[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 102 (Tuesday, June 18, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3689-S3691]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 671. Mr. MARKEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 1790, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2020 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy,
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of title XII, add the following:
Subtitle H--Arms Control and Verification Efforts
SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Save Arms control and
Verification Efforts Act of 2019'' or ``SAVE Act''.
SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Every United States president since John F. Kennedy has
successfully concluded at least one agreement with Russia to
reduce nuclear dangers.
(2) If the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is
terminated, and the New START Treaty is not extended, or a
new treaty is not negotiated and ratified before 2021, there
would be no legally binding, verifiable limits on the United
States or Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time since
1972.
(3) For both the United States and the Russian Federation,
the New START Treaty's transparency and verification measures
provide invaluable insight into the size, capabilities, and
operations of both countries' nuclear forces beyond that
provided by more traditional intelligence collection and
assessment methods, helping create a mutually beneficial
environment of stability and predictability.
(4) Former Republican and Democratic national security
leaders, including George Shultz, William Perry, Richard
Burt, Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and others, have expressed
support for a prompt decision to extend the New START Treaty.
(5) United States military leaders continue to see value in
the New START Treaty, including Gen. John Hyten, Commander of
United States Strategic Command, who told Congress in March
2018 that ``bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements are
essential to our ability to provide an effective deterrent,''
and testified before Congress in February 2019 that the New
START Treaty is important because it provides to the United
States ``a cap on [Russia's] strategic baseline nuclear
weapons, and their ballistic missiles, both submarine and
ICBM, as well as their bombers'' and ``just as important it
gives me insight through the verification regime to their
Russia's real capabilities''.
(6) The United States NATO allies have consistently
expressed support for a decision by the United States and the
Russian Federation to extend New START before the scheduled
expiration date in 2021.
(7) Russian President Vladimir Putin said in July 2018 that
``I reassured President Trump that Russia stands ready to
extend this treaty, to prolong it, but we have to agree on
the specifics . . .''.
(8) The Department of Defense Report on the Strategic
Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation submitted pursuant
to section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1643)
determined that Russia ``would not be able to achieve a
militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion
of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or
breakout scenario under the New START Treaty, primarily
because of the inherent survivability of the planned United
States strategic force structure, particularly the Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines, a number of which are at sea at
any given time''.
(9) For as long as it must exist, the United States nuclear
arsenal must be maintained and modernized in a cost-effective
manner to ensure it remains a safe, secure, and reliable
effective nuclear force that can continue to deter nuclear
attack on the United States and its allies, and so that the
United States can continue to pursue further verifiable
reduction in global nuclear stockpiles consistent with its
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
(10) The New START Treaty created a Bilateral Consultative
Commission to resolve issues related to implementation of the
New START Treaty, and Article II of the New START Treaty
states, ``When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic
offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to
raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for
consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.''
SEC. 1293. SENSE OF SENATE.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) extending the New START Treaty by a period of five
years is in the national security interest of the United
States, so long as the Russian Federation continues to meet
the central limits of the treaty;
(2) the United States should immediately seek to begin
discussions with the Russian Federation on agreeing to a 5-
year extension of the New START Treaty;
(3) the United States should use the Bilateral Consultative
Commission mechanism within the New START Treaty to address
issues related to new Russian strategic nuclear weapons it
believes may fall under New START treaty limits;
(4) extending the New START Treaty would facilitate efforts
by the United States to pursue additional arms control
efforts
[[Page S3690]]
with the Russian Federation, including efforts to address the
Russian Federation's nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons;
(5) the United States should resume more regular talks on
strategic stability with Russia, as well as additional
bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts worldwide to
address a changing global security environment; and
(6) extending the New START Treaty would facilitate efforts
by the United States to engage with the People's Republic of
China to reduce dangers associated with its nuclear arsenal,
which is fundamentally different than the Russian
Federation's and requires a separate, focused arms control
effort.
SEC. 1294. CERTIFICATIONS IN EVENT NEW START TREATY IS NOT
EXTENDED.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, if the parties to
the New START Treaty have not completed the procedures
outlined in the treaty and its related protocols and annexes
to extend the treaty's effective date by up to five years
beyond February 5, 2021--
(1) the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of State shall separately submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a justification for why New START
has not been extended and a certification that the absence of
an extension of the treaty is in the national security
interest of the United States; and
(2) the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees--
(A) an intelligence community-coordinated assessment of why
the New START Treaty has not been extended;
(B) a certification that the absence of an extension of the
treaty is in the national security interest of the United
States; and
(C)(i) a certification that the United States is not losing
intelligence insight into the Russian Federation's strategic
nuclear program; or
(ii) a report detailing how the Director of National
Intelligence and the intelligence community will account for
any lost intelligence capabilities.
SEC. 1295. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a National Intelligence Estimate, consisting of an
unclassified executive summary and judgments and a more
detailed, classified report on the Russian Federation's
compliance with the New START Treaty and the impact to the
intelligence collection capabilities of the United States if
the New START Treaty and its related information exchanges
and associated inspections regimes were to lapse. The report
shall include the following elements:
(1) A description of the Russian Federation's compliance
with the New START Treaty.
(2) An assessment of the Russian Federation's intentions
with regard to extending the New START Treaty.
(3) A description of the intelligence collection benefits
gained as a result of the ratification and implementation of
the New START Treaty.
(4) An assessment of what specific capabilities the United
States intelligence community would have to develop and
deploy to ensure that no loss of collection capability would
occur in the event of the lapse of the New START Treaty.
(5) A cost estimate and estimated timeline for developing
these new or additional capabilities, and a description of
how new intelligence gathering requirements related to the
Russian Federation's nuclear forces may affect other United
States intelligence gathering needs.
(6) An assessment of projections for Russian Federation
nuclear and non-nuclear force size, structure, and
composition with the New START Treaty limitations in place
and without the limitations in place.
(7) An assessment of Russian Federation actions,
intentions, and likely responses to the United States
withdrawing from, suspending its obligations under, or
allowing to lapse the New START Treaty and subsequently
developing platforms and weapons beyond the New START
Treaty's limitations.
(b) Briefings.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
brief the appropriate congressional committees on the
elements set forth in subsection (a) when the National
Intelligence Estimate is submitted under such subsection and
every 120 days thereafter.
SEC. 1296. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Department of Defense.--
(1) Report on expected force structure changes in event of
treaty lapse.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not later than February 5, 2021,
if the New START Treaty is allowed to lapse, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report discussing changes to the expected force
structure of the United States Armed Forces if the New START
Treaty is no longer in place and estimating the expected
costs necessary to make such changes.
(2) Report on impacts to modernization plan.--Not later
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
not later than February 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty is
allowed to lapse, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of Energy shall jointly submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on how the current program
of record to replace and upgrade United States nuclear
weapons delivery systems and warheads, which anticipates the
continued existence of the New START Treaty, would be
modified without the existence of the New START Treaty. The
report shall include the information required to be submitted
in the report required by section 1043 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law
112-81; 125 Stat. 1576) and shall include--
(A) a separate 10-year cost estimate from the Department of
Defense to implement a nuclear sustainment plan that does and
does not anticipate the continued existence of the New START
Treaty, including possible costs associated with conversion
or uploading of strategic delivery vehicles and warheads;
(B) a separate 10-year cost estimate from the Department of
Energy to implement a nuclear sustainment and modernization
plan that does and does not anticipate the continued
existence of the New START Treaty, including uploading
warheads previously withdrawn from service;
(C) a description of how the absence of the New START
Treaty limits would impact the schedule and cost of
Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship management plan;
and
(D) an assessment of the potential impacts on how these
changes will impact the Department of Energy's nuclear
weapons complex.
(b) Department of State.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than
February 5, 2021, if the New START Treaty is allowed to
lapse, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the likely foreign
policy implications of and potential impacts to United States
diplomatic relations if the New START Treaty lapses. The
report shall include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the likely reactions of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO member
countries, United States allies, Asia, and each permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council.
(2) A description of the expected impacts on the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and the ability of the United States
to key nonproliferation objectives.
(3) A description of the risks posed to the long-term
health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the absence
of United States-Russia bilateral nuclear arms control
agreements and dialogue.
(c) Presidential Report on Strategic Arms Control
Strategy.--Not later than February 5, 2020, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report including--
(1) a 5-year strategy for future strategic arms control
agreements with the Russian Federation;
(2) an update on the status of any current discussions that
may be in progress at time of report; and
(3) a description of other United States bilateral and
multilateral arms control efforts globally.
SEC. 1297. PROHIBITION ON INCREASES IN CERTAIN WARHEADS,
MISSILES, AND LAUNCHERS.
(a) Prohibition.--
(1) In general.--If either of the conditions in paragraph
(2) occurs, the United States Government may not, except as
provided under subsection (b), obligate or expend any funds
to--
(A) increase above 1,550 the number of United States
warheads operationally deployed on launchers for ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers;
(B) increase above 700 the number of deployed
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers; or
(C) increase above 800 the number of deployed and non-
deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers,
as such terms are defined and such systems are counted in the
New START Treaty.
(2) Conditions.--The conditions referred to in paragraph
(1) are as follows:
(A) The President initiates United States withdrawal from
the New START Treaty in accordance with the procedures
outlined in the New START Treaty and its related protocols
and annexes.
(B) As of February 5, 2021, the parties to the New START
Treaty have not completed the procedures outlined in the New
START Treaty and its related protocols and annexes to extend
the Treaty's effective date to February 5, 2026.
(C) The President takes one or more actions to suspend
United States obligations outlined in the New START Treaty
and its related protocols and annexes.
(b) Exceptions.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall
not be in effect if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of
National Intelligence jointly certify that the Russian
Federation is, in a way that is militarily significant--
(A) increasing above 1,550 the number of the Russian
Federation's strategic warheads operationally deployed on
launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and heavy
bombers;
[[Page S3691]]
(B) increasing above 700 the number of deployed ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers; or
(C) increasing above 800 the number of deployed and non-
deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers,
as such terms are defined and such systems are counted in the
New START Treaty and its related protocols and annexes.
(2) The President, the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the
Secretary of Defense certify that it is in the national
security interest of the United States to exceed prohibition
limits.
(3) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
with 10-year cost projections related to increasing the
number of United States nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles,
and systems as covered by the New START Treaty and its
related protocols and annexes.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a National Intelligence
Estimate of Russian actions, intentions, and likely responses
to the United States exceeding these specified caps.
(5) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National
Intelligence provide briefings to the appropriate
congressional committees about the certifications and reports
submitted under paragraphs (1) though (4).
(6) There is not enacted, within 60 days after each of the
conditions in paragraphs (1) through (5) having been met, a
joint resolution of disapproval that continues the
prohibition on funding levels under subsection (a).
(c) Sunset.--The prohibition under subsection (a) shall
expire on February 5, 2026.
SEC. 1298. FORM OF REPORTS AND CERTIFICATIONS.
If any report or certification required under this subtitle
is submitted in classified form, an unclassified version
shall also be submitted at the same time.
SEC. 1299. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means all members
of--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intermediate range nuclear forces treaty.--The term
``Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty'' means the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, together with the
Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols, signed at
Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1,
1988.
(3) New start treaty.--The term ``New START Treaty'' means
the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010,
and entered into force February 5, 2011.
(4) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington July
1, 1968 (commonly known as the ``NPT'').
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