[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 204 (Tuesday, December 17, 2019)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1599-E1600]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         SECURE AND TRUSTED COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS ACT OF 2019

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                           HON. ANNA G. ESHOO

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Monday, December 16, 2019

  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4998, the Secure 
and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, as amended.
  For nearly a decade I've raised how the vulnerabilities in our 
telecommunications infrastructure directly impact our national 
security. On November 2, 2010, I wrote to the Chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) expressing grave concerns about Huawei 
and ZTE, which have opaque relationships with the Chinese government, 
and I request that my letter be entered into the Congressional Record.
  Sadly, in the intervening nine years many small and rural providers 
have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in equipment made by 
Huawei and ZTE because the equipment is the cheapest available, and 
this investment was often funded by the FCC's own programs.
  I'm pleased that H.R. 4998 addresses this problem by strengthening 
the supply chain of the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure by 
prohibiting purchases of compromised equipment when FCC funds are used. 
The bill also creates a program to assist providers with the costs of 
removing and replacing prohibited equipment. This is necessary since 
smaller providers can't afford these upgrades on their own.
  However, H.R. 4998 is limited to strengthening our supply chain issue 
and is not a comprehensive network security effort. The threats we face 
are constantly evolving, and Congress must remain diligent in ensuring 
our communications are secure, private, and reliable.
  I support H.R. 4998 and urge my colleagues to do the same.

        House of Representatives, Washington, DC, November 2, 
                                                         2010.

     Hon. Julius Genachowski,
     Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, DC
       Dear Chairman Genachowski, As a senior member of the House 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I have had grave 
     concerns about the implications of foreign-controlled 
     telecommunications infrastructure companies providing 
     equipment to the U.S. market for quite some time. In 
     particular, I'm very concerned that Huawei and ZTE, Chinese 
     telecommunications infrastructure manufacturers are looking 
     to increase their presence in the U.S.
       These companies have long-standing relationships with the 
     Chinese People's Liberation Army, and are not subject to the 
     same kinds of independence and corporate transparency that 
     other countries require of their telecommunications 
     companies.
       Last May, I wrote to the Director of National Intelligence 
     and asked him to assess the national security implications of 
     Chinese-origin telecommunications equipment on our law 
     enforcement arid intelligence efforts, as well as on our 
     switched-telecommunications infrastructure. While I cannot 
     discuss the results of that assessment in an unclassified 
     letter, suffice to say the answers were troubling, and the 
     National Counter Intelligence Executive has made 
     communications infrastructure security a top priority.
       Huawei and ZTE have recently taken aggressive steps to 
     increase penetration into the U.S. telecommunications market. 
     This summer, Huawei was in discussions with Sprint to provide 
     mobile telecommunications equipment. And in August of 2009, 
     Huawei signed a deal with Clearwire to provide equipment to 
     their wireless network. Unlike mergers and acquisitions by 
     foreign firms, agreements to directly supply equipment to the 
     U.S. telecommunications infrastructure are not subject to 
     CFIUS requirements.
       However, the net result is the same, where sensitive U.S. 
     communications will travel over the networks and switches 
     provided by a foreign-controlled entity.
       Clearly, the current CFIUS regime does not provide scrutiny 
     of procurements from foreign companies to assess the risk to 
     the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure. I would like to 
     understand what your role is to protect the U.S. networks in 
     order to assess what additional legislation may be needed.
       Do you have authority to protect the U.S. 
     telecommunications infrastructure from inappropriate foreign 
     control or influence?
       What authorities do you have to review procurements of 
     foreign equipment by U.S. companies operating our 
     telecommunications networks? What additional authorities 
     would you need to ensure that the U.S.

[[Page E1600]]

     telecommunications infrastructure is secure from foreign 
     influence?
       To what extent are you working with our nation's 
     intelligence community to assess the threat to our 
     telecommunications infrastructure? What is, or should be, the 
     interagency structure to best review procurements from 
     foreign entities?
       What kinds of transparency requirements, including 
     divestment from state ownership, should be placed on 
     companies seeking to sell telecommunications infrastructure 
     equipment to U.S. network providers? Should this be a U.S. or 
     an international standard?
       Our nation's telecommunications infrastructure must be 
     protected for our national security, and I look forward to 
     your prompt reply.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Anna G. Eshoo,
     Member of Congress

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