[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 30 (Thursday, February 13, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1068-S1069]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              SOUTH SUDAN

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to express strong concern about 
the situation in South Sudan and to call on the administration to step 
up its diplomatic efforts to avert a return to conflict and help 
achieve a lasting peace. For 6 years, the people of South Sudan have 
suffered the effects of a brutal civil war. International efforts to 
find a diplomatic solution have failed, and the humanitarian situation 
in South Sudan remains one of the worst in the world.
  In September 2018, President Salva Kiir and his main political 
opponent,

[[Page S1069]]

former Vice President Riek Machar, agreed to form a unity government in 
the capital, Juba, by March of 2019. Though this so called 
``revitalized agreement'' is not perfect, it is what we have to work 
with. The ceasefire between Kiir and Machar that was part of it has 
largely held, sparing the South Sudanese from the violence and 
brutality so many experienced at the height of the civil war. I am also 
encouraged that the government and political opposition groups that had 
refused to sign the 2018 revitalized peace deal reached an accord last 
month.
  However, two successive delays in the establishment of the unity 
government have made me skeptical about the chances that the latest 
deadline, February 22, will be met. While both parties have stated 
their commitment to it, they have yet to effectively address two 
fundamental sticking points: the boundaries of South Sudan's states, 
and the formation of an inclusive national army. Absent an agreement on 
these two issues, lasting peace may prove elusive.
  At the end of the day, Kiir, Machar, and others who claim to 
represent the South Sudanese people are responsible for peace in their 
country. However, given our historical role in South Sudan, the United 
States has a significant role to play. I would like to remind my 
colleagues that the United States was heavily involved in brokering the 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which helped create the conditions 
for South Sudan's independence. Since independence, the United States 
has provided nearly $3.8 billion in emergency humanitarian assistance 
since the outbreak of civil war. We have supported the UN peacekeeping 
force in South Sudan, UNMISS, which is protecting 200,000 civilians 
sheltering in or near its bases, investing more than $342 million last 
fiscal year. These dollars are and have contributed to keeping 
thousands of people alive. But the South Sudanese deserve more than 
mere life support. They deserve to live in peace. We have influence 
with all of the key actors in the region, yet the administration has 
failed to use it. The administration must effectively use its influence 
to help the millions of South Sudanese who aspired to liberty but found 
misery instead.
  Previous administrations made South Sudan a priority in their foreign 
policy. The Bush administration helped negotiate the aforementioned 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Obama administration help shepherd 
the country to independence and remained actively engaged as the 
security and humanitarian situation devolved.
  At his confirmation hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa 
Tibor Nagy promised that under his leadership, ``The South Sudanese 
will realize just how involved the United States is.''
  However, administration engagement has been weak and inconsistent, 
and it is not guided by a clearly articulated strategy. In May 2018, 
the White House announced it was conducting a review of our assistance 
programs to South Sudan. In a statement, it expressed frustration that, 
``the leaders of this country have squandered this partnership, 
pilfered the wealth of South Sudan, killed their own people, and 
repeatedly demonstrated their inability and unwillingness to live up to 
their commitments to end the country's civil war''--a bold statement 
but it has been more than a year and a half since the review was 
announced, and it remains incomplete. Since that time, what has the 
administration done? Well, 3 years into the administration, it has 
finally designated a special envoy, something for which I have been 
advocating for years, but the envoy will not answer directly to the 
President or the Secretary of State, which I fear may limit his stature 
and, therefore, his effectiveness.
  Additionally, the administration has imposed targeted sanctions. Last 
year, the Treasury Department sanctioned two Cabinet ministers, Elia 
Lomuro and Kuol Manyang Juuk. Last month, they also sanctioned South 
Sudan's First Vice President Taban Deng Gai. Deng is credibly accused 
of influencing the government to execute to dissidents; he should be 
sanctioned for human rights abuses. But, as I have said many times 
before, sanctions are not a strategy. Sanctions are a tool to be used 
selectively to apply pressure towards a specific political goal. In 
this case, support for a comprehensive and durable peace agreement.
  Last month, a year and a half since his confirmation, Ambassador Nagy 
visited Juba. While I applaud Ambassador Nagy's trip--I believe that 
the U.S. should be increasing its diplomatic engagement--one visit does 
not a policy make. It is unclear what the trip was meant to accomplish 
in the absence of a comprehensive strategy.
  At this critical juncture, I am still hard pressed to understand the 
administration's approach towards South Sudan, and I am worried that we 
do not have a plan of action should this latest deadline not be met. 
Time is of the essence; I urge the administration to take several 
actions.
  First, ensure that Special Envoy Symington has the appropriate staff 
and resources to effectively undertake his responsibilities. The 
administration has moved from no envoys for Sudan and South Sudan to 
two envoys. While the challenges in the two countries are different, 
the fates of the two countries remain intertwined. Coordination is 
critical, as is support for both of their offices.
  Second, we must have a sound strategy for supporting a viable peace 
agreement. I call upon Special Envoy Symington to take immediate steps 
to develop an interagency strategy, in consultation with our 
Ambassadors in the region, aimed at uniting the region to apply 
pressure to the parties to address outstanding obstacles to the 
formation of a unity government. In the short term, the strategy should 
focus on developing benchmarks and milestones towards formation of a 
unity government, and steps--to include punitive measures--the United 
States will take to encourage regional partners to apply consistent 
pressure on the parties to the conflict to move towards peace. Longer 
term, it should lead towards supporting conditions that support a 
sustainable peace and credible elections. The strategy should also 
include actions to support grassroots reconciliation and restorative 
justice, as well as accountability for war crimes and human rights 
abuses.
  Finally, the administration must conclude its review of assistance to 
South Sudan and be transparent to the South Sudanese, members of the 
diplomatic community, and the American people about exactly what the 
next steps will be relative to its findings and how those steps fit 
into a broader strategy. Whatever these steps are, they should be aimed 
towards cementing peace, and continuing strong support for development 
and humanitarian assistance to the people of South Sudan.
  If past is prologue, South Sudan's leaders may well once again fail 
their people. The stakes for the formation of a unity government--one 
that can implement a durable peace--are perilously high. If the current 
negotiations collapse, millions will suffer. We must do all we can to 
ensure that the South Sudanese are able to move forward with this 
agreement, flawed though it may well be, and we must be prepared to 
help it succeed.

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