[Congressional Record Volume 166, Number 9 (Wednesday, January 15, 2020)]
[Senate]
[Pages S217-S219]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss U.S. policy
regarding Iran. We know that in 2009 the new Obama administration came
into office at a time when the Iranian regime was racing to develop a
nuclear weapon. The prospect of the Iranian regime with a nuclear
weapon would present a substantial threat to America and to our allies.
At the same time, Iran was engaged in a host of other malign
activities, but the most urgent and significant threat was nuclear.
In 2013, Iran was 2 to 3 months from being able to build a nuclear
weapon. The Obama administration decided to use hard-nosed diplomacy
resulting in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known by the
acronym JCPOA. This agreement was entered into with a number of
countries, three of them our allies--the United Kingdom, France and
Germany. We also had two partner countries--countries with which we
have a lot of tensions and conflict. We were partners with China and
Russia. So this agreement stretched from one end of the world to the
other.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action prevented Iran from acquiring
a nuclear weapon by, among other steps, authorizing some of the most
intrusive inspections that have ever been put into place. This
agreement, the JCPOA, did not cover several other nonnuclear malign
activities that the Iranian regime was and is engaged in. The JCPOA
isolated and largely solved the most dire threat, that of a nuclear-
armed Iran in the near future.
This agreement, from its signing in 2015 through 2018, worked. Until
recently, Iran was complying with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action. That is the considered judgment of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, known as IAEA. The considered judgment of the U.S.
intelligence community was that Iran was complying with the agreement.
It was also the judgment made by the U.S. Department of State and the
U.S. Department of Defense in both the Obama administration and the
Trump administration.
The determination that Iran was complying with the agreement is also
the assessment of our allies and partners with whom the Obama
administration worked to bring into a coalition.
Here is a sampling of assessments prior to recent events. In
September 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that Iran
is in ``technical compliance'' with the JCPOA.
Second, in October 2017, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis stated
that Iran was ``fundamentally'' in compliance with the JCPOA. ``Overall
our intelligence community believes that they have been compliant and
the IAEA also says so,'' said General Mattis, then Secretary of
Defense.
In March 2018, IAEA Director Amano stated: ``Iran is implementing its
nuclear-related commitments. . . . If the JCPOA were to fail, it would
be a great loss for nuclear verification and for multilateralism.''
Finally, No. 4, in January 2019, former Director of National
Intelligence Dan Coats, a former Republican Senator from the State of
Indiana, said: ``We continue to assess that Iran is not currently
undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities we judge
necessary to produce a nuclear device.''
Three of the four officials--Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary
of Defense Mattis, and Director of National Intelligence Coats--all
three were appointed by President Trump.
President Trump came into office determined to pull out of this
agreement, despite the fact that it was working. He surrounded himself
with advisers who supported a policy of regime change. Of course, the
words ``regime change'' are words that they will not say out loud--the
President or his administration--but that is the policy. The American
people, after nearly two decades of conflict, know that regime-change
policy is a march to war.
This administration calls their regime change policy a ``maximum
pressure campaign.'' Its stated goal was to force Iran to negotiate a
new agreement that would include a host of other nonnuclear issues.
Despite the stated goal, an examination of the methods used to achieve
it make it obvious that the administration was engaged in a policy that
would most likely lead to war instead of a new agreement. The
administration pulled out of the nuclear agreement, which was working,
and while it was in effect, it took the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran
off the table.
The administration reimposed sanctions which were lifted as part of
the nuclear agreement. They engaged in a host of other activities that
resulted in increased risks and moved us further away from a diplomatic
resolution.
The administration's regime change policy was supposed to deter the
Iranian regime from threatening our Nation and its allies. This policy
has not done that. This policy was supposed to bring Iran to the
bargaining table. It has not. It was supposed to cajole Iran to behave
like a ``normal nation.'' Once again, it has not.
Tensions have increased. Threats to our servicemembers, our citizens,
and allies have increased, not decreased. The region--the Middle East--
is less
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stable. Iran is closer--closer--to obtaining a nuclear weapon.
The terrible results of this policy were predictable. The
administration, including Secretary Pompeo and former National Security
Advisor John Bolton, never had any intention of forging a new
diplomatic agreement with Iran. All of this is how our Nation has found
itself on the brink of war with Iran, facing the potential of another
bloody conflict in the Middle East.
Americans across our country are well aware of the events leading up
to the killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran's
Quds Force on January 2. Following the killing of an American
contractor at a U.S. military compound in Kirkuk, Iraq, on December 27,
the U.S. military retaliated with a strike against the Iranian-backed
Kataib Hezbollah terrorist group, killing at least 25 members of the
militia and wounding others.
In response, the Iranian Government orchestrated protests in Baghdad,
which led hundreds of pro-Iranian protesters to storm the U.S. Embassy
in Baghdad on New Year's Eve. The strike against the Quds Force
Commander Qasem Soleimani followed.
Soleimani was a military figure who inflicted terror and killed
thousands in Israel, Iraq, and Syria as well. You can add other places
to that. He killed thousands. He worked to prop up Bashar al-Assad in
Syria. He aided Shiite forces that killed hundreds of Americans in
Iraq. We have been told that he was behind the attacks on the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad on New Year's Eve. Qasem Soleimani was directly
responsible for the killing of hundreds of American soldiers and
civilians and wounding many more. He was a despicable person who was
the leader of an entity designated as a terrorist organization.
Across the international stage, there are many committed enemies of
America who plot every day to do our Nation and our allies harm--every
single day. Those entrusted with the national security of our Nation
have to assess whether taking direct action against one of those
individual enemies increases or decreases risks over time and whether
taking actions against those individuals is consistent with our values
and our commitment to the rule of law.
This is a high standard, and it should be. We are the United States
of America, and we believe that conflicts have rules and limits. We
strive for a higher standard that both honors our values and protects
our security. Because we have high standards and because we expect our
leaders to act prudently and with deliberation, the Constitution
requires substantial consultation with Congress regarding matters of
war except in limited, urgent circumstances.
Acting with disregard for these standards, President Trump took this
unilateral action. The President may have endangered the lives of U.S.
servicemembers in the Middle East. He may have also prompted near-
lethal retaliation from Iran.
Iran's retaliatory strikes against U.S. bases at Al-Asad and Erbil on
January 7 thankfully did not claim any American lives. However,
conflicting reports continue to emerge about whether Iran intentionally
avoided hitting U.S. personnel, and that raises questions about whether
Iran sought to escalate or de-escalate its conflict with the United
States.
Video evidence has emerged in recent days showing that the Iranians
actually decimated housing units for soldiers on the base. Without
having received a classified briefing from the administration about
this incident--as opposed to the briefing we had on the killing of
Soleimani, which I will get to later--without having that classified
briefing, we can rely upon press reports for some information. Press
reports indicate that the Iranians were aiming to take American lives.
The fallout from the Soleimani strike didn't end there. On January 8,
the Iranian Government covered up the fact that it mistakenly shot down
a civilian aircraft killing 176 people onboard. The Iranian people have
since taken to the streets in protest of the coverup. I strongly
condemn the Iranian Government's crackdown on protesters and support
the Iranian people's right to rise up and demand human rights and
democratic governance in their country.
But let's not lose focus on a very important matter: President Trump
ordered a targeted killing of a high-ranking military official of a
country with which we are not in a declared or authorized conflict.
This is a serious step which required both a rigorous examination as
well as an explanation from the administration. Thus far, the
explanations we have received from this administration have been
woefully inadequate and inconsistent--and I think that is an
understatement.
We have been told that this strike was in response to an ``imminent
threat'' that four U.S. Embassies abroad were being targeted, which
Defense Secretary Esper almost immediately contradicted.
The word ``imminence'' is important here. Imminence derives from the
doctrine of self-defense, which under article 51 of the United Nations
Charter and the broader ``laws of war,'' imminence justifies use of
force in another state's territory when an armed attack occurs--
occurs--or when an armed attack is imminent. Some national security
scholars define ``imminence'' as ``leaving no reasonable time for
nonforceful measures to obviate such a threat.''
I will speak for myself only, but this is true of a number of
Senators, I believe. I have yet to see clear evidence that there was
``no reasonable time'' to seek nonlethal, diplomatic options prior to
killing Soleimani. The administration has failed to disclose sufficient
detail regarding the imminence of this threat. When asked on Friday,
Secretary Pompeo said he did not know when this asserted imminent
threat was supposed to take place.
The American people have also heard from Secretary Pompeo and
President Trump that the attack was a matter of retribution from events
that occurred in the past. We have heard from Secretary Pompeo that
this attack was designed to ``restore deterrence,'' but it is unclear
that he coordinated with his national security colleagues across the
interagency.
We know from reporting from the New York Times that Secretary Pompeo
was among the ``most hawkish voices arguing for a response to Iranian
aggression.'' The article also goes on to say: ``Top Pentagon officials
were stunned'' in reference to the strike.
So the question of why this strike was launched and when it was
launched remains unanswered. Both Democratic Senators and Republican
Senators asked this question in a classified briefing last week and few
received a satisfactory answer. We still lack answers on the ``imminent
threat.''
The President has spent the last week at rallies and other
appearances triumphantly marking the killing and indicating that the
Iranian threat is behind us. The strike authorized by President Trump
may have been reckless, taken without appropriate planning for the
consequences and aftermath, and done without serious consultation with
Congress and--and--within the administration. Contrary to the
President's boast, I am gravely concerned we will feel the adverse
consequences of this administration's actions across the Iran policy
landscape for years to come.
If we think the attacks on the Al-Asad and Kirkuk bases last Tuesday
were the end of Iranian retaliation for Soleimani's death, we are
likely mistaken, due to the continued threat of the Iranian regime's
proxy forces throughout the Middle East. Let's examine the potential
negative consequences of the strike. I hope this is something that the
administration engaged in before the strike, but it is important to
review this.
On January 5, Iran announced that it is no longer bound by the
restrictions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as it relates to
uranium enrichment. This agreement unequivocally extended Iran's
breakout time, which is the time it would take to obtain enough highly
enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. The agreement extended the
breakout time to 12 months--1 year. Again, before the agreement, Iran's
breakout time was 2 to 3 months. So the agreement extended that time,
meaning making the world safer by extending that time from 2 to 3
months to 1 year. That is where we were with the implementation of the
agreement.
Without this agreement--the JCPOA--without that agreement in
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place, Iran could reach the requisite uranium stockpile in as little as
6 months, if not sooner. Iran is closer today to a nuclear weapon than
it was a week or so ago, and certainly it is closer to a nuclear weapon
since 2018, when the administration withdrew from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action. That is one consequence we have to
consider. Iran is closer to a nuclear weapon.
No. 2 is ISIS. If the President's October 2019 withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Syria and the concurrent abandonment of our Kurdish
allies--if that did not create space for the resurgence of ISIS in the
Middle East, the President's recent action will almost certainly allow
for ISIS to regain a foothold in the region. Just 3 days after the
Soleimani strike, the New York Times reported that, and here is the
headline, ``U.S.-Led Coalition Halts ISIS Fight as it Steels for
Iranian Attacks''--halts ISIS fight. NATO has already suspended its
operations against ISIS. We have to consider, how does that outcome
make us safer?
Next, No. 3, we have to consider what is happening in Iraq. Iraq
voted to expel U.S. troops from their country as a result of the
strike. If we fully withdraw from Iraq, where are we going to launch
counter-ISIS operations in both Iraq and Syria from? How do we do
that--from where? Where was the effort to work with the Iraqi
Government in quashing Kataib Hezbollah and countering Iranian
influence in Iraq? Now that the Iraqi Government opposes U.S. troop
presence in its country, what is the plan? How does the administration
plan to restart conversations with Iran to negotiate a ``better''
nuclear deal that will ensure Iran never has a nuclear bomb? How do
they restart those negotiations? This strike looks more like another
step forward in a policy of regime change rather than a coherent
strategy designed to keep our Nation safe by using tough diplomacy and
alliance-building to confront Iran.
I have been one of the most determined advocates of being tough on
Iran, especially regarding sanctions. Since I came to the Senate in
2007, I have been part of almost every sanctions push in efforts to so-
call tighten the screws on the Iranian regime and hold them fully
accountable for their actions. All those steps that I have been a part
of, and people of both parties have been a part of, were part of a
strategy to get the results we saw when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action was signed.
Now, 2 years and after one particularly dangerous week, President
Trump has badly undermined all that progress. The advocates of regime
change in Iran are closer than ever to getting the United States into a
shooting war with Iran.
The events of the last few weeks remind me of the lead-up to the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Across both the House and the Senate,
Congress held only seven hearings that dealt directly with the proposed
2002 authorization for the use of military force to authorize the Iraq
war. AUMF is the acronym for that. Are seven hearings, over a period of
3 weeks between the House and the Senate, sufficient discussion and
debate prior to voting to go to war with Iraq? No. No, that is not
sufficient time and not a sufficient number of hearings.
At last count, 201 Pennsylvanians were killed in Iraq and over 1,200
were wounded. Have we learned from the mistakes of 2002 and 2003 that
led to those deaths and all those Pennsylvanians being wounded and many
thousands beyond that killed and wounded in the Iraq war? Have we
learned? Have we learned those lessons yet? We have a duty--an abiding
obligation--not to repeat the mistakes of the past and to constrain the
actions of a President who may endanger the lives of U.S.
servicemembers and Americans abroad.
Before we get too far down this path, Congress must reassert its
constitutional duty to debate and authorize war. Prior to authorizing a
strike, we must assess--and I hope the administration did this--whether
such an action would have an adverse impact on our national security.
Before we march our sons and daughters off to fight another war, we
need to make sure we are doing everything possible to prevent the loss
of American lives.
I have been clear in opposing a direct confrontation with Iran
without--without a clear authorization from Congress. The Trump
administration acted without a congressionally approved authorization
for the use of military force last week. That is why I and many others
have cosponsored Senator Tim Kaine's bipartisan S.J. Res. 68 to prevent
the President from going to war with Iran without congressional
authorization. If you want to go to war with Iran, you ought to be
compelled to vote for it, up or down--vote for or against as a Member
of Congress. Specifically, this resolution, S.J. Res. 68, requires the
President to ``terminate the use of the United States Armed Forces for
hostilities against the Islamic Republican of Iran or any part of its
government or military unless explicitly authorized by a declaration of
war or a specific authorization for the use of military force'' as
enacted by Congress. Nothing in this resolution prevents the United
States from ``defending itself against imminent attack.'' Those are the
exact words.
It is authorization or declaration before you go to war with Iran. I
think a lot of Americans--most Americans--believe that is not just the
right thing to do but that is our duty, no matter who is President.
When the administration fails to brief Congress on threats we face
and concurrently takes unilateral actions that could lead to all-out
war, we must act quickly and decisively to prevent further escalation
and demand a strategy. We owe it to Pennsylvanians, and we owe it to
all Americans, especially our men and women in uniform and their
families, to engage in a substantial, robust public debate on what
engaging in hostilities with Iran would mean for U.S. national security
and how it could endanger American lives. The House vote of last
Thursday was to reassert this congressional authority, and the Senate
will vote this week. I urge a vote in support of S.J. Res. 68, which
has several bipartisan cosponsors.
This is a dark time, and I cannot overstate my level of concern. I
know that concern is shared widely here in Congress but also across the
country. As to Iran, we are headed down a path to war, one which could
be more bloody, more complicated, and more protracted than any in my
lifetime. We have been walking down this path since President Trump
pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Every week since,
we are a little closer to an armed conflict, and the events of these
past weeks have likely turbocharged the dangerous path we are on.
Going back to the time of the Vietnam war and thereafter, elected
leaders of both political parties have lied to the American people. The
American people were told we were making progress, when we weren't. The
American people were told that insurgencies were in their ``last
throes,'' when the opposite was true. The American people demand that
politicians don't make serious mistakes that lead to war.
The good news is, we still have time. We have time to get it right.
We have time to engage in hard-nosed diplomacy. We have time to reject
a policy of regime change regarding Iran. There is time for this
administration to outline and implement an effective Iran strategy that
substantially reduces the likelihood of war in a nuclear-armed Iran,
but time is running short.
The administration may be committed to a policy of regime change, but
the Senate can act. We can pass the bipartisan S.J. Res. 68 and other
measures to make sure this administration cannot take us recklessly to
war with Iran without congressional authorization or a declaration of
war. We owe it to the American people and to our servicemembers to do
this.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cotton). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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