[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 8 (Tuesday, January 15, 2019)]
[House]
[Pages H563-H566]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  INSPECTOR GENERAL ACCESS ACT OF 2019

  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
bill (H.R. 202) to amend the Inspector General Act of 1978 relative to 
the powers of the Department of Justice Inspector General.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                H.R. 202

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Inspector General Access Act 
     of 2019''.

     SEC. 2. INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERSONNEL.

       Section 8E of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``and paragraph (3)'';
       (B) by striking paragraph (3);
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
     (3) and (4), respectively; and
       (D) in paragraph (4), as redesignated, by striking 
     ``paragraph (4)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``, except with respect 
     to allegations described in subsection (b)(3),''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cummings) and the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. 
Foxx) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.

                              {time}  1315


                             General Leave

  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and include 
extraneous material on the measure before us today.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Maryland?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 202, the 
Inspector General Access Act. I thank Representatives Richmond, Hice, 
and Lynch for the bipartisan manner in which they worked on this very 
important bill in the last Congress.
  The Inspector General Access Act would allow the inspector general of 
the Department of Justice to investigate allegations of misconduct by 
Department attorneys. The IG is statutorily independent and currently 
has the authority to investigate other DOJ personnel.
  The IG is barred from pursuing appropriate investigations into 
attorneys at the Department. Under current law, the authority to 
investigate attorneys is restricted to the Office of Professional 
Responsibility within DOJ. OPR is not statutorily independent, and its 
head is not confirmed by the Senate like the IG is. Treating attorneys 
differently from other personnel is simply unfair.
  Michael Horowitz, the inspector general at the Department of Justice, 
recently testified before our Committee on Oversight and Reform, and 
this is what he said: ``This bifurcated jurisdiction creates a system 
where misconduct by FBI agents and other DOJ law enforcement officers 
is conducted by a statutorily-independent IG appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate, while misconduct by DOJ prosecutors is 
investigated by a component head who is appointed by the Department's 
leadership and who lacks statutory independence. There is no principled 
reason for treating misconduct by Federal prosecutors differently than 
misconduct by DOJ law enforcement agents.''
  H.R. 202 would not prohibit OPR from investigating attorneys. It 
would simply add the ability to investigate attorneys, when appropriate 
to the IG's authority, an additional layer of accountability.
  Empowering IGs has been and should continue to be a nonpartisan 
issue. The Committee on Oversight and Reform relies on the work of IGs. 
We strongly support efforts to help them do their jobs effectively and 
efficiently.
  A bill identical to the one before us passed the House on a voice 
vote in the last Congress. I urge my colleagues to continue their 
support for IGs by supporting the Inspector General Access Act.

[[Page H564]]

  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. FOXX of North Carolina. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time 
as I may consume.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 202, the Inspector 
General Access Act of 2019. Inspectors general perform a critical 
oversight function with regard to misconduct at their respective 
agencies. This committee, the Oversight and Reform Committee, has a 
long history of advocating for IGs to have timely and complete access 
to all the information they need to fulfill their oversight and 
investigative functions.
  In continuance of that mission, H.R. 202 removes an unnecessary and 
outdated statutory hurdle that prevents the inspector general from 
investigating certain misconduct at the Department of Justice, DOJ.
  Current law requires the DOJ IG to refer allegations of misconduct by 
Department attorneys to the Office of Professional Responsibility, or 
OPR, rather than initiate an investigation himself. The OPR existed 
prior to the statutory creation of the DOJ IG in 1988. At the time DOJ 
IG was created, OPR retained the specific authority.
  H.R. 202 seeks to harmonize the Department of Justice IG's 
investigative authority with the rest of the Federal inspectors general 
who are not similarly restricted. Congress and this committee have 
consistently supported the need for independent and transparent 
oversight of Federal agencies and programs. The current bifurcation of 
investigative authority at DOJ is inconsistent with this committee's 
history of supporting the notion of an unencumbered IG.
  The DOJ IG is not without its own oversight. The IG is confirmed by 
the Senate, accountable to the public, and is only removable by the 
President after notification to Congress. Further, the IG has statutory 
reporting obligations to both agency leadership and Congress.
  The OPR, in contrast, lacks such independence from the agency it is 
obligated to investigate. The director of OPR is selected and appointed 
by the attorney general, answers to the attorney general, and can be 
removed or disciplined only by the attorney general. The IG's 
independence is critical to the value of their work.
  Also critical to the value of the IG's work is transparency. The IG 
maintains transparency by publishing its reports on a public website. 
The website also contains information about the IG's operations and 
functions and a full archive of completed and ongoing work. This 
standard of transparency does not apply to OPR. Adverse findings by OPR 
against a DOJ lawyer are subject to review by the Department's 
leadership and can be overruled by the Department's leadership without 
any transparency.
  It is important to note that this division of authority is a unique 
situation amongst the Federal IG community. The need for this 
legislation has also been discussed in multiple hearings before the 
Oversight and Reform Committee and in reports by watchdog groups.
  The DOJ IG, Michael Horowitz, testified before the Oversight and 
Reform Committee on the importance of eliminating this discrepancy. 
Congress's own watchdog, the Government Accountability Office, has 
issued reports with recommendations to empower the DOJ IG.
  This is a good bill, Madam Speaker, and I urge my colleagues to 
support it. With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from the State of Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz).
  Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Madam Speaker, I rise today to urge Congress to pass the Inspector 
General Access Act of 2019. This act, I am pleased to underscore, 
enjoys broad bipartisan support from this body now and has in the past, 
but its approval is more urgent now.
  The actions, for example, of former U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta have 
drawn intense scrutiny since new revelations surrounding a plea deal he 
offered to a serial pedophile came to light.
  Based on newly reported documents and a group of brave women who came 
forward to share their stories, it appears that Acosta gave a 
sweetheart deal to a wealthy and well-connected sex offender and hid it 
from his victims, some of whom were still in the midst of coming 
forward.
  Acosta is now the U.S. Secretary of Labor, a position that handles 
workplace harassment and sex trafficking policies, yet he has refused 
to discuss the new allegations. This IG Access Act would explicitly 
allow the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General to 
investigate allegations of such alleged misconduct.
  It is a power that the IG office--as has been pointed out by both the 
chair and ranking member here, it is a power that the IG office already 
has when it comes to investigating allegations made against any of the 
DOJ's many law enforcement agents, from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to the U.S. Marshals Service.
  This act has received broad bipartisan support, both in successive 
Congresses and from the Government Accountability Office, but because 
of an unusual carve-out, the DOJ's inspector general is believed to be, 
as the ranking member said, the only Federal agency that has no 
explicit power to review the conduct of its own attorneys.
  If professional misconduct was involved in Acosta's handling of 
Jeffrey Epstein's plea deal, potentially dozens of victims of this 
connected multimillionaire have a right to know. Acosta's seemingly 
unethical decision to drastically reduce the criminal penalties against 
this vile sexual predator and to shield his other coconspirators is 
simply unacceptable.
  The American people and the victims of these horrific crimes deserve 
to know why justice was not served in this disturbing case, and the 
lack of transparency still cloaking it is deeply disturbing.
  Giving the DOJ's inspector general more explicit and independent 
power to pull back the cloak of secrecy on Acosta's sweetheart deal 
goes to the heart of transparency and accountability that this office 
stands for and that this bill would insist upon.
  Ms. FOXX of North Carolina. Madam Speaker, again, I urge the adoption 
of this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  On November 29, 2018, DOJ Inspector General Michael Horowitz sent a 
letter to the Oversight and Reform Committee in support of the 
Inspector General Access Act, and this is what he wrote: ``Providing 
the OIG with authority to exercise jurisdiction in attorney 
professional misconduct cases would enhance the public's confidence in 
the outcomes of these investigations and provide the OIG with the same 
authority as every other inspector general.''
  I include Mr. Horowitz's letter in the Record.

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                              Office of the Inspector General,

                                                November 29, 2018.
     Hon. Trey Gowdy,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House 
         of Representatives, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Elijah E. Cummings,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
         House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Cummings: I write to 
     express my strong support for H.R. 3154, the ``Inspector 
     General Access Act of 2017'' (Access Act), which your 
     Committee approved unanimously on September 27, 2018. The 
     Access Act would amend the Inspector General Act (IG Act) to 
     provide the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the 
     Inspector General (OIG) with authority to investigate 
     allegations of misconduct against DOJ attorneys for their 
     actions as lawyers, just as the OIG has authority under the 
     IG Act to investigate allegations of misconduct made against 
     any non-lawyer in the Department, including law enforcement 
     agents at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug 
     Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, 
     Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the U.S. Marshals 
     Service (USMS). Currently, under Section 8E of the Inspector 
     General Act, the OIG does not have the authority to 
     investigate allegations of misconduct made against DOJ 
     attorneys acting in their capacity as lawyers; this role is 
     reserved exclusively for the Department's Office of 
     Professional Responsibility (OPR).
       The Access Act has received broad, bipartisan support over 
     successive Congresses because it promotes independent 
     oversight, transparency, and accountability within DOJ and 
     for all of its employees. For these

[[Page H565]]

     same reasons, in 1994, the then-General Accounting Office, 
     now the Government Accountability Office (GAO), issued a 
     report that found that preventing the OIG from investigating 
     attorney misconduct was inconsistent with the independence 
     and accountability that Congress envisioned under the IG Act.
       The OIG has long questioned this carve-out because OPR 
     lacks statutory independence and does not regularly release 
     its reports and conclusions to the public. Moreover, to our 
     knowledge, the DOJ Inspector General is the only Inspector 
     General in the entire federal government that does not have 
     the authority to investigate alleged professional misconduct 
     by attorneys who work in the agency it oversees. Providing 
     the OIG with authority to exercise jurisdiction in attorney 
     professional misconduct cases would enhance the public's 
     confidence in the outcomes of these investigations and 
     provide the OIG with the same authority as every other 
     Inspector General.
       Alleged professional misconduct by DOJ prosecutors, like 
     any alleged misconduct by DOJ agents, should be subject to 
     statutorily independent oversight:
       Over fifteen years ago, the Department and Congress 
     recognized the importance of statutorily independent OIG 
     oversight over all DOJ law enforcement components (FBI, DEA, 
     USMS, and ATF) when Attorney General Ashcroft authorized the 
     OIG to conduct additional law enforcement oversight in 2001 
     and Congress legislated it in 2002. Yet, allegations against 
     Department prosecutors for professional misconduct continue 
     to be handled exclusively by OPR. As a result, presently, if 
     an allegation of misconduct is made against the FBI Director, 
     it is reviewed by the OIG; by contrast, if an allegation of 
     professional misconduct is made against the Attorney General, 
     it is handled by OPR, a Departmental component that the 
     Attorney General supervises.
       The rationale supporting independent oversight for alleged 
     misconduct by law enforcement applies with equal force to 
     alleged wrongdoing by federal prosecutors, regardless of the 
     nature of the alleged misconduct. There is no principled 
     reason to have two standards of oversight at DOJ--one for 
     federal agents, who are subject to statutorily independent 
     and transparent oversight by the OIG, and one for federal 
     prosecutors, who are not for allegations of professional 
     misconduct. This is particularly true given the extraordinary 
     power that Department lawyers have to charge individuals with 
     crimes, to seek incarceration, and to pursue the seizure of 
     assets and property.
       The OIG's independence, established by statutory 
     authorities and protections, facilitates objective and 
     credible investigations of misconduct allegations, as well as 
     unbiased reports that identify and make useful 
     recommendations for improving the Department. The OIG is 
     headed by a Senate-confirmed Inspector General who can only 
     be removed by the President, with prior notice to Congress. 
     The OIG's statutory independence is bolstered by the OIG's 
     dual obligation to report findings and concerns both to the 
     Attorney General and to Congress. The independent OIG is able 
     to make critical investigative and audit findings without 
     fear of reprisal.
       Conversely, OPR has no statutory independence or 
     protections. The OPR Counsel is appointed by and answers to 
     the Attorney General, and can be removed or disciplined by 
     the Attorney General. Although a November 27, 2018 letter 
     from DOJ's Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) on H.R. 3154 
     states that ``OPR has always acted independently,'' it does 
     not point to any protections, statutory or otherwise, that 
     exist to ensure OPR's independence from the Attorney General, 
     nor has DOJ proposed strengthening OPR's independence by 
     adding such protections. Indeed, the letter fails to explain 
     or even address why DOJ believes it is better to have a non-
     statutorily independent entity handle attorney professional 
     misconduct cases rather than a statutorily independent 
     organization, as is the case for law enforcement professional 
     misconduct allegations.
       The OIG's independent and transparent oversight enhances 
     the public's confidence in the DOD's programs and improves 
     its operations:
       In addition to independence, the OIG considers transparency 
     a crucial component of its oversight mission. With limited 
     exceptions, the OIG ensures that the public is aware of the 
     results of our work. The majority of our reports are posted 
     on our public website at the time of release to ensure that 
     Congress and the public are informed of our findings, in a 
     comprehensive and timely manner. The OIG, consistent with the 
     IG Act, publishes on our website summaries of investigations 
     resulting in findings of administrative misconduct by senior 
     government employees and in matters of public interest even 
     when the subject is not prosecuted. We post such summaries 
     without identifying the investigative subject consistent with 
     the legal requirements under the Privacy Act. Because of this 
     commitment to transparency, there are currently hundreds of 
     OIG reports, audits, and reviews posted on our web site. 
     There are also summaries of dozens of OIG investigative 
     reports posted, including recent reports involving 
     significant misconduct by senior DOJ officials.
       In contrast, there are currently only a total of five 
     reports (other than annual reports) posted on OPR's website. 
     Four of those five reports are from 2008 and were the result 
     of OPR's joint work with the OIG, and which the OIG posted on 
     our website consistent with the IG Act and our practice. The 
     fifth report was completed by OPR in 2013 and only released 
     in 2015 in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
     request. Moreover, although the OLA letter states that ``OPR 
     discloses a substantial amount of information about its work 
     and findings in its annual report,'' this information is not 
     reported in a timely or comprehensive manner. Congress and 
     the public only find out about some, but not necessarily all, 
     of OPR's work when it issues an annual report.
       An example of this dichotomy can be found in a case 
     involving an Oregon lawyer who was arrested by the FBI and 
     wrongly imprisoned after mismatched fingerprints linked him 
     to the 2004 bombing at a Madrid train station. The OIG 
     investigated the allegations of FBI agent misconduct, while 
     the Department's OPR investigated the allegations of attorney 
     misconduct. This bifurcation led to inconsistent 
     treatment. The OIG report on the actions of the FBI agents 
     was published on the OIG's website, but OPR did not 
     publish the report on the conduct of the DOJ attorneys who 
     were involved in the same case.
       Transparency ensures greater accountability, and sends an 
     important deterrent message to other Department employees. 
     The credibility of the Department's disciplinary process is 
     inevitably reduced when the responsible component operates 
     under the direction of the Department's senior leadership and 
     is not subject to public scrutiny because of limited 
     transparency.
       The OIG has demonstrated its excellence in reviewing 
     complex legal and factual issues, including employee ethics 
     and misconduct matters:
       Over the past 30 years, the OIG has shown that it is 
     capable of fair and independent oversight of the DOJ. The 
     jurisdictional limitation of Section 8E(b)(3) is an 
     unnecessary historical vestige of the fact that OPR was in 
     existence prior to the statutory creation of the OIG in 1988. 
     Those who unsuccessfully tried in 2002 to forestall Congress 
     from providing the OIG with oversight of alleged misconduct 
     by FBI and DEA agents contended that those cases required 
     specialized expertise--just like the Department argues 
     currently that prosecutorial oversight requires specialized 
     expertise--and that argument was roundly rejected and has 
     proven to be entirely without merit. The decision by Congress 
     to extend OIG jurisdiction in 2002 to encompass misconduct by 
     FBI and DEA agents has allowed for significant and important 
     oversight of DOJ's law enforcement operations, and has had 
     significant positive impact on the integrity of those 
     agencies' operations.
       The OIG has consistently demonstrated our ability to handle 
     complex legal and factual issues related to our misconduct 
     reviews, including those involving FBI and DEA agents as well 
     as, on occasion, ethics issues involving DOJ lawyers. In 
     addition to our recent investigation of the FBI's actions 
     prior to the 2016 presidential election, which involved 
     evaluating the professional conduct by FBI agents, FBI 
     lawyers, and FBI senior officials, we have investigated the 
     FBI's actions involving its former agent Robert Hanssen, the 
     FBI's activities related to James ``Whitey'' Bulger, the 
     DEA's oversight of its confidential informant program, the 
     DEA and other components' handling of sexual misconduct and 
     harassment cases, the operation of the FBI laboratory, ATF's 
     actions involving Operation Fast and Furious, and the FBI's 
     use of its national security authorities (National Security 
     Letters, Patriot Act Section 215, FISA Amendment Act Section 
     702).
       Each of those and many other reviews resulted in 
     independent and transparent findings by the OIG, and resulted 
     in changes to Department operations that enhanced their 
     effectiveness and thereby increased the public's confidence 
     in those programs. Moreover, OIGs throughout the government, 
     including at the Department of Homeland Security and the 
     Securities and Exchange Commission, have authority to 
     investigate misconduct allegations made against attorneys at 
     those agencies and they have demonstrated that they are fully 
     capable of dealing with such matters covering a wide range of 
     complex legal issues. The DOJ OIG is the only OIG, to our 
     knowledge, that is barred by the IG Act from reviewing 
     misconduct by lawyers within the agency it oversees.
       The Access Act would provide the OIG with oversight over 
     Department lawyers in a manner that is entirely consistent 
     with its oversight authority over Department non-attorneys:
       The present oversight system that applies to allegations 
     made against any DOJ non-lawyer, as provided for in the IG 
     Act and Department regulations, is precisely the oversight 
     mechanism that the Access Act seeks to apply to Department 
     lawyers. Specifically, under the current system for DOJ non-
     lawyers, all non-frivolous misconduct allegations must be 
     provided to the OIG for the OIG's review and determination as 
     to whether it is of the type and nature that warrants and 
     necessitates independent OIG investigation. Given the OIG's 
     limited resources, the OIG handles only those allegations 
     that warrant an independent OIG investigation, and therefore 
     the OIG returns routine and less serious misconduct 
     allegations to Department components, such as the FBI's 
     Inspections Division and the DEA's OPR, for their handling 
     and investigation. For those matters that the OIG retains, 
     when the OIG completes its investigation, it sends its report 
     to

[[Page H566]]

     the component so that it can adjudicate the OIG's findings 
     and take disciplinary action, as appropriate. The Access Act 
     creates a similar practice, by maintaining the Department's 
     OPR to handle misconduct allegations that do not require 
     independent outside review as determined by the OIG, much as 
     the internal affairs offices at the FBI, DEA, ATF, and USMS 
     remain in place today.
       We are unaware of any claims by Department leaders that 
     this approach has resulted in ``different investigative 
     standards,'' ``decrease[d] efficiency,'' or ``inconsistent 
     application'' of legal standards. There is no evidence that 
     it has impacted the components ``ability to successfully 
     defend any significant discipline decision before the Merit 
     Systems Protection Board.'' Yet this parade of horribles is 
     precisely what the OLA letter claims will occur if attorneys 
     are treated in the same manner as Special Agents and non-
     attorneys at the Department, rather than continuing to 
     receive the special oversight treatment granted to them under 
     the current carve-out provision under the IG Act. This 
     argument is meritless. Indeed, the disciplinary processes at 
     the FBI and the DEA have substantially improved since the OIG 
     obtained statutory oversight authority over those components 
     in 2002, in significant part due to the greater transparency 
     and accountability that has resulted from the OIG's 
     oversight.
       I very much appreciate your strong support for my Office 
     and for Inspectors General throughout the federal government. 
     If you have further questions, please feel free to contact 
     me.
           Sincerely,
                                              Michael E. Horowitz,
                                                Inspector General.

  Mr. CUMMINGS. On December 25, 2018, the New York Times editorial 
board wrote: ``It makes sense to give Mr. Horowitz's office oversight 
authority over the activities of Justice Department lawyers--as other 
inspectors general have over lawyers in their departments. Doing so 
would aid the cause of justice and strengthen the public's trust in an 
institution charged with upholding it.''
  On December 30, 2018, the Miami Herald also published an editorial in 
support of the Inspector General Access Act. I hope the Senate will 
follow the quick and bipartisan action this body will take today when 
we pass this bill so that we can get it to the President's desk for his 
signature as soon as possible.
  With that, Madam Speaker, I urge all of our colleagues to vote in 
favor of this very important legislation, and I yield back the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. RICHMOND. Madam Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Cummings for 
bringing this important legislation to the Floor.
  In 2005, shortly after Hurricane Katrina, a group of New Orleans 
police officers opened fire on a handful of unarmed African American 
civilians walking across Danziger Bridge, killing two and injuring 
four.
  This occurred during the heart of the Hurricane Katrina aftermath and 
left deep scars on our community.
  Years later five officers were convicted on a variety of charges for 
these actions.
  However, their convictions were vacated in 2013 due to misconduct by 
Department of Justice prosecutors.
  In my efforts to find out what happened and why, and to also get 
transparency for my constituents, I received a DOJ report that was 
heavily redacted and missing crucial facts.
  I also learned that the DOJ Inspector General lacked the authority to 
investigate those actions.
  The DOJ was being left to investigate itself in situations like this 
and the American people were being left without the full story.
  That ultimately led to the victims and their families never receiving 
the full measure of justice they were owed.
  This bill grants the Office of the Inspector General for the 
Department of Justice the authority to investigate alleged misconduct 
committed by Department of Justice attorneys when they act in their 
capacity as lawyers.
  Currently, the OIG has jurisdiction to review alleged misconduct by 
non-lawyers in the DOJ, but the DOJ's own Office of Professional 
Responsibility exercises jurisdiction over alleged misconduct committed 
by DOJ attorneys when they are litigating, investigating, or providing 
legal advice.
  From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2013, Office of 
Professional Responsibility documented more than 650 infractions, 
including allegations that federal attorneys intentionally misled 
courts and alleged abuses of the grand jury or indictment process.
  In most of these matters--more than 400--OPR categorized the 
violations at the more severe end of the scale: recklessness or 
intentional misconduct as opposed to error or poor judgment.
  However, the DOJ does not make public the names of attorneys who 
acted improperly or the defendants whose cases were affected. As a 
result, the DOJ, its lawyers, and the internal watchdog office itself 
are protected from meaningful public scrutiny and accountability.
  This simple change in jurisdiction will ensure that people facing 
federal charges get a fair day in court and that the U.S. government is 
properly represented in disputes with corporations where taxpayer 
dollars are on the line.
  We must ensure that innocent people are not wrongly convicted and 
sent to prison, and that tainted cases do not cause convictions of 
guilty parties to be thrown out.
  With stakes as high as these, it is essential that DOJ attorneys be 
held to highest possible standards of accountability.
  While the Office of Professional Responsibility's investigations and 
actions are notorious for their secrecy, the OIG's independence and 
transparency will enhance the public's confidence in DOJ's operations.
  For these reasons, and for the victims of the Danziger Bridge 
shootings and their families, I encourage my colleagues to support this 
commonsense legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cummings) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 202.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________