[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 93 (Tuesday, June 4, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3203-S3209]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, on May 24, 2019, pursuant to section 
36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary of State determined 
``that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of the 
following military sales'' to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates. The Arms Export Control Act indicates that, in 
the Senate, the notification of such a determination shall be sent to 
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant 
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to 
have printed in the Record the Secretary's determination and 
transmittals submitted to the committee by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency regarding sales under section 36(b). The Secretary's 
emergency determination and transmittals for sales conducted pursuant 
to other sections of the Arms Export Control Act were included in the 
Congressional Record via separate executive communications on June 3, 
2019.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  Defense Security


                                           Cooperation Agency,

                                                    Arlington, VA.
     Hon. James E. Risch,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On May 23, 2019, the Secretary of State, 
     pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
     amended, determined that an emergency exists which requires 
     the immediate sale of the defense articles and defense 
     services identified in the attached transmittals to the 
     Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through 
     the Foreign Military Sales process, including any further 
     amendments specific to costs, quantity, or requirements, 
     occurring within the duration of circumstances giving rise to 
     these emergency sales, in order to deter further the malign 
     influence of the Government of Iran throughout the Middle 
     East region.
       Please find attached (Tab 1) the Secretary of State 
     Determination and Justification waiving the Congressional 
     review requirements under Section 36(b)(l) and 36 (b)(5)(C) 
     of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, for the attached 
     list of Transmittals of proposed Letters of Offer and 
     Acceptance to the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of 
     Saudi Arabia for defense articles and services pursuant to 
     the notification requirements of Section 36(b)(1) and Section 
     36(b)(5)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as 
     amended. The determination and detailed justification are a 
     part of each Transmittal. After this letter is delivered to 
     your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the 
     public of the proposed sales.
           Sincerely,
                                                Charles W. Hooper,
                                Lieutenant General, USA, Director.
       Enclosures.


            DETERMINATION UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

    Subject: Emergency Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
                          Emirates, and Jordan

       Pursuant to sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), and 36(d)(2) of 
     the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, I hereby state 
     that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale of 
     the following foreign military sales and direct commercial 
     sales cases, including any further amendments specific to the 
     cost, quantity, or requirements of these cases, in the 
     national security interest of the United States:
       For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
       F-15 Support
       Paveway Precision Guided Munitions (sale and co-production)
       Aircraft Maintenance Support
       Aurora Bomb Fuzing System
       120mm M933A1 Mortar Bombs
       Fl10 Engines for F-15s
       F/A-18 Panel Manufacture in Saudi Arabia for other end-
     users
       Advising and support of Ministry of Defense reform
       Continuation of follow-on logistics support and services 
     for Royal Saudi Air Force, including Tactical Air 
     Surveillance System support
       For the United Arab Emirates:
       AH-64 Equipment
       APK WS Laser-guided Rockets
       Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles
       Paveway Precision Guided Munitions and Maverick missile 
     support
       RQ-2l Blackjack UAS
       M107A1 .50 caliber Rifles
       FMU-152A/B Programmable Bomb Fuse
       Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile--Tactical Ballistic 
     Missile
       U.S. Marine Corps training of UAE Presidential Guard
       F-16 engine parts
       Amendment to previously Congressionally notified case for 
     ScanEagle and Integrator Unmanned Aerial Systems
       For Jordan:
       Transfer of Paveway II Precision Guided Munitions from the 
     United Arab Emirates.
       This determination shall be published in the Federal 
     Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of 
     Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress.


   (U) MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY ARMS TRANSFERS AND 
    AUTHORIZATIONS TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB 
 EMIRATES, AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN TO DETER IRANIAN MALIGN 
                               INFLUENCE

       (U) Iranian malign activity poses a fundamental threat to 
     the stability of the Middle East and to American security at 
     home and abroad. Iran's actions have led directly to the 
     deaths of over six hundred U.S. military personnel in Iraq, 
     untold suffering in Syria, and significant threats to Israeli 
     security. In Yemen, Iran helps fuel a conflict creating the 
     world's greatest humanitarian crisis. Iran directed repeated 
     attacks on civilian and military infrastructure in Saudi 
     Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by Iranian-designed 
     explosives-laden drones and ballistic missiles fired by the 
     Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, who receive financial, 
     technical, and materiel support from Iran.
       (U) Current threat reporting indicates Iran engages in 
     preparations for further malign activities throughout the 
     Middle East region, including potential targeting of U.S. and 
     allied military forces in the region. As the Administration 
     publicly noted and briefed to Congress in greater detail in 
     the appropriate setting, a number of troubling and escalatory 
     indications and warnings from the Iranian regime have 
     prompted an increased U.S. force posture in the region. The 
     Iran-backed Houthis publicly threatened to increase 
     operations targeting vital military targets in the United 
     Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition 
     positions in Yemen. The rapidly-evolving security situation 
     in the region requires an accelerated delivery of certain 
     capabilities to U.S. partners in the region.
       (U) As President Trump noted in National Security 
     Memorandum 11 of May 8, 2018, ``the actions and policies of 
     the Government of Iran, including its proliferation and 
     development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional 
     weapons capabilities, its network and campaign of regional 
     aggression, its support for terrorist groups, and the malign 
     activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its 
     surrogates continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary 
     threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
     of the United States.''
       (U) Iran's actions pose a critical threat to regional 
     stability and the national security of the United States, 
     which has been long acknowledged. Since 1984, Iran remains 
     designated by the United States as a State Sponsor of 
     Terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export 
     Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. In 
     addition, the recent designation of Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist 
     Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act notes the Government of Iran, through the 
     IRGC-Quds Force, provides material support

[[Page S3204]]

     to the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian 
     Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
     Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran is also identified 
     as constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
     national security, foreign policy and economy of the United 
     States under Executive Orders dating back to the Carter and 
     Clinton Administrations.
       (U) In 2014, the Houthis, an Iran-supported force 
     increasingly contributing to the Iranian regime's efforts to 
     destabilize the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to overthrow the 
     internationally recognized government of Yemen. The Houthis 
     have greatly increased regional instability, threatened the 
     global economy, destroyed infrastructure, and terrorized the 
     Yemeni people.
       (U) The Houthis have attacked civilian areas within Saudi 
     Arabia and the UAE with ballistic missile and unmanned aerial 
     vehicle attacks in addition to cross-border raids; these have 
     resulted in the deaths of over five hundred Saudi civilians, 
     and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was fortunate in 2017 to have 
     intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at Mecca which could 
     have led to a regional conflagration.
       (U) The Houthi threat to stability extends beyond the 
     security of their immediate neighbors. Over 10% of global 
     shipping passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb straits separating 
     Yemen from Africa, including an estimated 4.8 million barrels 
     of oil per day, or about 5% of the global oil trade. Since 
     2016, the Houthis have repeatedly targeted international 
     shipping transiting these straits to or from the Suez Canal. 
     Houthi-controlled media recently announced the Houthis' 
     intent to target Saudi ARAMCO infrastructure. Utilizing anti-
     ship cruise missiles, small boat attacks, and remote-
     controlled explosive vessels, the Houthis continue to strike 
     not only commercial oil tankers, but also struck a cargo ship 
     carrying grain to a Yemeni port. The Houthis conducted 
     maritime attacks on the USS Mason and the USS Ponce, 
     demonstrating the direct nature of the Houthi threat to U.S. 
     personnel, assets, and our national security.
       (U) Within Yemen, the Houthis severely limited the ability 
     of the international community to provide humanitarian 
     assistance to the population under their control. 
     International humanitarian organizations report the ``Houthi 
     forces' widespread use of landmines along Yemen's western 
     coast since mid-2017 has killed and injured hundreds of 
     civilians and prevented aid groups from reaching vulnerable 
     communities.'' Despite the humanitarian catastrophe, the 
     Houthis continue to escalate the conflict in Yemen, most 
     recently disregarding their own commitments under the UN-
     sponsored ceasefire deal regarding the port city of Hudaydah.
       (U) The United States strongly backs peace efforts brokered 
     by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Griffiths' painstaking 
     endeavor to have parties reach agreements in peace talks in 
     Sweden in 2018 would lay a solid track for a political 
     process to end the conflict.
       (U) For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists 
     requiring immediate provision of certain defense systems to 
     Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan in the 
     national security interest of the United States. Such 
     transfers, whether provided via the Foreign Military Sales 
     system, or through the licensing of Direct Commercial Sales, 
     must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further 
     Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle 
     East. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an 
     emergency exists under sections 36(b)(l), 36(c)(2), and 
     36(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, 
     thereby waiving the congressional review requirements of 
     those provisions.


                         Transmittal No. 17-0B

     Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology 
         or Capability (Sec. 36(8)(5)(C), AECA)
       (i) Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates 
     (UAE).
       (ii) Sec. 36(b)(l), AECA Transmittal No.: 16-15.
       Date: 8 December 2016.
       Military Department: Army.
       (iii) Description: On December 8, 2016, Congress was 
     notified by Congressional certification transmittal number 
     16-15 of the possible sale under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms 
     Export Control Act of twenty-eight (28) AH-64E Remanufactured 
     Apache Attack Helicopters; nine (9) new AH-64E Apache Attack 
     Helicopters; seventy-six (76) T700-GE-701D Engines (56 
     remanufactured, 18 new, 2 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ASQ-
     170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/
     AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (28 
     remanufactured, 9 new, 2 spares); thirty-two (32) 
     remanufactured AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency 
     Interferometers; forty-six (46) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning 
     Systems (31 remanufactured, 9 new, 6 spares); eighty-eight 
     (88) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial 
     Navigation (72 new, 16 spares); forty-four (44) Manned-
     Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMTi) systems (28 
     remanufactured, 9 new, 7 spares); and fifteen (15) new MUMTi 
     System Upper Receivers, training devices, helmets, 
     simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles and 
     organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support 
     equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and 
     publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. 
     government and contractor engineering, technical, and 
     logistics support services, and other related elements of 
     logistics support. The estimated cost was $3.5 billion. Major 
     Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted $1.68 billion of this 
     total.
       This transmittal reports:
       1. the addition of thirty (30) Radar Electronic Units (REU) 
     as MDE, which were included in the total value of the 
     original transmittal, but were not properly identified as 
     MDE; and
       2. the inclusion of additional quantities of the following 
     items: one (1) new AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter, six (6) 
     T700-GE-701D engines (2 installed, 4 spares), one (1) new AN/
     ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/
     AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensor, one (1) new 
     AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System, sixty-two (62) Embedded 
     Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGIs) 
     (60 remanufactured, 2 new), and one (1) new Manned-Unmanned 
     Teaming-International (MUMTi) system. The total MDE value of 
     these items is $101,518,591. The addition will not add to the 
     total notified value of MDE, which will remain $1.68 billion. 
     The total notified case value will remain $3.5 billion.
       (iv) Significance: This notification is being provided to 
     report the inclusion of MDE and non-MDE items that were not 
     included in the original notification. The UAE lost a 
     helicopter during recent operations and has requested to 
     replace this loss.
       (v) Justification: The Secretary of State has determined 
     and provided detailed justification that an emergency exists 
     that requires the immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates 
     of the above defense articles (and defense services) in the 
     national security interests of the United States, thereby 
     waiving the Congressional review requirements under Section 
     36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. This 
     equipment will support the capabilities of UAE's Apache fleet 
     and enhance interoperability with the United States.
       (vi) Sensitivity of Technology: The AH-64E Apache Attack 
     Helicopter weapon system contains communications and target 
     identification equipment, navigation equipment, aircraft 
     survivability equipment, displays, and sensors. The airframe 
     itself does not contain sensitive technology; however, the 
     pertinent equipment listed below will be either installed on 
     the aircraft or included in the sale:
       a. The Radar Electronic Unit (REU) is a component upgrade 
     to the AN/APO-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR). The REU replaces 
     two legacy Line Replaceable Units (Programmable Signal 
     Processor and Low Power Radio Frequency), achieving a weight 
     reduction of approximately 85 pounds, with improved 
     reliability, increased processing power, growth for new 
     modes/capabilities and replacement of obsolete components. 
     Critical system information is stored in the FCR/REU in the 
     form of mission executable code, target detection, 
     classification algorithms and coded threat parametric. This 
     information is provided in a form that cannot be extracted by 
     the foreign user via anti-tamper provisions built into the 
     system.
       b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low 
     probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined 
     with a passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency 
     Interferometer (M-RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast. 
     The FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies 
     and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks 
     and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering 
     helicopters, helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in normal 
     flight. If desired, the radar data can be used to refer 
     targets to the regular electro-optical Modernized Target 
     Acquisition and Designation Sight (MTADS). This information 
     is provided in a form that cannot be extracted by the foreign 
     user. The content of these items is classified SECRET. User 
     Data Module (UDM) on the RFI processor, contains the Radio 
     Frequency threat library. The UDM, which is a hardware 
     assemblage, is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with 
     threat parameters, threat priorities and/or techniques 
     derived from U.S. intelligence information.
       c. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and 
     Designation Sight/AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/
     PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather target 
     information, as well as night navigation capabilities. The 
     PNVS provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-earth 
     flight to, from, and within the battle area, while TADS 
     provides the co-pilot gunner with search, detection, 
     recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics 
     (DVO), EI2 television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) 
     sighting systems that may be used singularly or in 
     combinations. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. Technical manuals for 
     authorized maintenance levels are UNCLASSIFIED. Reverse 
     engineering is not a major concern.
       d. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects 
     energy emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates 
     potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares 
     validity of threat and selects appropriate countermeasures. 
     The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), 
     Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and 
     Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware 
     is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for 
     operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
       e. The Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial 
     Navigation System plus Multi-Mode Receiver (EGI+MMR) The 
     aircraft has

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     two EGIs which use internal accelerometers, rate gyro 
     measurements, and external sensor measurements to estimate 
     the aircraft state, provides aircraft flight and position 
     data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-aided, strap 
     down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The EGI unit 
     houses a GPS receiver. The receiver is capable of operating 
     in either non-encrypted or encrypted. When keyed, the GPS 
     receiver will automatically use anti-spoof/jam capabilities 
     when they are in use. The EGI will retain the key through 
     power on/off/on cycles. Because of safeguards built into the 
     EGI, it is not considered classified when keyed. Integrated 
     within the EGI is an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) for 
     processing functions. Each EGI also houses a Multi-Mode 
     Receiver (MMR). The MMR is incorporated to provide for 
     reception of ground based NAVAID signals for instrument aided 
     flight. Provides IMC I IFR integration and certification of 
     improved Embedded Global Positioning System and Inertial 
     (EGI) unit, with attached MMR, with specific cockpit 
     instrumentation allows Apaches to operate within the 
     worldwide IFR route structure. Also includes integration of 
     the Common Army Aviation Map (CAAM), Area Navigation (RNAV), 
     Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) and 
     Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) compliance.
       f. Manned-Unmanned Teaming-International (MUMT-I) provides 
     Manned-Unmanned Teaming with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), 
     other Apaches and other interoperable aircraft and land 
     platforms. Provides ability to display real-time UAS sensor 
     information to aircraft and transmit MTADS video. Capability 
     to receive video and metadata from Interoperability Profile 
     compliant (IOP) as well as legacy systems. It is a data link 
     for the AH-64E that provides a fully integrated multiband, 
     interoperable capability that allows pilots to receive off-
     board sensor video streaming from different platforms in non-
     Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) bands. The MUMT-I data link 
     can retransmit UAS or Apache Modernized Target Acquisition 
     Designation Sight full-motion sensor video and metadata to 
     another MUMT-I-equipped Apache. It can also transmit to 
     ground forces equipped with the One Station Remote Video 
     Terminal. It provides Apache aircrews with increased 
     situational awareness and net-centric interoperability while 
     significantly reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines. This 
     combination results in increased survivability of Apache 
     aircrews and ground forces by decreasing their exposure to 
     hostile fire.
       (vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.


                         Transmittal No. 17-39

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: United Arab Emirates.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment * $35 million.
       Other $45 million.
       Total $80 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
       Twenty (20) RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs).
       Non-MDE: This request also includes the following Non-MDE: 
     Forty (40) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with Selective 
     Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Type II (MPE-S), 
     air vehicle support equipment to include eight (8) Ground 
     Control Stations (GCS), four (4) launchers, and four (4) 
     retrievers, spare and repair parts, publications, training 
     and technical support services.
       (iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-SAW).
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached 
     Annex.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       * As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          policy justification

   United Arab Emirates (UAE)--RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles

       The Government of the UAE has requested to buy twenty (20) 
     RQ-21A Blackjack Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). Also included 
     are forty (40) Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with 
     Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Type II 
     (MPE-S); air vehicle support equipment including eight (8) 
     Ground Control Stations (GCS), four (4) launchers, and four 
     (4) retrievers; spare and repair parts; publications; 
     training; and technical support services. The estimated total 
     case value is $80 million.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign and 
     national security of the United States by improving the 
     security of an important ally in the Middle East. This sale 
     is consistent with U.S. national security objectives of 
     assisting the UAE in developing and maintaining a strong and 
     ready self-defense capability and enhancing interoperability 
     with U.S. forces. The UAE will have no difficulty absorbing 
     these UAVs into its armed forces.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The prime contractor will be Insitu, Bingen, WA, a wholly 
     owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company. There are no known 
     offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential 
     sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple 
     trips by U.S. Government and contractor representatives to 
     participate in program and technical reviews plus training 
     and maintenance support in country, on a temporary basis, for 
     a period of twenty-four (24) months. It will also require one 
     (1) contractor representative to reside in country for a 
     period of two (2) years to support this program.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 17-39

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act

                           Annex Item No. vii

       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
        1. The following components and technical documentation 
     for the program are classified as listed below:
       a. The RQ-21 unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is a runway-
     independent, modular unmanned aircraft system that is 
     designed for a variety of missions. The RQ-21 UAS has four 
     subsystems: RQ-21A air vehicle (AV), launcher, retriever, and 
     ground control stations (GCS).
        1) The RQ-2IA AV is a fixed-wing, single engine AV 
     remotely controlled by an operator via the GCS.
        2) The launcher is a pneumatically-controlled launch 
     device that accelerates the RQ-2IA AV to flying speed.
        3) The retriever is a hydraulically-controlled telescoping 
     crane that captures the RQ-21A AV at the end of the flight.
        4) The GCS is a workstation that is used to plan missions, 
     control and monitor the RQ-21A AV, and manage the data 
     received from the air vehicle.
       b. The RQ-21 UAS is capable of transport via ground, air, 
     or ship. The RQ-21 UAS performs a wide variety of 
     reconnaissance, intelligence, and special missions. 
     Operationally or tactically vital data may be obtained cost-
     effectively by exploiting the UAS mission systems and payload 
     options. The RQ-21A AV is designed to perform air 
     reconnaissance (AR) based missions. It is equipped to carry a 
     forward turret to support the primary mission of 
     reconnaissance and an assortment of specialized, mission 
     specific, payloads within the center payload bay. The Electro 
     Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Imager Counter Countermeasures 
     sensor ball is the Alticam 11 EOIR4, which provides 
     exceptional day/night capability in a small, lightweight, low 
     power solution, or the EOIR5 which adds a laser designator 
     capability. It uses mid-wave infrared (MWIR) electro-optical 
     image, a gyrostabilized gimbal system, has multiple operating 
     modes, is compatible with the Alticam video processing board 
     (AVS), and has a laser pointer and rangefinder. It is 
     designed for small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and is 
     also used on piloted airplanes, blimps, ground vehicles, and 
     unmanned surface vehicles.
       c. The imagery and electronic reconnaissance functions of 
     the RQ-21A AV support intelligence functions and operational 
     warfighting missions. Intelligence-based support functions 
     range from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
     (ISR) to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) 
     including imagery associated sub-tasks. Operational functions 
     are enhanced by a laser rangefinder and infrared marking 
     system. The turret, with laser system, facilitates target 
     acquisition and terminal guidance operations in support of a 
     wide breadth of aviation support to MAGTF operations mission. 
     These include but are not limited to point, area, and route 
     reconnaissance; convoy escort; call for indirect fires; 
     battle damage assessment; and tactical recovery of aircraft 
     and personnel. The aircraft also passively supports radio 
     communications relay and the vessel traffic function of 
     automatic identification.
       d. The GCS includes an operator work station (OWS), a 
     ground data terminal for C2 communication and video downlink, 
     and a GPS electronics module (GEM) integration kit for 
     navigation. The GCS is composed of a standard component 
     package. If installed on a ship, the GCS will be composed of 
     the same components as the land based system, but the number 
     and arrangement of each of the components will vary depending 
     on the specific class of ship on which the GCS is installed. 
     The RQ-21 GCS is comprised of the following components:
        1) Two operator work stations. The OWS consist of four 
     modules: electronics power module (EPM), network computer 
     module (NCM), user interface module (UIM), and the data 
     storage module (DSM). The EPM provides the power source for 
     the GCS. The EPM is the bottom module in the OWS. The UIM is 
     not installed in the GCS for ship-based operations.
        2) Ground data terminal. The GDT includes the antenna 
     interface module (AIM), directional antenna, and omni 
     antennas (for ship-board operations only). The AIM models are 
     different between land and ship-based configurations.

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        3) GEM integration kit. The GEM integration kit includes 
     the GEM itself and the ground GPS antenna.
        4) Moving platform module (MPM) integration kit (ship-
     based only).
        5) Selective availability and anti-spoofing module (SAASM) 
     GPS antenna.
        6) Systems check laptop.
        7) GCS cables.
       e. The launcher provides the initial RQ-21A AV speed 
     required for air vehicle flight over a wide range of wind and 
     density altitude conditions, and enables expeditionary 
     employment of the UAS in locations without suitable runways. 
     The launcher is designed for transport by air, ship, or towed 
     by light vehicles into rugged terrain. The launcher is made 
     up of the launcher core and systems and the accessory 
     components. The launcher core is attached lengthwise on the 
     launcher trailer deck at two interface towers. The trailer is 
     used to transport the launcher components and serves as a 
     platform for the launcher core and systems.
       f. The retriever system is comprised of the recovery system 
     and trailer. The recovery system is a hydraulically-
     controlled telescoping crane mast that uses a vertical 
     capture rope to catch the RQ-21A AV. The vertical capture 
     rope features a bungee and rope energy dissipation system. 
     The retriever is mounted to a modified MIL-STD trailer 
     chassis. The trailer frame and hitch assembly connects the 
     retriever to a towing vehicle. The trailer has one axle and 
     four outriggers that are installed for use.
       g. While no part of the RQ-21A UAS is itself classified, 
     the following performance data and technical characteristics 
     are classified as annotated:
       RQ-21 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
       GPS P/Y Code navigation equipment: SECRET when keyed.
       UAS Susceptibility to Jamming: SECRET.
       UAS TEMPEST Characteristics: SECRET.
       UAS Vulnerabilities: SECRET.
       UAS Survivability: SECRET.
       UAS Radar Cross Section: Up to SECRET.
       UAS Infrared Signature: SECRET.
       UAS Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Vulnerability: 
     SECRET.
       UAS Threat Data: SECRET.
       Communications Relay Tactical Employment: CONFIDENTIAL.
       Electro Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Imager Counter 
     Countermeasures: SECRET.
       EO/IR Imager Operational Characteristics: Up to SECRET.
       Automatic Information System Vulnerabilities: SECRET.
       2. If a technologically advanced adversary obtains 
     knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the 
     information could be used to develop countermeasures or 
     equivalent systems that might reduce weapon system 
     effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with 
     similar or advanced capabilities.
       3. A determination has been made that the United Arab 
     Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of 
     protection for the sensitive technology being released as the 
     U.S. Government. This proposed sale of the RQ-21 UAS and 
     associated equipment is necessary to the furtherance of the 
     U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined 
     in the policy justification.
       4. All defense articles and services listed in this 
     transmittal are authorized for release and export to the 
     Government of the United Arab Emirates.


                         Transmittal No. 17-70

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab 
     Emirates.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment * $92 million.
       Other $10 million.
       Total $102 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
       Three hundred thirty-one (331) Javelin Guided Missiles with 
     Containers.
       Non-MDE: Also included are System Integration & Checkout 
     (SICO) service; Field Service Representative; U.S. Government 
     and contractor technical, engineering and logistics support 
     services' tools and test equipment; support equipment; 
     publications and technical documentation; spare and repair 
     parts; and other related elements of logistics and program 
     support.
       (iv) Military Department: Army (AE-B-ZAO, Amendment 3).
       (v) Prior Related Cases. if any: AE-B-ZUB.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee. etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached 
     Annex.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       * As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

   UAE--JaVELIN Guided Missiles and Associated Materiel and Services

       The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has 
     requested to buy three hundred thirty-one (331) Javelin 
     Guided Missiles with container. Also included are System 
     Integration & Checkout (SICO) service; Field Service 
     Representative; U.S. Government and contractor technical, 
     engineering and logistics support services' tools and test 
     equipment; support equipment; publications and technical 
     documentation; spare and repair parts; and other related 
     elements of logistics and program support. The estimated 
     total case value is $102 million.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy 
     and national security of the United States by improving the 
     security of an important partner that has been, and continues 
     to be, a force for political stability and economic progress 
     in the Middle East. This sale is consistent with U.S. 
     initiatives to provide key partners in the region with modem 
     systems that will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces 
     and increase security.
       The proposed program will enhance the UAE's capability to 
     meet current and future enemy threats. The UAE will use the 
     capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to 
     strengthen its homeland defense. The UAE previously procured 
     Javelin missiles and will have no difficulty absorbing these 
     additional missiles into its armed forces.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The prime contractor will be is Raytheon, Tucson, AZ. There 
     are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with 
     this potential sale.
       Implementation of this proposed program will not require 
     additional Contractor or U.S. Government personnel in country 
     for an extended period of time.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 17-70

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act

                           Annex Item No. vii

       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
       1. The Javelin Weapon System is a medium-range, man 
     portable, shoulder-launched, fire and forget, anti-tank 
     system for infantry, scouts, and combat engineers. It may 
     also be mounted on a variety of platforms including vehicles, 
     aircraft and watercraft. The system weighs 49.5 pounds and 
     has a maximum range in excess of 2,500 meters. The system is 
     highly lethal against tanks and other systems with 
     conventional and reactive armors, The system possesses a 
     secondary capability against bunkers.
       2. Javelin's key technical feature is the use of fire-and-
     forget technology which allows the gunner to fire and 
     immediately relocate or take cover. Additional special 
     features are the top attack and/or direct fire modes, an 
     advanced tandem warhead and imaging infrared seeker, target 
     lock-on before launch, and soft launch from enclosures or 
     covered fighting positions. The Javelin missile also has a 
     minimum smoke motor thus decreasing its detection on the 
     battlefield.
       3. The Javelin Weapon System is comprised of two major 
     tactical components, which are a reusable Command Launch Unit 
     (CLU) and a round contained in a disposable launch tube 
     assembly. The CLU incorporates an integrated day-night sight 
     that provides a target engagement capability in adverse 
     weather and countermeasure environments. The CLU may also be 
     used in a stand-alone mode for battlefield surveillance and 
     target detection. The CLU's thermal sight is a second 
     generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor. To 
     facilitate initial loading and subsequent updating of 
     software, all on-board missile software is uploaded via the 
     CLU after mating and prior to launch.
       4. The missile is autonomously guided to the target using 
     an imaging infrared seeker and adaptive correlation tracking 
     algorithms. This allows the gunner to take cover or reload 
     and engage another target after firing a missile. The missile 
     has an advanced tandem warhead and can be used in either the 
     top attack or direct fire modes (for target undercover). An 
     onboard flight computer guides the missile to the selected 
     target.
       5. The Javelin Missile System hardware and the 
     documentation are UNCLASSIFIED. The missile software which 
     resides in the CLU is considered SENSITIVE. The sensitivity 
     is primarily in the software programs which instruct the 
     system how to operate in the presence of countermeasures. The 
     overall hardware is also considered sensitive in that the 
     infrared wavelengths could be useful in attempted 
     countermeasure development.
       6. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain 
     knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used 
     to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system 
     effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with 
     similar or advanced capabilities.
       7. A determination has been made that the United Arab 
     Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of 
     protection for sensitive technology being released as the 
     U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is 
     necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives outlined in the policy 
     justification.
       8. All defense articles and services listed in this 
     transmittal are authorized for release and export to the 
     Government of United Arab Emirates.

[[Page S3207]]

  



                          Transmittal No. 17-73

      Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab 
     Emirates.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment * $850 million.
       Other $50 million.
       Total $900 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
       Twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced Precision Kill 
     Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds.
       Non-MDE: Also included is weapon support and test 
     equipment, spares, technical publications, personnel 
     training, other training equipment, transportation, U.S. 
     Government and contractor engineering, technical and 
     logistics support services, and other related elements of 
     logistical and program support.
       (iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-ABL).
        (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AE-P-ABH (P&A) and AE-P-
     ABI (P&A).
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached 
     Annex.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

   United Arab Emirates (UAE)--Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System 
                                (APKWS)

       The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested a 
     possible sale of twenty thousand four (20,004) Advanced 
     Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) II All-Up-Rounds. Also 
     included is weapon support and test equipment, spares, 
     technical publications, personnel training, other training 
     equipment, transportation, U.S. Government and contractor 
     engineering, technical and logistics support services, and 
     other related elements of logistical and program support. The 
     estimated total case value is $900 million.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy 
     and national security of the United States by improving the 
     security of an important partner in the region. This sale is 
     consistent with U.S. initiatives to provide key partners in 
     the region with modern systems that will enhance 
     interoperability with U.S. forces and increase security.
       The APKWS will provide the UAE with flexibility in the use 
     of proportional, precision fires when operating in remote and 
     mountainous regions as well as populated areas. The APKWS 
     will complement the Hellfire II missile as a secondary 
     precision munition with lower collateral damage potential. 
     These aspects make the APKWS, employed in conjunction with 
     UAE's multiple types of helicopters and Hellfire II missiles, 
     an appropriate munition for the UAE's counterterrorism 
     operations. UAE will have no difficulty absorbing the APKWS 
     into its armed forces.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The prime contractor will be BAE Systems, Nashua, NH. There 
     are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with 
     this potential sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require up to 20 
     U.S. Government and up to 30 contractor representatives to 
     travel to UAE.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 17-73

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act

                           Annex Item No. vii

       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
       1. The APKWS II All-Up-Round (AUR) is an air-to-ground 
     weapon that consists of an APKWS II Guidance Section (GS), 
     legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor and legacy MK152, 
     MK282 and MK435/436 warhead/fuze. The APKWS II GS is 
     installed between the rocket motor and warhead and provides a 
     Semi-Active Laser (SAL) precision capability to legacy 
     unguided 2.75-inch rockets. The APKWS II is procured as an 
     independent component to be mated to the appropriate 2.75-
     inch warhead/fuze. The GS is manually set with the 
     appropriate laser code during loading and is launched from 
     any platform configured with a LAU-68F/A, or similar 
     launcher(s). After launch, the GS activates and the seeker 
     detects laser energy reflected from a target designated with 
     a remote or autonomous laser. The control system then guides 
     the rocket to the target. The only interface required with 
     the host platform is a 28V direct current (DC) firing pulse.
       2. APKWS II increases stowed kills by providing precise 
     engagements at standoff ranges with sufficient accuracy for a 
     high single-shot probability of hit against soft and lightly 
     armored targets, thereby minimizing collateral damage. The 
     APKWS II is capable of day and night operation and 
     performance in many adverse environments.
       3. The APKWS II requires no depot maintenance. Activities 
     to prepare the APKWS II for use include setting the laser 
     code switches, turning on the Electronic Thermal Battery 
     Initiator, and loading the AUR into the launcher. Wing Slot 
     Seals (WSS) may be replaced, if necessary, at an I-level 
     maintenance facility.
       4. All training for APKWS II is unclassified. The training 
     required is:
       a. Pilot training to effectively employ the APKWS II,
       b. Ordnance Handler training for safe handling and 
     preparation of the APKWS II and AUR, and
       c. Maintenance training for replacement of WSS.
       5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain 
     knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used 
     to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system 
     effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with 
     similar or advanced capabilities.
       6. A determination has been made that the United Arab 
     Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of 
     protection for sensitive technology being released as the 
     U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is 
     necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives outlined in the policy 
     justification.
       7. All defense articles and services listed in this 
     transmittal are authorized for release and export to the 
     Government of the United Arab Emirates.


                         Transmittal No. 18-21

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment * $0 million.
       Other $800 million.
       Total $800 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None
       Non-MDE: Follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air 
     Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; publications and 
     technical documentation; support equipment; spare and repair 
     parts; repair and return; calibration support and test 
     equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. Government and 
     contractor technical and logistics support, and other related 
     elements of program support. Equipment and spares will be 
     procured for support of, but not limited to, F-5, RG-5, F-15, 
     C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft.
       (iv) Military Department: Air Force (QAH).
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: FMS Case QAY-$100,000,000-
     05 June 2010 and QAY Amendment 7-$739,508,525-30 October 
     2016.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       * As defined in Section 471(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

 Saudi Arabia--Follow-on Support and Services for the Royal Saudi Air 
                             Force Aircraft

       Saudi Arabia has requested to purchase follow-on support 
     and services for Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and 
     weapons; publications and technical documentation; support 
     equipment; spare and repair parts; repair and return; 
     calibration support and test equipment; personnel equipment; 
     U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics 
     support, and other related elements of program support. 
     Equipment and spares will be procured for support of, but not 
     limited to, F-5, RG-5, F-15, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and 
     KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost will be $800 
     million.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives by helping to improve the 
     security of a friendly country, which has been, and continues 
     to be, an important force for political stability and 
     economic growth in the Middle East. This potential sale is a 
     continuation of current support. Saudi Arabia will have no 
     difficulty absorbing this support and services into its armed 
     forces.
       Implementation of this sale will sustain Saudi Arabia's 
     flight and maintenance activity. It will improve 
     sustainability and continue support for the fleet.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       There will be various contractors associated with the 
     equipment involved with this case, and there is no prime 
     contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in 
     connection with this potential sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require the 
     assignment of a small number of additional U.S. Government or 
     contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia for maintenance, 
     training, and sustainment.

[[Page S3208]]

       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 18-31

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment * $0 million.
       Other $136 million.
       Total $136 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MOE): None.
       Non-MOE: Continued spare and repair parts, U.S. Government 
     and Contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support 
     services, and other related elements of program support for 
     the TASS (Tactical Air Surveillance System) aircraft program. 
     Additionally, the sale will support the rehabilitation of the 
     integrated lab located in the United States used for testing 
     and troubleshooting.
       (iv) Military Department: Air Force (SR-D-QDJ).
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-D-QAS, SR-D-QCH.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       * As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia--Sustainment Support for Tactical Air Surveillance System 
                                 (TASS)

       Saudi Arabia has requested to purchase spare and repair 
     parts, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, 
     and logistics support services, and other related elements of 
     program support for their TASS (Tactical Air Surveillance 
     System) aircraft program. Additionally, the sale will support 
     rehabilitation of the integrated lab located in the United 
     States used for testing and troubleshooting. The total 
     estimated program cost will be $136 million.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and 
     national security of the United States by helping to improve 
     the security of a key regional ally which is an important 
     force for political stability and economic progress in the 
     Middle East.
       The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia's surveillance 
     capability to counter current and future regional threats and 
     strengthen its homeland defense. This is a continuation of a 
     previous sustainment case and Saudi Arabia will have no 
     difficulty absorbing addition support in country.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The prime contractor will be L3 Technologies, Greenville, 
     Texas. There are no known offsets proposed with this sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require the 
     assignment of up to 25 additional L3 contractor 
     representatives to Saudi Arabia.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 19-18

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab 
     Emirates.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment* $0 million.
       Other $100 million.
       Total $100 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MOE): None.
       Non-MDE: Follow-on blanket order U.S. Marine Corps 
     training, training support, and other training related 
     services in support of the United Arab Emirates Presidential 
     Guard Command.
       (iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-TAM).
       (v) Prior Related Cases. if any: AE-P-TAM.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee. etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       * As defined in Section 47
       (6) of the Arms Export Control Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

      United Arab Emirates (UAE)--Follow-On Blanket Order Training

       The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has 
     requested follow-on blanket order U.S. Marine Corps training, 
     training support, and other training related services in 
     support of the UAE Presidential Guard Command. The total 
     value for this sale is $100 million.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the United Arab Emirates of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy 
     and national security of the United States by helping to 
     improve the security of an important partner in the region.
       The proposed sale will provide the continuation of U.S. 
     Marine Corps training of the UAE's Presidential Guard for 
     counterterrorism, counter-piracy, critical infrastructure 
     protection, and national defense. This training also provides 
     engagement opportunities through military exercises, 
     training, and common equipment. UAE will have no difficulty 
     absorbing this training.
       The proposed sale of training will not alter the basic 
     military balance in the region.
       There will be no principal contractor associated with this 
     proposed sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed 
     in connection with this potential sale.
       Implementation of this proposed amendment to a current sale 
     will allow for the continued permanent assignment of thirty-
     four (34) U.S. Marine Corps active duty personnel to the UAE.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 19-01

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
       Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment* $0 billion.
       Other $1.8 billion.
       Total $1.8 billion.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None.
       Non-MDE: Follow-on logistics support and services for the 
     Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, engines, and weapons; 
     publications and technical documentation; support equipment; 
     spare and repair parts; repair and return; calibration 
     support and test equipment; personnel equipment; U.S. 
     Government and contractor technical and logistics support, 
     and other related elements of program support. Equipment and 
     spares will be procured for support of, but not limited to, 
     F-5, F-15, KA-350, C-130, KC-130, E-3, RE-3, and KE-3 
     aircraft. The total estimated program cost is $1.8 billion.
       (iv) Militarv Department: Air Force.
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-D-QAY, SR-D-QDE, SR-D-
     QBO, SR-D-QBD, SR-D-QBI, SR-D-QDF, SR-D-QAH.
       (vi) Sales Commission. Fee, etc., Paid, Offered. or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 24, 2019.
       * As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

         Saudi Arabia--Follow-on Logistics Support and Services

       Saudi Arabia has requested to buy follow-on logistics 
     support and services for the Royal Saudi Air Force aircraft, 
     engines, and weapons; publications and technical 
     documentation; support equipment; spare and repair parts; 
     repair and return; calibration support and test equipment; 
     personnel equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical 
     and logistics support, and other related elements of program 
     support. Equipment and spares will be procured for support 
     of, but not limited to, F-5, F-15, KA-350, C-130, KC-130, E-
     3, RE-3, and KE-3 aircraft. The total estimated program cost 
     will be $1.8 billion.
       The Secretary of State has determined and provided detailed 
     justification that an emergency exists that requires the 
     immediate sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of the above 
     defense articles (and defense services) in the national 
     security interests of the United States, thereby waiving the 
     Congressional review requirements under Section 36(b) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act, as amended.
       This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives by helping to improve the 
     security of a friendly country that continues to be an 
     important force for political stability and economic growth 
     in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty 
     absorbing this support and services into its armed forces.
       The proposed sale will sustain Saudi Arabia's operations 
     and maintenance activity, improve sustainability and ensure 
     capability for near and long term air operations across the 
     fleet.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       There will be various contractors associated with the 
     equipment involved with this case, and there is no prime 
     contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in 
     connection with this potential sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require the 
     assignment of a small number of additional U.S. Government or 
     contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia for maintenance, 
     training, and sustainment.

[[Page S3209]]

       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.

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