[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 63 (Thursday, April 11, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2416-S2417]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                                 ICBMs

  Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, recently I came to the Senate floor to 
speak about the airborne leg of the nuclear triad. Today I rise to 
discuss the value of another leg of the triad--our intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, or ICBMs.
  Following the brief deployment of the Atlas and Titan ICBM weapon 
systems in the early 1960s, the United States deployed the first 
Minuteman ICBMs in support of the strategic deterrence mission. Over 
half a century later, today the United States deploys 400 Minuteman III 
ICBMs, each carrying a single warhead. While the Minuteman III system 
was deployed in the 1970s, much of its technology dates to the previous 
decade. The system was originally designed for a 10-year service life 
but has sustained an exceptionally high availability rate and is 
expected to remain in service through the 2030s, thanks to a series of 
life-extension programs. But we cannot extend the current system beyond 
2030, and that is why we are now developing its replacement--the ground 
based strategic deterrent. Doing so will require resources in a budget-
constrained environment and, perhaps for that reason, we are hearing 
renewed calls to abandon the triad and cut our ICBM force. However, 
this step would be foolish and dangerous to the United States and to 
our allied security for several reasons.
  First, ICBMs are highly reliable and always ready. That is why they 
are regarded as the most responsive leg of the triad. Unlike bombers 
and submarines, which may require time to arm or maneuver, the ICBM 
force provides the President the ability to promptly respond if 
deterrence fails. This virtue is often mischaracterized as a source of 
risk.
  The system's rapid response is described as a ``hair trigger'' by 
critics who often paint chilling pictures of 400 ICBMs automatically 
flying to their

[[Page S2417]]

targets and causing Armageddon, either by accident or as a result of 
cyber interference.
  I want to be clear that there is no ``hair trigger'' about our ICBMs. 
We have many safeguards put in place to ensure the system operates only 
as intended. For example, our ICBMs are actually targeted on the open-
ocean spaces as a means of ensuring that, even if all of our safeguards 
failed and a missile somehow managed to launch by accident, it would 
land in the ocean and not accidentally start a nuclear war. The critics 
conveniently fail to mention this.
  Former STRATCOM commander General Robert Kehler recently testified 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and he said: ``It isn't the 
same thing at all as thinking about a Wild West hair trigger . . . . 
It's not the way it works.''
  The high readiness of the ICBM force also provides an important hedge 
against uncertainty. Since we no longer maintain bombers on nuclear 
alert, the ICBMs and the submarines reinforce each other so that a 
technical failure in one leg of the triad does not render our day-to-
day deterrent inoperative.
  Those who advocate for doing away with the ICBM force must account 
for the fact that, under their proposals, in such moments there would 
not have been an additional leg of the triad to ensure our Nation isn't 
left without a nuclear deterrent. As our nuclear forces continue to 
age, reliability challenges will only grow.
  Critics often describe the ICBM force as being vulnerable, even going 
so far as to call our missiles sitting ducks. It is true that silos are 
not hidden, they aren't mobile, and they can be targeted. But, again, 
this is a misunderstanding of what actually is the strength of the ICBM 
force.
  In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General 
Hyten stated that the ICBM force ``creates the most significant 
targeting problem for an adversary, because there are 400 separate 
targets across the United States. All would have to be independently 
targeted by an adversary. That targeting problem is hugely problematic 
and creates a significant advantage for us.''
  Simply put, destroying 400 hardened and geographically dispersed 
silos is an extremely difficult proposition. Only Russia possesses the 
capability to destroy our ICBM force. No other nation on Earth can do 
so, and it would greatly diminish Russia's arsenal in the process. That 
is not a vulnerability. As General Hyten clearly states, it is a 
significant advantage for our Nation.
  For these reasons and many others, Republican and Democratic 
administrations alike have maintained ICBMs as part of our nuclear 
forces for decades. The role of ICBMs has been reconsidered and 
reviewed many times, and their value has been repeatedly reaffirmed in 
a bipartisan manner. For example, last November the report by the 
bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission stated that the triad 
presents insurmountable targeting challenges for adversaries, imposes 
disproportionate costs on adversary defenses, and hedges against 
unforeseen geopolitical or technological changes.
  Mr. President, I will close by saying that our ICBM forces make key 
contributions to our overall nuclear forces and, as Members on both 
sides of the aisle agree, they are an essential ingredient to the 
bedrock of our national security--our nuclear deterrent.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.