[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 184 (Monday, November 18, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6627-S6628]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 SENATE RESOLUTION 429--RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
   ACT OF 1866 AND THE LAWS DERIVED FROM THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866

  Mr. SCHUMER (for Ms. Harris (for herself, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Booker, 
Mrs. Feinstein, Ms. Hirono, Mr.

[[Page S6628]]

Wyden, and Ms. Warren)) submitted the following resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

                              S. Res. 429

       Whereas, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the reunified 
     United States struggled to reconstruct the war-torn States 
     and establish laws granting newly freed slaves the same 
     rights afforded to White citizens;
       Whereas the reconstruction of the United States following 
     the conclusion of the Civil War necessarily included the 
     integration of newly emancipated African Americans into 
     broader society and, with that emancipation, the receipt by 
     those emancipated African Americans of civil and legal 
     protections;
       Whereas, as a response to the uncertain and unequal status 
     of newly freed slaves, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution 
     of the United States was ratified by the States on December 
     6, 1865, formally abolishing slavery ``within the United 
     States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction'';
       Whereas, on April 9, 1866, Congress overrode a Presidential 
     veto to enact the Act of April 9, 1866 (commonly known as and 
     referred to in this preamble as the ``Civil Rights Act of 
     1866'') (14 Stat. 27, chapter 31), a law written to protect 
     and clarify the newly bestowed rights of persons of African 
     descent;
       Whereas the Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that all 
     persons born in the United States are entitled to be 
     citizens, without regard to race, color, or previous 
     condition of slavery or involuntary servitude;
       Whereas the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted--
       (1) to establish that all persons born in the United States 
     are to be considered citizens;
       (2) to clearly define the rights guaranteed by United 
     States citizenship; and
       (3) to make it unlawful for any person to deprive another 
     person of those rights on the basis of race;
       Whereas the Civil Rights Act of 1866 served the role of 
     overriding ``Black Codes'', laws enacted in southern States 
     to restrict the freedom of African Americans and keep 
     formerly enslaved persons from thriving in society;
       Whereas the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
     created an avenue for citizens who fell victim to intentional 
     racial discrimination by allowing a citizen to go before a 
     Federal court and allege that the citizen was discriminated 
     against while engaging in lawful activity;
       Whereas the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
     was used to challenge the laws established by southern States 
     to limit the rights and opportunities of newly freed slaves;
       Whereas, under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 
     U.S.C. 1981), which is derived from section 16 of the Act of 
     May 31, 1870 (commonly known as and referred to in this 
     preamble as the ``Enforcement Act of 1870'') (16 Stat. 140, 
     chapter 114) and the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 
     1866, African American citizens are given the right to 
     enforce contracts, give evidence in court, sue and be sued, 
     and purchase, sell, and convey real and personal property;
       Whereas, in 1975, the Supreme Court recognized in Johnson 
     v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), that 
     section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 allowed for private 
     employers to be held accountable for discrimination within 
     their ranks;
       Whereas section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981) applies to all contracts, including those between 
     employer and employee, and has become a vital tool for 
     employment discrimination claimants;
       Whereas section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981) stands as one of the only laws protecting against 
     employers openly discriminating on the basis of race when 
     contracting with other parties;
       Whereas it is well established that section 1977 of the 
     Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981) has been invoked to 
     challenge race discrimination in employment matters and has 
     held bad actors accountable for contract discrimination;
       Whereas, in 1989, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
     U.S. 164 (1989), the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted 
     section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981) to 
     apply only to contract formation, finding that only certain 
     points in a contractual engagement could be subject to the 
     protections afforded in that section;
       Whereas the ruling in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
     U.S. 164 (1989), functioned as a major setback to ensuring 
     that all aspects of the interaction between an employee or 
     individual with a business would be free of racial 
     discrimination;
       Whereas, in 1991, Congress, by statute, as part of the 
     Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-166; 105 Stat. 
     1071), disagreed with a plethora of Supreme Court decisions 
     that undermined Federal antidiscrimination laws and 
     challenged the restrictive interpretation of section 1977 of 
     the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981) expressed by the 
     Supreme Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 
     164 (1989);
       Whereas the 2008 decision in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 
     553 U.S. 442 (2008), further determined that section 1977 of 
     the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981) prohibits not only 
     direct discrimination, but retaliation against those alleging 
     discrimination;
       Whereas the intent of Congress is clear through the 
     legislative history of section 1977 of the Revised Statutes 
     (42 U.S.C. 1981), which definitively illustrates that the law 
     was meant to provide and enforce robust protection against 
     race discrimination in contracting;
       Whereas section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981)--
       (1) in subsection (a), provides that ``[a]ll persons within 
     the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
     right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed 
     by white citizens''; and
       (2) in subsection (b), defines ``make and enforce 
     contracts'' to ``include the making, performance, 
     modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment 
     of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 
     contractual relationship'';
       Whereas section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981) clearly enumerates the protections afforded to 
     minorities in the United States when contracting with 
     businesses and makes clear that all aspects of the creation, 
     modification, and termination of contracts are subject to the 
     scrutiny of that section;
       Whereas the most direct interpretation of section 1977 of 
     the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981) ensures that all racial 
     minorities in the United States be granted the opportunity to 
     enter into contractual agreements free of discrimination; and
       Whereas section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981) serves as a critically important tool to ensure that no 
     person is denied the ability to contract with another on the 
     basis of race: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) recognizes and honors the historical significance of 
     section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981) and the 
     instrumental contributions of that law to the pursuit of 
     equal protection for all citizens of the United States;
       (2) reaffirms its commitment to the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
     Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to the 
     Act of April 9, 1866 (commonly known as and referred to in 
     this resolving clause as the ``Civil Rights Act of 1866'') 
     (14 Stat. 27, chapter 31) (and the laws derived from that 
     Act), and to the civil rights and liberties of all racial 
     minorities across the United States; and
       (3) reaffirms the congressional intent behind the first 
     section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (and the laws derived 
     from that Act), which was, and remains, the protection of the 
     rights of minorities seeking refuge from racial 
     discrimination in business.

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