[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 125 (Wednesday, July 24, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5051-S5053]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED TRANSFER TO THE 
   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
  NORTHERN IRELAND, THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, AND THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC OF 
       CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES--S. J. RES. 36--VETO

                                 ______
                                 

 PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED EXPORT TO THE 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN 
  IRELAND, AND THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND 
                     SERVICES--S. J. RES. 37--VETO

                                 ______
                                 

 PROVIDING FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED EXPORT TO THE 
  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
 NORTHERN IRELAND OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES--S. J. RES. 
                                38--VETO

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate having 
received the veto messages on S.J. Res. 36, S.J. Res. 37, and S.J. Res. 
38, the messages are considered read and spread upon the Journal in 
full, en bloc.
  The veto messages are ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:
  I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 36, a joint 
resolution that would prohibit the issuance of certain licenses with 
respect to several proposed agreements or transfers to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the Kingdom of

[[Page S5052]]

Spain, and the Italian Republic. This resolution would weaken America's 
global competitiveness and damage the important relationships we share 
with our allies and partners.
  In particular, S.J. Res. 36 would prohibit licensing for 
manufacturing in Saudi Arabia of Guidance Electronics Detector 
Assemblies, Computer Control Groups, Airfoil Groups, Aircraft Umbilical 
Interconnect Systems, Fuses, and other components to support the 
production of Paveway II, Enhanced Paveway II, and Paveway IV 
munitions. The misguided licensing prohibitions in the joint resolution 
directly conflict with the foreign policy and national security 
objectives of the United States, which include strengthening defense 
alliances with friendly countries throughout the world, deepening 
partnerships that preserve and extend our global influence, and 
enhancing our competitiveness in key markets. Apart from negatively 
affecting our bilateral relationships with Saudi Arabia, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and Italy, the joint resolution would hamper the 
ability of the United States to sustain and shape critical security 
cooperation activities. S.J. Res. 36 would also damage the credibility 
of the United States as a reliable partner by signaling that we are 
willing to abandon our partners and allies at the very moment when 
threats to them are increasing.
  The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution 
seeks to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our 
solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States 
citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and who are imperiled by Houthi 
attacks from Yemen. The Houthis, supported by Iran, have attacked 
civilian and military facilities using missiles, armed drones, and 
explosive boats, including in areas frequented by United States 
citizens, such as the airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Second, the 
joint resolution would degrade Saudi Arabia's military preparedness and 
ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting its ability to 
defend United States military personnel hosted there. Third, Saudi 
Arabia is a bulwark against the malign activities of Iran and its 
proxies in the region, and the licenses the joint resolution would 
prohibit enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to deter and defend against 
these threats.
  In addition, S.J. Res. 36 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and 
the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce 
unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability 
with and between our partners. It could also create diplomatic and 
security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.
  Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and 
purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 36 would likely prolong 
the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By 
undermining bilateral relationships of the United States and impeding 
our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint 
resolution would harm--not help--efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. 
And without precision-guided munitions, more--not fewer--civilians are 
likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns 
that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian 
casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will 
continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training 
and advising Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting 
processes.
  The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on 
innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an 
end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming 
resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend 
time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to 
direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through 
a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.
  For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 36 to the Senate 
without my approval.
                                                     Donald J. Trump.  
The White House, July 24, 2019.
                                  ____

To the Senate of the United States:
  I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 37, a joint 
resolution that would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for 
certain defense articles, defense services, and technical data to 
support the transfer of Paveway II kits to the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and 
the Republic of France. This resolution would weaken America's global 
competitiveness and damage the important relationships we share with 
our allies and partners.
  In particular, S.J. Res. 37 would prohibit the issuance of export 
licenses for Paveway II kits to the UAE, the United Kingdom, and 
France. The misguided licensing prohibitions in the joint resolution 
directly conflict with the foreign policy and national security 
objectives of the United States, which include strengthening defense 
alliances with friendly countries throughout the world, deepening 
partnerships that preserve and extend our global influence, and 
enhancing our competitiveness in key markets. Apart from negatively 
affecting our bilateral relationships with the UAE, the United Kingdom, 
and France, the joint resolution would hamper the ability of the United 
States to sustain and shape critical security cooperation activities 
with those partners. S.J. Res. 37 would also damage the credibility of 
the United States as a reliable partner by signaling that we are 
willing to abandon our partners and allies at the very moment when 
threats to them are increasing.
  The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution 
seeks to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our 
solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States 
citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and are imperiled by Houthis 
attacking from Yemen using missiles, armed drones, and explosive boats. 
The UAE is an important part of the Saudi-led Coalition that helps 
protect Americans from these Iranian-supported Houthi attacks on 
civilian and military facilities, including those located in areas 
frequented by United States citizens like the airport in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. Second, the joint resolution would degrade the UAE's military 
preparedness and ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting 
its ability to defend the thousands of United States military personnel 
hosted there. Third, the UAE is a bulwark against the malign activities 
of Iran and its proxies in the region. It is also an active partner 
with the United States in combatting terrorism in Yemen and elsewhere. 
The licenses the joint resolution would prohibit enhance our partner's 
ability to deter and defend against these threats.
  In addition, S.J. Res. 37 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and 
the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce 
unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability 
with and between our partners. It could also create diplomatic and 
security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.
  Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and 
purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 37 would likely prolong 
the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By 
undermining bilateral relationships of the United States and impeding 
our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint 
resolution would harm--not help--efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. 
And without precision-guided munitions, more--not fewer--civilians are 
likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns 
that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian 
casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will 
continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training 
and advising the Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting 
processes.
  The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on 
innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an 
end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming 
resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend 
time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to 
direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through 
a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.
  For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 37 to the Senate 
without my approval.
                                                     Donald J. Trump.  
                                        The White House, July 24, 2019.

[[Page S5053]]


                                  ____
To the Senate of the United States:
  I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 38, a joint 
resolution that would prohibit the issuance of export licenses for the 
proposed transfer of defense articles, defense services, and technical 
data to support the manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing System for the 
Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program in regard to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. This resolution would weaken America's global competitiveness 
and damage the important relationships we share with our allies and 
partners.
  In particular, S.J. Res. 38 would prohibit the issuance of export 
licenses for the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense 
services, and technical data for the manufacturing of the Aurora Fuzing 
System for the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program. The misguided 
licensing prohibition in the joint resolution directly conflicts with 
the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United 
States, which include strengthening defense alliances with friendly 
countries throughout the world, deepening partnerships that preserve 
and extend our global influence, and enhancing our competitiveness in 
key markets. Apart from negatively affecting our bilateral 
relationships with Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, the joint 
resolution would hamper the ability of the United States to sustain and 
shape critical security cooperation activities. S.J. Res. 38 would also 
damage the credibility of the United States as a reliable partner by 
signaling that we are willing to abandon our partners and allies at the 
very moment when threats to them are increasing.
  The United States is providing the licenses that the joint resolution 
seeks to prohibit for many reasons. First and foremost, it is our 
solemn duty to protect the safety of the more than 80,000 United States 
citizens who reside in Saudi Arabia and who are imperiled by Houthi 
attacks from Yemen. The Houthis, supported by Iran, have attacked 
civilian and military facilities using missiles, armed drones, and 
explosive boats, including in areas frequented by United States 
citizens, such as the airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Second, the 
joint resolution would degrade Saudi Arabia's military preparedness and 
ability to protect its sovereignty, directly affecting its ability to 
defend United States military personnel hosted there. Third, Saudi 
Arabia is a bulwark against the malign activities of Iran and its 
proxies in the region, and the licenses the joint resolution would 
prohibit enhance Saudi Arabia's ability to deter and defend against 
these threats.
  In addition, S.J. Res. 38 would negatively affect our NATO Allies and 
the transatlantic defense industry. It could, for example, produce 
unintended consequences for defense procurement and interoperability 
with and between our partners. It could also create diplomatic and 
security opportunities for our adversaries to exploit.
  Finally, by restricting the ability of our partners to produce and 
purchase precision-guided munitions, S.J. Res. 38 would likely prolong 
the conflict in Yemen and deepen the suffering it causes. By 
undermining bilateral relationships of the United States and impeding 
our ability to support key partners at a critical time, the joint 
resolution would harm--not help--efforts to end the conflict in Yemen. 
And without precision-guided munitions, more--not fewer--civilians are 
likely to become casualties of the conflict. While I share concerns 
that certain Members of Congress have expressed about civilian 
casualties of this conflict, the United States has taken and will 
continue to take action to minimize such casualties, including training 
and advising the Saudi-led Coalition forces to improve their targeting 
processes.
  The United States is very concerned about the conflict's toll on 
innocent civilians and is working to bring the conflict in Yemen to an 
end. But we cannot end it through ill-conceived and time-consuming 
resolutions that fail to address its root causes. Rather than expend 
time and resources on such resolutions, I encourage the Congress to 
direct its efforts toward supporting our work to achieve peace through 
a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Yemen.
  For these reasons, it is my duty to return S.J. Res. 38 to the Senate 
without my approval.
                                                     Donald J. Trump.  
                                        The White House, July 24, 2019.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

                          ____________________