[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 103 (Wednesday, June 19, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3815-S3817]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                   National Defense Authorization Act

  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, today we will take the first step in the 
passage of the National Defense Authorization Act when we hold the 
cloture vote this afternoon. For the last 58 years, consecutively, 
Congress has passed this important legislation to fund our Nation's 
military and support the men and women who wear our uniform and defend 
our freedoms, both at home and around the world.
  Last month the Senate Armed Services Committee voted overwhelmingly 
by a vote of 25 to 2 to advance this legislation to the Senate floor. 
So it goes without saying, perhaps, that this enjoys broad bipartisan 
support, but in this political environment, I will go ahead and say 
that anyway.
  This bill received that kind of support because it includes the ideas 
and feedback from Members of both parties and places our national 
security where it should be, above all other considerations when it 
comes to the Federal Congress.
  I wish I could say the same thing about the House version of the 
National Defense Authorization Act. After extensive debate and a 
largely party-line vote in the House, the House Armed Services 
Committee voted last week to ban the deployment of low-yield nuclear 
warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which is a dangerous 
step that could prevent us from being able to respond to attacks from 
our adversaries.
  I realize the seriousness of this topic, and really the purpose of my 
speaking today is to raise the visibility of this issue so that Members 
can begin to understand and grapple with the subject matter and reach 
informed decisions, which I believe would be in favor of the Senate 
version, which would allow the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons 
on submarines.

[[Page S3816]]

  Significantly, I believe the House provisions, although well-
intended, would make the potential for the use of these weapons more 
likely rather than less. To state the obvious, I hope that no nuclear 
weapon in our arsenal or in the arsenal of an adversary of ours will 
ever see the light of day. Nuclear weapons should always be a last 
resort.
  If you think about it, it is really almost a miracle that 74 years 
ago at Hiroshima was the last time a nuclear weapon was used, and I 
hope that record continues unbroken indefinitely. Why has it been 74 
years? Well, it is because the countries, by and large, that possess 
nuclear weapons realize the gravity of their use and that, once 
started, a nuclear war would result in devastation for everyone--
everyone, literally--on the planet.
  Yet we would be foolish to ignore the clear posture of our 
adversaries when it comes to nuclear weapons and play into their hands 
and, I think, actually make the use of these weapons more likely 
through miscalculation and mistake. Let's take Russia, for example. 
Back when General Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
testified at his confirmation hearing before the Armed Services 
Committee, he was asked his assessment of the threat that Russia poses 
to the United States. He said: My assessment today, Senator, is that 
Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security. If you 
want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to 
the United States, I would have to point to Russia, and if you look at 
their behavior, it is nothing short of alarming.

  That was in 2015, and I would say, in terms of the existential 
threat, nothing has changed in terms of Russia's bad behavior. They 
have continued their bad behavior to this day in Syria, Ukraine, and 
Crimea. Basically, if they feel they can make America's job tougher 
anywhere around the world, they try to do so.
  Looking at Russia and its nuclear arsenal--their nuclear deterrent 
strategy is one of the world's worst-kept secrets. It is known by most 
as ``escalate to deescalate.'' The Russians are aware that the United 
States possesses far greater conventional military capabilities and 
developed a strategy that uses their lesser capabilities as an 
advantage. But Russia's nuclear doctrine allows them to attack 
conventional forces--say, NATO forces in Europe--with a nuclear weapon 
under the pretext that the United States would have no way to respond 
to that attack--in other words, use of a low-yield tactical nuclear 
weapon in Europe--and they would essentially dare the United States to 
respond, and the only option the United States has is a strategic 
weapon on top of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Well, you can 
see why a President would be reluctant to use that sort of devastating 
power to respond to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Europe--
attacking one of our NATO partners. That is the disparity I think all 
of our Members need to be aware of and need to think about.
  The foundation of the Russian nuclear doctrine is this: They believe 
the United States would be hesitant to retaliate against a low-yield 
first strike by Russia with a high-yield weapon. Through their actions, 
those who are opposing the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons in 
the Defense authorization bill are confirming the belief of the 
Russians that absent a low-yield tactical weapon that could be used in 
response without using strategic weapons and risking a nuclear 
holocaust--actually, it counterintuitively makes it more likely that 
the Russians would take that step through miscalculation.
  Our friend and colleague Senator Inhofe, the Chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, said on the floor last summer when we were having a 
debate on this topic that Russia ``may perceive that limited nuclear 
first use, including low-yield weapons, would present the United States 
with two bad choices: escalate or do nothing.'' He is exactly right.
  We are dissuaded from using conventional forces out of fear that the 
conflict would quickly escalate into a catastrophic world war, but we 
cannot accept inaction as an appropriate response. In order to honor 
our NATO and global security commitments, our military needs to have 
the capacity to respond appropriately and proportionately to any 
attack, and to do that, we must develop our own low-yield nuclear 
weapons and bolster the deterrence value of the U.S. nuclear triad.
  The point here is to make nuclear war--to take it off the table so 
that no one will even dare travel down that path. That is the way we 
will keep that 74-year record since Hiroshima unbroken into the 
indefinite future, hopefully permanently.
  The importance of replacing high-yield warheads with low-yield ones 
was underscored in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. The administration 
called for the employment of low-yield nuclear warheads to remove 
Russia's perceived advantage, which former Secretary Defense James 
Mattis once called ``bellicose and cavalier.'' It specifically argues 
that expanding these options will ``help ensure that potential 
adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear 
escalation, making nuclear employment less likely.'' That is the point; 
that is the objective--to make nuclear employment less likely.
  This is what the strategy refers to as credible deterrence. By 
reducing the disparity between their potential strike and our potential 
response, the initial attack is less likely. This is of huge importance 
to our country and our national security, as well as that of our 
allies. NATO and non-NATO allies depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent 
for their own security, and we must take every step possible to be 
prepared.
  I note, parenthetically, that this is another reason why only 
rational actors should have nuclear weapons, because when Kim Jong Un 
in North Korea or when the ayatollahs in Tehran get ahold of nuclear 
weapons, they may or may not be subject to the same sort of deterrence 
that a Russia is when it comes to the use of possible employment of 
nuclear weapons.
  I find it perplexing that some of our Democratic colleagues are 
trying to take this step, which would place us in a strategic 
disadvantage against Russia, when they have made a platform of 
confronting Russian aggression. As a matter of fact, I think we all, on 
a bipartisan basis, have supported opposing Russian aggression. So why 
is it that we are hesitant to do so on this topic?
  When it comes to Russia's most blatant form of aggression--nuclear 
weapons--we can't afford to unilaterally disarm our military and leave 
the United States without a credible deterrent. We have already seen 
Russia's flagrant violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, and it continues to modernize its nuclear weapons. The more it 
feels like it has gained some advantage over the United States, the 
more they may be tempted to actually use them.
  Why should we allow that to continue without preparing for a possible 
response or, at minimum, reducing the likelihood they will ever be 
employed in the first place?
  House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith said: ``We do not think it 
is the proper approach to start talking about a proportional response, 
because it plants in peoples' minds that there is somehow an acceptable 
nuclear war.''
  That is just not true. No one accepts as inevitable a nuclear war. 
What we are trying to do is to reduce the potential that that might 
actually happen because of its devastating consequences to everyone on 
the planet, literally.
  While there is no doubt we would all prefer to live in a world with 
no nuclear weapons, indulging in utopian dreams is not what our 
constituents sent us here to do--wishful thinking. We can't reduce or 
stifle our nuclear capabilities while allowing our adversaries to 
increase their arsenals and their capability. We must operate in the 
world we live in, not the one we wish for. America's adversaries 
possess this low-yield nuclear weapon capability. At least from their 
rhetoric and their doctrine, it seems like they are prepared to use it.
  I fundamentally disagree with House Democrats' attempts to block the 
Pentagon from deploying low-yield nuclear warheads on submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, which was the recommendation of that 
Nuclear Posture Review I mentioned earlier. They would place our 
country at a strategic disadvantage and reinforce our adversaries' 
belief that they can escalate to deescalate and make the world a far 
more dangerous place.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

[[Page S3817]]