[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 196 (Wednesday, December 12, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H10130-H10138]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass
the bill (S. 2736) to develop a long-term strategic vision and a
comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for
the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
S. 2736
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 101. Policy.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.
TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security
partnership.
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of
international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.
TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional
economic summits.
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource
conservation.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.
TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people
engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension
of United States assistance.
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Indo-Pacific region--
(A) represents nearly 50 percent of the global population;
(B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the
world; and
(C) poses security challenges that threaten to undermine
United States national security interests, regional peace,
and global stability.
(2) The core tenets of the United States-backed
international system are being challenged, including by--
(A) China's illegal construction and militarization of
artificial features in the South China Sea and coercive
economic practices;
(B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and ballistic
missile capabilities; and
(C) the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia of the
Islamic State (referred to in this Act as ``ISIS'') and other
international terrorist organizations that threaten the
United States.
(3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues
to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to
United States economic interests.
(4) The United States has a fundamental interest in
defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the
Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region
have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-
Pacific governments continue to commit human rights abuses
and place restrictions on basic human rights and political
and civil liberties.
(5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the
international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of
law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional,
and global interests. It is imperative that the United States
continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region
by--
(A) defending peace and security;
(B) advancing economic prosperity; and
(C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
(6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific,
and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on
United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in
which--
(A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes,
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr,
Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray
Hiebert, and others detailed the security challenges,
economic opportunities, and imperatives of promoting the rule
of law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific
region; and
(B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of
Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, testified, ``As realistic students of
[[Page H10131]]
history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the United
States has played since World War II as the architect and
underwriter of regional stability and security has been
essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself. But
they believe that as the tide that brought the United States
to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as
Britain's role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the
beginning of the twentieth century, so must America's role in
Asia as the region's historic superpower resumes its
place.''.
(7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred
to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which
was released in December 2017, states--
(A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and
repressive visions of world order is taking place in the
Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the
west coast of India to the western shores of the United
States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic
part of the world. The United States interest in a free and
open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our
republic.''; and
(B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation.
We will redouble our commitment to established alliances and
partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships
with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, fair
and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce
our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful
resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance
with international law. We will work with allies and partners
to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the
non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.''.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 101. POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit
to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive,
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the
Indo-Pacific region that--
(1) secures the vital national security interests of the
United States and our allies and partners;
(2) promotes American prosperity and economic interests by
advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based
Indo-Pacific economic community;
(3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of
the American people and universal human rights;
(4) supports functional problem-solving regional
architecture; and
(5) accords with and supports the rule of law and
international norms.
SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.
It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States--
(1) to work with United States allies--
(A) to confront common challenges;
(B) to improve information sharing;
(C) to increase defense investment and trade;
(D) to ensure interoperability; and
(E) to strengthen shared capabilities;
(2) to strengthen relationships with partners who--
(A) share mutual respect for the rule of law;
(B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and
(C) understand the importance of civil society, the rule of
law, the free and reliable flow of information, and
transparent governance;
(3) to support functional problem-solving regional
architecture, including through the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the
East Asia Summit;
(4) to emphasize the commitment of the United States--
(A) to freedom of navigation under international law;
(B) to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and
territorial disputes; and
(C) to expand security and defense cooperation with allies
and partners, as appropriate;
(5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete,
verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea;
(6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law,
and advocate for transparent governance;
(7) to develop and grow the economy through private sector
partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific
partners;
(8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements
in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network of
partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets;
(9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries--
(A) to pursue high-quality and transparent infrastructure
projects;
(B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines or air
ways, and communication; and
(C) to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes; and
(10) to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo-
Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with
allies and partners throughout the region.
TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United
States Agency for International Development, and, as
appropriate, the Department of Defense, $1,500,000,000 for
each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be
used--
(1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the
value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the
furtherance of United States strategy;
(2) to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of
partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend
against security threats, including through foreign military
financing and international military education and training
programs;
(3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral
engagements, particularly with the United States' most
highly-capable allies and partners, to meet strategic
challenges, including--
(A) certain destabilizing activities of the People's
Republic of China; and
(B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic
missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea;
(4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in
Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and
other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat
to the United States, its allies, and its citizens' interests
abroad;
(5) to help partner countries strengthen their democratic
systems, with a focus on good governance;
(6) to ensure that the regulatory environments for trade,
infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are
transparent, open, and free of corruption;
(7) to encourage responsible natural resource management in
partner countries, which is closely associated with economic
growth; and
(8) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South
Asia and Southeast Asia--
(A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard
training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
(B) by expanding cooperation with democratic partners in
South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;
(C) through intelligence sharing and other information-
sharing efforts; and
(D) through multilateral engagements, including by
involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.
(c) Countering China's Influence to Undermine the
International System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (b) shall be made available for United States
Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the
People's Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy
required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2014 (division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in
consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.
(d) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (b) may be made available for International
Military Education and Training and Foreign Military
Financing Programs for the armed forces of the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').
(e) Philippines.--
(1) In general.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant
to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics
assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the
Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate
committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines
has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy
that is consistent with international human rights standards,
including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are
credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up
extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human
rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.
(2) Exception.--The limitation under paragraph (1) shall
not apply to funds made available--
(A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, or
transnational interdiction programs; or
(B) to support for the development of such counternarcotics
strategy, after consultation with the appropriate committees
of Congress.
(f) Cambodia.--None of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available
for United States assistance programs that benefit the
Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State
certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional
committees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of
division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018
(Public Law 115-141) have been met.
[[Page H10132]]
SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.
(a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, done at
Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent
bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on
or before the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Japan.
(b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United
States Government--
(1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington
October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before
the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security
in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and the Republic of Korea.
(c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States
Government--
(1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia
and the United States of America, done at San Francisco
September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral
security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before
the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the
United States and Australia in promoting peace and security
in the Indo-Pacific region; and
(3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and Australia.
(d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America, done at Washington August 30, 1951, and all related
and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements
concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act,
including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at
Manila April 28, 2014.
(e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed
to--
(1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between
the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
(2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at
Manila September 8, 1954; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral security
agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date
of the enactment of this Act, including the Joint Vision
Statement for the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued
in Bangkok November 15, 2012.
SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that
seek--
(A) to further constrain space for civil society and
religion within China; and
(B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world
affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of
law and international norms;
(3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and
comprehensive relationship with China--
(A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
(B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including over
human rights, economic policies, and maritime security; and
(4) is committed to working with China on shared regional
and global challenges, especially--
(A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based
international system; and
(B) the denuclearization of North Korea.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should--
(1) welcome a decision by China to change course and pursue
a responsible results-oriented relationship with the United
States and engagement on global issues;
(2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the
Indo-Pacific region and globally; and
(3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the
rules-based international system.
SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership
between the United States and India in promoting peace and
security in the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of
diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United
States and India; and
(3) is committed to--
(A) the New Framework for the United States-India Defense
Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;
(B) the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade
Initiative, launched in 2012;
(C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;
(D) the United States-India Joint Statement on Prosperity
Through Partnership, issued on June 26, 2017; and
(E) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements concluded as of the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the
following findings:
(1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328;
130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition
of India as a major defense partner.
(2) The designation of India as a major defense partner,
which is unique to India--
(A) institutionalizes the progress made to facilitate
defense trade and technology sharing between the United
States and India;
(B) elevates defense trade and technology cooperation
between the United States and India to a level commensurate
with the closest allies and partners of the United States;
(C) facilitates technology sharing between the United
States and India, including license-free access to a wide
range of dual-use technologies, after taking into account
national security concerns; and
(D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on defense
strategy and policy, military exchanges, and port calls in
support of defense cooperation between the United States and
India.
SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should--
(1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the United
States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in
this section as ``ASEAN'') relationship to a strategic
partnership;
(2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong,
stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and
socially responsible community of nations that has common
rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent
with international law and the principles of a rules-based
Indo-Pacific community;
(3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater
integration among its members;
(4) recognize the value of--
(A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and security
partners within Asia and elsewhere, including Australia,
Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and
(B) strategic economic initiatives, such as activities
under the United States-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework
Arrangement and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which
demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic
Community and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-
Pacific region;
(5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
(A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in a
constructive manner; and
(B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and
legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms,
consistent with international law, including through the
adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea to
further promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific
region;
(6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in
ASEAN--
(A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime domain
awareness;
(B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of,
international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that are
critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce;
(C) to counter piracy;
(D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking activities such
as the trafficking of persons, goods, and drugs; and
(E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of countries or
regional organizations to respond to emerging threats to
maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region; and
(7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach
to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of
China.
(b) Report on Strategic Framework for Engagement With
ASEAN.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with other Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees on a strategic framework
to administer programs, projects, and activities of the
United States to support diplomatic and economic engagement
between the United States and ASEAN member countries for the
10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall address the following elements of United States
strategy:
(A) Promoting commercial engagement between the United
States and member countries of ASEAN.
(B) Helping member countries of ASEAN use sustainable,
efficient, and innovative
[[Page H10133]]
technologies in their respective energy sectors.
(C) Supporting economic conditions in member countries of
ASEAN that promote innovation, the creation of new
businesses, sustainable growth, and the education of the
region's future innovators, entrepreneurs, and business
leaders.
(D) Working with member countries of ASEAN to improve the
policy and regulatory environment for growth, trade,
innovation, and investment.
(E) Supporting the regional integration objectives of
member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic Community.
(F) Partnership opportunities with the governments of other
countries friendly to the United States that have committed
to a high set of standards for investment and development
with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of State.
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL
SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should
develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security
cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and
Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and
other defense-related initiatives.
SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the security dialogue between the United States,
Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing
security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to
promote--
(A) a rules-based order;
(B) respect for international law; and
(C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
(2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to
replace, current mechanisms.
SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
(a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed
to--
(1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,
done in Washington November 9, 2010;
(2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense
Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed
to--
(1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
(2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive
Partnership between the United States of America and
Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed
to--
(1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer
Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at
Washington July 12, 2005;
(2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at
Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Singapore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed
to--
(1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,
done at Washington December 16, 2013;
(2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement on
Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
(3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement, done
at Washington May 31, 2017; and
(4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and
Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment of
this Act.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and
security cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime
security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnam.
SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.
(a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy
of the United States--
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security
relationship between Taiwan and the United States;
(2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States
Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint
communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President
Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and
(3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to
support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the
Taiwan Strait.
(b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President should conduct
regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are
tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from
the People's Republic of China, including supporting the
efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric
capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable,
and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.
(c) Travel.--The President should encourage the travel of
highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance
with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).
SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by
illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017),
and 2397 (2017).
(2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own
people and citizens of other countries, including the United
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
(3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful
denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close
concert with its partners.
(b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions
Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to
activities of the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such
government, or other persons in accordance with Executive
Order 13551 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
property of certain persons with respect to North Korea),
Executive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
imposing additional sanctions), Executive Order 13694 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of
certain persons engaging in significant malicious
cyberenabled activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the
Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea,
and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North
Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705;
relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to
North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the
day before the date of the enactment of this Act, until the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in
the illicit activities described in such Executive orders,
including actions in violation of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any
sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting
for or on behalf of such government, or any other person
provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a),
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees justifying the termination of the
sanction and explaining the relationship between such
termination and the cessation of any illicit activity that
violates any of the United Nations Security Council
resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1) by such
Government or person. The reporting requirement under this
paragraph shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.).
(c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation
on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and
Ballistic Missile Programs.--It is the policy of the United
States that the objective of negotiations with respect to the
nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and
irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
(d) Report on a Strategy to Address the Threats Posed by,
and the Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for
the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, or a designee
of the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that describes actions taken by the
United States to address the threats posed by, and the
capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United States to
identify strategies and policies, including an assessment of
the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and
policies--
(i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic missile
program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
(B) an assessment of--
(i) potential road maps toward peaceful denuclearization of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the elimination
of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by
[[Page H10134]]
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(ii) specific actions that the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea would need to take for each such roadmap to become
viable;
(C) a summary of the United States strategy to increase
international coordination and cooperation, whether
unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including
sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to address the threat
posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which shall include--
(i) a description of the actions taken by the Secretary of
State, or designees of the Secretary, to consult with
governments around the world, with the purpose of inducing
such governments to fully implement the United Nations
Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection
(a)(1);
(ii) a description of the actions taken by such governments
to fully implement United Nations Security Council
resolutions related to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea;
(iii) a list of countries with governments that the
Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to
implementing the United Nations Security Council resolutions
referred to in subsection (a)(1); and
(iv) a plan of action to engage, and increase cooperation
with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
with the governments of the countries on the list described
in clause (iii);
(D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national export
control regimes of countries that are members of the United
Nations, and multilateral export control regimes, that are
necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to the United
Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
subsection (a)(1); and
(E) an action plan to encourage and assist countries in
adopting and using authorities necessary to enforce export
controls required by United Nations Security Council
resolutions.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) representatives of the United States shall use the
voice and vote of the United States in all international
organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such
organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea meets its commitments under the United
Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
subsection (a)(1); and
(2) the Secretary of State should work to induce countries
to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security
Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1),
including by considering appropriate adjustments to the
diplomatic posture and foreign assistance of the United
States with governments that the Secretary has determined are
noncooperative with respect to implementing the United
Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in
subsection (a)(1).
SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.
The United States Government is committed to--
(1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 2010,
which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical
cooperation between the United States and New Zealand;
(2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012,
which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a
framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and
defense dialogues; and
(3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security
agreements and arrangements between the United States and New
Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the
United States should--
(1) support strong United States engagement with the
nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;
(2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South
Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--
(A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
(B) environmental challenges and resilience;
(C) global health;
(D) development and trade; and
(E) people-to-people ties; and
(3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands,
as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance,
and economic development.
(b) United States-Compacts of Free Association.--It is the
sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free Association
entered between the United States and the Freely Associated
States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of
Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)--
(1) enhance the strategic posture of the United States in
the Western Pacific;
(2) reinforce United States regional commitment;
(3) preempt potential adversaries from establishing
positional advantage; and
(4) further self-governance, economic development, and
self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated States.
SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
(a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation
Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight
operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with
applicable international law; and
(2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to
peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea,
in accordance with applicable international law.
(b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the
sense of Congress that the President should develop a
diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States
allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and
freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region,
including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in
support of a rules-based international system benefitting all
countries.
SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) ISIS.--The term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials, shall
submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress
that contains an assessment of the current and future
capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked,
and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that
pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies,
and its citizens interests abroad.
(c) Elements.--The report required under subsection (b)
shall include--
(1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and
other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in
Southeast Asia;
(2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters
expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the
Middle East;
(3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of ISIS-linked,
al Qaeda-linked, and other various extremist group
affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;
(4) the current resources available to combat the threat of
ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist
group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the
additional resources required to combat such threat;
(5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-
linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
affiliated fighters to operate effectively in the Indo-
Pacific region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Malaysia;
(6) a description of the capabilities and resources of
governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist
groups; and
(7) a list of additional United States resources and
capabilities that the Department of Defense and the
Department of State recommend providing to governments in
Southeast Asia to combat violent extremist groups.
SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the
United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
(1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats,
including state-sponsored threats;
(2) to share best practices to combat such threats;
(3) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks,
misinformation, and propaganda; and
(4) to strengthen the resilience of critical
infrastructure.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2019 through 2023 to enhance cooperation between the United
States and Indo-Pacific nations for the purposes of
combatting cybersecurity threats.
SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION.
(a) In General.--The United States Government--
(1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes
a threat to international peace and security;
(2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed
to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the
proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear
and missile technologies, and other weapons of mass
destruction;
(3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
(A) to expand and modernize their respective nuclear
arsenals, including through significant research and
development resources
[[Page H10135]]
in hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced technologies;
and
(B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear technologies; and
(4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in
the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of
peaceful applications.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States Government should undertake all reasonable
and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and
nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit
the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery.
TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by
2030--
(A) 66 percent of the global middle class population will
be living in Asia; and
(B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will take place
in Asia.
(2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
(A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or regional
trade agreements; and
(B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries are under
negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry into force.
(3) Free trade agreements between the United States and 3
nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and
the Republic of Korea) have entered into force.
(4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a
group--
(A) represent the fifth largest economy in the world; and
(B) have a combined gross domestic product of
$2,400,000,000,000.
(5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66
percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of
bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member
states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.
(6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies
in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was
$77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus
of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was
$8,000,000,000.
(7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and
services exported from the United States to ASEAN member
states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
(8) According to the Business Roundtable--
(A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and
Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40 percent of global
gross domestic product in 2017; and
(B) United States bilateral trade with the other nations
referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 15,600,000 jobs in
the United States.
(9) According to the United States National Security
Strategy--
(A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ``remain
centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's regional architecture and
platforms for promoting an order based on freedom''; and
(B) the United States will ``work with partners to build a
network of states dedicated to free markets and protected
from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-
Pacific region is vitally important to the United States
economy, United States exports, and jobs in the United
States.
SEC. 302. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.
Congress supports--
(1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements
with partners that--
(A) comply with trade obligations and respect, promote, and
strictly adhere to the rule of law; and
(B) increase United States employment and expand the
economy;
(2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete,
verifiable, and measured outcomes;
(3) negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization, including negotiations to enter into
appropriate plurilateral and sectoral agreements;
(4) full implementation of the World Trade Organization's
Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-Pacific countries; and
(5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia
Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic
objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.
The President should seek to develop to negotiate a
comprehensive economic engagement framework with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.
(a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a
robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade
facilitation strategy, including leveling the playing field
for American companies competing in the Indo-Pacific region.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry
out subsection (a).
SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.
(a) In General.--The President should takes steps to
strengthen the enforcement of United States intellectual
property laws as a top priority, including taking all
appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-
enabled theft of intellectual property.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the President shall submit a report to
Congress that--
(1) describes the efforts of the United States Government
to combat intellectual property violations and commercial
cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly
the People's Republic of China; and
(2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority
areas for United States engagement and capacity building
assistance.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated to the United States Trade Representative
such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and
multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the
identified priority areas described in the annual report
required under subsection (b).
SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.
(a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the President shall establish a
comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage
the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement national
power strategies and cooperation with United States energy
companies and the Department of Energy national laboratories
to develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to provide
access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order
to reduce poverty, drive economic growth and job creation,
and to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2019 through 2023 to carry out paragraph (1).
(b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of
Congress that the United States should explore opportunities
to partner with the private sector and multilateral
institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable
electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar
(historically known as ``Burma'').
SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, should increase regional
engagement in the areas of environment, health, education,
and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong
countries, including--
(1) assisting in the development of programs that focus on
forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;
(2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable
uses of forest and water resources with the goal of
preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to
safe drinking water;
(3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband
internet connectivity, particularly English training and
connectivity in rural communities; and
(4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries,
including--
(A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
(B) helping regional partners to track and treat malaria
and tuberculosis.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023,
the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development,
shall submit a report to Congress that includes--
(1) a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Initiative
activities since its inception in 2009;
(2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and
measures of success for the activities described in paragraph
(1); and
(3) an accounting of funds used to execute Lower Mekong
Initiative activities.
SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATURAL
RESOURCE CONSERVATION.
It is the sense of Congress that the President should
encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific
region and United States private sector interests with
operations and investments in the region to deploy
agriculture practices that--
(1) conserve natural resources; and
(2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and
water bodies.
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S ECONOMIC
RIGHTS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
should--
(1) support activities that secure private property rights
and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia,
including--
(A) establishing legal frameworks to give women equal
rights to own, register, use, profit from, and inherit land
and property;
(B) improving legal literacy to enable women to exercise
the rights described in subparagraph (A); and
(C) increasing the capacity of law enforcement and
community leaders to enforce such rights;
[[Page H10136]]
(2) work with Asian civil society, governments, and
multilateral organizations to increase the capability of
disadvantaged women and girls in Asia--
(A) to realize their rights;
(B) to determine their life outcomes;
(C) to assume leadership roles; and
(D) to influence decision-making in their households,
communities, and societies; and
(3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products
and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized
enterprises in Asia.
TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 401. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The promotion of human rights and respect for
democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United
States' national security interest.
(2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values,
and good governance is critical to a successful United States
diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
(3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in the
Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty,
build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of
extremism, and promote economic growth.
(4) There are serious concerns with the rule of law and
civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by
Freedom House as ``Not Free''.
(5) There have been unacceptable human rights developments
in--
(A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by Freedom
House as ``Partly Free'', and the Department of State has
declared that the violence against the Rohingya constitutes
ethnic cleansing;
(B) the Philippines, which has been identified by Freedom
House as ``Partly Free'', and where there are continued
disturbing reports of extra-judicial killings; and
(C) China, where forced disappearances, extralegal
detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and lack
of due process in judicial proceedings remain troublesome.
(6) according to the National Security Strategy, the United
States--
(A) will ``support, with our words and actions, those who
live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom,
individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
(B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to
isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and
whose actions run contrary to our values''; and
(C) ``will support efforts to advance women's equality,
protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and
youth empowerment programs''.
SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.
The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to
combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-
Pacific region.
SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States Government officials should lead by
example--
(A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of the press in
the Indo-Pacific region; and
(B) by engaging with the press corps at every appropriate
opportunity; and
(2) the United States should advocate and support a
Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to
convene government and civil society, including journalists,
to discuss and address the challenges facing press freedom in
the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PERSONNEL.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) United States embassies and consulates in the Indo-
Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are
dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States
democracy, human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good
governance policy interests; and
(2) appropriate resources should be made available to carry
out such activities.
SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE
ENGAGEMENT.
The Secretary of State should, as appropriate--
(1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues
with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human
rights and religious freedom violations;
(2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange
programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs
engaging young leaders; and
(3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building
programs emphasizing civil society development.
SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS
STRATEGY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should continue to work with ASEAN to
improve the capacity of ASEAN to address human rights,
democracy, and good governance issues in Southeast Asia.
(b) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, shall submit a strategy
to the appropriate congressional committees to increase
cooperation with ASEAN to promote human rights, democracy,
and good governance in Southeast Asia.
(c) Contents.--The strategy submitted under subsection (b)
should include--
(1) an assessment of the types of United States Government
resources available to support increased cooperation; and
(2) an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that
the United States could potentially support or partner with
to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in
Southeast Asia.
SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.
The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance
freedom of information access with regard to North Korea.
SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND
SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.
(a) Sanctions.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should impose targeted financial penalties and visa
ban sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and other
relevant authorities, on any individual or entity that--
(1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
(2) engages in censorship activities.
(b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--It is the sense of
Congress that the President should, in accordance with
applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United
States economic assistance to any country that has engaged in
serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.
SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023,
to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights,
rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-
Pacific region, including for universities, civil society,
and multilateral institutions that are focusing on education
awareness, training, and capacity building.
(2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States
Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy,
the rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of
China.
(3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to
support activities preserving cultural traditions and
promoting sustainable development, education, and
environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the
Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in
China, India, and Nepal.
SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``human rights
defenders'' means individuals, working alone or in groups,
who nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of
universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms
if the advocacy of such issues may result in the risk of
safety or life.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been
facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented
crackdowns and conflicts.
(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2019 through 2023 to provide critical assistance to human
rights defenders through the Department of State's Human
Rights Defenders Fund.
(d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023,
the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator
of the United States Agency for International Development,
shall submit a report to Congress that includes--
(1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights Defenders
Fund activities since its inception;
(2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and
measures of success for the activities described in paragraph
(1); and
(3) an accounting of funds used to execute the Human Rights
Defender Fund activities.
SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES.
There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for
each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support Indo-
Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young
Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth
Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange
programs that focus on building the capacity of democracy,
human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-
Pacific region.
SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION.
Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use
of military force.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
General Leave
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on this bill.
[[Page H10137]]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the Indo-Pacific region is of critical importance to the
United States. It is home to some of our most urgent security
challenges, our closest people-to-people links, and our strongest
commercial and economic ties. The administration has recognized this
priority in both the National Security Strategy document and the
subsequent free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.
The United States must adapt to new and emerging geostrategic
realities and recognize the competitive nature of our relationship with
China. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, or ARIA, is a key
component of this effort. It provides the administration with the
direction and resources it needs for meaningful implementation of this
free and open Indo-Pacific-Asia strategy.
ARIA cements U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region by reassuring
our allies and deterring our adversaries. It strengthens our security
commitments with our allies and builds the capacity of our many
partners in the region to combat terrorism and to stop aggressive
actors.
The bill reaffirms longstanding treaty alliances in Asia with
Australia, South Korea, and Japan, and it calls for building new
regional security partnerships. It also expresses unequivocal support
for Taiwan by authorizing new arms sales; supporting enhanced, high-
level contacts with Taipei; and countering any efforts to forcibly
change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
On security, ARIA commits the U.S. Government to the full
implementation of sanctions on North Korea and its enablers. It
enshrines a policy of regularly enforcing U.S. freedom of navigation
and overflight rights in the East and South China Seas, where we are
seeing increasingly aggressive activities by Chinese ships and
aircraft.
{time} 1430
Mr. Speaker, this bill also supports robust U.S. commercial presence
in the region. It promotes U.S. exports and trade facilitation efforts,
while also authorizing penalties against those who steal United States'
intellectual property. This is essential for the growth of the U.S.
economy and the success of American businesses operating in the region.
Unfortunately, there are also many challenges to human rights,
nonproliferation, and democratic values in the Indo-Pacific. For that
reason, this bill bolsters the critical work of the State Department
and USAID to promote democracy, strong civil society, and the rule of
law.
Mr. Speaker, I am so pleased that we are taking up this bill, which
earned unanimous bipartisan support in the Senate. The Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act demonstrates the strong, continuing commitment of the
United States to Asia. It reaffirms American values, strengthens
American commitments to our many partners and allies in the region, and
makes clear our enduring pursuit of peace and mutual prosperity.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this
measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this measure. The Asia Reassurance
Initiative is an extremely important and timely piece of legislation. I
am glad that we will be able to bring it forward today in a bipartisan
manner. And that is no small feat. This legislation is so comprehensive
and far reaching, it was referred to six different committees.
I cannot overstate the strategic importance of this bill before us
today. In Washington, we all too often focus on immediate crises and
fail to focus on the broader but slower moving challenges of our time.
This legislation focuses on that bigger strategic picture.
Over the next 100 years, the most significant issue facing American
foreign policy will be the rise of the Indo-Pacific. The region will be
the most significant driver of economic and demographic growth. Its
environmental policies will have immense impact on global health and
climate change, and China's rise will have extraordinary geopolitical
implications for the future of American leadership in the world.
The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act is an important piece of
legislation in directing Congress' attention to its vital foreign
policy. The bill states that the United States will develop and commit
to a long-term, comprehensive strategic policy for the Indo-Pacific
region that secures our and our allies' interests; advances American
influence, including through the promotion of human rights; and
supports the rule of law and international norms.
This bill also authorizes $1.5 billion in funds to State and USAID,
so we can start to put our money where our mouth is on this Indo-
Pacific policy.
Passing this legislation is critical, especially at this time, as
China's assertive behavior in the Asia region threatens the regional
balance of power--as this administration takes unorthodox positions and
chooses to carry them out in ways that are of concern--and as much of
the world sees the United States in retreat from the international
stage, this bill sends a clear and resounding message to the region:
American commitment remains steadfast.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this measure and urge all Members to
do the same, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Doggett), a member of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade.
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, as we approve this Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act, it is also very important that we provide reassurance
to Americans that our values are not being abandoned. With one deranged
tweet after another, many people, both here and in Asia, view the
United States as having lost its way.
As approved by the Senate, this particular resolution responds very
appropriately to the vacillation and confusion of the Trump
administration's foreign policy, including its trade agenda.
In today's important House amendment to section 302 of the bill, we
commit not only to support continued engagement and friendship in the
Asia-Pacific region, but to advance, through our trade negotiations,
the values for which America has long been recognized as a beacon of
hope to the world. That is a beacon that should leave no corner of this
globe, including Asia, in the dark, and it must include human rights as
a universal concept for all the people of the world.
Our economic relations must be rooted in our shared values, our
respect for human rights, and our adherence to the rule of law. It
takes more than simply an opportunity to have more exports to justify a
new agreement with a trading partner.
A previous administration looked the other way on Malaysian human
trafficking in pursuit of more commerce, and it found itself in this
House short of votes. We must not make that mistake again.
With this new, improved section 302, Congress rejects support for
just any trade agreement and indicates its support for those agreements
with partners that actually respect, promote, and adhere to the rule of
law.
By its very terms, when section 302, as amended, is tied with title
IV as it came over from the Senate, we would not, for example, be
justified in new trade agreements with Myanmar, formerly Burma, after
its murderous ethnic cleansing of its Rohingya population. Nor does it
offer any support to the Trump administration's July 26 declaration of
intent to reward the tyrant of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte.
Every Democratic member of the House Ways and Means Trade
Subcommittee, on which I serve, has advised this administration that
``we strongly oppose President Duterte's Philippines as a trade
agreement partner.''
All of us noted that ``Duterte's fiery rhetoric has been linked to a
surge of extrajudicial killings of citizens by police and gunmen.''
Duterte's shocking human rights abuses is not all. Child labor is
persistent and serious. Safety is not prioritized, as indicated by the
72 workers who were killed in a garment factory fire.
These anti-worker policies mean that the Philippines is a low-wage
country
[[Page H10138]]
that markets itself to American companies looking to further outsource
American jobs. Yet Duterte's rule has been marked by abusive, arbitrary
actions against international investors who have turned to the
Philippines.
We all said on the Trade Subcommittee that ``we strongly oppose
Duterte as a trade partner,'' and I hope the Administration is
listening.
Though Trump's hug-a-thug approach around the world has repeatedly
preferred foreign tyrants over dependable, long-term American allies, I
believe that human rights is not a luxury. It is central to American
values. It is central to the security of every American family.
Amending this bill today helps us to achieve that objective and to
send a strong message to the administration about the trade policies
that we will consider in the coming year.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time, and I
will close because there are no other speakers.
Mr. Speaker, I want to again express my same strong support for the
bill before us today. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act is an
important piece of legislation. It articulates a bipartisan policy
towards the Indo-Pacific, authorizes funding to support American
engagement in the region, highlights the importance of coordinating our
development, diplomacy, and security interests to create effective
foreign policy, and it sends a message to Asia and the world that the
United States is investing in our allies and our strategic priorities.
I hope all Members will join me in supporting this bill.
Before I yield the balance of my time, I know I said this the other
day, but it looks like it is really coming true now: This may be the
last time those of us in the Foreign Affairs Committee get to speak on
the House floor for this Congress, and since my good friend and
partner, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the gentlewoman from Florida, is here, I
want to just say, for everyone to know, what a pleasure it has been to
be by her side for all these years and work closely with her on so many
important pieces of legislation that I lost count years ago.
But one of the things with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, you can always count
on her to work hard, to do the right thing, to be on the right side. It
is really just a pleasure to be her colleague and an even bigger
pleasure to be her friend.
So I hope she will come back and visit us. If not, I am going to
Florida to visit her. And I will always cherish the gentlewoman's
wonderful tenure in the House of Representatives and particularly on
the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. Speaker, the Foreign Affairs Committee, under the leadership of
Chairman Royce, who also has been as bipartisan as you can get, has
done a lot of work this year, this Congress. I am really proud of the
work that we have done in this Congress, and I look forward to doing
even more work in the next Congress.
So I thank Chairman Royce and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the United States must continue to reassure the nations
of the Asia-Pacific region of the enduring commitment of the United
States to being a peaceful presence in the region, dedicated to
universal values and mutual prosperity.
Senate bill 2736 provides the United States with a long-term and
whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region that advances
American national security interests, prosperity, and promotes the
values of freedom and human rights. I urge my colleagues to join me in
support of this measure.
I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York, the ranking member
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, soon to be the chairman of our
committee, for his friendship and for his kind words. I look forward to
treating him to a nice cafe con leche in Miami. So come on down--the
weather is fine--rather than me going to New York.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, S. 2736, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________