[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 196 (Wednesday, December 12, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H10130-H10138]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
the bill (S. 2736) to develop a long-term strategic vision and a 
comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for 
the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                S. 2736

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia 
     Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.

   TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 101. Policy.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy.

   TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 203. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security 
              partnership.
Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 210. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 211. New Zealand.
Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands.
Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of 
              international law.
Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region.

   TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional 
              economic summits.
Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership.
Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource 
              conservation.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women's economic rights.

  TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 403. Freedom of the press.
Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel.
Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people 
              engagement.
Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy.
Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea.
Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension 
              of United States assistance.
Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders.
Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Indo-Pacific region--
       (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the global population;
       (B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the 
     world; and
       (C) poses security challenges that threaten to undermine 
     United States national security interests, regional peace, 
     and global stability.
       (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed 
     international system are being challenged, including by--
       (A) China's illegal construction and militarization of 
     artificial features in the South China Sea and coercive 
     economic practices;
       (B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and ballistic 
     missile capabilities; and
       (C) the increased presence throughout Southeast Asia of the 
     Islamic State (referred to in this Act as ``ISIS'') and other 
     international terrorist organizations that threaten the 
     United States.
       (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues 
     to transform, presenting opportunities and challenges to 
     United States economic interests.
       (4) The United States has a fundamental interest in 
     defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the 
     Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in the region 
     have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-
     Pacific governments continue to commit human rights abuses 
     and place restrictions on basic human rights and political 
     and civil liberties.
       (5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the 
     international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of 
     law, may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, 
     and global interests. It is imperative that the United States 
     continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region 
     by--
       (A) defending peace and security;
       (B) advancing economic prosperity; and
       (C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
       (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, 
     and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on 
     United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in 
     which--
       (A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, 
     Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, 
     Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. Murray 
     Hiebert, and others detailed the security challenges, 
     economic opportunities, and imperatives of promoting the rule 
     of law, human rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific 
     region; and
       (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of 
     Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
     Harvard University, testified, ``As realistic students of

[[Page H10131]]

     history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role the United 
     States has played since World War II as the architect and 
     underwriter of regional stability and security has been 
     essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself. But 
     they believe that as the tide that brought the United States 
     to Asia recedes, America must leave with it. Much as 
     Britain's role in the Western Hemisphere faded at the 
     beginning of the twentieth century, so must America's role in 
     Asia as the region's historic superpower resumes its 
     place.''.
       (7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred 
     to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which 
     was released in December 2017, states--
       (A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and 
     repressive visions of world order is taking place in the 
     Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the 
     west coast of India to the western shores of the United 
     States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic 
     part of the world. The United States interest in a free and 
     open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our 
     republic.''; and
       (B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. 
     We will redouble our commitment to established alliances and 
     partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships 
     with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, fair 
     and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce 
     our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful 
     resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance 
     with international law. We will work with allies and partners 
     to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
     denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the 
     non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.''.

   TITLE I--UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

     SEC. 101. POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to develop and commit 
     to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
     multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the 
     Indo-Pacific region that--
       (1) secures the vital national security interests of the 
     United States and our allies and partners;
       (2) promotes American prosperity and economic interests by 
     advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based 
     Indo-Pacific economic community;
       (3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of 
     the American people and universal human rights;
       (4) supports functional problem-solving regional 
     architecture; and
       (5) accords with and supports the rule of law and 
     international norms.

     SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.

       It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States--
       (1) to work with United States allies--
       (A) to confront common challenges;
       (B) to improve information sharing;
       (C) to increase defense investment and trade;
       (D) to ensure interoperability; and
       (E) to strengthen shared capabilities;
       (2) to strengthen relationships with partners who--
       (A) share mutual respect for the rule of law;
       (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; and
       (C) understand the importance of civil society, the rule of 
     law, the free and reliable flow of information, and 
     transparent governance;
       (3) to support functional problem-solving regional 
     architecture, including through the Association of Southeast 
     Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the 
     East Asia Summit;
       (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United States--
       (A) to freedom of navigation under international law;
       (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of maritime and 
     territorial disputes; and
       (C) to expand security and defense cooperation with allies 
     and partners, as appropriate;
       (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve complete, 
     verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea;
       (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule of law, 
     and advocate for transparent governance;
       (7) to develop and grow the economy through private sector 
     partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific 
     partners;
       (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements 
     in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and build a network of 
     partners in the Indo-Pacific committed to free markets;
       (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific countries--
       (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent infrastructure 
     projects;
       (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines or air 
     ways, and communication; and
       (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes; and
       (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the Indo-
     Pacific region and strengthen security relationships with 
     allies and partners throughout the region.

   TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     committees of Congress'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
       (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives;
       (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of State, the United 
     States Agency for International Development, and, as 
     appropriate, the Department of Defense, $1,500,000,000 for 
     each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall be 
     used--
       (1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and 
     objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the 
     value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the 
     furtherance of United States strategy;
       (2) to improve the defense capacity and resiliency of 
     partner nations to resist coercion and deter and defend 
     against security threats, including through foreign military 
     financing and international military education and training 
     programs;
       (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 
     engagements, particularly with the United States' most 
     highly-capable allies and partners, to meet strategic 
     challenges, including--
       (A) certain destabilizing activities of the People's 
     Republic of China; and
       (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic 
     missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea;
       (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in 
     Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and 
     other terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat 
     to the United States, its allies, and its citizens' interests 
     abroad;
       (5) to help partner countries strengthen their democratic 
     systems, with a focus on good governance;
       (6) to ensure that the regulatory environments for trade, 
     infrastructure, and investment in partner countries are 
     transparent, open, and free of corruption;
       (7) to encourage responsible natural resource management in 
     partner countries, which is closely associated with economic 
     growth; and
       (8) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in South 
     Asia and Southeast Asia--
       (A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard 
     training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
       (B) by expanding cooperation with democratic partners in 
     South Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka;
       (C) through intelligence sharing and other information-
     sharing efforts; and
       (D) through multilateral engagements, including by 
     involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts.
       (c) Countering China's Influence to Undermine the 
     International System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
     subsection (b) shall be made available for United States 
     Government efforts to counter the strategic influence of the 
     People's Republic of China, in accordance with the strategy 
     required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, 
     Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
     2014 (division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in 
     consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress.
       (d) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to 
     subsection (b) may be made available for International 
     Military Education and Training and Foreign Military 
     Financing Programs for the armed forces of the Republic of 
     the Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').
       (e) Philippines.--
       (1) In general.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant 
     to subsection (b) may be made available for counternarcotics 
     assistance for the Philippine National Police unless the 
     Secretary of State determines and reports to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress that the Government of the Philippines 
     has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy 
     that is consistent with international human rights standards, 
     including investigating and prosecuting individuals who are 
     credibly alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up 
     extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of human 
     rights in the conduct of counternarcotics operations.
       (2) Exception.--The limitation under paragraph (1) shall 
     not apply to funds made available--
       (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime programs, or 
     transnational interdiction programs; or
       (B) to support for the development of such counternarcotics 
     strategy, after consultation with the appropriate committees 
     of Congress.
       (f) Cambodia.--None of the amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made available 
     for United States assistance programs that benefit the 
     Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State 
     certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of 
     division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 
     (Public Law 115-141) have been met.

[[Page H10132]]

  


     SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States 
     Government--
       (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
     Security between the United States and Japan, done at 
     Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent 
     bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on 
     or before the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
     United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in 
     the Indo-Pacific region; and
       (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
     diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
     States and Japan.
       (b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United 
     States Government--
       (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
     United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington 
     October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral 
     security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
     United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security 
     in the Indo-Pacific region; and
       (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
     diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
     States and the Republic of Korea.
       (c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States 
     Government--
       (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia 
     and the United States of America, done at San Francisco 
     September 1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral 
     security agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act;
       (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
     United States and Australia in promoting peace and security 
     in the Indo-Pacific region; and
       (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
     diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
     States and Australia.
       (d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States 
     Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between 
     the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of 
     America, done at Washington August 30, 1951, and all related 
     and subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements 
     concluded on or before the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at 
     Manila April 28, 2014.
       (e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed 
     to--
       (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between 
     the Government of the United States of America and the 
     Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
       (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at 
     Manila September 8, 1954; and
       (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security 
     agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, including the Joint Vision 
     Statement for the Thai-United States Defense Alliance, issued 
     in Bangkok November 15, 2012.

     SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.

       (a) In General.--The United States Government--
       (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that 
     seek--
       (A) to further constrain space for civil society and 
     religion within China; and
       (B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific 
     region;
       (2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world 
     affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of 
     law and international norms;
       (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 
     comprehensive relationship with China--
       (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
       (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including over 
     human rights, economic policies, and maritime security; and
       (4) is committed to working with China on shared regional 
     and global challenges, especially--
       (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based 
     international system; and
       (B) the denuclearization of North Korea.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should--
       (1) welcome a decision by China to change course and pursue 
     a responsible results-oriented relationship with the United 
     States and engagement on global issues;
       (2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the 
     Indo-Pacific region and globally; and
       (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the 
     rules-based international system.

     SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

       (a) In General.--The United States Government--
       (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership 
     between the United States and India in promoting peace and 
     security in the Indo-Pacific region;
       (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
     diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
     States and India; and
       (3) is committed to--
       (A) the New Framework for the United States-India Defense 
     Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia on June 28, 2005;
       (B) the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade 
     Initiative, launched in 2012;
       (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific and 
     Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015;
       (D) the United States-India Joint Statement on Prosperity 
     Through Partnership, issued on June 26, 2017; and
       (E) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
     agreements and arrangements concluded as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the 
     following findings:
       (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 
     130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition 
     of India as a major defense partner.
       (2) The designation of India as a major defense partner, 
     which is unique to India--
       (A) institutionalizes the progress made to facilitate 
     defense trade and technology sharing between the United 
     States and India;
       (B) elevates defense trade and technology cooperation 
     between the United States and India to a level commensurate 
     with the closest allies and partners of the United States;
       (C) facilitates technology sharing between the United 
     States and India, including license-free access to a wide 
     range of dual-use technologies, after taking into account 
     national security concerns; and
       (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on defense 
     strategy and policy, military exchanges, and port calls in 
     support of defense cooperation between the United States and 
     India.

     SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should--
       (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the United 
     States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in 
     this section as ``ASEAN'') relationship to a strategic 
     partnership;
       (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, 
     stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and 
     socially responsible community of nations that has common 
     rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent 
     with international law and the principles of a rules-based 
     Indo-Pacific community;
       (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
     integration among its members;
       (4) recognize the value of--
       (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and security 
     partners within Asia and elsewhere, including Australia, 
     Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
     Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and
       (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as activities 
     under the United States-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework 
     Arrangement and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which 
     demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic 
     Community and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-
     Pacific region;
       (5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
       (A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in a 
     constructive manner; and
       (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and 
     legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, 
     consistent with international law, including through the 
     adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea to 
     further promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific 
     region;
       (6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in 
     ASEAN--
       (A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime domain 
     awareness;
       (B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of, 
     international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that are 
     critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce;
       (C) to counter piracy;
       (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking activities such 
     as the trafficking of persons, goods, and drugs; and
       (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of countries or 
     regional organizations to respond to emerging threats to 
     maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region; and
       (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
     to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
     Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the 
     Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (b) Report on Strategic Framework for Engagement With 
     ASEAN.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
     following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
     with other Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the 
     appropriate congressional committees on a strategic framework 
     to administer programs, projects, and activities of the 
     United States to support diplomatic and economic engagement 
     between the United States and ASEAN member countries for the 
     10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall address the following elements of United States 
     strategy:
       (A) Promoting commercial engagement between the United 
     States and member countries of ASEAN.
       (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN use sustainable, 
     efficient, and innovative

[[Page H10133]]

     technologies in their respective energy sectors.
       (C) Supporting economic conditions in member countries of 
     ASEAN that promote innovation, the creation of new 
     businesses, sustainable growth, and the education of the 
     region's future innovators, entrepreneurs, and business 
     leaders.
       (D) Working with member countries of ASEAN to improve the 
     policy and regulatory environment for growth, trade, 
     innovation, and investment.
       (E) Supporting the regional integration objectives of 
     member countries of ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic Community.
       (F) Partnership opportunities with the governments of other 
     countries friendly to the United States that have committed 
     to a high set of standards for investment and development 
     with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of State.

     SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL 
                   SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
     develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security 
     cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and 
     Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and 
     other defense-related initiatives.

     SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the security dialogue between the United States, 
     Australia, India, and Japan is vital to address pressing 
     security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to 
     promote--
       (A) a rules-based order;
       (B) respect for international law; and
       (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
       (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to 
     replace, current mechanisms.

     SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

       (a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed 
     to--
       (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, 
     done in Washington November 9, 2010;
       (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense 
     Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
       (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
     agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
     Indonesia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed 
     to--
       (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, 
     done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
       (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive 
     Partnership between the United States of America and 
     Malaysia, done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
       (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
     agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
     Malaysia concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed 
     to--
       (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United 
     States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer 
     Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at 
     Washington July 12, 2005;
       (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at 
     Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
       (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
     agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
     Singapore concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed 
     to--
       (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, 
     done at Washington December 16, 2013;
       (2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement on 
     Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
       (3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision Statement, done 
     at Washington May 31, 2017; and
       (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
     agreements and arrangements between the United States and 
     Vietnam concluded on or before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.
       (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic, and 
     security cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime 
     security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, 
     Singapore, and Vietnam.

     SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.

       (a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy 
     of the United States--
       (1) to support the close economic, political, and security 
     relationship between Taiwan and the United States;
       (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United States 
     Government commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan 
     Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the 3 joint 
     communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by President 
     Ronald Reagan in July 1982; and
       (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo and to 
     support peaceful resolution acceptable to both sides of the 
     Taiwan Strait.
       (b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President should conduct 
     regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are 
     tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats from 
     the People's Republic of China, including supporting the 
     efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric 
     capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, 
     and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces.
       (c) Travel.--The President should encourage the travel of 
     highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance 
     with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135).

     SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by 
     illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile 
     programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 
     (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 
     and 2397 (2017).
       (2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own 
     people and citizens of other countries, including the United 
     States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
       (3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful 
     denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
     through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close 
     concert with its partners.
       (b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions 
     Against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
       (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to 
     activities of the Government of the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such 
     government, or other persons in accordance with Executive 
     Order 13551 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking 
     property of certain persons with respect to North Korea), 
     Executive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     imposing additional sanctions), Executive Order 13694 (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of 
     certain persons engaging in significant malicious 
     cyberenabled activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the 
     Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, 
     and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to North 
     Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; 
     relating to imposing additional sanctions with respect to 
     North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect on the 
     day before the date of the enactment of this Act, until the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in 
     the illicit activities described in such Executive orders, 
     including actions in violation of the United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1).
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any 
     sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of 
     the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting 
     for or on behalf of such government, or any other person 
     provided for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), 
     the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees justifying the termination of the 
     sanction and explaining the relationship between such 
     termination and the cessation of any illicit activity that 
     violates any of the United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1) by such 
     Government or person. The reporting requirement under this 
     paragraph shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
     be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant 
     to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.).
       (c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation 
     on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and 
     Ballistic Missile Programs.--It is the policy of the United 
     States that the objective of negotiations with respect to the 
     nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and 
     irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
       (d) Report on a Strategy to Address the Threats Posed by, 
     and the Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 
     the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, or a designee 
     of the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees that describes actions taken by the 
     United States to address the threats posed by, and the 
     capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
       (2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall include--
       (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United States to 
     identify strategies and policies, including an assessment of 
     the strengths and weaknesses of such strategies and 
     policies--
       (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea; and
       (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the ballistic missile 
     program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
       (B) an assessment of--
       (i) potential road maps toward peaceful denuclearization of 
     the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the elimination 
     of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats posed by

[[Page H10134]]

     the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
       (ii) specific actions that the Democratic People's Republic 
     of Korea would need to take for each such roadmap to become 
     viable;
       (C) a summary of the United States strategy to increase 
     international coordination and cooperation, whether 
     unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, including 
     sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to address the threat 
     posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which shall include--
       (i) a description of the actions taken by the Secretary of 
     State, or designees of the Secretary, to consult with 
     governments around the world, with the purpose of inducing 
     such governments to fully implement the United Nations 
     Security Council resolutions referred to in subsection 
     (a)(1);
       (ii) a description of the actions taken by such governments 
     to fully implement United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions related to the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea;
       (iii) a list of countries with governments that the 
     Secretary has determined are noncooperative with respect to 
     implementing the United Nations Security Council resolutions 
     referred to in subsection (a)(1); and
       (iv) a plan of action to engage, and increase cooperation 
     with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
     with the governments of the countries on the list described 
     in clause (iii);
       (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national export 
     control regimes of countries that are members of the United 
     Nations, and multilateral export control regimes, that are 
     necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursuant to the United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1); and
       (E) an action plan to encourage and assist countries in 
     adopting and using authorities necessary to enforce export 
     controls required by United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions.
       (3) Form of report.--Each report required under this 
     subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     include a classified annex.
       (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) representatives of the United States shall use the 
     voice and vote of the United States in all international 
     organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion 
     of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such 
     organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea meets its commitments under the United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1); and
       (2) the Secretary of State should work to induce countries 
     to meet their commitments under the United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1), 
     including by considering appropriate adjustments to the 
     diplomatic posture and foreign assistance of the United 
     States with governments that the Secretary has determined are 
     noncooperative with respect to implementing the United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 
     subsection (a)(1).

     SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND.

       The United States Government is committed to--
       (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on November 5, 2010, 
     which reaffirmed close ties and outlined future practical 
     cooperation between the United States and New Zealand;
       (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 19, 2012, 
     which strengthened the defense relationship by providing a 
     framework and strategic guidance for security cooperation and 
     defense dialogues; and
       (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
     agreements and arrangements between the United States and New 
     Zealand concluded on or before the date of enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

       (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     United States should--
       (1) support strong United States engagement with the 
     nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the 
     Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
     Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
     Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;
       (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the South 
     Pacific in areas of mutual interest, including--
       (A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
       (B) environmental challenges and resilience;
       (C) global health;
       (D) development and trade; and
       (E) people-to-people ties; and
       (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, 
     as appropriate, to support the rule of law, good governance, 
     and economic development.
       (b) United States-Compacts of Free Association.--It is the 
     sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free Association 
     entered between the United States and the Freely Associated 
     States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
     Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)--
       (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United States in 
     the Western Pacific;
       (2) reinforce United States regional commitment;
       (3) preempt potential adversaries from establishing 
     positional advantage; and
       (4) further self-governance, economic development, and 
     self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated States.

     SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF 
                   INTERNATIONAL LAW.

       (a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United 
     States--
       (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation 
     Program, regular freedom of navigation, and overflight 
     operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with 
     applicable international law; and
       (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to 
     peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, 
     in accordance with applicable international law.
       (b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the 
     sense of Congress that the President should develop a 
     diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States 
     allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and 
     freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, 
     including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in 
     support of a rules-based international system benefitting all 
     countries.

     SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) ISIS.--The term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of 
     Iraq and Syria.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
     Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials, shall 
     submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress 
     that contains an assessment of the current and future 
     capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 
     and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that 
     pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, 
     and its citizens interests abroad.
       (c) Elements.--The report required under subsection (b) 
     shall include--
       (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and 
     other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in 
     Southeast Asia;
       (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-
     linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters 
     expected to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the 
     Middle East;
       (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of ISIS-linked, 
     al Qaeda-linked, and other various extremist group 
     affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia;
       (4) the current resources available to combat the threat of 
     ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist 
     group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the 
     additional resources required to combat such threat;
       (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-
     linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
     affiliated fighters to operate effectively in the Indo-
     Pacific region, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
     Malaysia;
       (6) a description of the capabilities and resources of 
     governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist 
     groups; and
       (7) a list of additional United States resources and 
     capabilities that the Department of Defense and the 
     Department of State recommend providing to governments in 
     Southeast Asia to combat violent extremist groups.

     SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the 
     United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
       (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, 
     including state-sponsored threats;
       (2) to share best practices to combat such threats;
       (3) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks, 
     misinformation, and propaganda; and
       (4) to strengthen the resilience of critical 
     infrastructure.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 
     2019 through 2023 to enhance cooperation between the United 
     States and Indo-Pacific nations for the purposes of 
     combatting cybersecurity threats.

     SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-
                   PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) In General.--The United States Government--
       (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and other weapons 
     of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes 
     a threat to international peace and security;
       (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed 
     to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the 
     proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear 
     and missile technologies, and other weapons of mass 
     destruction;
       (3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
       (A) to expand and modernize their respective nuclear 
     arsenals, including through significant research and 
     development resources

[[Page H10135]]

     in hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced technologies; 
     and
       (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear technologies; and
       (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in 
     the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of 
     peaceful applications.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States Government should undertake all reasonable 
     and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms control and 
     nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit 
     the further spread of weapons of mass destruction and their 
     means of delivery.

   TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

     SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by 
     2030--
       (A) 66 percent of the global middle class population will 
     be living in Asia; and
       (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will take place 
     in Asia.
       (2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
       (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or regional 
     trade agreements; and
       (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries are under 
     negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry into force.
       (3) Free trade agreements between the United States and 3 
     nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Australia, Singapore, and 
     the Republic of Korea) have entered into force.
       (4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
     Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a 
     group--
       (A) represent the fifth largest economy in the world; and
       (B) have a combined gross domestic product of 
     $2,400,000,000,000.
       (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66 
     percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of 
     bilateral trade between the United States and ASEAN member 
     states has increased by 78 percent since 2004.
       (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies 
     in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was 
     $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus 
     of services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was 
     $8,000,000,000.
       (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, goods and 
     services exported from the United States to ASEAN member 
     states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
       (8) According to the Business Roundtable--
       (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
     Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and 
     Vietnam were responsible for a combined 40 percent of global 
     gross domestic product in 2017; and
       (B) United States bilateral trade with the other nations 
     referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 15,600,000 jobs in 
     the United States.
       (9) According to the United States National Security 
     Strategy--
       (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ``remain 
     centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's regional architecture and 
     platforms for promoting an order based on freedom''; and
       (B) the United States will ``work with partners to build a 
     network of states dedicated to free markets and protected 
     from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     trade between the United States and the nations in the Indo-
     Pacific region is vitally important to the United States 
     economy, United States exports, and jobs in the United 
     States.

     SEC. 302. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL 
                   AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS.

       Congress supports--
       (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements 
     with partners that--
       (A) comply with trade obligations and respect, promote, and 
     strictly adhere to the rule of law; and
       (B) increase United States employment and expand the 
     economy;
       (2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete, 
     verifiable, and measured outcomes;
       (3) negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization, including negotiations to enter into 
     appropriate plurilateral and sectoral agreements;
       (4) full implementation of the World Trade Organization's 
     Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo-Pacific countries; and
       (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use 
     of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia 
     Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic 
     objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

     SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.

       The President should seek to develop to negotiate a 
     comprehensive economic engagement framework with the 
     Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

     SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.

       (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a 
     robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade 
     facilitation strategy, including leveling the playing field 
     for American companies competing in the Indo-Pacific region.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry 
     out subsection (a).

     SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.

       (a) In General.--The President should takes steps to 
     strengthen the enforcement of United States intellectual 
     property laws as a top priority, including taking all 
     appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-
     enabled theft of intellectual property.
       (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
     following 5 years, the President shall submit a report to 
     Congress that--
       (1) describes the efforts of the United States Government 
     to combat intellectual property violations and commercial 
     cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly 
     the People's Republic of China; and
       (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority 
     areas for United States engagement and capacity building 
     assistance.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the United States Trade Representative 
     such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and 
     multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the 
     identified priority areas described in the annual report 
     required under subsection (b).

     SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.

       (a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
       (1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
     following 5 years, the President shall establish a 
     comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage 
     the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement national 
     power strategies and cooperation with United States energy 
     companies and the Department of Energy national laboratories 
     to develop an appropriate mix of power solutions to provide 
     access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power in order 
     to reduce poverty, drive economic growth and job creation, 
     and to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific region.
       (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 
     2019 through 2023 to carry out paragraph (1).
       (b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of 
     Congress that the United States should explore opportunities 
     to partner with the private sector and multilateral 
     institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian 
     Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable 
     electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar 
     (historically known as ``Burma'').

     SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in cooperation 
     with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
     International Development, should increase regional 
     engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, 
     and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong 
     countries, including--
       (1) assisting in the development of programs that focus on 
     forecasting environmental challenges and resilience;
       (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable 
     uses of forest and water resources with the goal of 
     preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to 
     safe drinking water;
       (3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband 
     internet connectivity, particularly English training and 
     connectivity in rural communities; and
       (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, 
     including--
       (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
       (B) helping regional partners to track and treat malaria 
     and tuberculosis.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023, 
     the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator 
     of the United States Agency for International Development, 
     shall submit a report to Congress that includes--
       (1) a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Initiative 
     activities since its inception in 2009;
       (2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and 
     measures of success for the activities described in paragraph 
     (1); and
       (3) an accounting of funds used to execute Lower Mekong 
     Initiative activities.

     SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATURAL 
                   RESOURCE CONSERVATION.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
     encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific 
     region and United States private sector interests with 
     operations and investments in the region to deploy 
     agriculture practices that--
       (1) conserve natural resources; and
       (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable lands and 
     water bodies.

     SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN'S ECONOMIC 
                   RIGHTS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
     should--
       (1) support activities that secure private property rights 
     and land tenure for women in developing countries in Asia, 
     including--
       (A) establishing legal frameworks to give women equal 
     rights to own, register, use, profit from, and inherit land 
     and property;
       (B) improving legal literacy to enable women to exercise 
     the rights described in subparagraph (A); and
       (C) increasing the capacity of law enforcement and 
     community leaders to enforce such rights;

[[Page H10136]]

       (2) work with Asian civil society, governments, and 
     multilateral organizations to increase the capability of 
     disadvantaged women and girls in Asia--
       (A) to realize their rights;
       (B) to determine their life outcomes;
       (C) to assume leadership roles; and
       (D) to influence decision-making in their households, 
     communities, and societies; and
       (3) seek to expand access to appropriate financial products 
     and services for women-owned micro, small, and medium-sized 
     enterprises in Asia.

  TITLE IV--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

     SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The promotion of human rights and respect for 
     democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United 
     States' national security interest.
       (2) Continued support for human rights, democratic values, 
     and good governance is critical to a successful United States 
     diplomatic strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
       (3) Strong support for human rights and democracy in the 
     Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to reduce poverty, 
     build rule of law, combat corruption, reduce the allure of 
     extremism, and promote economic growth.
       (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of law and 
     civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, 
     Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by 
     Freedom House as ``Not Free''.
       (5) There have been unacceptable human rights developments 
     in--
       (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by Freedom 
     House as ``Partly Free'', and the Department of State has 
     declared that the violence against the Rohingya constitutes 
     ethnic cleansing;
       (B) the Philippines, which has been identified by Freedom 
     House as ``Partly Free'', and where there are continued 
     disturbing reports of extra-judicial killings; and
       (C) China, where forced disappearances, extralegal 
     detentions, invasive and omnipresent surveillance, and lack 
     of due process in judicial proceedings remain troublesome.
       (6) according to the National Security Strategy, the United 
     States--
       (A) will ``support, with our words and actions, those who 
     live under oppressive regimes and who seek freedom, 
     individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
       (B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to 
     isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and 
     whose actions run contrary to our values''; and
       (C) ``will support efforts to advance women's equality, 
     protect the rights of women and girls, and promote women and 
     youth empowerment programs''.

     SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.

       The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to 
     combat trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-
     Pacific region.

     SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) United States Government officials should lead by 
     example--
       (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of the press in 
     the Indo-Pacific region; and
       (B) by engaging with the press corps at every appropriate 
     opportunity; and
       (2) the United States should advocate and support a 
     Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the Indo-Pacific to 
     convene government and civil society, including journalists, 
     to discuss and address the challenges facing press freedom in 
     the Indo-Pacific region.

     SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PERSONNEL.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) United States embassies and consulates in the Indo-
     Pacific region should have personnel, as appropriate, who are 
     dedicated to reporting on and advancing United States 
     democracy, human rights, labor, anti-corruption, and good 
     governance policy interests; and
       (2) appropriate resources should be made available to carry 
     out such activities.

     SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE 
                   ENGAGEMENT.

       The Secretary of State should, as appropriate--
       (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues 
     with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human 
     rights and religious freedom violations;
       (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange 
     programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs 
     engaging young leaders; and
       (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building 
     programs emphasizing civil society development.

     SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   STRATEGY.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should continue to work with ASEAN to 
     improve the capacity of ASEAN to address human rights, 
     democracy, and good governance issues in Southeast Asia.
       (b) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after 
     consultation with the Administrator of the United States 
     Agency for International Development, shall submit a strategy 
     to the appropriate congressional committees to increase 
     cooperation with ASEAN to promote human rights, democracy, 
     and good governance in Southeast Asia.
       (c) Contents.--The strategy submitted under subsection (b) 
     should include--
       (1) an assessment of the types of United States Government 
     resources available to support increased cooperation; and
       (2) an assessment to identify entities within ASEAN that 
     the United States could potentially support or partner with 
     to promote human rights, democracy, and good governance in 
     Southeast Asia.

     SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA.

       The President is encouraged to continue efforts to enhance 
     freedom of information access with regard to North Korea.

     SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND 
                   SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.

       (a) Sanctions.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     President should impose targeted financial penalties and visa 
     ban sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and other 
     relevant authorities, on any individual or entity that--
       (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
       (2) engages in censorship activities.
       (b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--It is the sense of 
     Congress that the President should, in accordance with 
     applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United 
     States economic assistance to any country that has engaged in 
     serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.

     SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
       (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, 
     to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, 
     rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-
     Pacific region, including for universities, civil society, 
     and multilateral institutions that are focusing on education 
     awareness, training, and capacity building.
       (2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States 
     Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State 
     for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, 
     the rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of 
     China.
       (3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
     shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to 
     support activities preserving cultural traditions and 
     promoting sustainable development, education, and 
     environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the 
     Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan communities in 
     China, India, and Nepal.

     SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS.

       (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``human rights 
     defenders'' means individuals, working alone or in groups, 
     who nonviolently advocate for the promotion and protection of 
     universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms 
     if the advocacy of such issues may result in the risk of 
     safety or life.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have been 
     facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprecedented 
     crackdowns and conflicts.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 
     2019 through 2023 to provide critical assistance to human 
     rights defenders through the Department of State's Human 
     Rights Defenders Fund.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2023, 
     the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator 
     of the United States Agency for International Development, 
     shall submit a report to Congress that includes--
       (1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights Defenders 
     Fund activities since its inception;
       (2) a strategy for any increased regional engagement and 
     measures of success for the activities described in paragraph 
     (1); and
       (3) an accounting of funds used to execute the Human Rights 
     Defender Fund activities.

     SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES.

       There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for 
     each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support Indo-
     Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young 
     Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth 
     Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange 
     programs that focus on building the capacity of democracy, 
     human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo-
     Pacific region.

     SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION.

       Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use 
     of military force.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on this bill.

[[Page H10137]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the Indo-Pacific region is of critical importance to the 
United States. It is home to some of our most urgent security 
challenges, our closest people-to-people links, and our strongest 
commercial and economic ties. The administration has recognized this 
priority in both the National Security Strategy document and the 
subsequent free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.
  The United States must adapt to new and emerging geostrategic 
realities and recognize the competitive nature of our relationship with 
China. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, or ARIA, is a key 
component of this effort. It provides the administration with the 
direction and resources it needs for meaningful implementation of this 
free and open Indo-Pacific-Asia strategy.
  ARIA cements U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region by reassuring 
our allies and deterring our adversaries. It strengthens our security 
commitments with our allies and builds the capacity of our many 
partners in the region to combat terrorism and to stop aggressive 
actors.
  The bill reaffirms longstanding treaty alliances in Asia with 
Australia, South Korea, and Japan, and it calls for building new 
regional security partnerships. It also expresses unequivocal support 
for Taiwan by authorizing new arms sales; supporting enhanced, high-
level contacts with Taipei; and countering any efforts to forcibly 
change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
  On security, ARIA commits the U.S. Government to the full 
implementation of sanctions on North Korea and its enablers. It 
enshrines a policy of regularly enforcing U.S. freedom of navigation 
and overflight rights in the East and South China Seas, where we are 
seeing increasingly aggressive activities by Chinese ships and 
aircraft.

                              {time}  1430

  Mr. Speaker, this bill also supports robust U.S. commercial presence 
in the region. It promotes U.S. exports and trade facilitation efforts, 
while also authorizing penalties against those who steal United States' 
intellectual property. This is essential for the growth of the U.S. 
economy and the success of American businesses operating in the region.
  Unfortunately, there are also many challenges to human rights, 
nonproliferation, and democratic values in the Indo-Pacific. For that 
reason, this bill bolsters the critical work of the State Department 
and USAID to promote democracy, strong civil society, and the rule of 
law.
  Mr. Speaker, I am so pleased that we are taking up this bill, which 
earned unanimous bipartisan support in the Senate. The Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act demonstrates the strong, continuing commitment of the 
United States to Asia. It reaffirms American values, strengthens 
American commitments to our many partners and allies in the region, and 
makes clear our enduring pursuit of peace and mutual prosperity.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this measure. The Asia Reassurance 
Initiative is an extremely important and timely piece of legislation. I 
am glad that we will be able to bring it forward today in a bipartisan 
manner. And that is no small feat. This legislation is so comprehensive 
and far reaching, it was referred to six different committees.
  I cannot overstate the strategic importance of this bill before us 
today. In Washington, we all too often focus on immediate crises and 
fail to focus on the broader but slower moving challenges of our time. 
This legislation focuses on that bigger strategic picture.
  Over the next 100 years, the most significant issue facing American 
foreign policy will be the rise of the Indo-Pacific. The region will be 
the most significant driver of economic and demographic growth. Its 
environmental policies will have immense impact on global health and 
climate change, and China's rise will have extraordinary geopolitical 
implications for the future of American leadership in the world.
  The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act is an important piece of 
legislation in directing Congress' attention to its vital foreign 
policy. The bill states that the United States will develop and commit 
to a long-term, comprehensive strategic policy for the Indo-Pacific 
region that secures our and our allies' interests; advances American 
influence, including through the promotion of human rights; and 
supports the rule of law and international norms.
  This bill also authorizes $1.5 billion in funds to State and USAID, 
so we can start to put our money where our mouth is on this Indo-
Pacific policy.
  Passing this legislation is critical, especially at this time, as 
China's assertive behavior in the Asia region threatens the regional 
balance of power--as this administration takes unorthodox positions and 
chooses to carry them out in ways that are of concern--and as much of 
the world sees the United States in retreat from the international 
stage, this bill sends a clear and resounding message to the region: 
American commitment remains steadfast.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this measure and urge all Members to 
do the same, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Doggett), a member of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, as we approve this Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act, it is also very important that we provide reassurance 
to Americans that our values are not being abandoned. With one deranged 
tweet after another, many people, both here and in Asia, view the 
United States as having lost its way.
  As approved by the Senate, this particular resolution responds very 
appropriately to the vacillation and confusion of the Trump 
administration's foreign policy, including its trade agenda.
  In today's important House amendment to section 302 of the bill, we 
commit not only to support continued engagement and friendship in the 
Asia-Pacific region, but to advance, through our trade negotiations, 
the values for which America has long been recognized as a beacon of 
hope to the world. That is a beacon that should leave no corner of this 
globe, including Asia, in the dark, and it must include human rights as 
a universal concept for all the people of the world.
  Our economic relations must be rooted in our shared values, our 
respect for human rights, and our adherence to the rule of law. It 
takes more than simply an opportunity to have more exports to justify a 
new agreement with a trading partner.
  A previous administration looked the other way on Malaysian human 
trafficking in pursuit of more commerce, and it found itself in this 
House short of votes. We must not make that mistake again.
  With this new, improved section 302, Congress rejects support for 
just any trade agreement and indicates its support for those agreements 
with partners that actually respect, promote, and adhere to the rule of 
law.
  By its very terms, when section 302, as amended, is tied with title 
IV as it came over from the Senate, we would not, for example, be 
justified in new trade agreements with Myanmar, formerly Burma, after 
its murderous ethnic cleansing of its Rohingya population. Nor does it 
offer any support to the Trump administration's July 26 declaration of 
intent to reward the tyrant of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte.
  Every Democratic member of the House Ways and Means Trade 
Subcommittee, on which I serve, has advised this administration that 
``we strongly oppose President Duterte's Philippines as a trade 
agreement partner.''
  All of us noted that ``Duterte's fiery rhetoric has been linked to a 
surge of extrajudicial killings of citizens by police and gunmen.''
  Duterte's shocking human rights abuses is not all. Child labor is 
persistent and serious. Safety is not prioritized, as indicated by the 
72 workers who were killed in a garment factory fire.
  These anti-worker policies mean that the Philippines is a low-wage 
country

[[Page H10138]]

that markets itself to American companies looking to further outsource 
American jobs. Yet Duterte's rule has been marked by abusive, arbitrary 
actions against international investors who have turned to the 
Philippines.
  We all said on the Trade Subcommittee that ``we strongly oppose 
Duterte as a trade partner,'' and I hope the Administration is 
listening.
  Though Trump's hug-a-thug approach around the world has repeatedly 
preferred foreign tyrants over dependable, long-term American allies, I 
believe that human rights is not a luxury. It is central to American 
values. It is central to the security of every American family.
  Amending this bill today helps us to achieve that objective and to 
send a strong message to the administration about the trade policies 
that we will consider in the coming year.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time, and I 
will close because there are no other speakers.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to again express my same strong support for the 
bill before us today. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act is an 
important piece of legislation. It articulates a bipartisan policy 
towards the Indo-Pacific, authorizes funding to support American 
engagement in the region, highlights the importance of coordinating our 
development, diplomacy, and security interests to create effective 
foreign policy, and it sends a message to Asia and the world that the 
United States is investing in our allies and our strategic priorities.
  I hope all Members will join me in supporting this bill.
  Before I yield the balance of my time, I know I said this the other 
day, but it looks like it is really coming true now: This may be the 
last time those of us in the Foreign Affairs Committee get to speak on 
the House floor for this Congress, and since my good friend and 
partner, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the gentlewoman from Florida, is here, I 
want to just say, for everyone to know, what a pleasure it has been to 
be by her side for all these years and work closely with her on so many 
important pieces of legislation that I lost count years ago.
  But one of the things with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, you can always count 
on her to work hard, to do the right thing, to be on the right side. It 
is really just a pleasure to be her colleague and an even bigger 
pleasure to be her friend.
  So I hope she will come back and visit us. If not, I am going to 
Florida to visit her. And I will always cherish the gentlewoman's 
wonderful tenure in the House of Representatives and particularly on 
the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, the Foreign Affairs Committee, under the leadership of 
Chairman Royce, who also has been as bipartisan as you can get, has 
done a lot of work this year, this Congress. I am really proud of the 
work that we have done in this Congress, and I look forward to doing 
even more work in the next Congress.
  So I thank Chairman Royce and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the United States must continue to reassure the nations 
of the Asia-Pacific region of the enduring commitment of the United 
States to being a peaceful presence in the region, dedicated to 
universal values and mutual prosperity.
  Senate bill 2736 provides the United States with a long-term and 
whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region that advances 
American national security interests, prosperity, and promotes the 
values of freedom and human rights. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
support of this measure.
  I thank the distinguished gentleman from New York, the ranking member 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, soon to be the chairman of our 
committee, for his friendship and for his kind words. I look forward to 
treating him to a nice cafe con leche in Miami. So come on down--the 
weather is fine--rather than me going to New York.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, S. 2736, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________