[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 131 (Thursday, August 1, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5304-S5307]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CIVIL AFFAIRS
Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the Congressional Record this scholarly article ``Civil Affairs,
Winston Churchill, and the Power of Paying Attention,'' originally
published in Small Wars Journal, which analyzes the value of Civil
Affairs to supported commands and agencies through the lens of Winston
Churchill's conception of generalship and statesmanship. Its author,
CPT Andrew J. Bibb, U.S. Army, is from Santa Fe, NM.
Although often overlooked, our civil affairs forces contribute to the
ability of policymakers and military commanders to understand the full
landscape and make fully informed decisions. Civil Affairs units also
help us navigate conflicts where we more frequently confront civilians
than combatants. As the article puts it, Civil Affairs ``helps the
commander understand the factors that contribute to civil unrest and
make societies vulnerable to nefarious actors [and] enables them to
make decisions that not only defeat threats but prevent them from
arising in the first place.''
I want to thank our men and women in Civil Affairs and let them know
we value and appreciate their often unheralded work.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Civil Affairs, Winston Churchill, and the Power of Paying Attention
Captain Andrew J. Bibb, U.S. Army
Readiness, the top priority of the U.S. military in the
21st century, begins with awareness. This applies from the
individual all the way up to the national and international
levels, from the tactical level to the operational and
strategic. In this context,
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awareness is defined as the state of consciousness in which
one attains a functional realization of the state and nature
of reality. It is achieved when one pays attention to a given
situation and the factors that contribute to it, analyzing
and examining until he or she achieves an actionable level of
understanding. When the observer understands the problem well
enough, the solutions present themselves.
Clinical psychologist Dr. Jordan Peterson explains, ``If
you identify things, with careful attention and language, you
bring them forward as viable, obedient objects, detaching
them from their underlying near-universal interconnectedness.
You simplify them. You make them specific and useful, and
reduce their complexity.'' This process of enabling awareness
and understanding in support of readiness is what Army Civil
Affairs (CA) does best.
This paper aims to show the value of CA to both the
statesman and general as they are understood by Winston
Churchill in Dr. Larry P. Arnn's scholarly work Churchill's
Trial: Winston Churchill and the Salvation of Free
Government. Although Churchill uses the term ``general'' to
refer to commanders, CA's value is by no means limited to
flag officers. The CA team, the lowest-echelon CA element, is
a battalion-level asset and can inform tactical decisions as
well as operational and strategic ones. Similarly, CA support
to statesmen is not limited to elected officials, as
fostering partnerships within and supporting the various
branches of government fall directly within the purview of
Civil Affairs.
There are at least three good reasons to use Winston
Churchill's concepts of statesmanship and generalship as the
lens through which to analyze the value of CA. First, the
purpose of all Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) is to enable
and execute the decisions of commanders (generals) and policy
makers (statesmen). Second, of all of the world leaders in
the past hundred years few are as qualified to speak
authoritatively on both of these topics as Winston Churchill.
Third, none of these world leaders were as prolific as
Churchill at recording their perspectives, so through his
work we are able to clearly see what the general and
statesmen need that CA can provide.
Churchill served as Prime Minister of Great Britain during
and after World War II, as well as in numerous other
government positions, including First Lord of the Admiralty
at the outbreak of World War I. Throughout his long and
distinguished career he learned that the duty of statesmen
and generals was to comprehend a given situation and act in
concert with reality to produce the desired outcome. The
ability to do this in large part depends on having an
accurate, complete, and nuanced understanding of the
situation and its attending circumstances.
Fortunately for both the statesman and the general, this is
where CA excels. CA not only serves as the informational and
relational link between military and civilian entities, but
also paints an accurate picture of the on-the-ground reality
for the commander. CA focuses specifically on the civil
component of the operational environment (OE), and since the
non-threat (civil) aspect makes up the vast majority of the
OE a proper understanding of that aspect is critical to both
military and political success. Additionally, ``Military
operations always have a degree of involvement (assistance,
interference, or influence) with the civil component,'' so a
dedicated force oriented to that component is necessary to
every operation.
Defining the Particulars
Churchill believed that the ``right thing to do depends on
the circumstances,'' but those circumstances must be defined
in order to determine what the right course of action is.
CA's most critical function is to establish and maintain
awareness of both the raw civil data and its aggregate
significance. Civil Affairs Activities (CAA), the core
competency of which CA is the proponent, are ``enduring
capabilities that increase the commander's understanding of,
deliberate interaction with, and planning for the civil
component.'' While CA forces are capable of supporting
Military Governance Operations and other joint activities,
such as Foreign Assistance and Populace and Resources
Control, CAA define CA as the commander's asset. The five CAA
functions are Civil Reconnaissance, Civil Engagement, Civil
Information Management, Civil-Military Operations Center, and
Civil Affairs Operations Staff Support.
CAA make CA an invaluable asset to the commander because an
accurate picture of the on-the-ground reality frees the
commander to make timely decisions confidently. Without that
picture every decision is a gamble. In Churchill's mind, the
specifics surrounding each individual circumstance should
drive military decisions. For him, ``Circumstances alone . .
. decide whether a correct conventional maneuver is right or
wrong.'' That these circumstances ``are many in number and
constantly moving'' only emphasizes the need for CA input
into the commander's common operational picture (COP).
Policy makers benefit from this civil information as well,
as it enables them to make decisions in light of their real-
world implications. Churchill believed that, although the
``statesman lives and judges amidst the details of action,''
he ``serves a master beyond all particulars.'' For the policy
maker to rise above the particulars someone else must gather,
process, and disseminate the detailed information that drives
policy decisions. Someone else must pay close attention to
the specifics of a given civil situation. CA forces meet the
civil information requirements of both the general and the
statesmen in this regard and are uniquely ``trained in
understanding'' the particulars of ``foreign cultures, socio-
economic dynamics, and governance structures.''
Army CA has only two tactical mission tasks in its
doctrine, and both of them are oriented toward defining the
particulars of the civil component. Civil Reconnaissance (CR)
and Civil Engagement (CE), which are also the first two CAA
functions, are dedicated to gathering the raw civil data in a
given area of operations. These two ``CA specific tasks
answer key information gaps in which no other staff section
specializes.'' CA Forces are able to focus their attention on
the ``dynamic relationship'' between ``friendly forces, enemy
forces, and populations as . . . a host of other factors
contend to influence the OE on a daily basis.''
CR, the first tactical task, is the ``targeted, planned,
and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil
aspects of the environment.'' CA forces are capable of
conducting CR in any environment the commander deems
necessary by ``deploying to semi- and non-permissive
environments, and operating in places where traditional
military and civilian agencies cannot.'' For this reason,
among many others, Marine COL Jeffrey Lipson concludes that
tactical CA units are ``employed to their best effect'' when
they are tasked ``to gain an accurate picture of a region in
addition to what is gleaned from traditional intelligence
sources.''
CR is proactive in nature, not reactive. It continually
refines the commander's picture of the OE instead of waiting
for specific information requirements to be published,
although CA forces are perfectly capable of answering those
as well. CA forces base their CR on civil information
collection plans, which are specific enough to economize CA
efforts but broad enough to allow for flexibility depending
on the circumstances. The result is quality civil information
gained at a negligible cost. COL Lipson explains, ``When
properly gathered, analyzed, deployed, civil reconnaissance
will `push' information to commanders to help them tailor
their operations. Without it, the same information is
`pulled' through interrogations, patrols, or other more time-
and resource-intensive means and perhaps with less
efficacy.''
Churchill believed that those ``who cannot talk to each
other are likely to fight like roosters.'' CA has an answer
to this problem as well. Civil Engagement (CE), the second
tactical mission task, are ``the planned and targeted
activities in which CA forces deliberately focus on the
interaction with the IPI [indigenous populations and
institutions], unified action partners, and other civil
entities.''
Churchill knew first-hand that fostering relationships
leads to a clearer understanding of the circumstances. While
serving as a war correspondent in South Africa during the
Boer War in the late 1890s, Boer fighters captured Churchill
as well as a number of British soldiers. Churchill, unwilling
to stand passively by, built relationships with his captors,
befriended them, and then leveraged these relationships to
gain valuable information that led to his daring and
successful escape.
Although he did not refer to it as such, Churchill
conducted CE to gain access to and influence with his guards,
and, as a result, gather the necessary information for his
plan. Aside from the fact that his engagements were with
enemy combatants, it is no different than what CA does every
day with non-threat entities. The CE function provides a host
of capabilities to the supported commander, who may employ
``this task to obtain or disseminate information, mitigate
civilian-military interference, foster legitimacy, gain civil
cooperation, build partner capacity, and obtain unified
action.''
CE is a tactical level task that can have strategic
effects. Dr. David Kilcullen and Marine COL (Ret.) Curtis Lee
observe, ``Civilians are active participants in all
conflicts, making engagement with civil government, civil
society organizations, and community leaders a critical
combat function.'' The commander has in CE the capability to
reach directly down to the level of boots-on-the-ground and
thereby influence key partners to achieve his end-state, as
well as fill critical information gaps with data that can
only be acquired through face-to-face interactions. As Dr.
Peterson observes, ``It's amazing what people will tell you
if you pay attention.'' The commander finds in CA forces a
tool to employ ``in the information environment that can be
used to create effects and operationally desirable
conditions.''
A Single Unity of Conception
Churchill was not only a soldier, statesman, and writer. He
was also a painter. Painting was his favorite leisure
activity and he used the principles of painting to illustrate
the proper conduct of war as he saw it. He saw many
similarities between the painter, the general, and the
statesman, but the most critical of these similarities was
the need for ``a single unity of conception.''
Churchill describes this single unity of conception as an
``all-embracing view which presents the beginning and the
end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous impression
retentively and untiringly held in the mind.'' In both
painting and warfare the ``details,'' or, for CA, the data
points gathered through CR and CE, ``are essential to
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the problem presented by each,'' however these ``details have
no order without'' this single unity of conception.
Perhaps CA as a branch is best seen, using Churchill's
language, as a master painter who accurately depicts the
civil component of the OE in the commander's COP, reflecting
reality but also vividly emphasizing the most relevant
aspects in the foreground. The CA professional is like the
art, movie, or food critic who is so familiar with his or her
craft that he or she grasps details that would slip by the
average consumer unnoticed as the significant particulars
they are. Properly trained, CA forces are so intimately
familiar with the social and political nuances of a given
region that they recognize factors that others would consider
inconsequential. Their ``cultural orientation, regional
expertise, linguistic capabilities, advisory ability, and
civilian-acquired professional skills'' enable them to
discriminate between priority and ancillary data points.
For CA forces, the COP is the canvas and the pieces of
civil information gathered through CR and CE are the colors
on the palette. Information management systems and practices
are the brushes that feed the information into the overall
COP. Civil Information Management (CIM), the third CAA
function, is the process by which the colors are blended and
arranged on the canvas to reflect reality. In this process
``data relating to the civil component of the operational
environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed,
produced into information products, and disseminated.'' CIM
is how the particulars become actionable to the general and
the statesman.
The purpose of the COP is to enable the commander to
achieve a single unity of conception. In a properly
``painted'' picture of the civil component of the COP, every
detail, ``however distant, however subordinate, is set forth
naturally and in its true proportion and relation.'' This is
vital because, ``Like the details, the conception of the work
must be true. For the painter, nature appears on the canvas
with `startling obedience,' but only when the painter studies
it attentively and faithfully.'' The civil information
gathered during CR and CE must be accurate, but their
aggregation must not skew any aspect or make it any more or
less significant than it is. Reality as communicated by the
data, not preconceived notions, must drive the COP.
Preconceived notions, or assumptions that have not been
confirmed or denied, amount to nothing more than theories.
Churchill believed, ``The painter's art--and also that of the
general . . . and the statesman--does not consist in
admiration for or faith in theories.'' Theories are valuable
as a starting point, but the role of CA includes verifying or
refuting these assumptions to produce hard data that concurs
with reality.
The CIM process and the resulting COP is ``a service to the
truth as it is to be observed in nature.'' The verified
details that feed into the COP are crucial, but the COP ``is
more than and different from the details of which it has been
composed. The nature of the thing seems to bring in
qualitative factors, factors that are apparent only in the
details, but factors that are not the same as the details.''
The aggregate significance of the COP, not just reliable bits
of information, is both built by the details and also becomes
a separate entity. The resulting single unity of conception
drives military and policy decisions.
According to Churchill, both the general and the statesman
``must see things as they relate to one another in magnitude,
significance, and causality. Seeing in this way is not just
seeing the details but seeing the order in the details.'' The
civil component, perhaps the most ambiguous and constantly
shifting of all aspects of the OE, is also the one that
requires the most persistent engagement. Army CA doctrine
recognizes, ``The land domain is the most complex of the
domains, because it addresses humanity--its cultures,
ethnicities, religions, and politics.'' The information
gathering and production process helps the ``superior''
commander ``bring these shifting details into order and
comprehension,'' thus emphasizing the actionability of the
data, and avoid the danger of becoming merely an
``intelligent scribe.''
Actionability and Cooperation
The CIM process produces actionable information of a kind
that Churchill referred to as ``practical knowledge,'' the
purpose of which is ``not knowing, but doing. The result of
prudential reasoning is a choice and the result of a choice
is an action.'' Churchill recognized that the ``business of
statesmanship,'' as well as generalship, ``was choosing.''
Due to the constant flux of circumstances, the statesman and
general must ``choose at the moment when choices are
possible, in the present when the future `though imminent is
obscure.' ''
Statesmen and generals, policy makers and commanders, bear
the burden of making consequential decisions. For this
reason, the purpose of CIM is not academic but action-
oriented. In the CIM process, ``The data is used as civil
considerations input into possible courses of action to
determine the impact of military operations on the civil
component of the OE,'' as well as to describe ``how the civil
population affects military operations.''
In Churchill's experience, ``War actually calls forth the
most intense forms of cooperation.'' War ``is not only a
cooperative and political event: it is the supreme event of
that kind.'' He discerned that the ``maneuver which brings an
ally into the field is as serviceable as that which wins a
great battle.'' CA not only provides the commander with
actionable information through the COP, but also forges
partnerships within and without the U.S. military. CA forces
engage ``IPI and unified action partners to establish and
maintain relationships and communication channels in order to
enhance and influence the relationship between military
forces and the civil component.'' The nexus of this
coordination is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).
The CMOC, the fourth CAA function, is the workhorse of the
CA branch. It is ``a primary capability for coordination of
the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with
unified action partners, IPI, and interagency.'' When
necessary, the CMOC can also be augmented with relevant
specialists, such as engineers, military police, medical, and
transportation to provide the supported commander with a one-
stop-shop for subject-matter experts.
Reflecting the proactive nature of CAA, CMOCs may provide
Civil Liaison Teams (CLT) to key partners. The CLT guards
against miscommunication and allows for constant coordination
and near-instantaneous synchronization. It also ``provides
the supported CMOC with a CR and CE capability for . . .
coordination without interfering with the regular staff
functions.'' These capabilities make CA ``the Joint force
of choice to work with many civilian agency, non-
governmental, civil society, and private sector actors
whose capacities best mitigate drivers of conflict and
instability and promote peace.''
Ultimate Practical Accuracy
For Churchill, success ``on the battlefield cannot be
`calculated on paper alone, and never copied from examples of
the past.' The solution must be `evolved from the eye and
brain and soul of a single man,' '' with the goal of
``achieving an `ultimate practical accuracy.' '' This is
especially true in the 21st century and, as COL Lipson
asserts, ``There has never been a more pressing need to
understand the importance of the integration of civil
information into operational planning.'' Fortunately, the
commander need not be alone in his pursuit of ``ultimate
practical accuracy.''
Civil Affairs Operations Staff Support, the fifth and final
function of CAA, provides the commander with civil-military
experts who are ``aware of cultural nuances, divergent world
views, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes that affect both
the civil component and military operations.'' CA staff, in
conjunction with and supported by the CMOC, provides
``support during the military decision-making process (MDMP)
and the joint planning process.'' CA staff also
``synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates the civil
component with the commander's CMO [Civil-Military
Operations] responsibilities and operational plans.''
Input from CA staff supports whom Churchill would consider
the ``great'' general. In Churchill's view, ``Generals are
supposed to add something to war to bring it to the right
conclusion and to mitigate its effects. `Battles are won by
slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he
contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.'
'' He believed that the greatest ``contribution'' of the
general is to achieve victory while suffering ``few
casualties,'' leaving ``the enemy puzzled as well as
beaten.'' Churchill's generals were challenged to ``find
easier ways other than sheer slaughter of achieving the main
purpose.''
CA staff, more so than traditional command staff positions,
contribute to preventing the loss of human life, property,
and social capital. Rather than simply solve problems after
they have been created, CA staff helps the commander mitigate
or defeat sources of instability well before kinetic action
is called for. The fact is that ``in today's dynamic world,
it's likely that a conflict can arise before the presence of
an enemy is even fully understood.'' These conflicts ``can
only be won at the civil-military level,'' where ``coming to
grips with the deep internal divisions and tensions of the
host country, and the pressures from outside states, are
critical.''
CA staff acts as the commander's conduit to CIM and
facilitate its integration into his COP. Rather than react to
one threat after another, CA staff helps the commander
understand the factors that contribute to civil unrest and
make societies vulnerable to nefarious actors. Facilitating
the commander's single unity of conception, CA staff enables
him to make decisions that not only defeat threats but
prevent them from arising in the first place. When kinetic
operations are the priority, CA staff provides solutions to
reduce ``the friction between U.S. forces and the local
populations,'' as well as mitigate ``their impact on military
operations.''
The effects produced by CA staff are felt well above the
level of their supported command. ``Policy, doctrine, and
strategy have increasingly leaned on the information gleaned
from nontraditional sources . . . such as through social
actions, internet, and private sector partners to create a
more accurate view of the area of responsibility.'' Just as
``generals must prioritize when they fight,'' they must
prioritize how they train. CA staff provides these real-world
inputs to enable the U.S. military in its entirety to train
as it fights, further contributing to its readiness.
The Right Way of Warfighting
In Churchill's mind, setting these conditions culminates in
war being fought the
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right way. He saw war and politics as two extremes on the
same spectrum, in which ``the real work of politics begins
where war ends--and ends where war begins.'' He found that
``the distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as
the point of view is raised. At the summit true politics and
strategy are one.''
This being the case, for Churchill it was ``not enough to
win. One must win in the right way in order to serve the
purposes of peace, which are the purposes of politics.'' The
greatest generals were those who ``conducted war in ways that
were compatible with the aims of politics.'' They ``manage to
make the gravest choices well because they combine the
functions of statesman and general,'' meaning that they
account for both the military and political consequences of
their decisions.
Churchill's analysis holds true in today's geopolitical
climate. Dr. Kevin Melton and COL (Ret.) Christopher Holshek
acknowledge, ``Ultimately, neither stability nor security are
ends within themselves, but a way to foster an environment
necessary for enhancing social cohesion, governance, economic
livelihood that comprise the grand strategic goal of peace.''
Consequently ``the U.S. can neither afford--fiscally nor
politically--to engage in perpetual warfare, nor to ignore
simmering dynamics that have the potential to eventually
threaten national or global security.'' It is in this reality
that CA forces are best positioned to prove their value,
because the end of all CA efforts is to translate military
victory into political gains.
In 2016, then-Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster ``described war as
essentially political, human, and uncertain--and thus the key
role Civil Affairs plays in managing those determinants.'' In
shoring up the civil foundation of a given society, CA forces
lay the groundwork for stable and sustainable governance well
before kinetic operations have begun and long after they have
ended. They do this ``by building and sustaining
relationships with host nation and non-state partners, and
proactively engaging in activities such as supporting local
governance, education and employment programs, and elevating
moderate voices in civil society through active engagement.''
While emphasizing the ethical need to fight wars the right
way to bring about the desired political effects, Churchill
also stressed the economic necessity of doing so. He found,
``Wars fought strategically are cheaper, in both men and
materiel. They happen faster, and so they economize the time
spent in conflict.'' Both the low-cost and non-kinetic nature
of CA contribute to economy of time and resources, as does
the prevention of economic loss among the civil populace.
Described by COL (Ret.) Holshek as the ``low-tech solution to
low-tech problems,'' CA forces produce effects
disproportionate to their cost.
Conclusion
An accurate and complete grasp of the truth, the on-the-
ground reality, in both the particulars and as a single unity
of conception, enables both statesmen and generals to make
those consequential decisions pertaining to the national
security of the United States. Danielle Pletka of the
American Enterprise Institute agrees that the recipe for
success is clear: ``Understand the reality. Look at the
problems. Identify the solution. Keep an eye on dangerous
currents. And remember that any solution that does not lead
back to the true roots of stable governance will be no
solution at all in the long run.'' Army CA forces are single-
mindedly committed to supporting those efforts, and they
start by simply paying attention.
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