[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 199 (Thursday, December 12, 2019)]
[House]
[Pages H10237-H10254]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 EXPLANATORY MATERIAL STATEMENT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION MEASURES 
    FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020, SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHIFF, 
    CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

       The following is the explanation of the Damon Paul Nelson 
     and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (hereinafter, ``the Act'').
       This explanation reflects the result of negotiations and 
     disposition of issues reached between the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate 
     Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) (hereinafter, ``the 
     Agreement''). The explanation shall have the same effect with 
     respect to the implementation of the Act as if it were a 
     joint explanatory statement of a conference committee.
       The explanation comprises three parts: an overview of the 
     application of the annex to accompany this statement; 
     unclassified congressional direction; and a section-by-
     section analysis of the legislative text.

              Part I: Application of the Classified Annex

       The classified nature of U.S. intelligence activities 
     prevents the HPSCI and SSCI (collectively, the 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'') from publicly 
     disclosing many details concerning the conclusions and 
     recommendations of the Agreement. Therefore, a classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations and a classified annex have been 
     prepared to describe in detail the scope and intent of the 
     congressional intelligence committees' actions. The Agreement 
     authorizes the Intelligence Community (IC) to obligate and 
     expend funds not altered or modified by the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations as requested in the President's 
     budget, subject to modification under applicable 
     reprogramming procedures.
       The classified annex is the result of negotiations between 
     the congressional intelligence committees. They reconcile the 
     differences between the congressional intelligence 
     committees' respective versions of the bill for the National 
     Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
     2020. The Agreement also makes recommendations for the 
     Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and the Information 
     Systems Security Program (ISSP), consistent with the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, and provides 
     certain direction for these two programs. The Agreement 
     applies to IC activities for Fiscal Year 2020.
       The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated 
     into the bill pursuant to Section 5102 of Subdivision 1. It 
     has the status of law. The classified annex supplements and 
     adds detail to clarify the authorization levels found in the 
     bill and the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
     congressional intelligence committees view direction and 
     recommendations, whether contained in this explanation or in 
     the classified annex, as requiring compliance by the 
     Executive Branch.

          Part II: Select Unclassified Congressional Direction

       Unclassified Direction related to Subdivision 1 of the Act 
     relates to Fiscal Year 2020. Unclassified Direction related 
     to Subdivision 2 originated in Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019. 
     The term ``Committees'' refers to both SSCI and HPSCI.

[[Page H10238]]

  



            Unclassified Direction Related to Subdivision 1

     Plans for Operations During Government Shutdowns by All 
         Elements of the Intelligence Community.
       The Committees have an active interest in the impact of 
     government shutdowns on the intelligence mission. Office of 
     Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, Section 124, 
     outlines how agencies are supposed to plan for operations 
     during government shutdowns, and Section 124.2 provides that 
     agencies must share those plans with OMB. Additionally, 
     Section 323 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2014 requires the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
     and IC elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
     share those same plans with specified congressional 
     committees, including the congressional intelligence 
     committees.
       These requirements, however, omit IC elements that are not 
     separate ``agencies'' for the purposes of OMB Circular A-11, 
     Section 124, and are not ODNI, CIA, or elements within the 
     DoD for the purposes of the IAA for Fiscal Year 2014. As a 
     result, no such reporting requirement currently exists for IC 
     elements within the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, 
     State, and Homeland Security. For that reason, when portions 
     of the federal government were shut down between December 
     2018 and February 2019, the Committees had little to no 
     insight into the effects of the shutdown on these and other 
     important segments of the IC.
       Therefore, the Committees direct IC elements within the 
     Departments of Justice, Treasury, Energy, State, and Homeland 
     Security to submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees--on the same day as the host department's issuance 
     of any plan for a government shutdown--the number of 
     personnel in their respective elements that will be 
     furloughed.
     Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment Review.
       Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created a Program Manager-
     Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), administered from 
     within the ODNI, to better facilitate the interagency sharing 
     of terrorism-related information. Section 1016 also 
     designated the PM-ISE as a presidentially-appointed position. 
     Section 6402 of Subdivision 2 of the Act amends the IRTPA, so 
     that the PM-ISE is subject to appointment by the Director of 
     National Intelligence (DNI), not the President. Since the 
     establishment of the PM-ISE, the Federal government has 
     created entities, procedures, and processes to address 
     directly the mandate for improved terrorism information 
     sharing. Accordingly, the Committees find it appropriate to 
     reconsider the future of the PM-ISE's mission.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the ODNI, in consultation 
     with appropriate Federal departments, agencies, and 
     components, within 180 days of enactment of this Act, to 
     conduct a review of the PM-ISE's terrorism information 
     sharing mission, associated functions, and organizational 
     role within the ODNI and provide findings and recommendations 
     on the future of the PM-ISE to Congress.
     Leveraging Academic Institutions in the Intelligence 
         Community.
       The Committees encourage the DNI and the Director of the 
     DIA to ensure that IC elements continue to forge tighter 
     partnerships with leading universitiesand their affiliated 
     research centers in order to enhance mutual awareness of 
     domestic and international challenges, leverage subject 
     matter experts from higher education in a manner that uses 
     cutting edge technologies and methods, and bolsters the 
     recruitment of top-notch, diverse, and technically proficient 
     talent into the IC's workforce.
       The Committees further believe that IC-sponsored academic 
     programs such as the Intelligence Community Centers for 
     Academic Excellence (IC-CAE) should work closely with 
     educational institutions that offer interdisciplinary courses 
     of study and learning opportunities in national and 
     international security; geopolitical affairs, international 
     relations and national security; interdisciplinary courses of 
     study in the culture, history, languages, politics, and 
     religions of major world regions; foreign language 
     instruction; computer and data science; or cybersecurity.
       The DNI shall ensure that such programs are facilitated via 
     the streamlining of the security clearance process for 
     graduating students from such universities who receive offers 
     of employment from IC elements, provide for the temporary 
     exchange of faculty and IC professionals, including as 
     visiting fellows, and technical training opportunities for 
     faculty, students, and IC personnel.
       Therefore, the Committees direct all IC agencies to support 
     the IC-CAE effort by tracking recruits and new hires who have 
     graduated from IC-CAE-designated institutions, promptly 
     reporting these numbers to the office in charge of IC-CAE 
     implementation, and increasing all IC agencies' efforts to 
     recruit from such institutions.
     Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
       The Committees remain concerned about impediments for 
     companies with appropriately cleared personnel being able to 
     perform work for government entities and the effects of these 
     impediments on IC access to innovative products and services. 
     For example, businesses without access to a Sensitive 
     Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which includes 
     many small businesses and non-traditional contractors, find 
     it difficult to perform classified work for the IC. 
     Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces may be cost-
     prohibitive for small business and non-traditional government 
     contractors.
       Additionally, SCIF construction timelines often exceed the 
     period of performance of a contract. A modern trend for 
     innovative and non-traditional government contractors is the 
     use of co-working space environments. Additionally, public 
     and private entities are partnering to create emerging 
     regional innovation hubs to help identify technology 
     solutions and products in the private sector that can be 
     utilized by the DoD and IC. These innovation hubs currently 
     produce an agile, neutral, but largely unclassified, 
     development environment.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the ODNI to submit a 
     report to the congressional intelligence committees on:
       1. Processes and procedures necessary to build, certify, 
     and maintain certifications for multi-use sensitive 
     compartmented facilities not tied to a single contract and 
     where multiple companies can securely work on multiple 
     projects at different security levels;
       2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of issuing 
     DoD Contract Security Specification (DD Form 254s) to 
     Facilities'' as opposed to Contracts'';
       3. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace 
     environments such as innovation, incubation, catalyst, and 
     accelerator environments;
       4. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or 
     combination owned facilities that can operate at different 
     classification levels; and
       5. Any other opportunities to support companies with 
     appropriately cleared personnel but without effective access 
     to a neutral SCIF.
     Inclusion of Security Risks in Program Management Plans 
         Required for Acquisition of Major Systems in the National 
         Intelligence Program.
       Section 5305 of Subdivision 1 of the Act adds security risk 
     as a factor for the DNI to include in the annual Program 
     Management Plans for major system acquisitions submitted to 
     the congressional intelligence committees pursuant to Section 
     102A(q)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3024(q)(1)(A)). The Committees are increasingly concerned 
     with the security risks to IC acquisitions. The Joint 
     Explanatory Statement accompanying the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 directed updates to 
     Intelligence Community Directive 731, Supply Chain Risk 
     Management, and Committee leadership has engaged senior 
     industry representatives about the threats to the national 
     security industrial base posed by adversaries and 
     competitors, including China. Over the past few years, the 
     Department of Defense has been elevating security as a 
     ``fourth pillar'' (to complement cost, schedule, and 
     performance) in reviewing defense acquisitions, embodied in 
     the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's ``Deliver 
     Uncompromised'' initiative.
       Section 5305 of the Act extends that focus to the IC, 
     requiring the annual Program Management Plans to include 
     security risks in major system acquisitions, in addition to 
     cost, schedule, and performance. The Committees recognize 
     that security can be applied across a number of areas 
     (facilities, personnel, information, and supply chain) and 
     may vary by program, to appropriately ensure system integrity 
     and mission assurance.
       Therefore, for the purposes of implementing section 5305 of 
     the Act, the Committees direct the Director of National 
     Intelligence, with the Director of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center, to develop 
     parameters for including security risks (and risk management 
     measures) in the annual Program Management Plans to assist 
     congressional oversight.
     Intelligence Community Public-Private Talent Exchange.
       The Committees fully support section 5306 of Subdivision 
     1's implementation in accordance with applicable federal 
     ethics laws, regulations, and policies.
     Expansion of Scope of Protections for Identities of Covert 
         Agents.
       Section 5303 of Subdivision 1 of the Act removes temporal 
     and geographic limitations on the definition of ``covert 
     agent'', as that term was defined by Section 606 of the 
     Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, P.L. 97-200 
     (Jun. 23, 1982) (IIPA).
       Such limitations originally carved out of the IIPA 
     unauthorized disclosures of certain kinds of classified 
     identity information--those generally involving persons who 
     have not served or acted abroad in the last five years--on 
     grounds that such disclosures are generally less harmful to 
     national security, and therefore undeserving of IIPA 
     protections. But experience since then has proven otherwise. 
     With the benefit of experience, the Committees have concluded 
     that any disclosure of currently classified identity 
     information, without regard to the location or recency of the 
     activities of the person whose information is disclosed, can 
     risk serious harm to national security. That being the case, 
     such disclosures should potentially present a basis, under 
     appropriate circumstances, for prosecution under the IIPA.

[[Page H10239]]

       The Committees wish to stress, however, that the change 
     does not imply any enhanced risk of IIPA liability for 
     journalists.
       In the thirty-seven years since enactment, the statute has 
     never been used to prosecute members of the media. In fact, 
     prosecutors have charged violations of the IIPA in only two 
     cases, both of which involved unauthorized disclosures by 
     former federal government employees of classified information 
     obtained during their employment. The Committees view this 
     spare record, so far as traditional newsgathering and 
     publication is concerned, as reflecting the heavy, 
     constraining influence of the First Amendment's Press Clause. 
     Journalists continue to this day to report aggressively on 
     intelligence matters.
       The IIPA's enforcement history also reflects the narrowness 
     of Section 601(c), a provision which some have interpreted to 
     expose traditional journalists to the risk of liability under 
     the statute. But in the Committees' view, that provision does 
     not cover responsibly investigating and reporting news in the 
     public interest. There is a high burden for conviction under 
     Section 601(c). It requires a prosecutor to prove beyond a 
     reasonable doubt, among other things, that a defendant 
     engaged in a ``pattern of activities'': a series of acts with 
     the common purpose or objective of identifying and publicly 
     exposing covert agents. Such conduct entails ``engag[ing] in 
     a purposeful enterprise of revealing covert identities'' or 
     being in the ``business of naming names,'' as the Conference 
     Report to the IIPA put it in 1982. H.R. Rep. No. 97-580, at 9 
     (1982).
       Traditional news gathering and publication--including on 
     abuses of power, violations of law and civil liberties, and 
     other controversial activity--does not require, or even 
     typically involve, such conduct. Indeed, as the Conferees 
     illustrated the point:
       The reporters who have investigated the activities of 
     Wilson and Terpil, former CIA employees who allegedly 
     supplied explosives and terrorist training to Libya, would 
     not be covered even if they revealed the identity of covert 
     agents if their pattern of activities was intended to 
     investigate illegal or controversial activities, and not to 
     identify covert agents. Similarly, David Garrow would not be 
     within the scope of the statute even though he purported to 
     give the identity of covert agents in his book, ``The FBI and 
     Martin Luther King, Jr.: from `Solo' to Memphis.'' His intent 
     presumably was to explain what drove the FBI to wiretap 
     Martin Luther King and not to identify and expose covert 
     agents.
       H.R. Rep. No. 97-580, at 10. The same holds true for 
     traditional, responsible journalists today. Even after 
     amendments made by the Act, their work does not risk 
     liability under the revised IIPA.
       Furthermore, section 5303 has no effect on what information 
     may be withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
     U.S.C. Sec. 552 (FOIA). Section 5303 expands the universe of 
     ``covert agents'' whose classified relationship with the 
     United States Government is protected by the criminal law. 
     All of the people protected by the expanded ``covert agent'' 
     definition have a relationship with the United States 
     government that is already classified. If an individual's 
     relationship with the government is classified, it may be 
     withheld under FOIA. Consequently, even before passage of 
     section 5303, identifying information for all of the 
     individuals covered by the IIPA expansion could already have 
     been withheld under FOIA's (b)(1) exemption for national 
     security information. In general, when justifying withholding 
     under FOIA information that tends to identify covert agents, 
     agencies should use (b)(1) classification exemptions, not 
     (b)(3) exemptions regarding the IIPA and other statutes. 5 
     U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 552(b)(1), (3).
       Section 5303 is not intended to--and does not--affect 
     Congress' authority to oversee the IC. Section 5303 is not 
     intended to--and does not--affect the protections afforded to 
     whistleblowers to disclose violations of law and waste, 
     fraud, and abuse to Inspectors General or to Congress.
     Intelligence Community Cooperation with the Government 
         Accountability Office.
       The Committees believe the Government Accountability Office 
     (GAO) adds significant value to the Committees' oversight 
     efforts. For example, the GAO's designation in 2018 of the 
     government-wide Personnel Security Clearance process to its 
     high-risk list of federal areas needing reform to prevent 
     waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, was important to the 
     Committees' efforts to legislate on security clearance 
     reform, including in this Act. The Committees expect that all 
     IC elements will fully and promptly comply with requests from 
     the GAO made to support studies requested by, or of interest 
     to, the Committees.
     Clarification of Death Benefits for Survivors of Central 
         Intelligence Agency Personnel.
       The Committees concur with the Executive Branch that 
     section 5341 of Subdivision 1 of the Act shall apply 
     retroactively from the date of enactment of this Act.
     Intelligence Community Leave Policies.
       The Committees find it imperative that the federal 
     government, to include the IC, recruit, hire, and retain a 
     highly qualified workforce. That depends in part on offering 
     federal personnel a competitive benefits package--including 
     with respect to parental leave and related benefits. Toward 
     that end, the Committees strongly believe the federal 
     government must align such benefits to the fullest extent 
     possible with those of leading U.S. private sector companies 
     and other industrialized countries.
       In furtherance of that objective, the Committees in their 
     respective bills supported a provision to provide twelve 
     weeks of paid parental leave to all IC employees. The 
     Committees further support the succeeding provision in the 
     National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 
     2020 that provides government employees, to include those in 
     the IC, with twelve weeks of paid administrative leave in the 
     event of birth of a child, or the placement of a child for 
     purposes of adoptive or foster care. This is consistent with, 
     and supersedes, provisions that were contained in the House-
     passed and Senate-passed Intelligence Authorization Acts for 
     Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. Importantly, that NDAA 
     provision does not modify or otherwise affect the eligibility 
     of an IC employee for benefits relating to leave under any 
     other provision of law, to include the provisions of the 
     Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2601, et 
     seq.
       Moreover, so far as concerns the provision's 
     implementation, the Committees direct the DNI, within 180 
     days after enactment of this Act, to provide a briefing for 
     the Committees on how each element of the IC will implement 5 
     U.S.C. section 6382(d)(2), as provided by this Act.
     Transfer of National Intelligence University.
       The Committees have been closely watching the evolution of 
     how the IC provides for advanced intelligence education. The 
     Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has hosted an intelligence 
     college since 1962, which has been academically accredited 
     since 1983. When the ODNI was created in the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, ODNI created a 
     separate National Intelligence University (NIU) under its 
     auspices as a complement to DIA's intelligence effort. In 
     response to a report from the President's Intelligence 
     Advisory Board that accused the ODNI of being inadequately 
     focused, the ODNI in 2011 transferred the NIU to DIA's 
     intelligence college and rebranded the new combined 
     institution as NIU.
       Pursuant to the Joint Explanatory Statement to the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, an 
     independent panel offered alternative governance models to 
     enhance NIU, to include a more prominent role for ODNI. In 
     parallel, analyses of DIA by the Secretary of Defense and the 
     HPSCI during the 115th Congress concluded that DIA would 
     benefit from moving NIU elsewhere in the IC.
       The Committees believe transferring NIU to ODNI is now 
     appropriate if certain conditions, contained in section 5324 
     of Subdivision 1 of the Act, are met. The Committees believe 
     that clear commitment from the DNI and Principal Deputy DNI 
     is critical to NIU's success at ODNI. The Committees look 
     forward to working with ODNI and DoD on the successful 
     transfer of NIU.
     Associate Degree Program Eligibility.
       The Committees are concerned that students enrolled in, or 
     who have graduated from, Associate Degree programs have 
     insufficient opportunities to gain employment in the IC. 
     Therefore, the Committees direct the ODNI to submit a report 
     to the congressional intelligence committees on how to expand 
     the number of opportunities for students pursuing or having 
     earned an Associate Degree eligible for IC academic programs. 
     The Committees also direct the ODNI to make information about 
     these academic programs publicly available.
     Exposing Predatory and Anticompetitive Foreign Economic 
         Influence.
       The Committees are concerned about the significant threat 
     posed by foreign governments that engage in predatory and 
     anticompetitive behaviors aimed to undercut critical sectors 
     of the United States economy. Therefore, the Committees 
     direct the DNI, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary 
     of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, to submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     identifying top countries that pose a substantial threat to 
     the United States economy regarding technology transfer 
     issues, predatory investment practices, economic espionage, 
     and other anticompetitive behaviors. The report shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent 
     possible, but may include a classified annex.
       Furthermore, the DNI, in consultation with the Department 
     of the Treasury and other agencies that the Director deems 
     appropriate,shall submit a report to the congressional 
     intelligence committees assessing the costs and benefits of 
     requiring a foreign person or entity that invests in the 
     United States (and is subject to the jurisdiction of a 
     country that poses a substantial threat to the United States 
     economy) to submit annual disclosures to the Federal 
     Government. Such disclosures would include all investments 
     that the foreign person or entity made in the United States 
     during the preceding year; the ownership structure of the 
     entity; and any affiliation of the entity with a foreign 
     government. The report should detail how such information 
     could be used by the IC and other elements of the Federal 
     government working to identify and combat foreign threats to 
     the United States economy, and the appropriate scope and 
     thresholds for such disclosures. The report shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
     Increasing Data Security.
       The Committees are aware the IC faces challenges while 
     trying to balance mission

[[Page H10240]]

     and enterprise needs with IT modernization, including the 
     migration of data and applications to the cloud. With this in 
     mind, the Committees encourage the IC to identify and utilize 
     technologies that increase the security posture of data and 
     workloads and reduce cyber risks.
       The Committees further recommend that:
       1. IC elements identify, develop, and implement tools for 
     bi-directional data migration and division interoperability 
     between data center and cloud environments;
       2. These tools include, but are not limited to, encryption 
     of data while both at rest and in motion, and micro-
     segmentation of networks and workloads; and
       3. IC elements prioritize shifting resources towards 
     automation as a way to respond more quickly to cyber threats.
     Anonymous Annual Survey Regarding Workplace Climate.
       IC elements obtain mission-critical information from the 
     results of anonymous, annual surveys of their employees, on 
     issues related to workplace climate and retention. As 
     necessary as they are to the elements' own activities, survey 
     results are also vital to the Committees' continuing 
     oversight of elements' efforts to address workplace climate 
     and retention issues, and to propose legislative and other 
     remedies where appropriate.
       The need for reliable information is especially acute with 
     respect to sexual harassment and discrimination, given that--
     established policy and legal protections notwithstanding--an 
     employee may fear that directly raising concerns about such 
     matters risks exposing the employee to retaliatory personnel, 
     security clearance, or other actions. The anonymous survey 
     affords the element, and the Committees, a mechanism for 
     inquiring further about the extent of this well-documented 
     chilling effect against reporting; and about the 
     effectiveness (or not) of ongoing programs to uncover and 
     root out sexual harassment, discrimination, and other illegal 
     and/or inappropriate activities at the workplace.
       Therefore, the Committees direct that no later than 180 
     days after enactment of this Act, the DNI must certify in 
     writing to the congressional intelligence committees that:
       1. At least once a year, each element of the IC submits a 
     survey to its employees regarding workplace climate and 
     retention matters, and affords employees completing such 
     surveys the option to remain anonymous;
       2. Such survey includes questions regarding employees' 
     experiences with sexual assault, discrimination, harassment, 
     including sexual harassment, and related retaliation, 
     including, at a minimum, the questions covering the following 
     topics:
       a. Have you witnessed sexual harassment or sexual assault?
       i. Did you report it?
       ii. If not, why not?
       b. Have you experienced sexual harassment or sexual 
     assault?
       i. Did you report it?
       ii. If not, why not?
       c. Have you experienced retaliation for reporting 
     harassment, discrimination, or sexual assault?
       i. Have you faced retribution for taking leave for family, 
     medical, or other personal reasons?
       ii. Did you fear retribution for taking leave?
       3. Each element includes in its survey questions regarding 
     the job series, position, age, gender, race or ethnicity, 
     field, and job location at the time of the survey's 
     completion;
       4. Each element tracks employees' responses according to 
     job series, position, age, gender, race or ethnicity, field, 
     and location at the time of the survey's completion; and
       5. Each element reports the results of its survey annually 
     to the congressional intelligence committees.
     Report to Congress on the Representation of Women and 
         Minorities in the Workforce.
       The Committees continue to strongly support IC efforts to 
     identify, recruit, and retain a highly diverse and highly 
     qualified workforce--including, in particular, its efforts to 
     increase the representation within elements of the IC of 
     women and minorities.
       This is a data driven exercise. Bolstering and adjusting IC 
     workforce diversity programs depends in part on the 
     Committees' regularly obtaining current, detailed, and 
     reliable information, and about specific matters relevant to 
     the broader subject of workforce diversity--such as rates and 
     areas of promotion of women and minority employees. However, 
     some elements may produce such information only from time to 
     time; others may make regular submissions to the Committees 
     but include only general information.
       Therefore, the Committees direct that every six months, the 
     head of each element of the IC shall submit to the Committees 
     a written report that shall include, at a minimum:
       1. The total number of women and minorities hired by that 
     element during the reporting period and a calculation of that 
     figure as a percentage of the agency's total hiring for that 
     period;
       2. The distribution of women and minorities at that element 
     by grade level and by job series in the element's total 
     workforce during the reporting period, together with 
     comparisons from the immediately preceding two years;
       3. The number of women and minorities who applied for 
     promotion at the element and the final number selected for 
     promotion during the reporting period;
       4. The proportion of the total workforce of the element 
     occupied by each group or class protected by law, as of the 
     last day of the reporting period;
       5. The numbers of minorities and women serving in positions 
     at the element requiring advanced, specialized training or 
     certification, as well as the proportion of the workforce 
     those groups occupy; and
       6. To the extent that such element deploys civilian 
     employees to hazardous duty locations, the number of women 
     and minority employees who departed government service 
     subsequent to a deployment undertaken by an employee in 
     the previous two years.
     Report on Geospatial Commercial Activities for Basic and 
         Applied Research and Development.
       The Committees direct the Director of the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), in coordination with 
     the DNI, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     (CIA), and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 
     (NRO), within 90 days of enactment of this Act, to submit to 
     the congressional intelligence and defense committees a 
     report on the feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of 
     providing the private sector and academia, on a need-driven 
     and limited basis--consistent with the protection of sources 
     and methods, as well as privacy and civil liberties--access 
     to data in the possession of the NGA for the purpose of 
     assisting the efforts of the private sector and academia in 
     basic research, applied research, data transfers, and the 
     development of automation, artificial intelligence, and 
     associated algorithms. Such report shall include:
       1. Identification of any additional authorities that the 
     Director of NGA would require to provide the private sector 
     and academia with access to relevant data on a need-driven 
     and limited basis, consistent with applicable laws and 
     procedures relating to the protection of sources, methods, 
     privacy and civil liberties; and
       2. Market research to assess the commercial and academic 
     interest in such data and determine likely private-sector 
     entities and institutions of higher education interested in 
     public-private partnerships relating to such data.
     NRO Contracting Restrictions.
       The Committees continue to be very concerned that NRO 
     imposes unnecessary contractual restrictions that prohibits 
     or discourages a contractor from contacting or meeting with a 
     congressional intelligence committee or intelligence 
     committee Member offices. Therefore, the Committees direct 
     NRO to remove all restrictions that impacts contractors from 
     contacting or meeting with the congressional intelligence 
     committees or member offices in all current and future 
     contracts to include pre-coordination with executive branch 
     agencies.
     Enhancing Automation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
         Agency.
       The Committees strongly support efforts to leverage 
     commercial advances in automation of imagery such as electro-
     optical, infrared, Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI), Full 
     Motion Video (FMV), and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) 
     products to reduce manual processing and improve information 
     flow to users. However, the Committees are concerned that NGA 
     does not dedicate adequate resources to integrate new 
     automation techniques, which have resulted in years of 
     research into the issue, but limited operation gains during 
     day-to-day imagery processing.
       Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 90 days of 
     enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional 
     intelligence and defense committees on an updated plan to 
     reduce manual processing of imagery such as electro-optical, 
     infrared, WAMI, FMV, and SAR to improve information flow to 
     users. The briefing shall also address:
       1. NGA's strategy to leverage commercial advances;
       2. The various GEOINT automated exploitation development 
     programs across the National System for Geospatial-
     Intelligence, and the associated funding and specific purpose 
     of said programs;
       3. Any similar efforts by government entities outside the 
     National System for Geospatial-Intelligence of which NGA is 
     aware; and
       4. Which of these efforts may be duplicative.
     Redundant Organic Software Development.
       The Committees are concerned that NGA is developing 
     software solutions that are otherwise available for purchase 
     on the commercial market. This practice often increases the 
     time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter; 
     increases the overall cost of the solution through expensive 
     operational and maintenance costs; and undermines the U.S. 
     software industrial base.
       Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of 
     enactment of this Act, to brief the Committees, to identify 
     all NGA developed software programs and explain why they are 
     being developed organically instead of leveraging 
     commercially available products.
     Critical Skills Recruiting for Automation.
       Although cutting edge sensors have provided the IC and 
     Department of Defense with exquisite imagery, full motion 
     video (FMV), and wide area motion imagery (WAMI), 
     intelligence analysts are unable to keep pace with the volume 
     of data being generated. This demands a transformation in the 
     way the intelligence enterprise processes, organizes, and 
     presents data. For that reason, the

[[Page H10241]]

     Committees fully support the NGA's efforts to attract, 
     recruit, and retain a highly competent workforce that can 
     acquire and integrate new data automation tools.
       Therefore, the Committees direct NGA, within 60 days of 
     enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional 
     intelligence and defense committees on NGA's efforts to 
     recruit critical skills such as mathematicians, data 
     scientists, and software engineers that possess critical 
     skills needed to support NGA's objectives in automation.
     Common Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.
       The Committees have become aware of several major 
     impediments to companies performing work for agencies and 
     organizations like the NRO. For example, businesses without 
     ownership of a SCIF find it very difficult to perform 
     classified work. Additionally, these small businesses are 
     challenged with basic obstacles such as becoming aware of 
     classified work opportunities because it is difficult to 
     obtain access to the IC's and DoD's classified marketplaces 
     such as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). Construction 
     and accreditation of SCIF spaces is cost-prohibitive for 
     small business and non-traditional government contractors. 
     Additionally, construction timeline often exceeds the period 
     of performance of a contract.
       A modern trend for innovative and non-traditional 
     government contractors is the increased use of co-working 
     space environments. Additionally, public and private entities 
     are partnering to create emerging regional innovation hubs to 
     help identify technology solutions and products in the 
     private sector that can be utilized by the IC and DoD. These 
     innovation hubs currently produce an agile, neutral, but 
     largely unclassified development environment.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI, within 90 days of 
     enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees on the following:
       1. Steps necessary to establish new `Common SCIFs' in areas 
     of high demand;
       2. What approaches allow for SCIF spaces to be certified 
     and accredited outside of a traditional contractual 
     arrangement;
       3. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of issuing 
     Department of Defense Contract Security Specification (DD 
     Form 254s) to ``Facilities,'' as opposed to ``Contracts'';
       4. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace 
     environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst, and 
     accelerator environments;
       5. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or 
     combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
       6. Any other opportunities to support those without 
     ownership of a SCIF effective access to a neutral SCIF.
     Improving Use of the Unclassified Marketplaces.
       Another area where the Committees have become aware of 
     major impediments for companies to perform work for agencies 
     and organizations like the NRO are unclassified marketplaces 
     such as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). Instead of 
     posting data to unclassified marketplaces, unclassified NRO 
     postings often refer to the classified side for critical yet 
     unclassified information. If the NRO is serious about 
     embracing commercial innovation, unclassified marketplace 
     postings should remain on the unclassified side.
       Therefore, the Committees direct NRO, within 90 days of 
     enactment of this Act, to brief the Committees on options for 
     improving the unclassified marketplace process.
     Satellite Servicing.
       No later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, shall jointly provide the to the congressional 
     intelligence and defense committees a briefing detailing the 
     costs, risks, and operational benefits of leveraging 
     commercial satellite servicing capabilities for national 
     security satellite systems. The briefing shall include the 
     following:
       1. A prioritized list, with a rationale, of operational and 
     planned assets of the Intelligence Community that could be 
     enhanced by satellite servicing missions;
       2. The costs, risks, and benefits of integrating satellite 
     servicing capabilities as part of operational resilience; and
       3. Potential strategies that could allow future national 
     security space systems to leverage commercial in-orbit 
     servicing capabilities where appropriate and feasible.
     Commercial RF Mapping and SAR.
       U.S. commercial companies are now offering space-based 
     geolocation and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analysis of 
     radio frequency (RF) emitters as well as synthetic aperture 
     radar (SAR) products. These companies can identify, locate, 
     and analyze previously undetected activity, providing new 
     insights for U.S. national security and defense. The IC 
     currently has contracts that leverage commercial electro-
     optical satellites, however it does not have a program in 
     place to take full advantage of these emerging commercial 
     space-based RF GEOINT and SAR capabilities.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the NRO and NGA to brief 
     the Committees on how it will leverage these commercial 
     companies in Fiscal Year 2020 and beyond, to include funding 
     for, as well as testing and evaluation efforts.
     Commercial Remote Sensing.
       The Committees support efforts to establish a light-touch 
     regulatory structure that enables the rapidly evolving 
     commercial space-based imagery, RF sensing, and radar 
     industry markets to promote U.S. leadership in these areas. 
     However, the Committees also support the needs of the U.S. 
     Government to protect both IC and DoD personnel and assets. 
     The Committees believe there can be a balance that supports 
     both national security interests and the promotion of U.S. 
     innovation and leadership.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI, in consultation 
     with the Secretary of Defense, to brief the Committees within 
     60 days of the date of enactment of the Act, on efforts that 
     help address this balance and which streamline the IC and DoD 
     involvement in the rapidly evolving U.S. commercial space-
     based imagery, RF sensing, and radar industries.
     Deception Detection Techniques.
       The U.S. Government does not have sufficient security 
     screening capabilities available to determine deception in 
     individuals that intend to harm the United States. The 
     polygraph has been an effective investigative tool to detect 
     deception, but the cost and time required to administer a 
     polygraph examination is a major cause for security clearance 
     backlogs, and often limits the frequency of periodic 
     examinations to every 5-7 years. Entities within DoD and the 
     IC including DIA, Special Operations Command, NGA, Defense 
     Counterintelligence and Security Agency, U.S. Air Force and 
     others have expressed a desire to begin piloting new systems 
     such as ocular deception detection systems. However, progress 
     is being hindered by DoD Directive 5210.91 and ODNI Security 
     Agent Directive 2, which direct some oversight of new 
     deception detection technologies to the DoD National Center 
     of Credibility Assessment (NCCA), which does not have 
     sufficient budget or other resources to expeditiously 
     evaluate non-polygraph technologies.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the DNI in coordination 
     with the DoD to provide the congressional intelligence and 
     defense committees with a briefing on what steps they are 
     taking to ensure pilot programs are established to evaluate 
     these new technologies to help reduce our backlog, improve 
     efficiency, and reduce overall cost. Pilot programs shall 
     evaluate current and emerging technologies to efficiently and 
     rapidly verify the accuracy and truthfulness of statements of 
     candidates for employment within the DoD/IC, including for 
     interim security clearances, for periodic screening of 
     cleared DoD/IC personnel, to screen foreign national 
     collaborators and contractors overseas to prevent ``Green-on-
     Blue'' attacks, for immigration screening and for other 
     purposes.
     List of Foreign Entities That Pose a Threat to Critical 
         Technologies.
       The Committees direct the DNI, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Defense, to identify, compose, and maintain a 
     list of foreign entities, including governments, 
     corporations, nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and any 
     subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director 
     determines pose a threat of espionage with respect to 
     critical technologies or research projects, including 
     research conducted at institutions of higher education.
       Maintenance of this list will be critical to ensuring the 
     security of the most sensitive projects relating to U.S. 
     national security, such as defense and intelligence-related 
     research projects. The initial list shall be available to the 
     head of each qualified agency funding applicable projects and 
     will include the following entities already identified as 
     threatening: Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation, 
     Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital 
     Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, and Kaspersky 
     Lab. The DNI and the Secretary of Defense, or a delegate from 
     each agency, shall brief the findings to the congressional 
     intelligence and defense committees no later than 180 days 
     after the enactment of the Act.
     Protection of National Security Research.
       The Committees believe that institutes of higher learning, 
     laboratories, and other entities and organizations play 
     critical roles in advancing national security within the U.S. 
     science and technology ecosystem that is charged with 
     delivering the best capabilities to the warfighter in the 
     near, mid, and long-term. The Committees understand that 
     near-peer competitors such as China and Russia attempt to 
     exploit and benefit from the open and collaborative global 
     research environment created by the Reagan Administration's 
     National Security Decision Directive 189 on the National 
     Policy on the transfer of Scientific, Technical and 
     Engineering Information. This directive established that the 
     products of ``fundamental research''--defined as ``basic and 
     applied research in science and engineering, the results of 
     which ordinarily are published and shared''--should remain 
     unrestricted.
       The Committees are also aware that academia is not always 
     kept apprised by the interagency of a complete picture of 
     potential activities and threats in the research community, 
     such as improper technology transfer, intellectual property 
     theft, and cyber-attacks directly attributed to nation-state 
     governments. Elsewhere in this bill and report, the 
     Committees include measures to promote increased information 
     sharing across the interagency and with academia.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense 
     to provide the congressional intelligence and defense 
     committees,

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     within 90 days of enactment of the Act, a report listing 
     Chinese and Russian academic institutions that have a history 
     of improper technology transfer, intellectual property theft, 
     cyber espionage, or operate under the direction of their 
     respective armed forces or intelligence agencies. The report 
     should be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex.
     Investments in Scientific and Technological Intelligence.
       The Committees remain interested in the continued efforts 
     of the DoD to improve scientific and technological 
     intelligence (S&TI) capabilities and tradecraft across the 
     Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE). The Committees 
     recognize S&TI is critical to strategic competition with 
     near-peer competitors by ensuring comprehensive understanding 
     of adversary capabilities and ability to inform development 
     of joint force fifth-generation advanced weapons systems and 
     other emerging technologies.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I) in 
     collaboration with the Director of the DIA, to provide a 
     briefing to the Committees and the congressional defense 
     committees within 75 days of enactment of the Act, on the 
     alignment of current and planned DIE S&TI investments and 
     activities to DoD operational and strategic requirements.
       The briefing shall also include information on how the DoD 
     will continue the maturation of S&TI capabilities and 
     tradecraft across the DIE.
     Intelligence Support to Defense Operations in the Information 
         Environment.
       The Committees support DoD efforts to improve capabilities 
     and tradecraft to operate in the information environment. The 
     Committees are concerned about the Defense Intelligence 
     Enterprise's (DIE) ability to provide the information 
     operations community with all-source intelligence support, 
     consistent with the support provided to operations in other 
     domains.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in 
     coordination with the Joint Staff's Director for Intelligence 
     and the DNI, to provide a briefing to the congressional 
     intelligence and defense committees within 30 days of 
     enactment of the Act, on intelligence support to information 
     operations. The briefing should include standardized defense 
     intelligence lexicon for intelligence preparation of the 
     battlefield for information operations, efforts to develop a 
     process to ensure the full scope of emerging defense 
     information operations threat requirements are structured to 
     be addressed through the entirety of DIE capabilities, and 
     how the DIE perceives the future of defense operations in the 
     information environment.
       The briefing shall also include a description of how the 
     IC, through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, 
     will account for a more dynamic use of defense intelligence 
     capabilities to augment and enhance support to DoD operations 
     in the information environment.
     ROTC IC Recruitment Trial Program.
       The Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program, 
     with units or affiliates at approximately 1,600 U.S. colleges 
     and universities, is DoD's largest commissioning source, 
     providing approximately 6,500 new active duty officers to the 
     military each year.
       Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet all 
     graduation requirements of their academic institutions, 
     enroll in military, naval, or aerospace education courses, 
     and attend summer military training, making them ideal 
     candidates for IC placement. Currently, ROTC cadets only have 
     the option to utilize their training by joining one of the 
     military services. The Committees believe the government can 
     find cost savings and provide a wider range of opportunities 
     to ROTC recruits by leveraging the ROTC's existing training 
     program for the IC.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in 
     coordination with ODNI, to conduct a feasibility study on 
     creating a pathway for ROTC recruits to find employment in 
     the IC, on a reimbursable basis. The study should examine:
       1. Pros and cons of instituting an ROTC IC recruitment 
     pipeline;
       2. Approximate reimbursement cost per recruit; and
       3. Legislative requirements for program execution.
       The Committees direct that the study results be submitted 
     via report to the Committees and the congressional defense 
     committees within 90 days of enactment of the Act.
     Explosive Ordinance Disposal Intelligence.
       The Committees are concerned that the expertise of 
     Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel is not 
     adequately accessible and therefore, not sufficiently 
     utilized by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and IC to 
     provide the combatant commands with the required intelligence 
     to identify, combat, and deter violent extremism and other 
     asymmetric threats.
       Explosive ordnance includes all munitions, improvised 
     explosive devices, devices containing explosives, 
     propellants, nuclear fission or fusion materials, biological, 
     and chemical agents. The primary consumer of this information 
     are military tactical explosive ordnance disposal units that 
     employ the data for threat identification and neutralization. 
     However, the required analysis to determine appropriate 
     render-safe capabilities requires operational and strategic 
     intelligence to process and analyze the data, and data 
     management processes to promulgate the resulting information. 
     The Committees believe DoD should modernize the processes and 
     procedures to more comprehensively track, manage, and 
     coordinate the capability and capacity of EOD intelligence 
     within the IC and the DIE to support all levels of render-
     safe capabilities.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in 
     coordination with the ODNI, to provide a briefing to the 
     congressional intelligence and defense committees within 120 
     days of enactment of the Act on the capability and capacity 
     of EOD intelligence expertise across the DIE and IC. The 
     briefing shall include:
       1. An assessment of the coordination and integration of 
     defense and national intelligence capabilities against EOD 
     intelligence requirements, to include a mitigation strategy 
     to address any identified gaps or deficiencies, information-
     sharing challenges, or any other impediments to integration 
     of EOD expertise across the defense and intelligence 
     communities; and
       2. An assessment of the technical skills needed to address 
     EOD intelligence requirements, while identifying any gaps or 
     deficiencies in current personnel hiring and training 
     structures, and a long-term plan to develop proficiency of 
     EOD intelligence expertise in the defense and intelligence 
     communities.
     Information-Sharing Arrangements with India, Japan, and the 
         Republic of Korea.
       International alliances and partnerships are critical to 
     the pursuit and sustainment of the United States national 
     security objectives, built upon foundations of shared values 
     and intent. The Committees recognize the importance of the 
     DoD sharing information with international allies and 
     partners in support of the planning and execution of the 
     National Defense Strategy, as allies and third-party 
     international partners enhance strategic stability across the 
     Department's purview while increasing effectiveness of 
     operations. The Committees believe the mechanisms to share 
     information across the ``Five Eyes'' alliance continue to 
     mature through established exercises, exchange of personnel, 
     and virtual data sharing, while that cooperation is 
     potentially less robust with third-party partners.
       The Committees support the roles and contributions of 
     third-party partners such as India, Japan, and the Republic 
     of Korea, and recognizes their ongoing contribution toward 
     maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. 
     The Committees are interested in understanding the policies 
     and procedures governing the collaboration and information 
     sharing with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the 
     ``Five Eyes'' allies, and whether opportunities exist to 
     strengthen those arrangements.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the Under Secretary of 
     Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), in coordination with the 
     ODNI, to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence 
     and defense committees within 60 days of enactment of the 
     Act, on the benefits, challenges, and risks of broadening the 
     information-sharing mechanisms between India, Japan, the 
     Republic of Korea, and the ``Five Eyes'' allies.
     Transitioning the Function of Background Investigations to 
         the Department of Defense.
       Executive Order 13869 transitions the background 
     investigation functions of the Federal Government from the 
     Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National Background 
     Investigations Bureau, to the DoD, Defense 
     Counterintelligence and Security Agency. The Committees 
     recognize the importance of ensuring timely and efficient 
     background investigations to overcome workforce staffing 
     challenges of cleared individuals across the whole of 
     government and private sector, and to vet personnel who come 
     into contact with the Department's personnel, installations, 
     and technology. The Committees are aware of the temporary 
     establishment of the Personnel Vetting Transformation Office 
     in the OUSD(I) to manage the transition of this activity from 
     OPM to the Department and improve the processes and 
     procedures related to vetting personnel for clearances across 
     the whole of government and private sector.
       However, the Committees are concerned about the potential 
     risks to personnel management and mission such a transfer may 
     present, and believes that appropriate protections of civil 
     liberties and privacy must be prioritized throughout the 
     transition, through the implementation of modern and 
     efficient vetting measures. The Committees recognize the 
     Department's leadership, through sharing best practices with 
     ODNI, in reforming the vetting process using modern 
     techniques such as continuous evaluation, and expects regular 
     updates on the Department's progress in addressing the 
     current background investigations backlog.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in 
     coordination with the Director of the Defense 
     Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to provide a 
     briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense 
     committees within 90 days of enactment of the Act, on how the 
     DoD will transfer the background investigation mission and 
     establish an effective personnel vetting capability to 
     provide for the security of the Department, while maintaining 
     the civil liberties and privacy protections of personnel 
     under consideration to receive a clearance.
     Joint Intelligence Operations Center Staffing.
       The Committees recognize the evolving operational and 
     strategic priorities of the

[[Page H10243]]

     DoD will impact Defense Intelligence Enterprise capabilities 
     and resources. The Committees recognize the ongoing efforts 
     by the USD(I) to comply with direction specified by the John. 
     S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2019 (Public Law 115-232) to reduce and prevent imbalances in 
     priorities and mitigate against insufficient or misaligned 
     resources within the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
       While the Committees support the efforts by the USD(I) to 
     create efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence 
     Enterprise organizations, to include the Service Intelligence 
     Centers and combatant command Joint Operations Intelligence 
     Centers, and enable those elements to plan and posture 
     staffing requirements accordingly, the Committees are 
     concerned that the shifts in current and future resourcing 
     lack coherence to support the global mandate of the 
     Department.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in 
     coordination with DIA, to provide a briefing to the 
     congressional intelligence and defense committees within 90 
     days of enactment of the Act on how the OUSD(I) and DIA are 
     managing resourcing requirements to the combatant command 
     Joint Intelligence Operations Centers to meet current and 
     future needs of the combatant commanders and DoD.
     China's Biological Weapons Program.
       The Committees remain interested in ensuring the Defense 
     Intelligence Enterprise is providing timely, accurate, and 
     effective intelligence to support information needs of the 
     DoD, and are aware of a recent GAO report on long-range 
     emerging threats facing the United States that highlighted 
     potential pursuit by near-peer competitors of biological 
     weapons using genetic engineering and synthetic biology.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the USD(I), in 
     coordination with the Director of the DIA, to provide a 
     briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense 
     committees within 30 days of enactment of the Act with an 
     assessment of China's current and projected biological 
     weapons program, the risks presented to the joint force, and 
     the mitigation strategies to protect U.S. military forces 
     against said threats.
     Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid Repository System Government 
         Accountability Office Review.
       The re-emergence of great power competition will stress 
     DIA's ability to provide foundational military intelligence 
     for the IC and warfighters. As such, the Committees are 
     supportive of DIA's intent to replace the Modernized 
     Integrated Database (MIDB) with the Machine-assisted Analytic 
     Rapid Repository System (MARS).
       However, the Committees are concerned that MARS's 
     development and procurement will entail a complex and 
     extensive transformation that will impact the DIA's delivery 
     of foundational military intelligence.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the GAO to provide a 
     report to the congressional intelligence and defense 
     committees within one year of enactment of the Act that 
     describes:
       1. The envisioned users and customer base and how they will 
     use MARS;
       2. An assessment of the transition plan from MIDB to MARS 
     with input from current and historic MIDB users, as well as 
     customers;
       3. An assessment of the resources necessary to fully 
     implement MARS, to include funding and personnel 
     implications;
       4. An assessment of DIA's acquisition strategy for MARS to 
     include the use of any rapid acquisition or prototyping 
     authorities; and
       5. The challenges DIA has identified that it will face in 
     transitioning from MIDB to MARS and whether its migration 
     plans are sufficient for addressing these challenges.
       The Committees expect DIA's full cooperation with the GAO 
     study.
     Update on the DIA Strategic Approach.
       In September 2018, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
     adopted a Strategic Approach to enhance workforce 
     development, improve foundational military intelligence data 
     management, address perennial intelligence issues and realign 
     roles and missions. Improvements in these issue areas will 
     enhance the Agency's ability to support both the National 
     Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.
       The Committees support the DIA's initiative to improve 
     those structures it assesses are critical to providing 
     warfighters the information needed to prevent and, if 
     necessary, decisively win wars, such as intelligence on 
     foreign militaries' capabilities.
       Therefore, the Committees direct DIA to provide quarterly 
     briefings, beginning 45 days after enactment of the Act, to 
     the congressional intelligence and defense committees on its 
     efforts to enhance workforce development, improve 
     foundational military intelligence data management, address 
     perennial intelligence issues, and realign roles and 
     missions.
     Report on Chinese Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and 
         U.S. Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter 
         Chinese Election Interference.
       The Committees direct the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide a report to the 
     Committees, the congressional defense committees, the House 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, the House Committee on Homeland Security, and the 
     Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs on the Chinese government's influence operations and 
     campaigns targeting democratic elections.
       The report shall be divided into two sections, which 
     respectively address influence operations and campaigns 
     targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United 
     States (dating back to January 1, 2017), and (2) military 
     alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a 
     member. The report should also include a strategy to counter 
     these activities. The Committees further direct the Secretary 
     of Defense to provide an interim report within 30 days of 
     enactment of the Act, and a final report within a year of 
     enactment of the Act.
       The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for 
     release to the public but may include a classified annex. At 
     a minimum, the report should include:
       1. An assessment of China's objectives in influence 
     operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and 
     military alliances and partnerships of which the United 
     States is a member, and how such objectives relate to the 
     China's broader strategic aims;
       2. The United States' strategy and capabilities for 
     detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such Chinese 
     influence operations (including recommended authorities and 
     activities) and campaigns and a discussion of the DoD's and 
     the IC's respective roles in the strategy;
       3. A comprehensive list of specific Chinese state and non-
     state entities involved in supporting such Chinese influence 
     operations and campaigns and the role of each entity in 
     supporting them;
       4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and 
     procedures used in previous Chinese influence operations and 
     campaigns;
       5. A comprehensive identification of countries with 
     democratic election systems that have been targeted by 
     Chinese influence operations and campaigns since January 1, 
     2017;
       6. An assessment of the impact of previous Chinese 
     influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
     elections and military alliances and partnerships of which 
     the United States is a member, including the views of senior 
     Chinese officials about their effectiveness in achieving 
     Chinese objectives;
       7. An identification of countries with democratic elections 
     systems that may be targeted in future Chinese influence 
     operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood 
     that each such country will be targeted;
       8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and 
     partnerships that have been targeted by Chinese influence 
     operations and campaigns since January 1, 2017;
       9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and 
     partnerships that may be targeted in future Chinese influence 
     operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood 
     that each such country will be targeted; and
       10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and 
     procedures likely to be used in future Chinese influence 
     operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and 
     military alliances and partnerships of which the United 
     States is a member.
     Report on Russian Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and 
         U.S. Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter 
         Russian Election Interference.
       The Committees direct the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide a report to the 
     Committees, the congressional defense committees, the House 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, the House Committee on Homeland Security, and the 
     Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs on Russia's influence operations and campaigns 
     targeting democratic elections.
       The report shall be divided into two sections, which 
     respectively address influence operations and campaigns 
     targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United 
     States (dating back to January 1, 2017) and (2) military 
     alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a 
     member. The report should also include a strategy to counter 
     these activities. The Committees further direct the Secretary 
     of Defense to provide an interim report within 30 days of 
     enactment of the Act, and a final report within a year of 
     enactment of the Act.
       The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for 
     release to the public but may include a classified annex. At 
     a minimum, the report should include:
       1. An assessment of Russia's objectives in influence 
     operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and 
     military alliances and partnerships of which the United 
     States is a member, and how such objectives relate to 
     Russia's broader strategic aims;
       2. The United States strategy and capabilities for 
     detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such Russian 
     influence operations (including recommended authorities and 
     activities) and campaigns and a discussion of the DoD's and 
     IC's respective roles in the strategy;
       3. A comprehensive list of specific Russian state and non-
     state entities involved in supporting such Russian influence 
     operations and campaigns and the role of each entity in 
     supporting them;
       4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and 
     procedures used in previous Russian influence operations and 
     campaigns;

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       5. A comprehensive identification of countries with 
     democratic election systems that have been targeted by 
     Russian influence operations and campaigns since January 1, 
     2017;
       6. An assessment of the impact of previous Russian 
     influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic 
     elections and military alliances and partnerships of which 
     the United States is a member, including the views of senior 
     Russian officials about their effectiveness in achieving 
     Russian objectives;
       7. An identification of countries with democratic elections 
     systems that may be targeted in future Russian influence 
     operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood 
     that each such country will be targeted;
       8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and 
     partnerships that have been targeted by Russian influence 
     operations and campaigns since January 1, 2017;
       9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances and 
     partnerships that may be targeted in future Russian influence 
     operations and campaigns and an assessment of the likelihood 
     that each such country will be targeted; and
       10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and 
     procedures likely to be used in future Russian influence 
     operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections and 
     military alliances and partnerships of which the United 
     States is a member.


            UNCLASSIFIED DIRECTION RELATED TO SUBDIVISION 2

     Management of Intelligence Community Workforce.
       The Committees repeat direction from the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that IC elements 
     should build, develop, and maintain a workforce appropriately 
     balanced among its civilian, military, and contractor 
     workforce sectors to meet the missions assigned to it in law 
     and by the president. Starting in Fiscal Year 2019, the 
     Committees no longer authorize position ceiling levels in the 
     annual Schedule of Authorizations.
       The Committees look forward to working with the ODNI as it 
     develops an implementation strategy and sets standards for 
     workforce cost analysis tools.
     Countering Russian Propaganda.
       The Committees support the IC's role in countering Russian 
     propaganda and other active measures. The Committees are 
     committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities, 
     financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these 
     hostile acts. The Committees specifically find that language 
     capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering 
     Russia's hostile acts. The Committees encourage the IC to 
     commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering 
     officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting 
     Russian language speakers, and training officers in Russian, 
     in particular key technical language skills. This effort will 
     require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating 
     officers through language training. The Committees expect to 
     see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.
     Protection of the Supply Chain in Intelligence Community 
         Acquisition Decisions.
       The Committees continue to have significant concerns about 
     risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The Committees 
     encourage the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk 
     Management Task Force recommendations to support continued 
     efforts to develop an open, interoperable information 
     security-sharing platform to enable real-time cross-domain 
     sharing for the IC to effectively share and analyze 
     information on supply chain, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, 
     and counterintelligence risks.
       The report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the DNI to review and consider 
     changes to Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 801 
     (``Acquisition'') to reflect the issuance of ICD 731 
     (``Supply Chain Risk Management'') in 2013 and the issues 
     associated with cybersecurity. It specifically recommended 
     the review examine whether to: expand risk management 
     criteria in the acquisition process to include cyber and 
     supply chain threats; require counterintelligence and 
     security assessments as part of the acquisition and 
     procurement process; propose and adopt new education 
     requirements for acquisition professionals on cyber and 
     supply chain threats; and factor in the cost of cyber and 
     supply chain security. This review was due in November 2017, 
     with a report on the process for updating ICD 801 in December 
     2017. The report was completed on June 18, 2018.
       As a follow-on to this review, the Committees direct DNI to 
     address three other considerations: changes in the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes 
     should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security 
     risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and 
     operational phases of acquisition. The Committees further 
     direct the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary 
     changes within 60 days of completion of this review.
     National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use of VERA and VSIP 
         Authorities.
       The Committees encourage the use by the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early 
     Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation 
     Incentive Program (VSIP) offers to meet future goals of 
     building a workforce more attuned to automation of data 
     production, automation of analytic processes, and 
     establishment of development and operations (DevOps) software 
     development processes.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the NGA to report to the 
     Committees, within 120 days of enactment of the Act, on its 
     use to date of VERA and VSIP incentives, to include how they 
     have been used to develop an acquisition cadre skilled in 
     ``DevOps'' software development processes, as well as a plan 
     for further use of these incentives. The report should 
     specify metrics for retooling its workforce, including how it 
     measures data literacy and computational skills in potential 
     hires, and an accounting of the numbers of new hires who have 
     met these higher standards.
     Report on Engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with 
         University Community.
       The Committees recognize that the survivability and 
     resiliency of United States satellites is critically 
     important to the United States intelligence and defense 
     communities. While the NRO engages with the university 
     community in support of basic research and developing an 
     education workforce pipeline to help advance new technologies 
     and produce skilled professionals, it can do more in this 
     regard to focus on space survivability.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the NRO to report, within 
     120 days of enactment of the Act, on NRO's current efforts 
     and future strategies to engage with university partners that 
     are strategically located, host secure information 
     facilities, and offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a 
     particular focus on space survivability and resiliency. This 
     report should provide a summary of NRO's current and planned 
     university engagement programs, levels of funding, and 
     program research and workforce objectives and metrics. The 
     report should also include an assessment of the strategic 
     utility of chartering a University Affiliated Research Center 
     in this domain.
     National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Facilities.
       Consistent with section 2401 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the Committees 
     authorize the President's request for $447.8 million in 
     Fiscal Year 2019 for phase two construction activities of the 
     Next National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency West (N2W) 
     facility in St. Louis, Missouri. The Committees are pleased 
     that the second phase of this $837.2 million project was 
     included in the Fiscal Year 2019 President's budget.
     Clarification of Oversight Responsibilities.
       The Committees reinforce the requirement for all IC 
     agencies funded by the NIP to respond in a full, complete, 
     and timely manner to any request for information made by a 
     member of the congressional intelligence committees. In 
     addition, the Committees direct the DNI to issue guidelines, 
     within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to ensure that the 
     intent of section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3091) is carried out.
     Clarification on Cooperation with Investigation on Russian 
         Influence in the 2016 Election.
       The Committees continue to reinforce the obligation for all 
     IC agencies to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely 
     manner with the Committees' ongoing investigations into 
     Russian meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and 
     cooperation with the declassification process.
     Supervisory Feedback as Part of Continuous Vetting Program.
       The Committees direct the DNI to review the results of 
     ongoing pilot programs regarding the use of supervisory 
     feedback as part of the periodic reinvestigation and 
     continuous vetting process and report, within 180 days of 
     enactment of the Act, on the establishment of a policy for 
     its use across the IC.
     National Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure.
       The Committees are aware of significant threats to our 
     critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed 
     by foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the 
     information related to these threats make the role of the IC 
     of vital importance to United States defensive efforts. The 
     Committees have grave concerns that current IC resources 
     dedicated to analyzing and countering these threats are 
     neither sufficient nor closely coordinated. The Committees 
     include provisions within this legislation to address these 
     concerns.
     Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection 
         Doctrine.
       The Committees direct the ODNI, in coordination with 
     appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework 
     that could support the eventual creation and execution of a 
     Government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection 
     doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may 
     contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, within 180 days of enactment of the Act.
       This framework shall include:
       1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber 
     threats to the protection of the United States' national 
     security systems and critical infrastructure;
       2. IC definitions of key cybersecurity concepts, to include 
     cyberespionage, cyber theft, cyber acts of aggression, and 
     cyber deterrence;
       3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure 
     identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national 
     security interests, and

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     to inform policy responses to cyber-attacks and computer 
     network operations directed against the United States;
       4. The IC's methodology for assessing the impacts of cyber-
     attacks and computer network operations incidents directed 
     against the United States, taking into account differing 
     levels of severity of incidents;
       5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response to 
     cyber-attacks and computer network operations incidents, 
     taking into account differing levels of severity of 
     incidents;
       6. A policy and architecture for sharing cybersecurity-
     related intelligence with government, private sector, and 
     international partners, including existing statutory and 
     other authorities which may be exercised in pursuit of that 
     goal; and
       7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities, governance, 
     technology, resources, and policy to provide more capable and 
     agile cybersecurity.
     Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and 
         Responsibilities.
       The position of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community (IC IG) was codified by the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Among other things, 
     the IC IG's statutory purposes include ``conduct[ing] 
     independent reviews investigations, inspections, audits, and 
     reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility 
     and authority of the Director of National Intelligence;'' 
     keeping the Committees fully and currently informed of 
     significant problems and deficiencies; and leading efforts of 
     inspectors general within the IC.
       The Committees have included provisions intended to 
     strengthen the IC IG's role. The Committees will insist on 
     full cooperation from the Director, ODNI offices, as well as 
     those of inspectors general across the IC, in ensuring that 
     the IC IG's prescribed functions are carried out to the 
     fullest extent possible. The Committees further reiterate 
     Congress's intent that the IC IG is obligated to identify and 
     inform the Committees of significant problems and 
     deficiencies ``relating to'' all intelligence programs and 
     activities.
       The Committees also remain seriously concerned about the 
     undermining of protections and rights afforded to 
     whistleblowers within the IC and the level of insight 
     congressional committees have into the handling of lawful 
     disclosures. Without exception, the Committees must be made 
     aware of lawful disclosures made to any inspector general 
     within the IC, consistent with provisions added to Title 50 
     by sections 5331-5335 of Subdivision 1 of the Act; and of all 
     lawful disclosures made pursuant to ICWPA and Title 50 
     procedures, which Intelligence Community personnel intend to 
     be submitted to the Committees. The Committees underscore in 
     the strongest terms that all elements of the IC are 
     obligated, as a categorical matter, to comply with both 
     existing law as well as direction provided elsewhere in the 
     Act and this Explanation, with respect to inspector general 
     and whistleblower matters.
     Space Launch Facilities.
       The Committees continue to believe it is critical to 
     preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support 
     national security space missions, and encourage planned 
     launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital 
     Program (OSP)-3 NRO-111 mission, to be launched in 2019 on a 
     Minotaur 1 from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at 
     Wallops Flight Facility. In the Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Committees directed a brief 
     from the ODNI, in consultation with the DoD and the U.S. Air 
     Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned and operated 
     spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and private 
     investments to bolster United States launch capabilities and 
     provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high inclination 
     orbits for national security missions.
       The Committees direct that the ODNI supplement this brief 
     with how state investments in these spaceports may support 
     infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and 
     launch capabilities, for national security launches.
     Acquisition Research Center Postings.
       The Committees support a flexible NRO acquisition process 
     that allows the NRO to choose the most appropriate 
     contracting mechanism, whether for small research and 
     development efforts or large acquisitions. The NRO's 
     Acquisition Research Center (ARC), a classified contracting 
     and solicitation marketplace that NRO and other agencies use, 
     enables this flexible acquisition process for classified 
     efforts.
       The Committees direct the NRO, within 60 days of enactment 
     of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and 
     defense committees on options for modifying ARC posting 
     procedures to ensure fair and open competition. Those options 
     should include ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations 
     are posted on the unclassified FEDBIZOPS website, and 
     identifying ways to better utilize the ARC to encourage 
     contract opportunities for a more diverse industrial base 
     that includes smaller and non-traditional companies.
     Ensuring Strong Strategic Analytical Tradecraft.
       The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of 
     Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has taken steps to improve 
     the quality of its analysis, to identify its core customers, 
     and to tailor its production to meet customer needs. The 
     Committees concur with I&A's implementation of analytic 
     standards and review mechanisms that have improved the 
     tradecraft behind I&A products. The bedrock of these efforts 
     has been the development of a yearly program of analysis 
     (POA) and key intelligence questions, which are essential 
     tools for providing a roadmap and boundaries for the office's 
     production efforts.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the Office of I&A to 
     continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic 
     intelligence capabilities and production, including the 
     annual development of a POA. Within 90 days of enactment of 
     the Act, and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A 
     shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the 
     development and execution of its POA. These briefings should 
     provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been 
     incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against 
     the POA.
     Cyber/Counterintelligence Analysis.
       DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center 
     analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by 
     foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC 
     intelligence production. Advanced technologies are 
     increasingly ubiquitous and necessary to the function of 
     modern society. Consequently, the scope of the threats from 
     countries intent on using these technologies as a vector for 
     collecting intelligence from within the United States will 
     continue to expand. The Office of I&A is positioned to 
     conduct a niche analysis critical to national security that 
     combines foreign intelligence with domestic threat 
     information.
       The Committees strongly support I&A's Counterintelligence 
     Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the 
     increased resources dedicated to this analysis in Fiscal Year 
     2019. Therefore, the Committees direct the I&A, in 
     coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days 
     of enactment of the Act on its recent analytic production 
     related to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign 
     technology companies, including a review of the countries and 
     companies that present the greatest risks in this regard.
     Intelligence Support to the Export Control Process.
       The Committees have significant concerns that China poses a 
     growing threat to United States national security, due in 
     part to its relentless efforts to acquire United States 
     technology. China purposely blurs the distinction between its 
     military and civilian activities through its policy of 
     ``military-civilian fusion,'' which compounds the risks of 
     diversion of United States technology to the Chinese 
     military.
       The Committees conclude that the United States Government 
     currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed 
     to address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in 
     existing U.S. mechanisms aimed at preventing dangerous 
     technology transfers, including the U.S. export control 
     system, which is run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's 
     Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The Committees have 
     specific concerns about the lack of adequate and effective IC 
     support to BIS's export license application review process 
     and believe more robust IC support could have prevented many 
     of the ill-advised technology transfers that have occurred in 
     recent years.
       Therefore, the Committees directs the DNI to submit a plan, 
     within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to describe how the 
     IC will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely 
     analysis of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any 
     proposed export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled 
     technology. The plan shall include detailed information on 
     the appropriate organizational structure, including how many 
     IC personnel would be required, where they would be located 
     (including whether they would be embedded at BIS to 
     coordinate IC support), and the amounts of necessary funding. 
     In formulating the plan, the DNI should study the ``National 
     Security Threat Assessment'' process that the National 
     Intelligence Council uses to inform the actions of the 
     Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The DNI 
     shall submit the plan to the congressional intelligence 
     committees in classified form.
     Social Media.
       The Committees encourage the IC, notably the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation (FBI), to both continue and enhance its 
     efforts to assist in detecting, understanding, and warning 
     about foreign influence operations using social media tools 
     to target the United States. Additionally, within the scope 
     of the IC's authorities, and with all necessary protections 
     for U.S. person information, the Committees encourage the IC 
     to augment and prioritize these ongoing efforts.
     Trade-Based Money Laundering.
       Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money 
     laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committees direct 
     the DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit a 
     report to the congressional intelligence committees on these 
     threats, including an assessment of the severity of the 
     threats posed to the United States' national security by 
     trade-based money laundering conducted inside and outside the 
     United States; an assessment of the scope of the financial 
     threats to the U.S. economy and financial systems posed by 
     trade-based money laundering; a description of how terrorist 
     financing and drug trafficking organizations are advancing 
     their illicit activities through

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     the use of licit trade channels; an assessment of the 
     adequacy of the systems and tools available to the Federal 
     Government for combating trade-based money laundering; and a 
     description and assessment of the current structure and 
     coordination between Federal agencies, as well as with 
     foreign governments, to combat trade-based money laundering. 
     The report shall be submitted in classified form with an 
     unclassified summary to be made available to the public.
     Expansions of Security Protective Service Jurisdiction of the 
         Central Intelligence Agency.
       The Committees direct the CIA, in connection with the 
     expansion of its security protective service jurisdiction as 
     set forth in section 6413 of Subdivision 2 of the Act, to 
     engage with Virginia state and local law enforcement 
     authorities to ensure that a memorandum of understanding, 
     akin to those in place at other agencies setting forth the 
     appropriate allocation of duties and responsibilities, is in 
     effect.
     Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information.
       The Committees are concerned by the recent widespread media 
     reports that purport to contain unauthorized disclosures of 
     classified information. Protecting the nation's secrets from 
     unauthorized disclosure is essential to safeguarding our 
     nation's intelligence sources and methods. An unlawful 
     disclosure of classified information can destroy sensitive 
     collection capabilities and endanger American lives, 
     including those individuals who take great personal risks to 
     assist the United States in collecting vital foreign 
     intelligence.
       Federal law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information, but enforcement is often lacking or 
     inconsistent. Accordingly, the Committees desire to better 
     understand the number of potential unauthorized disclosures 
     discovered and investigated on a routine basis. Moreover, the 
     Committees have little visibility into the number of 
     investigations initiated by each IC agency or the number of 
     criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. Accordingly, 
     section 6718 of Subdivision 2 of the Act requires all IC 
     agencies to provide the congressional intelligence committees 
     with a semi-annual report of the number of investigations of 
     unauthorized disclosures to journalists or media 
     organizations, including subsequent referrals made to the 
     United States Attorney General.
       Additionally, the Committees wish to better understand the 
     role of IGs within elements of the IC, with respect to 
     unauthorized disclosures of classified information at those 
     elements.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the IC IG, within 180 days 
     of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional 
     intelligence committees with a report regarding the role of 
     IGs with respect to investigating unauthorized disclosures. 
     The report shall address: the roles of IC elements' security 
     personnel and law enforcement regarding unauthorized 
     disclosures; the current role of IGs within IC elements 
     regarding such disclosures; what, if any, specific actions 
     could be taken by such IGs to increase their involvement in 
     the investigation of such matters; any laws, rules or 
     procedures that currently prevent IGs from increasing their 
     involvement; and the benefits and drawbacks of increased IG 
     involvement, to include potential impacts to IG's roles and 
     missions.
     Presidential Policy Guidance.
       The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) dated May 22, 2013, 
     and entitled ``Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against 
     Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas 
     of Active Hostilities'' provides for the participation by 
     elements of the IC in reviews of certain proposed 
     counterterrorism operations. The Committees expect to remain 
     fully and currently informed about the status of the PPG and 
     its implementation.
       Therefore, the Committees direct ODNI, within five days of 
     any change to the PPG, or to any successor policy guidance, 
     to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     written notification thereof, that shall include a summary of 
     the change and the specific legal and policy justifications 
     for the change.
     Centers for Academic Excellence.
       The Committees commend the commitment demonstrated by the 
     program managers of the IC's Centers for Academic Excellence 
     (IC-CAE), IC agencies that sponsored CAE interns, and all 
     other personnel who contributed to the inaugural edition of 
     the CAE Internship Program in summer 2017.
       The Committees expect the IC-CAE Program to build on this 
     foundation by showing measurable, swift progress, and 
     ultimately fulfilling Congress's intent that the Program 
     serve as a pipeline of the next generation of IC 
     professionals.
       Therefore, the Committees direct that the IC take all 
     viable action to expand the IC-CAE Program by increasing, to 
     the fullest extent possible:
       1. The number and racial and gender diversity of IC-CAE 
     interns;
       2. The number of IC-CAE academic institutions and their 
     qualified internship candidates participating in the IC-CAE 
     Program; and
       3. The number of IC elements that sponsor IC-CAE interns.
     Report on Violent Extremist Groups.
       Violent extremist groups like ISIS continue to exploit the 
     Internet for nefarious purposes: to inspire lone wolves; to 
     spread propaganda; to recruit foreign fighters; and to plan 
     and publicize atrocities. As a former Director of the 
     National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stated publicly:
       [W]e need to counter our adversaries' successful use of 
     social media platforms to advance their propaganda goals, 
     raise funds, recruit, coordinate travel and attack plans, and 
     facilitate operations. . . . Our future work must focus on 
     denying our adversaries the capability to spread their 
     messages to at-risk populations that they can reach through 
     the use of these platforms.
       Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2017 required the DNI, consistent with the 
     protection of sources and methods, to assist public and 
     private sector entities in recognizing online violent 
     extremist content--specifically, by making publicly available 
     a list of insignias and logos associated with foreign 
     extremist groups designated by the Secretary of State. The 
     Committees believe the IC can take additional steps.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the Director of NCTC, in 
     coordination with other appropriate officials designated by 
     the DNI, within 180 days of enactment of the Act, to brief 
     the congressional intelligence committees on options for a 
     pilot program to develop and continually update best 
     practices for private technology companies to quickly 
     recognize and lawfully take down violent extremist content 
     online. Such briefing shall address:
       1. The feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of such a 
     program;
       2. The U.S. Government agencies and private sector entities 
     that would participate; and
       3. Any additional authorities that would be required by the 
     program's establishment.
     South China Sea.
       The South China Sea is an area of great geostrategic 
     importance to the United States and its allies. However, 
     China's controversial territorial claims and other actions 
     stand to undercut international norms and erode the region's 
     stability. It is thus imperative the United States uphold 
     respect for international law in the South China Sea. 
     Fulfilling that objective in turn will require an optimal 
     intelligence collection posture.
       Therefore, the direct the DoD, in coordination with DNI, 
     within 30 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the 
     congressional intelligence and defense committees on known 
     intelligence collection gaps, if any, with respect to 
     adversary operations and aims in the South China Sea. The 
     briefing shall identify the gaps and whether those gaps are 
     driven by lack of access, lack of necessary collection 
     capabilities or legal or policy authorities, or by other 
     factors. The briefing shall also identify IC judgments that 
     assess which intelligence disciplines would be best-suited to 
     answer the existing gaps, and current plans to address the 
     gaps over the Future Years Defense Program.
     Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards.
       Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Threat Task 
     Force established minimum insider threat standards. Such 
     standards are required for the sharing and safeguarding of 
     classified information on computer networks while ensuring 
     consistent, appropriate protections for privacy and civil 
     liberties. The Committees understand there are policies in 
     place to attempt implementation of such standards; however, 
     the Committees have found that several elements of the IC 
     have not fully implemented such standards. Therefore, given 
     the several high-profile insider threat issues, the 
     Committees emphasize the importance of such minimums by 
     statutorily requiring the DNI to establish a policy on 
     minimum insider threat standards, consistent with the 
     National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for 
     Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and IC elements 
     should expeditiously establish their own policies and 
     implement the DNI guidance.
       Further, referring to the directive language found in the 
     committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the Fiscal Year 2019 
     NDAA reported by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), 
     the Committees direct the Chief Management Officer to provide 
     a briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense 
     committees, no later than 90 days after enactment of the Act, 
     on the outcomes of its cost and technical analyses required 
     by this report, and the DoD's efforts to implement 
     enterprise-wide programs and policies for insider threat 
     detection, user activity monitoring, and cyber-attack 
     detection and remediation.
     Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment.
       The Committees remain supportive of the goals of 
     Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC 
     ITE) and the importance of the common, secure sharing 
     infrastructure it creates. The Committees further understand 
     that the path to implement a complex, technical environment 
     such as IC ITE needs to be sufficiently flexible and agile. 
     However, the Committees remain concerned with the lack of 
     consistency and substance in previous reports and briefings 
     on IC ITE. Therefore, section 6312 of Subdivision 2 of the 
     Act requires a long-term roadmap, business plan, and security 
     plan that shall be reported to the congressional intelligence 
     committees at least quarterly with additional notifications 
     as necessary.
     Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer.
       The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 mandated 
     best practices for decision-

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     making and accountability, as well as improved decision-
     makers' access to reliable and timely financial and 
     performance information. The CFO Act, as amended, requires 
     that the chief financial officers of 24 departments and 
     agencies ``report directly to the head of the agency 
     regarding financial management matters.'' Section 6404 of 
     Subdivision 2 of the Act brings the ODNI in line with the 
     best practices implemented in the CFO Act.
     Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer.
       As codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(1)(A), each federal agency 
     head is responsible for ``carrying out the information 
     resources management activities to improve agency 
     productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness.'' Accordingly, 
     section 6405 of Subdivision 2 of the Act expresses the 
     Committee's intent to emphasize the importance of the IC 
     Chief Information Officer (CIO), as defined in 50 U.S.C. 
     3032(a), in assisting the DNI with information resource 
     management by requiring the IC CIO to report directly to 
     the DNI.
     Central Intelligence Agency Subsistence for Personnel 
         Assigned to Austere Locations.
       Section 6411 of Subdivision 2 of the Act permits the 
     Director of the CIA to allow subsistence for personnel 
     assigned to austere locations. Although the statute does not 
     define ``austere,'' the Committees believe that utilization 
     of this authority should be minimal. Therefore, within 180 
     days after the enactment of the Act, the CIA shall brief the 
     Committees on the CIA's definition of ``austere'' and the CIA 
     regulations in place governing this authority.
     Collocation of Certain Department of Homeland Security 
         Personnel at Field Locations.
       The Committees support DHS I&A's intent to integrate into 
     operations across the broader DHS enterprise. Accordingly, 
     section 6434 of Subdivision 2 of the Act requires I&A to 
     identify opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers 
     and to submit to the Committees a plan for their deployment.
     Limitations on Intelligence Community Elements' 
         Communications with Congress.
       Effective oversight of the IC requires unencumbered 
     communications between representatives of the agencies, 
     members of Congress, and congressional staff. The Committees 
     direct the DNI not to limit any element of the IC from having 
     interactions with the congressional intelligence committees, 
     including but not limited to, preclearance by the DNI of 
     remarks, briefings, discussions of agency resources or 
     authorities requirements, or mandatory reports to the DNI on 
     conversations with the Committees.
     Intelligence Community Support to the National Vetting 
         Center.
       On February 6, 2018, the President issued National Security 
     Policy Memorandum (NSPM)-9, ''Presidential Memorandum on 
     Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in 
     Support of National Vetting Enterprise.'' The memorandum 
     directs the DHS, in coordination with the ODNI and other 
     agencies, to establish the National Vetting Center. The 
     memorandum also requires agencies to ``provide the Center 
     access to relevant biographic, biometric, and related 
     derogatory information.'' It further directs DNI, in 
     coordination with the heads of relevant IC elements, to 
     ``establish a support element to facilitate, guide, and 
     coordinate all IC efforts to use classified intelligence and 
     other relevant information within the IC holdings in support 
     of the center.'' The Committees wish to obtain regular 
     updates and the most current information about the activities 
     of that support element.
       Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
     the Act and annually thereafter, the Committees direct the 
     DNI and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at 
     DHS to brief the Committees on the status of IC support to 
     the National Vetting Center, as established by NSPM-9.
     Update on Status of Attorney General-Approved U.S. Person 
         Procedures under Executive Order 12333.
       The Committees acknowledge the difficult, labor-intensive 
     work undertaken by certain IC elements, to ensure the current 
     effectiveness of, and in some cases to substantially revise, 
     final Attorney General-approved procedures regarding the 
     collection, dissemination, and retention of United States 
     persons information. The Committees wish to better understand 
     the status of this project, throughout the IC.
       Therefore, the Committees direct that, not later than 60 
     days after enactment of the Act, the DNI and the Attorney 
     General shall brief the Committees on the issuance of final, 
     Attorney General-approved procedures by elements of the IC. 
     Specifically, the briefing shall identify (1) any such 
     elements that have not yet issued final procedures; and (2) 
     with respect to such elements, the status of the procedures' 
     development, and any interim guidance or procedures on which 
     those elements currently rely.
     Homegrown Violent Extremists Imprisoned in Department of 
         Defense Facilities.
       The Committees are concerned about an evident gap in 
     information sharing about individuals imprisoned in DoD 
     facilities who are categorized by the FBI as homegrown 
     violent extremists (HVEs). A recent FBI report underscores 
     this gap, highlighting the case of an individual who has been 
     convicted and sentenced to death by a U.S. military court 
     martial and remains incarcerated in a U.S. military facility. 
     The Committees understand that, despite his incarceration, 
     this inmate openly communicates with the outside world 
     through written correspondence and has continued to inspire 
     extremists throughout the world. The Committees further 
     understand that the FBI is unable to determine the full scope 
     of this inmate's contacts with the outside world because only 
     a portion of his communications have been provided by the 
     DoD.
       Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
     the Act, the Committees direct the FBI to work with the DoD 
     to create a process by which the DoD provides to the FBI the 
     complete communications of individuals imprisoned in DoD 
     facilities and who are categorized by the FBI as HVEs.
     Naming of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters.
       According to statute enacted in 1972, the current FBI 
     headquarters building in Washington, D.C. must be ``known and 
     designated'' as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' That 
     tribute has aged poorly. It should be reconsidered, in view 
     of Hoover's record on civil liberties--including the effort 
     to disparage and undermine Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Even 
     today, Hoover's name evokes the FBI's sordid ``COINTELPRO'' 
     activities.
       The Committees believe Congress should consider repealing 
     the provision requiring the existing Pennsylvania Avenue 
     building to be known as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' 
     A new name should be determined, through a joint dialogue 
     among Bureau leadership, law enforcement personnel, elected 
     officials, and civil rights leaders.
     Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math careers in Defense 
         Intelligence.
       Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
     report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported Fiscal Year 
     2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Director of DIA to 
     provide, within 90 days after enactment of the Act, a 
     briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
     congressional defense committees on a plan to develop a 
     Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math career program 
     that attracts and maintains the defense intelligence cadre of 
     Science and Technical Intelligence analysts to meet 
     tomorrow's threats.
     Security and Intelligence Role in Export Control.
       Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
     report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported Fiscal Year 
     2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Under Secretary of 
     Defense for Policy, in coordination with the USD(I), within 
     60 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional 
     intelligence and defense committees, on security support to 
     export control.
     Security Clearance Background Investigation Reciprocity.
       Referring to the directive language found in the committee 
     report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported Fiscal Year 
     2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of Defense, in 
     coordination with the DNI and the Director of the Office of 
     Personnel Management, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, 
     to brief the Committees and the congressional defense 
     committees on efforts to ensure seamless transition of 
     investigations between authorized investigative agencies, as 
     required by law.
       Further, referring to the directive language found in the 
     committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-reported 
     Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA, the Committees direct the Secretary of 
     Defense, in coordination with the DNI and the Director of the 
     Office of Personnel Management, within 90 days of enactment 
     of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence 
     committees on efforts to ensure reciprocity is a 
     consideration for implementation of continuous evaluation and 
     continuous vetting across the federal government.
     Foreign Influence Task Force.
       The IC has warned of active measures taken by foreign 
     actors to interfere with and undermine the U.S. democratic 
     process, most recently and brazenly by the Russian 
     Federation. The Committees appreciate FBI efforts to confront 
     this challenge in part through creation of its Foreign 
     Influence Task Force. The Committees believe that confronting 
     foreign influence directed at the United States is of 
     fundamental importance, and thus desire to engage in a close 
     and regular dialogue with the FBI about the task force's 
     activities.
       Therefore, the Committees direct the FBI to provide 
     detailed, quarterly briefings to the Committees regarding the 
     task force's activities, to include its progress and any 
     significant challenges.
     Enhanced Oversight of IC Contractors.
       A topic of sustained congressional intelligence committee 
     interest has been improving the federal government's 
     oversight of IC acquisition and procurement practices, 
     including activities by poorly performing IC contractors.
       A framework exists to ensure that IC elements do not award 
     IC contracts to businesses that engage in negligence or even 
     gross negligence, consistently fail to appropriately 
     safeguard classified information, maintain poor financial 
     practices, or other issues. For example, an IC element may 
     maintain a list of contractors of concern, in order to ensure 
     that proposals from such contractors are rejected or 
     subjected to additional scrutiny. The Committees wish to 
     build on these practices and are concerned about the existing 
     framework's adequacy.
       Therefore, the Committees direct all elements of the IC, to 
     the fullest extent consistent with applicable law and policy, 
     to

[[Page H10248]]

     share with one another information about contractors with 
     track records of concern--such as the commission of 
     negligence or gross negligence in the performance of IC 
     contracts, or the repeated failure to appropriately safeguard 
     classified information in a fashion that the contractor 
     reasonably could have been expected to prevent.
       Additionally, no later than 30 days after enactment of the 
     Act, the DNI shall brief the Committees on the authorities of 
     IC elements with respect to contractors with track records of 
     concern--before, during, and after procurement. An objective 
     of the briefing will be to discuss information sharing 
     practices in this regard, and to identify specific areas 
     where the oversight framework can be strengthened.
     Security Clearance Reporting Requirements.
       The Agreement directs the Office of Management and Budget, 
     in coordination with members of the Performance 
     Accountability Council, to report to Congress, within 90 days 
     of enactment of the Act, on recommendations for harmonizing 
     and streamlining reporting requirements related to security 
     clearances that have been set forth in legislation.

 Part III: Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Legislative 
                                  Text

              SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

       The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
     explanation of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
     Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 
     2019, and 2020 (the ``Act'').

    SUBDIVISION 1--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020

     Section 5100. Table of contents.

                   Title LI--Intelligence Activities

     Section 5101. Authorization of appropriations.
       Section 5101 lists the United States Government 
     departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act 
     authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities for Fiscal Year 2020.
     Section 5102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
       Section 5102 provides that the details of the amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2020 are 
     contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and 
     that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President.
     Section 5103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
       Section 5103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal 
     Year 2020.

Title LII--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

     Section 5201. Authorization of appropriations.
       Section 5201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
     $514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for 
     Fiscal Year 2020.

               Title LIII--Intelligence Community Matters

           Subtitle A--General Intelligence Community Matters

     Section 5301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence 
         activities.
       Section 5301 provides that the authorization of 
     appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
     authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that 
     is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of 
     the United States.
     Section 5302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits 
         authorized by law.
       Section 5302 provides that funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and 
     other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
     additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
     increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
     Section 5303. Expansion of scope of protections for 
         identities of covert agents.
       Section 5303 amends the definition of ``covert agent'' in 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3126(4)) to 
     protect the identities of all undercover intelligence 
     officers, and United States citizens whose relationship to 
     the United States is classified, regardless of the location 
     of the individuals' government service or time since 
     separation from government service.
     Section 5304. Required counterintelligence assessments, 
         briefings, notifications, and reports.
       Section 5304 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
     appropriate agencies, to conduct an assessment following a 
     United States election of any foreign government 
     interference. Section 5304 requires the DNI to post publicly 
     advisory reports on foreign counterintelligence and 
     cybersecurity threats to federal election campaigns. It also 
     requires quarterly briefings to the congressional 
     intelligence committees regarding the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation's counterintelligence activities and prompt 
     notification of an investigation carried out regarding a 
     counterintelligence risk related to a federal election or 
     campaign.
     Section 5305. Inclusion of security risks in program 
         management plans required for acquisition of major 
         systems in National Intelligence Program.
       Section 5305 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3024(q)(1)(A)) to require that the annual program 
     management plans on major system acquisitions that the DNI 
     submits to Congress address security risks, in addition to 
     cost, schedule, performance goals, and program milestone 
     criteria.
     Section 5306. Intelligence community public-private talent 
         exchange.
       Section 5306 requires the DNI to develop policies, 
     processes, and procedures to facilitate IC personnel 
     rotations to the private sector and vice versa, to bolster 
     skill development and collaboration. Section 5306 further 
     sets forth requirements with which agreements governing such 
     rotations must address, including terms and conditions, 
     including termination, duration, employment status, pay, and 
     benefits.
     Section 5307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify 
         certain security and counterintelligence concerns.
       Section 5307 requires the DNI to conduct an assessment of 
     the authorities, policies, processes, and standards used by 
     the IC to ensure that the IC is weighing security and 
     counterintelligence risks in contracting with companies that 
     contract--or carry out joint research and development--with 
     the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran.

      Subtitle B--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     Section 5321. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory 
         Council.
       Section 5321 requires the DNI to establish an advisory 
     council to assist analytic components of the IC with 
     incorporating analysis of climate security into their work. 
     The council will also facilitate coordination and sharing of 
     data between the IC and non-IC elements related to climate 
     change.
     Section 5322. Foreign Malign Influence Response Center.
       Section 5322 establishes a Foreign Malign Influence 
     Response Center within the ODNI to analyze and integrate all 
     U.S. Government intelligence pertaining to hostile efforts 
     undertaken by, at the direction of, or on behalf of or with 
     the substantial support of, the government of the Russian 
     Federation, Iran, North Korea, China, or any other country 
     that the Director of the Center determines appropriate, to 
     influence U.S.-based policies, activities, or public opinion.
     Section 5323. Encouragement of cooperative actions to detect 
         and counter foreign influence operations.
       Section 5323 provides the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of Defense, with the necessary authorities and 
     ability to use up to $30 million of NIP funds, to establish 
     an independent, non-profit Social Media Data and Threat 
     Analysis Center (``Center''). Section 323 further provides 
     that this Center shall establish a central portal for social 
     media data analysis, enabling: (1) social media companies to 
     voluntarily share data on foreign influence operations; (2) 
     researchers to analyze that data; and (3) information sharing 
     between and among government and private companies. Section 
     5323 also requires the Director of the Center to produce 
     quarterly public reports on trends in foreign influence and 
     disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns 
     and elections, as well as an annual report to Congress on the 
     degree of cooperation and commitment from the social media 
     companies.
     Section 5324. Transfer of National Intelligence University to 
         the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       Section 5324 requires the Director of the DIA to transfer 
     to the DNI the National Intelligence University, upon 
     submission of required joint certifications to appropriate 
     congressional committees by the Secretary of Defense and the 
     DNI.

      Subtitle C--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

     Section 5331. Definitions.
       Section 5331 provides definitions for terminology used 
     throughout this Subtitle.
     Section 5332. Inspector General external review panel.
       Section 5332 codifies the whistleblower protections 
     contained in Part C of Presidential Policy Directive-19 to 
     ensure an effective appeals process through external review 
     panels and the reporting of waste, fraud, and abuse. Section 
     5332 further requires the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community (IC IG) to submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a recommendation on how to ensure 
     that a whistleblower with a complaint against an Inspector 
     General of an IC agency has equal access to adjudication, 
     appellate review, and external review panels.
     Section 5333. Harmonization of whistleblower processes and 
         procedures.
       Section 5333 requires the IC IG, in coordination with the 
     IC Inspectors General Forum, to develop recommendations 
     applicable to Inspectors Generals for all IC elements 
     regarding the harmonization, where appropriate, of policies 
     and directives related to whistleblower claims and appeals 
     processes and procedures. Section 5333 further requires the 
     IC IG to maximize transparency regarding these processes and 
     procedures.
     Section 5334. Oversight by Inspector General of the 
         Intelligence Community over intelligence community 
         whistleblower matters.
       Section 5334 requires the IC IG, in consultation with the 
     IC Inspectors General

[[Page H10249]]

     Forum, to establish a system whereby the IC IG is provided in 
     near real time of whistleblower complaints relating to the 
     programs and activities under the DNI's jurisdiction, as well 
     as any IG actions relating to such complaints.
     Section 5335. Report on cleared whistleblower attorneys.
       Section 5335 requires the IC IG to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on access to 
     cleared attorneys by whistleblowers in the IC, including any 
     recommended improvements to the limited security agreement 
     process and such other options as the IC IG considers 
     appropriate.

                Subtitle D--Central Intelligence Agency

     Section 5341. Clarification of certain authority of the 
         Central Intelligence Agency.
       Section 5341 clarifies current CIA authorities related to 
     death benefits, requires the Director of the CIA to submit a 
     report if the CIA does not modify relevant regulations, and 
     requires a briefing on certain health care services for CIA 
     personnel.

                     Title LIV--Security Clearances

     Section 5401. Improving visibility into the security 
         clearance process.
       Section 5401 requires the DNI, acting as the Security 
     Executive Agent, to issue a policy requiring the head of each 
     Federal agency to create an electronic portal whereby the 
     agency and its workforce applicants can review the status of 
     their security clearance processing. An enterprise solution 
     that is accessible to multiple agencies may meet this 
     objective. Any portal should have appropriate security 
     safeguards.
     Section 5402. Making certain policies and execution plans 
         relating to personnel clearances available to industry 
         partners.
       Section 5402 requires each head of a Federal agency to 
     share security clearance policies and plans with directly 
     affected industry partners, consistent with national security 
     and with National Industrial Security Program (NISP) goals. 
     Section 5402 further requires the DNI, acting as the Security 
     Executive Agent, jointly with the Director of the NISP, to 
     develop policies and procedures for sharing this information.

            Title LV--Matters Relating to Foreign Countries

                 Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia

     Section 5501. Annual reports on influence operations and 
         campaigns in the United States by the Russian Federation.
       Section 5501 requires the Director of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center to submit an annual 
     report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     concerning the influence operations and campaigns in the 
     United States conducted by the Russian Federation.
     Section 5502. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate 
         financial and other assets of Vladimir Putin.
       Section 5502 expresses the sense of Congress that the 
     United States should do more to expose the corruption of 
     Russian President Vladimir Putin and directs the DNI to 
     submit to appropriate congressional committees an assessment 
     on the net worth and financial and other assets of President 
     Putin and his family members.
     Section 5503. Assessments of intentions of political 
         leadership of the Russian Federation.
       Section 5503 directs the IC to submit assessments to 
     certain congressional committees of the current intentions of 
     the political leadership of the Russian Federation concerning 
     potential military action against members of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), responses to an enlarged 
     United States or NATO military presence in Eastern Europe, 
     and potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting 
     perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western 
     adversaries.

                 Subtitle B--Matters Relating to China

     Section 5511. Annual reports on influence operations and 
         campaigns in the United States by the Communist Party of 
         China.
       Section 5511 requires the Director of the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center to submit an annual 
     report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     concerning the influence operations and campaigns in the 
     United States conducted by the Communist Party of China.
     Section 5512. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim 
         minorities in the Xinjiang region of the People's 
         Republic of China.
       Section 5512 requires the Director of National Intelligence 
     to submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees concerning activity by the People's Republic of 
     China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang 
     region of China.
     Section 5513. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China 
         to influence election in Taiwan.
       Section 5513 requires the DNI to submit a report within 45 
     days of the 2020 Taiwan Presidential and Vice Presidential 
     elections concerning any influence operations by China to 
     interfere in or undermine the election and efforts by the 
     United States to disrupt those operations.

            Subtitle C--Matters Relating to Other Countries

     Section 5521. Sense of Congress and report on Iranian efforts 
         in Syria and Lebanon.
       Section 5521 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, to submit a 
     report that assesses Iran's efforts to establish influence in 
     Syria, Iran's support of proxy forces, and the resulting 
     threats to U.S. interests and allies.
     Section 5522. Assessments regarding the Northern Triangle and 
         Mexico.
       Section 5522 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
     IC officials, to submit a comprehensive assessment of drug 
     trafficking, human trafficking, and human smuggling 
     activities in the Northern Triangle and Mexico. Section 508 
     further requires the DNI to provide a briefing on the IC's 
     collection priorities and activities in these areas.

         Title LVI--Federal Efforts Against Domestic Terrorism

     Section 5601. Definitions.
       Section 5601 provides definitions for terminology used 
     throughout this Title.
     Section 5602. Strategic intelligence assessment of and 
         reports on domestic terrorism.
       Section 5602 requires the Director of the FBI and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI, 
     to submit a report on standardization of terminology and 
     procedures relating to domestic terrorism, and a report 
     containing strategic intelligence assessment and data on 
     domestic terrorism, together with required documents and 
     materials, with annual updates for 5 years thereafter.

                 Title LVII--Reports and Other Matters

                   Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings

     Section 5701. Modification of requirements for submission to 
         Congress of certain reports.
       Section 5701 amends or cancels numerous reporting 
     requirements under current law.
     Section 5702. Increased transparency regarding 
         counterterrorism budget of the United States.
       Section 5702 makes several findings regarding the 
     transparency of the IC's counterterrorism budget and directs 
     a briefing from the executive branch on the feasibility of 
     releasing additional information to the public concerning the 
     IC's efforts on counterterrorism.
     Section 5703. Study on role of retired and former personnel 
         of intelligence community with respect to certain foreign 
         intelligence operations.
       Section 5703 requires the DNI to conduct a study on former 
     IC personnel providing intelligence assistance to foreign 
     governments, and to provide a report on the findings and a 
     plan for recommendations.
     Section 5704. Collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
         workforce data.
       Section 5704 requires the DNI to provide a publicly 
     available annual report on diversity and inclusion efforts of 
     the IC's workforce.
     Section 5705. Plan for strengthening the supply chain 
         intelligence function.
       Section 5705 requires the Director of the NCSC, in 
     coordination with interagency partners, to submit a plan for 
     strengthening supply chain intelligence function.
     Section 5706. Comprehensive economic assessment of investment 
         in key United States technologies by companies or 
         organizations linked to China.
       Section 5706 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
     designated agencies, to submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a comprehensive economic assessment 
     of investment in key United States technologies, by companies 
     or organizations linked to China, as well as the national 
     security implications of Chinese-backed investments to the 
     United States.
     Section 5707. Report by Director of National Intelligence on 
         fifth-generation wireless network technology.
       Section 5707 directs the DNI to submit to the appropriate 
     committees a report on the threat to the national security of 
     the United States posed by adoption of fifth-generation 
     wireless network built by foreign companies and possible 
     efforts to mitigate the threat.
     Section 5708. Report on use by intelligence community of 
         facial recognition technology.
       Section 5708 requires the DNI to submit a report on the 
     IC's use of facial recognition technology.
     Section 5709. Report on deepfake technology, foreign 
         weaponization of deepfakes, and related notifications.
       Section 5709 requires the DNI to submit a report on the 
     potential national security impacts of machine-manipulated 
     media and the use of machine-manipulated media by foreign 
     governments to spread disinformation or engage in other 
     malign activities.
     Section 5710. Annual report by Comptroller General of the 
         United States on cybersecurity and surveillance threats 
         to Congress.
       Section 5710 requires the Comptroller General, in 
     consultation with the DNI, Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     and the Sergeant at Arms, to submit a report to the 
     Committees on cybersecurity and surveillance threats to 
     Congress.
     Section 5711. Analysis and periodic briefings on major 
         initiatives of intelligence community in artificial 
         intelligence and machine learning.
       Section 5711 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
     appropriate IC elements, to provide briefings to the 
     congressional intelligence committees on the IC's major 
     initiatives in artificial intelligence and machine learning.
     Section 5712. Report on best practices to protect privacy and 
         civil liberties of Chinese Americans.
       Section 5712 requires the DNI, through the Office of Civil 
     Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency, and in coordination 
     with other IC

[[Page H10250]]

     civil liberty and privacy officers, to submit a report on how 
     IC policies targeting China affect the privacy and civil 
     liberties of certain Americans of Chinese descent, along with 
     recommendations for necessary protections.
     Section 5713. Oversight of foreign influence in academia.
       Section 5713 requires the DNI, in consultation with other 
     appropriate IC elements, to submit a report on the risks to 
     sensitive research subjects posed by foreign entities. 
     Section 5713 further requires the report to identify specific 
     national security-related threats to research conducted at 
     institutions of higher education.
     Section 5714. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.
       Section 5714 requires the DNI to submit to Congress an 
     unclassified report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi, 
     consistent with protecting sources and methods. The report 
     shall include identification of those who carried out, 
     participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in, or 
     responsible for, Mr. Khashoggi's death.
     Section 5715. Report on terrorist screening database.
       Section 5715 requires the DNI and the Secretary of State to 
     jointly submit a report on the FBI's terrorist screening 
     database.
     Section 5716. Report containing threat assessment of 
         terrorist use of conventional and advanced conventional 
         weapons.
       Section 5716 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for I&A, in coordination with the Director of the 
     FBI, to develop and submit a threat assessment regarding the 
     availability of certain conventional weapons in support of 
     terrorism activities.
     Section 5717. Assessment of homeland security vulnerabilities 
         associated with certain retired and former personnel of 
         the intelligence community.
       Section 5717 requires the DNI to submit an assessment of 
     the homeland security vulnerabilities associated with retired 
     and former personnel of the IC providing covered intelligence 
     assistance.
     Section 5718. Study on feasibility and advisability of 
         establishing Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning 
         center.
       Section 5718 requires the Director of the National 
     Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) to complete a study and 
     report the findings on the feasibility and advisability of 
     establishing a Geospatial-Intelligence Museum and learning 
     center.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

     Section 5721. Whistleblower disclosures to Congress and 
         committees of Congress.
       Section 5721 enables whistleblowers to provide classified 
     disclosures to appropriate committees of Congress.
     Section 5722. Task force on illicit financing of espionage 
         and foreign influence operations.
       Section 5722 requires the DNI to establish a task force to 
     study and assess the illicit financing of espionage and 
     foreign influence operations directed at the United States 
     and requires the task force to issue a report on this subject 
     to the appropriate congressional committees.
     Section 5723. Establishment of fifth-generation technology 
         prize competition.
       Section 5723 establishes a program to award prizes to 
     stimulate research and development relevant to fifth-
     generation wireless technology.
     Section 5724. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.
       Section 5724 establishes a program to award prizes to 
     stimulate the research, development, or commercialization of 
     technologies to automatically detect machine-manipulated 
     media.
     Section 5725. Identification of and countermeasures against 
         certain International Mobile Subscriber Identity-
         Catchers.
       Section 5725 requires the DNI and the Director of the FBI, 
     in collaboration with the Under Secretary of DHS for I&A, and 
     other appropriate heads of Federal agencies, to undertake an 
     effort to identify and, when appropriate, develop 
     countermeasures against, International Mobile Subscriber 
     Identity-Catchers operated within the United States by 
     criminals and hostile foreign governments.
     Section 5726. Securing energy infrastructure.
       Section 5726 requires the Secretary of Energy, within 180 
     days of enactment of the Act, to establish a two-year control 
     systems implementation pilot program within the National 
     Laboratories. This pilot program will partner with covered 
     entities in the energy sector to identify new security 
     vulnerabilities, and for purposes of researching, developing, 
     testing, and implementing technology platforms and standards 
     in partnership with such entities. Section 5726 also requires 
     the Secretary to establish a working group composed of 
     identified private and public sector entities to evaluate the 
     technology platforms and standards for the pilot program, and 
     develop a national cyber-informed engineering strategy to 
     isolate and defend covered entities from security 
     vulnerabilities. Section 5726 requires the Secretary, within 
     180 days after the date on which funds are first disbursed, 
     to submit to specified committees an interim report that 
     describes the pilot program's results, provides a feasibility 
     analysis, and describes the working group's evaluations. 
     Section 5726 further requires the Secretary, within two years 
     of funding, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a progress report on the pilot program and an 
     analysis of the feasibility of the methods studied, and a 
     description of the working group's evaluation results.

 SUBDIVISION 2--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 
                                  2019

     Section 6100. Table of contents.

                   Title LXI--Intelligence Activities

     Section 6101. Authorization of appropriations.
       Section 6101 lists the United States Government 
     departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act 
     deems authorized appropriations for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Years 2018 and 
     2019.
     Section 6102. Intelligence Community Management Account.
       Section 6102 provides that the amounts that were 
     appropriated for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 are deemed 
     authorized.

   Title LXII--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
                                 System

     Section 6201. Authorization of appropriations.
       Section 6201 deems authorized the appropriations for the 
     CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Years 2018 and 
     2019.
     Section 6202. Computation of annuities for employees of the 
         Central Intelligence Agency.
       Section 6202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement 
     Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil 
     Service Retirement System.

          Title LXIII--General Intelligence Community Matters

     Section 6301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence 
         activities.
       Section 6301 provides that the authorization of 
     appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
     authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that 
     is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws 
     of the United States.
     Section 6302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits 
         authorized by law.
       Section 6302 provides that funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and 
     other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
     additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
     increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
     Section 6303. Modification of special pay authority for 
         science, technology, engineering, or mathematics 
         positions and addition of special pay authority for cyber 
         positions.
       Section 6303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science, 
     Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee 
     positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions. 
     Section 6303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA) 
     to establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform 
     functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.
     Section 6304. Modification of appointment of Chief 
         Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
       Section 6304 changes the position of IC Chief Information 
     Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to 
     being subject to appointment by the DNI.
     Section 6305. Director of National Intelligence review of 
         placement of positions within the intelligence community 
         on the Executive Schedule.
       Section 6305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the 
     positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion 
     on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for 
     inclusion.
     Section 6306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk 
         Management Task Force.
       Section 6306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to 
     standardize information sharing between the IC and the United 
     States Government acquisition community with respect to 
     supply chain, cybersecurity, and counterintelligence risks. 
     Section 6306 further provides requirements for membership, 
     security clearances, and annual reports.
     Section 6307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications 
         and cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing 
         intelligence with foreign governments and entities.
       Section 6307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign 
     intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the 
     pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity 
     infrastructure, equipment, and services provided by United 
     States adversaries or entities thereof.
     Section 6308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of 
         the intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable 
         to cyber attack.
       Section 6308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection 
     support for the personal technology devices and personal 
     accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly 
     vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information 
     collection activities.
     Section 6309. Elimination of sunset authority relating to 
         management of supply-chain risk.
       Section 6309 extends certain IC procurement authorities to 
     manage and protect against supply chain risks.
     Section 6310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain 
         security classifications.
       Section 6310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is 
     nominated to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain 
     classification determinations posing potential conflicts of 
     interest regarding that nominee.

[[Page H10251]]

  

     Section 6311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
       Section 6311 amends Section 101A of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) as to the Joint Intelligence 
     Community Council meetings and to require a report on its 
     activities.
     Section 6312. Intelligence community information technology 
         environment.
       Section 6312 defines the roles and responsibilities for the 
     performance of the Intelligence Community Information 
     Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 6312 requires 
     certain reporting and briefing requirements to the 
     congressional intelligence committees regarding the IC's 
     ongoing implementation of IC ITE.
     Section 6313. Report on development of secure mobile voice 
         solution for intelligence community.
       Section 6313 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Directors of the CIA and NSA, provide the congressional 
     intelligence committees with a classified report on the 
     feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule 
     associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice 
     solution for the IC.
     Section 6314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
       Section 6314 requires the DNI to develop minimum insider 
     threat standards to be followed by each element of the IC, 
     consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and 
     Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat 
     Programs.
     Section 6315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
       Section 6315 requires the DNI to make all ODNI policies and 
     procedures available to the congressional intelligence 
     committees. Section 6315 also requires ODNI to notify the 
     congressional committees of any new or rescinded policies.
     Section 6316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment 
         efforts.
       Section 6316 requires the DNI, in consultation with IC 
     elements, to submit a plan to the congressional intelligence 
     committees as to each element's efforts in recruitment from 
     rural and underrepresented regions.

 Title LXIV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     Section 6401. Authority for protection of current and former 
         employees of the Office of the Director of National 
         Intelligence.
       Section 6401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide 
     protection for current and former ODNI personnel and 
     designated immediate family members, if there is a national 
     security threat that warrants such protection.
     Section 6402. Designation of the program manager-information 
         sharing environment.
       Section 6402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-
     Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to 
     appointment by the DNI, not the President.
     Section 6403. Technical modification to the executive 
         schedule.
       Section 6403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the 
     Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.
     Section 6404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence 
         Community.
       Section 6404 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
     requiring the Chief Financial Officer of the IC to directly 
     report to the DNI.
     Section 6405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
         Community.
       Section 6405 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by 
     requiring the Chief Information Officer of the IC to directly 
     report to the DNI.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     Section 6411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for 
         personnel assigned to austere locations.
       Section 6411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to approve, 
     with or without reimbursement, subsistence to personnel 
     assigned to an austere overseas location.
     Section 6412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' 
         compensation payments and other payments for Central 
         Intelligence Agency personnel.
       Section 6412 authorizes the Director of the CIA to provide 
     enhanced injury benefits to a covered employee or qualifying 
     dependents who suffer an injury overseas due to war, 
     insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities.
     Section 6413. Expansion of security protective service 
         jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency.
       Section 6413 expands the security perimeter jurisdiction at 
     CIA facilities from 500 feet to 500 yards.
     Section 6414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency 
         requirement for certain senior level positions in the 
         Central Intelligence Agency.
       Section 6414 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with 
     conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).

   Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the 
                          Department of Energy

     Section 6421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices 
         of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
       Section 6421 amends the Department of Energy Organization 
     Act to consolidate the offices of intelligence and 
     counterintelligence into the DOE Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence.
     Section 6422. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence 
         Executive Committee and budget reporting requirement.
       Section 6422 amends the Department of Energy Organization 
     Act by repealing the Department of Energy Intelligence 
     Executive Committee, as well as certain budgetary reporting 
     requirements.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

     Section 6431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence 
         component of the Defense Security Service as an element 
         of intelligence community.
       Section 6431 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of 
     Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director 
     of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to 
     provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees 
     with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security 
     Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of 
     the IC as defined in paragraph(4) of section 3 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January 
     1, 2020. Section 6431 further mandates that the plan shall 
     not address the DSS's personnel security functions.
     Section 6432. Notice not required for private entities.
       Section 6432 provides a Rule of Construction that the 
     Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not 
     required to provide notice to private entities before issuing 
     directives on agency information security policies and 
     practices.
     Section 6433. Establishment of advisory board for National 
         Reconnaissance Office.
       Section 6433 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     authorize the Director of the NRO to establish an advisory 
     board to study matters related to space, overhead 
     reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters. Section 6433 
     provides that the board shall terminate 3 years after the 
     Director declares the board's first meeting.
     Section 6434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland 
         Security personnel at field locations.
       Section 6434 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence & Analysis (DHS I&A) to identify 
     opportunities for collocation of I&A field officers and to 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan 
     for deployment.

                      Title LXV--Election Matters

     Section 6501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments 
         against United States election infrastructure.
       Section 6501 directs the DHS Under Secretary for I&A to 
     submit a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber attacks 
     by foreign governments on United States election 
     infrastructure, in connection with the 2016 presidential 
     election. Section 6501 further requires this report to 
     include identification of the States and localities affected 
     and include efforts to attack voter registration databases, 
     voting machines, voting-related computer networks, and the 
     networks of Secretaries of State and other election 
     officials.
     Section 6502. Review of intelligence community's posture to 
         collect against and analyze Russian efforts to influence 
         the Presidential election.
       Section 6502 requires the DNI to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, within one year of 
     enactment of the Act, a report on the Director's review of 
     the IC's posture to collect against and analyze Russian 
     efforts to interfere with the 2016 United States presidential 
     election. Section 6502 further requires the review to include 
     assessments of IC resources, information sharing, and legal 
     authorities.
     Section 6503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to 
         Federal elections.
       Section 6503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the 
     FBI, Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC 
     elements, to commence assessments of security vulnerabilities 
     of State election systems one year before regularly scheduled 
     Federal elections. Section 6503 further requires the DNI to 
     submit a report on such assessments 180 days before regularly 
     scheduled Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90 
     days before regularly scheduled Federal elections.
     Section 6504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats 
         to United States elections.
       Section 6504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA, 
     Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of 
     the Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for 
     countering Russian cyber threats against United States 
     electoral systems and processes. Section 6504 further 
     requires this strategy to include input from solicited 
     Secretaries of State and chief election officials.
     Section 6505. Assessment of significant Russian influence 
         campaigns directed at foreign elections and referenda.
       Section 6505 requires the DNI to provide a report assessing 
     past and ongoing Russian influence campaigns against foreign 
     elections and referenda, to include a summary of the means by 
     which such influence campaigns have been or are likely to be 
     conducted, a summary of defenses against or responses to such 
     Russian influence campaigns, a summary of IC activities to 
     assist

[[Page H10252]]

     foreign governments against such campaigns, and an assessment 
     of the effectiveness of such foreign defenses and responses.
     Section 6506. Information sharing with State election 
         officials.
       Section 6506 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment 
     of the Act, to support security clearances for each eligible 
     chief election official of a State, territory, or the 
     District of Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up 
     to the Top Secret level. Section 6506 also requires the DNI 
     to assist with sharing appropriate classified information 
     about threats to election systems.
     Section 6507. Notification of significant foreign cyber 
         intrusions and active measure campaigns directed at 
         elections for Federal offices.
       Section 6507 requires the Director of the FBI, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security to brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees, congressional leadership, the armed 
     services committees, the appropriations committees, and the 
     homeland security committees (consistent with sources and 
     methods) not later than 14 days after a determination has 
     been made with moderate or high confidence that a significant 
     foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended 
     to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has 
     taken place by a foreign state or foreign non-state person, 
     group, or other entity. The briefing shall provide a 
     description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or 
     active measures campaign, including an identification of the 
     foreign state or foreign non-state person or group.
     Section 6508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to 
         lead election security matters.
       Section 6508 requires the DNI to designate a national 
     counterintelligence officer within the National 
     Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and 
     coordinate election security-related counterintelligence 
     matters, including certain risks from foreign power 
     interference.

                    Title LXVI--Security Clearances

     Section 6601. Definitions.
       Section 6601 provides definitions for terminology used 
     throughout this Title.
     Section 6602. Reports and plans relating to security 
         clearances and background investigations.
       Section 6602 requires the interagency Performance 
     Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce 
     the background investigation inventory and best align the 
     investigation function between DoD and the National 
     Background Investigation Bureau. Section 6602 further 
     requires the Council to report on the future of the clearance 
     process and requires the DNI to notify the appropriate 
     committees of responding to official requests to change 
     clearance standards, and the status of those requests' 
     disposition. As with other reports in this title, these 
     reports can be met in a consolidated format and potentially 
     through the regularly scheduled quarterly Council briefings.
     Section 6603. Improving the process for security clearances.
       Section 6603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire 
     for National Security positions (SF-86 or any current 
     instantiation thereof) and the Federal Investigative 
     Standards to determine potential unnecessary information 
     required and assess whether revisions are necessary to 
     account for insider threats. Section 6603 further requires 
     the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish 
     policies on interim clearances and consistency between the 
     clearance process for contract and government personnel.
     Section 6604. Goals for promptness of determinations 
         regarding security clearances.
       Section 6604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be 
     able to process 90 percent of clearance requests at the 
     Secret level in 30 days, and at the Top Secret-level in 90 
     days. The provision provides the Council with latitude to 
     issue equivalent metrics that similarly improve the 
     timeliness of the clearance process. The plan shall also 
     address how to recognize reciprocity in accepting clearances 
     among agencies within two weeks, and to require that ninety 
     percent of clearance holders not be subject to a time-based 
     periodic investigation.
     Section 6605. Security Executive Agent.
       Section 6605 establishes the DNI as the government's 
     Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order 
     13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.
     Section 6606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide 
         standards for positions of trust and security clearances.
       Section 6606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office 
     of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and 
     implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of 
     trust and security clearances from 5 to 3 tiers.
     Section 6607. Report on clearance in person concept.
       Section 6607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a 
     concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for 
     access to classified information for up to 3 years after 
     access may lapse.
     Section 6608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances 
         inside of departments and agencies.
       Section 6608 requires each federal agency to submit a 
     report to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances 
     that take more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and 
     set forth the reason for any delays. Section 6608 further 
     requires the DNI to submit an annual report summarizing 
     reciprocity.
     Section 6609. Intelligence community reports on security 
         clearances.
       Section 6609 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC 
     element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal 
     employees and contractor employees.
     Section 6610. Periodic report on positions in the 
         intelligence community that can be conducted without 
         access to classified information, networks, or 
         facilities.
       Section 6610 requires the DNI to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on positions 
     that can be conducted without access to classified 
     information, networks, or facilities, or may require only a 
     Secret-level clearance.
     Section 6611. Information-sharing program for positions of 
         trust and security clearances.
       Section 6611 requires the Security Executive Agent and the 
     Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agents to establish a 
     program to share information between and among government 
     agencies and industry partners to inform decisions about 
     positions of trust and security clearances.
     Section 6612. Report on protections for confidentiality of 
         whistleblower-related communications.
       Section 6612 requires the Security Executive Agent, in 
     coordination with the IC IG, to submit a report detailing the 
     IC's controls used to ensure continuous evaluation programs 
     protect the confidentiality of whistleblower-related 
     communications.
     Section 6613. Reports on costs of security clearance 
         background investigations.
       Section 6613 requires the DNI to provide an annual report 
     for three years after enactment on the resources expended by 
     each government agency for processing security clearance 
     background investigations and continuous evaluation programs, 
     disaggregated by tier and employment status.

                 Title LXVII--Reports and Other Matters

    Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers

     Section 6701. Limitation relating to establishment or support 
         of cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
       Section 6701 prohibits the Federal government from 
     expending any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity 
     unit or other cyber agreement that is jointly established or 
     otherwise implemented by the United States Government and the 
     Russian Federation, unless the DNI submits a report to the 
     appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days prior 
     to any such agreement. The report shall include the 
     agreement's purpose, intended shared intelligence, value to 
     national security, counterintelligence concerns, and any 
     measures taken to mitigate such concerns.
     Section 6702. Assessment of threat finance relating to 
         Russia.
       Section 6702 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
     Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, an 
     assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source 
     intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and 
     Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section 
     6702 further requires the assessment to include global nodes 
     and entry points for Russian money laundering; United States 
     vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals 
     involved in money laundering and the Russian Government; 
     counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by 
     Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance; 
     and challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce 
     sanctions and combat organized crime.
     Section 6703. Notification of an active measures campaign.
        Section 6703 requires the DNI to notify congressional 
     leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking 
     Member of the appropriate congressional committees, each time 
     the DNI has determined there is credible information that a 
     foreign power has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt 
     to employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with 
     regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force 
     posture of the United States' nuclear deterrent or missile 
     defense. Section 6703 further requires that such notification 
     must include information on any actions that the United 
     States has taken to expose or halt such attempts.
     Section 6704. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic 
         and consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the 
         United States.
       Section 6704 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that 
     the Russian Federation provides notification at least two 
     business days in advance of all travel that is subject to 
     such requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular 
     personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States, and 
     take necessary action to secure full compliance by Russian 
     personnel and address any noncompliance.
     Section 6705. Report and annual briefing on Iranian 
         expenditures supporting foreign military and terrorist 
         activities.
       Section 6705 requires the DNI to submit a report to 
     Congress describing Iranian expenditures on military and 
     terrorist activities outside the country.

[[Page H10253]]

  

     Section 6706. Expansion of scope of committee to counter 
         active measures.
       Section 6706 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to expand the scope of 
     the interagency committee to counter active measures by the 
     Russian Federation to add China, Iran, North Korea, and other 
     nation states.

                          Subtitle B--Reports

     Section 6711. Technical correction to Inspector General 
         study.
        Section 6711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by 
     replacing the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors 
     General with employees having classified material access, 
     with a ``review'' requirement.
     Section 6712. Reports on authorities of the Chief 
         Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland 
         Security.
       Section 6712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
     with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     adequacy of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the 
     Chief Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security 
     Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes 
     necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence 
     activities.
     Section 6713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower 
         matters.
       Section 6713 directs the IC IG, in consultations with the 
     IGs of other IC agencies, to conduct a review of practices 
     and procedures relating to IC whistleblower matters.
     Section 6714. Report on role of Director of National 
         Intelligence with respect to certain foreign investments.
       Section 6714 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's 
     role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the 
     United States Government's evaluation of national security 
     risks associated with potential foreign investments.
     Section 6715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments 
         against United States telecommunications networks.
       Section 6715 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
     Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the 
     FBI, and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional 
     intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees, 
     within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report on known 
     attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity 
     vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks 
     to surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC 
     has taken to protect United States Government agencies and 
     personnel from such surveillance.
     Section 6716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
       Section 6716 requires the DNI to establish an IC working 
     group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial 
     report that includes an identification, analysis, and 
     explanation of national security vulnerabilities, foreign 
     investment trends, foreign countries' strategies to exploit 
     vulnerabilities through the acquisition of either critical 
     technologies (including components or items essential to 
     national defense), critical materials (including physical 
     materials essential to national security), or critical 
     infrastructure (including physical or virtual systems and 
     assets whose destruction or incapacity would have a 
     debilitating impact on national security), and market 
     distortions caused by foreign countries. Technologies, 
     materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be ``critical'' 
     under this provision if their exploitation by a foreign 
     government could cause severe harm to the national security 
     of the United States.
     Section 6717. Modification of certain reporting requirement 
         on travel of foreign diplomats.
        Section 6717 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting 
     of ``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of 
     certain travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and 
     consular personnel of the Russian Federation.
     Section 6718. Semiannual reports on investigations of 
         unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
       Section 6718 requires the Assistant Attorney General for 
     National Security at the Department of Justice, in 
     consultation with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence and judiciary committees a 
     semiannual report on the status of IC referrals to the 
     Department of Justice regarding unauthorized disclosures of 
     classified information. Section 6718 also directs IC elements 
     to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     semiannual report on the number of investigations opened and 
     completed by each agency regarding an unauthorized public 
     disclosure of classified information to the media, and the 
     number of completed investigations referred to the Attorney 
     General.
     Section 6719. Congressional notification of designation of 
         covered intelligence officer as persona non grata.
       Section 6719 requires, not later than 72 hours after a 
     covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non 
     grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, submit to the designated committees a notification of 
     that designation, to include the basis for the designation 
     and justification for the expulsion.
     Section 6720. Reports on intelligence community participation 
         in vulnerabilities equities process of Federal 
         Government.
       Section 6720 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of 
     enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities 
     Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element. 
     Section 6720 further requires each IC element to report to 
     the congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a 
     significant change to that respective IC element's VEP 
     process and criteria. Section 6720 also requires the DNI to 
     submit an annual report to the congressional intelligence 
     committees with specified information on certain VEP metrics.
     Section 6721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
       Section 6721 requires each designated IG to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     accuracy in the application of classification and handling 
     markings on a representative sample of finished products, to 
     include those with compartments. Section 6721 also directs 
     analyses of compliance with declassification procedures and a 
     review of the effectiveness of processes for identifying 
     topics of public or historical importance that merit 
     prioritization for declassification review.
     Section 6722. Reports on global water insecurity and national 
         security implications and briefing on emerging infectious 
         disease and pandemics.
       Section 6722 requires the DNI to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     implications of global water insecurity on the United States' 
     national security interests. Section 6722 further requires 
     the DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate congressional 
     committees on the geopolitical effects of emerging infectious 
     disease and pandemics, and their implications on the United 
     States' national security.
     Section 6723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding 
         between elements of intelligence community and other 
         entities of the United States Government regarding 
         significant operational activities or policy.
       Section 6723 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring 
     each IC element to submit an annual report to the Committees 
     that lists each significant memorandum of understanding or 
     other agreement entered into during the preceding fiscal 
     year. Section 6723 further requires each IC element to 
     provide such documents if an intelligence committee so 
     requests.
     Section 6724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting 
         unclassified wireline and wireless telephone calls.
       Section 6724 requires the DNI to complete a study on the 
     feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline and wireless 
     telephone calls between personnel in the IC.
     Section 6725. Reports on intelligence community loan 
         repayment and related programs.
       Section 6725 requires the DNI, in cooperation with the 
     heads of the elements of the IC, to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on potentially 
     establishing an IC-wide program for student loan repayment 
     and forgiveness.
     Section 6726. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
       Section 6726 repeals certain IC reporting requirements.
     Section 6727. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
         report on senior executives of the Office of the Director 
         of National Intelligence.
       Section 6727 directs the IC IG to submit a report to the 
     congressional intelligence committees regarding senior 
     executive service staffing at the ODNI.
     Section 6728. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation 
         offering permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
       Section 6728 directs the FBI within 30 days of enactment of 
     this Act to provide a briefing to the congressional 
     intelligence committees regarding the FBI's ability to 
     provide permanent U.S. residence to foreign individuals who 
     serve as cooperators in national security-related 
     investigations.
     Section 6729. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue 
         sources.
       Section 6729 requires the DNI, in coordination with other 
     relevant IC elements, to produce to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an intelligence assessment of the 
     North Korean regime's revenue sources.
     Section 6730. Report on possible exploitations of virtual 
         currencies by terrorist actors.
       Section 6730 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to Congress a report on 
     the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist 
     actors.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

     Section 6741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
       Section 6741 permanently reauthorizes the Public Interest 
     Declassification Board administered by the National Archives 
     and Records Administration.
     Section 6742. Technical and clerical amendments to the 
         National Security Act of 1947.
       Section 6742 makes certain edits to the National Security 
     Act of 1947 as amended for technical or clerical purposes.
     Section 6743. Bug bounty programs.
       Section 6743 directs the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
     with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a strategic plan to 
     implement bug bounty programs at appropriate

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     agencies and departments of the United States Government. 
     Section 6743 further requires the plan to include an 
     assessment of the ``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program and 
     subsequent bug bounty programs. Section 6743 also requires 
     the plan to provide recommendations on the feasibility of 
     initiating bug bounty programs across the United States 
     Government.
     Section 6744. Technical amendments related to the Department 
         of Energy.
       Section 6744 provides technical corrections to certain 
     provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
     Section 6745. Sense of Congress on notification of certain 
         disclosures of classified information.
       Section 6745 expresses the sense of Congress that, pursuant 
     to the requirement for the IC to keep the congressional 
     intelligence committees ``fully and currently informed'' in 
     Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, IC agencies 
     must submit prompt written notification after becoming aware 
     that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed 
     certain classified information outside established 
     intelligence channels to foreign adversaries--North Korea, 
     Iran, China, Russia, or Cuba.
     Section 6746. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage 
         activities when considering whether or not to provide 
         visas to foreign individuals to be accredited to a United 
         Nations mission in the United States.
       Section 6746 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to 
     foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations 
     mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and 
     suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including 
     activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out 
     by such individuals against the United States, or against 
     foreign allies or partners of the United States. Section 6746 
     further provides that the Secretary of State should consider 
     an individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence 
     officer for a foreign adversary.
     Section 6747. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks.
       Section 6747 provides a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks 
     and its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile 
     intelligence service, often abetted by state actors, and 
     should be treated as such.

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