[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 149 (Friday, September 7, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H7925-H7937]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               COMMUNITY SAFETY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2018

  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1051, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 6691) to amend title 18, United States Code, to 
clarify the definition of ``crime of violence'', and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1051, the bill 
is considered read.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 6691

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Community Safety and 
     Security Act of 2018''.

     SEC. 2. CRIME OF VIOLENCE.

       Section 16 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``SEC. 16. CRIME OF VIOLENCE DEFINED.

       ``(a) The term `crime of violence' means an offense--
       ``(1)(A) that--
       ``(i) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault, sexual 
     abuse or aggravated sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, 
     child abuse, kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, firearms use, 
     burglary, arson, extortion, communication of threats, 
     coercion, fleeing, interference with flight crew members and 
     attendants, domestic violence, hostage taking, stalking, 
     human trafficking, piracy, or a terrorism offense as 
     described in chapter 113B (other than in section 2332d); or
       ``(ii) involves the unlawful possession or use of a weapon 
     of mass destruction; or
       ``(B) that involves use or unlawful possession of 
     explosives or destructive devices described in 5845(f) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
       ``(2) that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
     threatened use of physical force against the person or 
     property of another; or
       ``(3) that is an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, 
     solicitation to commit, or aiding and abetting any of the 
     offenses set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2).
       ``(b) In this section:
       ``(1) The term `abusive sexual contact' means conduct 
     described in section 2244(a)(1) and (a)(2).
       ``(2) The terms `aggravated sexual abuse' and `sexual 
     abuse' mean conduct described in sections 2241 and 2242. For 
     purposes of such conduct, the term `sexual act' means conduct 
     described in section 2246(2), or the knowing and lewd 
     exposure of genitalia or masturbation, to any person, with an 
     intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
     gratify the sexual desire of any person.
       ``(3) The term `assault' means conduct described in section 
     113(a), and includes conduct committed recklessly, knowingly, 
     or intentionally.
       ``(4) The term `arson' means conduct described in section 
     844(i) or unlawfully or willfully damaging or destroying any 
     building, inhabited structure, vehicle, vessel, or real 
     property by means of fire or explosive.
       ``(5) The term `burglary' means an unlawful or unprivileged 
     entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, 
     including any nonpermanent or mobile structure that is 
     adapted or used for overnight accommodation or for the 
     ordinary carrying on of business, and, either before or after 
     entering, the person--
       ``(A) forms the intent to commit a crime; or
       ``(B) commits or attempts to commit a crime.
       ``(6) The term `carjacking' means conduct described in 
     section 2119, or the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle from 
     the immediate actual possession of a person against his will, 
     by means of actual or threatened force, or violence or 
     intimidation, or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, 
     or fear of injury.
       ``(7) The term `child abuse' means the unlawful infliction 
     of physical injury or the commission of any sexual act 
     against a child under fourteen by any person eighteen years 
     of age or older.
       ``(8) The term `communication of threats' means conduct 
     described in section 844(e), or the transmission of any 
     communications containing any threat of use of violence to--
       ``(A) demand or request for a ransom or reward for the 
     release of any kidnapped person; or
       ``(B) threaten to kidnap or injure the person of another.
       ``(9) The term `coercion' means causing the performance or 
     non-performance of any act

[[Page H7926]]

     by another person under which such other person has a legal 
     right to do or to abstain from doing, through fraud or by the 
     use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear thereof, 
     including the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, 
     of violence to cause harm, or threats to cause injury to the 
     person, reputation or property of any person.
       ``(10) The term `domestic violence' means any assault 
     committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian 
     of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a 
     child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has 
     cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, 
     or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or 
     guardian of the victim.
       ``(11) The term `extortion' means conduct described in 
     section 1951(b)(2)), but not extortion under color of 
     official right or fear of economic loss.
       ``(12) The term `firearms use' means conduct described in 
     section 924(c) or 929(a), if the firearm was brandished, 
     discharged, or otherwise possessed, carried, or used as a 
     weapon and the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime 
     during and in relation to which the firearm was possessed, 
     carried, or used was subject to prosecution in any court of 
     the United States, State court, military court or tribunal, 
     or tribal court. Such term also includes unlawfully 
     possessing a firearm described in section 5845(a) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (such as a sawed-off shotgun or 
     sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun), possession 
     of a firearm in violation of sections 922(g)(1), 922(g)(2) 
     and 922(g)(4), possession of a firearm with the intent to use 
     such firearm unlawfully, or reckless discharge of a firearm 
     at a dwelling.
       ``(13) The term `fleeing' means knowingly operating a motor 
     vehicle and, following a law enforcement officer's signal to 
     bring the motor vehicle to a stop--
       ``(A) failing or refusing to comply; or
       ``(B) fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement 
     officer.
       ``(14) The term `force' means the level of force capable of 
     causing physical pain or injury or needed or intended to 
     overcome resistance.
       ``(15) The term `hostage taking' means conduct described in 
     section 1203.
       ``(16) The term `human trafficking' means conduct described 
     in sections 1589, 1590, and 1591.
       ``(17) The term `interference with flight crew members and 
     attendants' means conduct described in section 46504 of title 
     49, United States Code.
       ``(18) The term `kidnapping' means conduct described in 
     section 1201(a)(1) or seizing, confining, inveigling, 
     decoying, abducting, or carrying away and holding for ransom 
     or reward or otherwise any person.
       ``(19) The term `murder' means conduct described as murder 
     in the first degree or murder in the second degree described 
     in section 1111.
       ``(20) The term `robbery' means conduct described in 
     section 1951(b)(1), or the unlawful taking or obtaining of 
     personal property from the person or in the presence of 
     another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened 
     force, or violence or intimidation, or by sudden or stealthy 
     seizure or snatching, or fear of injury, immediate or future, 
     to his person or property, or property in his custody or 
     possession, or the person or property of a relative or member 
     of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the 
     taking or obtaining.
       ``(21) The term `stalking' means conduct described in 
     section 2261A.
       ``(22) The term `weapon of mass destruction' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 2332a(c).
       ``(23) The term `voluntary manslaughter' means conduct 
     described in section 1112(a).
       ``(c) For purposes of this section, in the case of any 
     reference in subsection (b) to an offense under this title, 
     such reference shall include conduct that constitutes an 
     offense under State or tribal law or under the Uniform Code 
     of Military Justice, if such conduct would be an offense 
     under this title if a circumstance giving rise to Federal 
     jurisdiction had existed.
       ``(d) For purposes of this section, the term `conspiracy' 
     includes any offense that is a conspiracy to commit another 
     offense under State or Federal law, irrespective of whether 
     proof of an overt act is required to establish commission of 
     the conspiracy offense.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 1 hour 
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member 
of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  The gentlewoman from Georgia (Mrs. Handel) and the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Georgia.


                             General Leave

  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 6691.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise today in strong support of H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and 
Security Act of 2018. This legislation provides critical clarity to the 
definition of ``crime of violence'' in the United States Code in order 
to keep violent criminals off the streets and ensure the safety of our 
communities.
  In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Dimaya, the 
term ``crime of violence'' was determined to be unconstitutionally 
vague. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Congress to act to provide the 
necessary clarity in the law that allows our law enforcement and our 
judicial systems to work and, importantly, to protect the victims of 
these violent crimes.
  The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 provides that clarity 
by precisely and legally defining the phrase ``crime of violence'' and 
the related criminal acts that, when combined with the element of force 
are, indeed, considered violent.
  They include crimes such as voluntary manslaughter, attempted 
kidnapping, lewd acts upon a child, sexual assault, assault on a police 
officer, domestic violence, murder, and all other crimes that a normal, 
regular individual would think of as a violent crime, as well as human 
trafficking.
  In my State of Georgia, metro Atlanta is well known as a haven for 
human and sex trafficking, and as a recruiting center for vulnerable 
young people. In 2017 alone, it was reported that nearly 3,600 females 
and more than 600 males were trafficked. These are just the reported 
cases. Thousands more go unreported every year.
  This legislation that I bring forward today provides essential legal 
clarity to ensure that crimes like human trafficking and others in the 
bill are deemed legally as crimes of violence.
  Failure to address this issue would foster vagueness and uncertainty 
in our courts, and potentially disrupt the prosecution of certain 
crimes of violence, like human trafficking, child abuse, domestic 
violence, and other acts that any reasonable individual would consider 
a crime of violence.
  This legislation has the support of a number of organizations, 
including the Fraternal Order of Police and the National Association of 
Police Organizations.
  In a recent letter to Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi, the Fraternal 
Order of Police noted that ``there are numerous convictions and pending 
cases that would be jeopardized'' in the wake of the Dimaya decision.
  The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 is another step that 
we, as Congress, can take, that we must take, in order to make our 
communities the safest that they can possibly be. I urge my colleagues 
to support this important legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I will take the opportunity to say good morning to the manager of the 
bill, my co-member on the House Judiciary Committee. I start this way, 
Mr. Speaker, and to my colleagues, because I always want to emphasize 
when I am on the floor that the Judiciary Committee has had many 
instances of bipartisanship.
  I am very glad to have been on the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland 
Security, and Investigations Subcommittee for more than a number of 
years. I have seen our work, and it has certainly been in a bipartisan 
mode.
  I want to acknowledge the chairman of the committee, Mr. Goodlatte, 
and the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Nadler. In many instances 
on the crime reform issues, we have tried to work hand-in-hand 
together.
  It seems that criminal justice reform has partners on both sides of 
the aisle. It is certainly an issue that draws a vast number of 
stakeholders, particularly my friends in the faith community; social 
justice community; my friends in the libertarian community, if you 
will; and, certainly, giants like the ACLU, the Lawyers' Committee, and 
many others that have been engaged in these issues, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund. So you can see that we bring people together.
  So I rise to discuss H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and Security Act 
of 2018, which amends section 16 of title 18.

[[Page H7927]]

  Section 16 sets forth the universal definition of what constitutes a 
crime of violence for the entirety of the criminal code. Therefore, 
this definition is critically important, and I am deeply concerned that 
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are introducing such an 
important amendment in such a hasty, precipitous manner.
  Although my colleagues claim that the introduction of this bill has 
not been hasty and that it has been vetted for months on their side of 
the aisle, on our side of the aisle, we have had no engagement.
  This bill has been laid before us for 7 days. Last Friday, it was 
singly introduced when Members were not here and, as well, before a 3-
day weekend.
  Let me be very clear. Criminal justice reform is not a sausage. We 
would work over the months and years with academic experts; victims; 
law enforcement--that is our family; and beyond, our prosecutors; our 
law enforcement; and, certainly, the Sentencing Commission, for 
example; our judges. We are concerned about thei viewpoints.

  So I know there may be one or two who have written and may be 
supporting this, but this is not the way we get to the floor.
  H.R. 6691 would expand the definition of crimes of violence in 
section 16 in two ways: enumerating certain offenses that do not 
currently exist under Federal law, and it would have been good to have 
a hearing or a series of hearings on this to be recognized for crimes 
of violence for Federal purposes; and by adding alternative definitions 
to already-existing Federal offenses, in order to have these new 
definitions also qualify as Federal crimes of violence.
  Again, here is the trigger: More and more people incarcerated maybe 
could find another way of addressing these questions, even by law 
enforcement.
  The Supreme Court recently decided Sessions v. Dimaya, holding that 
subsection (b) of section 16, known as the residual clause, is 
unconstitutionally vague. Subsection (a) in the Dimaya case left 
untouched defines a crime of violence as one that requires as an 
element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person or property of another.
  In response to Dimaya, my colleagues are now putting forth a bill to 
substitute subsection (b) for a list of crimes of violence, many of 
which have no element involving the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of force.
  In addition, even the residual clause stricken down by Dimaya 
requires that a crime of violence at least be a felony. H.R. 6691 
strips away the felony requirement.
  For these reasons, this bill radically amends section 16. We go back 
to the old days of throwing everybody in jail.
  This bill does not just list a few statutes that are obvious crimes 
of violence. It enumerates at least 32 separate crimes, some of which 
are not Federal crimes. It even offers alternative definitions for 
several Federal crimes. This requires careful consideration.
  How dare anyone suggest that anyone on this side of the aisle is soft 
on crime. Some of my best friends, as we have heard others say in other 
settings, are law enforcement. I speak to my police officers every time 
I see them in the district. I am talking to the command frequently. 
Sometimes I congratulate them for a successful capture of a dastardly 
criminal.
  Obviously, many of those crimes are State laws. But I know the State 
of Texas has been working to reduce the numbers of persons 
incarcerated. There is no doubt with law enforcement who the bad actors 
are. On the Federal level, it is the same.
  But here we are, with a 1-week-old baby that has not been vetted and 
helped and nurtured to be able to make it work. This is serious work 
that we do here. So rather than proceeding through regular order by 
having a hearing to ascertain the relevant information from experts 
that will help us establish the best approach for dealing with the 
constitutionality of section 16, and the Federal definition of crimes 
of violence, we have been given 1 week to vote, with no markups to 
allow amendments germane to the bill's purpose.
  Mr. Speaker, regular order is not a crime. Instead of taking the time 
to fashion a definition that takes into consideration the many legal 
ramifications of changing this term as proposed, the bill's sponsors 
are haphazardly pushing forward an overly expansive definition of crime 
of violence for political purposes.
  Where are my civil libertarians? Where are my persons who believe in 
the Constitution, due process?
  The bill is overbroad; two, unnecessary; and three, it could have 
substantial harmful effects.
  First, the bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of 
violence a number of offenses that have no element of violence or force 
at all. No one likes burglary, but burglary, for example, is included 
in the enumerated list of crimes of violence, though it would simply 
mean remaining in a building without authorization and, while there, 
forming the attempt to commit even a minor, nonviolent offense.
  Likewise, the bill lists coercion through fraud as a violent felony, 
though violence plays no part in that criminal offense.
  The bill would also make simple assault a crime of violence, even in 
the circumstances where the underlying act is merely a push or a shove.
  None of us applaud any of that, but we recognize in this vast country 
that our citizens have basic rights. One of the more egregious examples 
of an offense listed as a crime of violence is fleeing by automobile, 
which is knowingly operating a motor vehicle and failing or refusing to 
comply with a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor 
vehicle to a stop, or fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement 
officer. This definition does not even require intent to elude law 
enforcement.
  Under this bill, what could have amounted to a traffic violation is, 
instead, a crime of violence.
  It doesn't mean that we do not utilize these elements, but we are 
able to have vetted it in a way that truly is the crime that law 
enforcement seeks to protect themselves against and the public against.
  Another specific area of concern is in the context of juvenile 
justice. If the Federal Government is prosecuting a juvenile, this bill 
would authorize the government to seek the transfer to adult court of 
someone as young as 15 years old if they were accused of committing a 
felony crime of violence. That may be a burglary, unintentionally in a 
building. We note where teenagers are and how they behave.
  Under this new definition is even interference with a flight crew or 
an argument with a flight attendant over a Diet Coke.

                              {time}  0930

  And we want safety everywhere, on the highways and byways, throughout 
our neighborhoods and schools. We want to make sure that we attend to 
this, but this is serious work and it should have been done in regular 
order.
  The consequences of H.R. 6691 are dangerous, especially as we look to 
the new attitude of the Justice Department, which is charging on every 
offense. Unlike the comprehensive and collaborative manner previously 
utilized in the past administration, working with faith leaders, 
working with law enforcement, working with advocates for social and 
criminal justice, U.S. attorneys were directed to not charge up, to 
focus on the highest crime.
  Now we have the tendency to use a sprawling, overbroad definition of 
violent crime to justify more arrests and prosecutions and long prison 
sentences.
  Has anybody met an ex-felon, many of them wanting to do right? I see 
a lot of them where good businesses have hired them. They want their 
head down, they want to work, they want to get an apartment, they want 
to support their family. They are not interested in going back again, 
nor are they interested in being accused of a minor offense and being 
``felonized,'' if you will.
  Second, a new definition of ``crime of violence'' is unnecessary, 
even in light of Dimaya. The court in Dimaya held that the residual 
clause is unconstitutional, but left in place subsection a. While 
perhaps not an ideal formulation, subsection a can, for now, suffice as 
a placeholder until Congress can undertake a more deliberate approach. 
Even so the Senate would have a companion bill, which to our knowledge, 
it does not. It is important to take note of the fact.
  Third, changing the definition of a crime of violence can have other 
harmful effects; for example, it could have

[[Page H7928]]

significant exclusionary effects for criminal justice reform 
legislation. There is proposed legislation that excludes people 
convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release considerations, 
expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors. So it would exclude 
people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release 
consideration, expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors while in 
custody. Unnecessarily expanding who is ineligible for these provisions 
is both unwise and counterproductive.
  So as I have indicated, it is important that when we work together, 
we must work together through the goals of reforming our criminal 
justice system, which Congress has acknowledged needs dire fixing. 
Let's work together.
  I am pushing for the revisions of criminal justice reform for 
juveniles. Reforming the juvenile justice system that locks up 
juveniles forever and ever because they are not sentenced in many 
instances. Certainly there are few juveniles in the Federal system, but 
in our State systems. And when we use the bully pulpit, States begin to 
reform their systems.
  In addition, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, ACLU, Center for 
American Progress, and several others have opposed this bill.
  We are on the Judiciary Committee. We believe in justice. Along with 
the advocates, we need true experts, and we are experts on these 
subject matters. And we are troubled by the reckless speed in which 
this bill was brought to the floor.
  We understand the intent. We welcome it. But I have listed the 
fractures, the problems, the undermining of due process, the throwing 
the key away on good people who want to do better or who did not intend 
to exercise some of the elements that are in this bill.
  So I ask my colleagues in this instance to recognize that this is too 
fast and to vote ``no'' on this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss H.R. 6691, the ``Community Safety and 
Security Act of 2018,'' which amends section 16 of Title 18.
  Section 16 sets forth the universal definition of what constitutes a 
``crime of violence'' for the entirety of the criminal code.
  Therefore, this definition is critically important and I am deeply 
concerned that my colleagues on the other side are introducing such an 
important amendment in such a reckless manner.
  Although my colleagues claim that the introduction of this bill has 
not been hasty and that it has been vetted for months, on this side we 
have had this bill for seven days. It was introduced exactly one week 
ago today, on the day before a three-day weekend. That is reckless.
  H.R. 6691 would expand the definition of crimes of violence in 
section 16 in two ways: (1) by enumerating certain offenses that do not 
currently exist under Federal law to be recognized as crimes of 
violence for Federal purposes; and (2) by adding alternative 
definitions to already-existing Federal offenses in order to have these 
new definitions also qualify as Federal crimes of violence.
  The Supreme Court recently decided Sessions v Dimaya, holding that 
subsection (b) of section 16, known as the ``residual clause,'' is 
unconstitutionally vague.
  Subsection (a), which Dimaya left untouched, defines a crime of 
violence as one that requires, as an element, the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of 
another.
  In response to Dimaya, my colleagues are now putting forth this bill 
to substitute subsection (b) for a list of ``crimes of violence,'' many 
of which have no element involving the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of force.
  In addition, even the residual clause stricken down by Dimaya 
required that a crime of violence at least be a felony. H.R. 6691 
strips away the felony requirement.
  For these reasons, this bill radically amends section 16. This bill 
does not just list a few statutes that are obvious crimes of violence. 
It enumerates at least 32 separate crimes, some of which are not 
Federal crimes, and it even offers alternative definitions for several 
Federal crimes. This requires careful consideration.
  But rather than proceeding through regular order by having a hearing, 
to ascertain relevant information from experts that will help us 
establish the best approach for dealing with the constitutionality of 
section 16 and the Federal definition of crimes of violence, we have 
been given one week to vote, with no markups to allow amendments, 
germane to the bill's purpose.
  Instead of taking the time to fashion a definition that takes into 
consideration the many legal ramifications of changing this term as 
proposed, the bill's sponsors are haphazardly pushing forward an 
overly-expansive definition of ``crime of violence'' for political 
purposes. The bill is (1) overbroad, (2) unnecessary, and (3) could 
have substantial harmful effects.
  First, the bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of 
violence a number of offenses that have no element of violence, or 
force, at all. Burglary, for example, is included in the enumerated 
list of crimes of violence though it could simply mean remaining in a 
building without authorization and, while there, forming the intent to 
commit even a minor, non-violent offense. Likewise, the bill lists 
coercion through fraud as a violent felony, though violence plays no 
part in that criminal offense. The bill would also make simple assault 
a crime of violence even in circumstances where the underlying act is 
merely a push or a shove.
  One of the more egregious examples of an offense listed as a crime of 
violence is ``fleeing by automobile'' which is ``knowingly operating a 
motor vehicle and--(A) failing or refusing to comply with a law 
enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a stop; or 
(B) fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.'' This 
definition does not even require an intent to elude law enforcement. 
Under this bill, what could have amounted to a traffic violation 
becomes, instead, a ``crime of violence''.
  Another specific area of concern is in the context of juvenile 
justice. If the Federal government is prosecuting a juvenile, this bill 
would authorize the government to seek transfer to adult court of 
someone as young as 15 years old if they are accused of committing a 
felony ``crime of violence'' under this new definition--even for 
something as minor as getting in an argument with a flight attendant 
over a Diet Coke.
  The consequences of H.R. 6691 are dangerous, especially in the hands 
of a Sessions Justice Department, which has displayed a general 
tendency to use a sprawling, overbroad definition of violent crime to 
justify more arrests and prosecutions and longer prison sentences.
  Second, a new definition of crime of violence is unnecessary, even in 
light of Dimaya. The Court in Dimaya held that the residual clause is 
unconstitutional, but left in place subsection (a). While perhaps not 
an ideal formulation, subsection (a) can for now suffice as a 
placeholder until Congress can undertake a more deliberate approach, 
instead of the reflexive one proposed by H.R. 6691.
  Third, changing the definition of a crime of violence can have other 
harmful effects. For example, it could have significant exclusionary 
effects for criminal justice reform legislation. There is proposed 
legislation that excludes people convicted of a crime of violence from 
pretrial release considerations, expungement of crimes, and receiving 
visitors while in custody. Unnecessarily expanding who is ineligible 
for these provisions is both unwise and counterproductive to the goals 
of reforming our criminal justice system, which Congress has 
acknowledged needs dire fixing.
  Families Against Mandatory Minimum (FAMM), ACLU, Center for American 
Progress (CAP), and several other organizations have opposed this bill.
  We on the Judiciary Committee, along with advocates that are true 
experts on these subject matters are troubled by the reckless speed 
with which this bill was brought to the floor today.
  We should take the time to explore why.
  According to a recent report by the Pew Research Center on January 
12, 2018, the number of African Americans in prisons are 33 percent. 
The number of Hispanics are 23 percent. Therefore, together they make 
up 56 percent of today's prison population.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, to my colleague from Texas, I want to say good morning 
to her as well and also recognize her significant efforts in criminal 
justice reform, and indeed I was proud to be able to support that 
recent piece of legislation that came through our committee as well.
  A couple of points. I very much appreciate the concerns that have 
been raised, Mr. Speaker, but I assure you that this law, as crafted, 
does not go beyond the scope contemplated when Section 16 was 
originally crafted.
  This is a responsible, carefully crafted piece of legislation that 
does what the United States Supreme Court recommended. It enumerates 
what crimes are crimes of violence so that there can be no vagueness 
and people know what the law is. In fact, it goes to protect due 
process, Mr. Speaker.
  This is our responsibility as legislators. And indeed, Mr. Speaker, 
time is of the essence, given the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
and indeed

[[Page H7929]]

there would be substantial harmful effects if we fail as Congress to 
act today on this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).
  Mr. MARINO. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Congresswoman Handel for 
bringing this forth, this very important piece of legislation that has 
been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
  The Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya ruled that 18 U.S.C. Section 
16 was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
  That is the way the process works. We, the legislators, write the 
law, not an unelected bureaucrat. We, as legislators, are supposed to 
write the law, then the court interprets that law if an issue is 
brought before the court, as in this particular case.
  So there is a several-page slip opinion, we call it, that explains 
why the court ruled the way it did, saying we need more of an 
explanation as to what a violent crime is. The court ruled that the 
statute in question failed to properly provide a definition for a crime 
of violence.
  H.R. 6691 eliminates that vagueness and addresses the Supreme Court's 
concerns and preserves the pre-Dimaya status quo.
  It has the support of the Justice Department.
  The legislation before us today is supported by the Department of 
Justice, I want to reemphasize that, and will properly define what a 
crime of violence is. It is clearly delineated here in eight pages, the 
crimes, what constitutes them, the meaning, the intent, crime by crime 
on these pages. It does not prevent anyone from due process.
  As a former Federal prosecutor and State prosecutor, I have seen 
serious violent crimes that were committed. And we must make sure that 
those that are here illegally and commit these violent crimes be sent 
back to their countries from where they came.
  Over 18 years as a prosecutor, I have seen my share of bodies on 
slabs in morgues because of violent crime, and many of those were young 
kids.
  This legislation defines crime by crime by crime and sets forth the 
criteria that the legislature was responsible for doing in the first 
place.
  I want to explain the process on how this works. The crime is 
committed, it is reported, law enforcement goes in and does an 
investigation. If they feel that a crime has been committed, they file 
a complaint or go to the DA or go to the United States Attorney and 
present probable cause, evidence that the crime probably was committed. 
And then, in whatever situation, whether it is the State or the Federal 
level, there can be an indictment, the evidence can go before a grand 
jury, and then the decision is made if it proceeds. Then that 
individual goes before a judge on a preliminary hearing to the point 
where the person's actual constitutional rights kick in. None of that, 
none of that is eliminated.
  I support this legislation because of what I have seen over my 
career. And taking care of issues of violence that we see so much of 
and the violence that we see, particularly by individuals that are here 
illegally, this remedies that matter.
  We have a lot of violence in this country committed by people that 
are citizens, and we take care of that through the judicial system as 
well.
  But this is commonsense legislation. It addresses the issue 
immediately and it does what the American people want it to do.
  There is due process, but if you are here illegally, you commit a 
violent crime, and once that is established, then you are sent back to 
your country of origin.
  Mr. Speaker, I support this legislation and I urge my colleagues to 
support it.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, if I might respond to the gentleman's 
presentation.
  Due process is denied and could be denied, based upon the fact that 
there is no element of the offenses that are just listed in a laundry-
list type. That would come about if we had done this in an extensive 
manner of review.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island 
(Mr. Cicilline), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law and a member of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6691, the so-called 
Community Safety and Security Act.
  This legislation would dramatically expand the definition of a crime 
of violence in the Federal criminal code, with many, many unintended 
consequences. The gentlewoman from Texas spoke about fleeing. That is 
just one example of one of the unintended consequences of this.
  This is partly happening because this legislation is being rushed 
through the House without any meaningful debate or committee 
consideration. It was introduced just last week before the Labor Day 
weekend when most Members were home for the district work period. We 
have had zero markups, zero hearings on this bill, and this bill has 
never been considered in the previous Congress. So not in this 
Congress, not in the previous Congress.

  It has not been considered through regular order, and that means key 
stakeholders, like outside experts and criminal justice reform 
advocates, have been given little chance to provide input on the bill.
  It is a demonstration, frankly, of the arrogance of this body. We 
don't even think we need to listen to anybody about the implications of 
this bill. We know best. We are not going to have a hearing. We are 
just going to bring it to the floor.
  In the very short time that the public has had to analyze it, groups 
like Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the ACLU, and the National 
Immigration Justice Center have expressed opposition to the bill.
  It is basically fast tracked, even though changing the definition of 
a crime of violence will have a domino effect on our laws, given its 
prevalence in Federal criminal law and its application in immigration 
law.
  This so-called Community Safety and Security Act could lead to more 
criminalization, harsh sentencing, and unfair results. It is overly 
broad and will open the doors to massive incarceration and people being 
unjustifiably detained, both pretrial and post-conviction. It could 
exacerbate racial disparities that already exist in policing and in the 
courts, and it could accelerate the number of immigrant detentions and 
deportations.
  I really don't understand why my Republican colleagues are scrambling 
to push this through, this just-introduced bill, without careful 
consideration.
  We do have to respond to the Supreme Court decision. We need to do it 
properly, and after careful deliberations, with a full understanding of 
all of the consequences. This bill will have far-reaching effects, not 
only on citizens of this country, but on people who are here in the 
United States.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, passing this bill today without a full 
understanding of these effects would be irresponsible.
  We have been able to engage in really deliberative, thoughtful 
consideration of criminal justice reform. This May we passed the FIRST 
STEP Act. There was a lot of good bipartisan collaboration. There were 
hearings and discussions and listening to experts. That is how we 
should be doing business. This will affect people's lives.
  We have a lot more work to do. I encourage my colleagues to reject 
this legislation so that we can get back to working in a bipartisan way 
to get rid of mandatory minimums, to making investments in reentry 
programs, to ending racial profiling, and so many of the other reforms 
that I know we can work on together. That is how we should be doing the 
business of the American people, not jamming things through in the dark 
of night with no hearings, no witnesses, no understanding of the bill 
that just passed.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, first, I certainly appreciate my colleagues and the fact 
that they have read the bill so very thoroughly.
  I must reiterate, however, that this legislation is not overly broad. 
In fact, it specifically maintains the status quo. And we drew those 
lines because

[[Page H7930]]

we crafted the bill to maintain that status quo.
  The legislation will not be able to fix some of the outrageous 
injustices that have occurred when courts have found certain offenses 
do not qualify as crimes of violence. For example, where a defendant 
who has a conviction for sexual abuse escapes more serious consequences 
because the State's sexual abuse statute also encompasses certain 
consensual conduct and, therefore, it was not categorically a crime of 
violence even when and where this particular defendant committed 
horrific acts that were most certainly not consensual.

                              {time}  0945

  Some of these injustices must be fixed through State legislation. We 
refrained specifically from expanding the law, despite the very human 
desire to want to fix these kinds of injustices and recognizing that 
the States have the duty to fix this.
  This legislation, Mr. Speaker, does affect people's lives. 
Specifically, it is going to affect the lives of individuals who are 
victims of violent crimes.
  A couple more points have been raised. First of all, on the issue of 
fleeing, we have heard the concerns that the written text is a little 
bit too broad on fleeing. Well, let me just correct that. Courts have 
found fleeing to be a crime of violence. This is not an expansion. This 
applies only in vehicles. It is not on foot.
  The Seventh Circuit called this specific conduct ``inherently 
aggressive.'' The 11th Circuit reasoned that ``fleeing from law 
enforcement, an individual has already resorted to an extreme measure 
to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the 
use of physical force.''
  So, Mr. Speaker, we approach this bill with great diligence. Time, as 
I said, is of the essence, given the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision. We heard from the police officers association that they are 
very concerned about the fact that pending cases and convictions could 
be effective if Congress does not act. Indeed, substantial harm will 
occur if we fail to act.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, reserving the status quo is the very 
point we are making, that the status quo is the unclarity, if you will, 
and, therefore, it is important that we pursue this in a manner of 
constructively understanding what is the best approach to protect the 
American people.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Takano), the vice ranking member on the Veterans' Affairs Committee.
  Mr. TAKANO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 6691, the Community 
Safety and Security Act of 2018.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to my colleague's attention an issue I 
don't think the majority considered when rushing this bill to the floor 
without any hearings or markup. They departed from regular order, and 
doing so always has some, I think, unintended consequences.
  H.R. 6691 will help deport veterans, people who have served in our 
military and often who have served in combat. Current law makes certain 
crimes a deportable offense for legal permanent residents. For the 
thousands of servicemembers and veterans who are legal permanent 
residents, this bill will make it easier to deport them.
  If a soldier comes home with PTSD or if a veteran is struggling with 
substance abuse or gets in trouble with the law, this bill makes it 
harder to grant them any kind of discretion.
  I have met with dozens of deported veterans who have served their 
country honorably, even been to war, but were deported when they came 
home. They made mistakes. They paid their debt to society, and their 
service meant nothing when it came time to permanently banish them from 
our country.
  Now, that is unfair. It is cruel and unusual punishment. I believe 
that if anyone deserves a second chance in our country, it is our 
veterans.
  Now, I agree with many of my colleagues that the Supreme Court is 
right and that we need to change the vagueness in the current law; 
however, we need to do that through regular order. This bill would 
classify certain crimes as violent, even if no one was harmed in the 
act. These are serious issues and they deserve a serious process.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill will have many unintended consequences if made 
into law. I implore my colleagues to vote against it and have it go 
through regular order and get the hearings that it merits.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, just one clarification to the most recent 
comments. The part that was left out in those comments was the fact 
that it would apply only if a violent crime is committed.
  May I inquire as to how much time remains.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Georgia has 18\3/4\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Carter).
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of legislation introduced by my 
colleague, Congresswoman Karen Handel from Georgia, H.R. 6691, the 
Community Safety and Security Act.
  This is an important piece of legislation for multiple reasons. 
First, passage of this legislation fulfills Congress' duty to fix a 
loophole in our Federal legal code that the Supreme Court has decided 
must be changed. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that our 
definition of ``crime of violence'' is unconstitutionally vague, 
applicable throughout U.S. Code. This means courts must decide on a 
case-by-case basis which crimes are of violence and which are not.
  Unfortunately, this vagueness leads to inconsistencies. Individuals 
who commit crimes of sexual assault, kidnapping, assault on a police 
officer, and much more may be set free by the courts because of this 
vague phrase in our code.
  With this legislation, we can ensure those committing these acts stay 
behind bars. And further, fixing this problem is exactly what Congress 
was designed to do, allowing those elected directly by the people to 
create and update the laws we live by, creating consistent and clear 
laws to uphold the rule of law.
  Mr. Speaker, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this 
important legislation.
  I thank my colleague from Georgia for sponsoring this legislation.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, if I might inquire how many speakers 
the gentlewoman from Georgia has remaining.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I have two additional speakers.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Holding).
  Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 6691, the 
Community Safety and Security Act, and urge all of my colleagues to 
support this bill.
  I also want to thank my colleague, Congresswoman Handel, for her very 
hard work in advancing this legislation.
  In April, as we know, the Supreme Court held, in Sessions v. Dimaya, 
that the term ``crime of violence'' was unconstitutionally vague. This 
decision meant certain obviously violent offenses would no longer 
qualify as violent crimes and, thus, made it more challenging to deport 
illegal immigrants who have committed what we would all call violent 
crimes.
  Justice Gorsuch was the deciding vote in the case, casting his vote 
for fear that vague laws invite arbitrary power. In his opinion, he 
indicated that it was the duty of the legislature to add to the list of 
what constitutes a crime of violence that could lead to a person's 
deportation. This legislation does just that.
  As a former United States attorney, I understand that clarity is the 
cornerstone of justice. So by clearly defining what constitutes a 
violent crime, we are not only strengthening our judicial system, but 
also ensuring the safety of the American people.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, earlier I indicated the work of the 
Judiciary Committee, and it has been enhanced by the ranking member, 
Mr. Nadler. We have worked on criminal justice issues bipartisanly, and 
I want to thank Mr. Nadler for doing so. That is the tragedy of this 
legislation.

[[Page H7931]]

  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Nadler), the ranking member of the House Judiciary 
Committee.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I must oppose the so-called Community Safety and 
Security Act. This highly flawed bill is an example of why regular 
order and a meaningful, deliberative process is essential to the proper 
crafting of legislation.
  Last April, the Supreme Court, in Sessions v. Dimaya, ruled that a 
portion of the criminal code's definition of criminal violence is 
unconstitutionally vague. That was nearly 6 months ago.
  The Judiciary Committee has had ample time to examine the decision, 
to hold hearings, to gather input from a range of stakeholders, and to 
carefully develop legislation through markup and regular order--but 
none of those things have happened.
  Instead, a bill with significant ramifications for criminal law in 
immigration cases was introduced just last week while Members were out 
of town and is being rushed to the floor today without any hearings, 
without any markup, without any adequate opportunity for review by the 
public, by legal experts, or by stakeholders. So it is not a surprise 
that we are left with many unanswered questions and concerns about the 
impact of the bill.
  The term ``crime of violence'' is referred to throughout the criminal 
code and is, for example, used to determine whether a juvenile may be 
prosecuted as an adult in Federal court. It also has serious 
implications in immigration law because a noncitizen convicted of an 
aggravated felony, described under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
to include a crime of violence under this section, is deportable and 
would be denied the opportunity for certain discretionary relief from 
removal.
  If we do not define this term properly, it could have significant 
adverse consequences. H.R. 6691 specifies a long list of offenses that 
would be considered crimes of violence, some of which are not currently 
included in the Federal criminal code. The bill further defines some of 
the offenses that are in the code, adding layers of confusion to the 
bill.
  We need proper definitions. For example, the crime of fleeing is 
identified as a crime of violence. Now, if by fleeing you mean that, 
when the cop pulls you over, you hit the gas and flee at 100 miles per 
hour, endangering anybody on the road, that is a crime of violence. But 
if by fleeing it is meant that you don't pull over immediately because 
you are looking for a safe place to stop, well, that probably shouldn't 
be a crime of violence, and yet, in this bill, it seems to be.
  We should carefully examine all of these offenses to determine which 
are appropriate to be included in this definition, and we should 
consider what the consequences will be for each one.
  In writing for the majority in Dimaya, Justice Kagan noted that:

       A host of issues respecting the definition of ``crime of 
     violence'' application to specific crimes divide the Federal 
     appellate courts.

  Although Congress has the power to clarify the definition or to 
establish a new one, as this bill would do, it is absolutely essential 
that we consider carefully what offenses should be included.
  Indeed, in considering a change to the definition of ``crime of 
violence'' for the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, the United 
States Sentencing Commission held a hearing and received testimony. It 
also sought public comments in response to proposed revisions. At a 
minimum, we should do the same.
  Finally, I note that, even in the brief time since the bill has been 
introduced, a week, a broad array of advocates have expressed 
opposition to this bill, including the American Civil Liberties Union 
and Families Against Mandatory Minimums.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New York.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for the additional 
time.
  Others opposing the bill are Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the 
Immigrant Justice Network, the Immigrant Defense Project, the National 
Center for Lesbian Rights, the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, and others. Such opposition should, at the very least, tell us 
that we should not be considering this legislation without thoughtful 
deliberation.
  This bill is a perfect example of a bill whose topics should be 
covered, but we could do it properly instead of having a sloppily 
drafted bill that does things we don't know it does and doesn't do 
things we think it does. We must have a hearing. We should have 
testimony. We should carefully consider this bill, and then we should 
pass some version of it.
  For those reasons, I oppose passage of this version of this bill, and 
I ask that we take the time to examine this issue through regular 
order.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, again, I want to make the point that time 
really is of the essence in being able to protect due process and, 
equally and perhaps more importantly, being able to protect victims of 
certain violent crimes.
  For example, right now, today, under Fourth Circuit precedent, sex 
trafficking is not considered a crime of violence; and I think that 
most of us would all agree that sex trafficking is, indeed, a crime of 
violence.
  Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Georgia has 14\3/4\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).
  Mr. MARINO. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make some clarifications. 
First of all, I am tired of hearing from the other side that bills are 
rushed through, bills are pushed through, there is no thought put into 
this, which is nothing more than a red herring.

                              {time}  1000

  The Supreme Court said that the term ``crime of violence'' is not 
specific enough. So what we did was we put into this new statute this 
new law explaining what murder is, and voluntary manslaughter, sexual 
abuse, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual abuse, child abuse, 
kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, firearms use, burglary, arson, 
extortion, communication of threats, and fleeing.
  These are already laws that have been on the books for two decades. 
The Court just simply said it wants the specifics in the legislation 
for removing someone who is here illegally and who has committed one of 
these crimes.
  Now, let's go into this. They are making, again, a red herring, a big 
deal, out of this term ``fleeing.'' Now, all the crimes, plus there 
were many more in here that I didn't have time to go over, explain and 
define those.
  One thing I want to talk about in ``fleeing'' is, it is not if a 
person is speeding and an officer wants to stop that person and the 
person drives a little longer to find a safe place to pull over. That 
is absurd.
  Here is the term. ``Fleeing'' means knowingly operating a motor 
vehicle and, following a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the 
motor vehicle to a stop: A, failing or refusing to comply; or, B, 
fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.
  The term ``force'' means the level of force capable of physical pain 
or injury, or needed or intended to overcome resistance.
  That means that that individual is fleeing in that automobile at a 
high rate of speed to get away from the officer because they don't want 
to be caught, and that person could cause much more havoc, much more 
danger and death, to somebody else if, when they are fleeing, they 
cause an accident.
  My colleagues on the other side leave out these important details. It 
is all listed here. It is very specific. It is exactly what the Court 
asked for, and this is good law.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the ranking member of 
the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, there are some things in this bill that 
probably make sense, and there are some things in this bill that I 
think are very poorly crafted and will have adverse implications for 
juvenile law or for sentencing reform.
  We should have had a hearing. We should have looked into this whole

[[Page H7932]]

matter and come up with something that we could all support.
  Now, one of the things, I hate to say, is that there is a sense of 
urgency here. The problem is the majority sat on their hands.
  This decision of the Supreme Court was April 17 of this year. What 
did the committee do in response? Nothing. Nothing. No bill was 
introduced. No hearings were held. Then, last week, this piece of 
legislation was introduced and rushed to the floor without adequate 
thought.
  So, yes, we need to act, but we need to act like grownups. We need to 
make sure that we are doing something that makes sense.
  I am actually going to vote ``present'' on this vote, because I don't 
want a ``no'' vote on the portions of the bill that I know are correct 
having to do with child abduction.
  But I can't support something that is so poorly crafted, that is a 
product of such disdain for the need to be serious about this issue.
  If we don't want to trample on the good work we did, and we have yet 
to bring to fruition on sentencing reform the juvenile justice issues 
that loom so large in our communities, we just can't go ahead blindly 
on this bill.
  I thought it was important to point out that the majority has a 
responsibility to react to court decisions, and they failed in this 
case.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Texas has 16\1/4\ 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, sometimes vagueness is the extinguishing of 
constitutional rights. I know, and I will have the numbers, that the 
predominant numbers of incarcerated persons throughout the Nation are 
African Americans and Hispanics. That is men and women. A rising number 
of women are being incarcerated, some of them tied to crimes of their 
boyfriend, husband, or other significant other.
  Juveniles are also being incarcerated throughout the State system.
  Mass incarceration is a big deal, so it behooves us to be diligent. 
In this particular bill, yes, Mr. Speaker, it should have been 
collaborative and bipartisan, because none of us will yield to a 
dastardly criminal act that impacts our constituents or the American 
people. But a fact is a fact. This generates racial disparities.
  As my friend from California indicated, individuals who put on the 
uniform, who may be legal permanent residents, veterans, have the 
potential, in spite of the uniform that they put on and their 
willingness to sacrifice their life for America, caught in the wrong 
situation, could be deported.
  This is not to be taken lightly. Frankly, if my friends had studied 
the Constitution and read the Supreme Court decision, they would have 
seen the statement that Justice Kagan made, and that is that this is 
dividing the Federal appellate courts. She raised the question: Does 
car burglary qualify as a violent felony under 16(b)? She indicated 
that some courts say yes, some courts say no.
  She went on to say, residential trespass, what is that? The same is 
true. She went on to say, it does not exhaust the conflict in the 
courts.

  Well, you don't answer the conflict by doing as was stated in the 
Families Against Mandatory Minimums letter dated September 6. On 
substantive grounds, H.R. 6691 has the potential to have severe 
unintended consequences on sentencing in our justice system writ large.
  Under this bill, seemingly nonviolent offenses will be considered 
violent offenses, for example, under H.R. 6691, burglary of an 
unoccupied home. How many teenagers--I am not condoning that--may we 
find in an unoccupied home? I am not condoning burglary, but it would 
be considered a violent offense.
  Burglary is a serious offense, but should it be considered violent if 
the perpetrator does not even interact with another person? Yes, they 
should be prosecuted. But you have in this bill violent offense.
  Then, of course, in this legislation, legal service providers who 
filed an amicus brief, these are the guys and ladies who are our public 
defenders who see these people every day--the indigent, and many of 
them minority--they wind up, as everyone says, up the road in these 
large, massive prisons, and their lives are ruined because we have not 
fixed the criminal justice system.
  Legal service providers who filed the amicus brief in the Dimaya case 
described the different applications of subsection (b) of section 16 
across Federal circuits, using the example of residential trespass, 
which was considered a crime of violence by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals but not by the Seventh Circuit. This bill does little to 
resolve the inconsistent way courts apply the crime of violence based 
on subsection (b) because it includes vague definitions of offenses and 
creates definitions for the same crimes that differ from those 
currently in the criminal code.
  That is a denial of due process, and that is not taking on this 
important issue. As was mentioned, there is a list of important 
elements. I support the fact that these are difficult and a terrible 
dilemma. But it can be done in a manner that is preferable, and that is 
through unceasing commitment and effort.
  Mr. Speaker, this is why we are here today having different 
positions. I cannot yield to what will be claimed as individuals who do 
not understand how important this bill is when I know the young African 
American men and young men of color who are entrapped in this system, 
and that the better approach and the better angels are for us to do 
comprehensive criminal justice reform and, I might add, immigration 
reform as well.
  But let me indicate that we support victims of crime, especially 
those who are victims of violent crimes. We want relief for them.
  This bill dangerously leads to overcriminalization, and we should not 
take the task of amending the definition of ``crime of violence'' 
lightly.
  In the Rules Committee, we addressed overcriminalization and mass 
incarceration. Representative Torres aptly stated that we should not 
proceed with haste, which will further exacerbate the overcrowdedness 
in our prisons.
  One Member suggested, in the Rules Committee, just build prisons, 
that is how we stop this criminal siege, as indicated, even though the 
FBI and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have indicated that crime is 
going down.
  Yes, we have our concerns. Even conservative groups that work with 
these very complicated and important criminal justice reform issues, 
like the Cook Foundation and Right on Crime, do not agree that building 
more prisons is the answer. Right on Crime states that, by reducing 
excessive sentence lengths and holding nonviolent offenders accountable 
through prison alternatives, public safety can often be achieved.
  We recognize that the violent perpetrators should be incarcerated. If 
that is the case, I would stand with my colleague.
  I would also stand with the Mothers of the Movement who saw their 
sons gunned down, in that we need to have relief in that direction.
  There are many issues of criminal justice reform that should be on 
this floor--as I mentioned, sentencing reduction and juvenile justice 
reform--but we have not come to that point.
  So I would ask, Mr. Speaker, that my colleagues vote ``no,'' because 
as Justice Kagan said in her opinion, the interpretation of crime and 
violence has divided the Federal appellate courts because the answer is 
not obvious. Therefore, we must carefully consider the alternatives to 
the approach prepared in this bill. We must do more than eliminate 
vagueness. We must achieve a just and fair result.
  Nothing in this Supreme Court opinion, nothing, says, go alone, put a 
bill on the floor for 1 week, give Members no chance to amend, try to 
deny due process, build more prisons, make sure that the disparities of 
those who go into our jails rises and goes up, rather than giving our 
young people opportunities, a fair chance, and justice. So I ask my 
colleagues to oppose this bill.

                              {time}  1015

  Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record letters from the ACLU, the 
Center for American Progress, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the 
National Center

[[Page H7933]]

for Lesbian Rights, and immigrant rights organizations ranging from the 
National Immigrant Justice Center to others.

                                                         ACLU,

                                                September 6, 2018.
     Re The ACLU Says Vote NO on H.R. 6691 Community Safety and 
         Security Act of 2018.

     Hon. Paul D. Ryan,
     Speaker, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
     Minority Leader, House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Speaker Ryan and Minority Leader Pelosi: On behalf of 
     the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), we write to urge 
     you to vote NO on H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and 
     Security Act of 2018. H.R. 6691 is overbroad and expands the 
     definition of a ``crime of violence'' to include a number of 
     offenses that have no element of violence which will further 
     fuel mass incarceration for low level offenses. The ACLU will 
     include your vote on The Community Safety and Security Act in 
     our voting scorecard for the 115th Congress.
       For nearly 100 years, the ACLU has been our nation's 
     guardian of liberty, working in courts, legislatures, and 
     communities to defend and preserve the individual rights and 
     liberties that the Constitution and the laws of the United 
     States guarantee everyone in this country. With more than 2 
     million members, activists, and supporters, the ACLU is a 
     nationwide organization that fights tirelessly in all 50 
     states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. for the principle 
     that every individual's rights must be protected equally 
     under the law, regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual 
     orientation, disability, or national origin.
       The Community Safety and Security Act is a flawed attempt 
     to address the unconstitutionally vague definition of a crime 
     of violence after the Supreme Court's decision in Dimaya v. 
     Sessions. To the contrary, the bill does not fix the 
     vagueness issue, but actually renders the statute even less 
     clear and concise than the unconstitutional language that the 
     Supreme Court struck down.


     h.r. 6691 will exacerbate mass incarceration by expanding the 
                  definition of ``crime of violence''

       While H.R. 6691 amends only one definition, it has far 
     reaching impact. The definition of ``crime of violence'' in 
     18 U.S.C. Sec. 16 is referenced throughout U.S. Code in 
     various contexts including in immigration law. Amending the 
     definition of a ``crime of violence'' would expand the impact 
     of a number of federal sentencing provisions as well as 
     impact pretrial detention decisions. It would allow for 
     severe, costly, and punitive sentences to apply to low level 
     crimes, and could prevent people accused of misdemeanors from 
     being released pretrial. This hastily drafted legislation 
     would have wide, costly, and harmful consequences.


                     vagueness has not been solved

       While attempting to address the vague language found 
     unconstitutional in Dimaya, this bill creates even more 
     statutory uncertainty in its wake. In the Dimaya decision, 
     sub-section (b) of Section 16 was declared unconstitutionally 
     vague in the immigration context due to the arbitrary and 
     unpredictable decisions that were sure to result from its 
     wording. H.R. 6691 however, creates new, imprecise 
     definitions of crimes, adding confusing and ambiguous 
     language to the statute.
       Perhaps most concerning is this bill's inclusion of conduct 
     and offenses unrelated to actual violence in a definition for 
     a ``crime of violence.'' For example, the definitions of 
     fleeing, coercion, burglary, and carjacking in H.R. 6691 
     would include within their list of qualifying conduct for a 
     ``crime of violence'' acts without threats to or actual 
     bodily harm. The definition of coercion for example, includes 
     coercion by fraud, carrying no risk of actual bodily harm, 
     threatened bodily harm, or fear of bodily harm to the victim. 
     By not connecting behavior that is actually violent to the 
     meaning of a ``crime of violence'' the legislation diminishes 
     the meaning of violence and opens the door for people 
     convicted of low level, nonviolent offenses to face the same 
     severe sentences as those convicted of more serious offenses.
       Legal services providers who filed an amicus brief in the 
     Dimaya case described the different application of subsection 
     (b) of Sec. 16 across federal circuits, using the example of 
     residential trespass which was considered a ``crime of 
     violence'' by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but not by 
     the Seventh Circuit. This bill does little to resolve the 
     inconsistent way courts applied the ``crime of violence'' 
     based on subsection (b) because it too includes vague 
     definitions of offenses and creates definitions for the same 
     crimes that differ from those currently in the criminal code.
       For instance, this legislation offers new and alternative 
     meanings to carjacking, fleeing, coercion, and extortion 
     among others without amending the respective criminal code to 
     make them consistent. The definition of carjacking in the 
     bill expands the language to include acts without intent to 
     cause death or serious bodily harm as well as acts that are 
     considered merely unauthorized use of a vehicle. The most 
     confusing and ill-advised expansion in the bill is 
     ``fleeing'' as a ``crime of violence'' offering one 
     definition of the offense as simply failing to comply with an 
     officer's signal to pull over. On top of being somewhat 
     confusing and vague, these new definitions could include 
     routine traffic stops and joyriding. This bill is so broad as 
     to include acts considered nonviolent while creating a 
     numerous conflicting definitions of the same conduct.
       Instead of attempting to expand the definition of crime of 
     violence to the point of rendering the word ``violent'' 
     meaningless, a more thoughtful approach would be to adopt the 
     U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines list of ``crimes of 
     violence'' in Sec. 4B1.2 that hold true to the meaning of 
     ``violent'' while solving the vagueness issue found in 
     Dimaya. Sec. 4B1.2 offers a definition of ``crime of 
     violence'' as ``a murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, 
     aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, 
     extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm 
     described in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5845(a) or explosive materials 
     defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 841(c).''


h.r. 6691 is duplicative and excessively punitive when applied to cases 
                            of deportations

       The term ``crime of violence'' is included in one of the 
     harshest provisions of our immigration laws--triggering 
     mandatory detention and leading to deportation with little to 
     no due process. By expanding the existing ``crime of 
     violence'' definition, H.R. 6691 would lead to generally non-
     violent offenses--such as communication of threats or simple 
     assault (which could include minor offenses such as spitting 
     on another person)--triggering no-bond detention and 
     deportation. Currently, immigrants who have had contact with 
     the criminal justice system are often subject to harsh and 
     overbroad immigration penalties. Residents who have lived 
     here for decades, including lawful permanent residents, can 
     face deportation for minor offenses like shoplifting or using 
     a false bus pass. Given there is already an exhaustive list 
     of crimes that are addressed by current immigration laws, 
     this bill is unnecessary, duplicative, and excessively harsh. 
     At a time when resources are limited and the public is 
     concerned with over-criminalization, this bill would expand 
     the way in which our laws criminalize immigrants and 
     communities of color.


                               conclusion

       H.R. 6691 would impose a sweeping and unwise expansion of 
     what are known as ``crimes of violence'' that would have 
     significant and wide-ranging impacts on immigrant communities 
     and communities of color and further burden our failing 
     criminal justice system.
       For these reasons, the ACLU urges you to vote ``No'' on 
     H.R. 6691 the Community Safety and Security Act of 2018. If 
     you have any additional questions, please feel free to 
     contact Jesselyn McCurdy, Deputy Director.
           Sincerely,
     Faiz Shakir,
       National Political Director, National Political Advocacy 
     Department.
     Jesselyn McCurdy,
       Deputy Director, Washington Legislative Office.
                                  ____


                [From the Center for American Progress]

              Community Safety and Security Act--H.R. 6691


                                analysis

       The Center for American Progress is deeply concerned about 
     H.R. 6691, a bill to amend Title 18, United States Code, 
     which purports to clarify the definition of a ``crime of 
     violence'' in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16. The bill was written in 
     response to the Supreme Court's decision in Dimaya v. 
     Sessions, which held that subsection (b), known as the 
     ``residual clause,'' is unconstitutionally vague. Yet, 
     instead of taking time to fashion a definition that takes 
     into consideration the many legal ramifications across 
     federal proceedings of changing this term, the bill's 
     sponsors are recklessly pushing forward a definition of a 
     crime of violence for political purposes. The bill is 
     unnecessary, overbroad, and could have substantial harmful 
     effects.
       The bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of 
     violence a number of offenses that have no element of 
     violence at all. Burglary, for example, is included in the 
     list of crimes of violence though it is defined as the 
     unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building. Likewise, the 
     bill lists coercion through fraud as a violent felony though 
     no element of violence is part of that criminal offense. 
     Simple assault is also considered a violent crime even in 
     circumstances where the underlying act was merely a push or 
     shove.
       One of the more egregious examples of an offense listed as 
     a crime of violence is ``fleeing'' which is described as 
     ``knowingly operating a motor vehicle and, following a law 
     enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a 
     stop, (A) failing or refusing to comply; or (B) fleeing or 
     attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.'' Depending on 
     factual circumstances, this provision elevates what could 
     have amounted to a traffic violation to a crime of violence.
       The bill dangerously expands the definition of violent 
     crime which leads to overcriminalization. Every existing 
     definition of a crime of violence in federal law or for 
     federal purposes includes as an element the use, threatened 
     use, or attempted use of force--see 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 924(c)(3), 3156; Uniform Crime Reports. But H.R. 
     6691 omits this crucial and basic requirement. The 
     consequences are

[[Page H7934]]

     dangerous, especially in the hands of a Sessions Justice 
     Department which has displayed a general tendency to use a 
     sprawling definition of violent crime to justify more arrests 
     and prosecutions and longer prison sentences. The residual 
     clause, while expansive, at least had the requirement that 
     the crime of violence be classified as a felony that involves 
     a substantial risk of force against person or property, but 
     even that requirement has been removed by H.R. 6691.
       A new definition of crime of violence is unnecessary, even 
     in light of Dimaya. The Court in Dimaya held that the 
     residual clause is unconstitutional but left in place 
     subsection (a) which defines a crime of violence as ``an 
     offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
     threatened use of physical force against the person or 
     property of another.'' While not an ideal formulation, it can 
     for now suffice as an adequate placeholder until Congress can 
     undertake a more deliberate approach instead of a reflexive 
     one.
       H.R. 6691 could have significant exclusionary effects on 
     federal criminal justice laws and legislation. Carelessly 
     expanding the definition of a ``crime of violence'' will 
     change criminal procedures under current law and lead to more 
     people being unnecessarily detained both pretrial and post-
     conviction. This goes against bipartisan efforts to reform 
     the criminal justice system. For example, proposed 
     legislation such as H.R. 4833 (Bail Fairness Act); H.R. 5043 
     (Fresh Start Act); and H.R. 5575 (Pathway to Parenting Act) 
     bars people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial 
     release considerations, expungement of crimes, and receiving 
     visitors. Expanding the definition of a crime of violence 
     would exclude some of the very people meant to be helped by 
     these bills.
                                  ____


               [From Asian Americans Advancing Justice,]

                         AAJC Opposes H.R. 6691

       Asian Americans Advancing Justice--AAJC, a national civil 
     rights organization, urges Members of Congress to vote NO on 
     the House Community Safety and Security Act (H.R. 6691)--a 
     measure that would dangerously expand the definition of a 
     ``crime of violence'' to include many offenses that have no 
     element of violence at all, leading to overcriminalization 
     and unnecessary detention.
       This bill's overly broad definition opens the door to a 
     massive increase in people being unjustifiably detained both 
     pre-trial and post-conviction because the bill omits the 
     crucial requirement that a ``crime of violence'' involve the 
     use, threatened use, or attempted use of force. Such severe 
     adverse consequences are highly likely to occur, especially 
     since the Department of Justice has exhibited an alarming 
     tendency to use an overly broad definition of a violent crime 
     to justify increased arrests, prosecutions, and harsher 
     prison sentences.
       Congress owes a duty to the American public to carefully 
     craft a definition of a ``crime of violence'' that takes into 
     consideration the many harmful legal consequences that might 
     flow from changing such a key term. Instead of following a 
     reasoned, deliberate approach to lawmaking, the sponsors of 
     this bill have hastily proposed a damaging definition that 
     would frustrate current bipartisan efforts to reform the 
     criminal justice system.
       We oppose any expanded definition of ``crime of violence'' 
     that would criminalize at-risk and marginalized communities. 
     We need more fairness and relief within our criminal justice 
     system, not less. This bill would disproportionately harm 
     communities of color, including Southeast Asian refugees who 
     are already being deported in high numbers for old criminal 
     convictions. A new, sprawling definition for ``crime of 
     violence'' would have negative ripple effects for community 
     members' eligibility for immigration relief, further fueling 
     Trump's draconian, anti-immigrant enforcement agenda.
       We urge Congress to stand with us against this harmful and 
     reckless bill. If you have any questions, please contact 
     Megan Essaheb or Hannah Woerner.
                                  ____

                                               National Center for


                                               Lesbian Rights,

                                                   Washington, DC.
       Dear Member of Congress: The National Center for Lesbian 
     Rights urges you to vote ``No'' on HR 6691, Community Safety 
     and Security Act of 2018. This bill would only serve to 
     exacerbate mass incarceration and racial inequality in our 
     country. The bill vastly broadens the scope of the federal 
     term ``crime of violence,'' a definition with sentencing 
     repercussions throughout the federal criminal code. 
     Additionally, because the term is also referred to in various 
     immigration statutes, the bill would also expand the already 
     vast category of crimes that render even lawfully present 
     immigrants subject to immigration mandatory detention and 
     deportation.
       This bill will likely lead to more lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
     transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people being incarcerated or 
     detained, where they are more likely to experience violence 
     than non-LGBTQ people. Currently LGBTQ people, especially 
     those of color, are disproportionally incarcerated due to 
     higher rates of poverty and to a history of anti-LGBTQ 
     discrimination, including by law enforcement. For adults 40% 
     of incarcerated women and 9% of incarcerated men are sexual 
     minorities. Additionally, one in eight transgender people 
     have been incarcerated; among transgender women, that number 
     jumps to one in five. The rate of incarceration is higher for 
     transgender people of color, with one in four trans Latinas 
     and nearly half of Black trans people experiencing 
     incarceration. In the last year, transgender people were 
     incarcerated at twice the rate of the general population, 
     with Black (9%) and American Indian (6%) transgender women 
     being the most impacted.
       Incarceration exposes LGBTQ people to verbal, physical, and 
     sexual harassment and abuse. LGBTQ prisoners are 
     significantly more likely to be sexually assaulted in prison, 
     with 12% of gay and bisexual men and 40% of transgender 
     people reporting a sexual assault in 2011. In a survey of 
     LGBTQ inmates, 85% of respondents had been placed in solitary 
     confinement--many purportedly for their own protection--and 
     approximately half had spent two years or more in solitary. 
     LGBTQ, and especially transgender inmates are often denied 
     needed medical care while incarcerated including transition-
     related care, HIV-related care, and mental and behavioral 
     care. In the previous year 37% of transgender people who were 
     on hormone treatment were denied medication once 
     incarcerated. Furthermore, LGBTQ individuals held at federal 
     immigration detention centers are 97 times more likely to be 
     sexually assaulted than other detainees.
       By causing more people to be deported, this bill will lead 
     to LGBTQ immigrants being sent back to countries where they 
     have little to no legal rights and are more likely to 
     experience anti-LGBTQ violence and possibly death. Nearly 80 
     countries criminalize same-sex relationships and many without 
     explicit laws remain very dangerous for the LGBTQ community.
       We urge you to vote ``No'' on HR 6691, because this bill 
     would hurt LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ people, especially those who 
     are of color and immigrants. As a community that experiences 
     high rates of violence, LGBTQ people understand the important 
     of addressing violence in our communities. However, 
     incarceration is not the solution to violence. Instead, 
     Congress should support community-based prevention strategies 
     and address the structural causes of violence.
       For more information, you can read the attached documents 
     which further explain the harms this bill would cause.
           Warmly,
                                               Tyrone Hanley, Esq.
     Policy Counsel.
                                  ____


                          [September 5, 2018]

Immigrants' Rights Organizations Encourage Members of Congress to Vote 
        No on H.R. 6691, a Retrogressive Mass Incarceration Bill

       H.R. 6691 is a retrogressive measure that seeks to expand 
     the federal criminal code and exacerbate mass incarceration 
     at a time when the vast majority of Americans believe the 
     country is ready for progressive criminal justice reform. The 
     bill vastly broadens the scope of the federal term ``crime of 
     violence,'' a definition with sentencing repercussions 
     throughout the federal criminal code. Because the term is 
     also referenced in one of the harshest provisions of 
     immigration law, the bill would also expand the already vast 
     category of crimes that render even lawfully present 
     immigrants subject to immigration detention and deportation. 
     The bill will cause numerous harms, outlined here and 
     described in detail below:
       1. H.R. 6691's expansion of Section 16 of Title 18 of the 
     United States Code, the definition of a ``crime of 
     violence,'' will expand the criminal justice and 
     incarceration systems. Because this definition is cross-
     referenced widely throughout the criminal code and 
     incorporated into federal immigration law, this bill will 
     trigger a significant expansion of the penalties attached to 
     even minor criminal conduct in federal criminal court, 
     exacerbate the mass incarceration crisis, and render even 
     more immigrants subject to the disproportionate penalty of 
     deportation.
       2. H.R. 6691 broadens the ``crime of violence'' definition 
     far beyond what the statute included prior to the Supreme 
     Court's decision in Dimaya, including offenses as minor as 
     simple assault and as vague as ``communication of threats.''
       3. H.R. 6691 will expand the already overly punitive 
     immigration consequences of involvement in the criminal 
     justice system by further broadening the already sweeping 
     list of offenses that constitute an ``aggravated felony,'' in 
     a manner almost entirely duplicative and sometimes at odds 
     with other provisions in federal immigration law.
       4. If H.R. 6691 became law, there would be serious 
     questions about its constitutionality.
       This bill represents a cynical effort to deepen the 
     penalties attached to even minor criminal offenses, further 
     criminalizing immigrants and communities of color. The 
     Immigrant Justice Network, Immigrant Defense Project, 
     Immigrant Legal Resource Center, National Immigrant Justice 
     Center, and the National Immigration Project of the National 
     Lawyers Guild urge Members of Congress to vote NO on H.R. 
     6691.


 1. H.R. 6691 expands the federal definition of ``crime of violence,'' 
                        with vast ripple effects

       H.R. 6691 purports to amend only one provision of U.S. 
     law--the definition of what constitutes a ``crime of 
     violence'' as defined at Section 16 of Title 18 of the United 
     States Code. Section 16, however, serves as the ``universal 
     definition'' of a ``crime of violence'' for the entirety of 
     the federal criminal code. The language is cross-referenced 
     in the definitions and sentencing provisions for

[[Page H7935]]

     numerous federal offenses, including racketeering, money 
     laundering, firearms, and domestic violence offenses. 
     Additionally, the definition is incorporated into the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act as one of a list of 21 
     different types of offenses that constitute an ``aggravated 
     felony,'' which in turn constitutes a ground of deportability 
     and a bar to nearly every type of defense to deportation.
       Expanding the ``crime of violence'' definition is anathema 
     to progressive criminal justice reform, criminalizing more 
     conduct and attaching greater penalties across numerous 
     provisions of the federal code, all while rendering more 
     immigrants subject to the double penalty of deportation.


 2. H.R. 6691 broadens the ``crime of violence'' definition far beyond 
  what the statute included prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 
                                 Dimaya

       H.R. 6691 is a solution in search of a problem. Section 16 
     is written in two sub-parts, (a) and (b). The text of the 
     statute already broadly defines ``crime of violence'' in sub-
     section (a), including any offense ``that has as an element 
     the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
     against the person or property of another.'' We can assume 
     that H.R. 6691 was written in response to the Supreme Court's 
     April 2018 decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, in which the Court 
     struck down sub-section (b) as unconstitutional in the 
     immigration context. Section 16(b) includes any felony 
     offense that ``by its nature'' involves a substantial risk of 
     the use of such force; in Dimaya, the Court found its 
     application so vague as to create ``more unpredictability and 
     arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.'' In 
     short, the Court found the second half of the statute void 
     for vagueness, but left the first half intact.
       The Dimaya decision remedied significant injustices that 
     had resulted from the inconsistent and often random 
     application of section 16(b). Immigration legal service 
     providers, serving as amid to the Dimaya Court, noted that 
     the statute's ``only predictable outcomes are continued 
     disagreements among the courts and continued harms to 
     immigrants.'' To demonstrate this harmful disparity, amici 
     described how the offense of residential trespass was 
     considered a crime of violence under section 16(b) in the 
     Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, but not in the Seventh 
     Circuit, which noted the offense could be committing simply 
     by walking into a neighbor's open door under ``the mistaken 
     belief that she is hosting an open house . . .''
       Now comes H.R. 6691, which proposes to keep section 16(a) 
     intact while expanding the ``crime of violence'' definition 
     to encompass dozens of other offenses that are in some cases 
     given their own new definitions and in others defined via 
     reference to the existing criminal code. Many of these 
     offenses move section 16 far beyond its pre-Dimaya scope, 
     including offenses as minor as spitting on another person. 
     The bill stretches the imagination by calling generally 
     nonviolent offenses, such as simple assault, ``communication 
     of threats,'' and extortion, crimes of violence.


   3. H.R. 6691 will expand the already overly punitive immigration 
consequences of involvement in the criminal justice system, in a manner 
almost entirely duplicative and sometimes at odd with other provisions 
                       of federal immigration law

       The immigration penalties of involvement in the criminal 
     justice system are already breathtakingly harsh and 
     overbroad; undocumented immigrants and decades-long lawful 
     permanent residents alike can face deportation for offenses 
     as minor as shoplifting, using a false bus pass, or simple 
     drug possession. Immigration detention and deportation are 
     frequently imposed as a penalty even in cases where a 
     criminal court judge found community service or an 
     entirely suspended sentence sufficient punishment for the 
     offense committed.
       The ``crime of violence'' definition at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16 
     is incorporated as one of twenty-one types of offense that 
     constitute an ``aggravated felony'' as defined at section 101 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act. An ``aggravated 
     felony'' is one of dozens of categories of offenses that 
     trigger deportation from or preclude entry to the United 
     States, layered on top of the provisions of federal 
     immigration law that authorize deportation for those 
     unlawfully present. The ``aggravated felony'' category is 
     different, however, because it triggers mandatory no-bond 
     detention in almost every case and categorically precludes 
     nearly all immigrants from presenting a defense to their 
     deportation.
       By adding dozens of offenses to the existing ``crime of 
     violence'' definition, H.R. 6691 therefore grows the already 
     vast expanse of offenses that render lawfully present 
     immigrants in the United States subject to immigration 
     detention and enforcement.
       The bill is largely duplicative of other grounds of 
     removability, in several cases putting forth new definitions 
     of offenses that are defined in other provisions of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act, setting up a nearly 
     impossible-to-effectuate removal scheme. Many of the offenses 
     delineated in the bill constitute their own independent 
     aggravated felony grounds (including, for example, murder and 
     burglary), their own independent ground of removability 
     (including, for example, child abuse, stalking, and domestic 
     violence), or--in nearly every other case--already fall 
     within the wide-reaching ``crime involving moral turpitude'' 
     grounds of deportability and inadmissibility, and those 
     excluded from those grounds are by nature largely minor 
     offenses.
       This bill will further criminalize immigrant communities, 
     communities already living in fear of increasingly 
     militarized immigration enforcement operations. The bill's 
     expanded list of ``crime of violence'' offenses includes 
     relatively minor offenses including simple assault, vaguely 
     worded offenses such as ``communication of threats,'' and a 
     sweeping list of inchoate offenses including solicitation or 
     ``aiding and abetting'' any of the enumerated categories.
       This bill will further marginalize historically 
     marginalized communities, triggering heightened immigration 
     penalties in already over-policed neighborhoods.


  4. If this bill were to pass, it would raise serious constitutional 
                                concerns

       If this bill were to become law, there would be serious 
     questions about its constitutionality because it jeopardizes 
     the long established ``categorical approach'' in our legal 
     system.
       What is the `categorical approach'? Over the years, the 
     Supreme Court has carefully crafted an efficient and 
     predictable legal framework to determine whether a non-
     citizen's crime makes him or her deportable or inadmissible. 
     This framework is called the ``categorical approach,'' which 
     applies to determine deportability and inadmissibility for 
     criminal grounds. It sets a clear and uniform standard to 
     evaluate the immigration consequences of the crime of 
     conviction. The categorical approach helps to eliminate 
     subjectivity in adjudication by ensuring that convictions are 
     characterized based on their inherent nature and official 
     record, rather than on potentially disputed facts, and thus 
     ensures that two people convicted of the same crime will be 
     treated similarly under the law.
       This bill makes a strong push to systematically switch from 
     the established framework of the ``categorical approach'' to 
     a ``conduct based'' definition. The conduct based definition 
     would effectively allow an immigration judge to go back and 
     ``re-try'' a conviction that was already decided in a court 
     of law. This bill, if passed, would raise the same Sixth 
     Amendment concerns that the Supreme Court identified in 
     Mathis v. United States: ``. . . allowing a sentencing judge 
     to go any further would raise serious Sixth Amendment 
     concerns. This Court has held that only a jury, and not a 
     judge, may find facts that increase a maximum penalty, except 
     for the simple fact of a prior conviction. See Apprendi v. 
     New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). That means a judge 
     cannot go beyond identifying the crime of conviction to 
     explore the manner in which the defendant committed that 
     offense.''
       Like the burglary provision analyzed in Mathis, the crime 
     of violence definition this bill amends is used as a 
     sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326(b)(2). As a 
     result of switching to a conduct-based definition rather than 
     ``the simple fact of a prior conviction,'' the bill presents 
     the same Sixth Amendment concerns that troubled the Mathis 
     Court.
       A yes vote on H.R. 6691 is a vote for mass incarceration, 
     for increased criminalization of communities of color, and 
     for even further militarization of immigration enforcement. 
     Members of Congress must vote no.

  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I leave my colleagues with a simple 
challenge. The simple challenge is: Read the Constitution.
  Vagueness can be the death of us. This bill is that kind of death, 
and I would hope that we would have the opportunity to do this as it 
should be: constitutionally sound and in a bipartisan way to save 
lives.
  Mr. Speaker, let me be clear. We support victims of crime, especially 
those who are victims of violent crime. But classifying particular 
offenses as crimes of violence has tremendous consequences for the 
individuals accused of committing them. This bill dangerously leads to 
over-criminalization and we should not take lightly the task of 
amending the definition of ``crime of violence.''
  At Rules on Wednesday, we addressed over-criminalization and mass 
incarceration. Rep. Torres aptly stated that we should not proceed with 
haste, which will further exacerbate the over crowdedness in our 
prisons. Rep. Bucks responded that we should build more prisons to 
address that problem.
  Even conservative groups that work with these very complicated and 
important criminal justice reform issues, like the Koch Foundation and 
Right on Crime, do not agree that building more prisons is the answer.
  Right on Crime states, ``by reducing excessive sentence lengths and 
holding non-violent offenders accountable through prison alternatives, 
public safety can often be achieved.''
  In a recent forum, the Koch Foundation stated, ``After four decades 
of increasing punitiveness and sky-rocketing levels of imprisonment, 
American incarceration rates have declined in many states over the past 
five years. In fact, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in favor of 
major criminal justice reforms that would reduce mass incarceration 
much further.''
  The original spark for this coalition of ``unlikely bedfellows'' has 
come from a group of conservative leaders who emphasize a variety of 
different factors, ranging from economic, to

[[Page H7936]]

freedom, to religious groups embracing redemption and second chances.
  The Koch Foundation went on to say, ``Although the 2016 presidential 
election temporarily halted this movement's momentum, the coalition has 
reemerged recently and seems prepared to make progress in 2018.''
  So I disagree with the notion that we should build more prisons and 
not exercise due diligence to ensure that in responding to the Supreme 
Court's finding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, that we 
are doing so in a well-informed, heavily-engaged and thoughtful manner.
  Due to the seriousness of our criminal justice system, we should 
always use due care and give thorough considerations when amending the 
criminal code.
  For all these reasons, I oppose this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, first let me address the criticism regarding burglary 
being too broad in the way it is addressed in the legislation. This is 
the Federal generic definition of burglary and one that courts have 
found satisfies the definition of ``crime of violence.''
  Mr. Speaker, the detractors of this fail to recognize that these 
definitions are not an expansion of actual State laws but only seek to 
cover the generic definition and reasonable iterations found in State 
law.
  In fact, prior to the Dimaya Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court 
had previously unanimously agreed in Leocal v. Ashcroft that ``burglary 
is the classic example of a crime of violence under subsection 16(b).''
  The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 is a necessary, crucial 
piece of legislation that will fix a major loophole in our system. We 
squarely address the issues raised by the United States Supreme Court, 
eliminating the vagueness, giving notice, and explaining which offenses 
Congress intended to cover when they had first crafted the language in 
clause 16(b) from the very beginning.
  By moving the legislation, we are avoiding potentially dangerous 
consequences of giving very serious, dangerous criminals a pass. We 
have examined the case law surrounding these offenses; we have 
considered the equities; we have been deliberative; and we have shown 
great restraint in many ways.
  Congress cannot sit idly by and allow criminals to disrupt our 
communities because of this loophole. This bill is a product of 
necessity, and we do not have the privilege to squabble over 
hypotheticals that ultimately have no bearing on real-life applications 
of this law. We must move to protect our communities to prevent more 
victims of crime.
  Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I can assure my colleagues that this bill is 
not overly broad. It is not, as some have irresponsibly stated, a 
``dangerous expansion of criminal law.'' Instead, it is a carefully 
crafted response to the U.S. Supreme Court's recommendations in the 
Dimaya case. Frankly, it is just the sort of bill that our system was 
designed to produce.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for this bill. Vote 
``yes,'' and in doing so, demonstrate to your constituents your 
commitment to protecting law-abiding Americans from violent criminals. 
It is a simple choice. Make the correct one and vote ``yes.''
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, today I will vote present on H.R. 6691. I 
support the premise of this legislation and agree that action needs to 
be taken after the Supreme Court's ruling earlier this year. However, 
in their finding the Court cautioned that careful consideration should 
be exercised before any new or expanded criminal definitions are 
finalized. This bill does not meet that test.
  In April, the Supreme Court ruled that the current definition of 
``crimes of violence'' was unconstitutionally vague and needed to be 
clarified. I support efforts to rectify this issue and make certain we 
are prosecuting criminals to the fullest extent of the law. Yet since 
the Court's ruling, Republicans have taken no steps to meaningfully 
consider what this new definition should be. Instead, they rushed the 
bill to the floor without a hearing, markup or time for proper review.
  I agree clarification is needed to ensure we are able to prosecute 
those who are guilty and uphold our laws as they are intended. However, 
rushing through a hasty definition of crimes of violence is dangerous 
and irresponsible. The definition is used in a number of federal 
criminal offenses beyond just the Immigration and Nationality Act. For 
instance, it also applies when determining whether a juvenile may be 
prosecuted as an adult in federal court.
  There is simply too much potential for unintended consequences to 
rush through a definition written impulsively and without proper 
review. I would rather the House carefully consider what an appropriate 
definition should include, in order to properly balance the rights of 
Americans with the need to fully enforce our laws and protect our 
fellow citizens.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 1051, the previous question is ordered 
on the bill.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 247, 
nays 152, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 28, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 393]

                               YEAS--247

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Babin
     Bacon
     Balderson
     Banks (IN)
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Bera
     Bergman
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blum
     Bost
     Brady (TX)
     Brat
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Budd
     Burgess
     Bustos
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carbajal
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Cloud
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comer
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Costa
     Costello (PA)
     Crawford
     Crist
     Cuellar
     Curbelo (FL)
     Curtis
     Davidson
     Denham
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Donovan
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Dunn
     Emmer
     Estes (KS)
     Faso
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frelinghuysen
     Gaetz
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Garrett
     Gibbs
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gottheimer
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Grothman
     Guthrie
     Handel
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Higgins (LA)
     Hill
     Holding
     Hollingsworth
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Joyce (OH)
     Katko
     Keating
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger
     Knight
     Kuster (NH)
     Kustoff (TN)
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lamb
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latta
     Lesko
     Lewis (MN)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Love
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan Grisham, M.
     Lynch
     MacArthur
     Marchant
     Marino
     Marshall
     Mast
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meadows
     Messer
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Mooney (WV)
     Mullin
     Murphy (FL)
     Newhouse
     Norman
     Nunes
     O'Halleran
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Peterson
     Pittenger
     Poe (TX)
     Poliquin
     Polis
     Posey
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Rice (SC)
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney, Francis
     Rosen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Ruiz
     Russell
     Rutherford
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schrader
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smucker
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Suozzi
     Taylor
     Tenney
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tipton
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Zeldin

                               NAYS--152

     Adams
     Aguilar
     Amash
     Barragan
     Bass
     Beatty
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt Rochester
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (MD)
     Brownley (CA)
     Butterfield
     Cardenas
     Carson (IN)
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Cooper
     Correa
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Demings
     DeSaulnier
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.

[[Page H7937]]


     Engel
     Espaillat
     Esty (CT)
     Evans
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Gomez
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffith
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hanabusa
     Heck
     Higgins (NY)
     Himes
     Hoyer
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kaptur
     Kelly (IL)
     Khanna
     Kihuen
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Krishnamoorthi
     Labrador
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lawson (FL)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lieu, Ted
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan, Ben Ray
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Massie
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McEachin
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Moore
     Moulton
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Nolan
     Norcross
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Rice (NY)
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Sherman
     Sires
     Smith (WA)
     Soto
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Thompson (MS)
     Tonko
     Torres
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Yarmuth

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--2

     DeFazio
     Lofgren
       

                             NOT VOTING--28

     Blackburn
     Capuano
     Cramer
     Culberson
     Davis, Rodney
     DeSantis
     Ellison
     Eshoo
     Gianforte
     Huffman
     Jenkins (WV)
     Jones
     Kennedy
     Maloney, Sean
     Neal
     Noem
     Renacci
     Richmond
     Rooney, Thomas J.
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce (CA)
     Ryan (OH)
     Shea-Porter
     Smith (TX)
     Speier
     Titus
     Tsongas
     Walz

                              {time}  1049

  Messrs. SANFORD and SUOZZI changed their vote from ``nay'' to 
``yea.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________