[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 196 (Wednesday, December 12, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7515-S7516]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 4085. Mr. MERKLEY submitted an amendment intended to be proposed
by him to the joint resolution S.J. Res. 54, to direct the removal of
United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen
that have not been authorized by Congress; which was ordered to lie on
the table; as follows:
At the end, add the following:
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE VALUE OF TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) opened for signature 50 years ago on July 1, 1968.
(2) The United States and the former Soviet Union averted a
catastrophic nuclear exchange during the October 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis, which led to a series of bilateral and
multilateral agreements to lessen the chance of nuclear war,
including the NPT.
(3) President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that as
many as 25 countries would acquire nuclear weapons by 1970
absent a treaty to control nuclear weapons.
(4) The United States Senate provided its advice and
consent to the NPT on March 13, 1969, with a vote on
ratification of 83 to 15.
(5) The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970.
(6) The NPT has grown to include 191 States Party to the
Treaty, making an irreplaceable contribution to international
security by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
(7) Article III of the NPT obligates all non-nuclear weapon
States Party to the NPT to conclude a Safeguards Agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify
treaty compliance, 174 of which are Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements crafted to detect the diversion of nuclear
materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses.
(8) Nuclear weapon States Party to the NPT have also
concluded voluntary offer Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols with the IAEA;
(9) The 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review
affirms, ``The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a
cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays
a positive role in building consensus for non-proliferation
and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those
that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty.''.
(10) The success of the NPT has and will continue to depend
upon the full implementation by all States Party to the
Treaty of the NPT's obligations and responsibilities, which
are derived from three mutually reinforcing pillars:
nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
and disarmament.
(11) Over the past half century, the United States has
exhibited leadership in strengthening each of the NPT's three
pillars for the global good, including--
(A) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile by more than 85
percent from its Cold War heights of 31,225 in parallel with
equally massive reductions of Russia's stockpile through
bilateral coordination;
(B) cooperating with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus--to
facilitate the surrender of nuclear weapons on their soil
after the fall of the Soviet Union--leading to each country's
accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state;
(C) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA to
promote peaceful nuclear activities exceeding $374,000,000
since 2010, including activities that help in the treatment
of cancer and other life-saving applications; and
(D) extending deterrence to United States allies in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, and the
Republic of Korea--which is an unmistakable demonstration of
the United States commitment to collective security;
heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have made
cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues with
the Russian Federation more challenging.
(12) A range of actions by the Government of the Russian
Federation has led to a deterioration in bilateral relations
with the United States, including Russia's brazen
interference in the 2016 United States presidential
elections, its violation of the Treaty between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles (commonly known as the ``INF Treaty''), signed
at Washington, D.C., December 8, 1987, and entered into force
June 1, 1988, its use of a chemical nerve agent in an
assassination attempt against Sergei Skirpal and his daughter
Yulia in the United Kingdom in March 2018, its illegal
annexation of Crimea, its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, its
destabilizing actions in Syria, and its use of polonium to
assassinate Alexander Litvinenko in the United Kingdom in
November 2006.
(13) The actions undertaken by the Russian Federation in
violation of the INF Treaty, including the flight-test,
production, and possession of prohibited systems diminishes
the contributions that the Treaty has made to security on the
European continent.
(14) Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a March 2018
speech, unveiled details of new kinds of strategic nuclear
weapons under development, including hypersonic nuclear
cruise missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, and a
multi-megaton nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines
that may be accountable under the Treaty between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for
the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February
5, 2011 (commonly known as the ``New START Treaty'').
(15) The Russian Federation erroneously claimed that the
United States may have not reached New START Treaty Central
Limits by February 5, 2018, as is mandated by the Treaty.
(16) The Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) is the
appropriate forum for the Parties to engage constructively on
any New START Treaty implementation issues that arise.
(17) Within a difficult environment, preserving full
compliance with agreements that may continue to contribute to
the national security of the United States and to global
security, particularly the New START Treaty, is all the more
essential, and to that end, the Department of State confirmed
in February 2018 that Russia had met New START's Central
Treaty Limits and stated that ``implementation of the New
START Treaty enhances the safety and security of the United
States''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should continue to encourage all
States Party to the NPT to comply fully with the Treaty;
(2) any United States negotiated agreement with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on
denuclearization should require the DPRK to return to as a
State Party to the NPT in good standing and full compliance
with the Treaty;
(3) the United States should maintain support for the IAEA
through its assessed and voluntary contributions and promote
the universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol;
(4) the United States and its allies should pursue
diplomatic efforts to ensure that the Islamic Republic of
Iran complies with the NPT and fully implements the IAEA
Additional Protocol;
(5) the United States should--
(A) consider whether to extend the New START Treaty, within
the context of meaningful arms control that decreases the
chances of misperception and miscalculation, avoids
destabilizing arms competition, and is verifiable and
consistent with the security objectives of the United States
and its allies and partners;
(B) assess whether Russia's recently announced nuclear
weapons should be accountable under the New START Treaty and
raise the issue directly with the Russian Federation;
(C) press the Russian Federation to engage constructively
on compliance matters related to the New START Treaty, and
also to take steps that provide greater transparency into
Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are not
captured under any treaty and which are numerically superior
to those held by the United States and its allies;
(D) begin negotiations with the Russian Federation on an
agreement to address the massive disparity between the non-
strategic
[[Page S7516]]
nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of
the United States and to secure and reduce non-strategic
nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner;
(E) begin an interagency process to discuss whether to
extend the New START Treaty and the possibility of further
engagement with the Russian Federation on strategic stability
and other arms control and nonproliferation issues; and
(F) consider the consequences of the New START Treaty's
expiration in 2021 also in relation to the insights the
Treaty provides into the location, movement, and disposition
of current and future Russian strategic systems;
(6) the United States strongly condemns the Russian
Federation's violations of the INF Treaty and its non-
compliance with its other arms control commitments and treaty
obligations, and urges Russia to come back into full
compliance;
(7) the executive branch of the United States Government
should consult with the Senate, and in particular with the
Committee on Foreign Relations, prior to any decision to
withdraw from an arms control treaty ratified by the Senate,
particularly any that may impact collective defense
arrangements the United States has entered into with other
countries; and
(8) the United States Government should continue to
encourage opportunities for cooperation with other states
possessing nuclear arms to reduce the salience, number, and
role of nuclear weapons in their national military
strategies.
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