[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 30 (Thursday, February 13, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1068-S1069]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SOUTH SUDAN
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to express strong concern about
the situation in South Sudan and to call on the administration to step
up its diplomatic efforts to avert a return to conflict and help
achieve a lasting peace. For 6 years, the people of South Sudan have
suffered the effects of a brutal civil war. International efforts to
find a diplomatic solution have failed, and the humanitarian situation
in South Sudan remains one of the worst in the world.
In September 2018, President Salva Kiir and his main political
opponent,
[[Page S1069]]
former Vice President Riek Machar, agreed to form a unity government in
the capital, Juba, by March of 2019. Though this so called
``revitalized agreement'' is not perfect, it is what we have to work
with. The ceasefire between Kiir and Machar that was part of it has
largely held, sparing the South Sudanese from the violence and
brutality so many experienced at the height of the civil war. I am also
encouraged that the government and political opposition groups that had
refused to sign the 2018 revitalized peace deal reached an accord last
month.
However, two successive delays in the establishment of the unity
government have made me skeptical about the chances that the latest
deadline, February 22, will be met. While both parties have stated
their commitment to it, they have yet to effectively address two
fundamental sticking points: the boundaries of South Sudan's states,
and the formation of an inclusive national army. Absent an agreement on
these two issues, lasting peace may prove elusive.
At the end of the day, Kiir, Machar, and others who claim to
represent the South Sudanese people are responsible for peace in their
country. However, given our historical role in South Sudan, the United
States has a significant role to play. I would like to remind my
colleagues that the United States was heavily involved in brokering the
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which helped create the conditions
for South Sudan's independence. Since independence, the United States
has provided nearly $3.8 billion in emergency humanitarian assistance
since the outbreak of civil war. We have supported the UN peacekeeping
force in South Sudan, UNMISS, which is protecting 200,000 civilians
sheltering in or near its bases, investing more than $342 million last
fiscal year. These dollars are and have contributed to keeping
thousands of people alive. But the South Sudanese deserve more than
mere life support. They deserve to live in peace. We have influence
with all of the key actors in the region, yet the administration has
failed to use it. The administration must effectively use its influence
to help the millions of South Sudanese who aspired to liberty but found
misery instead.
Previous administrations made South Sudan a priority in their foreign
policy. The Bush administration helped negotiate the aforementioned
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Obama administration help shepherd
the country to independence and remained actively engaged as the
security and humanitarian situation devolved.
At his confirmation hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
Tibor Nagy promised that under his leadership, ``The South Sudanese
will realize just how involved the United States is.''
However, administration engagement has been weak and inconsistent,
and it is not guided by a clearly articulated strategy. In May 2018,
the White House announced it was conducting a review of our assistance
programs to South Sudan. In a statement, it expressed frustration that,
``the leaders of this country have squandered this partnership,
pilfered the wealth of South Sudan, killed their own people, and
repeatedly demonstrated their inability and unwillingness to live up to
their commitments to end the country's civil war''--a bold statement
but it has been more than a year and a half since the review was
announced, and it remains incomplete. Since that time, what has the
administration done? Well, 3 years into the administration, it has
finally designated a special envoy, something for which I have been
advocating for years, but the envoy will not answer directly to the
President or the Secretary of State, which I fear may limit his stature
and, therefore, his effectiveness.
Additionally, the administration has imposed targeted sanctions. Last
year, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Cabinet ministers, Elia
Lomuro and Kuol Manyang Juuk. Last month, they also sanctioned South
Sudan's First Vice President Taban Deng Gai. Deng is credibly accused
of influencing the government to execute to dissidents; he should be
sanctioned for human rights abuses. But, as I have said many times
before, sanctions are not a strategy. Sanctions are a tool to be used
selectively to apply pressure towards a specific political goal. In
this case, support for a comprehensive and durable peace agreement.
Last month, a year and a half since his confirmation, Ambassador Nagy
visited Juba. While I applaud Ambassador Nagy's trip--I believe that
the U.S. should be increasing its diplomatic engagement--one visit does
not a policy make. It is unclear what the trip was meant to accomplish
in the absence of a comprehensive strategy.
At this critical juncture, I am still hard pressed to understand the
administration's approach towards South Sudan, and I am worried that we
do not have a plan of action should this latest deadline not be met.
Time is of the essence; I urge the administration to take several
actions.
First, ensure that Special Envoy Symington has the appropriate staff
and resources to effectively undertake his responsibilities. The
administration has moved from no envoys for Sudan and South Sudan to
two envoys. While the challenges in the two countries are different,
the fates of the two countries remain intertwined. Coordination is
critical, as is support for both of their offices.
Second, we must have a sound strategy for supporting a viable peace
agreement. I call upon Special Envoy Symington to take immediate steps
to develop an interagency strategy, in consultation with our
Ambassadors in the region, aimed at uniting the region to apply
pressure to the parties to address outstanding obstacles to the
formation of a unity government. In the short term, the strategy should
focus on developing benchmarks and milestones towards formation of a
unity government, and steps--to include punitive measures--the United
States will take to encourage regional partners to apply consistent
pressure on the parties to the conflict to move towards peace. Longer
term, it should lead towards supporting conditions that support a
sustainable peace and credible elections. The strategy should also
include actions to support grassroots reconciliation and restorative
justice, as well as accountability for war crimes and human rights
abuses.
Finally, the administration must conclude its review of assistance to
South Sudan and be transparent to the South Sudanese, members of the
diplomatic community, and the American people about exactly what the
next steps will be relative to its findings and how those steps fit
into a broader strategy. Whatever these steps are, they should be aimed
towards cementing peace, and continuing strong support for development
and humanitarian assistance to the people of South Sudan.
If past is prologue, South Sudan's leaders may well once again fail
their people. The stakes for the formation of a unity government--one
that can implement a durable peace--are perilously high. If the current
negotiations collapse, millions will suffer. We must do all we can to
ensure that the South Sudanese are able to move forward with this
agreement, flawed though it may well be, and we must be prepared to
help it succeed.
____________________