[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 34 (Monday, February 25, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1425-S1427]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                              North Korea

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I want to offer some thoughts regarding the 
ongoing negotiations with North Korea that began with the Singapore 
summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un and will continue in a 
few days when the two leaders meet again in Vietnam.
  I join the chorus of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who 
have expressed concern regarding the outcome of the last summit and the 
subsequent negotiations. This is not meant as a criticism of the 
diplomatic process itself. Clearly, we are in a much better place now 
than 2 years ago, when the President was promising fire and fury for 
the Korean Peninsula, terrifying our South Korean allies, who stand to 
lose millions of their citizens in any confrontation with North Korea. 
Furthermore, if the Singapore summit had resulted in a clear path 
toward denuclearization, I would be standing here right now commending 
these diplomatic efforts.
  The maximum pressure campaign, significantly enhanced by this body's 
sanctions regime and the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, 
brought North Korea to the negotiating table. It was a golden 
opportunity and, unfortunately, it was squandered by this ill-prepared 
administration, which seems more concerned with photo ops than with the 
substance of the negotiation.
  The Singapore summit was a loss for the United States and our 
alliances and a great publicity win for North Korea. The 2005 six-party 
joint statement contained significantly more commitments from North 
Korea than the joint statement of the Singapore summit. Given President 
Trump's bluster and renouncement of the JCPOA, one would have thought 
that he would leave Singapore with an ironclad commitment and schedule 
for denuclearization. Instead, he got less than in any past negotiation 
with North Korea.
  Most concerning to me is that without obtaining a single concrete 
concession from North Korea, President Trump undermined our alliance 
with the Republic of Korea by characterizing our joint exercises as 
provocative war games. It was a huge propaganda win for North Korea and 
a huge loss to the United States and to the readiness of the joint 
force. The regularly scheduled exercises are very important to troop 
readiness and our regional security. While I understand the need to 
create diplomatic space for these negotiations to proceed, we must 
ensure that we do not sacrifice readiness for empty promises.
  While I am pleased with the agreement on the return of prisoners of 
war and missing-in-action personnel remains, which rightfully continue 
to be important issues for U.S. families, the Singapore summit was 
mostly pomp and circumstance that did not advance our national security 
interests. In fact, it could be said that we are in a worse position 
than we were before the summit. President Trump undeservedly 
transformed Kim Jong Un from a ruthless dictator to a world statesman 
in short order. He has since used his stature from the summit to make 
closed-door deals with China and Russia that will be used as leverage 
against the United States.
  The President also conferred legitimacy on a corrupt and morally 
bankrupt dictator who has imprisoned hundreds of thousands of men, 
women, and children in political camps under brutal conditions and has 
committed horrendous crimes against his neighbors and own people. Human 
rights did not play a prominent role at the summit, and the joint 
declaration does not include one single reference. If we want to 
continue to serve as a beacon for human rights, this issue will have to 
be on the agenda for these negotiations. There are a number of U.S. 
sanctions against North Korea because of its human rights record, and 
this body will not loosen those sanctions until and unless we see 
progress on the issue. As such, I was dismayed that the President in 
his State of the Union Address did not call out the North Korean 
regime's callous disregard for human rights.
  Since the summit, we have seen just how problematic the joint 
declaration has been as a foundational document for the negotiations. 
While Secretary Pompeo characterized the first meeting with North 
Korean negotiators at the summit as ``productive,'' the North Koreans 
criticized Secretary Pompeo's gangster-like demand for 
denuclearization. The chasm between the two sides was created by the 
ambiguity of the summit itself and its failure to create an agreed-upon 
path for both parties. We have not seen a substantial dismantlement of 
nuclear or missile sites over the last year, and independent news 
reporting reflects that North Korea continues to develop its nuclear 
and missile arsenals despite the self-imposed ban on testing.
  What should we have gotten from the summit? Since we played our 
biggest card and gave Kim Jong Un a meeting with the President of the 
United States, the answer is a lot more than what we did get. First and 
foremost, we should have gotten a joint declaration that North Korea 
agrees to complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. If 
we were not going to get that commitment, then we should have at least 
gotten a specific commitment similar to the September 19, 2005, joint 
statement, where North Korea committed to ``abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA 
safeguards.'' Instead, we got a vague statement that North Korea will 
``work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.''

[[Page S1426]]

  Despite the administration's protestations to the contrary, it is not 
at all clear that North Korea actually agreed to complete, verifiable, 
and irreversible denuclearization, generally referred to as CVID. I am 
concerned, as are others, that the words ``complete denuclearization'' 
were used because the North Koreans would not agree to CVID. If that is 
the case, then, we are starting in a worse place than we were during 
the 2005 talks.

  Why do these words matter? They matter because of the historical 
context of these negotiations. Without the word ``verifiable,'' North 
Korea has not agreed to inspections, and, without inspections, we 
cannot be sure that North Korea will take the steps necessary to 
denuclearize. The regime does not have a good track record of living up 
to its agreements. Without a verification process that includes a 
robust inspection and verification regime, we will never be sure that 
North Korea is not reverting to its past tactics and cheating on its 
commitments.
  Even more alarming to those who follow past negotiations is that the 
commitment that did come out of the summit sounds suspiciously like the 
tack North Korea has taken in past negotiations--that denuclearization 
of the peninsula will require the United States to remove its nuclear 
umbrella from its ally, the Republic of Korea, and remove its troops 
from the peninsula. North Korea has peddled this tit-for-tat 
denuclearization narrative for years, and this administration must 
ensure that it does not become the narrative of the upcoming 
negotiations. These competing narratives should have been reconciled at 
the summit by the leaders but instead were left for future 
negotiations.
  The administration now has another opportunity in Vietnam to 
establish some credibility for these negotiations and demand a set of 
concrete deliverables. We should all recognize that CVID will take 
years to accomplish. Despite President Trump's patently false claim 
that he has solved the North Korean nuclear threat, that threat is 
still very real and very dangerous. There are commitments that we need 
from the other side to gauge whether North Korea is sincere in its 
intent to denuclearize. We already know that the intelligence community 
has made the determination that North Korea does not intend to 
denuclearize. Therefore, the concessions we seek from North Korea need 
to include a verification and inspection scheme that includes a 
reasonable timeline and is comprehensive enough to include all of its 
weapons of mass destruction programs and facilities and focuses on 
engagement instead of punishment. We should not use inspections as 
``aha'' moments to catch the North Koreans in intentional or 
unintentional mistakes. Instead, they should be used as the foundation 
to develop a comprehensive picture of all of North Korea's weapons 
programs and as the basis for future negotiations.
  What would a successful summit in Vietnam look like? We need a 
declaration from North Korea of all of its nuclear weapons and programs 
and facilities. Ideally, it would also include a catalog of all of its 
missiles and missile facilities. This declaration of all of its sites 
and programs needs to be provided to the United States in short order 
to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, 
inspectors to start the inspections process, which will take years.
  Second, we need North Korea to agree to verifiable denuclearization 
with IAEA inspections, and that agreement should include a concrete 
timeline with a step-by-step process. If we are going to continue to 
scope down our joint exercises for the sake of these negotiations, 
then, we need to see concrete actions by North Korea in the next few 
months. It has been almost a year since the last summit, and we have 
not seen any concrete irreversible actions taken by North Korea on its 
nuclear program that signify an intent by the regime to give up or 
significantly curtail its programs.
  I wanted to speak on this issue today before the second summit 
because I am concerned that the President will fall prey to North 
Korean manipulation and accept an agreement that does not include 
significant concessions by the regime. Kim Jong Un's ploy is to make 
commitments for the future that can easily be forgotten or to offer up 
facilities or sites that are obsolete.
  For example, if the President gets assurances for the dismantling of 
the Sohae launch facility and the closure and inspections of the 
Yongbyon nuclear facility, he may think that North Korea has moved the 
needle on denuclearization, but as the experts will tell you, the real 
jewels are other nuclear sites that are more critical for the regime's 
programs. As recent reports by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies have shown, there are many missile sites that 
have not been declared and that are critical to the nuclear program. 
This is why a full declaration is so critical--so that we finally have 
a comprehensive accounting of the nuclear and missile programs that 
exist.
  In the meantime, the administration also needs to be vigilant that 
China and other countries continue to enforce sanctions. President 
Trump's assertions that the problem is solved will significantly 
undercut our ability to keep the pressure on. We need consistent 
messaging from the White House and the rest of the administration that 
the Singapore summit was the first step, and until we see concrete 
results, there will be no abeyance of the sanctions regime. Keeping 
China in line on that front will be a significant challenge, especially 
given the isolationist bent of this President, who has managed to 
alienate the very partners we need to cooperate on the sanctions 
regime.
  China does not need to state publicly that it will stop enforcing 
sanctions. Even low-level cross-border trade can allow the North Korean 
economy to hobble along for years, and all it will take is an 
indication from Beijing that sanctions enforcement is no longer a 
priority.
  Let me be clear. One of the most important outcomes of this process 
is also the preservation of our alliances with South Korea and Japan. 
Even if we were to somehow achieve a CVID deal with North Korea but 
lose our special relationships with these two nations, we will come out 
the other side less secure than we are today. While North Korea poses a 
significant threat to the United States, peace on the peninsula cannot 
come at the cost of a diminished U.S. presence in Asia. Our alliances 
and partners in the region are the bulwark of our strength in the 
region.
  Both South Korea and Japan have significant national security 
interests that will be adjudicated during these negotiations. Neither 
is at the negotiating table. I am very concerned that Japan in 
particular is dismayed that there has not been any substantive progress 
in the negotiations. It is critical that the administration continue to 
raise issues that are critical to Japan, especially the Japanese 
citizens who were abducted by North Korea. It is up to this 
administration to ensure that their interests are voiced and that their 
security needs are met. That means not only addressing North Korea's 
intercontinental ballistic missile program but also its short- and 
intermediate-range missiles. It means consulting with our allies before 
significant decisions that affect their security are taken, and it 
means not publicly lamenting about the costs associated with these 
historic and strategic alliances. We cannot simply put a price tag on 
our regional security. Losing these alliances will cost us far more in 
the long run and leave us far less secure than we are today.
  We also need to be concerned about the recent deterioration of the 
relationship between our two critical allies. Trilateral cooperation is 
only effective if South Korea and Japan can overcome their historical 
animosities to present a united front against North Korea.
  I know there is a lot of discussion today about the possibility of a 
peace agreement to end the 65-year-old armistice. I fear that many see 
a peace agreement as the precursor for a removal of U.S. forces from 
the Korean Peninsula. I am concerned that our President does not 
understand the critical importance of the deployment of U.S. Forces 
Korea on the peninsula.
  Let me be clear. The withdrawal of troops from the peninsula would 
significantly undermine our ability to fulfill our treaty obligations 
to South Korea. It should not be a subject of these negotiations or any 
future negotiations with North Korea. The presence of our troops is the 
cornerstone of our military alliance with South

[[Page S1427]]

Korea, and they must remain present and ready to ``Fight Tonight'' for 
the benefit of the alliance and regional security.
  Looming over all of this is our long-term strategic competition with 
China. I find it telling that China was one of the first countries to 
announce the cancellation of our joint exercises with the Republic of 
Korea.
  What are China's ambitions for this negotiation process? While China 
is certainly concerned about the nuclear arsenal its southern neighbor 
has amassed, denuclearization may not be China's highest national 
security concern during these negotiations. In the long run, China 
recognizes that its near-peer competition with the United States 
complicates its interests in these negotiations. China's highest 
priority is likely to ensure that it does not end up with a U.S.-allied 
reunified Korea on its southern border. Another goal is driving a wedge 
between the United States and its allies in order to promote itself as 
a regional hegemon.

  We all recognize that Russia has similar ambitions--separate us from 
our allies, establish themselves as regional hegemons, and coerce and 
bully their smaller neighbors on issues of defense, trade, and 
economics. We cannot allow that to happen.
  We already see attempts by China to relax sanctions enforcement. This 
trade spat is just one of the wedges North Korea will be able to 
leverage between China and the United States. We need a coordinated 
strategy that keeps our long-term interests in Asia focused while 
resolving the North Korean crisis. To date, we have not seen any 
indication that such a strategy exists.
  Peace on the Korean Peninsula has eluded us for decades. There is an 
opportunity now to force Kim Jong Un's hand, through skillful 
negotiation and a coordinated sanctions regime, to take concrete steps 
toward denuclearization.
  I hope this administration will use the Vietnam summit to negotiate a 
substantive agreement that keeps America and its allies safe, strong, 
and secure.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.