[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 79 (Monday, May 13, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2780-S2782]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION
Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification,
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received.
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations
Committee, room SD-423.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Defense Security
Cooperation Agency,
Arlington, VA.
Hon. James E. Risch,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements
of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-14
concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and
Acceptance to the Government of Qatar for defense articles
and services estimated to cost $3.0 billion. After this
letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news
release to notify the public of this proposed sale.
Sincerely,
Gregory M. Kausner,
(For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
General, USA, Director).
Enclosures.
Transmittal No. 19-14
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $1.90 billion.
Other $1.10 billion.
Total $3.00 billion.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Twenty-four (24) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters.
Fifty-two (52) T700-GE-701D Engines (2 per aircraft, 4
spares).
Twenty-six (26) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition
and Designation Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares).
Twenty-six (26) AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision
Sensors (1 per aircraft, 2 spares).
Eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar
Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component).
Eight (8) AN/APR-48 Modernized-Radar Frequency
Interferometers (MRFI).
Twenty-nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System
(CMWS) (1 per aircraft, 5 spares).
Fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with
Inertial Navigation (EGI) (2 per aircraft, 10 spares).
Two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-114R Hellfire
Missiles.
Twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles
(CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare).
Non-MDE: Also included are twenty-eight (28) M230 30mm
automatic chain guns (1 per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B
laser detecting sets, AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets,
AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, M299 Hellfire missile
launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44
impulse cartridges, M206 and 211 countermeasure flares, M230
automatic guns and associated components, 2.75 inch rocket
launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and AN/ARC-201D radios with
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associated components, AN/APX-123 transponders, image
intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153 tactical airborne
navigation systems, chaff, spare and repair parts, support
equipment, training and training equipment, U.S. Government
and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support
services, and other related elements of logistics and program
support.
(iv) Military Department: Army (QA-B-WAG).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-WYX, QA-B-OAM, QA-B-
HAA.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 9, 2019.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Oatar--AH-64E Apache Helicopters with Spare Parts and Related Equipment
The Government of Qatar has requested to buy twenty-four
(24) AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters; fifty-two (52) T700-
GE-701D engines (2 per aircraft, 4 spares); twenty-six (26)
AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation
Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares); twenty-six (26) AN/
AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (1 per aircraft,
2 spare); eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with
Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component); eight (8) AN/APR-
48 Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); twenty-
nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (1
per aircraft, 5 spares); fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global
Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) (2 per
aircraft, 10 spares); two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-
114R Hellfire missiles; and twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive
Air Training Missiles (CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare). Also
included are twenty-eight (28) 30mm automatic chain guns (1
per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets, AN/
APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVS-6 Night Vision
Goggles, M299 Hellfire missile launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra
Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44 impulse cartridges, M206 and
211 countermeasure flares, M230 automatic guns and associated
components, 2.75 inch rocket launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and
AN/ARC-201D radios with associated components, AN/APX-123
transponders, image intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153
tactical airborne navigation systems, chaff, spare an repair
parts, support equipment, training and training equipment,
U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and
logistics support services, and other related elements of
logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $3.0
billion.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security of the United States by helping to improve
the security of a friendly country that continues to be an
important force for political and economic progress in the
Middle East. Qatar is host to the U.S. Central Command forces
and serves as a critical forward-deployed location in the
region. The acquisition of these helicopters will allow for
integration with U.S. forces for training exercises, which
contributes to regional security and interoperability.
The proposed sale of the AH-64E Apache helicopters will
supplement the Qatar Emiri Air Force's previous procurement
of twenty-four (24) AH-64Es, which are capable of meeting its
requirements for close air support, armed reconnaissance, and
anti-tank warfare missions. The helicopters will provide a
long-term defensive and offensive capability to the Qatar
peninsula as well as enhance the protection of key oil and
gas infrastructure and platforms. Qatar will have no
difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company, Mesa,
Arizona; Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, Florida;
General Electric, Cincinnati, Ohio; Lockheed Martin Mission
Systems and Sensors, Owego, New York; Longbow Limited
Liability Corporation, Orlando, Florida; Thales Corporation,
Paris, France; and Raytheon Corporation. There are no known
offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential
sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the
assignment of three (3) U.S. Government and five (5)
contractor representatives to Qatar to support delivery of
the Apache helicopters and provide support and equipment
familiarization. In addition, Qatar has expressed an interest
in expanding their planned Technical Assistance Fielding Team
for additional in-country pilot and maintenance training to
support this additional quantity of aircraft. To support the
requirement a team of twenty (20) personnel (up to three
military team members and 17 contractors) would be deployed
to Qatar for approximately three years.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 19-14
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system
contains communications and target identification equipment,
navigation equipment, aircraft survivability equipment,
displays, and sensors. The airframe itself does not contain
sensitive technology; however, the equipment listed below
will be either installed on the aircraft or included in the
sale and carries technology transfer significance. The
highest level of information that could be disclosed through
the sale of the Apache in the configuration proposed for sale
to Qatar is SECRET.
2. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low
probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined
with the AN/APR-48, a passive Radar Frequency Interferometer
(RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast. The FCR
Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes
stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks and mobile air
defense systems as well as hovering and moving helicopters
and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. The highest level
of information associated with the FCR and RFI is classified
SECRET.
3. The AN/ASQ-170, Modernized Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight (AN/AAQ-11), Modernized Pilot Night Vision
Sensor (M-TADS/M-PNVS) is an enhanced version of its
predecessor. It provides second generation day, night, and
limited adverse weather target information, as well as night
navigation capabilities. The M-PNVS provides second
generation thermal imaging that permits safer nap-of-the-
earth flight to, from, and within the battle area. The M-TADS
provides the co-pilot gunner with improved search, deletion,
recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics
(DVO), television, and second generation Forward Looking
Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems that may be used singularly
or in combinations. M-TAD/M-PNVS hardware is UNCLASSIFIED.
The technical manuals for authorized maintenance levels are
UNCLASSIFIED. Specific information related to effective
system performance parameters (e.g. range, accuracy, etc.) is
classified CONFIDENTIAL.
4. The AN/AAR-57(V)7, Common Missile Warning System detects
threat missiles in flight, evaluates potential false alarms,
declares validity of threat, and selects appropriate Infrared
Countermeasures (IRCM). It includes Electro Optical Missile
Sensors, Electronic Control Unit (ECU), Sequencer, and the
Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD) that consists of
the Dispenser Assembly and the Payload Module. The ICMD
dispenses decoy expendable objects (chaff, flares, etc.) to
confuse threat radar devices. In-country repair capability
will not be provided. Reverse engineering is not a major
concern. The hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is
not loaded. The software is classified SECRET.
5. The AN/APR-39, Radar Signal Detecting Set is designed to
operate on rotary wing and slow moving fixed wing aircraft to
detect, categorize, and prioritize pulse radio frequency
emitter illuminating the host platform to allow appropriate
countermeasures. This is the 1553 data bus compatible
configuration. In-country repair capability will not be
provided. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is not
loaded. The software is CONFIDENTIAL. The system can be
programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing
country.
6. The AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Set is a passive laser
warning system that receives processes, and displays threat
information resulting from aircraft illumination by laser
designators, rangefinders, and beamrider missile guidance
systems. The AN/AVR-2B uses the existing AN/APR-39A/D
interface for control status and crew warning. The threat
information is processed by the AN/APR-39 RSDS, displayed on
the aircraft multi-function display and announced by the AN/
APR-39 RSDS via the aircraft Inter Communication System. In-
country repair capability will not be provided. Reverse
engineering is not a major concern. The hardware is
classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
7. Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial
Navigation System (INS). GPS/INS utilize GPS satellite
signals to correct or calibrate a solution from an INS.
Inertial navigation systems usually can provide an accurate
solution only for short duration. The INS accelerometers
produce an unknown bias signal that appears as a genuine
specific force. The EGI is Selective Available Anti-Spoofing
Module (SAASM) based on navigation platform that combines an
inertia sensor for position information and is UNCLASSIFIED.
The GPS crypto variables need the highest GPS accuracy and
are classified up to SECRET.
8. The AGM-114R Hellfire missile is precision strike, Semi-
Active Laser (SAL) guided missile and is the principle air to
ground weapon for the AH-64 Apache. The SAL Hellfire missile
is guided by laser energy reflected off the target. It has
three warhead variants: a dual warhead, shape-charge, high
explosive anti-tank capability for armored targets, a blast
fragmentation warhead for urban patrol boat and other soft
targets and metal augmented charge warhead for urban
structures. AGM-114R allows selection of warhead effects
corresponding to a specific target type. Hardware for the
AGM-l14R is UNCLASSIFIED.
9. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R Hellfire
III missile is Secret, based upon the software. The highest
level of classified information that could be disclosed by a
proposed sale or by testing of the
[[Page S2782]]
end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be disclosed
for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL.
Reverse engineering could reveal confidential information.
Vulnerability data, countermeasures, vulnerability/
susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are
classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.
10. The M211-flare is a countermeasure decoy in a 1" x 1" x
8" form factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It consists of
case, piston, special material payload foils, and end cap.
The special material is a pyrophoric metal (iron) foil that
reacts with oxygen to generate infrared energy. The M211
decoys are dispersed from an aircraft to be used as a decoy
in combination with the currently fielded M206 and M212
countermeasure flares to protect against advanced air-to-air
and surface-to-air missile threats. The hardware is
Unclassified and releasable technical manuals for operation
and maintenance are classified SECRET.
11. The M36E9 Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) is a
Hellfire training missile (Non-NATO) that consists of a
functional guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus.
The missile has an operational semi-active laser seeker that
can search for and lock-on to laser designated targets for
pilot training, but it does not have a warhead or propulsion
section and cannot be launched.
12. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
13. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale
is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives outlined in the Policy
Justification.
14. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal are authorized for release and export to the
Government of Qatar.
____________________