[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 109 (Thursday, June 27, 2019)]
[House]
[Pages H5207-H5223]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SECURING AMERICA'S FEDERAL ELECTIONS ACT
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 460, I call
up the bill (H.R. 2722) to protect elections for public office by
providing financial support and enhanced security for the
infrastructure used to carry out such elections, and for other
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 460, in lieu of
the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the
Committee on House Administration printed in the bill, an amendment in
the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee
Print 116-20, modified by the amendment printed in part A of House
Report 116-126, is adopted, and the bill, as amended, is considered
read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 2722
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Securing
America's Federal Elections Act'' or the ``SAFE Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants
Part 1--Promoting Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
Verified Permanent Paper Ballot
Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Paper ballot and manual counting requirements.
Sec. 103. Accessibility and ballot verification for individuals with
disabilities.
Sec. 104. Durability and readability requirements for ballots.
Sec. 105. Paper ballot printing requirements.
Sec. 106. Study and report on optimal ballot design.
Sec. 107. Effective date for new requirements.
Part 2--Grants to Carry Out Improvements
Sec. 111. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems
and carrying out voting system security improvements.
Sec. 112. Coordination of voting system security activities with use of
requirements payments and election administration
requirements under Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Sec. 113. Incorporation of definitions.
Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits
Sec. 121. Risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 122. Funding for conducting post-election risk-limiting audits.
Sec. 123. GAO analysis of effects of audits.
TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION
Sec. 201. Voting system cybersecurity requirements.
Sec. 202. Testing of existing voting systems to ensure compliance with
election cybersecurity guidelines and other guidelines.
Sec. 203. Requiring use of software and hardware for which information
is disclosed by manufacturer.
Sec. 204. Treatment of electronic poll books as part of voting systems.
Sec. 205. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.
Sec. 206. Streamlining collection of election information.
TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES
Sec. 301. Use of voting machines manufactured in the United States.
TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY
Sec. 401. Severability.
TITLE I--FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
Subtitle A--Voting System Security Improvement Grants
PART 1--PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-
VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Voter Confidence and
Increased Accessibility Act of 2019''.
SEC. 102. PAPER BALLOT AND MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(2)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(2) Paper ballot requirement.--
``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
``(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) The voting system
shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-
verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be
marked and made available for inspection and verification by
the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted, and
which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical
character recognition device or other counting device. For
purposes of this subclause, the term `individual, durable,
voter-verified paper ballot' means a paper ballot marked by
the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through the use of
a nontabulating ballot marking device or system, so long as
the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by
hand. The paper ballot shall be printed or marked in such a
way that vote selections, including all vote selections
scanned by voting systems to tabulate votes, can be inspected
and verified by the voter without training or instruction or
audited by election officials without the aid of any machine
or other equipment.
``(II) The voting system shall provide the voter with an
opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot before
the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in
accordance with clause (ii).
``(III) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-
verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible,
at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a
voter with the record of the voter's vote without the voter's
consent.
[[Page H5208]]
``(ii) Preservation as official record.--The individual,
durable, voter-verified paper ballot used in accordance with
clause (i) shall constitute the official ballot and shall be
preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes of any
recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for
Federal office in which the voting system is used.
``(iii) Manual counting requirements for recounts and
audits.--(I) Each paper ballot used pursuant to clause (i)
shall be suitable for a manual audit, and shall be counted by
hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any
election for Federal office.
``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or
irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the
vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual,
durable, voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to clause
(i), and subject to subparagraph (B), the individual,
durable, voter-verified paper ballots shall be the true and
correct record of the votes cast.
``(iv) Application to all ballots.--The requirements of
this subparagraph shall apply to all ballots cast in
elections for Federal office, including ballots cast by
absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters under
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act and
other absentee voters.
``(B) Special rule for treatment of disputes when paper
ballots have been shown to be compromised.--
``(i) In general.--In the event that--
``(I) there is any inconsistency between any electronic
vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by
hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots
used pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i) with respect to any
election for Federal office; and
``(II) it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
(as determined in accordance with the applicable standards in
the jurisdiction involved) in any recount, audit, or contest
of the result of the election that the paper ballots have
been compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and
that a sufficient number of the ballots have been so
compromised that the result of the election could be changed,
the determination of the appropriate remedy with respect to
the election shall be made in accordance with applicable
State law, except that the electronic tally shall not be used
as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified
result.
``(ii) Rule for consideration of ballots associated with
each voting machine.--For purposes of clause (i), only the
paper ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered
in the calculation of whether or not the result of the
election could be changed due to the compromised paper
ballots.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment Clarifying Applicability of
Alternative Language Accessibility.--Section 301(a)(4) of
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(4)) is amended by inserting
``(including the paper ballots required to be used under
paragraph (2))'' after ``voting system''.
(c) Other Conforming Amendments.--Section 301(a)(1) of such
Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ``counted'' and
inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3)'';
(2) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and
inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3)'';
(3) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ``counted'' each
place it appears and inserting ``counted, in accordance with
paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
(4) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``counted'' and
inserting ``counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and
(3)''.
SEC. 103. ACCESSIBILITY AND BALLOT VERIFICATION FOR
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 301(a)(3)(B) of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(3)(B)) is amended to
read as follows:
``(B)(i) ensure that individuals with disabilities and
others are given an equivalent opportunity to vote, including
with privacy and independence, in a manner that produces a
voter-verified paper ballot as for other voters;
``(ii) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through
the use of at least one voting system equipped for
individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual and
enhanced visual accessibility for the blind and visually
impaired, and nonmanual and enhanced manual accessibility for
the mobility and dexterity impaired, at each polling place;
and
``(iii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and
paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--
``(I) allows the voter to privately and independently
verify the permanent paper ballot through the presentation,
in accessible form, of the printed or marked vote selections
from the same printed or marked information that would be
used for any vote counting or auditing; and
``(II) allows the voter to privately and independently
verify and cast the permanent paper ballot without requiring
the voter to manually handle the paper ballot;''.
(b) Specific Requirement of Study, Testing, and Development
of Accessible Paper Ballot Verification Mechanisms.--
(1) Study and reporting.--Subtitle C of title II of such
Act (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended--
(A) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and
(B) by inserting after section 246 the following new
section:
``SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE PAPER BALLOT
VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.
``(a) Study and Report.--The Director of the National
Science Foundation shall make grants to not fewer than 3
eligible entities to study, test, and develop accessible
paper ballot voting, verification, and casting mechanisms and
devices and best practices to enhance the accessibility of
paper ballot voting and verification mechanisms for
individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary
language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in
literacy, including best practices for the mechanisms
themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are
used.
``(b) Eligibility.--An entity is eligible to receive a
grant under this part if it submits to the Director (at such
time and in such form as the Director may require) an
application containing--
``(1) certifications that the entity shall specifically
investigate enhanced methods or devices, including non-
electronic devices, that will assist such individuals and
voters in marking voter-verified paper ballots and presenting
or transmitting the information printed or marked on such
ballots back to such individuals and voters, and casting such
ballots;
``(2) a certification that the entity shall complete the
activities carried out with the grant not later than December
31, 2020; and
``(3) such other information and certifications as the
Director may require.
``(c) Availability of Technology.--Any technology developed
with the grants made under this section shall be treated as
non-proprietary and shall be made available to the public,
including to manufacturers of voting systems.
``(d) Coordination With Grants for Technology
Improvements.--The Director shall carry out this section so
that the activities carried out with the grants made under
subsection (a) are coordinated with the research conducted
under the grant program carried out by the Commission under
section 271, to the extent that the Director and Commission
determine necessary to provide for the advancement of
accessible voting technology.
``(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $5,000,000, to
remain available until expended.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended--
(A) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as
relating to section 248; and
(B) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the
following new item:
``Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible paper ballot verification
mechanisms.''.
(c) Clarification of Accessibility Standards Under
Voluntary Voting System Guidance.--In adopting any voluntary
guidance under subtitle B of title III of the Help America
Vote Act with respect to the accessibility of the paper
ballot verification requirements for individuals with
disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall
include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable
under the voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting
systems under such subtitle.
(d) Permitting Use of Funds for Protection and Advocacy
Systems to Support Actions to Enforce Election-related
Disability Access.--Section 292(a) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21062(a)) is amended by striking ``;
except that'' and all that follows and inserting a period.
SEC. 104. DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
BALLOTS.
Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
U.S.C. 21081(a)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(7) Durability and readability requirements for
ballots.--
``(A) Durability requirements for paper ballots.--
``(i) In general.--All voter-verified paper ballots
required to be used under this Act shall be marked or printed
on durable paper.
``(ii) Definition.--For purposes of this Act, paper is
`durable' if it is capable of withstanding multiple counts
and recounts by hand without compromising the fundamental
integrity of the ballots, and capable of retaining the
information marked or printed on them for the full duration
of a retention and preservation period of 22 months.
``(B) Readability requirements for paper ballots marked by
ballot marking device.--All voter-verified paper ballots
completed by the voter through the use of a ballot marking
device shall be clearly readable by the voter without
assistance (other than eyeglasses or other personal vision
enhancing devices) and by an optical character recognition
device or other device equipped for individuals with
disabilities.''.
SEC. 105. PAPER BALLOT PRINTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Requiring Paper Ballots to Be Printed on Recycled Paper
Manufactured in United States.--Section 301(a) of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by
section 104, is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(8) Printing requirements for ballots.--All paper ballots
used in an election for Federal office shall be printed in
the United States on recycled paper manufactured in the
United States.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply with respect to elections occurring on or after
January 1, 2021.
SEC. 106. STUDY AND REPORT ON OPTIMAL BALLOT DESIGN.
(a) Study.--The Election Assistance Commission shall
conduct a study of the best ways to design ballots used in
elections for public office, including paper ballots and
electronic or digital ballots, to minimize confusion and user
errors.
(b) Report.--Not later than January 1, 2020, the Election
Assistance Commission shall submit to Congress a report on
the study conducted under subsection (a).
SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE FOR NEW REQUIREMENTS.
Section 301(d) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
U.S.C. 21081(d)) is amended to read as follows:
[[Page H5209]]
``(d) Effective Date.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
each State and jurisdiction shall be required to comply with
the requirements of this section on and after January 1,
2006.
``(2) Special rule for certain requirements.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in section 105(b) of
the Securing America's Federal Elections Act and
subparagraphs (B) and (C), the requirements of this section
which are first imposed on a State and jurisdiction pursuant
to the amendments made by the Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2019 shall apply with respect to voting
systems used for any election for Federal office held in 2020
or any succeeding year.
``(B) Delay for jurisdictions using certain paper record
printers or certain systems using or producing voter-verified
paper records in 2018.--
``(i) Delay.--In the case of a jurisdiction described in
clause (ii), subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system
in the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph
to `2020' were a reference to `2022', but only with respect
to the following requirements of this section:
``(I) Paragraph (2)(A)(i)(I) of subsection (a) (relating to
the use of voter-verified paper ballots).
``(II) Paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(I) and (II) of subsection (a)
(relating to access to verification from and casting of the
durable paper ballot).
``(III) Paragraph (7) of subsection (a) (relating to
durability and readability requirements for ballots).
``(ii) Jurisdictions described.--A jurisdiction described
in this clause is a jurisdiction--
``(I) which used voter-verified paper record printers
attached to direct recording electronic voting machines, or
which used other voting systems that used or produced paper
records of the vote verifiable by voters but that are not in
compliance with paragraphs (2)(A)(i)(I), (3)(B)(iii)(I) and
(II), and (7) of subsection (a) (as amended or added by the
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019),
for the administration of the regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office held in November 2018; and
``(II) which will continue to use such printers or systems
for the administration of elections for Federal office held
in years before 2022.
``(iii) Mandatory availability of paper ballots at polling
places using grandfathered printers and systems.--
``(I) Requiring ballots to be offered and provided.--The
appropriate election official at each polling place that uses
a printer or system described in clause (ii)(I) for the
administration of elections for Federal office shall offer
each individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the
election at the polling place the opportunity to cast the
vote using a blank pre-printed paper ballot which the
individual may mark by hand and which is not produced by the
direct recording electronic voting machine or other such
system. The official shall provide the individual with the
ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and
shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the
waiting period for the individual to cast a vote is the
lesser of 30 minutes or the average waiting period for an
individual who does not agree to cast the vote using such a
paper ballot under this clause.
``(II) Treatment of ballot.--Any paper ballot which is cast
by an individual under this clause shall be counted and
otherwise treated as a regular ballot for all purposes
(including by incorporating it into the final unofficial vote
count (as defined by the State) for the precinct) and not as
a provisional ballot, unless the individual casting the
ballot would have otherwise been required to cast a
provisional ballot.
``(III) Posting of notice.--The appropriate election
official shall ensure there is prominently displayed at each
polling place a notice that describes the obligation of the
official to offer individuals the opportunity to cast votes
using a pre-printed blank paper ballot.
``(IV) Training of election officials.--The chief State
election official shall ensure that election officials at
polling places in the State are aware of the requirements of
this clause, including the requirement to display a notice
under subclause (III), and are aware that it is a violation
of the requirements of this title for an election official to
fail to offer an individual the opportunity to cast a vote
using a blank pre-printed paper ballot.
``(V) Period of applicability.--The requirements of this
clause apply only during the period in which the delay is in
effect under clause (i).
``(C) Special rule for jurisdictions using certain
nontabulating ballot marking devices.--In the case of a
jurisdiction which uses a nontabulating ballot marking device
which automatically deposits the ballot into a privacy
sleeve, subparagraph (A) shall apply to a voting system in
the jurisdiction as if the reference in such subparagraph to
`any election for Federal office held in 2020 or any
succeeding year' were a reference to `elections for Federal
office occurring held in 2022 or each succeeding year', but
only with respect to paragraph (3)(B)(iii)(II) of subsection
(a) (relating to nonmanual casting of the durable paper
ballot).''.
PART 2--GRANTS TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS
SEC. 111. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING
SYSTEMS AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY
IMPROVEMENTS.
(a) Availability of Grants.--Subtitle D of title II of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following new part:
``PART 7--GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEMS
AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS
``SEC. 297. GRANTS FOR OBTAINING COMPLIANT PAPER BALLOT
VOTING SYSTEMS AND CARRYING OUT VOTING SYSTEM
SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS.
``(a) Availability and Use of Grant.--The Commission shall
make a grant to each eligible State--
``(1) to replace a voting system--
``(A) which does not meet the requirements which are first
imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments made by the
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019 with
a voting system which does meet such requirements, for use in
the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office
held in November 2020, or
``(B) which does meet such requirements but which is not in
compliance with the most recent voluntary voting system
guidelines issued by the Commission prior to the regularly
scheduled general election for Federal office held in
November 2020 with another system which does meet such
requirements and is in compliance with such guidelines;
``(2) to carry out voting system security improvements
described in section 297A with respect to the regularly
scheduled general elections for Federal office held in
November 2020 and each succeeding election for Federal
office; and
``(3) to implement and model best practices for ballot
design, ballot instructions, and the testing of ballots.
``(b) Amount of Grant.--The amount of a grant made to a
State under this section shall be such amount as the
Commission determines to be appropriate, except that such
amount may not be less than the product of $1 and the average
of the number of individuals who cast votes in any of the two
most recent regularly scheduled general elections for Federal
office held in the State.
``(c) Pro Rata Reductions.--If the amount of funds
appropriated for grants under this part is insufficient to
ensure that each State receives the amount of the grant
calculated under subsection (b), the Commission shall make
such pro rata reductions in such amounts as may be necessary
to ensure that the entire amount appropriated under this part
is distributed to the States.
``(d) Surplus Appropriations.--If the amount of funds
appropriated for grants authorized under section 297D(a)(2)
exceed the amount necessary to meet the requirements of
subsection (b), the Commission shall consider the following
in making a determination to award remaining funds to a
State:
``(1) The record of the State in carrying out the following
with respect to the administration of elections for Federal
office:
``(A) Providing voting machines that are less than 10 years
old.
``(B) Implementing strong chain of custody procedures for
the physical security of voting equipment and paper records
at all stages of the process.
``(C) Conducting pre-election testing on every voting
machine and ensuring that paper ballots are available
wherever electronic machines are used.
``(D) Maintaining offline backups of voter registration
lists.
``(E) Providing a secure voter registration database that
logs requests submitted to the database.
``(F) Publishing and enforcing a policy detailing use
limitations and security safeguards to protect the personal
information of voters in the voter registration process.
``(G) Providing secure processes and procedures for
reporting vote tallies.
``(H) Providing a secure platform for disseminating vote
totals.
``(2) Evidence of established conditions of innovation and
reform in providing voting system security and the proposed
plan of the State for implementing additional conditions.
``(3) Evidence of collaboration between relevant
stakeholders, including local election officials, in
developing the grant implementation plan described in section
297B.
``(4) The plan of the State to conduct a rigorous
evaluation of the effectiveness of the activities carried out
with the grant.
``(e) Ability of Replacement Systems to Administer Ranked
Choice Elections.--To the greatest extent practicable, an
eligible State which receives a grant to replace a voting
system under this section shall ensure that the replacement
system is capable of administering a system of ranked choice
voting under which each voter shall rank the candidates for
the office in the order of the voter's preference.
``SEC. 297A. VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED.
``(a) Permitted Uses.--A voting system security improvement
described in this section is any of the following:
``(1) The acquisition of goods and services from qualified
election infrastructure vendors by purchase, lease, or such
other arrangements as may be appropriate.
``(2) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
``(3) A security risk and vulnerability assessment of the
State's election infrastructure which is carried out by a
provider of cybersecurity services under a contract entered
into between the chief State election official and the
provider.
``(4) The maintenance of election infrastructure, including
addressing risks and vulnerabilities which are identified
under either of the security risk and vulnerability
assessments described in paragraph (3), except that none of
the funds provided under this part may be used to renovate or
replace a building or facility which is used primarily for
purposes other than the administration of elections for
public office.
``(5) Providing increased technical support for any
information technology infrastructure that the chief State
election official deems to be part
[[Page H5210]]
of the State's election infrastructure or designates as
critical to the operation of the State's election
infrastructure.
``(6) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the
information technology infrastructure described in paragraph
(4).
``(7) Enhancing the cybersecurity of voter registration
systems.
``(b) Qualified Election Infrastructure Vendors
Described.--
``(1) In general.--For purposes of this part, a `qualified
election infrastructure vendor' is any person who provides,
supports, or maintains, or who seeks to provide, support, or
maintain, election infrastructure on behalf of a State, unit
of local government, or election agency, who meets the
criteria described in paragraph (2).
``(2) Criteria.--The criteria described in this paragraph
are such criteria as the Chairman, in coordination with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, shall establish and publish,
and shall include each of the following requirements:
``(A) The vendor must be owned and controlled by a citizen
or permanent resident of the United States.
``(B) The vendor must disclose to the Chairman and the
Secretary, and to the chief State election official of any
State to which the vendor provides any goods and services
with funds provided under this part, of any sourcing outside
the United States for parts of the election infrastructure.
``(C) The vendor agrees to ensure that the election
infrastructure will be developed and maintained in a manner
that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices
issued by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
``(D) The vendor agrees to maintain its information
technology infrastructure in a manner that is consistent with
the cybersecurity best practices issued by the Technical
Guidelines Development Committee.
``(E) The vendor agrees to meet the requirements of
paragraph (3) with respect to any known or suspected
cybersecurity incidents involving any of the goods and
services provided by the vendor pursuant to a grant under
this part.
``(F) The vendor agrees to permit independent security
testing by the Commission (in accordance with section 231(a))
and by the Secretary of the goods and services provided by
the vendor pursuant to a grant under this part.
``(3) Cybersecurity incident reporting requirements.--
``(A) In general.--A vendor meets the requirements of this
paragraph if, upon becoming aware of the possibility that an
election cybersecurity incident has occurred involving any of
the goods and services provided by the vendor pursuant to a
grant under this part--
``(i) the vendor promptly assesses whether or not such an
incident occurred, and submits a notification meeting the
requirements of subparagraph (B) to the Secretary and the
Chairman of the assessment as soon as practicable (but in no
case later than 3 days after the vendor first becomes aware
of the possibility that the incident occurred);
``(ii) if the incident involves goods or services provided
to an election agency, the vendor submits a notification
meeting the requirements of subparagraph (B) to the agency as
soon as practicable (but in no case later than 3 days after
the vendor first becomes aware of the possibility that the
incident occurred), and cooperates with the agency in
providing any other necessary notifications relating to the
incident; and
``(iii) the vendor provides all necessary updates to any
notification submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii).
``(B) Contents of notifications.--Each notification
submitted under clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A)
shall contain the following information with respect to any
election cybersecurity incident covered by the notification:
``(i) The date, time, and time zone when the election
cybersecurity incident began, if known.
``(ii) The date, time, and time zone when the election
cybersecurity incident was detected.
``(iii) The date, time, and duration of the election
cybersecurity incident.
``(iv) The circumstances of the election cybersecurity
incident, including the specific election infrastructure
systems believed to have been accessed and information
acquired, if any.
``(v) Any planned and implemented technical measures to
respond to and recover from the incident.
``(vi) In the case of any notification which is an update
to a prior notification, any additional material information
relating to the incident, including technical data, as it
becomes available.
``SEC. 297B. ELIGIBILITY OF STATES.
``A State is eligible to receive a grant under this part if
the State submits to the Commission, at such time and in such
form as the Commission may require, an application
containing--
``(1) a description of how the State will use the grant to
carry out the activities authorized under this part;
``(2) a certification and assurance that, not later than 5
years after receiving the grant, the State will carry out
voting system security improvements, as described in section
297A; and
``(3) such other information and assurances as the
Commission may require.
``SEC. 297C. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
``Not later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year,
the Commission shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees, including the Committees on
Homeland Security, House Administration, and the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives and the Committees on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, the Judiciary, and Rules
and Administration of the Senate, on the activities carried
out with the funds provided under this part.
``SEC. 297D. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
``(a) Authorization.--There are authorized to be
appropriated for grants under this part--
``(1) $600,000,000 for fiscal year 2019; and
``(2) $175,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2020, 2022,
2024, and 2026.
``(b) Continuing Availability of Amounts.--Any amounts
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of this section
shall remain available until expended.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by adding at the end of the items relating to
subtitle D of title II the following:
``Part 7--Grants for Obtaining Compliant Paper Ballot Voting Systems
and Carrying Out Voting System Security Improvements
``Sec. 297. Grants for obtaining compliant paper ballot voting systems
and carrying out voting system security improvements.
``Sec. 297A. Voting system security improvements described.
``Sec. 297B. Eligibility of States.
``Sec. 297C. Reports to Congress.
``Sec. 297D. Authorization of appropriations.
SEC. 112. COORDINATION OF VOTING SYSTEM SECURITY ACTIVITIES
WITH USE OF REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS AND ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER HELP AMERICA
VOTE ACT OF 2002.
(a) Duties of Election Assistance Commission.--Section 202
of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20922) is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking
``by'' and inserting ``and the security of election
infrastructure by''.
(b) Membership of Secretary of Homeland Security on Board
of Advisors of Election Assistance Commission.--Section
214(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20944(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``37 members'' and inserting ``38
members''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(17) The Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Secretary's designee.''.
(c) Representative of Department of Homeland Security on
Technical Guidelines Development Committee.--Section
221(c)(1) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20961(c)(1)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F);
and
(2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) A representative of the Department of Homeland
Security.''.
(d) Goals of Periodic Studies of Election Administration
Issues; Consultation With Secretary of Homeland Security.--
Section 241(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C. 20981(a)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``the Commission shall'' and inserting ``the Commission, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security (as
appropriate), shall'';
(2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) will be secure against attempts to undermine the
integrity of election systems by cyber or other means; and''.
(e) Requirements Payments.--
(1) Use of payments for voting system security
improvements.--Section 251(b) of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21001(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(4) Permitting use of payments for voting system security
improvements.--A State may use a requirements payment to
carry out any of the following activities:
``(A) Cyber and risk mitigation training.
``(B) Providing increased technical support for any
information technology infrastructure that the chief State
election official deems to be part of the State's election
infrastructure or designates as critical to the operation of
the State's election infrastructure.
``(C) Enhancing the cybersecurity and operations of the
information technology infrastructure described in
subparagraph (B).
``(D) Enhancing the security of voter registration
databases.''.
(2) Incorporation of election infrastructure protection in
state plans for use of payments.--Section 254(a)(1) of such
Act (52 U.S.C. 21004(a)(1)) is amended by striking the period
at the end and inserting ``, including the protection of
election infrastructure.''.
(3) Composition of committee responsible for developing
state plan for use of payments.--Section 255 of such Act (52
U.S.C. 21005) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection:
``(b) Geographic Representation.--The members of the
committee shall be a representative group of individuals from
the State's counties, cities, towns, and Indian tribes, and
shall represent the needs of rural as well as urban areas of
the State, as the case may be.''.
(f) Ensuring Protection of Computerized Statewide Voter
Registration List.--Section 303(a)(3) of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21083(a)(3)) is amended by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``, as well as other measures to prevent and deter
cybersecurity incidents, as identified by the Commission, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Technical Guidelines
Development Committee.''.
SEC. 113. INCORPORATION OF DEFINITIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 901 of the Help America Vote Act
of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21141) is amended to read as follows:
[[Page H5211]]
``SEC. 901. DEFINITIONS.
``In this Act, the following definitions apply:
``(1) The term `cybersecurity incident' has the meaning
given the term `incident' in section 227 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 659).
``(2) The term `election agency' means any component of a
State, or any component of a unit of local government in a
State, which is responsible for the administration of
elections for Federal office in the State.
``(3) The term `election infrastructure' means storage
facilities, polling places, and centralized vote tabulation
locations used to support the administration of elections for
public office, as well as related information and
communications technology (including the technology used by
or on behalf of election officials to produce and distribute
voter guides to elections), including voter registration
databases, voting machines, electronic mail and other
communications systems (including electronic mail and other
systems of vendors who have entered into contracts with
election agencies to support the administration of elections,
manage the election process, and report and display election
results), and other systems used to manage the election
process and to report and display election results on behalf
of an election agency.
``(4) The term `State' means each of the several States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by amending the item relating to section 901 to
read as follows:
``Sec. 901. Definitions.''.
Subtitle B--Risk-Limiting Audits
SEC. 121. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
(a) In General.-- Title III of the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 303 the following new section:
``SEC. 303A. RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Risk-limiting audit.--The term `risk-limiting audit'
means, with respect to any election contest, a post-election
process that--
``(A) has a probability of at least 95 percent of
correcting the reported outcome if the reported outcome is
not the correct outcome;
``(B) will not change the outcome if the reported outcome
is the correct outcome; and
``(C) involves a manual adjudication of voter intent from
some or all of the ballots validly cast in the election
contest.
``(2) Reported outcome; correct outcome; outcome.--
``(A) Reported outcome.--The term `reported outcome' means
the outcome of an election contest which is determined
according to the canvass and which will become the official,
certified outcome unless it is revised by an audit, recount,
or other legal process.
``(B) Correct outcome.--The term `correct outcome' means
the outcome that would be determined by a manual adjudication
of voter intent for all votes validly cast in the election
contest.
``(C) Outcome.--The term `outcome' means the winner or set
of winners of an election contest.
``(3) Manual adjudication of voter intent.--The term
`manual adjudication of voter intent' means direct inspection
and determination by humans, without assistance from
electronic or mechanical tabulation devices, of the ballot
choices marked by voters on each voter-verified paper record.
``(4) Ballot manifest.--The term `ballot manifest' means a
record maintained by each jurisdiction that--
``(A) is created without reliance on any part of the voting
system used to tabulate votes;
``(B) functions as a sampling frame for conducting a risk-
limiting audit; and
``(C) accounts for all ballots validly cast regardless of
how they were tabulated and includes a precise description of
the manner in which the ballots are physically stored,
including the total number of physical groups of ballots, the
numbering system for each group, a unique label for each
group, and the number of ballots in each such group.
``(b) Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Audits.--
``(i) In general.--Each State and jurisdiction shall
administer risk-limiting audits of the results of all
election contests for Federal office held in the State in
accordance with the requirements of paragraph (2).
``(ii) Exception.--Clause (i) shall not apply to any
election contest for which the State or jurisdiction conducts
a full recount through a manual adjudication of voter intent.
``(B) Full manual tabulation.--If a risk-limiting audit
conducted under subparagraph (A) corrects the reported
outcome of an election contest, the State or jurisdiction
shall use the results of the manual adjudication of voter
intent conducted as part of the risk-limiting audit as the
official results of the election contest.
``(2) Audit requirements.--
``(A) Rules and procedures.--
``(i) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this section, the chief State election
official of the State shall establish rules and procedures
for conducting risk-limiting audits.
``(ii) Matters included.--The rules and procedures
established under clause (i) shall include the following:
``(I) Rules and procedures for ensuring the security of
ballots and documenting that prescribed procedures were
followed.
``(II) Rules and procedures for ensuring the accuracy of
ballot manifests produced by jurisdictions.
``(III) Rules and procedures for governing the format of
ballot manifests and other data involved in risk-limiting
audits.
``(IV) Methods to ensure that any cast vote records used in
a risk-limiting audit are those used by the voting system to
tally the results of the election contest sent to the chief
State election official of the State and made public.
``(V) Rules and procedures for the random selection of
ballots to be inspected manually during each audit.
``(VI) Rules and procedures for the calculations and other
methods to be used in the audit and to determine whether and
when the audit of each election contest is complete.
``(VII) Rules and procedures for testing any software used
to conduct risk-limiting audits.
``(B) Public report.--
``(i) In general.--After the completion of the risk-
limiting audit and at least 5 days before the election
contest is certified, the State shall publish a report on the
results of the audit, together with such information as
necessary to confirm that the audit was conducted properly.
``(ii) Format of data.--All data published with the report
under clause (i) shall be published in machine-readable, open
data formats.
``(iii) Protection of anonymity of votes.--Information and
data published by the State under this subparagraph shall not
compromise the anonymity of votes.
``(c) Effective Date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this section for
the first regularly scheduled election for Federal office
held more than 1 year after the date of the enactment of the
Securing America's Federal Elections Act and for each
subsequent election for Federal office.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments Relating to Enforcement.--Section
401 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking
``sections 301, 302, and 303'' and inserting ``subtitle A of
title III''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for such Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
303 the following new item:
``Sec. 303A. Risk-limiting audits.''.
SEC. 122. FUNDING FOR CONDUCTING POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING
AUDITS.
(a) Payments to States.-- Subtitle D of title II of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21001 et seq.), as
amended by section 111(a), is amended by adding at the end
the following new part:
``PART 8--FUNDING FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS
``SEC. 298. PAYMENTS FOR POST-ELECTION RISK-LIMITING AUDITS.
``(a) In General.--The Commission shall pay to States the
amount of eligible post-election audit costs.
``(b) Eligible Post-election Audit Costs.--For purposes of
this section, the term `eligible post-election audit costs'
means, with respect to any State, costs paid or incurred by
the State or local government within the State for--
``(1) the conduct of any risk-limiting audit (as defined in
section 303A) with respect to an election for Federal office
occurring after the date of the enactment of this part; and
``(2) any equipment, software, or services necessary for
the conduct of any such risk-limiting audit.
``(c) Special Rules.--
``(1) Rules and procedures.--The Commission shall establish
rules and procedures for submission of eligible post-election
audit costs for payments under this section.
``(2) Insufficient funds.--In any case in which the amounts
appropriated under subsection (d) are insufficient to pay all
eligible post-election audit costs submitted by States with
respect to any Federal election, the amount of such costs
paid under subsection (a) to any State shall be equal to the
amount that bears the same ratio to the amount which would be
paid to such State (determined without regard to this
paragraph) as--
``(A) the number of individuals who voted in such Federal
election in such State; bears to
``(B) the total number of individuals who voted in such
Federal election in all States submitting a claim for
eligible post-election audit costs.
``(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated to the Commission such sums as are necessary to
carry out this part.
``(2) Availability.--Any amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall remain available without fiscal year
limitation until expended.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act,
as amended by section 111(b), is further amended by adding at
the end of the items relating to subtitle D of title II the
following:
``Part 8--Funding for Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audits
``Sec. 298. Payments for post-election risk-limiting audits.
SEC. 123. GAO ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF AUDITS.
(a) Analysis.--Not later than 6 months after the first
elections for Federal office is held for which States must
conduct risk-limiting audits under section 303A of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (as added by section 121), the
Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an
analysis of the extent to which such audits have improved the
administration of such elections and the security of election
infrastructure in the States receiving such grants.
(b) Report.--The Comptroller General of the United States
shall submit a report on the analysis conducted under
subsection (a) to the Committee on House Administration of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Rules and
Administration of the Senate.
[[Page H5212]]
TITLE II--PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY THROUGH IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION
SEC. 201. VOTING SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Ballot Tabulating Devices.-- Section 301(a) of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by
section 104 and section 105, is further amended by adding at
the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) Ballot tabulating methods.--
``(A) In general.--The voting system tabulates ballots by
hand or through the use of an optical scanning device that
meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).
``(B) Requirements for optical scanning devices.--Except as
provided in subparagraph (C), the requirements of this
subparagraph are as follows:
``(i) The device is designed and built in a manner in which
it is mechanically impossible for the device to add or change
the vote selections on a printed or marked ballot.
``(ii) The device is capable of exporting its data
(including vote tally data sets and cast vote records) in a
machine-readable, open data standard format required by the
Commission, in consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
``(iii) The device consists of hardware that demonstrably
conforms to a hardware component manifest describing point-
of-origin information (including upstream hardware supply
chain information for each component) that--
``(I) has been provided to the Commission, the Director of
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, and the chief
State election official for each State in which the device is
used; and
``(II) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been
provided under subclause (I) with independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis.
``(iv) The device utilizes technology that prevents the
operation of the device if any hardware components do not
meet the requirements of clause (iii).
``(v) The device operates using software for which the
source code, system build tools, and compilation parameters--
``(I) have been provided to the Commission, the Director of
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, and the chief
State election official for each State in which the device is
used; and
``(II) may be shared by any entity to whom it has been
provided under subclause (I) with independent experts for
cybersecurity analysis.
``(vi) The device utilizes technology that prevents the
running of software on the device that does not meet the
requirements of clause (v).
``(vii) The device utilizes technology that enables
election officials, cybersecurity researchers, and voters to
verify that the software running on the device--
``(I) was built from a specific, untampered version of the
code that is described in clause (v); and
``(II) uses the system build tools and compilation
parameters that are described in clause (v).
``(viii) The device contains such other security
requirements as the Director of Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security requires.
``(C) Waiver.--
``(i) In general.--The Director of Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security, in consultation with the Director of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, may waive
one or more of the requirements of subparagraph (B) (other
than the requirement of clause (i) thereof) with respect to
any device for a period of not to exceed 2 years.
``(ii) Publication.--Information relating to any waiver
granted under clause (i) shall be made publicly available on
the Internet.
``(D) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph
for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in
November 2024, and for each subsequent election for Federal
office.''.
(b) Other Cybersecurity Requirements.-- Section 301(a) of
such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104,
section 105, and subsection (a), is further amended by adding
at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(10) Prohibition of use of wireless communications
devices in systems or devices.--
``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which ballot
marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon
which ballots are marked by voters (except as necessary for
individuals with disabilities to use ballot marking devices
that meet the accessibility requirements of paragraph (3)),
or upon which votes are cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall
contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line,
or concealed communication device.
``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph
for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in
November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal
office.
``(11) Prohibiting connection of system to the internet.--
``(A) In general.--No system or device upon which ballot
marking devices or optical scanners are configured, upon
which ballots are marked by voters, or upon which votes are
cast, tabulated, or aggregated shall be connected to the
Internet or any non-local computer system via telephone or
other communication network at any time.
``(B) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph
for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in
November 2020, and for each subsequent election for Federal
office.''.
(c) Special Cybersecurity Rules for Certain Ballot Marking
Devices.--
(1) In general.--Section 301(a) of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105, and
subsections (a) and (b), is further amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(12) Ballot marking devices.--
``(A) In general.--In the case of a voting system that uses
a ballot marking device, the ballot marking device shall be a
device that--
``(i) is not capable of tabulating votes;
``(ii) except in the case of a ballot marking device used
exclusively to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3),
is certified in accordance with section 232 as meeting the
requirements of subparagraph (B); and
``(iii) meets the requirements of clauses (iii) through
(viii) of section 301(a)(9)(B).
``(B) Requirements.--
``(i) In general.--A ballot marking device meets the
requirements of this subparagraph if, during a double-masked
test conducted by a qualified independent user experience
research laboratory (as defined in section 232(b)(4)) of a
simulated election scenario which meets the requirements of
clause (ii), there is less than a 5 percent chance that an
ordinary voter using the device would not detect and report
any difference between the vote selection printed on the
ballot by the ballot marking device and the vote selection
indicated by the voter.
``(ii) Simulated election scenario.--A simulated election
scenario meets the requirements of this clause if it is
conducted with--
``(I) a pool of subjects that are--
``(aa) diverse in age, gender, education, and physical
limitations; and
``(bb) representative of the communities in which the
voting system will be used; and
``(II) ballots that are representative of ballots
ordinarily used in the communities in which the voting system
will be used.
``(C) Effective date.--Each State and jurisdiction shall be
required to comply with the requirements of this paragraph
for the regularly scheduled election for Federal office in
November 2022, and for each subsequent election for Federal
office.''.
(2) Procedure for testing.--
(A) In general.--Subtitle B of title II of the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 232. TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT MARKING
DEVICES.
``(a) In General.--Any State or jurisdiction which intends
to use a ballot marking device (other than a ballot marking
device used exclusively to comply with the requirements of
section 301(a)(3)) in an election for Federal office may
submit an application to the Commission for testing and
certification under this section.
``(b) Application, Assignment, and Testing.--
``(1) In general.--An application under subsection (a)
shall be submitted not later than 18 months before the date
of the election for Federal office in which the ballot
marking device is intended to be used and shall contain such
information as the Commission requires.
``(2) Assignment.--Upon receipt of an application for
testing under this section, the Commission shall contract
with a qualified independent user experience research
laboratory for the testing of whether the ballot marking
device intended to be used by the State or jurisdiction meets
the requirements of section 301(a)(12)(B).
``(3) Requirements for testing.--Any contract described in
paragraph (2) shall require the qualified independent user
experience research laboratory to--
``(A) not later than 30 days before testing begins, submit
to the Commission for approval the protocol for the simulated
election scenario used for testing the ballot marking device;
``(B) use only protocols approved by the Commission in
conducting such testing; and
``(C) submit to the Commission a report on the results of
the testing.
``(4) Qualified independent user experience research
laboratory.--For purposes of this section:
``(A) In general.--The term `qualified independent user
experience research laboratory' means a laboratory accredited
under this subsection by the Election Assistance Commission
in accordance with standards determined by the Commission, in
consultation with the Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology and the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
``(B) Criteria.--A laboratory shall not be accredited under
this subsection unless such laboratory demonstrates that--
``(i) no employee of, or individual with an ownership in,
such laboratory has, or has had during the 5 preceding years,
any financial relationship with a manufacturer of voting
systems; and
``(ii) any group of individuals conducting tests under this
section collectively meet the following qualifications:
``(I) Experience designing and running user research
studies and experiments using both qualitative and
quantitative methodologies.
``(II) Experience with voting systems.
``(c) Review by Independent Board.--
``(1) In general.--The Commission shall submit for approval
to an independent review board established under paragraph
(3) the following:
``(A) Any protocol submitted to the Commission under
subsection (b)(3)(A).
``(B) Any report submitted to the Commission under
subsection (b)(3)(C).
``(2) Final approval.--Not later than the date that is 12
months before the date of the election for Federal office in
which a State or jurisdiction intends to use the ballot
marking device, the independent review board shall report to
the Commission on whether it has approved a report submitted
under paragraph (1)(B).
``(3) Independent review board.--
``(A) In general.--An independent review board established
under this paragraph shall be composed of 5 independent
scientists appointed by the Commission, in consultation with
the Director of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
[[Page H5213]]
``(B) Qualifications.--The members of the independent
review board--
``(i) shall have expertise and relevant peer-reviewed
publications in the following fields: cognitive psychology,
experimental design, statistics, and user experience research
and testing; and
``(ii) may not have, or have had during the 5 preceding
years, any financial relationship with a manufacturer of
voting systems.
``(4) Publication.--The Commission shall make public--
``(A) any protocol approved under this subsection;
``(B) any report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C); and
``(C) any determination made by an independent review board
under paragraph (2).
``(d) Certification.--If--
``(1) a ballot marking device is determined by the
qualified independent user experience research laboratory to
meet the requirements of section 301(a)(12); and
``(2) the report submitted under subsection (b)(3)(C) is
approved by a majority of the members of the independent
review board under subsection (d)(2),
then the Commission shall certify the ballot marking device.
``(e) Prohibition on Fees.--The Commission may not charge
any fee to a State or jurisdiction, a developer or
manufacturer of a ballot marking device, or any other person
in connection with testing and certification under this
section.''.
(B) Conforming amendments.--
(i) Section 202(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
U.S.C. 20922(2)) is amended by inserting ``and ballot marking
devices'' after ``hardware and software'').
(ii) The heading for subtitle B of title II of such Act is
amended by inserting at the end ``; Ballot Marking Devices''.
(iii) The table of contents of such Act is amended--
(I) by inserting ``; Ballot Marking Devices'' at the end of
the item relating to subtitle B of title II; and
(II) by inserting after the item related to section 231 the
following:
``Sec. 232. Testing and certification of ballot marking devices.''.
SEC. 202. TESTING OF EXISTING VOTING SYSTEMS TO ENSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH ELECTION CYBERSECURITY
GUIDELINES AND OTHER GUIDELINES.
(a) Requiring Testing of Existing Voting Systems.--
(1) In general.--Section 231(a) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20971(a)) is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Testing to ensure compliance with guidelines.--
``(A) Testing.--Not later than 9 months before the date of
each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office,
the Commission shall provide for the testing by accredited
laboratories under this section of the voting system hardware
and software which was certified for use in the most recent
such election, on the basis of the most recent voting system
guidelines applicable to such hardware or software (including
election cybersecurity guidelines) issued under this Act.
``(B) Decertification of hardware or software failing to
meet guidelines.--If, on the basis of the testing described
in subparagraph (A), the Commission determines that any
voting system hardware or software does not meet the most
recent guidelines applicable to such hardware or software
issued under this Act, the Commission shall decertify such
hardware or software.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall apply with respect to the regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office held in November 2020 and each
succeeding regularly scheduled general election for Federal
office.
(b) Issuance of Cybersecurity Guidelines by Technical
Guidelines Development Committee.--Section 221(b) of the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 20961(b)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Election cybersecurity guidelines.--Not later than 6
months after the date of the enactment of the Securing
America's Federal Elections Act, the Development Committee
shall issue election cybersecurity guidelines, including
standards and best practices for procuring, maintaining,
testing, operating, and updating election systems to prevent
and deter cybersecurity incidents.''.
SEC. 203. REQUIRING USE OF SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE FOR WHICH
INFORMATION IS DISCLOSED BY MANUFACTURER.
(a) Requirement.--Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by sections 104,
105, 201(a), 201(b), and 201(c), is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(13) Requiring use of software and hardware for which
information is disclosed by manufacturer.--
``(A) Requiring use of software for which source code is
disclosed by manufacturer.--
``(i) In general.--In the operation of voting systems in an
election for Federal office, a State may only use software
for which the manufacturer makes the source code (in the form
in which will be used at the time of the election) publicly
available online under a license that grants a worldwide,
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable
license to all intellectual property rights in such source
code, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a person who
obtains the software from using the software in a manner that
is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial
advantage or private monetary compensation that is unrelated
to carrying out legitimate research or cybersecurity
activity.
``(ii) Exceptions.--Clause (i) does not apply with respect
to--
``(I) widely-used operating system software which is not
specific to voting systems and for which the source code or
baseline functionality is not altered; or
``(II) widely-used cybersecurity software which is not
specific to voting systems and for which the source code or
baseline functionality is not altered.
``(B) Requiring use of hardware for which information is
disclosed by manufacturer.--
``(i) Requiring disclosure of hardware.--A State may not
use a voting system in an election for Federal office unless
the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses online the
identification of the hardware used to operate the system.
``(ii) Additional disclosure requirements for custom or
altered hardware.--To the extent that the hardware used to
operate a voting system or any component thereof is not
widely-used, or is widely-used but is altered, the State may
not use the system in an election for Federal office unless--
``(I) the manufacturer of the system publicly discloses
online the components of the hardware, the design of such
components, and how such components are connected in the
operation of the system; and
``(II) the manufacturer makes the design (in the form which
will be used at the time of the election) publicly available
online under a license that grants a worldwide, royalty-free,
non-exclusive, perpetual, sub-licensable license to all
intellectual property rights in the design of the hardware or
the component, except that the manufacturer may prohibit a
person who obtains the design from using the design in a
manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward
commercial advantage or private monetary compensation that is
unrelated to carrying out legitimate research or
cybersecurity activity.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office held
in 2020 or any succeeding year.
SEC. 204. TREATMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOKS AS PART OF
VOTING SYSTEMS.
(a) Inclusion in Definition of Voting System.--Section
301(b) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C.
21081(b)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``this section'' and inserting ``this Act'';
(2) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1);
(3) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new
paragraph:
``(2) any electronic poll book used with respect to the
election; and''.
(b) Definition.--Section 301 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21081)
is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections
(d) and (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Electronic Poll Book Defined.--In this Act, the term
`electronic poll book' means the total combination of
mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment
(including the software, firmware, and documentation required
to program, control, and support the equipment) that is
used--
``(1) to retain the list of registered voters at a polling
location, or vote center, or other location at which voters
cast votes in an election for Federal office; and
``(2) to identify registered voters who are eligible to
vote in an election.''.
(c) Effective Date.--Section 301(e) of such Act (52 U.S.C.
21081(e)), as amended by section 107 and as redesignated by
subsection (b), is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and
inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Special rule for electronic poll books.--In the case
of the requirements of subsection (c) (relating to electronic
poll books), each State and jurisdiction shall be required to
comply with such requirements on or after January 1, 2020.''.
SEC. 205. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.
(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Title III of the
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21081 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 301 the following new
section:
``SEC. 301A. PRE-ELECTION REPORTS ON VOTING SYSTEM USAGE.
``(a) Requiring States to Submit Reports.--Not later than
120 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general
election for Federal office, the chief State election
official of a State shall submit a report to the Commission
containing a detailed voting system usage plan for each
jurisdiction in the State which will administer the election,
including a detailed plan for the usage of electronic poll
books and other equipment and components of such system.
``(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with
respect to the regularly scheduled general election for
Federal office held in November 2020 and each succeeding
regularly scheduled general election for Federal office.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
301 the following new item:
``Sec. 301A. Pre-election reports on voting system usage.''.
[[Page H5214]]
SEC. 206. STREAMLINING COLLECTION OF ELECTION INFORMATION.
Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C.
20922) is amended--
(1) by striking ``The Commission'' and inserting ``(a) In
General.--The Commission''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(b) Waiver of Certain Requirements.--Subchapter I of
chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply
to the collection of information for purposes of maintaining
the clearinghouse described in paragraph (1) of subsection
(a).''.
TITLE III--USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES
SEC. 301. USE OF VOTING MACHINES MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED
STATES.
Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
U.S.C. 21081(a)), as amended by section 104, section 105,
section 201(a), 201(b), 201(c), and section 203(a), is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(14) Voting machine requirements.--By not later than the
date of the regularly scheduled general election for Federal
office occurring in November 2022, each State shall seek to
ensure that any voting machine used in such election and in
any subsequent election for Federal office is manufactured in
the United States.''.
TITLE IV--SEVERABILITY
SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act,
or the application of a provision or amendment to any person
or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the
remainder of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and
the application of the provisions and amendment to any person
or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for
1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority
member of the Committee on House Administration.
The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), and the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Rodney Davis) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
General Leave
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks
and to insert extraneous material on H.R. 2722.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from California?
There was no objection.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2722. The SAFE Act is
critical legislation to invest in and upgrade the machinery of American
democracy. It will help us combat the national emergency facing our
country. It will improve the resilience of election infrastructure used
in Federal elections.
Aging equipment, under-resourced jurisdictions, and interference by
foreign entities or non-state actors leaves the system vulnerable to
exploitation that can undermine confidence in election outcomes.
Ineffective and vulnerable equipment can also discourage participation
in Federal elections.
It comes to the floor after the Committee on House Administration
held three hearings in the first 6 months of this year that addressed
the integrity of our elections. In February the committee held the
``For the People: Our American Democracy'' hearing, where the integrity
of our democracy--including critical steps to improve the security and
reliability of our election infrastructure--was addressed.
On May 8 the committee held an election security hearing where we
heard testimony about the urgent need to upgrade our election
infrastructure and the lack of ongoing investment in the wake of new
threats.
And on May 21 the committee held an oversight hearing of the Election
Assistance Commission, an agency that plays a central role in
supporting election administration in this country.
I will remind this House that earlier this year, the Director of
National Intelligence published a report stating that our adversaries
and strategic competitors ``probably already are looking to the 2020
U.S. elections as an opportunity to advance their interests.
``They may also use cyber means to `directly manipulate or disrupt
elections systems--such as by tampering with voter registration or
disrupting the vote tallying process--either to alter data or to call
into question our voting process.'''
Last year he said that ``the warning lights are blinking red''. . . .
Special Counsel Robert Mueller noted in Volume One of his report that
the Russian military ``targeted individuals and entities involved in
the administration of the elections. Victims included U.S. State and
local entities, such as State boards of elections, secretaries of
State, and county governments, as well as individuals who worked for
those entities. The GRU also targeted private technology firms
responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related
software and hardware, such as voter registration software and
electronic polling stations.''
In April, FBI Director Christopher Wray called Russia's interference
efforts a ``significant counterintelligence threat,'' and said that the
2018 midterms were a ``dress rehearsal for the big show'' of the 2020
Presidential elections.
Early voters in Georgia in 2018 saw machines deleting votes and
switching them to other candidates. The machines where voters saw this
occur were purchased in 2002. During early voting in Texas in 2018 some
electronic voting machines deleted votes and switched them between
candidates. The machines were used in 78 of 254 Texas counties.
In June of 2016 the Russian GRU compromised the computer network of
the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in
their website. They gained access to a database with information on
millions of Illinois voters and extracted data on thousands before the
activity was detected.
H.R. 2722 responds to this emergency that we find ourselves in as a
nation. We ought to be doing everything we can to bolster the security
and integrity of our elections from interference and hacking.
The bill's section 102 requires that States transition to voting
systems that use individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots,
which means a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand or through the
use of a non-tabulating ballot marking device or system. Voter-verified
paper ballots are the best way to ensure that a voter's ballot
accurately reflects their choices and is counted as cast. Paper can be
audited. In the last Presidential election, approximately 20 percent of
registered voters cast their ballot on voting machines that do not have
any kind of paper backup.
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
concluded that paperless systems ``should be removed from service as
soon as possible.''
In at least 40 States, elections are carried out using machines that
are at least a decade old. And like any technology, they are
susceptible to increasing failure with age. One witness at our election
security hearing, Lawrence Norden of the Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU Law School, explained that some State officials have ``had to turn
to eBay to find critical components like dot-matrix printer ribbons,
decades old storage devices, and analog modems.'' Aging systems also
frequently rely on unsupported software like Windows XP and 2000, which
may not receive regular security patches and are thus more vulnerable
to the latest methods of cyberattack.
This bill addresses many other cybersecurity best practices besides
paper-based systems.
The bill in section 111 authorizes a $600 million Election Assistance
Commission grant program to assist States in securing election
infrastructure. States may use the money to replace their aging
equipment with voter-verified paper ballot voting systems, but also
ongoing maintenance of election infrastructure, enhanced cybersecurity
and operations of IT infrastructure, and enhanced cybersecurity of
voter registration systems.
Originally, the bill, as introduced, would have authorized $1 billion
for this initial round of surge funding; however, during the Committee
on House Administration's markup, the committee approved an amendment
in the nature of a substitute that authorized $600 million instead.
Combined with the $380 million that Congress appropriated last year in
election security grants, this funding reaches the $1 billion that
experts have said is necessary to implement these necessary
protections.
[[Page H5215]]
The bill also provides in section 111 $175 million in biennial
maintenance funding. Cybersecurity threats will not dissipate, they
will only evolve. State election officials have told us repeatedly they
need more funding and a sustainable source of funding.
Section 103 of the SAFE Act fosters innovation for voters living with
disabilities. It provides grant funding for the study, development, and
testing of accessible paper ballot voting, verification, and casting
mechanisms. It expressly requires States to ensure that individuals
with disabilities and others are given an equivalent opportunity to
vote, including with privacy and independence, in a manner that
produces voter-verified paper ballots as for other voters.
The bill fosters accountability for election technology vendors. It
would create a qualified election infrastructure vendor designation
where the Election Assistance Commission, in coordination with the
Department of Homeland Security, would craft criteria that vendors
would follow to receive the qualified designation. This would include
reporting any known or suspected cybersecurity incidents involving
election infrastructure to both the EAC and DHS, as well as affected
election agencies.
The bill in sections 201 and 203 also includes open-source
provisions, requiring use of software and hardware for which
information is disclosed by manufacturers. This will allow
cybersecurity experts and the public to vet the security of election
systems regardless of the technology used.
As amended in the committee, the bill in section 121 requires States
to adopt risk-limiting audits. Risk-limiting audits are the gold
standard of post-election audits. They involve hand counting a certain
number of ballots using advanced statistical methods to determine with
a high degree of confidence that the reported election outcome is
accurate. The SAFE Act requires States to implement risk-limiting
audits because they go hand in hand with paper ballots. We need audits
to ensure that ballot marking devices or optical scanners were not
hacked and that the reported results are accurate.
Second, as amended in committee, the bill in section 201 includes
specific cybersecurity standards to apply to optical scanner voting
systems and another set of standards to apply to ballot marking
devices. These will apply equally to current and future technology. For
example, H.R. 2722 prohibits the use of wireless communications devices
and internet connectivity in voting systems upon which ballots are
marked by voters or that otherwise mark and tabulate ballots.
Madam Speaker, H.R. 2722 is an essential step forward in shoring up
our election infrastructure and investing in secure elections. I ask
the House to pass this legislation and bolster the trust and confidence
in our system that all Americans expect and deserve.
Every American--no matter what their choice in politics--should know
that their vote will be counted as cast.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, in the 2016 election, we saw a very real threat to our
Nation when Russia interfered in our elections by using a
misinformation campaign through social media and attacking voter
registration databases. While this interference from Russia is
unacceptable, I feel it is necessary to point out that there is no
evidence that any voting machines were hacked in the 2016 or even in
the 2018 elections.
However, this does not mean that there isn't a need for election and
cybersecurity improvements for State election systems. On this point, I
know my friends and colleagues on the other side of the aisle,
including the distinguished chairperson of our Committee on House
Administration, we all agree that no one--and I mean, no one--should
interfere with our elections. Every Americans' vote should be counted
and protected.
Last Congress $380 million were appropriated to States to upgrade
their election security. Also, election infrastructure was designated
as critical infrastructure in response to the U.S. Intelligence
Community's reports that the Russian Government attacked.
{time} 0930
This allowed the Department of Homeland Security to begin providing
additional cybersecurity assistance to State and local election
officials.
Work has been done to help States improve their election security,
and more work must be done. This is why our committee Republicans, all
of us on the House Administration Committee, introduced H.R. 3412, the
Election Security Assistance Act, to assist States in their election
security strengthening efforts.
This realistic legislation provides $380 million in Federal grants to
States to update their aging and at-risk election infrastructure, while
also requiring State and local officials to have some skin in the game.
We require a 25 percent match to ensure that they understand they are
getting the best equipment that is going to protect their voters'
rights to have their votes counted and protected.
In addition, our bill is the only bill that creates the first ever
Election Cyber Assistance Unit, aimed at connecting our State and local
election officials with leading election administration and
cybersecurity experts from across the country.
Our bill also empowers State officials by providing security
clearances to our election officials to better facilitate the sharing
of information and requiring the Department of Homeland Security to
notify State election officials of cyberattacks and any foreign threats
within the State.
It is common sense that if there is an attempt to hack a State
election, the State election official should be notified, but they are
currently not able to let a State know if it has been attacked. If DHS
is the one that sees this attack from a foreign country, they can't
notify State election officials because, in many cases, they don't have
security clearance.
Our bill clears this up. Those State officials deserve the right to
know who is trying to attack their elections in each State in this
great Nation.
My good friend, Congresswoman Torres, stated at the Rules Committee
hearing on Monday night that she doesn't trust her State election
officials in California to have security clearances. Personally, I
don't feel that way, and I think other Members of Congress may agree
with me.
State officials should know if there is a threat to their election
system, and DHS should be the one telling them.
To sum up the Election Security Assistance Act, our solution provides
much-needed election security improvements and reinforcements for local
election officials, without overstepping the States' authority to
determine and maintain their own elections.
Unfortunately, I can't say the same for the bill we are voting on
today.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Mrs. Davis), a member of the House Administration
Committee.
Mrs. DAVIS of California. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the
SAFE Act.
No matter what my colleagues conclude about the Mueller report, I
think we can all agree it shows our elections are under foreign attack.
What would happen if a foreign government actually succeeded in
changing the results of a Federal election?
All bad actors have to do is break through the defenses of even one--
even one--of the over 10,000 election administration jurisdictions in
our country.
As we all know, questionable results in just one county can derail an
entire Presidential election and throw our country into a tailspin.
Election security is national security. Election machinery is the
machinery of democracy.
The SAFE Act gives States what they need to upgrade and maintain safe
and resilient election infrastructure.
In the House Administration Committee, we debated whether paper
ballots are the safest way to go. It does seem ironic that our answer
to cybersecurity, in fact, is old school, but we know what works.
As Oregon's Secretary of State Dennis Richardson said, ``You can't
hack paper.'' We can recount and audit paper ballots with a certainty
that we just don't have with machines.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to
[[Page H5216]]
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Baird).
Mr. BAIRD. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for
yielding me time.
Madam Speaker, keeping our elections safe from cyberattacks and fraud
is not and should not be a partisan priority.
H.R. 2722 has been rushed to the House floor without giving the
Science, Space, and Technology Committee the opportunity to hold even a
single hearing on the bill or the subject matter.
The problem with rushing this bill through Congress is that it will
have a significant negative impact on NIST's ability to work with State
and local governments to identify standards and best practices for
election security.
Our priority in Congress should be to develop useful tools that
empower States and local officials to ensure their elections are
secure, accessible, and accurate.
In fact, our secretary of state in Indiana, Ms. Connie Lawson, has
done a remarkable job leading the effort to add safeguards to our
elections process, ensuring it is completed with integrity.
Given the opportunity, I believe that our committee could come to an
agreement, in a bipartisan manner, to update NIST's election and
security activities.
Congress should focus on legislation that provides much-needed
improvements and reinforcements for local officials without
overstepping the States' authority to maintain their elections.
Madam Speaker, because of the lack of following regular order, the
committee has never been given the opportunity to ensure those issues
are addressed.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Raskin), a member of the House Administration Committee.
Mr. RASKIN. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the SAFE Act because
Vladimir Putin conducted a sweeping and systematic campaign to disrupt
and destabilize our Presidential election in 2016.
Some say we can't pass the SAFE Act to guarantee the security of our
elections, that because of federalism, we should let the States work it
out on their own.
But we are not the fragmented, divided States of America. We are the
United States of America, and that is the way we were designed.
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, Madam Speaker, says
Congress ``shall guarantee to every State in this union a republican
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion.''
What does it mean by ``republican form of government''? It doesn't
mean a Republican Party form of government. It means a representative
form of government. That means we must have a system that accurately
translates the popular will into the election of a Congress.
This is a massive technical challenge in a country of hundreds of
millions of people, 50 States, and thousands of jurisdictions,
especially in the computer age. We need voter-certified, paper-ballot
voting systems in every State in the Union. We need risk-reducing
audits. We need real accountability for election vendors. We need
voting machines manufactured in the United States, where our democracy
is created, too.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I certainly hope my good
friend from Maryland (Mr. Raskin) changes his mind and wants more
Republican governments, but I don't think that is going to happen, even
today, on the House floor.
Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Yoho).
Mr. YOHO. Madam Speaker, I thank my friend from Illinois for
yielding.
I rise today as a Member from the great State of Florida. We all
recall the 2000 Presidential election. What happened in Palm Beach
County turned into a national punch line, ``the hanging chad.''
The Democratic bill before us today would mandate paper ballots and
make our elections a technology-free zone. I, too, am worried about
malign actors like Russia and China when it comes to our cybersecurity
network. However, let us not throw out the baby with the bath water.
Many of my colleagues submitted commonsense amendments that would
improve the bill, amendments addressing ballot harvesting and ensuring
State matching funds. Yet, Democrats, under another closed rule, are
forcing passage on a one-sided bill with no prospect in the Senate and
no chance of being signed by the President.
Madam Speaker, I sincerely hope we address these issues in a
bipartisan manner that reflects well on this body and the American
people.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from Georgia (Mrs. McBath), a new Member of Congress.
Mrs. McBATH. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2722. Our
elections are the foundation of our democracy, but they face increasing
threats.
There is bipartisan agreement that we must do more to guard against
these threats to our most fundamental democratic process. Our elections
must allow us to truly hear the voices of every American voter.
My home State of Georgia has recently taken steps to safeguard its
voting processes from cybersecurity threats, and this bill would
provide necessary funding to support these efforts in Georgia and
across our country.
This legislation will strengthen the partnership of the Election
Assistance Commission, the Department of Homeland Security, and our
State election officials.
Together, we must modernize our election infrastructure and ensure
the security of our democracy.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this critical measure.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Waltz), another good friend of mine from
the great State of Florida.
Mr. WALTZ. Madam Speaker, election security is especially significant
to Floridians. Two Florida counties were breached in the 2016 election
as a result of Russian spear phishing targeting county election
officials.
As Members of Congress, obviously, we are not here to relitigate 2016
but to work toward bipartisan solutions to defend the 2020 elections
from foreign intrusion.
I am disappointed that the majority is rushing this partisan proposal
to the floor this week and has bypassed Republicans who have shown
interest in working on election security. Just yesterday, the Science,
Space, and Technology Committee held a hearing on election
vulnerabilities and potential solutions. That hearing occurred after--
after--this proposal had been introduced and a day before it will
receive a vote on the House floor.
This proposal throws $1.3 billion at the problem without careful
consideration by the authorizing committees. This proposal also
excludes bipartisan solutions, like the one I am drafting with
Representative Stephanie Murphy from Florida.
Our proposal, the ALERTS Act, would require Federal agencies to
report to the Department of Homeland Security if an election intrusion
is identified and require DHS to notify State and local officials of
the breach, unless the information is deemed to compromise intelligence
sources.
Federal, State, and local officials have a duty to notify voters in
Florida and voters across the country impacted by election attacks, a
duty that was not upheld by the FBI in the wake of the 2016 elections
and a duty that the ALERTS Act, this bipartisan proposal, would
require.
At yesterday's Science, Space, and Technology Committee hearing, the
secretary of Oklahoma's State Election Board recommended a State and
local reporting requirement like the ALERTS Act.
So, testimony and a recommendation--both--were not considered by the
authors of this bill.
Madam Speaker, I request that my colleagues oppose this bill, and
immediately following this vote, I ask Democrats and Republicans to
come together to work toward a bipartisan election security package.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Casten).
Mr. CASTEN of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of
H.R. 2722, the SAFE Act.
Among the many disturbing revelations in the Mueller report, we
learned that Russian intelligence officers successfully infiltrated the
computer network in my home State at the Illinois
[[Page H5217]]
State Board of Elections. They accessed the personal information of
millions of voters and stole thousands of voter records before being
detected.
As far as we know, this breach has not affected the results of any
subsequent elections, but it desperately underscores the need for much
greater election security moving forward.
Now, officials in my home State and others around the country have
worked tirelessly to secure these vulnerabilities over the past 3
years, but without the help of the Federal Government, they can only do
so much. It is past time that we step up and give States the resources
they need to ensure our elections and our voters are safe in the
upcoming election.
Our democratic system depends on the consent of the governed. That is
far too fragile to take lightly. And our constituents' trust and the
independence of our democracy depend on it.
Madam Speaker, for these reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote for
the SAFE Act on the floor today.
{time} 0945
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, look, I respect and
agree with my good friend from Illinois (Mr. Casten), my colleague. We
want to protect our home State. We saw intrusion into our Illinois
State Board of Elections voter registration system. It is something
that had to be addressed.
I am happy to report, after talking with the State Board of Election
officials, they have been given resources already appropriated by a
Republican majority Congress, Republicans in the Senate, and President
Trump last year to effectively ensure that that information is not
vulnerable again.
What we are debating here today is a bill that will put more unfunded
and underfunded mandates on States like Illinois. That is not what our
local election officials in my district asked for.
The reason Illinois was able to protect itself and ensure that it
didn't happen again in the extremely high, historic turnout of the 2018
midterm election was because they were given the flexibility to spend
the HAVA funds that Republicans in Congress ensured that the State of
Illinois had, leading to a Democratic majority in the midterm
elections.
No one is questioning the safety and security of our midterm
elections. No one has told me that any foreign entity hacked into any
institution, voter registration system, or machines. Maybe DHS hasn't
called me, even though I think I have a security clearance, so they
could.
But they can't call our local election officials, under this bill, if
it happens again because they don't have security clearance. That is
why our bill is a better choice.
The one that is on the floor today does not address the concerns of
States like mine, and it certainly does not address the concerns of
States like California.
Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Calvert).
Mr. CALVERT. Madam Speaker, as a Member from California, it is hard
for me to believe that the majority could possibly propose an election
security bill that doesn't address the major vulnerabilities related to
ballot harvesting.
Ballot harvesting is where paid campaign operatives collect up to
hundreds or even thousands of ballots and drop them off at polling
places or an election office. The practice is ripe for fraud and a
recipe for disaster. Any serious effort to secure elections would
address it.
Let's be clear: We want to give people who need it an opportunity to
vote by mail, and we want to look for ways to make it easier for
disabled or elderly Americans to participate in our elections. My
concern is inserting campaign operatives into the ballot-handling
process without any safeguards.
In California, paid campaign staff can collect hundreds of ballots
without having to disclose who they are working for. When they hand
over those ballots to election officials, there is no requirement to
even provide their name.
Some of my friends across the aisle claim that the real problem is
bad actors committing fraud. But it is the very practice of ballot
harvesting being the problem. The reality is this process is an open
invitation for fraud. That is why most States have banned the practice.
Ignoring the most notable threat to election security is unacceptable
in a so-called election security bill.
Madam Speaker, American voters deserve better. I urge my colleagues
to oppose this bill until we can get serious about real threats to our
democracy.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Virginia (Ms. Wexton).
Ms. WEXTON. Madam Speaker, in 2016, Russian hackers tried to break
into Virginia's election system. In response to this information,
Virginia took active steps to secure the integrity of our elections. We
sped up our transition to paper ballots to ensure that our elections
were secure and the results could be verified and audited.
But it is not just about any one election or just about any one
adversary. Passing the SAFE Act is about securing our elections from
all threats, foreign or otherwise. These threats are coming for us in
every State, red or blue, rural or urban.
In 2016, State election websites in Illinois and Arizona were hacked
by intruders that installed malware and downloaded sensitive voter
information.
In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted
votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to
another.
In Johnson County, Indiana, e-poll books failed in 2018, halting
voting entirely for 4 hours, with no extension of polling hours.
It is clear that Congress must take action. Passage of the SAFE Act
will secure our elections by updating our election infrastructure,
speeding up the transition to paper ballots, and making necessary
investments in cybersecurity.
Every Member of Congress took an oath to protect this Nation from
threats foreign and domestic, and I urge my colleagues to honor that
oath. Let's protect our democracy while we still have one.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk), my fellow House Administration
Committee Republican and one of my good friends here in Congress.
Mr. LOUDERMILK. Madam Speaker, I thank my good friend from Illinois,
an exceptional baseball player, as well, for yielding this time.
Look, this is something I am very passionate about, and I am a bit
surprised that one of my colleagues from Georgia would speak against
this bill or even support this bill.
Let's be frank. Yes, the Russians are bad. They are very bad. They
seek to do harm to America, and they have been attempting to influence
our elections for many years.
Yes, we need to be concerned about election security. But if you want
to secure our election system, this is the exact opposite of what we
should be doing.
The State of Georgia has recognized this. Just this year, our State
legislature overwhelmingly passed a bill to spend $150 million to
upgrade our electronic voting machines so that they will produce a
verifiable ballot that represents the way the person voted at the
machine.
This is the direction we should be going, not to eliminate electronic
ballots, not eliminate the efficiency that you get when you can walk
in.
The verifiable aspect of it, a voter is given a card, after it is
verified who the voter is. When a voter walks into a voting precinct,
they fill out the paperwork and show their ID, and they are given a
card that identifies that they have been certified. They insert that
card and vote electronically, and then it will produce a printed
receipt that they can verify that this is the way they voted. That
receipt goes into a box that is used for a recount. That is a secure
voting system that also embraces technology.
This bill would take us back decades. It is like when a student takes
an SAT exam. They fill out the little bubbles, and then it runs through
an electronic counter.
Look, even in our own hearing, the chief technologist at the Center
for Democracy and Technology agreed when I brought this scenario
forward, that we use the technology of DREs that then will print a
verifiable ballot or a receipt. He said that those were absolutely
safe.
[[Page H5218]]
Now, here is the problem. When we go to paper ballots, and everyone
is going to fill out these paper ballots, we are talking long lines. We
are talking about fewer people being able to get to the polls.
Madam Speaker, when we decide to vote on this bill, the last thing
you are going to say from that rostrum is Members will cast their votes
via electronic device. Why? It is efficient. We have a verifiable way
of making sure that we can see the way we voted on this board up here
or on a printed piece of paper we can get in the back. This is because
of efficiency.
Madam Speaker, can you imagine if we had to do paper ballots or voice
vote every one of the many amendments we have on these appropriations
bills? We would never go home. We would be here 24 hours a day.
The American people expect us to live by the same laws that they have
to live by. We should embrace technology and make it secure, not revert
back decades to old technology.
Look, the reality is, this bill would subject us to the problem of
people walking up with boxes full of preprinted ballots, all across the
Nation, and they could drop those in at the last minute. We need to
verify that people voting are who they are.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), my colleague from the House Judiciary
Committee and Homeland Security Committee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from
California for her leadership.
There is not a time that I go home that they don't ask me how we will
secure our elections. I am proudly supporting the Securing America's
Federal Elections Act, the SAFE Act, and I am asking why our colleagues
are fighting against Americans having the right to vote.
The SAFE Act authorizes a $600 million Election Assistance Commission
grant program. It provides States with $175 million in biannual
sustainment funding to help maintain election infrastructure.
Voting machines are required to be manufactured in the United States.
States are mandated to conduct risk-limiting audits.
Another very important feature of the SAFE Act is that it requires
accountability for election technology vendors and sets cybersecurity
standards.
As a member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, recognizing what
happened in 2016, I want to make sure that the Russian adversaries, the
Russian military, are not our poll watchers, are not our secretaries of
states, are not the vendors for our machines.
I want to make sure for minorities, every vote counts, and for every
American, every vote counts.
I want to end voter suppression. The way we do this is to have safe
elections.
I am very proud of this legislation, and I am proud of this Speaker,
proud of the leadership, to say that we are going to be first on the
line to tell America we believe in safe, equal, and fair elections.
I ask my friends to support this legislation.
Madam Speaker, as a senior member of the Committees on the Judiciary
and Homeland Security, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2722, the
``Securing America's Federal Elections Act'' or SAFE Act.
I strongly support this legislation because the linchpin of
representative democracy is public confidence in the political system,
regime, and community.
That confidence in turn rests upon the extent to which the public has
faith that the system employed to select its leaders accurately
reflects its preferences.
At bottom, this means that all citizens casting a vote have a
fundamental right and reasonable expectation that their votes count and
are counted.
This concern is particularly salient because of the unprecedented
interference by a hostile foreign power to secure victory for its
preferred candidate in the 2016 presidential election and the
determination of that hostile power to repeat its success in future
American elections.
That is why it is necessary to pass H.R. 2722, the SAFE Act, so
comprehensive election security reform measures can be implemented.
Specifically, the SAFE Act authorizes a $600 million Election
Assistance Commission (EAC) grant program to assist in securing
election infrastructure and a $5 million grant program to study and
report on accessible paper ballot voting systems.
The bill provides grants to State and local election officials to
replace aging voting machines with voter-verified paper ballot voting
systems and grants to support hiring IT staff, cybersecurity training,
security and risk vulnerability assessments, and other activities to
secure election infrastructure.
The bill also provides states with $175 million in biannual
sustainment funding to help maintain election infrastructure and, to
ensure States can maintain security gains, provides each State with no
less than $1 per voter who participated in the most recent election to
maintain election security.
Under the legislation, voting machines are required to be
manufactured in the United States and states are mandated to conduct
risk-limiting audits, a critical tool to ensuring the integrity of
elections.
These audits, which involve hand counting a certain number of ballots
and using statistical methods to determine the accuracy of the original
vote tally, are effective at detecting any incorrect election outcomes,
whether caused by a cyberattack or something more mundane like a
programming error.
The SAFE Act also directs the National Science Foundation to
administer a $5 million grant program to study and report on accessible
paper ballot verification mechanisms, including for individuals with
disabilities, voters with difficulties in literacy, and voters whose
primary language is not English.
Madam Speaker, another salutary feature of the SAFE Act is that it
requires accountability for election technology vendors and sets
cybersecurity standards and prohibits wireless and internet
connectivity on systems that count ballots or upon which voters mark
their ballots or systems are configured.
The SAFE Act also limits state expenditures on goods and services
with grant monies provided under this Act to purchases from ``qualified
election infrastructure vendors.''
The EAC, in coordination with DHS, establishes the criteria for
achieving the status of ``qualified election infrastructure vendor,''
which includes maintaining IT infrastructure in a manner consistent
with the best practices provided by the EAC and agreeing to report any
known or suspected security incidents involving election
infrastructure.
Madam Speaker, there is compelling reason for the Congress to pass
the SAFE Act by overwhelming margins in the House and Senate because to
date the President and his Administration has shown little interest or
inclination in taking effective action to deter and prevent
interference by foreign powers in American elections.
Let us remember that the Intelligence Community Assessment (``ICA'')
of January 2017 assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered
an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election
in which Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the U.S.
democratic process, denigrate Democratic presidential candidate and
implacable foe of Vladimir Putin, former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, facilitate the election of Vladimir Putin's preferred
candidate, Donald J. Trump.
Russia's interference in the election processes of democratic
countries is not new but a continuation of the ``Translator Project,''
an ongoing information warfare effort launched by Vladimir Putin in
2014 to use social media to manipulate public opinion and voters in
western democracies.
Instead of supporting the unanimous assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, the President attacked and sought to discredit
and undermine the agencies and officials responsible for detecting and
assessing Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election as
well as those responsible for investigating and bringing to justice the
conspirators who committed crimes against the United States our law
enforcement.
And to add shame to insult and injury, at a meeting in Helsinki,
Finland, rather than embracing the conclusions of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, the President of the United States sided with Russian
President Vladimir Putin in heaping scorn on the IC's assessment
regarding Russian interference and called the U.S. Justice Department
investigation into Russia's interference led by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller ``the greatest political witch hunt in history.''
As the Mueller Report concluded, ``The Russian government interfered
in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.''
In his only public remarks made since he was appointed Special
Counsel, Robert Mueller reiterated at his farewell press conference
held at the Department of Justice on May 29, 2017, the ``central
allegation of our indictments--that there were multiple, systematic
efforts to interfere in our election'' and that ``allegation deserves
the attention of every American.''
[[Page H5219]]
Madam Speaker, American elections are to be decided by American
voters free from foreign interference or sabotage, and that is why I
support and urge all my colleague to vote to pass H.R. 2722, the
``Securing America's Federal Elections Act'' or SAFE Act.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Palmer), our Republican Policy Committee
chair.
Mr. PALMER. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois, who
is also a good friend, for the work he is doing on this, trying to
bring some transparency to what is really going on here.
There are numerous reasons that mandating paper ballots isn't
workable. They are susceptible to fraud; they are inefficient; and they
are antiquated. I have seen, over the years, where the joke was ``one
man, one vote,'' where it was ``one suitcase, one vote,'' with people
bringing in paper ballots. We have seen a situation around the country
now where that is still a bit of a problem.
For argument's sake, though, let's just say that paper ballots were
foolproof and didn't come with their own set of problems or security
concerns. I would still be concerned about the impact this bill would
have on the majority of our States.
The mandate, in and of itself, is troubling. Twenty-nine out of our
50 States, plus the District of Columbia, would have to completely
revamp their current election systems. This is both costly and time-
intensive. There is nearly zero chance this can be adopted by the 2020
elections. The funding in the bill makes it clear that they realize
this is not enough money to pay for this and, if it is not, it would be
on a pro rata share. That means it is an unfunded mandate in violation
of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act.
It is easy for Federal lawmakers here in D.C. to gloss over the
impact this Federal mandate would have, but the numbers don't lie. Only
18 States currently use a paper-only voting system, as the bill would
mandate. Not to mention, this bill would also impact those 18 States,
including my home State of Alabama.
Just a few days ago, the House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology held a hearing on ``Election Security: Voting Technology
Vulnerabilities,'' where Oklahoma's Secretary of the State Election
Board Ziriax pointed out that this bill would require the use of
recycled paper, which would be impossible to use with Oklahoma's
current paper ballot system because the fibers found in recycled paper
would cause repeated false readings.
While this may seem like a small or silly detail, this is just one
example of the great impact this bill will have on all States, with
many considerations that have yet to be vetted properly.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. I yield the gentleman from Alabama an
additional 30 seconds.
Mr. PALMER. My colleagues on the other side continue to offer radical
and unworkable policies to revamp our election system. Security risks
do exist within our ballot boxes, but this bill is not the answer. This
bill will just add to the existing risks, and I cannot support it.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, may I inquire how much time remains on
each side.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from California has 14
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Illinois has 12\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Sarbanes).
{time} 1000
Mr. SARBANES. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
I very strongly support the SAFE Act. This is something that the
Democrats have been focused on from day one. Day one meaning, the day
after the 2016 election, when we saw the attacks that had come in
against our democracy, we realized we were very exposed, and we needed
to take action.
This is our chance to stand up against interference from foreign
adversaries who are trying to hack in, sow discord, undermine our
elections, and create havoc here in our own country. This is
fundamental to protecting our democracy.
So we were on the case from the beginning. We convened the Election
Security Task Force, which was led by Zoe Lofgren, Bob Brady, Bennie
Thompson and others. They looked at all of the best practices that we
need to put in place to make sure that our elections are strong and
sturdy, and how do we fortify them, and they produced those
recommendations.
We then took those recommendations and we put them into H.R. 1, the
For the People Act, and we passed those on March 8 of this year,
because we knew that this was a priority and that there is no time to
waste.
Now, our Republican colleagues, unfortunately, did not want to go
along with those broad, sweeping reforms that were contained in H.R. 1,
including election security measures. So we made it easy for them, we
said, ``Okay. We will start to break those things out. We will take the
election security piece and we will bring it as a separate bill to the
floor of the House.'' That is the SAFE Act. But we still, apparently,
don't have their support.
This is their opportunity, this is their chance to stand up and show
their patriotism, to defend our democracy, to protect our Constitution,
to make sure that our elections are going to be safe.
So let's talk about what is in the SAFE Act, the Safeguarding
America's Federal Elections Act.
We have significant resources that are going to be brought to bear to
build up, to fortify the election security infrastructure of our
country. This is what the public wants to see. They want to be ready
for the 2020 election.
We have risk-limiting audits to make sure that States across the
country are figuring out what is going on. Where do we make changes?
How do we protect ourselves?
Paper ballots. We have had a lot of discussion about that today.
Paper ballots are incredibly important in terms of boosting the
confidence of the public that elections will be carried out in a way
that you can verify the tally, people have the confidence that when
they go to the ballot box, they put their ballot in there, that that
vote will be counted.
We have no time to waste. We need to get this done now if we are
going to be ready for the 2020 election.
Bob Mueller came along with his report and he said that the Russian
interference was sweeping and systematic in 2016.
Every leader in our intelligence community has also echoed the fact
that 2016 was a dress rehearsal. They are coming in 2020.
We need to be ready. We need to protect our elections. Let's support
the SAFE Act.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much
time as I might consume.
Madam Speaker, I agree with my good friend from Maryland. We as
Republicans and Democrats need to do the patriotic thing and make sure
that our elections are protected.
And I do agree that the Russians tried to interfere in our election
process with misinformation campaigns. But I also want to ask my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, if their concentration on
election security happened the day after the 2016 election, why in the
world didn't the administration who was in the White House at the time
when the intelligence analysts were talking about how other foreign
entities, including Russia, were wanting to interfere in our elections,
why didn't they do something about it?
Why are we here today?
Why didn't it happen before the 2016 election, when our intelligence
analysts said nefarious activity was moving against the United States
of America?
They did nothing. The Obama administration did nothing. They let it
go.
Now we are here watching the new Democrat majority that was elected
in 2018, after explosive turnout in our midterm elections, their first
bill, H.R. 1, that every member of the Democratic majority cosponsored
and supported, that is the solution?
The solution is to add millions of taxpayer dollars and then the
first ever corporate dollars into their own congressional campaign
accounts?
No one has ever said that is the solution to too much money in
politics or
[[Page H5220]]
to election security. Not one time have I had a constituent say that to
me.
Now, we have got to come together and do what is right.
We have yet to address any of the issues that were laid out in the
Mueller report. This bill we are debating today does not address any of
them. This is a discussion about what happened in 2016 without a
discussion of what is needed in our States and local election
authorities.
That is what is wrong with this bill, too. It is hypocrisy at its
greatest.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), the Speaker of the House.
Ms. PELOSI. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding, the
chair of the House Administration Committee, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren,
of whom we are very proud in California. I thank her for leading us on
this path of patriotism and respecting the oath of office we take.
Madam Speaker, it is just a joy to be having this opportunity to
speak out for the sacred oath to vote, the sacred blessing, the right
to vote as we leave to go on the Fourth of July break.
Madam Speaker, I thank the members of the House Administration
Committee: Mr. Butterfield, whom we heard from yesterday; Mr. Raskin;
Mr. Aguilar; Congresswoman Susan Davis, who presented to us earlier;
and to all of you.
Madam Speaker, I thank Mr. Sarbanes. He has been the face of the
future. He has been speaking out against the misrepresentations that
have happened, the propagandizing that has happened by foreign
governments in our election.
Yes, we won the election. We won the election because the American
people were sick and tired of what the Republicans were putting forth.
We won the election in the most gerrymandered, voter suppressed
political arena you could imagine, and yet the American people came
forward.
One the biggest messages we had in the campaign was H.R. 1, to reduce
the role of dark, special-interest money in politics, to stop the
systemic intentional voter suppression by the Republicans across the
country, to stop political gerrymandering on all sides.
Let's do it in a nonpartisan way. Let the chips fall where they may,
and to do so in a way that we are taking a piece of it today to talk
about protecting our electoral system.
In a short while, we will take up the Voting Rights Act that is also
part of H.R. 1.
So this H.R. 1 was very supported by the Democrats, very publicized
to the American people, and part of our For the People agenda: lower
healthcare costs by lowering the cost of prescription drugs and
protecting the preexisting conditions benefit; bigger paychecks by
building the infrastructure of America in a green way; cleaner
government by passing H.R. 1--one of the component parts of what we are
coming together around today.
As we approach the Fourth of July, we must remember the oath that we
take to support and defend the Constitution and to protect the American
people, which demands that this House of Representatives take urgent
action.
We must legislate, we must investigate, and we must litigate to
protect our national security, defend our democracy for the people.
Special Counsel Robert Mueller's report revealed an all-out attack on
our elections by the Russians, concluding that they ``interfered in the
2016 Presidential election in sweeping and systemic fashion.''
Top intelligence and security officials have made clear that these
attacks continue. They are happening, and they are happening now.
This spring, FBI Director Chris Wray warned of a ``365-day-a-year
threat'' from the Russians, explaining that their attacks in our
elections were simply ``a dress rehearsal for the big show in 2020.''
This House has a patriotic duty to protect our democracy from these
attacks. This is a matter of national security. That is why the
Democrats first act in the majority was to advance, as I mentioned,
H.R. 1, For the People Act, to secure our elections.
Today we are building on that progress with the Securing America's
Federal Elections Act, which takes urgently needed action to further
strengthen America's defenses.
This bill closes dangerous gaps in our election systems and brings
our security into the 21st century.
I know that other Members have spoken about the provisions of the
bill, but I just would really like to know from my Republican friends
what is wrong with replacing outdated, vulnerable voting equipment?
What is wrong with requiring paper ballot voting systems to ensure the
integrity of our elections? What is wrong with enacting strong
cybersecurity requirements for elections technology vendors and voting
systems?
We must be relentless in the defense of our democracy, fighting on
all fronts to keep America safe.
There is a reason why the Russians are interfering in our elections,
and other countries may be too, but we can document with full
confidence from the intelligence community that the Russians are. It is
because they want to affect the outcome of the elections, so they can
affect the policy.
I think it was really sad, I was sad to hear, and, hopefully, it will
be retracted, that the President gave a green light to the Russians to
do it again. Really? Really?
This week, we are advancing appropriations legislation that provides
$600 million for election security grants to States, and increases
funding for the Election Assistance Commission, which has been starved
for funding for years, a couple of dollars for every person in our
country to honor the vision of our Founders of a democracy where
everyone who is eligible to vote can vote and everyone's vote is
counted as cast.
Next month, we will advance further legislation to protect our
national security and prevent foreign interference in our elections.
Madam Speaker, I commend the distinguished chairman of the Homeland
Security Committee, Mr. Bennie Thompson, for the great work that he has
been doing with his task force and his committee and other members who
are working with him as we go forward.
We are pleased that the administration has agreed to provide an all-
Member briefing on election security that will happen in July, so we
can get the facts. We have been trying to get the facts.
Some people around here may think that it is okay to just make policy
without the facts. We are evidence-based, scientifically oriented,
truth-and-knowledge based on how we go forward, and we look forward to
that briefing.
We also look forward to July 17, when Special Counsel Robert Mueller
will come forward and give testimony.
Our national security is being threatened, and the American people
need answers.
This is not to be fearmongering. This is to be smart and to
anticipate a known challenge that exists and to do something about it.
We can't just talk about the Mueller report and saying what it says
about the Russian interference in our elections, unless we are ready to
do something about it. Today we are, thanks to our distinguished chair,
Chairwoman Lofgren.
There is a need for bipartisan support for our critical commonsense
action to secure our elections.
Unfortunately, Senator McConnell, a self-described crepehanger, has
vowed to kill our bills in the Senate, while the President openly
declares that he sees no problem with foreign interference in our
elections.
The GOP Senate and the White House are giving foreign countries the
green light to attack our country, but the House will do our patriotic
duty to protect America.
Madam Speaker, as we approach the Fourth of July holiday, I urge my
colleagues to remember the oath we took and the democracy we defend,
and to join me in a strong bipartisan vote to defend America's
security.
This isn't about politics. It is about patriotism. As our Founders
said at the beginning of the Constitution in its preamble, we do this
for the people.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I agree with my distinguished colleague from
California that we do need to have the ability for the Department of
Homeland Security
[[Page H5221]]
and our intelligence officials to notify our State and local election
officials if they see nefarious activity, but right now under the bill
we are debating today, that would not be the case, because in many
cases, DHS won't talk to local election officials or State election
officials because they don't have security clearances.
Our bill, pushed by the Republicans on the House Administration
Committee, would allow the communication to take place.
{time} 1015
You know, we hear a lot of talk about patriotism coming up on the
Fourth of July. I believe we are all patriots in this institution, but
I believe, also, we have to govern together.
We were working on a bipartisan solution to election security, and
all of the sudden, we were told no more negotiations. That is not how I
thought this institution worked. I thought we could work together.
Well, I do want to respond to a couple of comments that my colleague
from California made. She may have mentioned H.R. 1. H.R. 1 was the
Democrats' attempt to address not only too much money in politics, they
said; they also wanted to address election security.
Clearly, what H.R. 1 did was do nothing to affect the money that is
coming into politics, and it is not doing enough to ensure that our
elections are not impacted by foreign entities with nefarious
intentions.
Our bill today that we hoped could have been debated but was voted
down on a party-line vote in the House Administration Committee earlier
this week, just a few days ago, we hoped we could have come up with
that, that is a bipartisan solution that would have worked. What works,
our last speaker said, was this. Clearly, that is not what works.
What works isn't voting for a bill like H.R. 1 that votes to put the
first ever corporate money directly into every Member of Congress'
campaign accounts. What works, clearly, is not taxpayer money to fix
that problem when there are not enough corporate malfeasance funds.
That is not what the American people wanted.
And what would have worked would have been the last administration,
the Obama administration, listening to their intelligence agencies and
doing something about nefarious activities before the 2016 election,
not the day after, when Democrats decided to take this issue on.
And then all I ever hear is they are going to blame Mitch McConnell.
Well, I had no idea, before 2016, that the Obama administration ceded
Presidential authority to the Senate majority leader. I had no idea
that happened.
Everything is Mitch McConnell's fault, right? He is the one who told
the intelligence agencies to stand down. Are you kidding me?
And now we hear we should have done something. You are darn right we
should have done something. You are darn right the Obama administration
should have done something. You are darn right they should have done it
when they first heard about it before the 2016 election, and now here
we are to fix it.
And today's bill is clearly not a fix.
We have got some issues, and it is really interesting to see my
colleagues from California come up and not want to address a practice
like ballot harvesting that is illegal in the State of North Carolina,
where a Republican who did it is likely to go to jail for it, but the
same process is legal in the State of California--disastrous.
You want to talk about trying to determine the outcome of elections?
We have put forth amendment after amendment to address ballot
harvesting, with complete party-line votes against making sure the
process that is illegal in North Carolina that a Republican operative
will likely go to jail for is completely legal in States like
California.
And you want to talk about determining the outcome of an election?
Come on.
I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk), my
good friend.
Mr. LOUDERMILK. Madam Speaker, I thank my friend from Illinois for
yielding this minute to me.
The distinguished Speaker talked about misinformation, and I agree.
There is a lot of misinformation out there about elections and election
security and a lot of that that goes on around here. Let's be factual
here.
There has been zero solid evidence of voter suppression during the
last election, which had the largest turnout in the history of this
Nation. Our own committee held seven field hearings across the Nation,
with zero solid evidence of voter suppression, but the only acts of
voter suppression that they tried to bring up had to deal with purging
voter rolls.
We actually had one hearing in Broward County. What is Broward County
known for? Voter irregularities. Why? Many times, why? Because of paper
ballots.
But yet this is the direction we are going in, and the distinguished
Speaker said we are taking it into the 21st century. Show me how. How
is this taking us into the 21st century? It is taking us back decades.
Look, if the Russians were actually physically invading our Nation
with bombers and tanks, this bill would be the equivalent of giving our
military pellet guns and paper airplanes to thwart the attack. This is
taking us away from election security.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Butterfield), a valued member of the House
Administration Committee.
Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Madam Speaker, I thank the chair of our committee
for yielding me time this morning.
Madam Speaker, I rise this morning in strong support of H.R. 2722. It
is past time that this Congress act boldly in response to the foreign
interference that took place in our 2016 elections, and that is exactly
what this bill does.
The gentleman from Ohio, the ranking member of the committee, I say
to him it is disingenuous to point the finger at the Obama
administration. That may or may not be accurate, but let us look
forward.
This legislation provides $600 million in grants to State and local
officials to secure election infrastructure and replace aging voting
machines with voter-verified paper ballot voting systems; $175 million
to States every 2 years to maintain elections infrastructure. It
requires States to implement risk-limiting audits; it prohibits
internet accessibility or connectivity for devices on which ballots are
marked or tabulated; and it sets long-needed cybersecurity standards
for vendors.
I ask my colleagues, let us look forward. Let us protect the right to
vote. Let us protect the ballot of every American citizen.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I really respect my colleague from North Carolina, and
I do want to correct him a little bit.
I am from Illinois, not Ohio. I would never mistake the gentleman
from North Carolina as being from someplace like South Carolina. But
the gentleman from North Carolina is a good friend.
Look, we all have disagreements on this House floor, but that doesn't
mean we are disagreeable when it comes to having good friendships, and
I thank him for his courtesies and thank him for his friendship.
The State of North Carolina is a great example of why we need to do
better, why we ought to go back to the drawing board.
Let's take this bill off the floor. Let's get back to bipartisan
negotiations, because in States like North Carolina and States like
Illinois where local election officials have bought machines, they
bought machines, maybe they have current optical scan machines, but the
requirement in this bill, as the Oklahoma secretary of state said, the
requirement of this bill to have recycled paper through ballots, many
of the already purchased optical scan machines that would be required
for every local and State election official to purchase after the year
2022 may not be able to read the ballots on recycled paper. So you are
going to have to reinvest hard-earned tax dollars where many local
communities in our great States have already invested in updating their
election security with the most secure election equipment that they
felt was going to protect them.
Washington should not be telling our local officials what to buy,
especially when there are provisions in this bill that make equipment
that would fit
[[Page H5222]]
those guidelines illegal to use or are inoperable even if they have
purchased it. We have got to do better.
We all want to protect this great Nation. We all want free and fair
elections so that every vote is counted and protected. Let's do it
together. Let's do it right.
Let's make sure we address some DHS concerns. Let's put a
cybersecurity assistance unit together like we have tried to do.
Let's outlaw ballot harvesting, because I know we have got bipartisan
support in working together on that issue, especially with my good
friend from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield. I look forward to working
with him on this. I know he and I both have concerns about this
process, and I thank him for his willingness to sit down and talk.
We can do better. The bill on the floor today is not better. Let's do
it. Let's work together. Pull this bill off the floor. We have got a
lot of other issues to debate today.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, we have no additional speakers, so if the
gentleman would like to yield back, I will close.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, how much time do I have
left?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Jackson Lee). The gentleman from
Illinois has 2\3/4\ minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California
has 9 minutes remaining.
Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the
balance of my time.
Madam Speaker, well, clearly the timekeeper is wrong. I obviously
thought I had more, but I am not able to debate that today. I will go
ahead and close.
I do want to thank my colleague from California and also the members
of the House Administration Committee, where we have an opportunity to
come together, but this bill is just simply another partisan bill by
the majority aimed at federally mandating election standards, like
mandating that States exclusively use paper ballots, effectively
banning any type of digital recording device that would have even a
verified paper backup.
The committee even had one hearing on this issue with Commissioners
from the EAC--remember, that agency that one speaker earlier said was
getting a pittance of dollars, small amounts of dollars over the last
few years. Only in this institution is $380 million given by the
Republican majority here in the House in the last Congress and signed
into law by the President of the United States, only in this
institution is $380 million a little bit. A lot of that money still
hasn't even been spent by our local election officials.
So here we are today debating a bill that is going to basically
commit 1.3 billion taxpayer dollars toward so-called election security.
We still have not addressed the problem that if DHS, if our same
intelligence officials who told the Obama administration that there was
foreign interference in our 2016 elections and the Obama administration
did nothing about it--because, why? Because of Mitch McConnell. It is
Mitch McConnell's fault.
Seriously, come on. Get real here. We are legislators. We are an
equal branch of government. There is absolutely no way any
administration cedes authority to anybody in this legislative
institution.
The Obama administration failed to address the problem of election
interference in 2016, and here we are today trying to make sure that we
fix it. This attempt to fix it is a partisan attempt at ensuring that
our elections authorities and our States and our local election
officials have a top-down, federally mandated approach that is going to
potentially cost them millions of taxpayer dollars that they have
already inserted into their own budgets over the last few years.
Our local officials have told us they want flexibility. Cybersecurity
concerns are where they have invested much of the $380 million that we
put forth in the last Congress.
Let's make sure we spend the money that we have already appropriated;
let's make sure we take a commonsense approach; and let's give our
election officials, Republicans and Democrats from throughout this
great Nation, the ability to address the concerns they know are weakest
in their own system. Let's not have some bureaucrat out here in a
concrete building determining what is going to work best in the State
of Texas, in the State of Illinois, in the State of California, or
anywhere else.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. LOFGREN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I think it is important to address a few of the issues that have been
raised in the course of this debate.
First, we are moving forward with the SAFE Act because of a sense of
urgency that we have about the 2020 election. That sense of urgency was
fueled by the Director of National Intelligence, and it was fueled by
the Director of the FBI who told us that red lights, warning lights
were flashing and that the 2016 election was just a prelude to what the
Russians were going to do in the 2020 election. We feel a sense of
urgency.
As has been mentioned by others, H.R. 1 included provisions about
ballot security. But I introduced this bill, the SAFE Act, on May 14
because it was specifically addressing election security, and, also, we
made some additional enhancements to H.R. 1 relative to cybersecurity
and the like.
{time} 1030
We drafted the bill with the assistance of the Parliamentarian so
that it was entirely within the jurisdiction of the House
Administration Committee, with one exception. There was a line on page
11 of the committee mark that authorized a study by the NSF. The
Science, Space, and Technology Committee waived jurisdiction on markup
because it was just a study, and that was very clear.
This bill has proceeded in the regular order. It has been noticed
according to our rules. And it brings us here today to test whether we
are going to meet the challenge that faces us in ballot security:
whether we are going to allow the Russians to attack our country by
trying to steal our election next year or not.
Mention has been made about the need for bipartisanship. I work often
on a bipartisan basis with Members of the other party. I will say that
we have tried in vain to have the Republican Members buy into the need
to require best practices for next year's election, and we couldn't
reach agreement.
We decided that it is our responsibility to move forward, and that is
why we are here today.
Just a mention on unfunded mandates, we are authorizing about $1
billion. $380 million was appropriated last year, and as the Speaker
mentioned, we are appropriating this year an additional $600 million
for ballot security.
This bill authorizes the $600 million that we are appropriating, and
we think it is important that that money flow to the States to harden
our systems so the election cannot be stolen by our enemies. It is
ironic that some on the other side of the aisle have complained about
unfunded mandates at the same time they tried to impose a 25 percent
match requirement on States for receiving these funds that they need to
get to harden our system.
Just a comment on DREs, DREs are not as unsafe as pure electronic
voting, but they are not best practices.
Much has been mentioned about the State of Georgia. It is worth
noting that the Georgia legislature ignored the advice they got from
computer scientists that what they were doing did not meet best
practices for ballot security.
A study published by Georgia Tech indicated that most voters did not
actually look at the receipt when it was printed. They also point out
that even though printed ballots, when voters do look at them, include
the names of candidates, votes will be encoded in barcodes that humans
can't authenticate and that are subject to hacking.
``There's nothing speculative about these vulnerabilities,'' said a
Georgia Tech computer professor and former chief technology officer for
Hewlett-Packard. ``If exploited, it would affect the result of the
election. It's not a secure system.''
We need to fix these things not because it is partisan but because we
need to protect America.
The idea that we would allow this just to be decided at a local level
is
[[Page H5223]]
wrongheaded. If the Russians launched missiles at the counties of the
United States, we wouldn't say, well, that is just a local issue. We
would say, no, that is an attack on the United States of America.
We need to harden our systems and protect our country.
Madam Speaker, I strongly urge the adoption of this measure.
I would like to read from a letter that we received just yesterday
from the NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice. In their last
paragraph, the Catholics say:
In a secular democracy, elections are the closest thing we
have to a sacrament. We know that nefarious foreign and
domestic actors continue to meddle in our democratic systems,
and we have been put on notice that previous efforts were
only trial runs, presumably for our next election in 2020.
The NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice considers our
elections to be sacrosanct and that Congress must pass the
SAFE Act to protect them.
This bill is supported by a broad sector of civil rights groups,
including the NAACP and Common Cause. It deserves all of our support.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2722 to ensure the security of
our Nation's election infrastructure.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 460, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 1(c) of rule XIX, further
consideration of H.R. 2722 is postponed.
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