[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 79 (Monday, May 13, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2780-S2782]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control 
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain 
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, 
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be 
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the 
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant 
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to 
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. 
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is 
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, room SD-423.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  Defense Security


                                           Cooperation Agency,

                                                    Arlington, VA.
     Hon. James E. Risch,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements 
     of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
     amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-14 
     concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and 
     Acceptance to the Government of Qatar for defense articles 
     and services estimated to cost $3.0 billion. After this 
     letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news 
     release to notify the public of this proposed sale.
           Sincerely,

                                           Gregory M. Kausner,

                                (For Charles W. Hooper, Lieutenant
                                          General, USA, Director).
       Enclosures.


                         Transmittal No. 19-14

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment* $1.90 billion.
       Other $1.10 billion.
       Total $3.00 billion.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
       Twenty-four (24) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters.
       Fifty-two (52) T700-GE-701D Engines (2 per aircraft, 4 
     spares).
       Twenty-six (26) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition 
     and Designation Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares).
       Twenty-six (26) AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision 
     Sensors (1 per aircraft, 2 spares).
       Eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar 
     Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component).
       Eight (8) AN/APR-48 Modernized-Radar Frequency 
     Interferometers (MRFI).
       Twenty-nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System 
     (CMWS) (1 per aircraft, 5 spares).
       Fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with 
     Inertial Navigation (EGI) (2 per aircraft, 10 spares).
       Two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-114R Hellfire 
     Missiles.
       Twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles 
     (CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare).
       Non-MDE: Also included are twenty-eight (28) M230 30mm 
     automatic chain guns (1 per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B 
     laser detecting sets, AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 
     AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Goggles, M299 Hellfire missile 
     launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44 
     impulse cartridges, M206 and 211 countermeasure flares, M230 
     automatic guns and associated components, 2.75 inch rocket 
     launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and AN/ARC-201D radios with

[[Page S2781]]

     associated components, AN/APX-123 transponders, image 
     intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153 tactical airborne 
     navigation systems, chaff, spare and repair parts, support 
     equipment, training and training equipment, U.S. Government 
     and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support 
     services, and other related elements of logistics and program 
     support.
       (iv) Military Department: Army (QA-B-WAG).
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-WYX, QA-B-OAM, QA-B-
     HAA.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached 
     Annex.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 9, 2019.
       *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Oatar--AH-64E Apache Helicopters with Spare Parts and Related Equipment

       The Government of Qatar has requested to buy twenty-four 
     (24) AH-64E Apache Attack helicopters; fifty-two (52) T700-
     GE-701D engines (2 per aircraft, 4 spares); twenty-six (26) 
     AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation 
     Sight (MTADS) (1 per aircraft, 2 spares); twenty-six (26) AN/
     AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (1 per aircraft, 
     2 spare); eight (8) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with 
     Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component); eight (8) AN/APR-
     48 Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); twenty-
     nine (29) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) (1 
     per aircraft, 5 spares); fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global 
     Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) (2 per 
     aircraft, 10 spares); two thousand five hundred (2,500) AGM-
     114R Hellfire missiles; and twenty-five (25) Hellfire Captive 
     Air Training Missiles (CATM) (1 per aircraft, 1 spare). Also 
     included are twenty-eight (28) 30mm automatic chain guns (1 
     per aircraft, 4 spares), AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets, AN/
     APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, AN/AVS-6 Night Vision 
     Goggles, M299 Hellfire missile launchers, 2.75 inch Hydra 
     Rockets, 30mm cartridges, CCU-44 impulse cartridges, M206 and 
     211 countermeasure flares, M230 automatic guns and associated 
     components, 2.75 inch rocket launcher tubes, AN/ARC-231 and 
     AN/ARC-201D radios with associated components, AN/APX-123 
     transponders, image intensifiers, MUMT2i systems, AN/ARN-153 
     tactical airborne navigation systems, chaff, spare an repair 
     parts, support equipment, training and training equipment, 
     U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and 
     logistics support services, and other related elements of 
     logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $3.0 
     billion.
       This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and 
     national security of the United States by helping to improve 
     the security of a friendly country that continues to be an 
     important force for political and economic progress in the 
     Middle East. Qatar is host to the U.S. Central Command forces 
     and serves as a critical forward-deployed location in the 
     region. The acquisition of these helicopters will allow for 
     integration with U.S. forces for training exercises, which 
     contributes to regional security and interoperability.
       The proposed sale of the AH-64E Apache helicopters will 
     supplement the Qatar Emiri Air Force's previous procurement 
     of twenty-four (24) AH-64Es, which are capable of meeting its 
     requirements for close air support, armed reconnaissance, and 
     anti-tank warfare missions. The helicopters will provide a 
     long-term defensive and offensive capability to the Qatar 
     peninsula as well as enhance the protection of key oil and 
     gas infrastructure and platforms. Qatar will have no 
     difficulty absorbing these helicopters into its armed forces.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company, Mesa, 
     Arizona; Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, Florida; 
     General Electric, Cincinnati, Ohio; Lockheed Martin Mission 
     Systems and Sensors, Owego, New York; Longbow Limited 
     Liability Corporation, Orlando, Florida; Thales Corporation, 
     Paris, France; and Raytheon Corporation. There are no known 
     offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential 
     sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require the 
     assignment of three (3) U.S. Government and five (5) 
     contractor representatives to Qatar to support delivery of 
     the Apache helicopters and provide support and equipment 
     familiarization. In addition, Qatar has expressed an interest 
     in expanding their planned Technical Assistance Fielding Team 
     for additional in-country pilot and maintenance training to 
     support this additional quantity of aircraft. To support the 
     requirement a team of twenty (20) personnel (up to three 
     military team members and 17 contractors) would be deployed 
     to Qatar for approximately three years.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 19-14

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

                           Annex Item No. vii

       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
       1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system 
     contains communications and target identification equipment, 
     navigation equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, 
     displays, and sensors. The airframe itself does not contain 
     sensitive technology; however, the equipment listed below 
     will be either installed on the aircraft or included in the 
     sale and carries technology transfer significance. The 
     highest level of information that could be disclosed through 
     the sale of the Apache in the configuration proposed for sale 
     to Qatar is SECRET.
       2. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low 
     probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined 
     with the AN/APR-48, a passive Radar Frequency Interferometer 
     (RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast. The FCR 
     Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes 
     stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks and mobile air 
     defense systems as well as hovering and moving helicopters 
     and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. The highest level 
     of information associated with the FCR and RFI is classified 
     SECRET.
       3. The AN/ASQ-170, Modernized Target Acquisition and 
     Designation Sight (AN/AAQ-11), Modernized Pilot Night Vision 
     Sensor (M-TADS/M-PNVS) is an enhanced version of its 
     predecessor. It provides second generation day, night, and 
     limited adverse weather target information, as well as night 
     navigation capabilities. The M-PNVS provides second 
     generation thermal imaging that permits safer nap-of-the-
     earth flight to, from, and within the battle area. The M-TADS 
     provides the co-pilot gunner with improved search, deletion, 
     recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics 
     (DVO), television, and second generation Forward Looking 
     Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems that may be used singularly 
     or in combinations. M-TAD/M-PNVS hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. 
     The technical manuals for authorized maintenance levels are 
     UNCLASSIFIED. Specific information related to effective 
     system performance parameters (e.g. range, accuracy, etc.) is 
     classified CONFIDENTIAL.
       4. The AN/AAR-57(V)7, Common Missile Warning System detects 
     threat missiles in flight, evaluates potential false alarms, 
     declares validity of threat, and selects appropriate Infrared 
     Countermeasures (IRCM). It includes Electro Optical Missile 
     Sensors, Electronic Control Unit (ECU), Sequencer, and the 
     Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD) that consists of 
     the Dispenser Assembly and the Payload Module. The ICMD 
     dispenses decoy expendable objects (chaff, flares, etc.) to 
     confuse threat radar devices. In-country repair capability 
     will not be provided. Reverse engineering is not a major 
     concern. The hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is 
     not loaded. The software is classified SECRET.
       5. The AN/APR-39, Radar Signal Detecting Set is designed to 
     operate on rotary wing and slow moving fixed wing aircraft to 
     detect, categorize, and prioritize pulse radio frequency 
     emitter illuminating the host platform to allow appropriate 
     countermeasures. This is the 1553 data bus compatible 
     configuration. In-country repair capability will not be 
     provided. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED when the software is not 
     loaded. The software is CONFIDENTIAL. The system can be 
     programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing 
     country.
       6. The AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Set is a passive laser 
     warning system that receives processes, and displays threat 
     information resulting from aircraft illumination by laser 
     designators, rangefinders, and beamrider missile guidance 
     systems. The AN/AVR-2B uses the existing AN/APR-39A/D 
     interface for control status and crew warning. The threat 
     information is processed by the AN/APR-39 RSDS, displayed on 
     the aircraft multi-function display and announced by the AN/
     APR-39 RSDS via the aircraft Inter Communication System. In-
     country repair capability will not be provided. Reverse 
     engineering is not a major concern. The hardware is 
     classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for 
     operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
       7. Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial 
     Navigation System (INS). GPS/INS utilize GPS satellite 
     signals to correct or calibrate a solution from an INS. 
     Inertial navigation systems usually can provide an accurate 
     solution only for short duration. The INS accelerometers 
     produce an unknown bias signal that appears as a genuine 
     specific force. The EGI is Selective Available Anti-Spoofing 
     Module (SAASM) based on navigation platform that combines an 
     inertia sensor for position information and is UNCLASSIFIED. 
     The GPS crypto variables need the highest GPS accuracy and 
     are classified up to SECRET.
       8. The AGM-114R Hellfire missile is precision strike, Semi-
     Active Laser (SAL) guided missile and is the principle air to 
     ground weapon for the AH-64 Apache. The SAL Hellfire missile 
     is guided by laser energy reflected off the target. It has 
     three warhead variants: a dual warhead, shape-charge, high 
     explosive anti-tank capability for armored targets, a blast 
     fragmentation warhead for urban patrol boat and other soft 
     targets and metal augmented charge warhead for urban 
     structures. AGM-114R allows selection of warhead effects 
     corresponding to a specific target type. Hardware for the 
     AGM-l14R is UNCLASSIFIED.
       9. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R Hellfire 
     III missile is Secret, based upon the software. The highest 
     level of classified information that could be disclosed by a 
     proposed sale or by testing of the

[[Page S2782]]

     end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be disclosed 
     for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. 
     Reverse engineering could reveal confidential information. 
     Vulnerability data, countermeasures, vulnerability/
     susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are 
     classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.
       10. The M211-flare is a countermeasure decoy in a 1" x 1" x 
     8" form factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It consists of 
     case, piston, special material payload foils, and end cap. 
     The special material is a pyrophoric metal (iron) foil that 
     reacts with oxygen to generate infrared energy. The M211 
     decoys are dispersed from an aircraft to be used as a decoy 
     in combination with the currently fielded M206 and M212 
     countermeasure flares to protect against advanced air-to-air 
     and surface-to-air missile threats. The hardware is 
     Unclassified and releasable technical manuals for operation 
     and maintenance are classified SECRET.
       11. The M36E9 Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) is a 
     Hellfire training missile (Non-NATO) that consists of a 
     functional guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus. 
     The missile has an operational semi-active laser seeker that 
     can search for and lock-on to laser designated targets for 
     pilot training, but it does not have a warhead or propulsion 
     section and cannot be launched.
       12. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain 
     knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the 
     information could be used to develop countermeasures that 
     might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the 
     development of a system with similar or advanced 
     capabilities.
       13. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide 
     substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive 
     technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale 
     is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives outlined in the Policy 
     Justification.
       14. All defense articles and services listed in this 
     transmittal are authorized for release and export to the 
     Government of Qatar.

                          ____________________