[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 181 (Wednesday, November 13, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6545-S6546]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

 Mr. ROUNDS. Mr. President, today I join my fellow Senate Armed 
Services Committee subcommittee chairs in expressing my serious 
concerns with the possibility that congress might not pass a National 
Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, for fiscal year 2020.
  For more than five decades, the NDAA has been signed into law with 
bipartisan support. We had our differences, but if we fail to pass the 
NDAA this year, what kind of message does that send to the men and 
women who, in many cases, are risking their lives for our national 
security? Further, they will receive this message at a time of 
heightened strategic competition with China and Russia and a continued 
need to support our allies and partners. Meanwhile, we must continue

[[Page S6546]]

to rebuild the readiness of our Armed Forces and take care of our 
troops and their families.
  With regard to rebuilding our readiness, I remember the recent and 
significant dip in the readiness of our B-1B bomber fleet at Ellsworth 
Air Force Base in South Dakota. While the Air Force has reversed that 
trend, it remains an example of the wear and tear on our forces after 
18 years of war. Now is not the time to go backward by failing, for the 
first time in 58 years, to pass a National Defense Authorization Act.
  NDAA is must-pass legislation, as it has been every year for over 
half a century. That is why Chairman Inhofe introduced his ``skinny'' 
NDAA. The NDAA is typically bipartisan, and it should stay that way. I 
am hopeful we will find a final agreement.
  This is about more than the NDAA. It is also about Defense 
appropriations. In that regard, I will not vote for another continuing 
resolution with its distinctive impact on our national security.
  As chairman of the Cybersecurity Subcommittee of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, I am particularly concerned about what failure to 
enact NDAA 2020 would mean for our cybersecurity. Some vital 
cybersecurity measures in the NDAA passed by the Senate include the 
following: critical funding for United Stated Cyber Command, CYBERCOM, 
infrastructure development. In a sense, CYBERCOM is at war every day, 
operating in our enemies' backyards to negate or at least reduce their 
ability to attack the United States. It is not a coincidence that there 
was no successful interference in our 2018 mid-term elections. We can 
thank the men and women of CYBERCOM for that. Now is not the time to 
deny them what they need to boost their capabilities. Our adversaries 
and enemies will surely boost theirs; development of a consistent, 
comprehensive framework to enhance the cybersecurity of the U.S. 
defense industrial base after disastrous theft of critical defense 
information relating to development of an important new weapon system. 
I am concerned there may be other ongoing such instances of which we 
are not even aware; a consortium of universities, to include Dakota 
State University in Madison, SD, to advise and assist the Secretary of 
Defense on cybersecurity matters; authorization for the armed services 
to use operation and maintenance funds for the rapid creation testing, 
fielding, and operation of new cyber capabilities; and completion of 
the work of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission charged with evaluating 
divergent approaches to defending the United States in cyberspace and 
driving consensus toward a comprehensive strategy.
  These are just some of the cybersecurity related measures that will 
have to wait another year, unless Congress passes NDAA 2020. When added 
to the concerns noted by my fellow chairs, it should be clear to all 
that now is the time to put aside partisan obstructionism and enact 
this must-pass legislation.

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