[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 89 (Tuesday, May 12, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2369-S2374]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Federal Communications Commission
Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, by now, I think people are pretty much
aware of something that happened about 2 weeks ago--an FCC approval of
an application that was very, very significant. Yet not many people
knew that it was going on.
I think by now it shouldn't be a surprise to anyone that I oppose
this decision by the Federal Communications Commission to approve an
application by Ligado Networks. Ligado's plan would use Federal
spectrum in a way that will interfere with GPS and satellite
communications, and despite near-unanimous objection from the rest of
the Federal Government, the Federal Communications Commission has just
said OK.
I said ``near-unanimous.'' It was nearly unanimous. A week before the
decision was made by the FCC, they sent a letter outlining all of the
reasons that everyone should be opposed to the application made by
Ligado to the FCC. Their statement was that Ligado's proposal is not
feasible, affordable, or technically executable. It goes on to say how
destructive this would be, how the whole country uses this GPS, and how
this would alter the GPS system so that it no longer could be used with
predictability.
When I say ``nearly everyone,'' it is not ``nearly''; it is everyone
objected to it. I have never seen anything like this happen, to have
something approved that was objected to by all of government. This
letter objecting to this was signed by the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Navy, the Department of Commerce, NASA, the
Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the National Science
Foundation, the Department of Transportation, the U.S. Coast Guard, and
the Federal Aviation Administration. That is everybody. I have never
seen anything that has ever had that unanimity in being objected to.
For that reason, it was never approved until April 20 by the Federal
Communications Commission.
The GPS and satellite communication functions support everything:
equipment that our troops use in the field, navigation for first
responders, airlines--that is how airplanes keep from running into each
other; they use GPS--cell phones, and ATMs. The list goes on and on.
Simply put, the FCC is jeopardizing GPS signals that Americans rely
on every day. I chair the Senate Armed Services Committee. When you are
conducting warfare, you are using GPS. You use GPS every day. Simply
put, the FCC is jeopardizing GPS signals that we rely on for both our
national and economic security for the benefit of just one company and
its hedge fund investors.
Ligado may be a new name, but the problem goes back a decade, when
LightSquared was created in a hedge fund deal worth $5.3 billion. The
investors put billions on the table, and the only way to get a return
was to repurpose LightSquared's satellite spectrum for the terrestrial
cell phone network
In 2011, when LightSquared asked the FCC for permission to do just
that, GPS and satellite communication users strongly objected due to
the interference with the GPS signal. That is the problem. The signal
is in the same area that purchase took place by a company at that time
named LightSquared. Federal agencies like the Department of Defense,
the Department of Transportation, and the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration echoed these concerns.
In 2012, after it was clear that there was no way to mitigate the GPS
interference in their proposal, LightSquared declared bankruptcy, so it
was gone.
Years later, LightSquared got enough new Wall Street hedge fund money
to emerge from bankruptcy and be renamed ``Ligado'' and again pushed
for repurpose of the satellite spectrum for its network. That is
exactly the thing that the predecessor company tried to do for a long
period of time, and they were denied, and they were justly denied. They
shouldn't have been able to do that.
There was never any idea that an application by an operation like
this would be acceptable. After extensive testing and analysis, experts
at nine Federal agencies have unanimously concluded that Ligado's
proposal, even with updates, will still interfere with GPS signals and
satellite communications. That is the one I just read. They were
unanimous in doing this. Of course, we read the names of the agencies
that were involved. This is something everyone agreed with. We can't
find anyone who disagreed with it except Ligado itself--the ones who
would end up with a lot of billions of dollars, and I am not sure where
it would go.
They rely on GPS for navigation, logistics, and precision-guided
missiles in training and on the battlefield. But at the end of the day,
this is about much more than risking our military
[[Page S2370]]
readiness and capabilities. Ligado's proposal will hurt the American
economy. Our farmers rely on GPS to harvest their crops. Our truckers
and our airlines rely on GPS to move supplies and people safely. Our
maritime industry depends on GPS to place channel markings. Weather
forecasting relies on satellite communications to save lives and
property when tornadoes and hurricanes and floods strike our
communities. I am from Oklahoma. We know what hurricanes are. In fact,
we were in our basement two times in 1 day about a month ago with those
threats. That is how you determine where they are and how serious they
are, and it saves lives.
The FCC--Federal Communications Commission--has put all of this at
risk by approving Ligado's application. There wasn't a lot of
opposition out there talking about it because they had not been
approved for a number of years. It has never been approved before. And
all of that was now at risk, just as of a week ago.
This is a complex issue. Here is an easy way to think about how
Ligado's network would interfere with our GPS signals. ``Once Ligado
turns its service on, it will be like trying to hear leaves rustling
over the roar of 100 jet engines.'' This is according to Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Michael Griffin,
an expert in this field.
The FCC has included certain mitigation measures in approving
Ligado's application, but these are fundamentally flawed in every
practical sense. They would make Ligado the fox guarding the henhouse.
How can Ligado be impartial in deciding whether its own system is
causing interference? It is not going to happen, and everybody knows
that. Ultimately, the taxpayer and consumer will be left to pay to fix
the interference. Ultimately, the people of America will end up paying
for this.
What I am most upset about is the failure in the process behind this
decision. A few people made a hasty decision over the weekend. Keep in
mind, it was in the middle of the national crisis. We have a national
crisis. Everybody knows that is going on right now. Everyone is having
to live differently than they have ever lived before, so people are
concentrating on that. No one was looking.
It was against the judgment of a unanimous conclusion by the
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee, which included nine Federal
agencies, as well as private sector stakeholders dependent on GPS and
satellite communications.
As far as I can tell, this is the first time that the FCC made a
decision over the weekend, completely discounting the universal
opposition to the proposal. A week before this decision was made, it
was universal. They decided--and this is a group in the hearing that we
had--we had really talented people there, scientists, making all of the
decisions. They talked about how the decision was made over a weekend,
during a national crisis we were dealing with, and on a Sunday. I went
back and checked, and we could not find any time a decision that was
made by the FCC on a Sunday or on a weekend. They don't do that on
weekends.
On top of that, this decision was opposed by everybody in a letter
they received a week before.
Just look in the Wall Street Journal. Mark Esper is the Secretary of
Defense. Mark Esper had an article there that said.
The FCC has set conditions to ensure GPS won't be affected.
Don't be fooled.
It would be affected.
Independent testing and analysis conducted by nine federal
departments and agencies show that allowing the Ligado's
proposed system--including its proposed modifications--to
operate in close proximity to the GPS spectrum would cause
harmful interference to millions of GPS receivers across the
United States.
Actually, the band that is used for GPS is called the L band. It gets
a little bit complicated. The area that people are concerned about, and
that the Ligado is trying to say they are correcting, was an area that
was in a different band all together. I think it was the C band and the
S band.
I think this is the first time a decision has ever been made--even
discounting the universal opposition who oppose it--in response to this
unprecedented and unwise decision. I am leading a letter to the FCC
outlining critical national security concerns and urging the FCC to
rescind the order.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters by the NTIA
be printed in the Record
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
April 10, 2020.
Re Ligado Networks LLC, License Modification Applications (as
amended), IBFS File Nos. SAT-MOD-20151231-00090, SAT-MOD-
20151231-00091, and SESMOD20151231-00981; SES-AMD-
20180531-00856, SAT-AMD-20180531-00044, SAT-AMD-20180531-
00045 (IB Docket Nos. 11-109 and 12-340).
Hon. Ajit Pai,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Pai: On behalf of the executive branch, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) submits the enclosed supplemental materials for
consideration by the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) regarding the above-referenced license
modification applications of Ligado Networks (Ligado), as
amended. This letter and its enclosures are provided for
inclusion in the record of the application proceedings,
supplementing my letter to you dated December 6, 2019, in
which I indicated that NTIA was ``unable to recommend the
Commission's approval of the Ligado applications.''
I enclose a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to
the Secretary of Commerce dated March 24, 2020. In the
letter, the Deputy Secretary, citing 10 USC Sec. 2281, states
that ``approval of the Ligado application would adversely
affect the military potential of GPS and the Department of
Defense is strongly opposed.'' ``After reviewing the existing
public record of the Ligado proceeding,'' he continues, ``I
believe the information Air Force has submitted to the IRAC
would be of significant value to the FCC in making its
decision regarding Ligado's license modification application.
I therefore request that you have NTIA communicate this
additional information to the FCC expeditiously to be put on
the public record.'' I received a similar and consistent
letter from senior officials of the Department of Defense on
March 12, 2020.
The letters refer to the enclosed memorandum from the Air
Force--joined by several executive branch departments and
agencies--providing supplemental information to the
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) that detailed
numerous expected impacts Ligado's proposed license
modifications would cause. The memorandum concluded that
Ligado's modifications ``would cause unacceptable operational
impacts . . . and adversely affect the military potential of
GPS,'' and further noted that ``Ligado's proposed
accommodations of identifying and then repairing or replacing
potentially-impacted legacy equipment is not feasible,
affordable or technically executable.''
NTIA notes that in a 2011 Order and Authorization, the
Commission's International Bureau declared that its processes
for authorizing then-LightSquared to commence commercial
operations on its MSS L-band frequencies would be complete
only ``once the Commission, after consultation with NTIA,
concludes that the harmful interference concerns have been
resolved.'' We believe the Commission cannot reasonably reach
such a conclusion.
Should you have any questions about this submission, please
do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Douglas W. Kinkoph,
Associate Administrator,
Performing the Delegated Duties of the Assistant Secretary
for Communications and Information.
____
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, March 24, 2020.
Hon. Wilbur L. Ross, Jr.,
Secretary of Commerce,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: On December 6, 2019, the Acting
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
Information and Administrator of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) sent
a letter, on behalf of the Executive Branch, to the Chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recommending
rejection of the license modification request of Ligado
Networks. The Air Force, on behalf of DoD and endorsed by the
interagency, has provided additional supplemental information
to the Chairman of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee (IRAC) on expected national security and defense
impacts to Global Positioning System (GPS) operations if the
proposed license modification request were granted. I request
this additional information be transmitted by NTIA to the FCC
for inclusion in the public record of the Ligado proceeding
(FCC International Bureau Docket Numbers 11-109 and 12-340).
Per 10 U.S.C. 2281, the Secretary of Defense ``may not
agree to any restriction on the GPS proposed by the head of a
department or agency of the United States outside DoD that
would adversely affect the military potential of GPS.''
Approval of the Ligado application would adversely affect the
military
[[Page S2371]]
potential of GPS and the Department of Defense is strongly
opposed. After reviewing the existing public record of the
Ligado proceeding, I believe the information Air Force has
submitted to the IRAC would be of significant value to the
FCC in making its decision regarding Ligado's license
modification application. I therefore request that you have
NTIA communicate this additional information to the FCC
expeditiously to be put on the public record.
I have consulted with my Chief Technical Officer and Chief
Information Officer and both agree.
Your personal attention to this matter would be greatly
appreciated.
Sincerely,
David L. Norquist.
____
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, March 12, 2020.
Douglas W. Kinkoph,
Associate Administrator, Office of Telecommunications and
Information Applications, Performing the non-exclusive
functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Communications and Information, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Kinkoph: On December 6, 2019, you sent a letter on
behalf of the Executive Branch, to the Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) stating that the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) is unable to recommend the Commission's approval of
the Ligado applications. The Air Force, the Executive Agent
for the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Global
Positioning System (GPS) and DoD's member of the
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), has provided
additional information to the Chair of the IRAC, endorsed by
other interested agencies on expected national security and
defense impacts to GPS operations if the proposed Ligado
license modification request is granted by the FCC. The
Department requests this additional information be
transmitted to the FCC for inclusion into the public record
of the Ligado proceeding (FCC International Bureau Docket
Numbers 11-109 and 12-340).
Consistent with the authority delegated by the Secretary of
Defense in DoD Directive 4650.05, ``Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing (PNT)'', the undersigned agree with the enclosed
memorandum for the IRAC Chair. Specifically, FCC approval of
Ligado's license modification would cause unacceptable
operational impacts and adversely affect the military
potential of GPS. The Secretary of Defense, pursuant to 10
USC Sec. 2281, ``may not agree to any restriction on the GPS
System proposed by the head of a department or agency of the
United States outside DoD that would adversely affect the
military potential of GPS''. After review of the public
record of the Ligado proceeding, the Air Force's memorandum
submitted to the IRAC Chair would be critical to the FCC in
making its decision regarding Ligado's license modification
application. The Department remains strongly opposed to the
granting of the license modification sought by Ligado.
Accordingly, the Department requests NTIA to provide this
additional information to the FCC and that such information
be expeditiously submitted in the public record.
Your personal attention to this matter would be greatly
appreciated.
Dana Deasy,
Department of Defense Chief Information Officer.
Michael Griffin,
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
____
February 14, 2020.
Memorandum for IRAC Chairman
National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The Air Force, in the exercise of the Department of
Defense's (DoD) statutory duties under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2281,
and as the Executive Agent for the Global Positioning System
(GPS), and in its role as a member of the National
Telecommunication Information Administration (NTIA)
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), hereby
submits supplemental information in support of the Department
of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information
Administration's letter to Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) Chairman Ajit Pai of December 6, 2019. Specifically,
this letter provides additional detail regarding the expected
impacts on national security, operational impacts to the
warfighter, and effects on the military potential of GPS by
the proposed license modification sought by Ligado Networks
(Ligado).
Extensive and technically rigorous testing and analysis
conducted over the past nine years by DoD, the National
Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems
Engineering Forum (NPEF), the Department and Transportation
(DOT), and the Air Force has shown--and Ligado itself has
conceded--that the proposed Ligado (previously LightSquared)
license modification threatens disruption of the GPS, which
is a critical National Security System. As such, the
Secretary of Defense, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2281, ``may
not agree to any restriction on the GPS System proposed by
the head of a department or agency of the United States
outside DoD that would adversely affect the military
potential of GPS.'' It is DoD's position that FCC approval of
Ligado's license modification would cause unacceptable
operational impacts to the warfighter and adversely affect
the military potential of GPS by negatively impacting GPS
receivers. Ligado's proposed accommodations of identifying
and then repairing or replacing potentially-impacted legacy
equipment is not feasible, affordable or technically
executable given the vast number of systems implicated,
including critical national security and weapon systems.
Accordingly, DoD remains strongly opposed to granting the
license modification sought by Ligado.
On December 6, 2019, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Communications and Information and the
Administrator of the NTIA sent a letter to the Chairman of
the FCC indicating the executive branch could not support
approval of the license modification request of Ligado. This
decision was supported by recommendations by the National
Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive
Committee (PNT EXCOM) and by the June and November 2019
letters from the Secretary of Defense expressing strong
opposition to the Ligado license modification request.
DoD is providing this supplemental information in support
of the NTIA letter with specific focus on expected national
security and defense impacts to GPS, including operational
impacts to the warfighter, if the proposed license
modification request were granted.
The Department is providing the following specific
information in three categories: 1) national defense mission
categories that would be negatively impacted; 2) cost and
resource implications of identifying and repairing or
replacing any potentially adversely affected GPS receivers
supporting national defense missions; and 3) the time,
disruption, and programmatic impact to identify and repair or
replace the potentially affected GPS receivers supporting
national defense missions. Individually and collectively,
each of these categories would adversely affect the national
defense and security of the United States. It is the
Department's position that there are no practical measures to
meaningfully mitigate the impact of the proposed Ligado
license modification.
The mitigation measures Ligado has proposed are impractical
and un-executable in that they would shift the risk of
interference to, and place enormous burdens on, agencies and
other GPS users to monitor and report the interference.
Moreover, Ligado's mitigation proposals would not protect the
vast majority of GPS receivers, such as airborne uses, that
are not restricted to specific defined areas of operation
such as military installations. Ligado's proposal to replace
government GPS receivers that are affected by its proposed
network, is a tacit admission that there would be
interference, and is further addressed below in terms of
cost, operational and mission impact, and timelines to
replace these receivers. Additionally, the mitigation
proposal by Ligado, even if technically feasible, only covers
those receivers owned by the government and would leave many
high-value federal uses of civil GPS receivers not owned by
the government, such as high precision receivers, vulnerable
to interference, as Ligado has admitted in its filings.
EXPECTED OPERATIONAL AND MISSION IMPACTS
The U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes the
importance of maintaining leadership and freedom of action in
space as a vital U.S. interest as well as responding to any
interference to the Department's critical space capabilities.
The National Defense Strategy stresses the importance of
building a more lethal force and strengthening
(interoperable) alliances and partnerships. GPS is one
such space capability critical to the lethality of the
Department's forces and around which, over the years, the
Department has structured its weapons systems and business
processes. GPS is widely and heavily integrated throughout
DoD in operations and applications including, but not
limited to, precision weapons, air, land, and sea
navigation, communications and network synchronization,
command and control, civil engineering, and surveillance
applications. Given the sophistication, classification,
and the nature of how GPS receivers are embedded into all
aspects of DoD testing, training, exercise and operations,
it would be practically impossible for DoD to identify and
repair or replace all of the potentially adversely
affected receivers. These are not simple ``plug-n-play''
devices but would require significant time and resources
to effect software modifications, trial and testing, and
validation. The Department simply cannot accept such
negative operational and mission impacts to our
warfighting capabilities. In addition, military GPS
receivers are also used by Federal civil agencies,
specifically the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and the Department of State through agreements with
the DoD. For example, NASA uses high-precision military
GPS receivers for their launch anomaly monitoring and
destruct systems. DHS and the border patrol use military
GPS receivers in unmanned aerial surveillance systems
(UAS). In addition, some law enforcement and intelligence
agencies use military GPS in their UAS. The State
Department's diplomatic security service also uses
military GPS receivers. It would be untenable for the
United States to pursue an initiative that undermines
these capabilities, and it would
[[Page S2372]]
be exceptionally detrimental to national security.
Ligado's proposal would have significant effect on legacy
military receivers and civil receivers used by DoD.
Legacy Military GPS Receivers: Modernized GPS receivers
cannot replace all military GPS receivers currently in use.
Even after the transition to modernized military receivers is
completed (by 2035 at the earliest), some high precision
receivers would remain vulnerable to interference from the
Ligado network transmissions. Remaining legacy military
receivers are unable to lock onto weak signals and lack the
anti-jam capabilities more typical of more modern military
receivers. In addition to continued military use, other
Federal agencies and many partner nations will continue to
use these legacy high precision receivers. Even as the U.S.
military transitions to modernized GPS receivers, it is
unclear as to when, or if, legacy GPS high precision
receivers used by other critical agencies will be modernized.
Civil GPS Receivers Used by DoD: DoD makes use of civil GPS
receivers in non-combat environments, such as surveying,
flight training, training, exercises, other national security
events, and scientific applications. Like their civilian
counterparts, DoD surveyors and construction units often rely
on high-precision GPS receivers that are exceedingly
sensitive to interference from signals at nearby frequencies.
As analysis indicates, these high precision GPS receivers
potentially could be adversely affected at significant
distances from the Ligado-proposed terrestrial transmitters,
which would negatively impact high precision receiver use in
major military installations near urban areas of the United
States. Ligado has admitted in its filings that there would
be such interference. Additionally, both civilian and
commercial applications for high precision wideband-GPS
provide far-reaching benefits to the public interest,
including capabilities that go beyond the PNT services for
which it was originally developed. The great potential
capabilities wideband GPS applications hold would also be the
most susceptible to the adjacent band interference from
Ligado's proposed network. Further, DoD uses civil and
commercial infrastructure of many types on bases and test/
training ranges domestically and abroad. To the extent that
operation of commercial infrastructure is degraded by Ligados
proposed signals, DoD's use of electrical power,
communications networks, operation of unmanned vehicles
(including UAS), precision landings, helicopter operations,
collection of location based services data, first responder
applications, and other applications demanding high accuracy
would be at increased risk.
Cost and Resource Impact
By 2024, DoD will have invested more than $15 billion
taxpayer dollars since 2000 to sustain and modernize the GPS
constellation and continue to modernize GPS user equipment
integration across the force. As described earlier, almost
every GPS receiver fielded throughout the DoD joint force
potentially could be adversely affected if Ligado's proposal
is approved. As indicated in the Fiscal Year 2020 President's
Budget, DoD is currently planning to spend more than $1.8
billion taxpayer dollars to procure, integrate and test
modernized GPS receivers, from 2019-2024, into user platforms
across the Services. The $1.8 billion figure will grow to a
total of approximately $3.5 billion when all of the
approximately 1 million GPS receivers currently in the DoD
inventory are transitioned to modernized GPS receivers before
2035. This cost includes the integration of the receivers
into each of thousands of different air, maritime, and ground
vehicles, as well as weapons.
Regarding Ligado's proposal to identify and repair or
replace potentially affected GPS receivers owned by the U.S.
government, given the classified nature of the military use
and the sheer number of platforms potentially affected,
Ligado could not possibly know the magnitude of the problem
or the costs and operational impacts relative to military
receivers. To avoid an adverse effect to the Department's
capabilities if Ligado's proposal were approved, DoD would
need to undertake unprecedented accelerated testing,
modification, and integration actions, which is cost- and
schedule-prohibitive and would likely result in significantly
degraded national security. For each integration, DoD would
need to take the asset out of service, test the platform to
ensure that the upgrade worked as planned and did not cause a
negative impact to other parts of the weapons system prior to
re-fielding. To be clear, every weapons system or platform in
the DoD inventory must be tested as an integrated system and
it would cause significant operational impact (including
substantial retesting) if modernized military GPS
receivers require further modification. Adding such a
requirement to mitigate the adverse effect to the military
potential of GPS from this potential interference would be
extremely difficult and likely cost prohibitive given
current technology.
Time Required to Replace Impacted Receivers
Modification or replacement of GPS receivers within DoD has
historically taken approximately a decade due to the sheer
receiver numbers, complications with how receivers are
integrated in thousands of platforms and systems, depot and
scheduling, and global operations. The first M-code capable
receivers are now going through integration and testing and
will begin installation in DoD platforms beginning in 2020.
The full transition is not expected to be complete until at
least 2035, based on past experience transitioning from first
and second-generation GPS equipment to the present third
generation. Any change to the requirements for these
modernized receivers as a result of approving Ligado's
proposed network and the need to mitigate the resultant
interference would only extend that timeline, putting DoD
forces and warfighting capabilities at risk due to the
rapidly evolving threats.
It is therefore DoD's position that approval of Ligado's
proposal would adversely affect the military potential of GPS
significantly, based on the extensive testing done by DoD and
others. Consistent with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2281, DoD cannot
accept this adverse impact to military use of GPS and the
resultant negative operational impacts to our warfighting
capabilities. Modification or replacement of GPS receivers
across the force to avoid adverse impacts from such a
proposal, even if a solution were shown to be feasible, could
take on the order of billions of dollars and delay fielding
of modified equipment needed to respond to rapidly evolving
threats by decades.
In his June 7, 2019 letter to FCC Chairman Pai, Acting
Secretary of Defense Shanahan stated there are too many
unknowns and the risks are far too great to federal
operations to allow Ligado's proposed system to proceed. We
collectively agree with that assessment. Accordingly, the
Department of Defense, pursuant to its statutory duties,
restates its formal objection to Ligados request for a
license modification and, along with the below signatories,
requests that it be rejected.
Ms. Thu Luu,
Department of the Air Force,
Executive Agent for GPS.
The undersigned IRAC agencies endorse and support the
position stated by the Department of the Air Force and the
Department of Defense:
Ms. Sarah Bauer, Department of the Army; Mr. Kenneth
Willis, Department of the Navy; Mr. Ivan Navarro, Department
of Commerce; Mr. Rene (RJ) Balanga, NASA; Mr. Ramon L.
Gladden, Department of the Interior; Mr. Quan Vu, Department
of Justice; Mr. John Cornicelli, Department of Homeland
Security; Mr. George Dudley, Department of Energy; Mr.
Jonathan Williams, National Science Foundation; Mr. James
Arnold, Department of Transportation; Mr. Jerry Ulcek, U.S.
Coast Guard; Mr. Michael Richmond, Federal Aviation
Administration.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the FCC
article in the Wall Street Journal be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2020]
The FCC's Decision Puts GPS at Risk
(By Mark Esper)
Every day, tens of millions of Americans rely on the Global
Positioning System. We use it for location features in
cellphones, navigation for vehicles and aircraft, and
financial and commercial transactions, including ATM
withdrawals. And every day, the Defense Department and our
colleagues across government use GPS to protect and serve the
public by coordinating global trade, banking and
transportation, as well as tracking terrorists and other
threats to U.S. national security.
A recent decision by the Federal Communications Commission,
however, will degrade the effectiveness and reliability of
this critical technology. On April 20, the FCC announced its
approval of Ligado Networks' application to create a cellular
network by repurposing a portion of radio spectrum adjacent
to that used by GPS. The power and proximity of Ligado's
ground emissions on this spectrum will drown out GPS's space-
based signals. If you've ever tried to talk to a friend while
standing next to the speakers at a rock concert, you get the
point.
In announcing its recent decision, the FCC rehashed
Ligado's old arguments, wrapped in new language, to say that
the company has made changes and the FCC has set conditions
to ensure GPS won't be affected. Don't be fooled. The sheer
number of cases of interference combined with the difficulty
of attribution will make enforcement nearly impossible, not
to mention expensive.
Independent testing and analyses conducted by nine federal
departments and agencies show that allowing Ligado's proposed
system--including its proposed modifications--to operate in
close proximity to the GPS spectrum would cause harmful
interference to millions of GPS receivers across the U.S. The
FCC's decision will disrupt the daily lives and commerce of
millions of Americans and inject unacceptable risk into
systems that are critical for emergency response, aviation
and missile defense. Further, it will stunt innovation in
GPS; people won't use the system if they can't depend on it
everywhere, all the time. For these and many other reasons,
13 federal agencies, along with leaders from a range of
industries, called on the FCC to deny the Ligado request.
Ligado claims it is the solution to America's 5G woes, but
its proposed license modification isn't really about 5G.
There is no evidence that the company has a technically
viable 5G solution. This is about one company changing the
rules to maximize the
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value of its spectrum, and the cost to Americans is too great
to justify.
The Defense Department recognizes that 5G technology is
vital to maintaining America's strategic and economic
advantage over its competitors. We strongly support President
Trump's call for the U.S. private sector to lead the way, and
we're moving quickly to develop opportunities to share
midband spectrum, a finite resource. As demand outpaces
supply, spectrum sharing holds the key to U.S. dominance in
5G. The Defense Department will dedicate millions of dollars
to test 5G technologies at military bases, while promoting
collaboration among government agencies, academia, and allied
countries to advance a 5G solution.
We need a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach to
develop technologies that affect so many. Disregarding the
concerns of industry and government--objections grounded in
hard data--the FCC's Ligado decision is a shortsighted
giveaway that will disrupt our way of life and potentially
cost the American people billions of dollars.
The first and most sacred responsibility of government is
to protect and defend its people. GPS allows us to pinpoint
911 calls, launch precision airstrikes, prepare our forces
for combat, and otherwise act to safeguard health and well-
being. Interfering with the accuracy and reliability of GPS
risks the safety of the American people and undermines
national and economic security. America deserves a better
alternative.
Mr. INHOFE. We can't allow this to stand, and all of America agrees.
In the last 3 weeks, stakeholders from across the country and across
the economy have expressed their opposition to the FCC decision.
Not just the military, but all of government and the private sector--
including airlines, pilots, farmers, truckers, marine manufacturers,
conservationists, equipment manufacturers and distributors, road
builders, weather forecasters, and GPS device makers--are opposed to
the Ligado's application.
I know my colleagues here in the Senate have heard from all of these
groups, representing jobs and Americans from every single State who use
these GPS and satellite services every day. This has happened
nationally. People realized, all of a sudden, that GPS would be
affected by this.
I ask my colleagues to consider who supports the Ligado--hedge fund
investors. No one is supporting it. It is my understanding, from
talking to the people close to the FCC, that the FCC was expected to
reject the Ligado proposal once and for all. They had already rejected
it before. It has been there. The unanimous opposition from the
interagency review committee was not surprising, but the final outcome
was shocking.
With all of this opposition, how could the FCC decide, in the cover
of darkness over a weekend, that the unanimous concern of GPS
interference was worth the risk to support the investments of hedge
fund investors? I can't figure out what happened, nor can the former
FCC Commissioners. Why did the FCC change its course and in such a
dramatic fashion? We may never know. But we do know that Ligado has
spent $1.3 million in just 2020. That is the company that we are
talking about. They have spent $1.3 million on lobbyists trying to
convince Congress that their proposal is a good idea.
This chart shows the list of all of the lobbyists that come up to
$1.38 million. Keep in mind that is just for 3 months. Over a period of
a year, you can multiply that by four. Ligado is hiring whoever they
can to convince you to support the hedge fund investors. That is one of
the reasons I am talking about this today. I am not sure what form it
will take to reverse this decision. People have to hear from people
before they realize how bad this is.
When you have this many people--one of the individuals was a former
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and turned lobbyist. He
is a guy who spent his career building the military. Obviously, he is
one of the lobbyists supporting this thing.
Ligado said this order is about winning the race for 5G and beating
China. Those who claim Ligado's proposal was necessary to defeat
China's 5G push are deliberately mixing up two different and important
spectrum issues in order to sell their product--the share of the mid-
band 5G spectrum by DOD with industry and harmful interference of
Ligado's signal with the low band--that is L band, which we are talking
about, which is right next to GPS signals that would be used in nearly
every aspect of daily life.
The Ligado spectrum they are repurposing is not in the prime mid-band
spectrum being considered for 5G. Ligado's low-band spectrum was not a
part of the FCC's own plan to accelerate 5G development released in
September of 2018, the so-called ``5G FAST Plan.''
I would like to say that it is complicated, but that isn't what they
did at all with this thing. Their concern was with only the L band,
which is next to the GPS.
Reliable GPS satellite communication is important to everyone in
America. It drives much of the Nation's economy. We shouldn't sacrifice
GPS reliability for the sake of lobbyists and hedge fund investors on
Wall Street.
I ask my colleagues to join me in urging the FCC to withdraw its
approval of Ligado's application. Instead of moving ahead with this
order, we have to reverse the order. That is the effort that is taking
place right now. If they had denied Ligado's application the same as
they have done for the last 10 years, there would not be a problem
today. We have people with an interest in this.
The hearing that we had just on May 6 was with the people who head up
Data DC and the DOD Chief Information Officer. By the way, in the
private sector he was the CIO of three of the largest corporations in
America. We had Dr. Michael Griffin, Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, a retired U.S. Coast Guard Admiral; Thad
Allen, who is now on the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing Advisory Board; and Gen. Jay Raymond, Chief of Space
Operations, U.S. Space Force. That is everyone who is really
knowledgeable about this. They are all unanimous in their opposition to
this program.
I would ask that Members keep advised of the opportunities they have
to reverse this decision. We would actually try to get the Federal
Communications Commission to do that on their own.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote scheduled for
4:30 p.m. start at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cassidy). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the Edgar
nomination?
Mr. INHOFE. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. THUNE. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator
from Tennessee (Mr. Alexander) and the Senator from Nebraska (Mr.
Sasse).
Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
Alexander) would have voted ``yea.''
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Leahy), the
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), the Senator from Washington
(Mrs. Murray), the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), and the Senator
from Rhode Island (Mr. Whitehouse) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. McSally). Are there any other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 62, nays 31, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 88 Ex.]
YEAS--62
Barrasso
Blackburn
Blunt
Boozman
Braun
Burr
Capito
Carper
Cassidy
Collins
Cornyn
Cotton
Cramer
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Duckworth
Enzi
Ernst
Fischer
Gardner
Graham
Grassley
Hassan
Hawley
Hoeven
Hyde-Smith
Inhofe
Johnson
Jones
Kaine
Kennedy
King
Lankford
Lee
Loeffler
Manchin
McConnell
McSally
Moran
Murkowski
Paul
Perdue
Peters
Portman
Risch
Roberts
Romney
Rounds
Rubio
Scott (FL)
Scott (SC)
Shelby
Sinema
Sullivan
Tester
Thune
Tillis
Toomey
Warner
Wicker
Young
NAYS--31
Baldwin
Bennet
Blumenthal
Booker
Brown
Cantwell
Cardin
Casey
Coons
Cortez Masto
Durbin
Feinstein
Gillibrand
Harris
Heinrich
Hirono
Klobuchar
Menendez
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Merkley
Murphy
Reed
Rosen
Schatz
Schumer
Shaheen
Smith
Stabenow
Udall
Van Hollen
Warren
Wyden
NOT VOTING--7
Alexander
Leahy
Markey
Murray
Sanders
Sasse
Whitehouse
The nomination was confirmed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the motion to
reconsider is considered made and laid upon the table, and the
President will be immediately notified of the Senate's action.
The Senator from the Iowa.
(The remarks of Mr. Grassley pertaining to the introduction of S.
3693 are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')