[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 102 (Tuesday, June 18, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3750-S3752]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 716. Mr. HAWLEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 1790, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2020 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of division C, add the following:
TITLE XXXVI--PROTECT OUR UNIVERSITIES
SEC. 3601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Protect Our Universities
Act of 2019''.
SEC. 3602. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States enjoys one of the most vibrant and
open education systems in the world. The free flow of ideas
has led to the development of innovative technologies and new
modes of thinking. The openness of the system also puts it at
risk. Adversaries of the United States take advantage of
access to federally funded sensitive research that takes
place on the campuses of institutions of higher education.
(2) According to Alex Joske of the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, there are thousands of scientists with
links to China's People's Liberation Army who have traveled
to American universities over the last several years. In his
report, Joske described the Chinese military's tactic as
``picking flowers in foreign lands to make honey in China''.
(3) As stated in the January 2018 China's Technology
Transfer Strategy report by the Defense Innovation Unit,
``Academia is an opportune environment for learning about
science and technology since the cultural values of U.S.
educational institutions reflect an open and free exchange of
ideas. As a result, Chinese science and engineering students
frequently master technologies that later become critical to
key military systems, amounting over time to unintentional
violations of U.S. export control laws.''.
(4) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
Wray's view, Chinese nontraditional intelligence collectors
``are exploiting the very open research and development
environment that we have, which we all revere. But they're
taking advantage of it, so one of the things we're trying to
do is view the China threat as not just the whole-of-
government threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their
end, and I think it's going to take a whole-of-society
response by us.''.
(5) Russia has also attempted to exploit the openness of
our university system for intelligence purposes. In 2012, for
instance, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
tasked an undercover officer at Columbia University with
recruiting classmates or professors who might have access to
sensitive information.
(6) Iran poses a similar threat. In 2012, President Barack
Obama signed into law the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158), which
prohibited issuance of a student visa to any Iranian who
wished to pursue coursework in preparation for a career in
the Iranian energy, nuclear science, or nuclear engineering
sectors, or related fields.
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(7) The United States recognizes the great value of
appropriate openness and the security need of striking a
balance with asset protection.
(8) However, technology and information that could be
deemed sensitive to the national security interests of the
United States should be given increased scrutiny to determine
if access should be restricted in a research environment.
(9) An open federally funded research environment exposes
the United States to the possibility of exchanging research
affiliated with current or future critical military
technological systems.
(10) This title preserves the openness of America's higher
education system, while preventing adversaries from
exploiting that very system in furtherance of their own
repressive agendas.
SEC. 3603. TASK FORCE AND SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECT
DESIGNATION.
(a) Task Force Established.--Not later than one year after
the date of enactment of this title, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
establish the National Security Technology Task Force
(hereinafter referred to as the ``Task Force'') to address
the threat of espionage, targeting research and development
at institutions of higher education that is funded in part or
whole by any member agency of the Task Force.
(b) Membership.--
(1) Designation.--
(A) Participation.--The Task Force shall include not more
than 30 members as follows:
(i) At least 1 representative shall be from the Department
of Homeland Security, designated by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
(ii) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate
with the following in order to secure their participation on
the Task Force:
(I) The Director of National Intelligence for at least 1
representative from the intelligence community.
(II) The United States Attorney General for at least 1
representative from the Department of Justice.
(III) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for at least 1 representative from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(IV) The Secretary of Energy for at least 1 representative
from the Department of Energy.
(V) The Secretary of Education for at least 1
representative from each of the following offices of the
Department of Education:
(aa) The Office of Postsecondary Education.
(bb) The Office of the General Counsel.
(cc) Any other office the Secretary of Homeland Security
determines to be appropriate.
(VI) The Secretary of State for at least 1 representative
from the Department of State.
(VII) The Secretary of Defense for at least 1
representative from the Department of Defense.
(VIII) The Director of the National Institutes of Health
for at least 1 representative from the National Institutes of
Health.
(IX) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy.
(B) Equal representation.--Each agency represented on the
Task Force shall maintain equal representation with the other
agencies on the Task Force.
(2) Membership list.--Not later than 10 days after the
first meeting of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit
to Congress a list identifying each member agency of the Task
Force.
(c) Sensitive Research Topics List.--The Task Force shall
maintain a list of topics determined sensitive by one or more
Task Force member agencies. Such list shall be referred to as
the ``Sensitive Research Topics List'' and be populated and
maintained in accordance with the following:
(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of
this title, each Task Force member agency shall generate an
initial list of research topics determined sensitive for
national security reasons and submit such list to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Each Task Force member agency shall update their
respective list of sensitive research topics on a 6-month
basis and submit changes to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(3) Task Force member agency inputs described in paragraphs
(1) and (2) shall be added to--
(A) any item listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL)
maintained by the Department of Commerce; and
(B) any item listed on the United States Munitions List
maintained by the Department of State.
(4) Not later than 90 days after receipt of Task Force
member agency inputs described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall compile
the inputs and issue the first Sensitive Research Topics List
to all Task Force member agencies. Thereafter, the Office of
Directory of National Intelligence shall maintain an updated
list of the research topics based on Task Force member agency
inputs and any changes to the Commerce Control List and the
United States Munitions List, and ensure an updated version
of the Sensitive Research Topic Lists is available to all of
the Task Force member agencies.
(d) Sensitive Research Projects List.--The Task Force shall
maintain a list of projects funded by Task Force member
agencies and addressing sensitive research topics. Such list
shall be referred to as the ``Sensitive Research Projects
List'' and be populated and maintained in accordance with the
following:
(1) Not later than 90 days after the first issuance of the
Sensitive Research Topics List, each Task Force member agency
shall identify any ongoing or scheduled projects that--
(A) receive or are scheduled to receive funding from said
agency;
(B) involve personnel from an institution of higher
education; and
(C) address one or more topics found on the Sensitive
Research Topics List.
(2) The Task Force shall collect the following information
relevant to each project identified in paragraph (1):
(A) The Task Force member agency that is funding the
project.
(B) Which topic on the Sensitive Research Topics List is
addressed by the project.
(C) Contact information for the principal investigator on
the project.
(3) The Task Force shall submit the Sensitive Research
Projects List, with the required information, to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, who shall maintain
the Sensitive Research Projects List
(4) The Sensitive Research Projects List shall be updated
in response to any changes to the Sensitive Research Topics
List, and--
(A) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
shall issue notification to all Task Force member agencies of
any changes to the Sensitive Research Topics List resulting
from updated inputs from Task Force member agencies or the
Commerce Control Lists or United States Munitions List; and
(B) each Task Force member agency shall--
(i) reinitiate the process detailed in paragraph (1); and
(ii) provide an update list of agency-funded sensitive
research projects to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(e) Consultation With OIG.--The Task Force shall
periodically, but not less frequently than annually, consult
with the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Homeland Security, which shall include annual reports to the
Office of the Inspector General on the activities of the Task
Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the Inspector
General to provide active feedback related to such
activities.
(f) Instruction to Institutions of Higher Education.--Not
less frequently than annually, the Task Force shall provide
relevant instruction to institutions of higher education at
which research projects on the Sensitive Research Projects
List are being carried out. Such instruction shall provide
the institutions of higher education with information related
to the threat posed by espionage, best practices identified
by the Task Force, and, to the extent possible, any specific
risks that the intelligence community, the qualified funding
agency, or law enforcement entities determine appropriate to
share with the institutions.
(g) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the
date of enactment of this title, and every 6 months
thereafter, the Task Force shall provide a report to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and to the Committee on Homeland
Security, the Committee on Education and Labor, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, regarding the
threat of espionage at institutions of higher education. In
each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify actions
that may be taken to reduce espionage carried out through
student participation in sensitive research projects. The
Task Force shall also include in this report an assessment of
whether the current licensing regulations relating to the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export
Administration Regulations are sufficient to protect the
security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research
Projects List.
SEC. 3604. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE
RESEARCH PROJECTS.
(a) Approval of Foreign Student Participation Required.--
(1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is one year
after the date of enactment of this title, for each project
on the Sensitive Research Projects List that is open to
student participation, the head of such project at the
institution of higher education at which the project is being
carried out shall--
(A) obtain proof of citizenship from any student
participating or expected to participate in such project
before the student is permitted to participate in such
project; and
(B) for any student who is a citizen of a country
identified in subsection (b), submit the required
information, to be defined in coordination with the office
designated by the Task Force to perform the background
screening, to their grantmaking agency, who shall transmit
that information in a standardized format, to be stipulated
in coordination with the office designated by the Task Force
to perform the background screening, to the office designated
by the Task Force to perform the background screening.
(2) Background screening.--An office designated by the Task
Force shall perform a
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background screening of a student described in paragraph (1)
and approve or deny the student's participation in the
relevant project within 90 days of initial receipt of the
information described in paragraph (1)(B), and--
(A) the scope of any such screening shall be determined by
the designated office in consultation with the Task Force,
with reference to the specific project and the requirements
of the grantmaking agency;
(B) the Secretary of Homeland Security, as head of the Task
Force, shall retain authority to delay approval or denial of
a student's participation in a sensitive research project in
30-day increments, as needed in coordination with Task Force
member agencies; and
(C) institutions of higher education shall maintain the
right to petition findings and contest the outcome of a
screening.
(b) List of Citizenship Requiring Approval.--Approval under
subsection (a) shall be required for any student who is a
citizen of a country that is one of the following:
(1) The People's Republic of China.
(2) The Russian Federation.
(3) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
SEC. 3605. FOREIGN ENTITIES.
(a) List of Foreign Entities That Pose an Intelligence
Threat.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this title, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence
to identify foreign entities, including governments,
corporations, nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and any
subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that the Director
determines pose a threat of espionage with respect to
sensitive research projects, and shall develop and maintain a
list of such entities. The Director may add or remove
entities from such list at any time. The initial list
developed by the Director shall include the following
entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate):
(1) Huawei Technologies Company.
(2) ZTE Corporation.
(3) Hytera Communications Corporation.
(4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company.
(5) Dahua Technology Company.
(6) Kaspersky Lab.
(7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by, or otherwise
has demonstrated financial ties to, the government of a
country identified under section 3604(b).
(b) Notice to Institutions of Higher Education.--The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall make the initial list
required under subsection (a) in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence, and any changes to such
list, available to the Task Force and the head of each
qualified funding agency as soon as practicable. The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide such initial
list and subsequent amendments to each institution of higher
education at which a project on the Sensitive Research
Projects List is being carried out.
(c) Prohibition on Use of Certain Technologies.--Beginning
on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment
of this title, the head of each sensitive research project
shall, as a condition of receipt of funds from the Department
of Homeland Security, certify to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, beginning on the date that is 2 years after the
date of the enactment of this title, any technology developed
by an entity included on the list maintained under subsection
(a) shall not be utilized in carrying out the sensitive
research project.
SEC. 3606. ENFORCEMENT.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such steps as
may be necessary to enforce the provisions of sections 3604
and 3605 of this title. Upon determination that the head of a
sensitive research project has failed to meet the
requirements of either section 3604 or section 3605, the
Secretary of Homeland Security may determine the appropriate
enforcement action, including--
(1) imposing a probationary period, not to exceed 6 months,
on the head of such project, or on the project;
(2) reducing or otherwise limiting the funding for such
project until the violation has been remedied;
(3) permanently cancelling the funding for such project; or
(4) any other action the head of the qualified funding
agency determines to be appropriate.
SEC. 3607. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Citizen of a country.--The term ``citizen of a
country,'' with respect to a student, includes all countries
in which the student has held or holds citizenship or holds
permanent residency.
(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' means an institution
described in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1002) that receives Federal funds in any amount
and for any purpose.
(3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(4) Qualified funding agency.--The term ``qualified funding
agency'', with respect to a sensitive research project,
means--
(A) the Department of Defense, if the sensitive research
project is funded in whole or in part by the Department of
Defense;
(B) the Department of Energy, if the sensitive research
project is funded in whole or in part by the Department of
Energy; or
(C) an element of the intelligence community, if the
sensitive research project is funded in whole or in part by
the element of the intelligence community.
(5) Sensitive research project.--The term ``sensitive
research project'' means a research project at an institution
of higher education that is funded by a Task Force member
agency, except that such term shall not include any research
project that is classified or that requires the participants
in such project to obtain a security clearance.
(6) Student participation.--The term ``student
participation'' means any student activity of a student with
access to sensitive research project-specific information for
any reason.
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