[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 45 (Wednesday, March 13, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Page S1851]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 197. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed 
by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 7, to direct the removal of 
United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen 
that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on 
the table; as follows:

       At the end, add the following:

     SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
                   ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL AS CONDITION OF ENTERING 
                   INTO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT 
                   WITH THE UNITED STATES PURSUANT TO SECTION 123 
                   OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In 1971, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
     established the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), 
     which non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington 
     July 1, 1968 (commonly known as the ``NPT''), are obligated 
     to bring into force to verify compliance with their 
     nonproliferation obligations under the treaty.
       (2) In 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
     established the model Additional Protocol to CSAs, which 
     grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and 
     sites related to a state's peaceful nuclear program.
       (3) The IAEA and international nonproliferation community 
     established the Additional Protocol as a response to major 
     shocks to the nonproliferation regime, most notably 
     revelations that the IAEA's existing safeguards system had 
     failed to detect the Government of Iraq's covert, undeclared 
     nuclear program for non-peaceful purposes prior to the 1991 
     Persian Gulf War.
       (4) The Additional Protocol strengthens the IAEA's ability 
     not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear 
     material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of 
     undeclared nuclear material activities in a state by--
       (A) applying IAEA safeguards to a state's entire nuclear 
     program, including uranium mining and milling sites, fuel 
     fabrication, enrichment, and nuclear waste sites, as well as 
     to any other location where nuclear is or may be present;
       (B) expanding the amount and type of information a state is 
     obligated to report to the IAEA regarding its nuclear program 
     and related activities;
       (C) expanding the IAEA's inspection access at declared--and 
     undeclared--locations to verify the absence of undeclared 
     material or to resolve questions or inconsistencies in the 
     information a state has provided about its nuclear 
     activities; and
       (D) specifying the IAEA's right to use additional 
     safeguards methods and equipment, including environmental 
     sampling at both declared and undeclared sites.
       (5) Universalizing the Additional Protocol and establishing 
     it as the international standard for IAEA safeguards has been 
     a bipartisan objective of United States nonproliferation 
     policy since the Additional Protocol's adoption.
       (6) During the 2000 NPT Review Conference at the United 
     Nations, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright endorsed 
     the ``IAEA's new strengthened safeguards to deter and detect 
     cheating'' and urged ``all states to adopt them''.
       (7) During the 2005 NPT Review Conference at the United 
     Nations, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control 
     Stephen G. Rademaker stated that President George W. Bush's 
     nonproliferation policy included ``universalizing adherence 
     to the Additional Protocol and making it a condition of 
     nuclear supply''.
       (8) During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Secretary of 
     State John Kerry emphasized that the ``United States is 
     working to bring the Additional Protocol into force globally 
     and to make it the global standard for safeguards 
     compliance''.
       (9) During the 2018 IAEA General Conference, Secretary of 
     Energy Rick Perry delivered a letter on behalf of President 
     Donald J. Trump, announcing that the United States ``will 
     continue promoting high standards of safety, security, 
     safeguards, and nonproliferation, including an Additional 
     Protocol as the international standard, and call on other 
     nations to do the same''.
       (10) At the same conference, Assistant Secretary of State 
     for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher 
     Ashley Ford stressed that the Additional Protocol ``should be 
     universalized, and all supplier states should make adherence 
     to the AP by recipient states a condition for nuclear 
     supply''.
       (11) As of December 2018, 134 states have brought in force 
     the Additional Protocol with the IAEA while another 16 states 
     have signed the Additional Protocol but have yet to bring it 
     into force.
       (12) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has not brought into force 
     an Additional Protocol. It currently has a Small Quantities 
     Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA, a safeguards agreement that 
     suspends the application of many provisions of a CSA for 
     countries with minimal nuclear material and activities on its 
     territory or under its jurisdiction.
       (13) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has expressed its intent 
     to build an extensive civilian nuclear program, including two 
     large-scale nuclear power reactors and multiple small modular 
     reactors.
       (14) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will no longer be eligible 
     for a SQP and will be obligated to implement a CSA with the 
     IAEA without exemptions if it either has nuclear material in 
     quantities exceeding minimal limits or constructs nuclear 
     facilities on its territory or under its jurisdiction, 
     including a nuclear reactor.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Additional Protocol represents the international 
     safeguards standard;
       (2) Saudi Arabia should, at a minimum, bring into force an 
     Additional Protocol with the IAEA as a requirement under any 
     nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States made 
     pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2153); and
       (3) any future civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with 
     other nations pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) should require that the proposed 
     recipient has in force an Additional Protocol to its 
     safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
       (c) Requirements for Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements 
     With Other Nations.--Section 123a. of the Atomic Energy Act 
     of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(10) the cooperating party has in force an Additional 
     Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.''.
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