[Congressional Record Volume 165, Number 2 (Friday, January 4, 2019)]
[Senate]
[Pages S27-S30]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. SCHUMER:
  S.J. Res. 2. A joint resolution disapproving the President's proposal 
to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with 
respect to the Russian Federation; to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, on December 19, as Congress was preparing 
to leave for the holidays, the Treasury Department notified Congress of 
its intent to terminate within 30 days a set of Russia sanctions 
imposed on En+ Group plc (``En+''), UC Rusal plc (``Rusal''), and JSC 
EuroSibEnergo (``ESE''). Each of these firms were sanctioned because 
they were owned or controlled by Oleg Deripaska, a notorious Russian 
oligarch and trusted agent of Vladimir Putin. As Treasury noted when it 
sanctioned him: ``Deripaska has been investigated for money laundering, 
and accused of threatening the lives of business rivals, illegally 
wiretapping a government official, and taking part in extortion and 
racketeering. There are also allegations that Deripaska bribed a 
government official, ordered the murder of a businessman, and had links 
to a Russian organized crime group.''

[[Page S28]]

  In its notification letter, Treasury argued it had secured an 
agreement with Deripaska, the companies and other stakeholders involved 
to significantly restructure the companies and make corporate 
governance changes. Under the agreement, Deripaska will remain 
sanctioned, and his property will remain blocked. The Treasury 
Department proposes to remove the three firms, including the huge 
Russian aluminum producer Rusal, from the sanctions list in the belief 
that the agreement will effectively separate the companies from 
Deripaska, eliminating his control over them and sharply limiting his 
influence. The proposal also reportedly places limits on any family 
members of Deripaska who are also significant investors in the 
companies.
  I noted in December that Treasury's decision raises critical 
questions that the Administration must answer about whether the 
structural and governance changes made by these companies are 
sufficient to ensure that Deripaska is no longer directing or even 
influencing these firms. I have also said that it remains to be seen 
whether Treasury's approach can succeed in Putin's Russia. Serious 
questions remain about whether Treasury can monitor and enforce the 
agreement even with the monitoring mechanisms proposed.
  The timing of Treasury's notice compressed an already tight 30-day 
review timetable provided for in sanctions law, giving Congress until 
January 17 to make its own independent assessment of whether it 
adequately protects US economic and national security, especially with 
respect to Russia. The Congressional review provisions of CAATSA were 
designed for precisely this kind of circumstance. They were imposed by 
Congress after serious questions had arisen about President Trump's 
relationship with Russia. Members on both sides of the aisle wanted an 
opportunity to independently assess the Administration's actions to 
lift, terminate or issue licenses on Russia-related sanctions. Those 
questions still linger, and have become even more pronounced in recent 
days.
  The formal review process is underway. The Banking and Foreign 
Relations committees are assessing the terms of the agreement, and the 
documents that have been provided by Treasury. But time is short, and 
if we did not introduce a resolution today we would have been overtaken 
by events, since any resolution must be pending in committee for ten 
days before it is subject to discharge to the full Senate. So today I 
am introducing such a resolution. I do so not because I have concluded 
that Congress should act to disapprove this agreement--I have not made 
that determination yet--but to preserve the procedural option of moving 
to bring up such a resolution at the end of the review process, if 
necessary, for expedited review and a vote by the full Senate.
  I intend to consult with my colleagues on the Banking, Foreign 
Relations, and Intelligence Committees, and others, before making a 
judgment on whether to call for consideration, under expedited 
procedures provided for in CAATSA, of this disapproval resolution. I 
know my colleagues will carefully review the proposal, and I look 
forward to hearing their conclusions once that assessment is complete.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Treasury Department's report 
provided pursuant to section 216 of CAATSA be printed in the Record.
  Mr. PRESIDENT. Without objection, so ordered.

                                   Department of the Treasury,

                                Washington, DC, December 19, 2018.
     Hon. Sherrod Brown,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban 
         Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Ranking Member Brown: With this letter, we wish to 
     provide you with notification that Treasury intends to 
     terminate the sanctions imposed on En+ Group plc (``En+''), 
     UC Rusal plc (``Rusal''), and JSC EuroSibEnergo (``ESE'') in 
     30 days. En+, Rusal, and ESE have agreed to undertake 
     significant restructuring and corporate governance changes to 
     address the circumstances that led to their designation, 
     including reducing Oleg Deripaska's direct and indirect 
     shareholding stake in those entities to below 50 percent; 
     overhauling the composition of those entities' boards of 
     directors; taking restrictive steps related to their 
     corporate governance; and agreeing to unprecedented 
     transparency by undertaking extensive, ongoing auditing, 
     certification, and reporting requirements. As part of this 
     agreement, half of En+'s restructured board of directors will 
     be comprised of U.S. or UK nationals and Rusal's current 
     board chairman will step down. Deripaska will remain 
     sanctioned. All of Deripaska's property and interests in 
     property, including entities in which he owns a fifty percent 
     or greater interest, will remain blocked, and foreign persons 
     will continue to be subject to secondary sanctions should 
     they knowingly facilitate a significant transaction for or on 
     behalf of Deripaska or entities in which he owns a fifty 
     percent or greater interest. None of the transactions to be 
     undertaken to divest Deripaska of his interests in these 
     companies will allow Deripaska to obtain cash either in 
     return for shares relinquished in, or from future dividends 
     he may receive from, En+, Rusal, or ESE. OFAC reserves the 
     right to relist any or all of these companies should the 
     change in circumstances represented by their implementation 
     of the agreement with OFAC be reversed, including by a 
     material breach of the terms of the agreement.

                             1. Background

       On April 6, 2018, OFAC designated seven Russian oligarchs, 
     including Oleg Deripaska, and 12 companies they own or 
     control. This action also targeted 17 senior government 
     officials as well as a state-owned Russian weapons trading 
     company and its subsidiary, a Russian bank. The April 6 
     action aggressively targeted Russian oligarchs and elites 
     that further the Kremlin's global malign activities, 
     including its attempts to subvert Western democracy, its 
     support for the Assad regime, its malicious cyber activities, 
     its occupation of Crimea, and its instigation of violence in 
     Ukraine. This sanctions action was one of many that the 
     Treasury Department has taken to target Russia's malign 
     behavior. Under this Administration, Treasury has sanctioned 
     256 Russia-related individuals and entities, including 150 
     individuals and entities under Ukraine/Russia-related 
     sanctions authorities codified by the Countering America's 
     Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
       Among the 12 companies targeted on April 6, OFAC designated 
     En+ for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, 
     Deripaska, and placed En+ on its list of Specially Designated 
     Nationals and Blocked Persons (``SDN List'') pursuant to 
     Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014, ``Blocking Property 
     of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in 
     Ukraine'' (``E.O. 13661'') and Executive Order 13662 of March 
     20, 2014, ``Blocking Property of Additional Persons 
     Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine'' (``E.O. 13662''). 
     OFAC also designated Rusal for being owned or controlled by, 
     directly or indirectly, En+; Deripaska has a 0.01 percent 
     direct ownership interest in Rusal, and his involvement was 
     not a basis for the designation of Rusal. OFAC also 
     designated ESE for being owned or controlled by, directly or 
     indirectly, En+ and Deripaska. As with En+, OFAC placed both 
     Rusal and ESE on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 13661 and E.O. 
     13662.
       The action on April 6 was among the most impactful targeted 
     sanctions actions ever taken by OFAC and included many of the 
     globally integrated companies the oligarchs rely on to 
     generate their wealth. The designation of Rusal, the world's 
     second largest aluminum producer, was felt immediately in 
     global aluminum markets. The price of aluminum soared in the 
     weeks following the designation, and Rusal subsidiaries in 
     the United States, Ireland, Sweden, Jamaica, Guinea, and 
     elsewhere faced imminent closure without limited sanctions 
     mitigation in the form of OFAC general licenses.

           2. En+, Rusal, and ESE Petition OFAC for Delisting

       As stated publicly by Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin, 
     the designations of En+, Rusal, and ESE, as well as the 
     follow-on collateral consequences, were not the primary aim 
     of the April 6 sanctions against Deripaska. Rather, En+, 
     Rusal, and ESE were designated due to their entanglement with 
     Deripaska. Economic sanctions, including those in E.O. 13661 
     and E.O. 13662, are designed to change behavior. In this 
     case, the objectives of the sanctions were to reduce 
     Deripaska's ownership in and sever his control of these 
     entities.
       Upon their designation on April 6, 2018, En+, Rusal, and 
     ESE (collectively, the ``Petitioners'') approached the U.S. 
     Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
     (OFAC) to petition for delisting pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 
     Sec. 501.807. The Petitioners, led by Lord Gregory Barker, 
     the former Minister of State for Energy and Climate Change 
     for the United Kingdom, have engaged in negotiations with 
     OFAC extensively during the past eight months, while OFAC 
     evaluated whether Petitioners were credibly able to make 
     material changes in the structure and composition of the 
     companies such to be eligible for delisting. Petitioners 
     conducted themselves throughout in a cooperative and 
     transparent manner. Petitioners submitted proposals whereby 
     they would sever the ownership and control of Deripaska over 
     Petitioners. Throughout the negotiations, OFAC pressed for 
     terms that were targeted towards further restricting 
     Deripaska. Ultimately, OFAC and the Petitioners were able to 
     settle on terms acceptable to OFAC and implementable by 
     Petitioners. As a result, Petitioners have agreed to 
     undertake significant restructuring and corporate governance 
     changes to address the circumstances that led to their 
     designation, including significantly reducing Deripaska's 
     direct and indirect shareholding stake in Petitioners; 
     overhauling the composition of their boards of

[[Page S29]]

     directors; taking other restrictive steps related to their 
     corporate governance; and agreeing to undertake extensive, 
     ongoing auditing, certification, and reporting 
     requirements.

     3. Change in Circumstances With Respect to En+, Rusal, and ESE

       Since their designation and following months of detailed 
     negotiations with Treasury, OFAC has secured from Petitioners 
     a binding agreement that severs Deripaska's control over 
     these critical revenue-generating entities and reduces his 
     ownership in these entities below 50 percent, thereby 
     untangling and protecting these companies from the 
     controlling influence of a Kremlin insider. The agreement 
     between OFAC and the Petitioners is subject to approval by a 
     number of stakeholders. Furthermore, the agreement reached 
     between OFAC and the Petitioners will create an unprecedented 
     level of transparency for the U.S. government into these 
     global companies, along with the other substantial 
     concessions obtained from them.
       With the change in circumstances that led to the original 
     designations of Petitioners, including Petitioners' ongoing 
     substantial commitments, this letter serves as notification 
     of Treasury's intention to terminate the sanctions imposed on 
     En+, Rusal, and ESE in 30 days. Treasury also assesses that 
     this action--a removal based on a change in factual 
     circumstances that is in line with longstanding U.S. 
     sanctions precedent and practice designed to change 
     behavior--is not intended to significantly alter U.S. foreign 
     policy.
       We stress that Deripaska will remain sanctioned and on 
     OFAC's SDN List. All of Deripaska's property and interests in 
     property, including entities in which he owns a fifty percent 
     or greater interest, will remain blocked. The result of 
     OFAC's conditions for delisting is that Deripaska's 
     investment in En+ is isolated and frozen. En+ is the linchpin 
     underlying the designations of these companies, since 
     Deripaska has virtually no direct ownership stake in Rusal, 
     and none at all in ESE. Specifically, Deripaska's stake in 
     En+ will be reduced from approximately 70 percent to 44.95 
     percent, and his stake cannot be increased in the future. 
     Pursuant to the agreement, Deripaska's stake in En+ will be 
     reduced through corporate restructuring transactions that do 
     not involve the transfer of funds directly or indirectly to 
     Deripaska, as well as by a donation of shares to a charitable 
     foundation. None of the transactions to be undertaken 
     consistent with the agreement will allow Deripaska to obtain 
     cash either in return for his shares or from future dividends 
     issued by En+, Rusal, or ESE. Future dividends to which 
     Deripaska may be entitled due to his diminished ownership 
     interests will be placed into a blocked account. Furthermore, 
     foreign persons will be subject to secondary sanctions under 
     section 228 of the CAATSA should they knowingly facilitate a 
     significant transaction for or on behalf of Deripaska. 
     Finally, OFAC has made it clear to the Petitioners that it 
     reserves the right to relist any or all of the Petitioners 
     should the change in circumstances represented by their 
     implementation of the agreement with OFAC be reversed, 
     including by a material breach of the terms of the agreement.

    4. Details of the Restructuring Agreed to by En+, Rusal, and ESE

       The significant restructuring and corporate governance 
     changes agreed to by Petitioners have been documented in a 
     ``Terms of Removal,'' which is a binding agreement between 
     Petitioners and OFAC that remains in effect as long as 
     Deripaska is on the SDN List. The foundation of this 
     agreement is the role of En+ in the restructuring and 
     corporate governance changes. Deripaska will have no direct 
     ownership stake in ESE and will retain only a 0.01 percent 
     direct ownership stake in Rusal. En+ will own and control 
     Rusal and ESE, which operates to isolate and freeze 
     Deripaska's indirect ownership in Rusal and ESE. Through the 
     Terms of Removal, Petitioners agreed to implement the 
     following:
       Deripaska's ownership in En+ brought well below 50 percent. 
     Deripaska's stake in En+ will fall from approximately 70 
     percent to 44.95 percent, and his stake cannot be increased. 
     Pursuant to the Terms of Removal, VTB Bank or another non-SDN 
     assignee approved by OFAC (``VTB Bank'') will take ownership 
     of a block of Deripaska's shares in En+ pledged as collateral 
     for previously issued obligations of entities controlled by 
     Deripaska issued by VTB Bank. Deripaska's ownership interest 
     in En+ will fall further as a result of a restructuring 
     transaction whereby the Swiss company Glencore, or its 
     subsidiary, swaps shares in Rusal for a direct ownership 
     interest in En+. The end result of these corporate 
     transactions will be a significant fall in Deripaska's 
     ownership of En+, none of which involve the transfer of funds 
     directly or indirectly to Deripaska. Deripaska will also 
     donate a block of shares to a charitable foundation. None of 
     the transactions to be undertaken consistent with the 
     agreement will allow Deripaska to obtain cash either in 
     return for his shares or from future dividends issued by En+, 
     Rusal, or ESE.
       Limited voting rights in En+. Deripaska will not be able to 
     vote more than 35 percent of En+ shares, as Deripaska will 
     assign any voting rights above 35 percent of En+ shares to a 
     voting trust obligated to vote in the same manner as the 
     majority of shares held by shareholders other than Deripaska. 
     Furthermore, OFAC has identified several shareholders with 
     professional or family ties to Deripaska. In all such cases, 
     En+ has agreed to assign the voting rights under these shares 
     to an independent third party with no personal or 
     professional ties to Deripaska. Furthermore, VTB Bank will 
     reassign voting rights associated with the shares it takes 
     ownership of to an independent third party.
       Independent board of directors for En+. En+ agreed to 
     create a board of 12 directors with a majority of independent 
     directors. Eight of the directors will be independent of 
     Deripaska and selected through an agreed-to process that 
     utilizes an executive search firm to select members with no 
     business, professional, or family ties to Deripaska or any 
     other designated person. With these changes, half of the En+ 
     board will now be U.S. or UK nationals with extensive 
     business expertise. OFAC has vetted the entire slate of the 
     proposed new board members. Prior to designation, En+'s board 
     was not majority-independent and consisted of 12 directors, 
     of whom only three were independent non-executive directors. 
     Deripaska will have the right to nominate no more than four 
     directors. Replacements for these eight will be selected 
     through the same process, with an opportunity for further 
     review by OFAC. En+ has agreed that Directors nominated by 
     Deripaska will not be permitted to sit on the Audit or 
     Nominations committees.
       Further extinguishment of control. To further extinguish 
     potential avenues of control by Deripaska, Deripaska is 
     required by the Terms of Removal to provide a deed letter to 
     En+ that includes a number of binding legal commitments 
     severing his ability to control En+. Specifically, the deed 
     letter provides that En+ and Deripaska explicitly agree not 
     to act in any manner or to enter into any arrangement, 
     whether by contract, trust, or otherwise, that directly or 
     indirectly provides Deripaska with the ability to exercise a 
     controlling influence over the management or policies of En+ 
     or any entity owned or controlled by En+, including Rusal and 
     ESE. En+ also has agreed to certify that, besides the right 
     to nominate four directors, it has not granted Deripaska or 
     any of his relatives any rights beyond those of ordinary 
     shareholders with respect to En+ and any entity owned or 
     controlled by En+.
       Ongoing transparency through auditing, certification, and 
     reporting. The Petitioners have agreed to provide OFAC with 
     an unprecedented level of transparency into the management 
     and operation of these companies. En+ and Rusal agreed to 
     comply with ongoing auditing, certification, and reporting 
     requirements, including: (i) auditing En+'s and Rusal's 
     engagements with and obligations to Deripaska and any 
     entities controlled by Deripaska as well as certifications 
     that such engagements have been terminated or do not 
     constitute control by Deripaska; (ii) providing OFAC monthly 
     certifications of compliance with the agreed upon Terms of 
     Removal; (iii) providing OFAC quarterly company reports for 
     En+ and Rusal; (iv) providing OFAC board minutes for En+ and 
     Rusal; (v) immediately notifying OFAC of any change in the 
     composition of the independent En+ board and certifying that 
     any such change is consistent with the selection process 
     outlined in the Terms of Removal; (vi) immediately notifying 
     OFAC of any anticipated changes to the identity of any 
     independent third party assigned voting rights in relation to 
     En+ and certifying that such individual has no business, 
     professional, or family ties to Deripaska or any other SDN; 
     (vii) immediately notifying OFAC of any anticipated change in 
     ownership of shares of En+ related to the Terms of Removal 
     and certifying, inter alia, that the change is consistent 
     with the Terms of Removal and that Deripaska's ownership 
     shall not rise above 44.95 percent; (viii) immediately 
     notifying OFAC of any anticipated changes to the constituent 
     documents of any of the Petitioners and certifying the 
     anticipated changes are consistent with the Terms of Removal.
       In all cases, notifications and certifications required to 
     be made under the Terms of Removal are designed to ensure 
     that Deripaska cannot obtain increased influence over En+ or 
     Rusal by changes in the management or ownership of En+. 
     Furthermore, En+ has agreed that no entity owned or 
     controlled by En+, including En+ and Rusal, will change its 
     place of incorporation to Russia from any other jurisdiction 
     without an affirmative vote of the new En+ board and 
     certifications to OFAC.
       En+ has agreed to respond fully and expeditiously to any 
     request for information from OFAC regarding the Terms of 
     Removal or general sanctions compliance. OFAC will continue 
     to actively monitor the Petitioners' compliance with the 
     Terms of Removal for any information suggesting that 
     Deripaska, any entity in which he owns a 50 percent or 
     greater interest, or any other blocked person seeks to 
     influence the Petitioners. All of the information provided 
     and certifications En+ is required to make under the Terms 
     of Removal will be directed to OFAC's Office of Global 
     Targeting, the office that develops evidentiary packages 
     to designate individuals and entities and which manages 
     the delisting process.
       Additional commitments with respect to Rusal. OFAC 
     designated Rusal for being owned or controlled by En+. 
     Therefore, through the same binding agreement with OFAC, 
     Rusal and En+ agreed that En+, once it is no longer subject 
     to sanctions, shall continue to control Rusal through a 56.88 
     percent stake and that En+ shall retain its right to nominate 
     the CEO of Rusal.

[[Page S30]]

     Deripaska will only retain a direct shareholding interest in 
     Rusal of 0.01 percent and any dividends from this interest 
     would be placed in a blocked account. En+ has committed to 
     use its majority control of Rusal to create a board of 14 
     members, and a majority of those board members (eight) will 
     be independent non-executive directors who have no business, 
     professional, or family ties to Deripaska, or any other SDN. 
     The Chairman of the Board of Rusal will be one of the 
     independent non-executive directors, and the current Chairman 
     of Rusal (Matthias Warnig) is stepping down as a condition of 
     the delisting of Rusal and further will no longer be a member 
     of the Rusal board. The other six directors will likewise 
     have no business, professional, or family ties to Deripaska, 
     or any other SDN, other than their professional backgrounds 
     as employees of Rusal or En+. Deripaska will have no right to 
     appoint any board members of Rusal. Prior to designation, 
     Rusal's board was not majority-independent and consisted of 
     18 directors, of whom only six were independent non-executive 
     directors. OFAC has vetted the current slate of directors for 
     Rusal's board, will review any future independent director 
     candidates, and will monitor all director appointments to 
     ensure Rusal's ongoing compliance with the Terms of Removal. 
     Rusal has also agreed to extensive certification and 
     reporting requirements similar to those agreed to by En+. 
     Furthermore, En+ has agreed that it will use its majority 
     control of Rusal to provide ongoing auditing and monitoring 
     of potential Deripaska involvement in Rusal.
       Commitments with respect to ESE. OFAC designated ESE for 
     being owned or controlled by En+ and Deripaska. ESE is a 
     Russian power company and a wholly owned subsidiary of En+. 
     It does not have an independent board of directors, and day-
     to-day management is the responsibility of the General 
     Director, who is appointed and overseen by the En+ board of 
     directors. The change in ownership and control of En+ 
     described above would also extinguish Deripaska's control of 
     ESE. Deripaska will not have any direct shareholding interest 
     in ESE. Furthermore, ESE's General Director will provide OFAC 
     with monthly certifications that he or she is not acting for 
     or on behalf of Deripaska, or any other SDN, and that control 
     over ESE rests with the General Director of ESE and En+. As a 
     wholly owned subsidiary of En+, the reporting and 
     certification requirements that En+ committed to will 
     necessarily encompass ESE operations and management.

               5. Ongoing OFAC Monitoring and Enforcement

       OFAC will continue to enforce its sanctions on Deripaska 
     aggressively, including by closely monitoring the 
     Petitioners' compliance with the Terms of Removal (``TOR''). 
     Should one or all of the Petitioners fail to abide by the 
     binding TOR, OFAC will consider all remedies at its disposal, 
     including re-designating the offending entity.
       Enforcement through complete transparency. The TOR agreed 
     to between OFAC and Petitioners require unprecedented 
     transparency. The Petitioners must regularly provide OFAC 
     with information and certifications about their compliance 
     with the TOR. This will supplement and be confirmed with the 
     U.S. Government's own information.
       The Petitioners are required to provide OFAC monthly 
     certifications regarding independence from Deripaska and any 
     other designated person; En+ and Rusal, which make extensive 
     commitments in the TOR, are required to certify monthly to 
     their compliance with respect to all elements of the TOR.
       En+ and Rusal are required to submit to OFAC copies of 
     their quarterly reports, board minutes, and audit reports 
     related to Deripaska's or other designated persons' potential 
     collateral involvement in En+ and Rusal.
       En+ and Rusal are required to give OFAC notice of and an 
     opportunity to respond to anticipated changes in the 
     composition of their boards, as well as of anticipated 
     changes to third parties assigned voting rights pursuant to 
     the commitments in the TOR.
       En+ and Rusal are required to commit to respond in full and 
     on a timely basis to any additional questions from OFAC 
     related to compliance with the TOR.
       En+ and Rusal are required to agree that if OFAC provides 
     En+/Rusal with information that bears on the compliance of 
     En+/Rusal with any of the elements of the TOR--including with 
     respect to the independence of any of the eight non-Deripaska 
     appointed directors of En+ or with respect to any of the 
     eight independent non-executive directors of Rusal--En+/Rusal 
     will report to OFAC promptly on any actions that will be 
     undertaken to remediate the issues identified by OFAC and 
     will provide OFAC with an opportunity to respond or object to 
     those actions.
       OFAC reserves the right to relist any or all of the 
     Petitioners to the extent that the change in circumstances 
     represented by Petitioners' entering into and adhering to the 
     TOR is reversed, including by a material breach of the TOR.
       Additional mechanisms for enforcement. Over and above the 
     TOR, OFAC retains broad authorities to potentially designate 
     or bring an enforcement action for direct or indirect 
     dealings with Deripaska or any other designated person in the 
     course of dealing with the Petitioners.
       Notwithstanding the delisting of the Petitioners, Deripaska 
     remains sanctioned. OFAC, therefore, has the authority to 
     designate any person for providing, directly or indirectly, 
     material support to Deripaska, including, for example, an 
     ``independent'' director who acts at Deripaska's behest.
       Notwithstanding a delisting of the Petitioners, U.S. 
     persons will continue to be prohibited from dealing, directly 
     or indirectly, with Deripaska or any other designated person. 
     OFAC's civil enforcement authorities and processes to address 
     such a situation are described in detail in OFAC's Economic 
     Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A.
       Notwithstanding a delisting of the Petitioners, non-U.S. 
     persons will face potential secondary sanctions for knowingly 
     facilitating significant transactions for or on behalf of 
     Deripaska or any other person or entity subject to sanctions 
     imposed by the United States with respect to the Russian 
     Federation, as described in OFAC's guidance.

                             6. Conclusion

       Treasury officials stand ready to engage and answer any 
     questions that may arise upon review of this submission, 
     Moreover, the Petitioners have confirmed their consent to the 
     release of the proprietary information contained in the TOR 
     to the appropriate congressional leadership and committees as 
     may be necessary. Please feel free to reach out to Treasury's 
     Office of Legislative Affairs at (202) 622-1900 if you would 
     like to discuss this matter further.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Andrea M. Gacki,
                       Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

       Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
     the text of the bill be printed in the Record. There being no 
     objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be printed in 
     the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 2

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress 
     disapproves of the action relating to the application of 
     sanctions imposed with respect to the Russian Federation 
     proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress 
     under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 
     2017 on December 19, 2018, relating to terminating sanctions 
     imposed on En+ Group plc (``En+''), UC Rusal plc (``Rusal''), 
     and JSC EuroSibEnergo (``ESE'').
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

                          ____________________