[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 71 (Wednesday, May 1, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2553-S2554]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Missouri Flooding
Mr. BLUNT. Madam President, we have been stuck for some time now on
having an appropriations bill that meets the disasters that have
occurred recently in Missouri and, before that, in the Carolinas and
Georgia, and other places. I want to continue to work hard to get that
done, but I want to talk a little bit about the effects of what has
happened in the State of Missouri as part of what has happened with
floods this spring.
We have seen catastrophic and, in some cases, historic flooding both
on the Missouri and the Mississippi Rivers over the last couple of
months. Along the Missouri, there was this unusual thing, and I
actually never heard the term before, a ``bomb cyclone.'' It is a wind
event that also produced lots of rain in Nebraska in the Northern
Plains on frozen ground. All of that water had no place to go except
run off, and it was the equivalent of 8 inches of rain in a place from
which we usually don't get water. There had been significant rain over
the last few days of March. That created another flood. On the
Mississippi, we have seen significant rains there. While they haven't
set a record, they have certainly consistently ranked the Mississippi
crests among the seventh highest flood levels that river has ever been
from some of the locks. There are locks north of St. Louis. You can
navigate the river without locks south of St. Louis, but in the area
from the Canton Lock and Dam to the Winfield Lock and Dam on the
Mississippi, there are significant problems waiting to happen over the
next few weeks.
After the rains occurred in Northwest Missouri and in Iowa and
Nebraska, in our State and Kansas, much of the water is still there.
The floods have stayed up so high for so long that it is difficult to
really evaluate the damage that has been done. Unlike a tornado, which
we have some familiarity with, where you can go in quickly and evaluate
what happened, you can't do that nearly as quickly with a flood.
We do know there has been at least $25 million in damages to public
infrastructure and costs of emergency measures experienced statewide.
There have been 215 road closures statewide, with 46 roads that
continue to be closed as late as the third week in April. Interstate
29, north of St. Joseph, has been closed since March and is expected to
stay closed until probably June.
This is obviously a very disruptive set of circumstances for people
who would normally use those roads and bridges all the time. One of the
major class 1 roadways has been damaged. That roadway was just raised
in 2011 to deal with the flood in 2011. An ethanol plant was knocked
offline. Electric substations have been damaged. Grains stored in bins
from last year's harvest have been destroyed. Livestock have been lost.
Many farmers will not be able to get crops in the ground this year
because it will be too wet once the water goes down--until it is too
late to successfully plant the crops. So thousands of acres and
hundreds of farms just simply will not be able to do what they do
because of the flood.
The scale and scope of these events has clearly overwhelmed local
governments, overwhelmed county governments, and stretched the State
government in a significant way. Most effectively, and most
importantly, it has impacted families and individuals. If your home is
underwater, if it takes 2 more hours to get to school, if you have no
chance of planting your crop or if you are in a business that relates
to the family who is going to plant the crop, if you have nobody buying
the seed or paying the repairs for their equipment, paying for the
gasoline--the things you do to stay in business--that has all kinds of
impact as well.
The Governor of Missouri has requested a Presidential disaster
declaration. I am certainly for that, and every
[[Page S2554]]
Member of the Missouri delegation signed the letter asking the
President to grant that declaration. The assistance that would be
impacted by this would be vital. It is important. We need that kind of
assistance now.
I am going to continue to work--and I hope all our colleagues
continue to work--to make this year's disasters and last fall's
disasters eligible for the funds we appropriate for disaster coverage.
During the flood, a lot has been said about the Corps of Engineer's
management of the Missouri River, and what, if anything, they could
have done that might have prevented the flood this time. I think
probably not. This is such an unusual flood that the locks on the
Missouri were north of where the flood occurred. There was a dam that
broke that would not normally have broken, and that would normally not
even be part of the Missouri River management system.
The Corps has been out there trying to help figure out how to recover
rather than figure out what caused this particular flood. In fact, the
Corps and the permanent staff in places like the Kansas City office of
the Corps understand the Missouri River better than anybody, in my
view, and are helpful when they can be.
That doesn't mean the Corps, in a greater sense, isn't responsible
for what has become the new normal on the Missouri River. We have had
recurrent historic flooding on the river now for 15 years. Ever since
the Corps asked for a new management plan in 2004 and got the new
management plan, it just simply doesn't work.
At least 6 of the top 10 river crests in recorded history have
occurred in the last 15 years. Floods in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011--you
see the pattern here--2013, and 2019. The only reason we didn't have
dramatic floods every year was we had a couple of drought years in 2009
and 2012.
This all goes back to that 2004 management plan. What changed in
2004? In 2004, the Corps started to implement the Missouri River
Recovery Program in response to a Biological Opinion--``opinion'' may
be the key word here--Biological Opinion from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, which took the position that the existing management
of the river was impacting one species of fish and two species of
birds.
The ultimate result was prioritizing the management of the entire
river to benefit that fish and those birds. It was above flood control.
It was above navigation. It didn't consider what was detrimental to
families, to farms, or the local infrastructure and was not necessary.
Saving wildlife is a worthy goal, but for that goal to truly be worthy,
it has to also include how it impacts families, how it impacts people,
and how it impacts the economy.
We had management plans on the Mississippi River as well, but the
wildlife management plans didn't become the plan that substituted for
all other plans.
The Corps' management plan brought about changes to the lower river.
There are six locks and there are six dams, rather, and reservoirs
above the Lower Missouri that starts roughly in the place where Kansas,
Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri all come together. What happened was they
began to destabilize the banks, constructing pallid sturgeon chutes
that impacted how the water ran into the river. They no longer dredged
the river like they had before. Just to understand why that matters, a
9-foot channel of the river carries a lot more water than a 6- or 7-
foot channel of the river. If you are channeling the river so you can
still navigate the river, they had interception rearing complexes, none
of which appears to have made much of a difference, except they made it
hard to control the river at flood stage.
Modifying or eliminating the river control systems eliminate the
normal things in a river, such as revetments, wing dikes, and chevrons
that control the river and send the water in the direction it needs to
be for flood protection, and that just didn't happen.
Fish and Wildlife and the Corps of Engineers actually now know that
some of the actions they were carrying out caused direct negative
impacts on the river and didn't do any good. There is a high level of
certainty that when you notch a dike in the river--which means you cut
a hole in a structure that is designed to channel the water--that when
you do that, bad things happen. That is why that structure was put
there in the first place for a reason.
One of the most disappointing parts of what has happened is a
relatively low level of certainty that any of these things do any good.
In fact, the Corps and the Fish and Wildlife people have already
abandoned the pursuit of what they constructed, pallid sturgeon chutes,
which they thought would encourage the pallid sturgeon to multiply. By
the way, this is a fish we happen to multiply ourselves at the Neosho
National Fish Hatchery, which I believe is the oldest fish hatchery in
the United States. The U.S. hatchery system is in Neosho. Pallid
sturgeon is one of the things they do. They didn't work, but they did
encourage more flood risk.
I would have one suggestion for the Corps: If you know an action will
increase flood control and you know it will harm people and harm
property and you don't know whether it will help save a species, don't
do it. There has to be a way you figure out first whether this is going
to work, and then you might evaluate if it is so important that we are
going to impact people and property.
What we had is a big experiment that turned out to be the wrong thing
to do to start with. It didn't serve the purpose, and it did harm the
river and people who live on the river. Flood control and navigation
needs to be, once again, elevated to the top two priorities of managing
the river. I look forward to working with my colleagues to figure out
how to do this in a better way.
There is no question that the Mississippi River is about to be more
important than it has been in 100 years. There is also no reason that
the Missouri River, as an avenue of commerce and as an avenue that
people can get near and enjoy from a tourist's and traveler's
perspective, can't be there, and there is no reason it can't continue
to be managed in a way that benefits families, that benefits us
economically, and that doesn't repeat year after year after year the
flooding that did not occur under the original management plan.
We need to look at that plan. We need to have a management plan that
meets the commonsense standard. The current plan does not, and we have
had now 15 years to prove that the current plan does not meet it. I am
going to be working hard with both the Corps, the Department of the
Interior, and Fish and Wildlife to see if we can't have a plan that
meets that commonsense standard.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, first of all, I thank the Senator from
Missouri for his comments about the disaster. We are having a disaster
in the U.S. Senate because we haven't been able to solve our emergency
problem yet. It is not because of Senator Blunt. He has done a great
job, as have many Members of the Senate. We are close now, and there is
a meeting this afternoon with important Senators. We are close on
Hawaii, on Alaska, on Georgia, on South Carolina, on Tennessee, on
Alabama, on Florida, and on the other States that have had disasters in
the past year to which we have still been late on getting disaster
emergency funds.
In fact, in Georgia, this is the 222nd day, in the case of one
emergency, that those funds have been held up. In the agricultural
season, 222 days is 1\1/2\ plants. It is one planting, one picking, and
a second planting. So it is a significant part of the agriculture year.
We are getting killed in Georgia. Our farmers are getting hurt badly
because of the ineptitude, in part and sometimes in whole, of the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, cool heads are coming together. We are getting over some
arguments, and we are getting some things solved. Thanks to the help of
Senator Blunt and others in the U.S. Senate, we are going to get help
to our farmers in Georgia, to those in Alabama, and to those in Alaska
from the earthquake and to those in Hawaii from the lava flow and the
eruptions they have had there and from all of the other disasters we
have had. Finally, that money is going to start flowing.