[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 47 (Wednesday, March 11, 2020)]
[House]
[Pages H1622-H1637]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1515
                USA FREEDOM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2020

  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 891, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 6172) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 to prohibit the production of certain business records, and 
for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. DeGette). Pursuant to House Resolution 
891, the amendment printed in House Report 116-415 is adopted, and the 
bill, as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 6172

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``USA 
     FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
              1978.

                     TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS

Sec. 101. Repeal of authority to access on an ongoing basis call detail 
              records.
Sec. 102. Protection of certain information.
Sec. 103. Use of information.
Sec. 104. Limitation on retention of business record information.
Sec. 105. Effective date.

            TITLE II--ACCURACY AND INTEGRITY OF FISA PROCESS

Sec. 201. Certifications regarding accuracy of FISA applications.
Sec. 202. Description of techniques carried out before targeting United 
              States person.
Sec. 203. Investigations relating to Federal candidates and elected 
              Federal officials.
Sec. 204. Removal or suspension of Federal officers for misconduct 
              before Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Sec. 205. Penalties for offenses related to FISA.
Sec. 206. Contempts constituting crimes.
Sec. 207. Effective date.

           TITLE III--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

Sec. 301. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and 
              opinions.
Sec. 302. Appointment of amici curiae and access to information.
Sec. 303. Effective and independent advice for Foreign Intelligence 
              Surveillance Court.
Sec. 304. Transcripts of proceedings and communications regarding 
              applications.
Sec. 305. Information provided in annual reports.

           TITLE IV--TRANSPARENCY, SUNSETS, AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 401. Congressional oversight.
Sec. 402. Establishment of compliance officers.
Sec. 403. Public reports on information obtained or derived under FISA 
              and protection of First Amendment activities.
Sec. 404. Mandatory reporting on certain orders.
Sec. 405. Report on use of FISA authorities regarding protected 
              activities and protected classes.
Sec. 406. Improvements to Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 407. Sunsets.
Sec. 408. Technical amendments.

     SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978.

       Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this 
     Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
     amendment

[[Page H1623]]

     to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, the 
     reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).

                     TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS

     SEC. 101. REPEAL OF AUTHORITY TO ACCESS ON AN ONGOING BASIS 
                   CALL DETAIL RECORDS.

       (a) Call Detail Records.--
       (1) Repeal.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 
     1861) is amended--
       (A) by striking subparagraph (C);
       (B) in subparagraph (B)--
       (i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``in 
     the case of'' and all that follows through ``in subparagraph 
     (C)),''; and
       (ii) in clause (iii), by striking the semicolon at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (C).
       (2) Prohibition.--Section 501(a) (50 U.S.C. 1861) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) An application under paragraph (1) may not seek an 
     order authorizing or requiring the production on an ongoing 
     basis of call detail records.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Orders.--Subsection (c) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861) 
     is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``with subsection 
     (b)(2)(D)'' and inserting ``with subsection (b)(2)(C)''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (F) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(F) in the case of an application for call detail 
     records, shall direct the Government--
       ``(i) to adopt minimization procedures that require the 
     prompt destruction of all call detail records produced under 
     the order that the Government determines are not foreign 
     intelligence information; and
       ``(ii) to destroy all call detail records produced under 
     the order as prescribed by such procedures.'';
       (2) Compensation.--Subsection (j) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 
     1861) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(j) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate a 
     person for reasonable expenses incurred for providing 
     technical assistance to the Government under this section.''.
       (3) Definitions.--Subsection (k)(4)(B) of section 501 (50 
     U.S.C. 1861) is amended by striking ``For purposes of an 
     application submitted under subsection (b)(2)(C)'' and 
     inserting ``In the case of an application for a call detail 
     record''.
       (4) Oversight.--Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)) is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking paragraph (4); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (8) as 
     paragraphs (4) through (7), respectively;
       (5) Annual reports.--Section 603 (50 U.S.C. 1873) is 
     amended--
       (A) in subsection (b)--
       (i) by transferring subparagraph (C) of paragraph (6) to 
     the end of paragraph (5);
       (ii) in paragraph (5)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking the semicolon and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (III) in subparagraph (C), as transferred by clause (i) of 
     this subparagraph, by striking ``any database of'';

       (iii) by striking paragraph (6) (as amended by clause (i) 
     of this subparagraph); and
       (iv) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (6); and
       (B) in subsection (d)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``any of paragraphs (3), 
     (5), or (6)'' and inserting ``either of paragraph (3) or 
     (5)''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``Paragraphs (2)(B), 
     (2)(C), and (6)(C)'' and inserting ``Paragraphs (2)(B) and 
     (2)(C)''.
       (6) Public reporting.--Section 604(a)(1)(F) (50 U.S.C. 
     1874(a)(1)(F)) is amended--
       (A) in clause (i), by striking the semicolon and inserting 
     ``; and'';
       (B) in clause (ii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     period; and
       (C) by striking clause (iii).

     SEC. 102. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

       (a) Protection.--Subsection (a) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 
     1861), as amended by section 101, is further amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5)(A) An application under paragraph (1) may not seek an 
     order authorizing or requiring the production of a tangible 
     thing under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable 
     expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for 
     law enforcement purposes.
       ``(B) An application under paragraph (1) may not seek an 
     order authorizing or requiring the production of cell site 
     location or global positioning system information.''.
       (b) Clarification of Emergency Authority for Cell Site 
     Location or Global Positioning System Information.--The 
     Attorney General may treat the production of cell site 
     location or global positioning system information as 
     electronic surveillance rather than business records for 
     purposes of authorizing the emergency production of such 
     information pursuant to section 105(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)).
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (a) of section 501 
     (50 U.S.C. 1861) is further amended by striking ``Subject to 
     paragraph (3)'' and inserting ``Subject to paragraphs (3), 
     (4), and (5)''.

     SEC. 103. USE OF INFORMATION.

       Section 501(h) (50 U.S.C. 1861(h)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Information acquired'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Information acquired''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(2) Use in trials, hearings, or other proceedings.--For 
     purposes of subsections (b) through (h) of section 106--
       ``(A) information obtained or derived from the production 
     of tangible things pursuant to an investigation conducted 
     under this section shall be deemed to be information acquired 
     from an electronic surveillance pursuant to title I, unless 
     the court or other authority of the United States finds, in 
     response to a motion from the Government, that providing 
     notice to an aggrieved person would harm the national 
     security of the United States; and
       ``(B) in carrying out subparagraph (A), a person shall be 
     deemed to be an aggrieved person if--
       ``(i) the person is the target of such an investigation; 
     and
       ``(ii) the activities or communications of the person are 
     described in the tangible things that the Government intends 
     to use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other 
     proceeding.''.

     SEC. 104. LIMITATION ON RETENTION OF BUSINESS RECORD 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Requirement.--Section 501(g) (50 U.S.C. 1861(g)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``In this section'' and 
     inserting ``In accordance with paragraph (3), in this 
     section'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
     paragraph (3):
       ``(3) Limitation on retention.--The minimization procedures 
     under paragraph (1) shall ensure that tangible things, and 
     information therein, received under this section may not be 
     retained in excess of 5 years, unless--
       ``(A) the tangible thing or information has been 
     affirmatively determined, in whole or in part, to constitute 
     foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or to be 
     necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence;
       ``(B) the tangible thing or information is reasonably 
     believed to constitute evidence of a crime and is retained by 
     a law enforcement agency;
       ``(C) the tangible thing or information is enciphered or 
     reasonably believed to have a secret meaning;
       ``(D) retention is necessary to protect against an imminent 
     threat to human life;
       ``(E) retention is necessary for technical assurance or 
     compliance purposes, including a court order or discovery 
     obligation, in which case access to the tangible thing or 
     information retained for technical assurance or compliance 
     purposes shall be reported to the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate 
     on an annual basis; or
       ``(F) retention for a period in excess of 5 years is 
     approved by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, based on a determination that retention is 
     necessary to protect the national security of the United 
     States, in which case the Director shall provide to such 
     committees a written certification describing--
       ``(i) the reasons extended retention is necessary to 
     protect the national security of the United States;
       ``(ii) the duration for which the Director is authorizing 
     retention;
       ``(iii) generally the tangible things or information to be 
     retained; and
       ``(iv) the measures the Director is taking to protect the 
     privacy interests of United States persons or persons located 
     inside the United States.''.
       (b) Oversight.--Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (8)(E), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) a description of each time that an exception to the 
     5-year limitation on the retention of information was made 
     pursuant to any of subparagraphs (C) through (E) of 
     subsection (g)(3) of section 501, including an explanation 
     for each such exception.''.

     SEC. 105. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this title shall take effect on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with 
     respect to applications made under section 501 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) on or 
     after such date.

            TITLE II--ACCURACY AND INTEGRITY OF FISA PROCESS

     SEC. 201. CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING ACCURACY OF FISA 
                   APPLICATIONS.

       (a) Title I.--Subsection (a) of section 104 (50 U.S.C. 
     1804) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(10) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the

[[Page H1624]]

     attorney for the Government and the Department of Justice has 
     been apprised of all information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under section 105(a).''.
       (b) Title III.--Subsection (a) of section 303 (50 U.S.C. 
     1823) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government 
     and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all 
     information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under section 304(a).''.
       (c) Title IV.--Subsection (c) of section 402 (50 U.S.C. 
     1842) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government 
     and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all 
     information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (d).''.
       (d) Title V.--Subsection (b)(2) of section 501 (50 U.S.C. 
     1861), as amended by section 101, is further amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) a statement by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the application fairly reflects 
     all information that might reasonably--
       ``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (c).''.
       (e) Title VII.--
       (1) Section 703.--Subsection (b)(1) of section 703 (50 
     U.S.C. 1881b) is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (J), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(K) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government 
     and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all 
     information that might reasonably--
       ``(i) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(ii) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (c).''.
       (2) Section 704.--Subsection (b) of section 704 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881c) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(8) a certification by the applicant that, to the best 
     knowledge of the applicant, the attorney for the Government 
     and the Department of Justice has been apprised of all 
     information that might reasonably--
       ``(A) call into question the accuracy of the application or 
     the reasonableness of any assessment in the application 
     conducted by the department or agency on whose behalf the 
     application is made; or
       ``(B) otherwise raise doubts with respect to the findings 
     required under subsection (c).''.
       (f) Review of Case Files To Ensure Accuracy.--Not later 
     than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall promulgate rules 
     governing the review of case files, as appropriate, to ensure 
     that applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court under titles I or III of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) that target 
     United States persons are accurate and complete.

     SEC. 202. DESCRIPTION OF TECHNIQUES CARRIED OUT BEFORE 
                   TARGETING UNITED STATES PERSON.

       (a) Title I.--Section 104(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(6)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) with respect to a target who is a United States 
     person, including a statement describing the investigative 
     techniques carried out before making the application; and''.
       (b) Title III.--Section 303(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1823(a)(6)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) with respect to a target who is a United States 
     person, includes a statement describing the investigative 
     techniques carried out before making the application; and''.

     SEC. 203. INVESTIGATIONS RELATING TO FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND 
                   ELECTED FEDERAL OFFICIALS.

       (a) Title I.--Section 104(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(6)), as 
     amended by section 202, is further amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(G) if the target of the electronic surveillance is an 
     elected Federal official or a candidate in a Federal 
     election, that the Attorney General has approved in writing 
     of the investigation;''.
       (b) Title III.--Section 303(a)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1823(a)(6)), 
     as amended by section 202, is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(G) if the target of the physical search is an elected 
     Federal official or a candidate in a Federal election, that 
     the Attorney General has approved in writing of the 
     investigation;''.

     SEC. 204. REMOVAL OR SUSPENSION OF FEDERAL OFFICERS FOR 
                   MISCONDUCT BEFORE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE COURT.

       Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(l) Removal or Suspension of Federal Officers for 
     Misconduct Before Courts.--An employee, officer, or 
     contractor of the United States Government who engages in 
     deliberate misconduct with respect to proceedings before the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review shall be subject to 
     appropriate adverse actions, including, as appropriate, 
     suspension without pay or removal.''.

     SEC. 205. PENALTIES FOR OFFENSES RELATED TO FISA.

       (a) False Declarations Before FISC and FISCR.--Section 
     1623(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting before ``, or both'' the following: ``or, if such 
     proceedings are before or ancillary to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review established by section 103 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803), imprisoned not more than eight years''.
       (b) Increased Penalty for Unauthorized Use.--Section 109(c) 
     (50 U.S.C. 1809(c)) is amended by striking ``five years'' and 
     inserting ``eight years''.
       (c) Unauthorized Disclosure of Applications.--
       (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 109 (50 U.S.C. 
     1809) is amended--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``intentionally'';
       (B) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by inserting ``intentionally'' before ``engages in''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking ``; or'' and inserting a semicolon;
       (C) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) by inserting ``intentionally'' before ``disclose or 
     uses''; and
       (ii) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     or''; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) is an employee, officer, or contractor of the United 
     States Government and intentionally discloses an application, 
     or classified information contained therein, for an order 
     under any title of this Act to any person not entitled to 
     receive classified information.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Subsection (b) of such section 
     is amended by striking ``under subsection (a)'' and inserting 
     ``under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)''.

     SEC. 206. CONTEMPTS CONSTITUTING CRIMES.

       Section 402 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting after ``any district court of the United States'' 
     the following: ``, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review established by section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803),''.

     SEC. 207. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this title shall take effect on the 
     date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with 
     respect to applications made under section 501 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) on or 
     after such date.

           TITLE III--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

     SEC. 301. DECLASSIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS, ORDERS, 
                   AND OPINIONS.

       (a) Timing of Declassification.--Subsection (a) of section 
     602 (50 U.S.C. 1872) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new sentence: ``The Director shall complete the 
     declassification review and public release of each such 
     decision, order, or opinion by not later than 180 days after 
     the date on which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
     issues such decision, order, or opinion.''.

[[Page H1625]]

       (b) Matters Covered.--Such subsection is further amended--
       (1) by striking ``Subject to subsection (b)'' and inserting 
     ``(1) Subject to subsection (b)'';
       (2) by striking ``includes a significant'' and all that 
     follows through ``, and,'' and inserting ``is described in 
     paragraph (2) and,''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The decisions, orders, or opinions issued by the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review described in this 
     paragraph are such decisions, orders, or opinions that--
       ``(A) include a significant construction or interpretation 
     of any provision of law, including any novel or significant 
     construction or interpretation of--
       ``(i) the term `specific selection term'; or
       ``(ii) section 501(a)(5); or
       ``(B) result from a proceeding in which an amicus curiae 
     has been appointed pursuant to section 103(i).''.
       (c) Application of Requirement.--Section 602 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1872) shall 
     apply with respect to each decision, order, or opinion issued 
     by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review before, on, or 
     after the date of the enactment of such section. With respect 
     to such decisions, orders, or opinions issued before or on 
     such date, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     complete the declassification review and public release of 
     each such decision, order, or opinion pursuant to such 
     section by not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 302. APPOINTMENT OF AMICI CURIAE AND ACCESS TO 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Expansion of Appointment Authority.--Subparagraph (A) 
     of section 103(i)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(2)) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(A) shall appoint an individual who has been designated 
     under paragraph (1) to serve as amicus curiae to assist such 
     court in the consideration of any application for an order or 
     review that, in the opinion of the court--
       ``(i) presents a novel or significant interpretation of the 
     law, unless the court issues a finding that such appointment 
     is not appropriate; or
       ``(ii) presents exceptional concerns about the protection 
     of the rights of a United States person under the first 
     amendment to the Constitution, unless the court issues a 
     finding that such appointment is not appropriate; and''.
       (b) Authority To Seek Review.--Subsection (i) of section 
     103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) through (11) as 
     paragraphs (8) through (12), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(7) Authority to seek review of decisions.--
       ``(A) FISA court decisions.--Following issuance of an order 
     under this Act by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court, an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) may 
     petition the court to certify for review to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review a question of law 
     pursuant to subsection (j). If the court denies such 
     petition, the court shall provide for the record a written 
     statement of the reasons for such denial. Upon certification 
     of any question of law pursuant to this subparagraph, the 
     Court of Review shall appoint the amicus curiae to assist the 
     Court of Review in its consideration of the certified 
     question, unless the Court of Review issues a finding that 
     such appointment is not appropriate.
       ``(B) FISA court of review decisions.--An amicus curiae 
     appointed under paragraph (2) may petition the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review to certify for 
     review to the Supreme Court of the United States any question 
     of law pursuant to section 1254(2) of title 28, United States 
     Code.''.
       (c) Access to Information.--
       (1) Application and materials.--Subparagraph (A) of section 
     103(i)(6) (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(6)) is amended by striking 
     clause (ii) and inserting the following new clause:
       ``(ii) may make a submission to the court requesting access 
     to any particular materials or information (or category of 
     materials or information) that the amicus curiae believes to 
     be relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae.''.
       (2) Consultation among amici curiae.--Such section is 
     further amended--
       (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as 
     subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(B) Consultation.--If the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court of Review determines that it is relevant to the duties 
     of an amicus curiae appointed by the court under paragraph 
     (2), the amicus curiae may consult with one or more of the 
     other individuals designated by the court to serve as amicus 
     curiae pursuant to paragraph (1) regarding any of the 
     information relevant to any assigned proceeding.''.
       (d) Term Limits.--
       (1) Requirement.--Paragraph (1) of section 103(i) (50 
     U.S.C. 1803(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new sentence: ``An individual may serve as an amicus curiae 
     for a 5-year term, and the presiding judges may, for good 
     cause, jointly reappoint the individual to a single 
     additional term.''.
       (2) Application.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall 
     apply with respect to the service of an amicus curiae 
     appointed under section 103(i) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)) that occurs on 
     or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of 
     the date on which the amicus curiae is appointed.

     SEC. 303. EFFECTIVE AND INDEPENDENT ADVICE FOR FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.

       Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803), as amended by section 204, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(m) Independent Legal Advisors.--
       ``(1) Authority.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review may jointly employ legal advisors to assist the courts 
     in all aspects of considering any matter before the courts, 
     including with respect to--
       ``(A) providing advice on issues of law or fact presented 
     by any application for an order under this Act;
       ``(B) requesting information from the Government in 
     connection with any such application;
       ``(C) identifying any concerns with any such application; 
     and
       ``(D) proposing requirements or conditions for the approval 
     of any such application.
       ``(2) Direction.--The legal advisors employed under 
     paragraph (1) shall be subject solely to the direction of the 
     presiding judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review.''.

     SEC. 304. TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
                   REGARDING APPLICATIONS.

       (a) Transcripts.--Subsection (c) of section 103 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Proceedings under this Act'' and 
     inserting ``(1) Proceedings under this Act'';
       (2) by inserting ``, and shall be transcribed'' before the 
     first period;
       (3) by inserting ``, transcriptions of proceedings,'' after 
     ``applications made''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new sentence: 
     ``Transcriptions of proceedings shall be stored in a file 
     associated with the relevant application or order.''.
       (b) Requirement for Written Records of Interactions With 
     Court.--Such subsection, as amended by paragraph (1) of this 
     section, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The Attorney General and the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court shall maintain all written substantive 
     communications between the Department of Justice and the 
     court, including the identity of the employees of the court 
     to or from whom the communications were made, regarding an 
     application or order made under this title in a file 
     associated with the application or order.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (i)(2) of section 103 
     (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by striking ``subsection (c)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (c)(1)''.

     SEC. 305. INFORMATION PROVIDED IN ANNUAL REPORTS.

       (a) Reports by Director of the Administrative Office of the 
     United States Courts.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 603 (50 
     U.S.C. 1873) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (2) in subparagraph (F), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting a semicolon; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
       ``(G) the number of times the Attorney General required the 
     emergency production of tangible things pursuant to section 
     501(i)(1) and the application under subparagraph (D) of such 
     section was denied;
       ``(H) the number of certifications by the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review pursuant to section 
     103(j); and
       ``(I) the number of requests to certify a question made by 
     an amicus curiae to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review pursuant to section 103(i)(7).''.
       (b) Reports by Director of National Intelligence.--
     Subsection (b)(5)(B) of such section, as amended by section 
     101, is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end 
     the following: ``, including information received 
     electronically and through hardcopy and portable media''.

           TITLE IV--TRANSPARENCY, SUNSETS, AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 401. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

       (a) In General.--Section 601 (50 U.S.C. 1871) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection (e):
       ``(e) Congressional Oversight.--In a manner consistent with 
     the protection of the national security, nothing in this Act 
     or any other provision of law may be construed to preclude 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the Senate from receiving in a timely manner, upon 
     request, applications submitted under this Act to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court, orders of the court, and 
     relevant materials relating to such applications and 
     orders.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 602(a) (50 U.S.C. 
     1872(a)) is amended by striking ``in section 601(e)'' and 
     inserting ``in section 601(f)''.

[[Page H1626]]

  


     SEC. 402. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPLIANCE OFFICERS.

       (a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 605. COMPLIANCE OFFICERS.

       ``(a) Appointment.--The head of each covered agency shall 
     appoint a single Federal officer to serve as the Compliance 
     Officer for that agency.
       ``(b) Compliance.--Each Compliance Officer appointed under 
     subsection (a) shall be responsible for overseeing the 
     compliance of the relevant covered agency with the 
     requirements of this Act.
       ``(c) Audits.--Each Compliance Officer shall conduct 
     routine audits of the compliance by the relevant covered 
     agency with--
       ``(1) the requirements of this Act regarding submitting 
     applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
     including with respect to the accuracy of such applications; 
     and
       ``(2) the minimization, targeting, querying, and accuracy 
     procedures required by this Act.
       ``(d) Assessments.--Each Compliance Officer shall--
       ``(1) conduct on a routine basis assessments of the 
     efficacy of the minimization, targeting, querying, and 
     accuracy procedures adopted by the Attorney General pursuant 
     to this Act; and
       ``(2) annually submit to the Assistant Attorney General 
     designated as the Assistant Attorney General for National 
     Security under section 507A of title 28, United States Code, 
     and the head of the relevant covered agency the findings of 
     such assessments, including any recommendations of the 
     Compliance Officer with respect to improving such procedures.
       ``(e) Remediation.--Each Compliance Officer shall ensure 
     the remediation of any compliance issues of the relevant 
     covered agency identified pursuant to this section or the 
     rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       ``(f) Inspector Generals Assessment.--On an annual basis, 
     and consistent with the protection of sources and methods, 
     each Inspector General of a covered agency shall submit to 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the 
     appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the 
     implementation of this section by the covered agency.
       ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' means--
       ``(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       ``(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
       ``(2) Covered agency.--The term `covered agency' means a 
     department or agency of the United States Government that 
     submits applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court under this Act.
       ``(3) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term 
     `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 101.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
     section 604 the following new item:

``Sec. 605. Compliance officers.''.

     SEC. 403. PUBLIC REPORTS ON INFORMATION OBTAINED OR DERIVED 
                   UNDER FISA AND PROTECTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall make 
     publicly available the following reports:
       (1) A report explaining how the United States Government 
     determines whether information is ``obtained or derived'' 
     from activities authorized by the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) for 
     purposes of the notice requirements under such Act.
       (2) A report explaining how the United States Government 
     interprets the prohibition under section 501(a) of such Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1861(a)) on conducting an investigation of a 
     United States person ``solely upon the basis of activities 
     protected by the first amendment to the Constitution''.
       (b) Requirements.--The Attorney General shall ensure that 
     the reports under subsection (a) are detailed and use 
     hypothetical fact patterns to describe how the United States 
     Government conducts the analyses covered by the reports.
       (c) Form.--The reports under subsection (a) shall be made 
     publicly available in unclassified form.

     SEC. 404. MANDATORY REPORTING ON CERTAIN ORDERS.

       (a) Reporting on United States Person Queries.--Subsection 
     (b)(2) of section 603 (50 U.S.C. 1873), as amended by section 
     101, is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the number of search 
     terms concerning a known United States person'' and inserting 
     ``the number of search terms that concern a known United 
     States person or are reasonably likely to identify a United 
     States person''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``the number of 
     queries concerning a known United States person'' and 
     inserting ``the number of queries that concern a known United 
     States person or are reasonably likely to identify a United 
     States person''.
       (b) Modification to Exceptions.--Subsection (d)(2) of such 
     section, as amended by section 101, is amended by striking 
     ``(A) Federal'' and all that follows through ``(B) Electronic 
     mail address and telephone numbers.--''.

     SEC. 405. REPORT ON USE OF FISA AUTHORITIES REGARDING 
                   PROTECTED ACTIVITIES AND PROTECTED CLASSES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board shall make publicly available, to the extent 
     practicable, a report on--
       (1) the extent to which the activities and protected 
     classes described in subsection (b) are used to support 
     targeting decisions in the use of authorities pursuant to the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
     et seq.); and
       (2) the impact of the use of such authorities on such 
     activities and protected classes.
       (b) Activities and Protected Classes Described.--The 
     activities and protected classes described in this subsection 
     are the following:
       (1) Activities and expression protected by the First 
     Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
       (2) Race, ethnicity, national origin, religious 
     affiliation, sex, and any other protected characteristic 
     determined appropriate by the Board.
       (c) Form.--In addition to the report made publicly 
     available under subsection (a), the Board may submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a classified annex.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate.

     SEC. 406. IMPROVEMENTS TO PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
                   OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       Paragraph (4) of section 1061(h) of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(h)) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) Term.--
       ``(A) Commencement.--Each member of the Board shall serve a 
     term of 6 years, commencing on the date of the appointment of 
     the member to the Board.
       ``(B) Reappointment.--A member may be reappointed to one or 
     more additional terms.
       ``(C) Vacancy.--A vacancy in the Board shall be filled in 
     the manner in which the original appointment was made.
       ``(D) Extension.--Upon the expiration of the term of office 
     of a member, the member may continue to serve, at the 
     election of the member--
       ``(i) during the period preceding the reappointment of the 
     member pursuant to subparagraph (B); or
       ``(ii) until the member's successor has been appointed and 
     qualified.''.

     SEC. 407. SUNSETS.

       (a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
     2005.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
     Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended 
     by striking ``March 15, 2020'' and inserting ``December 1, 
     2023''.
       (b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004.--Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is 
     amended by striking ``March 15, 2020'' and inserting 
     ``December 1, 2023''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect on the earlier of the date of the enactment 
     of this Act or March 15, 2020.

     SEC. 408. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.

       (a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended as follows:
       (1) In section 103(e) (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)), by striking 
     ``702(h)(4)'' both places it appears and inserting 
     ``702(i)(4)''.
       (2) In section 105(a)(4) (50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(4))--
       (A) by striking ``section 104(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting 
     ``section 104(a)(6)(E)''; and
       (B) by striking ``section 104(d)'' and inserting ``section 
     104(c)''.
       (3) In section 501(a) (50 U.S.C. 1861(a)), by indenting 
     paragraph (3) 2 ems to the left.
       (4) In section 603(b)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 1873(b)(2)(C)), by 
     inserting ``and'' after the semicolon.
       (5) In section 702 (50 U.S.C. 1881a)--
       (A) in subsection (h)(3), by striking ``subsection (i)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (j)'';
       (B) in subsection (j)(1), by striking ``subsection (g)'' 
     each place it appears and inserting ``subsection (h)''; and
       (C) in the subsection heading of subsection (m), by 
     inserting a comma after ``Assessments''.
       (6) In section 801(8)(B)(iii) (50 U.S.C. 1885(8)(B)(iii)), 
     by striking ``702(h)'' and inserting ``702(i)''.
       (7) In section 802(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1885a(a)(3)), by 
     striking ``702(h)'' and inserting ``702(i)''.
       (b) References to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.--
       (1) Definitions.--Section 101 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new subsections:
       ``(q) The term `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' 
     means the court established under section 103(a).

[[Page H1627]]

       ``(r) The terms `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
     Review' and `Court of Review' mean the court established 
     under section 103(b).''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is 
     amended--
       (A) in section 102 (50 U.S.C. 1802), by striking ``the 
     court established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
       (B) in section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803)--
       (i) in subsection (a)--

       (I) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``The court 
     established under this subsection'' and inserting ``The 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
       (II) by striking ``the court established under this 
     subsection'' each place it appears and inserting ``the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';

       (ii) in subsection (g)--

       (I) by striking ``the court established pursuant to 
     subsection (a)'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court'';
       (II) by striking ``the court of review established pursuant 
     to subsection (b)'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review''; and
       (III) by striking ``The courts established pursuant to 
     subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``The Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review'';

       (iii) in subsection (h), by striking ``a court established 
     under this section'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court of Review'';
       (iv) in subsection (i)--

       (I) in paragraph (1), by striking ``the courts established 
     under subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review'';
       (II) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``the courts'' and 
     inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review'';
       (III) in paragraph (5), by striking ``the court'' and 
     inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, as the 
     case may be,'';
       (IV) in paragraph (6), by striking ``the court'' each place 
     it appears and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court of Review'';
       (V) by striking ``a court established under subsection (a) 
     or (b)'' each place it appears and inserting ``the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review''; and
       (VI) by striking ``A court established under subsection (a) 
     or (b)'' each place it appears and inserting ``The Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review'';

       (v) in subsection (j)--

       (I) by striking ``a court established under subsection 
     (a)'' and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court''; and
       (II) by striking ``the court determines'' and inserting 
     ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court determines'';

       (vi) by striking ``the court established under subsection 
     (a)'' each place it appears and inserting ``the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
       (vii) by striking ``the court established under subsection 
     (b)'' each place it appears and inserting ``the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review'';
       (C) in section 105(c) (50 U.S.C. 1805(c))--
       (i) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking ``the Court'' and 
     inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; 
     and
       (ii) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the court'' each place 
     it appears and inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court'';
       (D) in section 401(1) (50 U.S.C. 1841(1)), by striking ``, 
     and `State' '' and inserting `` `State', `Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court', and `Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court of Review' '';
       (E) in section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842)--
       (i) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``the court 
     established by section 103(a) of this Act'' and inserting 
     ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
       (ii) in subsection (h)(2), by striking ``the court 
     established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
       (F) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861)--
       (i) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``the court 
     established by section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court'';
       (ii) in subsection (g)(3), by striking ``the court 
     established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
       (iii) in subsection (k)(1), by striking ``, and `State' '' 
     and inserting `` `State', and `Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Court' '';
       (G) in section 502(c)(1)(E), by striking ``the court 
     established under section 103'' and inserting ``the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court (as defined by section 
     101)'';
       (H) in section 801 (50 U.S.C. 1885)--
       (i) in paragraph (8)(B)(i), by striking ``the court 
     established under section 103(a)'' and inserting ``the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''; and
       (ii) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(10) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term 
     `Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court 
     established under section 103(a).''; and
       (I) in section 802(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1885a(a)(1)), by 
     striking ``the court established under section 103(a)'' and 
     inserting ``the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court''.
       (c) Updated References to Certain Individuals.--The Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 102(a) (50 U.S.C. 1802(a))--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``him'' and inserting 
     ``the Attorney General''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``his certification'' and 
     inserting ``the Attorney General's certification'';
       (2) in section 103(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)(1)), by 
     striking ``his decision'' and inserting ``the decision of 
     such judge'';
       (3) in section 104(a) (50 U.S.C. 1804)(a))--
       (A) in the language preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``his finding'' and inserting ``the Attorney General's 
     finding''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``his belief'' and 
     inserting ``the applicant's belief'';
       (4) in section 105(a) (50 U.S.C. 1805(a)), by striking 
     ``he'' and inserting ``the judge'';
       (5) in section 106 (50 U.S.C. 1806)--
       (A) in subsection (e), by striking ``he'' and inserting 
     ``the person''; and
       (B) in subsection (j), by striking ``his discretion'' and 
     inserting ``the discretion of the judge'';
       (6) in section 109 (50 U.S.C. 1809)--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``he'' and inserting 
     ``the person''; and
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``his official duties'' 
     and inserting ``the official duties of such officer'';
       (7) in section 305 (50 U.S.C. 1825)--
       (A) in subsection (f)(1), by striking ``he'' and inserting 
     ``the person''; and
       (B) in subsection (j)(1), by striking ``his discretion'' 
     and inserting ``the discretion of the judge'';
       (8) in section 307 (50 U.S.C. 1827)--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``he'' and inserting 
     ``the person''; and
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``his official duties'' 
     and inserting ``the official duties of such officer''; and
       (9) in section 403 (50 U.S.C. 1843), by striking ``his 
     designee'' and inserting ``a designee of the Attorney 
     General''.

       (d) Coordination With Other Amendments Made by This Act.--
     For purposes of applying amendments made by provisions of 
     this Act other than this section, the amendments made by this 
     section shall be treated as having been enacted immediately 
     before any such amendments by other provisions of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 
1 hour, equally divided among and controlled by the chair and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and the chair and 
ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Jordan), the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), and the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) each will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).


                             General Leave

  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and insert extraneous material into the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, 
authorizes the government to collect foreign intelligence in the United 
States under the supervision of a secret court.
  It is one of the most complicated, technical statutes we handle, but 
the story of FISA and how Congress reacts to its use is really very 
simple.
  Some measure of surveillance is necessary to keep our country safe. 
Left unchecked, however, the executive branch is all too willing to 
unleash its considerable surveillance capabilities on the American 
people.
  Our job as Members of Congress is to make sure that our intelligence 
capabilities are robust, but also to provide that critical check, to 
claw back authorities that go too far, and to press for changes that 
protect our civil liberties to the maximum extent possible.
  H.R. 6172, the USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act, is one step in that 
ongoing project of protecting our civil liberties.
  It is by no means a perfect bill. There are many other changes to 
FISA that I would have liked to have seen here, but this bill includes 
very important reforms.
  First and foremost, it ends the NSA's call detail records program, 
which

[[Page H1628]]

began as part of a secret and unlawful surveillance project almost 20 
years ago. This experiment has run its course, and our responsibility 
is to bring it to its formal end. It should never have been permitted 
to start, but now at least we can finally end it.
  This bill also prohibits the use of section 215 to acquire 
information that would otherwise require a warrant in the law 
enforcement context. Our understanding of the Fourth Amendment has come 
to recognize a privacy interest in our physical location, and this 
legislation provides new protections accordingly.
  As the law continues to evolve, the public will see how the 
government applies these standards in the FISA court. This bill 
requires the government to disclose all significant opinions of the 
FISA court within 180 days.
  The bill also requires a one-time historical review of all 
significant opinions issued by the court since its inception. The 
Department of Justice may have good cause to classify the details of 
any particular case, but there is no reason that important 
interpretations of the law should be kept secret. There never was, and 
we finally managed to get rid of it.
  Now, since we circulated the original draft of this bill, we have 
heard from a wide range of stakeholders, from the most progressive 
Members of the Democratic Caucus to the staunchest supporters of 
President Trump, and they have convinced us to make yet additional 
changes.
  To address the concerns of those who seek additional guarantees of 
privacy, we have added new retention limits, new reports to explain key 
legal issues, and an explicit prohibition on the use of section 215 to 
obtain GPS and cell site location information.
  Other Members asked us to address the deep structural flaws in FISA 
identified by the inspector general in the report issued late last 
year. We have done just that. Working with our Republican colleagues, 
we have mandated additional transparency in FISA applications, created 
additional scrutiny for cases that involve elected officials, and 
elevated the consequences for misrepresenting information to the FISA 
court.
  I should also address the Members on both sides of the aisle who 
urged opposition to this bill because it does not contain every reform 
we might have wanted.
  Madam Speaker, I agree. It does not contain every reform that I want. 
I am no fan of the underlying authorities.
  I represent Lower Manhattan. I was in Congress when the World Trade 
Center was hit. Then and now, I resented that the government exploited 
9/11 to pass the PATRIOT Act, which was much too restrictive of civil 
liberties, and other measures that I find dangerous and overbroad.
  For many years, I led the opposition to reauthorization of the 
business records provision of FISA, which we are finally doing 
something about today.
  I am a founding member of what was then called the PATRIOT Act Reform 
Caucus to reform the PATRIOT Act. I have voted against every FISA bill 
that did not contain significant reform.
  But the measure before us today does contain significant reform--
again, not every change we would like to see, certainly not many of the 
changes I would like to see, but very decisive steps in the direction 
of protecting our civil rights and our civil liberties.
  We are taking that step as we should--together, in a bipartisan 
fashion, and in complete agreement that when it comes to safeguarding 
our civil liberties, we have done what we could do, and we still have a 
great deal of work to do.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might 
consume.
  I rise in support of the reform legislation.
  This bill is not perfect, as the chairman said. It does not contain 
every reform that I would like to see or the reforms that I advocated 
for and many others advocated for, but it is a start. Most importantly, 
this bill is an improvement over what currently exists, over the status 
quo.
  The legislation begins to address the problems that we saw with the 
FBI's illegal surveillance of Trump campaign associate Carter Page.
  On December 9, 2019, the nonpartisan Justice Department inspector 
general released a 400-page report detailing the FBI's misconduct and 
the failures in its warrantless surveillance of Mr. Page.
  Congressman Meadows and I urged our Democratic chairman to hold 
hearings on this report, but they were not interested.
  Still, I hope all of my colleagues had a chance to read the inspector 
general's report because it should concern every single American.
  Remember, if our law enforcement agencies can do this to a President, 
imagine what they can do to you and me.
  The Justice Department inspector general found 17 significant errors 
or omissions in the FISA warrant applications for Mr. Page. Said more 
plainly, they lied to the court 17 times.
  They didn't tell the court important information, like the guy who 
wrote the dossier was being paid for by the opposition party's 
campaign. They didn't tell the court the guy who wrote the document, 
the dossier, that they used to get the warrant was ``desperate'' to 
stop Trump and had communicated that to the Justice Department.
  The inspector general also found 51 factual assertions made to the 
FISA court that were wrong or unsupported. It detailed how the FBI was 
too eager to rely on phony political opposition research conducted by 
Christopher Steele and, as I said, funded by the Democrats.
  According to the inspector general: ``The FISA request form drew 
almost entirely from Steele's reporting in describing the factual basis 
to establish probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a 
foreign power,'' which was not true.
  The inspector general determined that the FBI did not have 
corroborating information to support the specific allegations made 
against Mr. Page. In fact, Steele was feeding the FBI gossip and 
innuendo as proof of wrongdoing. Then, the FBI used that information, 
as I said, to spy on an American citizen, without corroborating the 
information.
  This is a great misuse of immense power that our Federal Government 
agencies have, and it is a severe abuse of trust.
  Now, there has been a lot of talk about accountability for this 
misconduct, and I absolutely agree. There needs to be accountability at 
all levels.
  The inspector general found that an FBI attorney actually doctored a 
piece of evidence. An FBI attorney did this. He doctored a piece of 
evidence that he used to obtain the warrant to spy on Mr. Page.
  The attorney took an email that would have cut against the 
surveillance order on Mr. Page and changed its meaning. He changed its 
meaning 180 degrees so that it would support the surveillance. This is 
totally unacceptable.
  The same FBI lawyer who the inspector general found to have shared 
anti-Trump text messages with his colleagues, writing all kinds of 
things--``the crazies won finally,'' ``viva la resistance''--this 
attorney went on to serve on Special Counsel Robert Mueller's team 
investigating the debunked allegations about Russian collusion.
  The FBI's misconduct on FISA is not limited to junior staffers, as 
some of my colleagues have asserted. Such rampant and flagrant abuse 
can occur only because of senior leadership failures: Director Comey, 
Deputy Director McCabe, and General Counsel Jim Baker.
  In fact, the inspector general said as much in his report. Here are 
his words: ``In our view, this was a failure of not only the 
operational team, but also of the managers and supervisors, including 
senior officials, in the chain of command.''
  It is no coincidence that the two most senior FBI officials involved, 
Director Comey and Deputy Director McCabe, were both referred for 
criminal prosecution by the inspector general for wrongdoing related to 
the investigations.
  We cannot forget this background because that is why this reform 
legislation--again, while not everything we hoped for--is a necessary 
first step.

[[Page H1629]]

  This bill would add several requirements to ensure a FISA application 
is complete and accurate. It requires the Attorney General to sign off 
on a FISA investigation of an elected official or candidate for Federal 
office. It forces the Justice Department to fire anyone who knowingly 
hides information from the FISA court. And the bill enhances 
congressional oversight of the FISA process.
  It also allows the FISA court to appoint an amicus in cases involving 
political activities of a U.S. person. Because the FISA process is ex 
parte--meaning, of course, the U.S. person is not represented--I hope 
the appointment of the amicus will help the FISA court to protect the 
civil liberties of U.S. persons.
  Like I said, I think we can and should do more, and I look forward to 
working with the chairman toward that end. But right now, this bill 
would improve the civil liberty protections of U.S. citizens.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I include in the Record this letter from 
the chairwoman of the Committee on Oversight and Reform.

                                         House of Representatives,


                            Committee on Oversight and Reform,

                                   Washington, DC, March 10, 2020.
     Hon. Jerrold Nadler,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning H.R. 
     6172, the ``USA Freedom Reauthorization Act.'' There are 
     certain provisions in the legislation which fall within the 
     Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Reform.
       In the interest of permitting your Committee to proceed 
     expeditiously on this bill, I am willing to waive this 
     Committee's right to sequential referral. I do so with the 
     understanding that by waiving consideration of the bill, the 
     Committee on Oversight and Reform does not waive any future 
     jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in 
     the bill which fall within its Rule X jurisdiction. I request 
     that you urge the Speaker to name Members of this Committee 
     to any conference committee which is named to consider such 
     provisions.
       Please place this letter into the Congressional Record 
     during consideration of the measure on the House floor. Thank 
     you for the cooperative spirit in which you have worked 
     regarding this matter and others between our respective 
     Committees.
           Sincerely,
                                               Carolyn B. Maloney,
                                                       Chairwoman.

  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary 
Committee, I am delighted to be able to join our Republican colleagues 
and Democratic colleagues and those of us who have advocated for a 
progressive mindset as it relates to civil liberties in this country in 
support of the reauthorization of the USA FREEDOM Act.
  With that backdrop, however, I want to say to my good friend, he 
knows that the inspector general's report indicated that there was no 
political motive to the beginning of the investigation. And even though 
referrals have been made, none of the individuals he mentioned have 
been criminally prosecuted.
  That is behind us, to a certain extent, but it is a good backdrop to 
make sure that anything we do, no matter who the individuals are, that 
we do it with the impeccable credentials of the Constitution, civil 
liberties, civil justice, and equality.
  That is why I rise to support this legislation, although I know that 
a more detailed review might have warranted some additional fixes.
  But I think it is important to take note that we do have the 
prohibition of the government from using section 215 to collect any 
records that would require a warrant if the information being assessed 
was for law enforcement purposes.
  We are trying to contain and constrain. The bill requires the 
government to provide notice to individuals whose information is 
collected pursuant to 215, and it strengthens First Amendment 
protections by requiring the FISA court and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review to appoint an amicus curiae in any 
instance where an application by the government presents significant 
concerns about impinging on the First Amendment.
  The bill also strengthens the amicus curiae's ability to protect 
privacy in civil liberties cases. As well, it directs the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board to conduct a study of the way the 
government's use of FISA authorities may be premised.
  The bill improves transparency. The bill strengthens reporting 
requirements. It strengthens, as I said, the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board.
  In further debates right after 9/11, I worked on a number of 
legislative initiatives, including one bill in 2013, the FISA Court and 
Sunshine Act, bipartisan legislation that provided much-needed 
transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, 
orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
  That language is in this bill, the opportunity to review those 
decisions and for those decisions to be able to be reviewed as well.
  I am a longstanding supporter of the USA FREEDOM Act, particularly 
because section 301 of that bill, which is not in this bill, has 
protections against reversed targeting.

                              {time}  1530

  Each moment that we have an opportunity to provide security for this 
Nation we also have the equal opportunity of infringing on the civil 
liberties of our fellow citizens. It is important today to stand on 
this floor and say to the American people that we do believe in their 
constitutional rights and the Bill of Rights. This legislation is to 
further contain those infringements and to protect the rights of our 
citizens.
  Madam Speaker, I want my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and as 
an original co-sponsor of the USA Freedom Act, which stands for 
``Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending 
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and Online Monitoring Act'', I rise 
in support of the ``USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020.''
  I support the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020 for several 
reasons:
  1. The bill continues to prohibit the NSA from collecting bulk phone 
records. By doing so, the government no longer has the authority to 
collect large amounts of call detail records on an ongoing basis. The 
Call Detail Records program not only resulted in the over-collection of 
records that the NSA did not have authority to receive but also 
resulted in several technical problems.
  2. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act prohibits the government from 
using Section 215 to collect any records that would require a warrant 
if the information being accessed were for law enforcement purposes. 
This provision ensures that Section 215 can keep pace with future 
developments in the law as courts interpret Carpenter v. United States 
and apply it to other contexts.
  3. The bill requires the government to provide notice to individuals 
whose information is collected pursuant to Section 215 if the 
government plans to use that information, or any information derived 
from it, in a criminal case or other legal proceeding.
  4. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act strengthens First Amendment 
Protections by requiring the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review to appoint an amicus curia in any instance 
where an application by the government presents significant concerns 
about impinging on the First Amendment activities of Americans.
  5. The bill contains other measures to strengthen amici curiae's 
ability to protect privacy in civil liberties in cases to which they 
are appointed.
  6. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act directs the Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board to conduct a study of the way the 
government's use of FISA authorities may be premised on or may impact 
protected classes, including based on race, ethnicity, national origin, 
religion, or sex.
  7. The bill improves transparency by requiring the declassification 
of significant FISC and FISC-R opinions within 180 days.
  8. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act strengthens the reporting 
requirement for Section 702 queries by eliminating an existing 
exemption for the FBI.
  9. The bill strengthens the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB) by allowing members to be reappointed to consecutive 
terms and to continue serving after their terms have expired, should 
they so choose.
  The USA Freedom Act was first passed in 2015 as the House's unified 
response to the unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in 
the media in June 2013, regarding the National Security Agency's 
collection from Verizon of the phone records of all of its American 
customers, which was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 
215 of the Patriot Act.

[[Page H1630]]

  Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering 
operation was swift and negative.
  There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large 
percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of 
this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of 
magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil 
liberties of American citizens.
  To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National 
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this 
program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this 
program did not include the content of any communications or the 
identity of any subscriber.
  The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the 
Court's order is telephony meta data, such as telephone numbers dialed 
and length of calls.''
  The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very 
reassuring.
  In response, many Members of Congress, including then Ranking Member 
Conyers, Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in 
response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of 
the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA 
Patriot Act and subsequent amendments.
  For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine 
Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that provided much needed 
transparency without compromising national security to the decisions, 
orders, and opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or 
``FISA Court.''
  Specifically, my bill required the Attorney General to disclose each 
decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority 
the government is claiming under the PATRIOT ACT and Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to 
keep Americans safe.
  These requirements were then incorporated in substantial fl part in 
the USA Freedom Act, which required the Attorney General to conduct a 
declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA 
court that included a significant construction or interpretation of law 
and to submit a report to Congress within 45 days.
  As I indicated, perhaps the most important reasons for supporting 
passage of the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act is the prohibition on 
domestic bulk collection, as well as its enhanced First Amendment 
protections, both of which seek to protect American citizens from the 
NSA' s abuse of power through unlawful collection of personal data.
  I was also a longstanding supporter of the USA Freedom Act, 
particularly because Section 301 of the bill contained protections 
against ``reverse targeting,'' which became law when an earlier Jackson 
Lee Amendment was included in H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007.
  ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this 
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the 
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government 
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to 
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
  One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives, 
as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving 
expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation for 
national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be 
difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
  The Jackson Lee Amendment, preserved in Section 301 of the USA 
Freedom Act, reduced even further any such temptation to resort to 
reverse targeting by making any information concerning a United States 
person obtained improperly inadmissible in any federal, state, or local 
judicial, legal, executive, or administrative proceeding.
  Madam Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 
2007, that as Alexis DeTocqueville, the most astute student of American 
democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies 
invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the 
governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that 
are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a 
love of justice.
  I support the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2020 because it will 
help keep us true to the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance 
between cherished liberties and smart security.
  I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Reauthorization Act.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I will just real quickly say that the gentlewoman is exactly right. 
People should be prosecuted. It was so bad in the Carter Page 
application. Here is what the former chief judge of the FISA court 
said:

       The frequency with which representations made by FBI 
     personnel turned out to be unsupported or contradicted by 
     information in their possession and with which they withheld 
     information detrimental to their case calls into question 
     whether information contained in other FBI applications is 
     reliable.

  Put in plain English: You lied so much, how can we trust any other 
representation you have made to the court?
  That is what this legislation is designed to begin to address and 
protect American citizens who will be in front of this court.
  Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner), who has been a strong advocate in this area and former 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Speaker, I am no stranger to this debate. In 
the aftermath of 9/11, I stood on this floor to advance the USA PATRIOT 
Act. I still believe, as I did at the time, in its necessity to protect 
our country from terrorist attacks.
  In 2015, after abuses of the surveillance authorities were brought to 
light, I fought for reforms that resulted in the passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act.
  Today I rise in support of this reauthorization bill. The expiring 
provisions are still necessary to the national security of the United 
States. However, much like in 2015, we have been made aware of 
surveillance abuses that require our attention. I believe this bill 
offers substantial reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, reforms that are imperative for accountability and the restoration 
of Americans' confidence in our intelligence system.
  The FISA abuses in the Carter Page case were staggering. We learned 
about these when Inspector General Michael Horowitz released his report 
on December 9, 2019. I said at the time that Congress had the 
responsibility to fully examine his findings and to take corrective 
actions.
  Unfortunately, we have not fully examined this report. Despite being 
released 3 months ago, we have not held one hearing on the House side. 
There is documented evidence of errors, missteps, and omissions that 
resulted in the degradation of Carter Page's constitutional rights, 
and, to date, the House majority has largely ignored it.
  So I am glad that the majority is finally acknowledging the abuses in 
the Horowitz report by introducing corrective actions in this bill.
  There are several good provisions for accountability in the bill. For 
instance, the Attorney General must now approve, in writing, the FISA 
investigation of an elected official or candidate for Federal office. 
Also, the legislation expands the use of an amicus in cases involving 
the political activities of U.S. citizens. The legislation creates 
checks to ensure that information being presented to the FISC is 
accurate.
  It is impossible to legislate away bad behavior by malicious actors, 
but this legislation places much-needed safeguards to prevent another 
Carter Page-type scandal from happening again.
  My colleagues who wish we should do more are right; we should do 
more. But with a deadline on Sunday, we must either act now or let 
these important national security authorities expire.
  Since the inception of the PATRIOT Act, I have fought for oversight 
of powerful surveillance apparatus. I believe that the reforms 
presented in this bill are a good step to restoring the oversight.
  The reauthorization reinforces essential and effective tools that 
have been in place since 9/11, while also strengthening the protection 
of citizen civil liberties in the United States.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Quigley).
  Mr. QUIGLEY. Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this USA 
FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.
  This bill strikes just the right balance between protecting our 
national security and strengthening civil liberties. It preserves 
critical tools used by authorities to investigate international 
terrorism and foreign intelligence matters, but also makes significant 
reforms to enhance privacy and transparency.
  I would like to quickly highlight some of the important privacy 
protections included in the bill.

[[Page H1631]]

  For example, the FBI may no longer be able to keep business records 
collected under FISA indefinitely. Those records would have to be 
destroyed after 5 years, except in very narrow circumstances.
  The government will also have to provide notice to individuals whose 
business records are used in a criminal case or other proceeding unless 
the proceeding's adjudicator finds that disclosure would harm national 
security. Individuals who receive notice would then be able to 
challenge the legality of the government's collection, a right that 
should be maintained when intrusive national security authorities are 
used to gather evidence.
  In addition to these privacy enhancements, the bill also requires 
greater transparency about how the government uses FISA. The bill 
imposes a 180-day clock on declassification of significant opinions 
issued by the FISA court and requires the government to look further in 
its historical records than it has done before.
  Moreover, the bill enhances transparency in the intelligence 
community's annual public reports so we get a better sense of when the 
government conducts U.S. person queries into FISA data.
  These are but some examples of the important transparency and private 
reforms contained in this bill. These reforms are all accomplished 
without negatively impacting our national security.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for it.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Biggs).
  Mr. BIGGS. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  The recurring theme that I have heard today is that we should be 
doing more to fix FISA. That is not unlike what James Madison described 
in the Federalist Papers when he described parchment barriers between 
the various departments of government, meaning the three branches of 
government, afraid that all of it could be sucked into the vortex of 
power--those are his words--of the legislative branch.
  And here we are discussing parchment barriers for those who have 
basically abused the FISA process so far. We are putting more parchment 
barriers in place, but they don't mean anything. They don't mean 
anything if you never see someone prosecuted.
  So let's talk about one of the things that has been touted, a 
lengthening of the time of sentencing from 5 years to 8 years if you 
are found to commit abuse. How about contempt proceedings that are 
being put in here?
  But do you know what? We know FISA was abused. We know that people 
lied to the court, and we know something else. The Inspector General 
recommended criminal charges be filed on people.
  These parchment barriers make no sense, have no strength and no 
efficacy when we don't see someone indicted, charged, or convicted. To 
say something is criminal in nature doesn't matter when you don't 
prosecute them.
  If you want to deter somebody, you must see prosecution so, that way, 
you get specific deterrence for that individual or general deterrence 
to the rest of the people who are inclined to commit bad acts.
  The flaws in this bill are that we don't see application of any of 
these reforms. So we can tout them all we wish--a whole litany of 
them--but until you actually hold people accountable, this bill has no 
efficacy. For that reason, I will be opposing.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
  Mr. DAVIDSON of Ohio. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Madam Speaker, I rise to caution my colleagues about this false 
dilemma of security versus freedom and about supporting and defending 
our Constitution against all enemies foreign or domestic by abridging 
the rights and freedoms protected by our Constitution.
  I want to applaud, frankly, the behind-the-scenes folks on the 
committees who worked hard to make this bill better than the status 
quo. Many of my colleagues will look at this, and, frankly, that has 
been the argument by the ranking member and the chairman that this bill 
really isn't that good of a bill, that it is really not what we should 
do, but it is better than the status quo.
  Too often that is what happens here. I think that might leave people 
with the false perception that we couldn't do better. But the reality 
is there is bipartisan agreement and bicameral agreement on the 
Safeguarding Americans' Private Records Act.
  The bill that the committee was going to move forward with was 
pulled. The committee process didn't take place because there was a 
bipartisan coalition of conservatives and progressives who had a plan 
to amend the bill. It may, in fact, have been a completely different 
bill.
  We also didn't take it through committee. We also didn't allow any 
amendments, so numerous good amendments weren't even able to be 
considered, amendments like the confess your transgressions amendment 
that would say that, of all these agencies that report, the Director of 
National Intelligence would say: What has been done to discipline 
people who access these records in violation of statute?
  My colleague, Mr. Biggs, highlighted the real problem. There is one 
standard for everyday Americans and a different one for the powerful 
and connected. Our Justice Department needs to hold someone 
accountable. Whether it is in my district, in a Republican district, or 
one of my colleagues' districts, in a Democratic district, we get the 
same question: When is someone going to jail?
  We need to know that the law is being followed, that Lady Justice 
does have a blindfold on, and that there is one standard. This falls 
far short of that, and it is not the standard that should be used 
against American citizens; therefore, it is not the standard that 
should be used to secure our country.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, may I inquire of the Chair how much time 
the minority has remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Dakota (Mr. Armstrong).
  Mr. ARMSTRONG. Madam Speaker, to my colleagues on both sides who 
think that this bill doesn't go far enough, I can tell you that, 
probably 3 days ago, I was 100 percent in your camp. If you would have 
told me today I was going to stand up and speak in favor of this bill, 
I would have told you that is not true, yet here I am.
  The reason is because I think we are dealing with some issues that 
are important to discuss:
  One, there is no legislation that we can write that will make bad 
actors not be bad actors. There is no amicus provision or any provision 
that is going to allow for somebody who is going to lie to their own 
superiors to not lie to somebody else.
  Two, the provisions of lone wolf and roving wiretaps are incredibly 
important to national security. There is not a lot of debate amongst 
those things.
  Three, FISA and title 1 were originally designed because of abuses to 
civil rights. We know that title 1 has been abused, and that is why we 
are here.
  But are we better off without title 1? I don't think so. We weren't 
before. We are better off with it.
  So what does this bill actually do that is important, that is why a 
guy like me who believes in the Fourth Amendment, believes in the First 
Amendment, and believes in the privacy of our citizens, why would I 
stand here? Because it increases transparency; it moves it through the 
process faster; it puts real compliance checks in place; and it holds 
people accountable both through a contempt proceeding and enhanced 
criminal penalties.
  When we are dealing with something as important as civil liberties, I 
think we have to ask the question: Are we better off tomorrow than we 
are today? This bill puts us in a better position tomorrow than it did 
yesterday.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. JORDAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to 
close.

[[Page H1632]]

  Madam Speaker, as the gentleman from North Dakota just articulated, 
the bill is better than where we are currently--no call detail records, 
amicus kicks in if there is a First Amendment concern of any American 
citizen who is in front of the court. The penalties are real: You lie 
to the court, you omit information from the court, or you go leak 
information about the application you submitted to the court, there are 
enhanced penalties.
  There is the transcript provision. There is now a transcript that 
will be given to the intelligence community. That is a good step, 
knowing that somebody is going to be looking at what you are doing and 
is going to see it in a real timeframe is important.
  The annual assessment from the IG, the same IG who just told us 3 
months ago that the FBI went to the court in the Carter Page 
application and lied 17 times, that individual, Mr. Horowitz, will be 
doing an annual assessment; compliance office within the Department of 
Justice so that there are more people looking at the application on the 
front end, hopefully, we don't have as many problems; and finally, as 
the chairman indicated, no cell site GPS location indication without a 
warrant--those are victories for the American citizen. It is not as 
much as we would like, but it is a darn good first step.
  Madam Speaker, I urge people to support the legislation, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I just want to say that I am in complete agreement with the ranking 
minority member that this is a very good bill, that we do a lot of 
things that we ought to do, that we don't do a lot of things, 
unfortunately, that we should do, but we did what we could.
  Undoubtedly, the ranking member and I have different ideas. Some of 
the things which he thinks we did not enough I think we did too much 
and vice versa, but we did have some of the things he thinks that we 
shouldn't have done I wish we had done. But we did manage to reach 
agreement.
  As I said, I believe it is a very good bill. It is not as protective 
of civil liberties as I would like to see it, but we got as far as we 
possibly could, and so I urge everyone to vote for this bill.
  I know there will be some dissent on our side of the aisle based on 
civil liberties concerns. I can only say that, with most of those 
concerns that I have heard voiced, I agree with them, but we just 
couldn't get them.
  Before I close, I want to recognize the staff on both sides of the 
aisle who have worked around the clock for the past few weeks to reach 
a compromise and bring this bill to the floor.
  Although there are too many to name here, I should single out the 
following individuals: Aaron Hiller, Sophia Brill, and Sarah Istel from 
my staff; Wells Bennett, Nicolas Mitchell, Raffaela Wakeman, and 
William Wu from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
majority; Ryan Breitenbach and Bobby Parmiter from the Judiciary 
Republican side; Stephen Castor and Tyler Grimm from Mr. Jordan's 
staff; and Laura Casulli, Meghan Green, and Allen Souza for the HPSCI 
Republicans.

                              {time}  1545

  The country should be proud of what we have all accomplished here, 
what they have accomplished here, and I thank each and every one of 
them.
  Madam Speaker, in closing, I will simply say that it is our 
responsibility to work across the aisle and across the branches of the 
government to bring our national security in line with our values.
  We have done so here, but that work is an ongoing project. It must 
not end today, because we have a long way to go yet.
  Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the USA FREEDOM 
Reauthorization Act, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) 
and the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) each will control 15 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM 
Reauthorization Act of 2020.
  This bill makes a number of critical and important reforms to 
strengthen civil liberties and privacy protections under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act while simultaneously protecting the 
national security of the United States. In addition, the bill provides 
for greater transparency and increased oversight and accountability to 
ensure the integrity of the FISA process.
  Over the past several weeks, Chairman Nadler and I, along with 
Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Hoyer, have worked with Members from 
across the caucus and the aisle to develop a set of reforms that our 
Democratic Caucus could be proud to support. This bill is a result of 
that effort. It builds on the achievements of the USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015, which passed with 338 votes in the House and the overwhelming 
support of the Democratic Caucus to put in place long-sought reforms to 
FISA.
  The three expiring provisions that this bill would reauthorize are 
vitally important to protecting national security. One of those 
measures, the roving wiretap provision, authorizes continued court-
approved surveillance of targets, even if they change their phones or 
other devices. Its expiration, or that of the other two provisions, 
would be to no one's benefit. Our counterterrorism and national 
security activities would be severely hamstrung, and we would have lost 
the opportunity to press for reforms that we are seeking.
  At the outside of this process, administration officials, like the 
Attorney General, along with Senate Republican leadership, made it 
clear that they preferred a clean and permanent reauthorization of 
these authorities. On a bipartisan basis, this bill rejects that 
demand, producing a bill that holds firm to our commitment to civil 
liberties, oversight, and transparency, and, importantly, has an 
important sunset.
  Let me describe just a few of the reforms included in this 
legislation:
  The bill would end, once and for all, NSA's authority to collect call 
detail records on an ongoing basis, and destroy all records previously 
obtained under these authorities.
  This bill would require that the government get a warrant under FISA, 
if one would be needed in the law enforcement context.
  This bill would prohibit the government from retaining business 
records for more than 5 years, with exceptions, such as an imminent 
threat to human life.
  This bill would expand the appointment of amici in FISA court 
proceedings, permit amici to seek access to more information, and 
creating a framework for amicus to seek higher court review of 
questions of law to the FISA courts.
  The bill would also strengthen the requirement for the 
declassification and release of FISA court opinions and apply the 
requirements retroactively to prior to the enactment of the 2015 USA 
FREEDOM Act.
  Madam Speaker, I recognize there are additional reforms that Members 
would like to see in the bill. I sought additional reforms as well. As 
with any negotiation, no one side is getting everything they want, but 
I believe it is important to enhance transparency and privacy 
safeguards whenever possible.
  But this is a strong result that makes substantial reforms that so 
many members of our caucus, myself included, have worked hard to secure 
for many years. And I will continue to work to secure further 
protections for privacy and civil liberties and to provide vigorous 
oversight of FISA.
  Madam Speaker, I support the bill, which makes important reforms to 
the FISA process and urge Members to vote ``yes,'' and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, is 
a critical tool for thwarting terrorist plots and collecting vital 
intelligence on actors who are hostile to U.S. interests.
  During the FBI's 2016 Russia collusion investigation, however, FBI 
officials grossly abused FISA to spy on an associate of a Presidential 
campaign they opposed.
  The purpose of the bill before us today is to reauthorize expiring 
FISA authorities while ensuring that other

[[Page H1633]]

FISA tools can never again be turned against the American people for 
political purposes.
  In 2017, in the course of our own investigation on Russia, House 
Intelligence Committee Republicans received strong indications that 
FISA had been severely abused in order to spy on Carter Page, a former 
associate of the Trump campaign.
  As we investigated the matter, we were stonewalled at nearly every 
juncture by top officials of the FBI and the Department of Justice. 
Their denials of any wrongdoing were uniformly repeated by the media 
and by political figures, who were spreading the false accusation that 
Trump campaign officials colluded with the Russian Government to 
interfere in the 2016 Presidential election.

  Madam Speaker, I want to thank my Republican colleagues and staff on 
the committee who persisted amid the most determined obstruction of any 
investigation this House has seen in a long time.
  I also want to thank our Republican colleagues on the House Oversight 
and Judiciary Committees who worked hard to uncover the full extent of 
this malfeasance.
  The full scope of the abuse was eventually detailed by Inspector 
General Michael Horowitz, whose December 2019 report revealed 17 major 
mistakes and omissions, along with many lesser abuses.
  Among many other abuses the Inspector General found, is that the FBI 
had used unverified allegations from the Steele dossier to get a FISA 
warrant on Carter Page; had misrepresented the reliability of those 
allegations to the court; had omitted exculpatory information from 
their submission; and had doctored an email to hide Page's prior 
cooperation with a U.S. intelligence agency.
  H.R. 6172 is the first step in imposing reforms to address these 
gross abuses and restore accountability in the FISA process. These 
reforms include but are not limited to:
  Requiring the Attorney General's approval in order to obtain a FISA 
warrant for any candidate for Federal office;
  Imposing stronger penalties for those who conceal information from 
the FISA court or leak FISA-derived information; and
  Providing clear authorization for Congress to access FISA materials 
so that elected officials can better oversee FISA cases without 
obstruction.
  This legislation makes strong reforms that will protect the American 
people from government overreach while continuing to protect the 
homeland from terrorist threats.
  Close Congressional oversight of the FISA process, which will be 
enhanced significantly by this bill, must continue in order to prevent 
future abuses. What happened to the Trump campaign in 2016 can never be 
allowed to happen again, not to a political campaign and not to an 
American citizen.
  I believe I speak for all Republicans when I say that our work is not 
finished. We will continue to look for further ways to improve both 
privacy protections as well as FISA's effectiveness in defusing 
national security threats to our country.
  Madam Speaker, I urge support of H.R. 6172, and I reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Connecticut (Mr. Himes).
  Mr. HIMES. Madam Speaker, I thank and compliment the chairman and the 
ranking member--and the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on 
the Judiciary--for doing such good and bipartisan work at this rather 
tense and polarized time around reauthorizing a number of authorities 
that have been, not just important, but essential to keeping the 
American public safe.
  And they did that, of course, mindful of the need to balance those 
authorities and those activities with the very legitimate civil 
liberties interests that we all have, and with our obligation to the 
Constitution, which we all swear an oath to support and defend.
  Madam Speaker, as the chairman said, this bill will reauthorize, even 
as it imposes additional oversight, a couple of very important 
authorities, while ending the authority that I think in the last 
several years was most problematic to me, to many people in this 
Chamber, and to the American people, which was the bulk collection of 
telephone metadata.
  That was a debate that led to the original USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, 
to those reforms, and gets us to where we are today where Americans can 
know that the NSA, a foreign intelligence agency, will not be 
collecting their records, their metadata. And I believe that that is a 
very substantial achievement in today's bill.
  I would like to take a moment, though, to wrestle with a charge that 
was leveled by my friends and colleagues on the progressive side, and 
their recommendation with respect to this bill. Their statement called 
these authorities ``sweeping unconstitutional surveillance.'' And, with 
respect, I would say that none of that is true.
  Sweeping. Let's talk about sweeping for a second. I guess we could 
argue about exactly what that means, but of the authorities that are 
being discussed, we are ending the metadata program. The lone-wolf 
authority, which allows us to surveil a potential terrorist who is not 
affiliated with a designated terrorist group, has never been used. That 
leaves, of course, the roving wiretap authority, which is used in a 
pointed and careful way and has been used to save lives and prosecute 
terrorists. That is not, I would suggest with respect, sweeping.
  So constitutional, the charge that this is unconstitutional is 
something that we should examine and take seriously. In this time of 
overheated rhetoric, I think it is important that we be very clear and 
very specific in the words that we use. So let me just say about the 
charge that there is anything unconstitutional in these authorities:
  No provision has ever been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court, by the FISA court itself, or by any other court.
  And it is not just the courts, these authorities have been subject to 
review by the President's Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and they 
have not deemed any of these authorities unconstitutional.
  They have been subject to Congressional scrutiny and, of course, most 
famously and most recently, subject to review by the Inspector General, 
who--yes--discovered very significant deficiencies in the way a FISA 
application dealing with an American citizen was dealt with.
  My friends who are concerned about the possibility of the 
unconstitutional activity should remember, not a single authority has 
ever been deemed to be unconstitutional. And over and over again, the 
FISA court, and most recently Inspector General Horowitz, has pushed 
back hard on misbehavior, on negligence in this area.
  So what we are left with here is balance. And as the chairman and as 
the ranking member have said, the reforms that are made in this bill 
with respect to empowering an amicus, with respect to giving the 
President's Civil Liberties Oversight Board additional authorities 
strike that balance.
  Madam Speaker, I close by urging my colleagues to accept that we have 
made a lot of progress, that this was all about preserving civil 
liberties, and to vote in favor of H.R. 6172, the USA FREEDOM 
Reauthorization Act of 2020.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. McCarthy), the Republican leader.
  Mr. McCARTHY. Madam Speaker, before I begin, I want to thank the 
gentleman, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee. He warned 
the American public when he was chair. He warned them and told them 
that FISA was not used correctly, that the power of the government 
overstretched their arms.
  But even when the other elements of government said no, they did not, 
even when others got on to that exact same position and told us 
everything was fine with FISA, it was not until the inspector general 
got his report that the truth was known.
  I thank Congressman Devin Nunes for being the truth, telling it to 
the American public, and staying with it when others wanted to lie.
  That is why we are here today. That is why this will not continue or 
ever happen again.
  Madam Speaker, at the heart of our Constitution is a simple idea, the 
idea

[[Page H1634]]

of checks and balances. These principles protect Americans' freedoms by 
creating safeguards against the potential of government overreach of 
power.
  Unfortunately, in 2016, those checks and balances were not in place 
to stop individuals at the highest level of the FBI and Justice 
Department from spying on Carter Page, an American citizen who could 
have been one of us.
  They used the secretive FISA courts, which are meant to keep 
Americans safe from foreign enemies, to attempt to undermine their 
domestic political opponent at that time, then-candidate Donald Trump.
  After years of thorough and independent investigation, we now know 
the truth: what happened in 2016 was politically motivated; it was 
completely unjustified; and it must never happen again.
  This bipartisan legislation addresses the need for greater accuracy 
and accountability in the FISA process. It does not damage the 
legitimate authorities our intelligence community relies on to keep us 
safe, but it does strengthen protections for civil liberties.
  Among its many reforms, this legislation increases the punishment for 
unauthorized disclosure of FISA applications, authorizes an amicus to 
be appointed to cases involving political activity, and enhances 
oversight by Congress and creates a new Office of Compliance.
  These reforms are an astonishing accomplishment in a period of 
divided government. That just tells you how important FISA reforms and 
checks and balances truly are.
  Outside this Chamber, there are quotes from famous Americans who 
dedicated their lives to preserving American freedom.
  One of those individuals, Patrick Henry, was so passionate about his 
defense of freedom that he famously said: ``Give me liberty or give me 
death.'' We can learn a lot from Henry's total devotion to the American 
cause.
  We can learn a lot from those who are willing to stand up to 
oppressive Big Government, who would use an arm illegally against the 
check and balance just to try to have an outcome in a political race.
  We could thank those like Devin, who stood for the American public 
and the truth, or those in other committees who helped work on this, 
the   Jim Jordans, the Doug Collinses, that we would not be here today 
and getting a new compliance office, a check and balance to make sure 
what happened in 2016 cannot happen again.
  I do urge all my colleagues to vote ``yes.'' I do urge that this is a 
turning point, that even though in these committees they could have 
told us, and they did, that there was nothing wrong, that we had to 
continue to fight to get an inspector general to have the truth.
  Now, we have a check and balance that we will not have to wait for 
that. Even if somebody tries to use it in the wrong manner, it cannot 
happen again.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I am especially thankful to Chairman 
Schiff for yielding me this time since I have reached a different 
conclusion on the bill than he has.
  I would like to quote from the American Civil Liberties Union letter 
received today. The American Civil Liberties Union strongly urges us to 
vote ``no'' on this bill.
  They say: ``Over the last several years, it has been abundantly clear 
that many of our surveillance laws are broken.'' But that, 
``disappointingly, the reforms contained in H.R. 6172 are minimal--in 
many cases merely representing a codification of the status quo. In 
addition,'' the ACLU says, ``the bill contains provisions that would be 
a step back from even our flawed current law.''
  The ACLU goes on to say that ``the bill fails to require that 
individuals receive appropriate notice and access to information when 
FISA information is used against them,'' that ``the bill fails to fully 
address deficiencies with the FISA court that have led to illegal 
surveillance,'' that ``the bill fails to appropriately limit the types 
of information that can be collected under section 215,'' that ``the 
bill fails to appropriately raise the standard for collecting 
information under section 215,'' and that ``the bill fails to 
appropriately limit the retention of information collected under 
section 215.''
  I agree with the chairman that the roving wiretap provision in the 
act is important and should be renewed. But I cannot support the bill 
that is before us today, and I say that with tremendous respect for 
Chairman Schiff. We have had very candid and useful discussions. I 
appreciate the effort that he has put into this.
  I have put in a lot of effort, too. But in the end, we have a bill 
that I think should not be supported. I intend to vote ``no,'' with 
tremendous respect for the chairman and the effort that he has put into 
this.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Gohmert).
  Mr. GOHMERT. Madam Speaker, I appreciate my friend yielding to me, 
and I appreciate my colleague, Ms. Lofgren's comments.

  Any law that is based on a lie has a good chance of being a problem. 
The lie starts with the initial FISA, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act. Yet, it is not foreign.
  Now, since I have been here, whether it is the PATRIOT Act or 
reauthorizing the FISA court, we are told: Look, American citizens have 
nothing to worry about because the only American citizen that gets 
caught up through the FISA court is somebody that is dealing with a 
known foreign terrorist or a known foreign organization engaged in 
terrorism. You know, just avoid dealing with terrorists, and you are 
going to be okay.
  The problem is, I keep hearing, this is a good first step. No, this 
isn't the first step. This is the last step, and as my friend Ms. 
Lofgren said, it doesn't go far enough.
  As my friend   Michael Cloud said, under the current bill, they 
ignored the penalty for lying to the judge, which was a 5-year 
sentence. Now, under the new law, they can ignore an 8-year sentence. 
That doesn't really help preserve anybody's rights.
  This was not done in the committee. It did not have proper debate. 
The secret court had the bill pulled away from the full committee, so 
we couldn't debate it. We couldn't discuss it, and it was pulled into a 
secret negotiation that many of us were not part of.
  Look, having the Attorney General sign it doesn't work either, and it 
shouldn't be a special category for Federal elected officials. In fact, 
what it should be is all Americans.
  Acting Attorney General Rosenstein, he signed off on one of the 
applications himself. Obviously, that is not a deterrent.
  We need to fix the FISA court. This doesn't do it, and I will vote 
``no'' until we have adequate reforms that do.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I have no further speakers. I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Utah (Mr. Stewart).
  Mr. STEWART. Madam Speaker, let me state a fact. FISA has been abused 
by those who are trusted with authority, and we can't let it happen 
again.
  This is what we know are also facts: An opposing campaign paid a 
foreign citizen to dig up dirt on President Trump and his campaign 
associates. These allegations--produced, by the way, by a foreign 
citizen--came to be known as the Steele dossier. The campaign then fed 
these bogus allegations through the administration, to include 
leadership at the FBI, the CIA, the Department of Justice, and even the 
State Department. Then, the FBI shamefully used these bogus allegations 
as the basis for a secret wiretap, of course, on the famous Mr. Carter 
Page.
  The FBI deliberately hid the fact that these allegations were both 
known to be bogus and the fact that the campaign had paid for them. The 
application on Mr. Page cited a news article corroborating these 
allegations, but the FBI hid from the court the fact that they knew the 
source of these articles was the author of the dossier.
  We discovered that the FBI and DOJ investigators in this case 
demonstrated enormous bias against the Trump campaign with such words 
as: we will stop him; he won't become President; viva la resistance.
  Finally, the inspector general revealed that an FBI attorney altered 
a

[[Page H1635]]

document to deceive the court regarding Mr. Page's relationship with 
another agency.
  These are shocking abuses of power, and the reforms in this bill will 
stop them from ever happening again.
  I am proud to have been the author of the bill that is the basis for 
some of these reforms.
  It requires an amicus review for applications against U.S. citizens 
when their First Amendment rights are in question.
  It requires the court to maintain a transcript. I have read this FISA 
application. It begs for questions to be asked. We don't know if the 
judges were curious or asked obvious questions because we don't have a 
transcript.
  It requires the government to keep a log.
  It enhances penalties for up to 8 years for those who improperly 
surveil or deceive the court. It allows agencies to take immediate 
action, including termination, of those who do.
  Madam Speaker, it is incumbent on us, as an institution, to ensure 
these abuses simply don't happen again. The USA FREEDOM Reauthorization 
Act will accomplish this.
  Let me end by saying this: To those who oppose this bill, if you vote 
against this bill, you keep the status quo. FISA remains in place. The 
ability to abuse FISA doesn't change.
  Vote ``yes'' on this bill or accept future abuse. That is the choice 
we have before us. I hope that we don't do that.

  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arkansas (Mr. Crawford).
  Mr. CRAWFORD. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of the USA 
FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.
  I would also like to associate myself with the comments of my friend 
and colleague from Utah (Mr. Stewart).
  I also acknowledge and applaud the efforts of the distinguished 
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes), whose tenacity brought this to 
bear. I appreciate his leadership on this issue.
  This is a bipartisan piece of legislation that makes urgent and 
necessary reforms to the FISA process, which, as Inspector General 
Horowitz found 3 months ago, was misused to conduct illegal 
surveillance on Carter Page, a U.S. person.
  This bill enhances requirements on the FBI and DOJ to ensure all 
applications are accurate and complete. This bill creates a compliance 
officer at the FBI who is directly responsible for making sure FBI 
agents are following the law.
  This bill heightens criminal penalties to deter bad actors and other 
layers of review to root them out.
  Finally, the bill reauthorizes three counterterrorism tools that are 
significantly important to our national security.
  Madam Speaker, I rise to support this bill, and I urge a ``yes'' vote 
from my colleagues.
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Just a couple of comments for some of my colleagues who I know are 
concerned that this doesn't go far enough.
  One of the concerns they have is that there is an ongoing 
investigation led by the U.S. attorney out of Connecticut, and there is 
a lot of consternation on our side of the aisle that nothing has been 
done yet.
  I want to assure my colleagues that even if that gets to a point 
where people are held accountable for what we believe to be criminal 
activity, these reforms in this new piece of legislation where we 
opened up title I, we believe that we have all the reforms that are 
necessary to prevent this malfeasance from happening again in the 
future.

                              {time}  1615

  If this doesn't work and if this does happen again, I think then you 
will have what some people want, which is a complete elimination of the 
court and this entire system.
  I hope that we don't get to that point in this country, because these 
tools have worked well as long as the people who are conducting and 
using these surveillance capabilities don't decide to turn them on 
political opponents.
  So I want to, you know, assure my colleagues on this side of the 
aisle that we feel like these reforms are as far as we need to go at 
this time, no matter what the ultimate conclusion is of the U.S. 
attorney out of Connecticut on whether or not to bring charges against 
those who perpetrated these crimes and criminal activity.
  Madam Speaker, I am prepared to close at this time.
  In closing, the weaponization of FISA, as exhibited in 2016, should 
never have happened, and this bill aims to prevent future gross abuses 
from occurring again.
  I would like to thank my staff, particularly Allen Souza, Laura 
Casulli, Meghan Green, Andrew House, and Betsy Hulme, for all their 
efforts to reach this bipartisan compromise. They worked many, many 
hours with Members of both parties and colleagues of both parties, 
staff of both parties, from the Judiciary Committee and the Republican 
and Democratic leadership, to reach this bipartisan compromise.
  I am also fairly confident, with the remarks that have been made on 
the Senate side, that this will be a rare opportunity where we actually 
pass a bill, and it appears like the Senate is prepared to accept a 
complete House-produced product, which I think means a lot to everyone 
involved in this process, that that rarely happens, especially in this 
day and age.
  Madam Speaker, I urge adoption of H.R. 6172, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I want to, for my Democratic colleagues, provide a reality check on 
some of what they have heard during this debate.
  It is important to remember that the inspector general report--which, 
by the way, doesn't go to the expiring provisions that we are here to 
authorize today. But the inspector general report found no evidence of 
spying on the Trump campaign.
  The inspector general found no evidence of political bias influencing 
decisionmaking in the investigation of the Trump campaign and its 
connections to Russia during the 2016 election.
  The inspector general found that the investigation, in fact, was 
properly predicated, that investigation into many of the more than 100 
unexplained and often falsely denied contacts between the Trump 
campaign and the Russians during the 2016 campaign, including a 
notorious secret meeting in Trump Tower between the President's son, 
son-in-law, and campaign chairman with a Russian delegation that was 
set up by a series of emails in which a Russian delegation offered dirt 
on Hillary Clinton to the Trump campaign, and the President's son, on 
behalf of that campaign, said that he would love it and set up that 
secret meeting. Now, my colleagues don't think that is collusion; the 
American people do.
  Bob Mueller, for his part, much as his report has been 
misrepresented, makes it clear in the very first pages of the report 
that he does not address the issues of collusion, only whether he can 
prove criminal conspiracy.
  So it is important, with that reality check, to once again return to 
the bill before us. With respect to the bill before us, we do make 
important changes to strengthen the privacy protections, the civil 
liberties protections. We also retain the important tools necessary to 
help protect the country, the business records provision, the lone-wolf 
provision, as well as the roving wiretaps.
  The roving wiretap provision, for example, allows the government, 
when someone, for example, in the midst of planning a crime of 
terrorism uses phones disposably and goes from one phone to another, it 
is not necessary to go and get a new warrant every time they change 
phones. The warrant can follow the individual rather than the phone.
  The business records provision has also been very important in terms 
of our efforts at foreign intelligence gathering as well as 
counterterrorism. Those authorities would be retained, but new 
protections would be put in place such that business records couldn't 
be retained more than 5 years unless certain exceptions applied, 
protections where, if business records gathered in the FISA context are 
used in a criminal proceeding, there is notice given to people that 
they are being used in a criminal proceeding.
  There is expansion of the amicus authorities so that we have the 
amicus

[[Page H1636]]

involved in a broader scope of cases so the court has the advantage of 
independent judgment.
  Some of those reforms come out of the inspector general's 
recommendations and looking into the FISA application involving Carter 
Page. Many of those recommendations have nothing to do with Carter Page 
and are longstanding interests of the privacy community in trying to 
strengthen some of the privacy protections.
  I also want to take this opportunity to thank Representative Lofgren 
and Representative Jayapal. We worked extensively, have spent hours 
ourselves, our staff, consulting and trying to make this a better and 
stronger bill. While I regret that we couldn't get it to the point 
where those two esteemed Members felt they could support the bill, 
nonetheless, their input made this bill better, and I am grateful for 
their hard work and advocacy on behalf of a stronger privacy and civil 
liberties protection.
  This vote today is the culmination of many months of negotiations. 
Therefore, with our diverse Caucus, with our friends in the other party 
who, as you have heard today, we have strong disagreements over the 
Russia investigation, the Trump campaign's conduct, as well as the FISA 
process, but, nonetheless, in the interest of our Nation's security, we 
were able to get to common ground on this measure, giving the 
government the critical tools it needs to protect the country while 
advancing civil liberties and privacy rights.
  This bill creates a much-needed change to the way government uses 
FISA, ensures the government is more transparent and accountable, and I 
urge my colleagues to support the bill.
  Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. COLLINS of Georgia. Madam Speaker, in 2016, our nation's premier 
law enforcement agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, weaponized 
its authority to illegally surveil a U.S. citizen for political 
purposes.
  What happened to Carter Page, then-candidate Trump, and the Trump 
campaign was wrong, and it is our responsibility to ensure it never 
happens again. The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act achieves that, but 
our work is far from done.
  While this bill doesn't include every reform sought by Republicans, 
it does accomplish our central goal: To institute necessary safeguards 
to protect the civil liberties of every American and reauthorize 
critical counterterrorism provisions.
  This bipartisan legislation also protects U.S. citizens from being 
spied on for political purposes by requiring that the Attorney General 
approve any investigation of an elected official or federal candidate. 
This provision directly addresses the abuses against Carter Page and 
the Trump campaign.
  Some have claimed that provision prioritizes politicians over 
Americans. It does not. That provision addresses the real abuse 
documented by House Republicans and the DOJ Inspector General--abuse 
that strikes at the core of our democratic republic.
  In addition to multiple other reforms, this legislation makes it a 
crime to willfully make a false statement to the court, and increases 
penalties for those who abuse the system. These provisions are aimed 
like a laser at the abuses that occurred in 2016 and 2017.
  Madam Speaker, Congress must continue to conduct vigorous oversight 
and work with our law enforcement and intelligence communities to 
restore the American people's trust in these critical institutions.
  Our government's primary duty is to protect its citizens and their 
constitutional rights, and every American should have confidence we're 
fulfilling that role.
  I urge my colleagues to support this vitally important legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 891, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 278, 
nays 136, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 98]

                               YEAS--278

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allen
     Allred
     Amodei
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Axne
     Babin
     Bacon
     Baird
     Balderson
     Banks
     Barr
     Bera
     Bergman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (UT)
     Blunt Rochester
     Bost
     Brady
     Brindisi
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (MD)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carbajal
     Cardenas
     Carson (IN)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten (IL)
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Cicilline
     Cisneros
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Cole
     Comer
     Conaway
     Cook
     Cooper
     Costa
     Courtney
     Cox (CA)
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crist
     Crow
     Cuellar
     Cunningham
     Curtis
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Rodney
     Dean
     DeLauro
     Delgado
     Demings
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dunn
     Engel
     Escobar
     Estes
     Evans
     Ferguson
     Finkenauer
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fletcher
     Foster
     Foxx (NC)
     Frankel
     Gallagher
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia (TX)
     Gibbs
     Gonzalez (OH)
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (MO)
     Green (TN)
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Harder (CA)
     Hartzler
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Heck
     Hern, Kevin
     Higgins (NY)
     Hill (AR)
     Himes
     Holding
     Horn, Kendra S.
     Horsford
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Hurd (TX)
     Jackson Lee
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson (TX)
     Jordan
     Joyce (OH)
     Joyce (PA)
     Kaptur
     Katko
     Keating
     Keller
     Kelly (MS)
     Kilmer
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger
     Kirkpatrick
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster (NH)
     Kustoff (TN)
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lamb
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latta
     Lawrence
     Lawson (FL)
     Lee (NV)
     Lesko
     Levin (CA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Luria
     Lynch
     Malinowski
     Maloney, Sean
     Marshall
     Matsui
     McAdams
     McBath
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McEachin
     McHenry
     McKinley
     Meeks
     Meuser
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Morelle
     Moulton
     Mucarsel-Powell
     Murphy (FL)
     Murphy (NC)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Newhouse
     Norcross
     Nunes
     O'Halleran
     Olson
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Phillips
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Reed
     Reschenthaler
     Rice (NY)
     Rice (SC)
     Richmond
     Riggleman
     Roby
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose (NY)
     Rouda
     Rouzer
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Scanlon
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Schrier
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Sewell (AL)
     Shalala
     Sherman
     Sherrill
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Sires
     Slotkin
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smucker
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Spano
     Stanton
     Stauber
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Steube
     Stevens
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Suozzi
     Swalwell (CA)
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Timmons
     Torres Small (NM)
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Upton
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Visclosky
     Wagner
     Walorski
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Watkins
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Wexton
     Wild
     Wilson (FL)
     Womack
     Woodall
     Young

                               NAYS--136

     Abraham
     Amash
     Barragan
     Bass
     Beatty
     Biggs
     Bishop (NC)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brooks (AL)
     Buck
     Budd
     Burchett
     Carter (GA)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Cline
     Cloud
     Connolly
     Correa
     Davidson (OH)
     Davis, Danny K.
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DelBene
     DeSaulnier
     DesJarlais
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duncan
     Emmer
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Flores
     Fudge
     Fulcher
     Gabbard
     Garcia (IL)
     Gianforte
     Gohmert
     Golden
     Gomez
     Gooden
     Graves (LA)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Griffith
     Grijalva
     Haaland
     Hagedorn
     Harris
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice (GA)
     Higgins (LA)
     Hollingsworth
     Huffman
     Huizenga
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kennedy
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kim
     King (IA)
     Lamborn
     Lee (CA)
     Levin (MI)
     Lieu, Ted
     Lofgren
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Lowenthal
     Lujan
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Marchant
     Massie
     Mast
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meng
     Mooney (WV)
     Moore
     Neguse
     Norman
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Omar
     Pallone
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Posey
     Pressley
     Raskin
     Rodgers (WA)
     Roe, David P.
     Rose, John W.
     Roy
     Rush
     Schakowsky
     Schweikert
     Serrano
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (WA)
     Takano
     Tipton
     Titus
     Tlaib
     Tonko
     Torres (CA)
     Trahan
     Van Drew
     Velazquez
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Waters
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Welch
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wright
     Yarmuth
     Yoho
     Zeldin

[[Page H1637]]


  


                             NOT VOTING--15

     Beyer
     Brownley (CA)
     Collins (GA)
     Fortenberry
     Gaetz
     Gosar
     Graves (GA)
     Lewis
     Meadows
     Miller
     Mullin
     Palazzo
     Ratcliffe
     Rooney (FL)
     Speier

                              {time}  1703

  Messrs. WEBER of Texas, BLUMENAUER, LONG, Mses. VELAZQUEZ, ESHOO, 
BARRAGAN, SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. DeSAULNIER, Ms. KELLY of Illinois, Mr. 
CLEAVER, Ms. WATERS, Messrs. GREEN of Texas, RUSH, and Ms. PRESSLEY 
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Messrs. KELLER, TIMMONS, and NORCROSS changed their vote from ``nay'' 
to ``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.


               Amendment Offered by Mr. Buck of Colorado

  Mr. BUCK. Madam Speaker, I have an amendment at the desk to correct 
the name of the bill to the ``Federal Initiative to Spy on Americans 
(FISA) Act.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

         Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to be known as 
     the Federal Initiative to Spy on Americans (FISA) Act''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under clause 6 of rule XVI, the amendment is 
not debatable.
  The question is on the amendment.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. BUCK of Colorado. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 35, 
noes 376, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 99]

                                AYES--35

     Abraham
     Amash
     Babin
     Biggs
     Bishop (NC)
     Bishop (UT)
     Brooks (AL)
     Buck
     Budd
     Burchett
     Davidson (OH)
     DesJarlais
     Duncan
     Estes
     Gohmert
     Griffith
     Harris
     Hice (GA)
     Kelly (PA)
     Massie
     McClintock
     Mooney (WV)
     Perry
     Posey
     Roe, David P.
     Rose, John W.
     Roy
     Rush
     Schweikert
     Van Drew
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wright
     Yoho
     Young

                               NOES--376

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allen
     Allred
     Amodei
     Armstrong
     Arrington
     Axne
     Bacon
     Baird
     Balderson
     Banks
     Barr
     Barragan
     Bass
     Beatty
     Bera
     Bergman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt Rochester
     Bonamici
     Bost
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady
     Brindisi
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (MD)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carbajal
     Cardenas
     Carson (IN)
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Case
     Casten (IL)
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Cisneros
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Cline
     Cloud
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Cole
     Comer
     Conaway
     Connolly
     Cook
     Cooper
     Correa
     Costa
     Courtney
     Cox (CA)
     Craig
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crist
     Crow
     Cuellar
     Cunningham
     Curtis
     Davids (KS)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny K.
     Davis, Rodney
     Dean
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Delgado
     Demings
     DeSaulnier
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Dunn
     Emmer
     Engel
     Escobar
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Evans
     Ferguson
     Finkenauer
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fletcher
     Flores
     Foster
     Foxx (NC)
     Frankel
     Fudge
     Fulcher
     Gabbard
     Gallagher
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia (IL)
     Garcia (TX)
     Gianforte
     Gibbs
     Golden
     Gomez
     Gonzalez (OH)
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Gooden
     Gottheimer
     Granger
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green (TN)
     Green, Al (TX)
     Grijalva
     Grothman
     Guest
     Guthrie
     Haaland
     Hagedorn
     Harder (CA)
     Hartzler
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Heck
     Hern, Kevin
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins (LA)
     Higgins (NY)
     Hill (AR)
     Himes
     Holding
     Hollingsworth
     Horn, Kendra S.
     Horsford
     Houlahan
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huffman
     Huizenga
     Hurd (TX)
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson (TX)
     Jordan
     Joyce (OH)
     Joyce (PA)
     Kaptur
     Katko
     Keating
     Keller
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kennedy
     Khanna
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kim
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger
     Kirkpatrick
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster (NH)
     Kustoff (TN)
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lamb
     Lamborn
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latta
     Lawrence
     Lawson (FL)
     Lee (CA)
     Lee (NV)
     Lesko
     Levin (CA)
     Levin (MI)
     Lieu, Ted
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Luria
     Lynch
     Malinowski
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Maloney, Sean
     Marchant
     Marshall
     Mast
     Matsui
     McAdams
     McBath
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McCollum
     McEachin
     McGovern
     McHenry
     McKinley
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Meuser
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Moore
     Morelle
     Moulton
     Mucarsel-Powell
     Murphy (FL)
     Murphy (NC)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neguse
     Newhouse
     Norcross
     Norman
     Nunes
     O'Halleran
     Ocasio-Cortez
     Olson
     Omar
     Pallone
     Panetta
     Pappas
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Phillips
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Porter
     Pressley
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Reed
     Reschenthaler
     Rice (NY)
     Rice (SC)
     Richmond
     Riggleman
     Roby
     Rodgers (WA)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rose (NY)
     Rouda
     Rouzer
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rutherford
     Ryan
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Scanlon
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Schrier
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Shalala
     Sherman
     Sherrill
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Sires
     Slotkin
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Smucker
     Soto
     Spanberger
     Spano
     Stanton
     Stauber
     Stefanik
     Steil
     Steube
     Stevens
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Suozzi
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Timmons
     Tipton
     Titus
     Tlaib
     Tonko
     Torres (CA)
     Torres Small (NM)
     Trahan
     Trone
     Turner
     Underwood
     Upton
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Waltz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Wexton
     Wild
     Williams
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yarmuth
     Zeldin

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Beyer
     Brownley (CA)
     Collins (GA)
     Fortenberry
     Gaetz
     Gosar
     Graves (GA)
     Lewis
     Lipinski
     Meadows
     Miller
     Mullin
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Ratcliffe
     Rogers (AL)
     Rooney (FL)
     Speier


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes 
remaining.

                              {time}  1713

  Mr. RUSH changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________