[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 83 (Monday, May 4, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2210-S2212]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION
Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification,
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received.
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations
Committee, room SD-423.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Defense Security
Cooperation Agency,
Arlington, VA.
Hon. James E. Risch,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements
of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 20-05
concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and
Acceptance to the Republic of the Philippines for defense
articles and services estimated to cost $1.5 billion. After
this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a
news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.
Sincerely,
Charles W. Hooper,
Lieutenant General, USA,
Director.
Enclosures.
Transmittal No. 20-05
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Republic of the Philippines.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment $1.0 billion.
Other $ .5 billion.
Total $1.5 billion.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Six (6) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters.
Eighteen (18) T700-GE-701D Engines (12 installed, 6
spares).
Fifteen (15) Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning Systems/
Inertial Navigation (EGIs) w/Precise Positioning Service
(PPS) (12 installed, 3 spares).
Two hundred (200) AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles.
[[Page S2211]]
Twelve (12) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles
(CATM).
Three hundred (300) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System
(APKWS) Kits.
One thousand seven hundred (1,700) Advanced Precision Kill
Weapon System (APKWS) Guidance Sections.
Six (6) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight/ AN/ AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision
Sensors (M-T ADS/PNVS).
Six (6) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar
Electronic Units (REU).
Six (6) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency
Interferometers (M-RFI).
Eight (8) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6
installed, 2 spares).
Two hundred (200) FIM-92H Stinger Missiles.
Eight (8) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Video
Receivers (6 installed, 2 spares).
Eight (8) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Air-Air-
Ground Kits (6 installed, 2 spares).
Non-MDE: Also included are eight (8) AN/AVR-2B Laser
Detecting sets (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/APR-
39C(V)1+ Radar Signal Detecting sets (6 installed, 2 spares);
fourteen (14) Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
Systems (SINCGARS) radios (12 installed, 2 spares); fourteen
(14) UHF/VHF/LOS airborne radios (12 installed, 2 spares);
eight (8) AN/APX-123A (V) Common Transponders (6 installed, 2
spares); eight (8) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems (6 new, 2
spares); eight (8) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 Automatic Direction
Finders (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) Doppler ASN-157
Doppler Radar Velocity Sensors (6 installed, 2 spares); eight
(8) AN/APN-209 Radar Altimeters (6 installed, 2 spares);
eight (8) AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation sets (TACAN) (6
installed, 2 spares); four (4) TACAN Ground Stations; eight
(8) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range/Instrument
Landing Systems (VOR/ILS) (6 installed, 2 spares); three (3)
AN/PYQ-lO(C) Simple Key Loader (3 new); six (6) M230EI + M139
AWS Automatic Gun (6 new); eighteen (18) M261 rocket
launchers (12 new, 6 spares); eighteen (18) M299 missile
launchers (12 new, 6 spares); six (6) rocket motor, 2.75-
inch, MK66-4, Inert (6 new); six (6) High Explosive Warhead
for Airborne 2.75 Rocket, Inert (6 new); eighteen (18)
Stinger air-to-air launchers (18 new); twelve (12) Stinger
Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) (12 new); six (6) Stinger
Aerial Handling Trainers (AHT) (6 new); five thousand (5,000)
each 2.75 inch rockets (5,000 new); eighty thousand (80,000)
30mm rounds (80,000 new), training devices, communication
systems, helmets, simulators, generators, transportation and
organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support
equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and
publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S.
Government and contractor technical assistance, technical and
logistics support services, and other related elements of
logistics support.
(iv) Military Department: Army (PI-B-VXX).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: April 30, 2020.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Philippines--Apache AH-64E Attack Helicopters and Related Equipment and
Support
The Government of the Philippines has requested to buy six
(6) AH-64E Apache attack helicopters; eighteen (18) T700-GE-
701 D engines (12 installed, 6 spares); fifteen (15)
Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Inertial
Navigation (EGIs) w/Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (12
installed, 3 spares); two hundred (200) AGM-114 Hellfire
missiles; twelve (12) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training
Missiles (CATM); three hundred (300) Advanced Precision Kill
Weapon System (APKWS) Kits; one thousand seven hundred
(1,700) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)
Guidance Sections; six (6) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target
Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot
Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS); six (6) AN/APG-78 Fire
Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units (REU); six
(6) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (M-
RFI); eight (8) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS)
(6 installed, 2 spares); two hundred (200) FIM-92H Stinger
missiles; eight (8) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Video
Receivers (6 installed, 2 spares); and eight (8) Manned-
Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2i) Air-Air-Ground Kits (6
installed, 2 spares). Also included are eight (8) AN/AVR-2B
Laser Detecting sets (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/
APR-39C(V)l+ Radar Signal Detecting sets (6 installed, 2
spares); fourteen (14) Single Channel Ground and Airborne
Radio Systems (SINCGARS) radios (12 installed, 2 spares);
fourteen (14) UHF/VHF/LOS airborne radios (12 installed, 2
spares); eight (8) AN/APX-123A (V) Common Transponders (6
installed, 2 spares); eight (8) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems
(6 new, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 Automatic
Direction Finders (6 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) Doppler
ASN-157 Doppler Radar Velocity Sensors (6 installed, 2
spares); eight (8) AN/APN-209 Radar Altimeters (6 installed,
2 spares); eight (8) AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation sets
(TACAN) (6 installed, 2 spares); four (4) TACAN Ground
Stations; eight (8) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional
Range/Instrument Landing Systems (VOR/ILS) (6 installed, 2
spares); three (3) AN/PYQ-10(C) Simple Key Loader (3 new);
six (6) M230El + M139 AWS Automatic Gun (6 new); eighteen
(18) M261 rocket launchers (12 new, 6 spares); eighteen (18)
M299 missile launchers (12 new, 6 spares); six (6) rocket
motor, 2.75-inch, MK66-4, Inert (6 new); six (6) High
Explosive Warhead for Airborne 2.75 Rocket, Inert (6 new);
eighteen (18) Stinger air-to-air launchers (18 new); twelve
(12) Stinger Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) (12 new); six (6)
Stinger Aerial Handling Trainers (AHT) (6 new); five thousand
(5,000) each 2.75-inch rockets (5,000 new); eighty thousand
(80,000) 30mm rounds (80,000 new), training devices,
communication systems, helmets, simulators, generators,
transportation and organization equipment, spare and repair
parts, support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical
data and publications, personnel training and training
equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical
assistance, technical and logistics support services, and
other related elements of logistics support. The estimated
cost is $1.5 billion.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security of the United States by helping to improve
the security of a friendly country that continues to be an
important force for political stability, peace, and economic
progress in South-East Asia.
The Philippines is considering either the AH-64E or the AH-
1Z to modernize its attack helicopter capabilities. The
proposed sale will assist the Philippines in developing and
maintaining strong self-defense, counterterrorism, and
critical infrastructure protection capabilities. The
Philippines will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment
and support into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractors will be Boeing, Mesa, Arizona;
and Lockheed Martin, Orlando, Florida. Offsets may be a
requirement of doing business in the Philippines; however,
offsets are negotiated directly between the Original
Equipment Manufacturers or other vendors and the Government
of the Philippines, and further details are not known at this
time.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require 60 U.S.
Government or contractor representatives to travel to
Philippines for a period of 6 weeks (non concurrent).
Activities will include de-processing/fielding, training, and
technical/logistics support.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 20-05
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter is a fielded armed
attack rotary wing aircraft in the Army inventory. The AH-64E
is equipped with communication and target identification
equipment, navigational equipment, aircraft survivability
equipment, displays and sensors. Components considered to
contain sensitive technology in the proposed case are as
follows:
a. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight/AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/
PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather target
information, as well as night navigation capabilities. The
PNVS provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-earth
flight to, from, and within the battle area, while TADS
provides the co-pilot gunner with search, detection,
recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics
(DVO), EI2 television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
sighting systems that may be used singularly or in
combinations. MTADS/PNVS contain sensitive technology and are
classified CONFIDENTIAL.
b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active,
low-probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined
with a passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency
Interferometer (M-RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast.
The AN/APG-78 and the AN/APR-78B M-RFI hardware components
contain sensitive critical technologies. The FCR Ground
Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes
stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks and mobile air
defense systems as well as hovering helicopters, helicopters,
and fixed wing aircraft.
c. The AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometer
(M-RFI) is an updated version of the passive radar detection
and direction finding system. The AN/APR-78B M-RFI hardware
components contain sensitive technology and are classified
CONFIDENTIAL. It utilizes a detachable UDM on the M-RFI
processor, which contains the Radar Frequency (RF) threat
library.
d. The AGM-114R Hellfire is an air-to-ground missiles used
against heavy and light armored targets, thin skinned
vehicles, urban structures, bunkers, caves and personnel. The
missile is Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) based, with a
variable delay fuse, improved safety and reliability. The
highest level of classified information that could be
disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the end item is
up to and including SECRET. Loss or compromise of classified
information
[[Page S2212]]
associated with AGM-114R could lead to development of
countermeasures or exploitation of system vulnerabilities by
those obtaining the information.
e. The Hellfire M36E9 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM)
is a flight-training missile that consists of a functional
guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus. The M36E9
CATM does not have a functional rocket motor or warhead, and
cannot be launched. It functions like a tactical missile
(without launch capability) during captive carry on the
aircraft, making it suitable for training the aircrew in
simulated Hellfire missile target acquisition and lock. The
highest level of classified information that could be
disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the end item is
SECRET.
f. The aircraft has an Embedded Global Positioning System/
Inertial Navigation System (EGI) plus MultiMode Receiver
(MMR), and two EGIs which use internal accelerometers, rate
gyro measurements, and external sensor measurements to
estimate the aircraft state, provides aircraft flight and
position data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-
aided, strap down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The
EGI unit houses a GPS receiver. Integrated within the EGI is
an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) for processing functions.
Each EGI also houses an MMR to provide for reception of
ground based NAVAID signals for instrument aided flight.
g. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects
energy emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates
potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares
validity of threat and selects appropriate countermeasures.
The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU),
Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and
Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware
is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
h. The AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Set is a system
that provides warnings of radar-directed air defense threats
and allows appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553
databus compatible configuration. The hardware is classified
CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with threat data; releasable
technical manuals for operation and maintenance are
classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical data (technical
performance) is classified SECRET. The system can be
programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing
country.
i. The M36E9 Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) is a
Hellfire training missile (NonNATO) that consists of a
functional guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus.
The missile has an operational semi-active laser seeker that
can search for and lock-on to laser designated targets for
pilot training, but it does not have a warhead or propulsion
section and cannot be launched.
j. The Stinger RMP Block I Missile, hardware, embedded
software object code and operating documentation contain
sensitive technology and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. The
highest classification of the Stinger 92H Reprogrammable
Micro-Processor (RMP) Block I missile hardware is
CONFIDENTIAL, and the highest classification of data and
information is SECRET. The guidance section of the missile
and tracking head trainer contain highly sensitive technology
and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. Missile System hardware
components contain sensitive critical technologies. Stinger
Block I critical technology is primarily in the area of
design and production know-how and not end-items. Information
on countermeasures vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures, system performance capabilities and
effectiveness, simulation and test data and software source
code are classified up to SECRET.
2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
3. A determination has been made that the Republic of the
Philippines can provide substantially the same degree of
protection for the sensitive technology being released as the
U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the
U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined
in the Policy Justification.
4. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Republic of the Philippines.
____________________