the Department of Transportation, the U.S. Coast Guard, and 
the Federal Aviation Administration. That is everybody. I have never 
seen anything that has ever had that unanimity in being objected to. 
For that reason, it was never approved until April 20 by the Federal 
Communications Commission.
  The GPS and satellite communication functions support everything: 
equipment that our troops use in the field, navigation for first 
responders, airlines--that is how airplanes keep from running into each 
other; they use GPS--cell phones, and ATMs. The list goes on and on.
  Simply put, the FCC is jeopardizing GPS signals that Americans rely 
on every day. I chair the Senate Armed Services Committee. When you are 
conducting warfare, you are using GPS. You use GPS every day. Simply 
put, the FCC is jeopardizing GPS signals that we rely on for both our 
national and economic security for the benefit of just one company and 
its hedge fund investors.
  Ligado may be a new name, but the problem goes back a decade, when 
LightSquared was created in a hedge fund deal worth $5.3 billion. The 
investors put billions on the table, and the only way to get a return 
was to repurpose LightSquared's satellite spectrum for the terrestrial 
cell phone network
  In 2011, when LightSquared asked the FCC for permission to do just 
that, GPS and satellite communication users strongly objected due to 
the interference with the GPS signal. That is the problem. The signal 
is in the same area that purchase took place by a company at that time 
named LightSquared. Federal agencies like the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Transportation, and the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration echoed these concerns.
  In 2012, after it was clear that there was no way to mitigate the GPS 
interference in their proposal, LightSquared declared bankruptcy, so it 
was gone.
  Years later, LightSquared got enough new Wall Street hedge fund money 
to emerge from bankruptcy and be renamed ``Ligado'' and again pushed 
for repurpose of the satellite spectrum for its network. That is 
exactly the thing that the predecessor company tried to do for a long 
period of time, and they were denied, and they were justly denied. They 
shouldn't have been able to do that.
  There was never any idea that an application by an operation like 
this would be acceptable. After extensive testing and analysis, experts 
at nine Federal agencies have unanimously concluded that Ligado's 
proposal, even with updates, will still interfere with GPS signals and 
satellite communications. That is the one I just read. They were 
unanimous in doing this. Of course, we read the names of the agencies 
that were involved. This is something everyone agreed with. We can't 
find anyone who disagreed with it except Ligado itself--the ones who 
would end up with a lot of billions of dollars, and I am not sure where 
it would go.
  They rely on GPS for navigation, logistics, and precision-guided 
missiles in training and on the battlefield. But at the end of the day, 
this is about much more than risking our military

[[Page S2370]]

readiness and capabilities. Ligado's proposal will hurt the American 
economy. Our farmers rely on GPS to harvest their crops. Our truckers 
and our airlines rely on GPS to move supplies and people safely. Our 
maritime industry depends on GPS to place channel markings. Weather 
forecasting relies on satellite communications to save lives and 
property when tornadoes and hurricanes and floods strike our 
communities. I am from Oklahoma. We know what hurricanes are. In fact, 
we were in our basement two times in 1 day about a month ago with those 
threats. That is how you determine where they are and how serious they 
are, and it saves lives.
  The FCC--Federal Communications Commission--has put all of this at 
risk by approving Ligado's application. There wasn't a lot of 
opposition out there talking about it because they had not been 
approved for a number of years. It has never been approved before. And 
all of that was now at risk, just as of a week ago.
  This is a complex issue. Here is an easy way to think about how 
Ligado's network would interfere with our GPS signals. ``Once Ligado 
turns its service on, it will be like trying to hear leaves rustling 
over the roar of 100 jet engines.'' This is according to Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Michael Griffin, 
an expert in this field.
  The FCC has included certain mitigation measures in approving 
Ligado's application, but these are fundamentally flawed in every 
practical sense. They would make Ligado the fox guarding the henhouse. 
How can Ligado be impartial in deciding whether its own system is 
causing interference? It is not going to happen, and everybody knows 
that. Ultimately, the taxpayer and consumer will be left to pay to fix 
the interference. Ultimately, the people of America will end up paying 
for this.
  What I am most upset about is the failure in the process behind this 
decision. A few people made a hasty decision over the weekend. Keep in 
mind, it was in the middle of the national crisis. We have a national 
crisis. Everybody knows that is going on right now. Everyone is having 
to live differently than they have ever lived before, so people are 
concentrating on that. No one was looking.
  It was against the judgment of a unanimous conclusion by the 
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, which included nine Federal 
agencies, as well as private sector stakeholders dependent on GPS and 
satellite communications.
  As far as I can tell, this is the first time that the FCC made a 
decision over the weekend, completely discounting the universal 
opposition to the proposal. A week before this decision was made, it 
was universal. They decided--and this is a group in the hearing that we 
had--we had really talented people there, scientists, making all of the 
decisions. They talked about how the decision was made over a weekend, 
during a national crisis we were dealing with, and on a Sunday. I went 
back and checked, and we could not find any time a decision that was 
made by the FCC on a Sunday or on a weekend. They don't do that on 
weekends.

  On top of that, this decision was opposed by everybody in a letter 
they received a week before.
  Just look in the Wall Street Journal. Mark Esper is the Secretary of 
Defense. Mark Esper had an article there that said.

       The FCC has set conditions to ensure GPS won't be affected. 
     Don't be fooled.

  It would be affected.

       Independent testing and analysis conducted by nine federal 
     departments and agencies show that allowing the Ligado's 
     proposed system--including its proposed modifications--to 
     operate in close proximity to the GPS spectrum would cause 
     harmful interference to millions of GPS receivers across the 
     United States.

  Actually, the band that is used for GPS is called the L band. It gets 
a little bit complicated. The area that people are concerned about, and 
that the Ligado is trying to say they are correcting, was an area that 
was in a different band all together. I think it was the C band and the 
S band.
  I think this is the first time a decision has ever been made--even 
discounting the universal opposition who oppose it--in response to this 
unprecedented and unwise decision. I am leading a letter to the FCC 
outlining critical national security concerns and urging the FCC to 
rescind the order.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters by the NTIA 
be printed in the Record
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                   April 10, 2020.
     Re Ligado Networks LLC, License Modification Applications (as 
         amended), IBFS File Nos. SAT-MOD-20151231-00090, SAT-MOD-
         20151231-00091, and SESMOD20151231-00981; SES-AMD-
         20180531-00856, SAT-AMD-20180531-00044, SAT-AMD-20180531-
         00045 (IB Docket Nos. 11-109 and 12-340).

     Hon. Ajit Pai,
     Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Pai: On behalf of the executive branch, the 
     National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
     (NTIA) submits the enclosed supplemental materials for 
     consideration by the Federal Communications Commission 
     (Commission) regarding the above-referenced license 
     modification applications of Ligado Networks (Ligado), as 
     amended. This letter and its enclosures are provided for 
     inclusion in the record of the application proceedings, 
     supplementing my letter to you dated December 6, 2019, in 
     which I indicated that NTIA was ``unable to recommend the 
     Commission's approval of the Ligado applications.''
       I enclose a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to 
     the Secretary of Commerce dated March 24, 2020. In the 
     letter, the Deputy Secretary, citing 10 USC Sec. 2281, states 
     that ``approval of the Ligado application would adversely 
     affect the military potential of GPS and the Department of 
     Defense is strongly opposed.'' ``After reviewing the existing 
     public record of the Ligado proceeding,'' he continues, ``I 
     believe the information Air Force has submitted to the IRAC 
     would be of significant value to the FCC in making its 
     decision regarding Ligado's license modification application. 
     I therefore request that you have NTIA communicate this 
     additional information to the FCC expeditiously to be put on 
     the public record.'' I received a similar and consistent 
     letter from senior officials of the Department of Defense on 
     March 12, 2020.
       The letters refer to the enclosed memorandum from the Air 
     Force--joined by several executive branch departments and 
     agencies--providing supplemental information to the 
     Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) that detailed 
     numerous expected impacts Ligado's proposed license 
     modifications would cause. The memorandum concluded that 
     Ligado's modifications ``would cause unacceptable operational 
     impacts . . . and adversely affect the military potential of 
     GPS,'' and further noted that ``Ligado's proposed 
     accommodations of identifying and then repairing or replacing 
     potentially-impacted legacy equipment is not feasible, 
     affordable or technically executable.''
       NTIA notes that in a 2011 Order and Authorization, the 
     Commission's International Bureau declared that its processes 
     for authorizing then-LightSquared to commence commercial 
     operations on its MSS L-band frequencies would be complete 
     only ``once the Commission, after consultation with NTIA, 
     concludes that the harmful interference concerns have been 
     resolved.'' We believe the Commission cannot reasonably reach 
     such a conclusion.
       Should you have any questions about this submission, please 
     do not hesitate to contact me.
           Sincerely,

                                           Douglas W. Kinkoph,

                                          Associate Administrator,
       Performing the Delegated Duties of the Assistant Secretary 
     for Communications and Information.
                                  ____



                                  Deputy Secretary of Defense,

                                   Washington, DC, March 24, 2020.
     Hon. Wilbur L. Ross, Jr.,
     Secretary of Commerce,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: On December 6, 2019, the Acting 
     Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and 
     Information and Administrator of the National 
     Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) sent 
     a letter, on behalf of the Executive Branch, to the Chairman 
     of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recommending 
     rejection of the license modification request of Ligado 
     Networks. The Air Force, on behalf of DoD and endorsed by the 
     interagency, has provided additional supplemental information 
     to the Chairman of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory 
     Committee (IRAC) on expected national security and defense 
     impacts to Global Positioning System (GPS) operations if the 
     proposed license modification request were granted. I request 
     this additional information be transmitted by NTIA to the FCC 
     for inclusion in the public record of the Ligado proceeding 
     (FCC International Bureau Docket Numbers 11-109 and 12-340).
       Per 10 U.S.C. 2281, the Secretary of Defense ``may not 
     agree to any restriction on the GPS proposed by the head of a 
     department or agency of the United States outside DoD that 
     would adversely affect the military potential of GPS.'' 
     Approval of the Ligado application would adversely affect the 
     military

[[Page S2371]]

     potential of GPS and the Department of Defense is strongly 
     opposed. After reviewing the existing public record of the 
     Ligado proceeding, I believe the information Air Force has 
     submitted to the IRAC would be of significant value to the 
     FCC in making its decision regarding Ligado's license 
     modification application. I therefore request that you have 
     NTIA communicate this additional information to the FCC 
     expeditiously to be put on the public record.
       I have consulted with my Chief Technical Officer and Chief 
     Information Officer and both agree.
       Your personal attention to this matter would be greatly 
     appreciated.
           Sincerely,
     David L. Norquist.
                                  ____



                           Office of the Secretary of Defense,

                                   Washington, DC, March 12, 2020.
     Douglas W. Kinkoph,
     Associate Administrator, Office of Telecommunications and 
         Information Applications, Performing the non-exclusive 
         functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of 
         Commerce for Communications and Information, National 
         Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. 
         Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Kinkoph: On December 6, 2019, you sent a letter on 
     behalf of the Executive Branch, to the Chairman of the 
     Federal Communications Commission (FCC) stating that the 
     National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
     (NTIA) is unable to recommend the Commission's approval of 
     the Ligado applications. The Air Force, the Executive Agent 
     for the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Global 
     Positioning System (GPS) and DoD's member of the 
     Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), has provided 
     additional information to the Chair of the IRAC, endorsed by 
     other interested agencies on expected national security and 
     defense impacts to GPS operations if the proposed Ligado 
     license modification request is granted by the FCC. The 
     Department requests this additional information be 
     transmitted to the FCC for inclusion into the public record 
     of the Ligado proceeding (FCC International Bureau Docket 
     Numbers 11-109 and 12-340).
       Consistent with the authority delegated by the Secretary of 
     Defense in DoD Directive 4650.05, ``Positioning, Navigation, 
     and Timing (PNT)'', the undersigned agree with the enclosed 
     memorandum for the IRAC Chair. Specifically, FCC approval of 
     Ligado's license modification would cause unacceptable 
     operational impacts and adversely affect the military 
     potential of GPS. The Secretary of Defense, pursuant to 10 
     USC Sec. 2281, ``may not agree to any restriction on the GPS 
     System proposed by the head of a department or agency of the 
     United States outside DoD that would adversely affect the 
     military potential of GPS''. After review of the public 
     record of the Ligado proceeding, the Air Force's memorandum 
     submitted to the IRAC Chair would be critical to the FCC in 
     making its decision regarding Ligado's license modification 
     application. The Department remains strongly opposed to the 
     granting of the license modification sought by Ligado. 
     Accordingly, the Department requests NTIA to provide this 
     additional information to the FCC and that such information 
     be expeditiously submitted in the public record.
       Your personal attention to this matter would be greatly 
     appreciated.
     Dana Deasy,
       Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.
     Michael Griffin,
       Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
                                  ____

                                                February 14, 2020.
     Memorandum for IRAC Chairman

     National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
     U.S. Department of Commerce,
     Washington, DC.
       The Air Force, in the exercise of the Department of 
     Defense's (DoD) statutory duties under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2281, 
     and as the Executive Agent for the Global Positioning System 
     (GPS), and in its role as a member of the National 
     Telecommunication Information Administration (NTIA) 
     Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), hereby 
     submits supplemental information in support of the Department 
     of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information 
     Administration's letter to Federal Communications Commission 
     (FCC) Chairman Ajit Pai of December 6, 2019. Specifically, 
     this letter provides additional detail regarding the expected 
     impacts on national security, operational impacts to the 
     warfighter, and effects on the military potential of GPS by 
     the proposed license modification sought by Ligado Networks 
     (Ligado).
       Extensive and technically rigorous testing and analysis 
     conducted over the past nine years by DoD, the National 
     Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems 
     Engineering Forum (NPEF), the Department and Transportation 
     (DOT), and the Air Force has shown--and Ligado itself has 
     conceded--that the proposed Ligado (previously LightSquared) 
     license modification threatens disruption of the GPS, which 
     is a critical National Security System. As such, the 
     Secretary of Defense, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2281, ``may 
     not agree to any restriction on the GPS System proposed by 
     the head of a department or agency of the United States 
     outside DoD that would adversely affect the military 
     potential of GPS.'' It is DoD's position that FCC approval of 
     Ligado's license modification would cause unacceptable 
     operational impacts to the warfighter and adversely affect 
     the military potential of GPS by negatively impacting GPS 
     receivers. Ligado's proposed accommodations of identifying 
     and then repairing or replacing potentially-impacted legacy 
     equipment is not feasible, affordable or technically 
     executable given the vast number of systems implicated, 
     including critical national security and weapon systems. 
     Accordingly, DoD remains strongly opposed to granting the 
     license modification sought by Ligado.
       On December 6, 2019, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 
     of Commerce for Communications and Information and the 
     Administrator of the NTIA sent a letter to the Chairman of 
     the FCC indicating the executive branch could not support 
     approval of the license modification request of Ligado. This 
     decision was supported by recommendations by the National 
     Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive 
     Committee (PNT EXCOM) and by the June and November 2019 
     letters from the Secretary of Defense expressing strong 
     opposition to the Ligado license modification request.
       DoD is providing this supplemental information in support 
     of the NTIA letter with specific focus on expected national 
     security and defense impacts to GPS, including operational 
     impacts to the warfighter, if the proposed license 
     modification request were granted.
       The Department is providing the following specific 
     information in three categories: 1) national defense mission 
     categories that would be negatively impacted; 2) cost and 
     resource implications of identifying and repairing or 
     replacing any potentially adversely affected GPS receivers 
     supporting national defense missions; and 3) the time, 
     disruption, and programmatic impact to identify and repair or 
     replace the potentially affected GPS receivers supporting 
     national defense missions. Individually and collectively, 
     each of these categories would adversely affect the national 
     defense and security of the United States. It is the 
     Department's position that there are no practical measures to 
     meaningfully mitigate the impact of the proposed Ligado 
     license modification.
       The mitigation measures Ligado has proposed are impractical 
     and un-executable in that they would shift the risk of 
     interference to, and place enormous burdens on, agencies and 
     other GPS users to monitor and report the interference. 
     Moreover, Ligado's mitigation proposals would not protect the 
     vast majority of GPS receivers, such as airborne uses, that 
     are not restricted to specific defined areas of operation 
     such as military installations. Ligado's proposal to replace 
     government GPS receivers that are affected by its proposed 
     network, is a tacit admission that there would be 
     interference, and is further addressed below in terms of 
     cost, operational and mission impact, and timelines to 
     replace these receivers. Additionally, the mitigation 
     proposal by Ligado, even if technically feasible, only covers 
     those receivers owned by the government and would leave many 
     high-value federal uses of civil GPS receivers not owned by 
     the government, such as high precision receivers, vulnerable 
     to interference, as Ligado has admitted in its filings.


                EXPECTED OPERATIONAL AND MISSION IMPACTS

       The U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes the 
     importance of maintaining leadership and freedom of action in 
     space as a vital U.S. interest as well as responding to any 
     interference to the Department's critical space capabilities. 
     The National Defense Strategy stresses the importance of 
     building a more lethal force and strengthening 
     (interoperable) alliances and partnerships. GPS is one 
     such space capability critical to the lethality of the 
     Department's forces and around which, over the years, the 
     Department has structured its weapons systems and business 
     processes. GPS is widely and heavily integrated throughout 
     DoD in operations and applications including, but not 
     limited to, precision weapons, air, land, and sea 
     navigation, communications and network synchronization, 
     command and control, civil engineering, and surveillance 
     applications. Given the sophistication, classification, 
     and the nature of how GPS receivers are embedded into all 
     aspects of DoD testing, training, exercise and operations, 
     it would be practically impossible for DoD to identify and 
     repair or replace all of the potentially adversely 
     affected receivers. These are not simple ``plug-n-play'' 
     devices but would require significant time and resources 
     to effect software modifications, trial and testing, and 
     validation. The Department simply cannot accept such 
     negative operational and mission impacts to our 
     warfighting capabilities. In addition, military GPS 
     receivers are also used by Federal civil agencies, 
     specifically the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration (NASA), the Department of Homeland Security 
     (DHS), and the Department of State through agreements with 
     the DoD. For example, NASA uses high-precision military 
     GPS receivers for their launch anomaly monitoring and 
     destruct systems. DHS and the border patrol use military 
     GPS receivers in unmanned aerial surveillance systems 
     (UAS). In addition, some law enforcement and intelligence 
     agencies use military GPS in their UAS. The State 
     Department's diplomatic security service also uses 
     military GPS receivers. It would be untenable for the 
     United States to pursue an initiative that undermines 
     these capabilities, and it would

[[Page S2372]]

     be exceptionally detrimental to national security.
       Ligado's proposal would have significant effect on legacy 
     military receivers and civil receivers used by DoD.
       Legacy Military GPS Receivers: Modernized GPS receivers 
     cannot replace all military GPS receivers currently in use. 
     Even after the transition to modernized military receivers is 
     completed (by 2035 at the earliest), some high precision 
     receivers would remain vulnerable to interference from the 
     Ligado network transmissions. Remaining legacy military 
     receivers are unable to lock onto weak signals and lack the 
     anti-jam capabilities more typical of more modern military 
     receivers. In addition to continued military use, other 
     Federal agencies and many partner nations will continue to 
     use these legacy high precision receivers. Even as the U.S. 
     military transitions to modernized GPS receivers, it is 
     unclear as to when, or if, legacy GPS high precision 
     receivers used by other critical agencies will be modernized.
       Civil GPS Receivers Used by DoD: DoD makes use of civil GPS 
     receivers in non-combat environments, such as surveying, 
     flight training, training, exercises, other national security 
     events, and scientific applications. Like their civilian 
     counterparts, DoD surveyors and construction units often rely 
     on high-precision GPS receivers that are exceedingly 
     sensitive to interference from signals at nearby frequencies. 
     As analysis indicates, these high precision GPS receivers 
     potentially could be adversely affected at significant 
     distances from the Ligado-proposed terrestrial transmitters, 
     which would negatively impact high precision receiver use in 
     major military installations near urban areas of the United 
     States. Ligado has admitted in its filings that there would 
     be such interference. Additionally, both civilian and 
     commercial applications for high precision wideband-GPS 
     provide far-reaching benefits to the public interest, 
     including capabilities that go beyond the PNT services for 
     which it was originally developed. The great potential 
     capabilities wideband GPS applications hold would also be the 
     most susceptible to the adjacent band interference from 
     Ligado's proposed network. Further, DoD uses civil and 
     commercial infrastructure of many types on bases and test/
     training ranges domestically and abroad. To the extent that 
     operation of commercial infrastructure is degraded by Ligados 
     proposed signals, DoD's use of electrical power, 
     communications networks, operation of unmanned vehicles 
     (including UAS), precision landings, helicopter operations, 
     collection of location based services data, first responder 
     applications, and other applications demanding high accuracy 
     would be at increased risk.


                        Cost and Resource Impact

       By 2024, DoD will have invested more than $15 billion 
     taxpayer dollars since 2000 to sustain and modernize the GPS 
     constellation and continue to modernize GPS user equipment 
     integration across the force. As described earlier, almost 
     every GPS receiver fielded throughout the DoD joint force 
     potentially could be adversely affected if Ligado's proposal 
     is approved. As indicated in the Fiscal Year 2020 President's 
     Budget, DoD is currently planning to spend more than $1.8 
     billion taxpayer dollars to procure, integrate and test 
     modernized GPS receivers, from 2019-2024, into user platforms 
     across the Services. The $1.8 billion figure will grow to a 
     total of approximately $3.5 billion when all of the 
     approximately 1 million GPS receivers currently in the DoD 
     inventory are transitioned to modernized GPS receivers before 
     2035. This cost includes the integration of the receivers 
     into each of thousands of different air, maritime, and ground 
     vehicles, as well as weapons.
       Regarding Ligado's proposal to identify and repair or 
     replace potentially affected GPS receivers owned by the U.S. 
     government, given the classified nature of the military use 
     and the sheer number of platforms potentially affected, 
     Ligado could not possibly know the magnitude of the problem 
     or the costs and operational impacts relative to military 
     receivers. To avoid an adverse effect to the Department's 
     capabilities if Ligado's proposal were approved, DoD would 
     need to undertake unprecedented accelerated testing, 
     modification, and integration actions, which is cost- and 
     schedule-prohibitive and would likely result in significantly 
     degraded national security. For each integration, DoD would 
     need to take the asset out of service, test the platform to 
     ensure that the upgrade worked as planned and did not cause a 
     negative impact to other parts of the weapons system prior to 
     re-fielding. To be clear, every weapons system or platform in 
     the DoD inventory must be tested as an integrated system and 
     it would cause significant operational impact (including 
     substantial retesting) if modernized military GPS 
     receivers require further modification. Adding such a 
     requirement to mitigate the adverse effect to the military 
     potential of GPS from this potential interference would be 
     extremely difficult and likely cost prohibitive given 
     current technology.


              Time Required to Replace Impacted Receivers

       Modification or replacement of GPS receivers within DoD has 
     historically taken approximately a decade due to the sheer 
     receiver numbers, complications with how receivers are 
     integrated in thousands of platforms and systems, depot and 
     scheduling, and global operations. The first M-code capable 
     receivers are now going through integration and testing and 
     will begin installation in DoD platforms beginning in 2020. 
     The full transition is not expected to be complete until at 
     least 2035, based on past experience transitioning from first 
     and second-generation GPS equipment to the present third 
     generation. Any change to the requirements for these 
     modernized receivers as a result of approving Ligado's 
     proposed network and the need to mitigate the resultant 
     interference would only extend that timeline, putting DoD 
     forces and warfighting capabilities at risk due to the 
     rapidly evolving threats.
       It is therefore DoD's position that approval of Ligado's 
     proposal would adversely affect the military potential of GPS 
     significantly, based on the extensive testing done by DoD and 
     others. Consistent with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2281, DoD cannot 
     accept this adverse impact to military use of GPS and the 
     resultant negative operational impacts to our warfighting 
     capabilities. Modification or replacement of GPS receivers 
     across the force to avoid adverse impacts from such a 
     proposal, even if a solution were shown to be feasible, could 
     take on the order of billions of dollars and delay fielding 
     of modified equipment needed to respond to rapidly evolving 
     threats by decades.
       In his June 7, 2019 letter to FCC Chairman Pai, Acting 
     Secretary of Defense Shanahan stated there are too many 
     unknowns and the risks are far too great to federal 
     operations to allow Ligado's proposed system to proceed. We 
     collectively agree with that assessment. Accordingly, the 
     Department of Defense, pursuant to its statutory duties, 
     restates its formal objection to Ligados request for a 
     license modification and, along with the below signatories, 
     requests that it be rejected.

                                                  Ms. Thu Luu,

                                      Department of the Air Force,
                                          Executive Agent for GPS.
       The undersigned IRAC agencies endorse and support the 
     position stated by the Department of the Air Force and the 
     Department of Defense:
       Ms. Sarah Bauer, Department of the Army; Mr. Kenneth 
     Willis, Department of the Navy; Mr. Ivan Navarro, Department 
     of Commerce; Mr. Rene (RJ) Balanga, NASA; Mr. Ramon L. 
     Gladden, Department of the Interior; Mr. Quan Vu, Department 
     of Justice; Mr. John Cornicelli, Department of Homeland 
     Security; Mr. George Dudley, Department of Energy; Mr. 
     Jonathan Williams, National Science Foundation; Mr. James 
     Arnold, Department of Transportation; Mr. Jerry Ulcek, U.S. 
     Coast Guard; Mr. Michael Richmond, Federal Aviation 
     Administration.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the FCC 
article in the Wall Street Journal be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From the Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2020]

                  The FCC's Decision Puts GPS at Risk

                            (By Mark Esper)

       Every day, tens of millions of Americans rely on the Global 
     Positioning System. We use it for location features in 
     cellphones, navigation for vehicles and aircraft, and 
     financial and commercial transactions, including ATM 
     withdrawals. And every day, the Defense Department and our 
     colleagues across government use GPS to protect and serve the 
     public by coordinating global trade, banking and 
     transportation, as well as tracking terrorists and other 
     threats to U.S. national security.
       A recent decision by the Federal Communications Commission, 
     however, will degrade the effectiveness and reliability of 
     this critical technology. On April 20, the FCC announced its 
     approval of Ligado Networks' application to create a cellular 
     network by repurposing a portion of radio spectrum adjacent 
     to that used by GPS. The power and proximity of Ligado's 
     ground emissions on this spectrum will drown out GPS's space-
     based signals. If you've ever tried to talk to a friend while 
     standing next to the speakers at a rock concert, you get the 
     point.
       In announcing its recent decision, the FCC rehashed 
     Ligado's old arguments, wrapped in new language, to say that 
     the company has made changes and the FCC has set conditions 
     to ensure GPS won't be affected. Don't be fooled. The sheer 
     number of cases of interference combined with the difficulty 
     of attribution will make enforcement nearly impossible, not 
     to mention expensive.
       Independent testing and analyses conducted by nine federal 
     departments and agencies show that allowing Ligado's proposed 
     system--including its proposed modifications--to operate in 
     close proximity to the GPS spectrum would cause harmful 
     interference to millions of GPS receivers across the U.S. The 
     FCC's decision will disrupt the daily lives and commerce of 
     millions of Americans and inject unacceptable risk into 
     systems that are critical for emergency response, aviation 
     and missile defense. Further, it will stunt innovation in 
     GPS; people won't use the system if they can't depend on it 
     everywhere, all the time. For these and many other reasons, 
     13 federal agencies, along with leaders from a range of 
     industries, called on the FCC to deny the Ligado request.
       Ligado claims it is the solution to America's 5G woes, but 
     its proposed license modification isn't really about 5G. 
     There is no evidence that the company has a technically 
     viable 5G solution. This is about one company changing the 
     rules to maximize the

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     value of its spectrum, and the cost to Americans is too great 
     to justify.
       The Defense Department recognizes that 5G technology is 
     vital to maintaining America's strategic and economic 
     advantage over its competitors. We strongly support President 
     Trump's call for the U.S. private sector to lead the way, and 
     we're moving quickly to develop opportunities to share 
     midband spectrum, a finite resource. As demand outpaces 
     supply, spectrum sharing holds the key to U.S. dominance in 
     5G. The Defense Department will dedicate millions of dollars 
     to test 5G technologies at military bases, while promoting 
     collaboration among government agencies, academia, and allied 
     countries to advance a 5G solution.
       We need a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach to 
     develop technologies that affect so many. Disregarding the 
     concerns of industry and government--objections grounded in 
     hard data--the FCC's Ligado decision is a shortsighted 
     giveaway that will disrupt our way of life and potentially 
     cost the American people billions of dollars.
       The first and most sacred responsibility of government is 
     to protect and defend its people. GPS allows us to pinpoint 
     911 calls, launch precision airstrikes, prepare our forces 
     for combat, and otherwise act to safeguard health and well-
     being. Interfering with the accuracy and reliability of GPS 
     risks the safety of the American people and undermines 
     national and economic security. America deserves a better 
     alternative.

  Mr. INHOFE. We can't allow this to stand, and all of America agrees. 
In the last 3 weeks, stakeholders from across the country and across 
the economy have expressed their opposition to the FCC decision.
  Not just the military, but all of government and the private sector--
including airlines, pilots, farmers, truckers, marine manufacturers, 
conservationists, equipment manufacturers and distributors, road 
builders, weather forecasters, and GPS device makers--are opposed to 
the Ligado's application.
  I know my colleagues here in the Senate have heard from all of these 
groups, representing jobs and Americans from every single State who use 
these GPS and satellite services every day. This has happened 
nationally. People realized, all of a sudden, that GPS would be 
affected by this.
  I ask my colleagues to consider who supports the Ligado--hedge fund 
investors. No one is supporting it. It is my understanding, from 
talking to the people close to the FCC, that the FCC was expected to 
reject the Ligado proposal once and for all. They had already rejected 
it before. It has been there. The unanimous opposition from the 
interagency review committee was not surprising, but the final outcome 
was shocking.
  With all of this opposition, how could the FCC decide, in the cover 
of darkness over a weekend, that the unanimous concern of GPS 
interference was worth the risk to support the investments of hedge 
fund investors? I can't figure out what happened, nor can the former 
FCC Commissioners. Why did the FCC change its course and in such a 
dramatic fashion? We may never know. But we do know that Ligado has 
spent $1.3 million in just 2020. That is the company that we are 
talking about. They have spent $1.3 million on lobbyists trying to 
convince Congress that their proposal is a good idea.
  This chart shows the list of all of the lobbyists that come up to 
$1.38 million. Keep in mind that is just for 3 months. Over a period of 
a year, you can multiply that by four. Ligado is hiring whoever they 
can to convince you to support the hedge fund investors. That is one of 
the reasons I am talking about this today. I am not sure what form it 
will take to reverse this decision. People have to hear from people 
before they realize how bad this is.
  When you have this many people--one of the individuals was a former 
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and turned lobbyist. He 
is a guy who spent his career building the military. Obviously, he is 
one of the lobbyists supporting this thing.
  Ligado said this order is about winning the race for 5G and beating 
China. Those who claim Ligado's proposal was necessary to defeat 
China's 5G push are deliberately mixing up two different and important 
spectrum issues in order to sell their product--the share of the mid-
band 5G spectrum by DOD with industry and harmful interference of 
Ligado's signal with the low band--that is L band, which we are talking 
about, which is right next to GPS signals that would be used in nearly 
every aspect of daily life.
  The Ligado spectrum they are repurposing is not in the prime mid-band 
spectrum being considered for 5G. Ligado's low-band spectrum was not a 
part of the FCC's own plan to accelerate 5G development released in 
September of 2018, the so-called ``5G FAST Plan.''
  I would like to say that it is complicated, but that isn't what they 
did at all with this thing. Their concern was with only the L band, 
which is next to the GPS.
  Reliable GPS satellite communication is important to everyone in 
America. It drives much of the Nation's economy. We shouldn't sacrifice 
GPS reliability for the sake of lobbyists and hedge fund investors on 
Wall Street.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in urging the FCC to withdraw its 
approval of Ligado's application. Instead of moving ahead with this 
order, we have to reverse the order. That is the effort that is taking 
place right now. If they had denied Ligado's application the same as 
they have done for the last 10 years, there would not be a problem 
today. We have people with an interest in this.
  The hearing that we had just on May 6 was with the people who head up 
Data DC and the DOD Chief Information Officer. By the way, in the 
private sector he was the CIO of three of the largest corporations in 
America. We had Dr. Michael Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, a retired U.S. Coast Guard Admiral; Thad 
Allen, who is now on the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, 
and Timing Advisory Board; and Gen. Jay Raymond, Chief of Space 
Operations, U.S. Space Force. That is everyone who is really 
knowledgeable about this. They are all unanimous in their opposition to 
this program.
  I would ask that Members keep advised of the opportunities they have 
to reverse this decision. We would actually try to get the Federal 
Communications Commission to do that on their own.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote scheduled for 
4:30 p.m. start at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cassidy). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the Edgar 
nomination?
  Mr. INHOFE. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander) and the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. 
Sasse).
  Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. 
Alexander) would have voted ``yea.''
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Leahy), the 
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), the Senator from Washington 
(Mrs. Murray), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), and the Senator 
from Rhode Island (Mr. Whitehouse) are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. McSally). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 62, nays 31, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 88 Ex.]

                                YEAS--62

     Barrasso
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boozman
     Braun
     Burr
     Capito
     Carper
     Cassidy
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Cramer
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Duckworth
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Gardner
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hassan
     Hawley
     Hoeven
     Hyde-Smith
     Inhofe
     Johnson
     Jones
     Kaine
     Kennedy
     King
     Lankford
     Lee
     Loeffler
     Manchin
     McConnell
     McSally
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Paul
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Risch
     Roberts
     Romney
     Rounds
     Rubio
     Scott (FL)
     Scott (SC)
     Shelby
     Sinema
     Sullivan
     Tester
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Warner
     Wicker
     Young

                                NAYS--31

     Baldwin
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Booker
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Casey
     Coons
     Cortez Masto
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Gillibrand
     Harris
     Heinrich
     Hirono
     Klobuchar
     Menendez

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     Merkley
     Murphy
     Reed
     Rosen
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Smith
     Stabenow
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warren
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Alexander
     Leahy
     Markey
     Murray
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Whitehouse
  The nomination was confirmed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motion to 
reconsider is considered made and laid upon the table, and the 
President will be immediately notified of the Senate's action.
  The Senator from the Iowa.
  (The remarks of Mr. Grassley pertaining to the introduction of S. 
3693 are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced 
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')