[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 168 (Wednesday, October 10, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6762-S6766]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Russian Hybrid Warfare

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, today I rise to continue my series of 
speeches on Russian hybrid warfare and the threat it poses to our 
national security. Russian hybrid warfare occurs

[[Page S6763]]

below the level of direct military conflict, yet it is no less a threat 
to our national security and the integrity of our democracy and our 
society. We must reframe our thinking to understand that these are 
attacks from a foreign adversary on our democratic institutions, our 
free markets, and our open society.
  We recently honored our fallen and observed the attacks of September 
11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission Report, which looked into what happened 
after the attacks, assessed that one of our government's failures in 
preventing those attacks was a failure of imagination. Now, too, we 
have the Director of National Intelligence telling us that the ``system 
is blinking red,'' akin to the threats we received before 9/11. We must 
be focused on the current problem as a national security threat. This 
threat requires that the United States defend itself against hybrid 
attacks with the same level of commitment and resolve as we would 
against a military attack against our country.
  For far too long, we have failed to recognize that hybrid attacks are 
the new Russian form of warfare. As laid out in the Russian National 
Security Strategy of 2015, the Kremlin's approach to conflict includes 
weaponizing tools and resources from across government and society. The 
Russian strategy states: ``Interrelated political, military, military-
technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are 
being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic deterrence 
and the prevention of armed conflicts.''
  The Russian strategy describes the conventional and nonconventional 
arenas of warfare as the Kremlin envisions it and how Russia has 
utilized all of the tools of statecraft to engage an adversary without, 
in many cases, firing a shot. These different disciplines make up a 
Russian hybrid approach to confrontation below the threshold of direct-
armed conflict, a method that has been developing and escalating since 
the earliest days of Putin's rise to power in Russia.
  The main tenets of the Kremlin's hybrid operations are these: 
information operations with cyber tools, which people commonly think of 
as hacking; propaganda and disinformation; manipulation of social 
media; and malign influence, which can be deployed through political, 
legal, or financial channels.
  A further characteristic of Russian hybrid warfare is denial and 
deception used to obscure its involvement. The Kremlin deploys more 
than one hybrid warfare tactic simultaneously to provide maximum 
effect.
  A look at the Russian hybrid warfare doctrine also illuminates that 
the Kremlin sees deterrence and prevention differently than we do. This 
is a critical point. We see deterrence as a way to avoid conflict. They 
are not merely using these tactics as deterrence or strategic 
prevention in the way we think about these conflicts.
  Instead, they are deploying these tactics aggressively but below the 
threshold of where they assess we will respond with conventional 
weapons. One such example was the hybrid warfare operations the Kremlin 
deployed in Crimea, including covert forces sometimes referred to as 
``little green men'' and the use of coercive political tactics, 
including an illegitimate referendum.
  Now, previously I have addressed aspects of Russia's hybrid warfare 
operations against the United States dealing with tactics of financial 
malign influence and multiple hybrid tools they have deployed against 
our democratic elections. Today I will discuss another Russian tactic 
and its hybrid warfare arsenal: the use of assassination, politically 
motivated violence, intimidation, or detention to pursue the Kremlin's 
objectives. These tactics are sometimes referred to as dirty active 
measures.
  With dirty active measures, the immediate attack is deployed against 
an individual who is working counter to the Kremlin's strategic goals 
by challenging Putin's power base, exposing corruption, or unearthing 
hybrid warfare operations.
  But the damage of these hybrid warfare tactics goes well beyond the 
individual killed, hurt, threatened, or jailed by the Kremlin. These 
tactics cause chaos, fear, and instability to bystanders and have a 
deterrent effect, sending a chilling message to others that might seek 
to challenge the Kremlin's rule.
  Further, the reach with which Putin has deployed these weapons inside 
Russia, across Ukraine, Europe, and even in the United States instills 
fear that if the Kremlin wants to get rid of you, there is nowhere to 
hide.
  Like all aspects of Russian hybrid warfare, dirty active measures are 
part of a pattern of behavior that serve Russia's strategic interests. 
Putin's highest strategic objective is preserving his grip on power. He 
also seeks to operate unconstrained domestically and in the near 
abroad. Finally, Putin seeks for Russia to be seen equal to the United 
States and to regain the great power status it lost at the end of the 
Cold War.
  He knows he cannot effectively compete with the United States in 
conventional ways and win. Instead, he seeks to use tools from his 
hybrid warfare arsenal in order to divide us from our allies and 
partners in the West and weaken our democratic societies from within.
  The Putin regime has been engaged in a pattern of dirty active 
measures for more than a decade, and the tempo has only increased since 
he retook the Presidency in 2012. These tactics have increasing 
implications for the United States and allied national security.
  I want to address this tactic of dirty active measures because it has 
taken on greater urgency due to recent events. In particular, I am 
thinking of the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military 
intelligence officer, and his daughter on British soil and Putin's 
threat against Ambassador McFaul and other U.S. Government officials at 
the Helsinki Summit. These events may seem unrelated, but they are 
actually part of a pattern of malicious and threatening Russian 
behavior.
  Today, I will explain the connection and make recommendations for how 
we can deter and counter Russia's use of dirty active measures as part 
of its hybrid warfare operations below the level of military conflict.
  Dirty active measures have a long and sordid history in Russia and 
the Soviet Union, dating back to czarist times. For assassinations, 
poison was often the weapon of choice, including the attempted cyanide 
poisoning of Rasputin in 1916. In 1921, Lenin opened a poison 
laboratory to test methods to be used against political enemies named 
the ``special room,'' which was also known as the ``lab of death.'' At 
this lab, they developed the nerve agents known as novichoks, which 
were designed to be undetectable and were recently deployed against the 
Skirpals. These tactics were amplified under Stalin and featured 
killings by hired assassins, staged automobile accidents, and 
poisonings, used inside Russia and deployed abroad. Stalin notoriously 
said:

       Death solves all problems. No man, no problem.

  Given President Putin's background as a spy master, it should come as 
no surprise that Russia's use of dirty active measures have continued 
under his regime. Before becoming Prime Minister and President, Putin 
spent the majority of his career in the KGB, the state's security 
service, and its successor, the FSB.
  As Russian journalist Andrei Soldatov wrote, the KGB's ``main task 
was always to protect the interests of whoever currently resided in the 
Kremlin.'' In this system, loyalty and fidelity to the state is prized 
above all, and Putin's values were shaped by it.
  In 2005, Putin lamented that the breakup of the Soviet Union was the 
greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century. When he assumed 
power, he resurrected a system that reflected Soviet methods. He 
employed all of the instruments of the state, including the Parliament, 
the courts, and security services, to protect his power base and to 
allow him to pursue strategic objectives in the foreign arena 
unconstrained.
  Putin's use of hybrid warfare tactics of assassination, political 
violence, intimidation, and detention--the dirty active measures--are 
tenets of this system he created to cement his hold on power.
  Putin has also manipulated the Parliament and the court system to 
make and enforce laws that manufacture legal consent for tactics of 
dirty active measures. As opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza, who 
survived being

[[Page S6764]]

twice poisoned, wrote recently in the Washington Post, ``in Vladimir 
Putin's Russia, laws are often passed with specific people in mind, 
whether to reward or punish.'' Notably, in July of 2006, the Russian 
Parliament gave President Putin permission to use Russian armed forces 
and security services to perpetrate extrajudicial killings abroad on 
people that Moscow accused of extremism. Companion legislation passed 
about the same time expanded the definition of extremism to include 
libelous statements about Putin's administration. This legislation 
effectively gave those who carry out dirty active measures immunity.
  In addition to the use of the legislative and legal mechanisms at 
their disposal, the Kremlin unleashes a barrage of propaganda against 
those targeted for dirty active measures. These information operations 
contribute to a climate of fear targeting both the individuals the 
Kremlin is trying to silence and the broader population. Propaganda 
campaigns are also deployed after the dirty active measure is carried 
out, in order to sow confusion and make people doubt whether Russia is 
culpable.
  Putin and his inner circle have drawn a distinct narrative, branding 
those who oppose the Kremlin as criminals, thus deeming them as 
deserving of punishment. They are often also accused of being part of 
the so-called ``fifth column,'' Russians that Putin defines as 
advancing foreign interests.

  Worse than criminals in Putin's mind are those the Kremlin viewed as 
having been loyal in the past but who are now working against the 
interest of the state. These people are branded as traitors, and as the 
New York Times reported last month, traitors hold a special status for 
Putin. Putin's disdain for traitors stems from the early days of the 
end of the Cold War, when dozens of former Soviet intelligence officers 
became defectors or informants for the West.
  According to the Times, ``Mr. Putin cannot speak of them without a 
lip curl of disgust. They are `beasts' and `swine.' Treachery, he told 
one interviewer, is the one thing he is incapable of forgiving. It 
could also, he said darkly, be bad for your health.''
  Putin publicly threatened those considered traitors on multiple 
occasions. One of those episodes occurred in 2010. After a spy swap 
between Russia and the United States, which included the recently 
poisoned Skripal, Putin stated ominously: ``A person gives his whole 
life for his homeland, and then some . . . [blank] comes along and 
betrays such people. How will he be able to look into the eyes of his 
children, the pig? Whatever they got in exchange for it, those thirty 
pieces of silver they were given, they will choke on them. Believe 
me.''
  For Putin, labeling his political opponents in these stark terms 
helps to justify the dirty active measures deployed against these 
individuals.
  These tactics of dirty active measures have been used with impunity 
inside Russia to silence and intimidate Kremlin critics and preserve 
the system of power Putin created. They have been unleashed against 
journalists, opposition leaders, oligarchs, and others seen as 
betraying the system. A Senate Foreign Relations minority staff report 
from January detailed more than two dozen Kremlin critics who died 
under mysterious circumstances in Russia since Putin took power in 
2000. The report separately compiled violent attacks and harassment on 
human rights activists and journalists.
  Russian opposition activists are also a target of dirty active 
measures inside Russia. One example was the assassination of Boris 
Nemtsov, a popular regional Governor and Deputy Prime Minister under 
Yeltsin, who became disenchanted with Putin's political system. He 
publicly exposed extensive corruption and covert use of Russian hybrid 
warfare tactics in Ukraine. Arkady Ostrovsky, a Moscow correspondent 
for the Economist, described the tactics of intimidation deployed 
against him, including that he was stigmatized as a ``national 
traitor'' and an ``American stooge.'' He was demonized on television 
and on the streets banners with Nemtsov's face were hung on building 
facades framed by the words ``fifth column--aliens among us.''
  These threats were followed with Nemtsov being brazenly assassinated 
steps from the Kremlin. Nemtsov appears to have been killed for 
exposing corruption in Putin's inner circle and trying to serve as a 
constraint on his ability to conduct hybrid warfare operations in 
Ukraine. These acts were clearly seen as a threat to Putin's power and 
his ability to act with impunity.
  Attacks of dirty active measures inside Russia continue unabated. 
This April, Russian journalist Maxim Borodin fell to his death after 
investigating the Wagner paramilitary forces linked to a close Putin 
ally and Russian troll farm patron, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Three additional 
Russian journalists who were investigating Prigozhin-sponsored, 
Kremlin-linked military activities, particularly in the Central African 
Republic, were killed under suspicious circumstances in August. Just a 
few weeks ago, the publisher of a website that exposes Kremlin abuses 
in the criminal justice system fell ill from apparent poisoning. This 
attack occurred on the same day he expected to receive the results of 
an investigation he commissioned into the deaths of the journalists in 
the Central African Republic.
  As I have detailed here, these attacks are not officially linked back 
to the Kremlin, allowing for plausible deniability, but are part of a 
clear pattern of tactics deployed against those who work to expose 
activities that may hurt Putin's base of power.
  Putin has resorted to using dirty active measures beyond Russia's 
borders, which demonstrates the willingness of the Kremlin to use these 
tactics not only for domestic political purposes but also as part of 
its hybrid warfare operations to advance Russia's strategic interests 
against other countries.
  Similar to other tactics of hybrid warfare operations, Ukraine is 
usually where Russia deploys these tactics first, a testing ground for 
tools that may be deployed in the West at a later time.
  We see these tactics of dirty active measures deployed in Ukraine as 
far back as 2005, when the more Western-oriented Viktor Yushchencko was 
poisoned after he won the Presidency, beating Victor Yanukovych, the 
preferred pro-Russian candidate.
  The Kremlin continues to deploy dirty active measures, including 
assassination, in Ukraine with impunity. Last May, Denis Voronenkov, a 
former FSB colonel and a former Russian Parliament Member, was shot in 
the head on a crowded Kiev sidewalk in broad daylight. Voronenkov was 
once a close Putin ally who used his position to promote key Kremlin 
priorities, including, ironically, annexing Crimea. He fled to Ukraine 
in October of 2016 and began to criticize Putin's government. He was 
slated to provide testimony to Ukrainian authorities that would expose 
Kremlin deliberations prior to hybrid warfare operations against 
Ukraine. Forebodingly, a few days before his murder, he told the 
Washington Post: ``They say we are traitors in Russia.'' Again, the 
idea that he could be shot brazenly in broad daylight served as a 
warning to others who might want to expose hybrid warfare operations to 
think twice, and that they can't escape even if they leave Russia.
  Similar tactics were deployed against Montenegro as it considered and 
ultimately chose to join NATO in 2015 and 2016. The Kremlin saw the 
Montenegrin Government's decision to move closer to the West as a 
threat to its strategic interests, including Russia's ability to 
operate in Eastern Europe unconstrained.
  When several other hybrid warfare operations, including propaganda 
and information operations, failed to keep Montenegro from joining the 
alliance, Russian military intelligence officers planned and attempted 
to execute an election day coup that included a plan to assassinate the 
Montenegrin Prime Minister. The attempt on the Prime Minister's life 
was unsuccessful, fortunately. However, it showed the extremes to which 
the Kremlin would go and the methods that were used to try to maintain 
its strategic interests.
  Beyond Ukraine and Montenegro, the Kremlin has increasingly 
demonstrated a willingness to use dirty active measures in the West, 
suggesting a sense that Russia feels it can operate with impunity even 
in these countries.
  One Western country where a pattern of Russian dirty active measures 
appears prominently is in the United Kingdom. Investigative reports 
have

[[Page S6765]]

unearthed an estimated 16 suspicious deaths over the past 12 years, and 
that may not even be the totality.
  The most well-known measure of Russian dirty active measures inside 
the UK is Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB and FSB officer who blew 
the whistle on corrupt practices of the FSB. While Litvinenko had 
retired from spying, he did consulting work with the British and 
Spanish intelligence services, helping both governments understand 
connections between the Russian mafia, senior political figures, and 
the FSB. Further, he continued to speak out against the Putin 
government and expose Kremlin corruption.
  Because of these actions, the Kremlin branded Litvinenko a traitor. 
He received threatening emails from a former colleague who told him to 
``start writing a will.'' Litvinenko was later poisoned with polonium-
210. The poisoning also served as a deterrent to others.
  The day after Litvinenko's death, a member of the Russian Parliament 
stated:

       The deserved punishment reached the traitor. I am sure his 
     death will be a warning to all the traitors that Russian 
     treason will not be forgiven.

  Litvinenko's poisoning served as a prologue for the poisoning of 
Sergei Skripal 12 years later. Skripal was a former Russian military 
intelligence officer who was convicted of being a double agent and 
sentenced to prison. As I mentioned earlier, he was traded as part of a 
spy swap in 2010. He was given asylum in the United Kingdom. Press 
reports indicate that, similar to Litvinenko, Skripal appeared to have 
been working with the Spanish, Czech, and Estonian intelligence 
services.
  This March, he and his daughter were poisoned by novichok sprayed on 
the door handle of his Salisbury, England, home. In conjunction with 
the assassination attempt, Kremlin officials deflected, denied, and 
deployed absurd propaganda and disinformation. They unleashed an 
estimated 2,800 bots to cast doubt on Prime Minister May's assessment 
that Russia was responsible and to amplify divisions among the British 
people. They blamed the West for the poisoning and suggested it was a 
hoax. Once the UK named suspects and pointed a finger at Russian 
military intelligence, the two alleged perpetrators went on TV and 
absurdly claimed to be sports nutritionists with a yearning desire to 
visit a Salisbury cathedral.
  Again, these killings are part of a pattern. Both Litvinenko and 
Skripal were part of security services. They turned on the state and 
were deemed traitors. Even when they appeared to be safe, they were 
targeted for dirty active measures, sending the message that the 
Kremlin was the ultimate arbiter and that they could reach traitors 
anytime or anywhere. This message was also directed at others who might 
wish to expose Putin's secrets in the future or try to constrain or 
challenge his power.
  The pattern of dirty active measures also extends to the United 
States. This includes Mikhail Lesin, a former Kremlin insider who was 
crucial to Putin's consolidation of the Russian media. Lesin was also 
responsible for the rise of Russian TV and internet platform RT, a tool 
the Kremlin uses to deploy propaganda and disinformation across the 
world, including against the United States during the Presidential 
election in 2016.
  Lesin was reported to have had a falling out with two members of 
Putin's inner circle, including a longtime friend known as Putin's 
banker. Lesin was found dead in a Washington, DC, hotel room in 
November of 2015. The DC coroner concluded that the death was 
accidental and that he died alone, despite noting that Lesin had 
sustained blunt force injuries to his neck, torso, and upper and lower 
extremities. Lesin was allegedly planning to tell the secrets of a 
major component of the Kremlin's hybrid warfare operations to the 
Justice Department when he appeared to have conveniently died before he 
could explain its inner workings.
  Similar to other dirty active measures campaigns, the Kremlin 
unleashed a disinformation campaign to ensure plausible deniability and 
generate confusion about the circumstances surrounding his death. Here, 
too, Lesin appears to fit the pattern of being targeted for revealing 
aspects of the hybrid warfare campaigns that the Kremlin has come to 
rely on.
  In what appears to have been an even more brazen move for Putin, he 
engaged in dirty active measures while the whole world was watching. 
While standing next to President Trump in Helsinki, President Putin 
proposed that he would allow Special Counsel Mueller to interview the 
12 Russian military intelligence officers indicted on charges of 
``large-scale cyber operations to interfere with the 2016 Presidential 
election.'' But there was a catch. Putin announced that in return, he 
would expect that Russian authorities would be able to question current 
and former U.S. Government officials whom Putin described as having 
``something to do with illegal actions on the territory of Russia.'' 
President Trump stood next to President Putin during this 
disinformation operation and endorsed it as being an ``incredible'' 
offer that he and his administration actually considered.
  The very next day, Russian officials announced a list of 11 accused 
``criminals'' whom they wanted to interrogate because, in the course of 
doing the work of the United States of America, they took stances that 
the Kremlin opposed. Among those listed was a congressional staffer who 
helped write the Magnitsky sanctions act and former U.S. Ambassador to 
Russia Michael McFaul, who served as the point person during the Obama 
Administration and as Ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014.
  During McFaul's time as Ambassador to Russia, the Kremlin unleashed 
its hybrid warfare playbook against him. They denounced him as an enemy 
and had security forces follow his family. The Kremlin also deployed a 
disinformation campaign against him that accused him of being a 
pedophile. The Kremlin was using these active measures in an attempt to 
instill fear in him and others that they could be killed, hurt, or 
jailed for doing the work of the U.S. Government.
  The United States and Western countries more broadly must understand 
that these attacks are not random; they are part of a pattern, a 
doctrine of hybrid warfare being expressed across the globe. We need to 
understand that assassinations, violence, threats, and intimidation are 
tools and tactics that Putin is using to achieve strategic or foreign 
policy goals, and these activities are harming our national security.
  For instance, the New York Times reported in August that vital 
Kremlin informants have gone silent, leaving our intelligence community 
in the dark about what Russia's plans are for November's midterm 
elections. The report continues that American officials familiar with 
the intelligence ``concluded they have gone to ground amid more 
aggressive counterintelligence by Moscow, including efforts to kill 
spies.''

  These are not just brutal tragedies or incidents; the use of dirty 
active measures are purposeful and are intended to advance Putin's 
agenda short of using tools of conventional warfare.
  The United States must lead with strong denouncements against dirty 
active measures and all other hybrid tactics used by Russia or any 
other country. It is particularly critical that the President denounce 
Russian threats against U.S. officials for their actions in carrying 
out U.S. foreign policy or advancing our national security interests. 
Instead, the President's deference to Putin at Helsinki sent the wrong 
signal to Putin in the face of his threats.
  Fortunately, the Senate has taken some action, including voting 98 to 
0 to protect our diplomats and other government officials implementing 
U.S. policy after Putin requested they be turned over for questioning. 
However, our government must speak with one voice and send consistent 
messages that this kind of action will not be tolerated and that Putin 
will pay consequences for his behavior.
  While it is important that we respond to these attacks, including 
with unequivocal denouncements of these tactics by the President and by 
the Congress, we should not be in the business of trying to respond to 
these attacks symmetrically. Putin resorts to using these tactics 
because he believes they give him an advantage over the West. We need 
to stay true to our ideals of democracy, human rights, and liberty.

[[Page S6766]]

We don't need to normalize or legitimize these methods by engaging in 
them ourselves. Doing so would simply create a false moral equivalence 
that plays right into Putin's hands. Instead, we must employ responses 
that play to our strengths. We stand for transparency and 
accountability in the United States. We stand for the rule of law. We 
must develop and implement a comprehensive strategy that deploys tools 
that are consistent with and showcase these values. We must shine a 
light on corruption at the highest levels of the Putin regime. We must 
shine a light on how Putin's cronies are hiding their ill-gotten gains 
in the West. We must deploy a systematic and strategic messaging 
campaign that counters the base of Putin's power, reputation, and 
funding.
  We must take these actions in concert with our allies and partners. 
In response to the Skripal poisoning, the United States expelled 60 
Russian diplomats, joining with more than 25 ally and partner nations 
in applying diplomatic pressure on Russia. This action sent a strong 
signal that the world would not allow Putin to act with impunity. When 
we act together with our allies and partners to push back against these 
hybrid operations, it imposes a cost to Putin's reputation on the world 
stage, which thwarts one of his major strategic interests.
  While these steps were in the right direction, they have been 
undermined by the President's words and actions. Despite punitive 
measures in response to the Skripal poisoning, the Kremlin thought that 
the Helsinki summit erased that damage. Press reports indicate that 
Western and U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that the Kremlin was 
pleased with the outcome of the summit at Helsinki and is confused as 
to why President Trump is not implementing more Russia-friendly 
policies.
  One important tool in our arsenal for holding the Kremlin accountable 
is sanctions, including those on Putin's inner circle. In particular, 
sanctions implemented under the Magnitsky Act appear to be particularly 
threatening to him. This act was passed in response to the death of 
Sergei Magnitsky, who uncovered massive tax fraud and corruption that 
was traced back to Kremlin officials. He was arrested in Russia and 
placed in jail, where he was tortured until he died.
  The origins of the Magnitsky Act were to hold accountable those in 
the Russian Government who were complicit in Magnitsky's abuse and 
death by sanctioning their assets and barring them from receiving 
American visas. Subsequently, the Magnitsky Act has been expanded to 
include others who are culpable of acts of significant corruption and 
abuse.
  Russia expert Heather Conley of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies testified recently at a Banking Committee hearing 
about the significance of the Magnitsky sanctions to Putin. She said:

       Because the Kremlin has based its economic model and its 
     survival on kleptocracy, sanctions and other policy 
     instruments dedicated to preventing the furtherance of 
     corruption--or worse yet in the minds of the Kremlin, to 
     providing accurate information to the Russian people of the 
     extent of this corruption--are a powerful countermeasure to 
     Russia's malign behavior.

  The Magnitsky sanctions, along with those designated under the 
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA, 
threaten Putin's power structure and present a counter-narrative of 
corruption and abuse by the Kremlin.
  We need to continue to use these sanctions to hold those who are 
complicit in dirty active measures and those who are responsible for 
aggression, corruption, and interfering in our elections accountable. 
Ratcheting up sanctions on those in Putin's inner circle is a way to 
make Putin and his cronies feel pain and has the potential to change 
their behavior. Additional sanctions should be imposed on oligarchs and 
high-ranking government officials to target Putin's base of power and 
further expose the corrupt nature of their sources of income.
  We should also consider declassifying the so-called 241 report 
compiled by the intelligence community along with the Departments of 
Treasury and State. This report required an assessment of the net worth 
of senior Kremlin officials and oligarchs, their relationship to Putin 
and his inner circle, and evidence of corrupt practices. If we were to 
release such a report--with redactions for portions with national 
security implications--to the public, it would further expose malign 
activity and unexplained streams of wealth.
  Congress has provided many tools for the administration to implement, 
and it is time to utilize them fully. Implementing them in a 
transparent, public manner is likely to cause reputational harm to 
Putin himself and restore a level of confidence in the administration 
here at home. However, specifically targeting sanctions this way is 
unlikely to cause large-scale harm to the Russian people or to our 
European allies.
  It is very clear that implementing sanctions is far more effective 
when done with the cooperation of the international community. The most 
effective sanctions regimes are those that are implemented in a 
multilateral fashion.
  I urge the administration to engage with our allies and partners to 
coordinate sanctions enforcement and further escalatory steps as 
warranted. That includes working through diplomatic channels to ensure 
that the sanctions placed on Russia by the European Union remain in 
place. A coordinated front of the United States and our European allies 
provides the greatest chance of successful implementation of sanctions 
and deterring further aggression by Russia.
  The administration must also place a premium on exerting diplomatic 
pressure to isolate those who flout or do not enforce sanctions on 
Russia.
  Another form of pressure should be an increase in assistance to pro-
democracy and civil society groups in Russia and in nations of the 
former Soviet Union. Working with these groups in conjunction with our 
allies, partners, and the private sector would provide another means of 
raising the costs of Putin and his oligarchs. Putin is threatened by 
the success of democracies and private enterprise.
  In addition to sanctions, we must continue to play a strong role in 
law enforcement, along with our allies and partners. That includes 
aggressive prosecution of murders and threats of violence to limit the 
impunity. With Litvinenko, it took almost 10 years for the United 
Kingdom to have an official inquiry into the assassination. The United 
Kingdom has acted quicker in the wake of the Skripal poisoning, moving 
to identify suspects and hold the Kremlin accountable for these 
actions. We need to adopt UK's lessons learned to ensure that those who 
seek to use these weapons will be prosecuted fully and without delay.
  We have missed too many of these dirty active measures operations for 
far too long. We must recognize this is an element of Russia's hybrid 
warfare. We must not fail to have the imagination to see what is 
happening right before our eyes. We must do more to identify and 
attribute these attacks from Russia. These attacks have only grown more 
brazen and will not stop unless we take strong measures to counter them 
and send the message that dirty active measures are unacceptable and 
will be costly to Russia or any other country which uses them.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sullivan). The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.