[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 23 (Wednesday, February 6, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S913-S914]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                               INF TREATY

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, today I wish to express my deep concerns 
regarding President Trump's suspension of U.S. participation in the 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces--INF--Treaty and decision to withdraw 
from the treaty in 6 months.
  Before diving into the substance of this misguided decision, I am 
compelled, as the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, to object to the process.
  The President is pulling out of this treaty, a treaty that was 
approved by the U.S. Senate by a vote of 93-5 and that has been in 
force for three decades, without official notice or any meaningful 
consultation with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
congressional committee charged with responsibility and jurisdiction 
over treaties and without the approval of the Senate.
  This was despite multiple opportunities to explain the rationale for 
this decision, including a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing 
on arms control and Russia. In that hearing, senior officials from the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense provided no 
indication that a decision to withdraw was even imminent, nor that U.S. 
forces envisioned any military operational benefit from near-term 
withdrawal.
  Article 2 of the Constitution endows the President and the Senate 
with shared power over treaties, including an exceptionally high bar 
for advice and consent. This President's unilateral decision to 
withdraw from the INF, without any meaningful engagement with the 
Senate, much less the approval of this body, is impossible to square 
with this shared constitutional power.
  In that vein, I urge all of my colleagues to focus not just on the 
substance of the President's decision but also on the process. INF is 
not alone; it is one of several treaties that the President has 
jettisoned without any input from the Senate. He is eroding the 
constitutional powers and institutional prerogatives of this body, and 
we cannot be silent.
  Even if the President had followed a sound process, this decision is 
misguided on substance. It is another example of the President and his 
team's apparent belief that destroying international agreements, with 
little or no thought given to how to address the underlying problem, is 
the solution to a complex security issues.
  In this case, there is no doubt, what the problem is and where it 
comes from.
  Russia, and Russia alone, bears the responsibility for the 
degradation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. It has 
brazenly violated the treaty and has been unwilling to take the steps 
necessary to come back into compliance.
  Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats has succinctly laid out 
Russia's efforts to undermine the INF treaty. He stated ``the 
Intelligence Community assesses Russia has flight-tested, produced, and 
deployed cruise missiles with a range capability prohibited by the 
Treaty.''
  Why is Russia doing this? Again, according to Director Coats: Russia 
is developing missiles to ``target critical European military and 
economic infrastructure'' with both conventional and nuclear 
capabilities. Russia is seeking the means to coerce our European and 
Asian allies by ``posing a direct conventional and nuclear threat'' to 
them.

  Russia's violation of its INF treaty obligations and its nuclear 
threats against Europe are not particularly surprising. It fits within 
a pattern of malign behavior that seeks to undermine the security 
framework that contributed to the peaceful end to the Cold War. Russia 
has suspended its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe and of course

[[Page S914]]

violated the core principles of the Helsinki accord by annexing Crimea 
and invading Ukraine.
  The question has never been whether Russia is violating the INF 
treaty. It is and has been in violation. The question is how the United 
States should respond.
  Throughout the process of trying to bring Russia back into 
compliance, I have raised serious concerns about the Trump 
administration's approach. As is the case with most major foreign 
policy challenges facing the United States, the Trump administration 
lacks a coherent strategy. In this case, they do not appear to have any 
realistic plan to address the threat that new Russian missile 
capabilities pose to the interests of the United States and those of 
our allies.
  By withdrawing from INF at this time, the United States is providing 
Russia with a pass on its obligations and giving them the unfettered 
and unconstrained opportunity to expand the deployment of their new 
missile system. The U.S. does not have the assets in place to defend 
against Russia's new missile, nor is it anywhere close to developing, 
manufacturing, and deploying a similar system that would operate as a 
counter to it.
  So the President is shredding the INF treaty without any credible 
alternative. It is not just bad policy; it is dangerous to European 
security. The path the administration has chosen leaves our allies 
vulnerable to Russian aggression, and at this moment, there is no 
recourse for the United States or our allies.
  It is within this vein of poor foreign policy planning that I want to 
discuss a second issue related to INF. In 2021, the United States will 
face the decision whether to extend New START. I am extremely concerned 
that President Trump has no appreciation or understating of the 
importance of arms control treaties and that this deficiency will lead 
him to abandon all limitations on U.S-Russian nuclear forces.
  We have historically negotiated and entered into agreements with our 
adversaries recognizing that we are dealing with hostile powers that 
cannot be trusted. We build in metrics that account for a probability 
of efforts to deceive and dodge. In high stakes agreements, provisions 
outlining U.S. intelligence verification and compliance are essential. 
In the universe of arms control agreements with Russia, we conduct on-
site inspections of military bases and facilities, and we require data 
exchanges in order track the status and makeup of their nuclear forces.
  In assessing the value of an arms control agreement, we consider 
whether our participation in the agreement advances our national 
security interests.
  Let's be clear: The New START treaty clearly advances vital U.S. 
national security interests. Through our inspection regime, we are able 
to verify that Russia is adhering to the limitations the treaty places 
on the size of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. Through our data 
exchanges and our verification regimes, we gain extremely valuable 
insights into the size and location of their nuclear forces.
  At a time when Russia is engaged in malign behavior all over the 
world and Putin is pressing to reassert Russian power, it is critical 
we maintain key leverage points to protect against a revisionist 
Russia. New START is one of those points, and I urge my colleagues and 
the administration that, in light of ongoing Russian compliance with 
New START, we must extend the treaty for an additional 5 years.
  I strongly urge the administration try a new approach and develop a 
coherent strategy to stabilize our arms control regime. The 
relationship with the Russian Federation remains a challenge, but we 
must address these arms control issues and negotiate a durable 
agreement that ensures stability in our nuclear forces.
  Neither an unconstrained nuclear arms race nor blind faith in arms 
control agreements serve U.S. national security interest. American 
security is best served through a strong, credible deterrent that 
operates within a legally binding, stable, and constrained arms control 
environment.

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