[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 131 (Thursday, August 1, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5304-S5307]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             CIVIL AFFAIRS

  Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed 
in the Congressional Record this scholarly article ``Civil Affairs, 
Winston Churchill, and the Power of Paying Attention,'' originally 
published in Small Wars Journal, which analyzes the value of Civil 
Affairs to supported commands and agencies through the lens of Winston 
Churchill's conception of generalship and statesmanship. Its author, 
CPT Andrew J. Bibb, U.S. Army, is from Santa Fe, NM.
  Although often overlooked, our civil affairs forces contribute to the 
ability of policymakers and military commanders to understand the full 
landscape and make fully informed decisions. Civil Affairs units also 
help us navigate conflicts where we more frequently confront civilians 
than combatants. As the article puts it, Civil Affairs ``helps the 
commander understand the factors that contribute to civil unrest and 
make societies vulnerable to nefarious actors [and] enables them to 
make decisions that not only defeat threats but prevent them from 
arising in the first place.''
  I want to thank our men and women in Civil Affairs and let them know 
we value and appreciate their often unheralded work.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Civil Affairs, Winston Churchill, and the Power of Paying Attention 
                   Captain Andrew J. Bibb, U.S. Army

       Readiness, the top priority of the U.S. military in the 
     21st century, begins with awareness. This applies from the 
     individual all the way up to the national and international 
     levels, from the tactical level to the operational and 
     strategic. In this context,

[[Page S5305]]

     awareness is defined as the state of consciousness in which 
     one attains a functional realization of the state and nature 
     of reality. It is achieved when one pays attention to a given 
     situation and the factors that contribute to it, analyzing 
     and examining until he or she achieves an actionable level of 
     understanding. When the observer understands the problem well 
     enough, the solutions present themselves.
       Clinical psychologist Dr. Jordan Peterson explains, ``If 
     you identify things, with careful attention and language, you 
     bring them forward as viable, obedient objects, detaching 
     them from their underlying near-universal interconnectedness. 
     You simplify them. You make them specific and useful, and 
     reduce their complexity.'' This process of enabling awareness 
     and understanding in support of readiness is what Army Civil 
     Affairs (CA) does best.
       This paper aims to show the value of CA to both the 
     statesman and general as they are understood by Winston 
     Churchill in Dr. Larry P. Arnn's scholarly work Churchill's 
     Trial: Winston Churchill and the Salvation of Free 
     Government. Although Churchill uses the term ``general'' to 
     refer to commanders, CA's value is by no means limited to 
     flag officers. The CA team, the lowest-echelon CA element, is 
     a battalion-level asset and can inform tactical decisions as 
     well as operational and strategic ones. Similarly, CA support 
     to statesmen is not limited to elected officials, as 
     fostering partnerships within and supporting the various 
     branches of government fall directly within the purview of 
     Civil Affairs.
       There are at least three good reasons to use Winston 
     Churchill's concepts of statesmanship and generalship as the 
     lens through which to analyze the value of CA. First, the 
     purpose of all Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) is to enable 
     and execute the decisions of commanders (generals) and policy 
     makers (statesmen). Second, of all of the world leaders in 
     the past hundred years few are as qualified to speak 
     authoritatively on both of these topics as Winston Churchill. 
     Third, none of these world leaders were as prolific as 
     Churchill at recording their perspectives, so through his 
     work we are able to clearly see what the general and 
     statesmen need that CA can provide.
       Churchill served as Prime Minister of Great Britain during 
     and after World War II, as well as in numerous other 
     government positions, including First Lord of the Admiralty 
     at the outbreak of World War I. Throughout his long and 
     distinguished career he learned that the duty of statesmen 
     and generals was to comprehend a given situation and act in 
     concert with reality to produce the desired outcome. The 
     ability to do this in large part depends on having an 
     accurate, complete, and nuanced understanding of the 
     situation and its attending circumstances.
       Fortunately for both the statesman and the general, this is 
     where CA excels. CA not only serves as the informational and 
     relational link between military and civilian entities, but 
     also paints an accurate picture of the on-the-ground reality 
     for the commander. CA focuses specifically on the civil 
     component of the operational environment (OE), and since the 
     non-threat (civil) aspect makes up the vast majority of the 
     OE a proper understanding of that aspect is critical to both 
     military and political success. Additionally, ``Military 
     operations always have a degree of involvement (assistance, 
     interference, or influence) with the civil component,'' so a 
     dedicated force oriented to that component is necessary to 
     every operation.


                        Defining the Particulars

       Churchill believed that the ``right thing to do depends on 
     the circumstances,'' but those circumstances must be defined 
     in order to determine what the right course of action is. 
     CA's most critical function is to establish and maintain 
     awareness of both the raw civil data and its aggregate 
     significance. Civil Affairs Activities (CAA), the core 
     competency of which CA is the proponent, are ``enduring 
     capabilities that increase the commander's understanding of, 
     deliberate interaction with, and planning for the civil 
     component.'' While CA forces are capable of supporting 
     Military Governance Operations and other joint activities, 
     such as Foreign Assistance and Populace and Resources 
     Control, CAA define CA as the commander's asset. The five CAA 
     functions are Civil Reconnaissance, Civil Engagement, Civil 
     Information Management, Civil-Military Operations Center, and 
     Civil Affairs Operations Staff Support.
       CAA make CA an invaluable asset to the commander because an 
     accurate picture of the on-the-ground reality frees the 
     commander to make timely decisions confidently. Without that 
     picture every decision is a gamble. In Churchill's mind, the 
     specifics surrounding each individual circumstance should 
     drive military decisions. For him, ``Circumstances alone . . 
     . decide whether a correct conventional maneuver is right or 
     wrong.'' That these circumstances ``are many in number and 
     constantly moving'' only emphasizes the need for CA input 
     into the commander's common operational picture (COP).
       Policy makers benefit from this civil information as well, 
     as it enables them to make decisions in light of their real-
     world implications. Churchill believed that, although the 
     ``statesman lives and judges amidst the details of action,'' 
     he ``serves a master beyond all particulars.'' For the policy 
     maker to rise above the particulars someone else must gather, 
     process, and disseminate the detailed information that drives 
     policy decisions. Someone else must pay close attention to 
     the specifics of a given civil situation. CA forces meet the 
     civil information requirements of both the general and the 
     statesmen in this regard and are uniquely ``trained in 
     understanding'' the particulars of ``foreign cultures, socio-
     economic dynamics, and governance structures.''
       Army CA has only two tactical mission tasks in its 
     doctrine, and both of them are oriented toward defining the 
     particulars of the civil component. Civil Reconnaissance (CR) 
     and Civil Engagement (CE), which are also the first two CAA 
     functions, are dedicated to gathering the raw civil data in a 
     given area of operations. These two ``CA specific tasks 
     answer key information gaps in which no other staff section 
     specializes.'' CA Forces are able to focus their attention on 
     the ``dynamic relationship'' between ``friendly forces, enemy 
     forces, and populations as . . . a host of other factors 
     contend to influence the OE on a daily basis.''
       CR, the first tactical task, is the ``targeted, planned, 
     and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil 
     aspects of the environment.'' CA forces are capable of 
     conducting CR in any environment the commander deems 
     necessary by ``deploying to semi- and non-permissive 
     environments, and operating in places where traditional 
     military and civilian agencies cannot.'' For this reason, 
     among many others, Marine COL Jeffrey Lipson concludes that 
     tactical CA units are ``employed to their best effect'' when 
     they are tasked ``to gain an accurate picture of a region in 
     addition to what is gleaned from traditional intelligence 
     sources.''
       CR is proactive in nature, not reactive. It continually 
     refines the commander's picture of the OE instead of waiting 
     for specific information requirements to be published, 
     although CA forces are perfectly capable of answering those 
     as well. CA forces base their CR on civil information 
     collection plans, which are specific enough to economize CA 
     efforts but broad enough to allow for flexibility depending 
     on the circumstances. The result is quality civil information 
     gained at a negligible cost. COL Lipson explains, ``When 
     properly gathered, analyzed, deployed, civil reconnaissance 
     will `push' information to commanders to help them tailor 
     their operations. Without it, the same information is 
     `pulled' through interrogations, patrols, or other more time-
     and resource-intensive means and perhaps with less 
     efficacy.''
       Churchill believed that those ``who cannot talk to each 
     other are likely to fight like roosters.'' CA has an answer 
     to this problem as well. Civil Engagement (CE), the second 
     tactical mission task, are ``the planned and targeted 
     activities in which CA forces deliberately focus on the 
     interaction with the IPI [indigenous populations and 
     institutions], unified action partners, and other civil 
     entities.''
       Churchill knew first-hand that fostering relationships 
     leads to a clearer understanding of the circumstances. While 
     serving as a war correspondent in South Africa during the 
     Boer War in the late 1890s, Boer fighters captured Churchill 
     as well as a number of British soldiers. Churchill, unwilling 
     to stand passively by, built relationships with his captors, 
     befriended them, and then leveraged these relationships to 
     gain valuable information that led to his daring and 
     successful escape.
       Although he did not refer to it as such, Churchill 
     conducted CE to gain access to and influence with his guards, 
     and, as a result, gather the necessary information for his 
     plan. Aside from the fact that his engagements were with 
     enemy combatants, it is no different than what CA does every 
     day with non-threat entities. The CE function provides a host 
     of capabilities to the supported commander, who may employ 
     ``this task to obtain or disseminate information, mitigate 
     civilian-military interference, foster legitimacy, gain civil 
     cooperation, build partner capacity, and obtain unified 
     action.''
       CE is a tactical level task that can have strategic 
     effects. Dr. David Kilcullen and Marine COL (Ret.) Curtis Lee 
     observe, ``Civilians are active participants in all 
     conflicts, making engagement with civil government, civil 
     society organizations, and community leaders a critical 
     combat function.'' The commander has in CE the capability to 
     reach directly down to the level of boots-on-the-ground and 
     thereby influence key partners to achieve his end-state, as 
     well as fill critical information gaps with data that can 
     only be acquired through face-to-face interactions. As Dr. 
     Peterson observes, ``It's amazing what people will tell you 
     if you pay attention.'' The commander finds in CA forces a 
     tool to employ ``in the information environment that can be 
     used to create effects and operationally desirable 
     conditions.''


                      A Single Unity of Conception

       Churchill was not only a soldier, statesman, and writer. He 
     was also a painter. Painting was his favorite leisure 
     activity and he used the principles of painting to illustrate 
     the proper conduct of war as he saw it. He saw many 
     similarities between the painter, the general, and the 
     statesman, but the most critical of these similarities was 
     the need for ``a single unity of conception.''
       Churchill describes this single unity of conception as an 
     ``all-embracing view which presents the beginning and the 
     end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous impression 
     retentively and untiringly held in the mind.'' In both 
     painting and warfare the ``details,'' or, for CA, the data 
     points gathered through CR and CE, ``are essential to

[[Page S5306]]

     the problem presented by each,'' however these ``details have 
     no order without'' this single unity of conception.
       Perhaps CA as a branch is best seen, using Churchill's 
     language, as a master painter who accurately depicts the 
     civil component of the OE in the commander's COP, reflecting 
     reality but also vividly emphasizing the most relevant 
     aspects in the foreground. The CA professional is like the 
     art, movie, or food critic who is so familiar with his or her 
     craft that he or she grasps details that would slip by the 
     average consumer unnoticed as the significant particulars 
     they are. Properly trained, CA forces are so intimately 
     familiar with the social and political nuances of a given 
     region that they recognize factors that others would consider 
     inconsequential. Their ``cultural orientation, regional 
     expertise, linguistic capabilities, advisory ability, and 
     civilian-acquired professional skills'' enable them to 
     discriminate between priority and ancillary data points.
       For CA forces, the COP is the canvas and the pieces of 
     civil information gathered through CR and CE are the colors 
     on the palette. Information management systems and practices 
     are the brushes that feed the information into the overall 
     COP. Civil Information Management (CIM), the third CAA 
     function, is the process by which the colors are blended and 
     arranged on the canvas to reflect reality. In this process 
     ``data relating to the civil component of the operational 
     environment is gathered, collated, processed, analyzed, 
     produced into information products, and disseminated.'' CIM 
     is how the particulars become actionable to the general and 
     the statesman.
       The purpose of the COP is to enable the commander to 
     achieve a single unity of conception. In a properly 
     ``painted'' picture of the civil component of the COP, every 
     detail, ``however distant, however subordinate, is set forth 
     naturally and in its true proportion and relation.'' This is 
     vital because, ``Like the details, the conception of the work 
     must be true. For the painter, nature appears on the canvas 
     with `startling obedience,' but only when the painter studies 
     it attentively and faithfully.'' The civil information 
     gathered during CR and CE must be accurate, but their 
     aggregation must not skew any aspect or make it any more or 
     less significant than it is. Reality as communicated by the 
     data, not preconceived notions, must drive the COP.
       Preconceived notions, or assumptions that have not been 
     confirmed or denied, amount to nothing more than theories. 
     Churchill believed, ``The painter's art--and also that of the 
     general . . . and the statesman--does not consist in 
     admiration for or faith in theories.'' Theories are valuable 
     as a starting point, but the role of CA includes verifying or 
     refuting these assumptions to produce hard data that concurs 
     with reality.
       The CIM process and the resulting COP is ``a service to the 
     truth as it is to be observed in nature.'' The verified 
     details that feed into the COP are crucial, but the COP ``is 
     more than and different from the details of which it has been 
     composed. The nature of the thing seems to bring in 
     qualitative factors, factors that are apparent only in the 
     details, but factors that are not the same as the details.'' 
     The aggregate significance of the COP, not just reliable bits 
     of information, is both built by the details and also becomes 
     a separate entity. The resulting single unity of conception 
     drives military and policy decisions.
       According to Churchill, both the general and the statesman 
     ``must see things as they relate to one another in magnitude, 
     significance, and causality. Seeing in this way is not just 
     seeing the details but seeing the order in the details.'' The 
     civil component, perhaps the most ambiguous and constantly 
     shifting of all aspects of the OE, is also the one that 
     requires the most persistent engagement. Army CA doctrine 
     recognizes, ``The land domain is the most complex of the 
     domains, because it addresses humanity--its cultures, 
     ethnicities, religions, and politics.'' The information 
     gathering and production process helps the ``superior'' 
     commander ``bring these shifting details into order and 
     comprehension,'' thus emphasizing the actionability of the 
     data, and avoid the danger of becoming merely an 
     ``intelligent scribe.''


                     Actionability and Cooperation

       The CIM process produces actionable information of a kind 
     that Churchill referred to as ``practical knowledge,'' the 
     purpose of which is ``not knowing, but doing. The result of 
     prudential reasoning is a choice and the result of a choice 
     is an action.'' Churchill recognized that the ``business of 
     statesmanship,'' as well as generalship, ``was choosing.'' 
     Due to the constant flux of circumstances, the statesman and 
     general must ``choose at the moment when choices are 
     possible, in the present when the future `though imminent is 
     obscure.' ''
       Statesmen and generals, policy makers and commanders, bear 
     the burden of making consequential decisions. For this 
     reason, the purpose of CIM is not academic but action-
     oriented. In the CIM process, ``The data is used as civil 
     considerations input into possible courses of action to 
     determine the impact of military operations on the civil 
     component of the OE,'' as well as to describe ``how the civil 
     population affects military operations.''
       In Churchill's experience, ``War actually calls forth the 
     most intense forms of cooperation.'' War ``is not only a 
     cooperative and political event: it is the supreme event of 
     that kind.'' He discerned that the ``maneuver which brings an 
     ally into the field is as serviceable as that which wins a 
     great battle.'' CA not only provides the commander with 
     actionable information through the COP, but also forges 
     partnerships within and without the U.S. military. CA forces 
     engage ``IPI and unified action partners to establish and 
     maintain relationships and communication channels in order to 
     enhance and influence the relationship between military 
     forces and the civil component.'' The nexus of this 
     coordination is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).
       The CMOC, the fourth CAA function, is the workhorse of the 
     CA branch. It is ``a primary capability for coordination of 
     the activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with 
     unified action partners, IPI, and interagency.'' When 
     necessary, the CMOC can also be augmented with relevant 
     specialists, such as engineers, military police, medical, and 
     transportation to provide the supported commander with a one-
     stop-shop for subject-matter experts.
       Reflecting the proactive nature of CAA, CMOCs may provide 
     Civil Liaison Teams (CLT) to key partners. The CLT guards 
     against miscommunication and allows for constant coordination 
     and near-instantaneous synchronization. It also ``provides 
     the supported CMOC with a CR and CE capability for . . . 
     coordination without interfering with the regular staff 
     functions.'' These capabilities make CA ``the Joint force 
     of choice to work with many civilian agency, non-
     governmental, civil society, and private sector actors 
     whose capacities best mitigate drivers of conflict and 
     instability and promote peace.''


                      Ultimate Practical Accuracy

       For Churchill, success ``on the battlefield cannot be 
     `calculated on paper alone, and never copied from examples of 
     the past.' The solution must be `evolved from the eye and 
     brain and soul of a single man,' '' with the goal of 
     ``achieving an `ultimate practical accuracy.' '' This is 
     especially true in the 21st century and, as COL Lipson 
     asserts, ``There has never been a more pressing need to 
     understand the importance of the integration of civil 
     information into operational planning.'' Fortunately, the 
     commander need not be alone in his pursuit of ``ultimate 
     practical accuracy.''
       Civil Affairs Operations Staff Support, the fifth and final 
     function of CAA, provides the commander with civil-military 
     experts who are ``aware of cultural nuances, divergent world 
     views, biases, prejudices, and stereotypes that affect both 
     the civil component and military operations.'' CA staff, in 
     conjunction with and supported by the CMOC, provides 
     ``support during the military decision-making process (MDMP) 
     and the joint planning process.'' CA staff also 
     ``synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates the civil 
     component with the commander's CMO [Civil-Military 
     Operations] responsibilities and operational plans.''
       Input from CA staff supports whom Churchill would consider 
     the ``great'' general. In Churchill's view, ``Generals are 
     supposed to add something to war to bring it to the right 
     conclusion and to mitigate its effects. `Battles are won by 
     slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he 
     contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter.' 
     '' He believed that the greatest ``contribution'' of the 
     general is to achieve victory while suffering ``few 
     casualties,'' leaving ``the enemy puzzled as well as 
     beaten.'' Churchill's generals were challenged to ``find 
     easier ways other than sheer slaughter of achieving the main 
     purpose.''
       CA staff, more so than traditional command staff positions, 
     contribute to preventing the loss of human life, property, 
     and social capital. Rather than simply solve problems after 
     they have been created, CA staff helps the commander mitigate 
     or defeat sources of instability well before kinetic action 
     is called for. The fact is that ``in today's dynamic world, 
     it's likely that a conflict can arise before the presence of 
     an enemy is even fully understood.'' These conflicts ``can 
     only be won at the civil-military level,'' where ``coming to 
     grips with the deep internal divisions and tensions of the 
     host country, and the pressures from outside states, are 
     critical.''
       CA staff acts as the commander's conduit to CIM and 
     facilitate its integration into his COP. Rather than react to 
     one threat after another, CA staff helps the commander 
     understand the factors that contribute to civil unrest and 
     make societies vulnerable to nefarious actors. Facilitating 
     the commander's single unity of conception, CA staff enables 
     him to make decisions that not only defeat threats but 
     prevent them from arising in the first place. When kinetic 
     operations are the priority, CA staff provides solutions to 
     reduce ``the friction between U.S. forces and the local 
     populations,'' as well as mitigate ``their impact on military 
     operations.''
       The effects produced by CA staff are felt well above the 
     level of their supported command. ``Policy, doctrine, and 
     strategy have increasingly leaned on the information gleaned 
     from nontraditional sources . . . such as through social 
     actions, internet, and private sector partners to create a 
     more accurate view of the area of responsibility.'' Just as 
     ``generals must prioritize when they fight,'' they must 
     prioritize how they train. CA staff provides these real-world 
     inputs to enable the U.S. military in its entirety to train 
     as it fights, further contributing to its readiness.


                      The Right Way of Warfighting

       In Churchill's mind, setting these conditions culminates in 
     war being fought the

[[Page S5307]]

     right way. He saw war and politics as two extremes on the 
     same spectrum, in which ``the real work of politics begins 
     where war ends--and ends where war begins.'' He found that 
     ``the distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as 
     the point of view is raised. At the summit true politics and 
     strategy are one.''
       This being the case, for Churchill it was ``not enough to 
     win. One must win in the right way in order to serve the 
     purposes of peace, which are the purposes of politics.'' The 
     greatest generals were those who ``conducted war in ways that 
     were compatible with the aims of politics.'' They ``manage to 
     make the gravest choices well because they combine the 
     functions of statesman and general,'' meaning that they 
     account for both the military and political consequences of 
     their decisions.
       Churchill's analysis holds true in today's geopolitical 
     climate. Dr. Kevin Melton and COL (Ret.) Christopher Holshek 
     acknowledge, ``Ultimately, neither stability nor security are 
     ends within themselves, but a way to foster an environment 
     necessary for enhancing social cohesion, governance, economic 
     livelihood that comprise the grand strategic goal of peace.'' 
     Consequently ``the U.S. can neither afford--fiscally nor 
     politically--to engage in perpetual warfare, nor to ignore 
     simmering dynamics that have the potential to eventually 
     threaten national or global security.'' It is in this reality 
     that CA forces are best positioned to prove their value, 
     because the end of all CA efforts is to translate military 
     victory into political gains.
       In 2016, then-Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster ``described war as 
     essentially political, human, and uncertain--and thus the key 
     role Civil Affairs plays in managing those determinants.'' In 
     shoring up the civil foundation of a given society, CA forces 
     lay the groundwork for stable and sustainable governance well 
     before kinetic operations have begun and long after they have 
     ended. They do this ``by building and sustaining 
     relationships with host nation and non-state partners, and 
     proactively engaging in activities such as supporting local 
     governance, education and employment programs, and elevating 
     moderate voices in civil society through active engagement.''
       While emphasizing the ethical need to fight wars the right 
     way to bring about the desired political effects, Churchill 
     also stressed the economic necessity of doing so. He found, 
     ``Wars fought strategically are cheaper, in both men and 
     materiel. They happen faster, and so they economize the time 
     spent in conflict.'' Both the low-cost and non-kinetic nature 
     of CA contribute to economy of time and resources, as does 
     the prevention of economic loss among the civil populace. 
     Described by COL (Ret.) Holshek as the ``low-tech solution to 
     low-tech problems,'' CA forces produce effects 
     disproportionate to their cost.


                               Conclusion

       An accurate and complete grasp of the truth, the on-the-
     ground reality, in both the particulars and as a single unity 
     of conception, enables both statesmen and generals to make 
     those consequential decisions pertaining to the national 
     security of the United States. Danielle Pletka of the 
     American Enterprise Institute agrees that the recipe for 
     success is clear: ``Understand the reality. Look at the 
     problems. Identify the solution. Keep an eye on dangerous 
     currents. And remember that any solution that does not lead 
     back to the true roots of stable governance will be no 
     solution at all in the long run.'' Army CA forces are single-
     mindedly committed to supporting those efforts, and they 
     start by simply paying attention.

                          ____________________