[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 45 (Wednesday, March 13, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Page S1851]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 197. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed
by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of
United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen
that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on
the table; as follows:
At the end, add the following:
SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS CONDITION OF ENTERING
INTO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT
WITH THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO SECTION 123
OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 1971, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
established the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA),
which non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington
July 1, 1968 (commonly known as the ``NPT''), are obligated
to bring into force to verify compliance with their
nonproliferation obligations under the treaty.
(2) In 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
established the model Additional Protocol to CSAs, which
grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and
sites related to a state's peaceful nuclear program.
(3) The IAEA and international nonproliferation community
established the Additional Protocol as a response to major
shocks to the nonproliferation regime, most notably
revelations that the IAEA's existing safeguards system had
failed to detect the Government of Iraq's covert, undeclared
nuclear program for non-peaceful purposes prior to the 1991
Persian Gulf War.
(4) The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's ability
not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear
material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of
undeclared nuclear material activities in a state by--
(A) applying IAEA safeguards to a state's entire nuclear
program, including uranium mining and milling sites, fuel
fabrication, enrichment, and nuclear waste sites, as well as
to any other location where nuclear is or may be present;
(B) expanding the amount and type of information a state is
obligated to report to the IAEA regarding its nuclear program
and related activities;
(C) expanding the IAEA's inspection access at declared--and
undeclared--locations to verify the absence of undeclared
material or to resolve questions or inconsistencies in the
information a state has provided about its nuclear
activities; and
(D) specifying the IAEA's right to use additional
safeguards methods and equipment, including environmental
sampling at both declared and undeclared sites.
(5) Universalizing the Additional Protocol and establishing
it as the international standard for IAEA safeguards has been
a bipartisan objective of United States nonproliferation
policy since the Additional Protocol's adoption.
(6) During the 2000 NPT Review Conference at the United
Nations, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright endorsed
the ``IAEA's new strengthened safeguards to deter and detect
cheating'' and urged ``all states to adopt them''.
(7) During the 2005 NPT Review Conference at the United
Nations, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control
Stephen G. Rademaker stated that President George W. Bush's
nonproliferation policy included ``universalizing adherence
to the Additional Protocol and making it a condition of
nuclear supply''.
(8) During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Secretary of
State John Kerry emphasized that the ``United States is
working to bring the Additional Protocol into force globally
and to make it the global standard for safeguards
compliance''.
(9) During the 2018 IAEA General Conference, Secretary of
Energy Rick Perry delivered a letter on behalf of President
Donald J. Trump, announcing that the United States ``will
continue promoting high standards of safety, security,
safeguards, and nonproliferation, including an Additional
Protocol as the international standard, and call on other
nations to do the same''.
(10) At the same conference, Assistant Secretary of State
for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher
Ashley Ford stressed that the Additional Protocol ``should be
universalized, and all supplier states should make adherence
to the AP by recipient states a condition for nuclear
supply''.
(11) As of December 2018, 134 states have brought in force
the Additional Protocol with the IAEA while another 16 states
have signed the Additional Protocol but have yet to bring it
into force.
(12) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has not brought into force
an Additional Protocol. It currently has a Small Quantities
Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA, a safeguards agreement that
suspends the application of many provisions of a CSA for
countries with minimal nuclear material and activities on its
territory or under its jurisdiction.
(13) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has expressed its intent
to build an extensive civilian nuclear program, including two
large-scale nuclear power reactors and multiple small modular
reactors.
(14) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will no longer be eligible
for a SQP and will be obligated to implement a CSA with the
IAEA without exemptions if it either has nuclear material in
quantities exceeding minimal limits or constructs nuclear
facilities on its territory or under its jurisdiction,
including a nuclear reactor.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Additional Protocol represents the international
safeguards standard;
(2) Saudi Arabia should, at a minimum, bring into force an
Additional Protocol with the IAEA as a requirement under any
nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States made
pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2153); and
(3) any future civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with
other nations pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) should require that the proposed
recipient has in force an Additional Protocol to its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
(c) Requirements for Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
With Other Nations.--Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new
paragraph:
``(10) the cooperating party has in force an Additional
Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.''.
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