[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 99 (Thursday, June 13, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3495-S3496]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 425. Mr. HOEVEN (for himself, Mr. Tester, Mr. Daines, and Mr. 
Enzi) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill 
S. 1790, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2020 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title XVI, add the following:

     SEC. 1668. SENSE OF SENATE ON SUPPORT FOR A ROBUST AND MODERN 
                   ICBM FORCE TO MAXIMIZE THE VALUE OF THE NUCLEAR 
                   TRIAD OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (in this 
     section referred to as ``ICBMs'') have been a critical part 
     of the strategic deterrent of the United States for 6 decades 
     in conjunction with air and sea-based strategic delivery 
     systems.
       (2) President John F. Kennedy referred to the deployment of 
     the first Minuteman missile during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
     as his ``ace in the hole''.
       (3) The Minuteman III missile entered service in 1970 and 
     is still deployed in 2019, well beyond its originally 
     intended service life.
       (4) The ICBM force of the United States peaked at more than 
     1,200 deployed missiles during the Cold War.
       (5) The ICBM force of the United States currently consists 
     of approximately 400 Minuteman III missiles deployed across 
     450 operational missile silos, each carrying a single 
     warhead.

[[Page S3496]]

       (6) The Russian Federation currently deploys at least 300 
     ICBMs with multiple warheads loaded on each missile and has 
     announced plans to replace its Soviet-era systems with 
     modernized ICBMs.
       (7) The People's Republic of China currently deploys at 
     least 75 ICBMs and plans to grow its ICBM force through the 
     deployment of modernized, road-mobile ICBMs that carry 
     multiple warheads.
       (8) The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of 
     China deploy nuclear weapons across a variety of platforms in 
     addition to their ICBM forces.
       (9) Numerous countries possess or are seeking to develop 
     nuclear weapons capabilities that pose challenges to the 
     nuclear deterrence of the United States.
       (10) The nuclear deterrent of the United States is 
     comprised of a triad of delivery systems for nuclear weapons, 
     including submarine-launched ballistic missiles (in this 
     subsection referred to as ``SLBMs''), air-delivered gravity 
     bombs and cruise missiles, and land-based ballistic missiles 
     that provide interlocking and mutually reinforcing attributes 
     that enhance strategic deterrence.
       (11) Weakening one leg of the triad limits the deterrent 
     value of the other legs of the triad.
       (12) In the nuclear deterrent of the United States, ICBMs 
     provide commanders with the most prompt response capability, 
     SLBMs provide stealth and survivability, and aircraft armed 
     with nuclear weapons provide flexibility.
       (13) The ICBM force of the United States forces any would-
     be attacker to confront more than 400 discrete targets, thus 
     creating an effectively insurmountable targeting problem for 
     a potential adversary.
       (14) The size, dispersal, and global reach of the ICBM 
     force of the United States ensures that no adversary can 
     escalate a crisis beyond the ability of the United States to 
     respond.
       (15) A potential attacker would be forced to expend far 
     more warheads to destroy the ICBMs of the United States than 
     the United States would lose in an attack, because of the 
     deployment of a single warhead on each ICBM of the United 
     States.
       (16) The ICBM force provides a persistent deterrent 
     capability that reinforces strategic stability.
       (17) ICBMs are the cheapest delivery system for nuclear 
     weapons for the United States to operate and maintain.
       (18) United States Strategic Command has validated military 
     requirements for the unique capabilities of ICBMs.
       (19) In a 2014 analysis of alternatives, the Air Force 
     concluded that replacing the Minuteman III missile would 
     provide upgraded capabilities at lower cost when compared 
     with extending the service life of the Minuteman III missile.
       (20) The Minuteman III replacement program, known as the 
     ground-based strategic deterrent, is expected to provide a 
     land-based strategic deterrent capability for 5 decades after 
     the program enters service.
       (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (1) land-based ICBMs have certain characteristics, 
     including responsiveness, persistence, and dispersal, that 
     enhance strategic stability and magnify the deterrent value 
     of the air and sea-based legs of the nuclear triad of the 
     United States;
       (2) ICBMs have played and continue to play a role in 
     deterring attacks on the United States and its allies;
       (3) while arms control agreements have reduced the size of 
     the ICBM force of the United States, adversaries of the 
     United States continue to enhance, enlarge, and modernize 
     their ICBM forces;
       (4) the modernization of the ICBM force of the United 
     States through the ground-based strategic deterrent program 
     should be supported;
       (5) ICBMs have the lowest operation, maintenance, and 
     modernization costs of any part of the nuclear deterrent of 
     the United States; and
       (6) unilaterally reducing the size of the ICBM force of the 
     United States or delaying the implementation of the ground-
     based strategic deterrent program would degrade the deterrent 
     capabilities of a fully operational and modernized nuclear 
     triad and should not take place at the present time.
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