[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 149 (Friday, September 7, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H7925-H7937]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COMMUNITY SAFETY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2018
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1051, I call
up the bill (H.R. 6691) to amend title 18, United States Code, to
clarify the definition of ``crime of violence'', and for other
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1051, the bill
is considered read.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 6691
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Community Safety and
Security Act of 2018''.
SEC. 2. CRIME OF VIOLENCE.
Section 16 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
``SEC. 16. CRIME OF VIOLENCE DEFINED.
``(a) The term `crime of violence' means an offense--
``(1)(A) that--
``(i) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, assault, sexual
abuse or aggravated sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact,
child abuse, kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, firearms use,
burglary, arson, extortion, communication of threats,
coercion, fleeing, interference with flight crew members and
attendants, domestic violence, hostage taking, stalking,
human trafficking, piracy, or a terrorism offense as
described in chapter 113B (other than in section 2332d); or
``(ii) involves the unlawful possession or use of a weapon
of mass destruction; or
``(B) that involves use or unlawful possession of
explosives or destructive devices described in 5845(f) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
``(2) that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another; or
``(3) that is an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit,
solicitation to commit, or aiding and abetting any of the
offenses set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2).
``(b) In this section:
``(1) The term `abusive sexual contact' means conduct
described in section 2244(a)(1) and (a)(2).
``(2) The terms `aggravated sexual abuse' and `sexual
abuse' mean conduct described in sections 2241 and 2242. For
purposes of such conduct, the term `sexual act' means conduct
described in section 2246(2), or the knowing and lewd
exposure of genitalia or masturbation, to any person, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person.
``(3) The term `assault' means conduct described in section
113(a), and includes conduct committed recklessly, knowingly,
or intentionally.
``(4) The term `arson' means conduct described in section
844(i) or unlawfully or willfully damaging or destroying any
building, inhabited structure, vehicle, vessel, or real
property by means of fire or explosive.
``(5) The term `burglary' means an unlawful or unprivileged
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure,
including any nonpermanent or mobile structure that is
adapted or used for overnight accommodation or for the
ordinary carrying on of business, and, either before or after
entering, the person--
``(A) forms the intent to commit a crime; or
``(B) commits or attempts to commit a crime.
``(6) The term `carjacking' means conduct described in
section 2119, or the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle from
the immediate actual possession of a person against his will,
by means of actual or threatened force, or violence or
intimidation, or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching,
or fear of injury.
``(7) The term `child abuse' means the unlawful infliction
of physical injury or the commission of any sexual act
against a child under fourteen by any person eighteen years
of age or older.
``(8) The term `communication of threats' means conduct
described in section 844(e), or the transmission of any
communications containing any threat of use of violence to--
``(A) demand or request for a ransom or reward for the
release of any kidnapped person; or
``(B) threaten to kidnap or injure the person of another.
``(9) The term `coercion' means causing the performance or
non-performance of any act
[[Page H7926]]
by another person under which such other person has a legal
right to do or to abstain from doing, through fraud or by the
use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear thereof,
including the use, or an express or implicit threat of use,
of violence to cause harm, or threats to cause injury to the
person, reputation or property of any person.
``(10) The term `domestic violence' means any assault
committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian
of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a
child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has
cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian,
or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.
``(11) The term `extortion' means conduct described in
section 1951(b)(2)), but not extortion under color of
official right or fear of economic loss.
``(12) The term `firearms use' means conduct described in
section 924(c) or 929(a), if the firearm was brandished,
discharged, or otherwise possessed, carried, or used as a
weapon and the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
during and in relation to which the firearm was possessed,
carried, or used was subject to prosecution in any court of
the United States, State court, military court or tribunal,
or tribal court. Such term also includes unlawfully
possessing a firearm described in section 5845(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (such as a sawed-off shotgun or
sawed-off rifle, silencer, bomb, or machine gun), possession
of a firearm in violation of sections 922(g)(1), 922(g)(2)
and 922(g)(4), possession of a firearm with the intent to use
such firearm unlawfully, or reckless discharge of a firearm
at a dwelling.
``(13) The term `fleeing' means knowingly operating a motor
vehicle and, following a law enforcement officer's signal to
bring the motor vehicle to a stop--
``(A) failing or refusing to comply; or
``(B) fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement
officer.
``(14) The term `force' means the level of force capable of
causing physical pain or injury or needed or intended to
overcome resistance.
``(15) The term `hostage taking' means conduct described in
section 1203.
``(16) The term `human trafficking' means conduct described
in sections 1589, 1590, and 1591.
``(17) The term `interference with flight crew members and
attendants' means conduct described in section 46504 of title
49, United States Code.
``(18) The term `kidnapping' means conduct described in
section 1201(a)(1) or seizing, confining, inveigling,
decoying, abducting, or carrying away and holding for ransom
or reward or otherwise any person.
``(19) The term `murder' means conduct described as murder
in the first degree or murder in the second degree described
in section 1111.
``(20) The term `robbery' means conduct described in
section 1951(b)(1), or the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property from the person or in the presence of
another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened
force, or violence or intimidation, or by sudden or stealthy
seizure or snatching, or fear of injury, immediate or future,
to his person or property, or property in his custody or
possession, or the person or property of a relative or member
of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the
taking or obtaining.
``(21) The term `stalking' means conduct described in
section 2261A.
``(22) The term `weapon of mass destruction' has the
meaning given such term in section 2332a(c).
``(23) The term `voluntary manslaughter' means conduct
described in section 1112(a).
``(c) For purposes of this section, in the case of any
reference in subsection (b) to an offense under this title,
such reference shall include conduct that constitutes an
offense under State or tribal law or under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, if such conduct would be an offense
under this title if a circumstance giving rise to Federal
jurisdiction had existed.
``(d) For purposes of this section, the term `conspiracy'
includes any offense that is a conspiracy to commit another
offense under State or Federal law, irrespective of whether
proof of an overt act is required to establish commission of
the conspiracy offense.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 1 hour
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member
of the Committee on the Judiciary.
The gentlewoman from Georgia (Mrs. Handel) and the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Georgia.
General Leave
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 6691.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Georgia?
There was no objection.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise today in strong support of H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and
Security Act of 2018. This legislation provides critical clarity to the
definition of ``crime of violence'' in the United States Code in order
to keep violent criminals off the streets and ensure the safety of our
communities.
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Dimaya, the
term ``crime of violence'' was determined to be unconstitutionally
vague. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Congress to act to provide the
necessary clarity in the law that allows our law enforcement and our
judicial systems to work and, importantly, to protect the victims of
these violent crimes.
The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 provides that clarity
by precisely and legally defining the phrase ``crime of violence'' and
the related criminal acts that, when combined with the element of force
are, indeed, considered violent.
They include crimes such as voluntary manslaughter, attempted
kidnapping, lewd acts upon a child, sexual assault, assault on a police
officer, domestic violence, murder, and all other crimes that a normal,
regular individual would think of as a violent crime, as well as human
trafficking.
In my State of Georgia, metro Atlanta is well known as a haven for
human and sex trafficking, and as a recruiting center for vulnerable
young people. In 2017 alone, it was reported that nearly 3,600 females
and more than 600 males were trafficked. These are just the reported
cases. Thousands more go unreported every year.
This legislation that I bring forward today provides essential legal
clarity to ensure that crimes like human trafficking and others in the
bill are deemed legally as crimes of violence.
Failure to address this issue would foster vagueness and uncertainty
in our courts, and potentially disrupt the prosecution of certain
crimes of violence, like human trafficking, child abuse, domestic
violence, and other acts that any reasonable individual would consider
a crime of violence.
This legislation has the support of a number of organizations,
including the Fraternal Order of Police and the National Association of
Police Organizations.
In a recent letter to Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi, the Fraternal
Order of Police noted that ``there are numerous convictions and pending
cases that would be jeopardized'' in the wake of the Dimaya decision.
The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 is another step that
we, as Congress, can take, that we must take, in order to make our
communities the safest that they can possibly be. I urge my colleagues
to support this important legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I will take the opportunity to say good morning to the manager of the
bill, my co-member on the House Judiciary Committee. I start this way,
Mr. Speaker, and to my colleagues, because I always want to emphasize
when I am on the floor that the Judiciary Committee has had many
instances of bipartisanship.
I am very glad to have been on the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland
Security, and Investigations Subcommittee for more than a number of
years. I have seen our work, and it has certainly been in a bipartisan
mode.
I want to acknowledge the chairman of the committee, Mr. Goodlatte,
and the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Nadler. In many instances
on the crime reform issues, we have tried to work hand-in-hand
together.
It seems that criminal justice reform has partners on both sides of
the aisle. It is certainly an issue that draws a vast number of
stakeholders, particularly my friends in the faith community; social
justice community; my friends in the libertarian community, if you
will; and, certainly, giants like the ACLU, the Lawyers' Committee, and
many others that have been engaged in these issues, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund. So you can see that we bring people together.
So I rise to discuss H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and Security Act
of 2018, which amends section 16 of title 18.
[[Page H7927]]
Section 16 sets forth the universal definition of what constitutes a
crime of violence for the entirety of the criminal code. Therefore,
this definition is critically important, and I am deeply concerned that
my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are introducing such an
important amendment in such a hasty, precipitous manner.
Although my colleagues claim that the introduction of this bill has
not been hasty and that it has been vetted for months on their side of
the aisle, on our side of the aisle, we have had no engagement.
This bill has been laid before us for 7 days. Last Friday, it was
singly introduced when Members were not here and, as well, before a 3-
day weekend.
Let me be very clear. Criminal justice reform is not a sausage. We
would work over the months and years with academic experts; victims;
law enforcement--that is our family; and beyond, our prosecutors; our
law enforcement; and, certainly, the Sentencing Commission, for
example; our judges. We are concerned about thei viewpoints.
So I know there may be one or two who have written and may be
supporting this, but this is not the way we get to the floor.
H.R. 6691 would expand the definition of crimes of violence in
section 16 in two ways: enumerating certain offenses that do not
currently exist under Federal law, and it would have been good to have
a hearing or a series of hearings on this to be recognized for crimes
of violence for Federal purposes; and by adding alternative definitions
to already-existing Federal offenses, in order to have these new
definitions also qualify as Federal crimes of violence.
Again, here is the trigger: More and more people incarcerated maybe
could find another way of addressing these questions, even by law
enforcement.
The Supreme Court recently decided Sessions v. Dimaya, holding that
subsection (b) of section 16, known as the residual clause, is
unconstitutionally vague. Subsection (a) in the Dimaya case left
untouched defines a crime of violence as one that requires as an
element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.
In response to Dimaya, my colleagues are now putting forth a bill to
substitute subsection (b) for a list of crimes of violence, many of
which have no element involving the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of force.
In addition, even the residual clause stricken down by Dimaya
requires that a crime of violence at least be a felony. H.R. 6691
strips away the felony requirement.
For these reasons, this bill radically amends section 16. We go back
to the old days of throwing everybody in jail.
This bill does not just list a few statutes that are obvious crimes
of violence. It enumerates at least 32 separate crimes, some of which
are not Federal crimes. It even offers alternative definitions for
several Federal crimes. This requires careful consideration.
How dare anyone suggest that anyone on this side of the aisle is soft
on crime. Some of my best friends, as we have heard others say in other
settings, are law enforcement. I speak to my police officers every time
I see them in the district. I am talking to the command frequently.
Sometimes I congratulate them for a successful capture of a dastardly
criminal.
Obviously, many of those crimes are State laws. But I know the State
of Texas has been working to reduce the numbers of persons
incarcerated. There is no doubt with law enforcement who the bad actors
are. On the Federal level, it is the same.
But here we are, with a 1-week-old baby that has not been vetted and
helped and nurtured to be able to make it work. This is serious work
that we do here. So rather than proceeding through regular order by
having a hearing to ascertain the relevant information from experts
that will help us establish the best approach for dealing with the
constitutionality of section 16, and the Federal definition of crimes
of violence, we have been given 1 week to vote, with no markups to
allow amendments germane to the bill's purpose.
Mr. Speaker, regular order is not a crime. Instead of taking the time
to fashion a definition that takes into consideration the many legal
ramifications of changing this term as proposed, the bill's sponsors
are haphazardly pushing forward an overly expansive definition of crime
of violence for political purposes.
Where are my civil libertarians? Where are my persons who believe in
the Constitution, due process?
The bill is overbroad; two, unnecessary; and three, it could have
substantial harmful effects.
First, the bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of
violence a number of offenses that have no element of violence or force
at all. No one likes burglary, but burglary, for example, is included
in the enumerated list of crimes of violence, though it would simply
mean remaining in a building without authorization and, while there,
forming the attempt to commit even a minor, nonviolent offense.
Likewise, the bill lists coercion through fraud as a violent felony,
though violence plays no part in that criminal offense.
The bill would also make simple assault a crime of violence, even in
the circumstances where the underlying act is merely a push or a shove.
None of us applaud any of that, but we recognize in this vast country
that our citizens have basic rights. One of the more egregious examples
of an offense listed as a crime of violence is fleeing by automobile,
which is knowingly operating a motor vehicle and failing or refusing to
comply with a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor
vehicle to a stop, or fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement
officer. This definition does not even require intent to elude law
enforcement.
Under this bill, what could have amounted to a traffic violation is,
instead, a crime of violence.
It doesn't mean that we do not utilize these elements, but we are
able to have vetted it in a way that truly is the crime that law
enforcement seeks to protect themselves against and the public against.
Another specific area of concern is in the context of juvenile
justice. If the Federal Government is prosecuting a juvenile, this bill
would authorize the government to seek the transfer to adult court of
someone as young as 15 years old if they were accused of committing a
felony crime of violence. That may be a burglary, unintentionally in a
building. We note where teenagers are and how they behave.
Under this new definition is even interference with a flight crew or
an argument with a flight attendant over a Diet Coke.
{time} 0930
And we want safety everywhere, on the highways and byways, throughout
our neighborhoods and schools. We want to make sure that we attend to
this, but this is serious work and it should have been done in regular
order.
The consequences of H.R. 6691 are dangerous, especially as we look to
the new attitude of the Justice Department, which is charging on every
offense. Unlike the comprehensive and collaborative manner previously
utilized in the past administration, working with faith leaders,
working with law enforcement, working with advocates for social and
criminal justice, U.S. attorneys were directed to not charge up, to
focus on the highest crime.
Now we have the tendency to use a sprawling, overbroad definition of
violent crime to justify more arrests and prosecutions and long prison
sentences.
Has anybody met an ex-felon, many of them wanting to do right? I see
a lot of them where good businesses have hired them. They want their
head down, they want to work, they want to get an apartment, they want
to support their family. They are not interested in going back again,
nor are they interested in being accused of a minor offense and being
``felonized,'' if you will.
Second, a new definition of ``crime of violence'' is unnecessary,
even in light of Dimaya. The court in Dimaya held that the residual
clause is unconstitutional, but left in place subsection a. While
perhaps not an ideal formulation, subsection a can, for now, suffice as
a placeholder until Congress can undertake a more deliberate approach.
Even so the Senate would have a companion bill, which to our knowledge,
it does not. It is important to take note of the fact.
Third, changing the definition of a crime of violence can have other
harmful effects; for example, it could have
[[Page H7928]]
significant exclusionary effects for criminal justice reform
legislation. There is proposed legislation that excludes people
convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release considerations,
expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors. So it would exclude
people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial release
consideration, expungement of crimes, and receiving visitors while in
custody. Unnecessarily expanding who is ineligible for these provisions
is both unwise and counterproductive.
So as I have indicated, it is important that when we work together,
we must work together through the goals of reforming our criminal
justice system, which Congress has acknowledged needs dire fixing.
Let's work together.
I am pushing for the revisions of criminal justice reform for
juveniles. Reforming the juvenile justice system that locks up
juveniles forever and ever because they are not sentenced in many
instances. Certainly there are few juveniles in the Federal system, but
in our State systems. And when we use the bully pulpit, States begin to
reform their systems.
In addition, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, ACLU, Center for
American Progress, and several others have opposed this bill.
We are on the Judiciary Committee. We believe in justice. Along with
the advocates, we need true experts, and we are experts on these
subject matters. And we are troubled by the reckless speed in which
this bill was brought to the floor.
We understand the intent. We welcome it. But I have listed the
fractures, the problems, the undermining of due process, the throwing
the key away on good people who want to do better or who did not intend
to exercise some of the elements that are in this bill.
So I ask my colleagues in this instance to recognize that this is too
fast and to vote ``no'' on this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss H.R. 6691, the ``Community Safety and
Security Act of 2018,'' which amends section 16 of Title 18.
Section 16 sets forth the universal definition of what constitutes a
``crime of violence'' for the entirety of the criminal code.
Therefore, this definition is critically important and I am deeply
concerned that my colleagues on the other side are introducing such an
important amendment in such a reckless manner.
Although my colleagues claim that the introduction of this bill has
not been hasty and that it has been vetted for months, on this side we
have had this bill for seven days. It was introduced exactly one week
ago today, on the day before a three-day weekend. That is reckless.
H.R. 6691 would expand the definition of crimes of violence in
section 16 in two ways: (1) by enumerating certain offenses that do not
currently exist under Federal law to be recognized as crimes of
violence for Federal purposes; and (2) by adding alternative
definitions to already-existing Federal offenses in order to have these
new definitions also qualify as Federal crimes of violence.
The Supreme Court recently decided Sessions v Dimaya, holding that
subsection (b) of section 16, known as the ``residual clause,'' is
unconstitutionally vague.
Subsection (a), which Dimaya left untouched, defines a crime of
violence as one that requires, as an element, the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another.
In response to Dimaya, my colleagues are now putting forth this bill
to substitute subsection (b) for a list of ``crimes of violence,'' many
of which have no element involving the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of force.
In addition, even the residual clause stricken down by Dimaya
required that a crime of violence at least be a felony. H.R. 6691
strips away the felony requirement.
For these reasons, this bill radically amends section 16. This bill
does not just list a few statutes that are obvious crimes of violence.
It enumerates at least 32 separate crimes, some of which are not
Federal crimes, and it even offers alternative definitions for several
Federal crimes. This requires careful consideration.
But rather than proceeding through regular order by having a hearing,
to ascertain relevant information from experts that will help us
establish the best approach for dealing with the constitutionality of
section 16 and the Federal definition of crimes of violence, we have
been given one week to vote, with no markups to allow amendments,
germane to the bill's purpose.
Instead of taking the time to fashion a definition that takes into
consideration the many legal ramifications of changing this term as
proposed, the bill's sponsors are haphazardly pushing forward an
overly-expansive definition of ``crime of violence'' for political
purposes. The bill is (1) overbroad, (2) unnecessary, and (3) could
have substantial harmful effects.
First, the bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of
violence a number of offenses that have no element of violence, or
force, at all. Burglary, for example, is included in the enumerated
list of crimes of violence though it could simply mean remaining in a
building without authorization and, while there, forming the intent to
commit even a minor, non-violent offense. Likewise, the bill lists
coercion through fraud as a violent felony, though violence plays no
part in that criminal offense. The bill would also make simple assault
a crime of violence even in circumstances where the underlying act is
merely a push or a shove.
One of the more egregious examples of an offense listed as a crime of
violence is ``fleeing by automobile'' which is ``knowingly operating a
motor vehicle and--(A) failing or refusing to comply with a law
enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a stop; or
(B) fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.'' This
definition does not even require an intent to elude law enforcement.
Under this bill, what could have amounted to a traffic violation
becomes, instead, a ``crime of violence''.
Another specific area of concern is in the context of juvenile
justice. If the Federal government is prosecuting a juvenile, this bill
would authorize the government to seek transfer to adult court of
someone as young as 15 years old if they are accused of committing a
felony ``crime of violence'' under this new definition--even for
something as minor as getting in an argument with a flight attendant
over a Diet Coke.
The consequences of H.R. 6691 are dangerous, especially in the hands
of a Sessions Justice Department, which has displayed a general
tendency to use a sprawling, overbroad definition of violent crime to
justify more arrests and prosecutions and longer prison sentences.
Second, a new definition of crime of violence is unnecessary, even in
light of Dimaya. The Court in Dimaya held that the residual clause is
unconstitutional, but left in place subsection (a). While perhaps not
an ideal formulation, subsection (a) can for now suffice as a
placeholder until Congress can undertake a more deliberate approach,
instead of the reflexive one proposed by H.R. 6691.
Third, changing the definition of a crime of violence can have other
harmful effects. For example, it could have significant exclusionary
effects for criminal justice reform legislation. There is proposed
legislation that excludes people convicted of a crime of violence from
pretrial release considerations, expungement of crimes, and receiving
visitors while in custody. Unnecessarily expanding who is ineligible
for these provisions is both unwise and counterproductive to the goals
of reforming our criminal justice system, which Congress has
acknowledged needs dire fixing.
Families Against Mandatory Minimum (FAMM), ACLU, Center for American
Progress (CAP), and several other organizations have opposed this bill.
We on the Judiciary Committee, along with advocates that are true
experts on these subject matters are troubled by the reckless speed
with which this bill was brought to the floor today.
We should take the time to explore why.
According to a recent report by the Pew Research Center on January
12, 2018, the number of African Americans in prisons are 33 percent.
The number of Hispanics are 23 percent. Therefore, together they make
up 56 percent of today's prison population.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, to my colleague from Texas, I want to say good morning
to her as well and also recognize her significant efforts in criminal
justice reform, and indeed I was proud to be able to support that
recent piece of legislation that came through our committee as well.
A couple of points. I very much appreciate the concerns that have
been raised, Mr. Speaker, but I assure you that this law, as crafted,
does not go beyond the scope contemplated when Section 16 was
originally crafted.
This is a responsible, carefully crafted piece of legislation that
does what the United States Supreme Court recommended. It enumerates
what crimes are crimes of violence so that there can be no vagueness
and people know what the law is. In fact, it goes to protect due
process, Mr. Speaker.
This is our responsibility as legislators. And indeed, Mr. Speaker,
time is of the essence, given the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision,
and indeed
[[Page H7929]]
there would be substantial harmful effects if we fail as Congress to
act today on this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).
Mr. MARINO. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Congresswoman Handel for
bringing this forth, this very important piece of legislation that has
been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya ruled that 18 U.S.C. Section
16 was unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
That is the way the process works. We, the legislators, write the
law, not an unelected bureaucrat. We, as legislators, are supposed to
write the law, then the court interprets that law if an issue is
brought before the court, as in this particular case.
So there is a several-page slip opinion, we call it, that explains
why the court ruled the way it did, saying we need more of an
explanation as to what a violent crime is. The court ruled that the
statute in question failed to properly provide a definition for a crime
of violence.
H.R. 6691 eliminates that vagueness and addresses the Supreme Court's
concerns and preserves the pre-Dimaya status quo.
It has the support of the Justice Department.
The legislation before us today is supported by the Department of
Justice, I want to reemphasize that, and will properly define what a
crime of violence is. It is clearly delineated here in eight pages, the
crimes, what constitutes them, the meaning, the intent, crime by crime
on these pages. It does not prevent anyone from due process.
As a former Federal prosecutor and State prosecutor, I have seen
serious violent crimes that were committed. And we must make sure that
those that are here illegally and commit these violent crimes be sent
back to their countries from where they came.
Over 18 years as a prosecutor, I have seen my share of bodies on
slabs in morgues because of violent crime, and many of those were young
kids.
This legislation defines crime by crime by crime and sets forth the
criteria that the legislature was responsible for doing in the first
place.
I want to explain the process on how this works. The crime is
committed, it is reported, law enforcement goes in and does an
investigation. If they feel that a crime has been committed, they file
a complaint or go to the DA or go to the United States Attorney and
present probable cause, evidence that the crime probably was committed.
And then, in whatever situation, whether it is the State or the Federal
level, there can be an indictment, the evidence can go before a grand
jury, and then the decision is made if it proceeds. Then that
individual goes before a judge on a preliminary hearing to the point
where the person's actual constitutional rights kick in. None of that,
none of that is eliminated.
I support this legislation because of what I have seen over my
career. And taking care of issues of violence that we see so much of
and the violence that we see, particularly by individuals that are here
illegally, this remedies that matter.
We have a lot of violence in this country committed by people that
are citizens, and we take care of that through the judicial system as
well.
But this is commonsense legislation. It addresses the issue
immediately and it does what the American people want it to do.
There is due process, but if you are here illegally, you commit a
violent crime, and once that is established, then you are sent back to
your country of origin.
Mr. Speaker, I support this legislation and I urge my colleagues to
support it.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, if I might respond to the gentleman's
presentation.
Due process is denied and could be denied, based upon the fact that
there is no element of the offenses that are just listed in a laundry-
list type. That would come about if we had done this in an extensive
manner of review.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island
(Mr. Cicilline), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law and a member of the Judiciary
Committee.
Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6691, the so-called
Community Safety and Security Act.
This legislation would dramatically expand the definition of a crime
of violence in the Federal criminal code, with many, many unintended
consequences. The gentlewoman from Texas spoke about fleeing. That is
just one example of one of the unintended consequences of this.
This is partly happening because this legislation is being rushed
through the House without any meaningful debate or committee
consideration. It was introduced just last week before the Labor Day
weekend when most Members were home for the district work period. We
have had zero markups, zero hearings on this bill, and this bill has
never been considered in the previous Congress. So not in this
Congress, not in the previous Congress.
It has not been considered through regular order, and that means key
stakeholders, like outside experts and criminal justice reform
advocates, have been given little chance to provide input on the bill.
It is a demonstration, frankly, of the arrogance of this body. We
don't even think we need to listen to anybody about the implications of
this bill. We know best. We are not going to have a hearing. We are
just going to bring it to the floor.
In the very short time that the public has had to analyze it, groups
like Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the ACLU, and the National
Immigration Justice Center have expressed opposition to the bill.
It is basically fast tracked, even though changing the definition of
a crime of violence will have a domino effect on our laws, given its
prevalence in Federal criminal law and its application in immigration
law.
This so-called Community Safety and Security Act could lead to more
criminalization, harsh sentencing, and unfair results. It is overly
broad and will open the doors to massive incarceration and people being
unjustifiably detained, both pretrial and post-conviction. It could
exacerbate racial disparities that already exist in policing and in the
courts, and it could accelerate the number of immigrant detentions and
deportations.
I really don't understand why my Republican colleagues are scrambling
to push this through, this just-introduced bill, without careful
consideration.
We do have to respond to the Supreme Court decision. We need to do it
properly, and after careful deliberations, with a full understanding of
all of the consequences. This bill will have far-reaching effects, not
only on citizens of this country, but on people who are here in the
United States.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman.
Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, passing this bill today without a full
understanding of these effects would be irresponsible.
We have been able to engage in really deliberative, thoughtful
consideration of criminal justice reform. This May we passed the FIRST
STEP Act. There was a lot of good bipartisan collaboration. There were
hearings and discussions and listening to experts. That is how we
should be doing business. This will affect people's lives.
We have a lot more work to do. I encourage my colleagues to reject
this legislation so that we can get back to working in a bipartisan way
to get rid of mandatory minimums, to making investments in reentry
programs, to ending racial profiling, and so many of the other reforms
that I know we can work on together. That is how we should be doing the
business of the American people, not jamming things through in the dark
of night with no hearings, no witnesses, no understanding of the bill
that just passed.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, first, I certainly appreciate my colleagues and the fact
that they have read the bill so very thoroughly.
I must reiterate, however, that this legislation is not overly broad.
In fact, it specifically maintains the status quo. And we drew those
lines because
[[Page H7930]]
we crafted the bill to maintain that status quo.
The legislation will not be able to fix some of the outrageous
injustices that have occurred when courts have found certain offenses
do not qualify as crimes of violence. For example, where a defendant
who has a conviction for sexual abuse escapes more serious consequences
because the State's sexual abuse statute also encompasses certain
consensual conduct and, therefore, it was not categorically a crime of
violence even when and where this particular defendant committed
horrific acts that were most certainly not consensual.
{time} 0945
Some of these injustices must be fixed through State legislation. We
refrained specifically from expanding the law, despite the very human
desire to want to fix these kinds of injustices and recognizing that
the States have the duty to fix this.
This legislation, Mr. Speaker, does affect people's lives.
Specifically, it is going to affect the lives of individuals who are
victims of violent crimes.
A couple more points have been raised. First of all, on the issue of
fleeing, we have heard the concerns that the written text is a little
bit too broad on fleeing. Well, let me just correct that. Courts have
found fleeing to be a crime of violence. This is not an expansion. This
applies only in vehicles. It is not on foot.
The Seventh Circuit called this specific conduct ``inherently
aggressive.'' The 11th Circuit reasoned that ``fleeing from law
enforcement, an individual has already resorted to an extreme measure
to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the
use of physical force.''
So, Mr. Speaker, we approach this bill with great diligence. Time, as
I said, is of the essence, given the recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision. We heard from the police officers association that they are
very concerned about the fact that pending cases and convictions could
be effective if Congress does not act. Indeed, substantial harm will
occur if we fail to act.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, reserving the status quo is the very
point we are making, that the status quo is the unclarity, if you will,
and, therefore, it is important that we pursue this in a manner of
constructively understanding what is the best approach to protect the
American people.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Takano), the vice ranking member on the Veterans' Affairs Committee.
Mr. TAKANO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Texas for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 6691, the Community
Safety and Security Act of 2018.
Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to my colleague's attention an issue I
don't think the majority considered when rushing this bill to the floor
without any hearings or markup. They departed from regular order, and
doing so always has some, I think, unintended consequences.
H.R. 6691 will help deport veterans, people who have served in our
military and often who have served in combat. Current law makes certain
crimes a deportable offense for legal permanent residents. For the
thousands of servicemembers and veterans who are legal permanent
residents, this bill will make it easier to deport them.
If a soldier comes home with PTSD or if a veteran is struggling with
substance abuse or gets in trouble with the law, this bill makes it
harder to grant them any kind of discretion.
I have met with dozens of deported veterans who have served their
country honorably, even been to war, but were deported when they came
home. They made mistakes. They paid their debt to society, and their
service meant nothing when it came time to permanently banish them from
our country.
Now, that is unfair. It is cruel and unusual punishment. I believe
that if anyone deserves a second chance in our country, it is our
veterans.
Now, I agree with many of my colleagues that the Supreme Court is
right and that we need to change the vagueness in the current law;
however, we need to do that through regular order. This bill would
classify certain crimes as violent, even if no one was harmed in the
act. These are serious issues and they deserve a serious process.
Mr. Speaker, this bill will have many unintended consequences if made
into law. I implore my colleagues to vote against it and have it go
through regular order and get the hearings that it merits.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, just one clarification to the most recent
comments. The part that was left out in those comments was the fact
that it would apply only if a violent crime is committed.
May I inquire as to how much time remains.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Georgia has 18\3/4\
minutes remaining.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Carter).
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for
yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of legislation introduced by my
colleague, Congresswoman Karen Handel from Georgia, H.R. 6691, the
Community Safety and Security Act.
This is an important piece of legislation for multiple reasons.
First, passage of this legislation fulfills Congress' duty to fix a
loophole in our Federal legal code that the Supreme Court has decided
must be changed. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that our
definition of ``crime of violence'' is unconstitutionally vague,
applicable throughout U.S. Code. This means courts must decide on a
case-by-case basis which crimes are of violence and which are not.
Unfortunately, this vagueness leads to inconsistencies. Individuals
who commit crimes of sexual assault, kidnapping, assault on a police
officer, and much more may be set free by the courts because of this
vague phrase in our code.
With this legislation, we can ensure those committing these acts stay
behind bars. And further, fixing this problem is exactly what Congress
was designed to do, allowing those elected directly by the people to
create and update the laws we live by, creating consistent and clear
laws to uphold the rule of law.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage all of my colleagues to support this
important legislation.
I thank my colleague from Georgia for sponsoring this legislation.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, if I might inquire how many speakers
the gentlewoman from Georgia has remaining.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I have two additional speakers.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Holding).
Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 6691, the
Community Safety and Security Act, and urge all of my colleagues to
support this bill.
I also want to thank my colleague, Congresswoman Handel, for her very
hard work in advancing this legislation.
In April, as we know, the Supreme Court held, in Sessions v. Dimaya,
that the term ``crime of violence'' was unconstitutionally vague. This
decision meant certain obviously violent offenses would no longer
qualify as violent crimes and, thus, made it more challenging to deport
illegal immigrants who have committed what we would all call violent
crimes.
Justice Gorsuch was the deciding vote in the case, casting his vote
for fear that vague laws invite arbitrary power. In his opinion, he
indicated that it was the duty of the legislature to add to the list of
what constitutes a crime of violence that could lead to a person's
deportation. This legislation does just that.
As a former United States attorney, I understand that clarity is the
cornerstone of justice. So by clearly defining what constitutes a
violent crime, we are not only strengthening our judicial system, but
also ensuring the safety of the American people.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, earlier I indicated the work of the
Judiciary Committee, and it has been enhanced by the ranking member,
Mr. Nadler. We have worked on criminal justice issues bipartisanly, and
I want to thank Mr. Nadler for doing so. That is the tragedy of this
legislation.
[[Page H7931]]
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Nadler), the ranking member of the House Judiciary
Committee.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I must oppose the so-called Community Safety and
Security Act. This highly flawed bill is an example of why regular
order and a meaningful, deliberative process is essential to the proper
crafting of legislation.
Last April, the Supreme Court, in Sessions v. Dimaya, ruled that a
portion of the criminal code's definition of criminal violence is
unconstitutionally vague. That was nearly 6 months ago.
The Judiciary Committee has had ample time to examine the decision,
to hold hearings, to gather input from a range of stakeholders, and to
carefully develop legislation through markup and regular order--but
none of those things have happened.
Instead, a bill with significant ramifications for criminal law in
immigration cases was introduced just last week while Members were out
of town and is being rushed to the floor today without any hearings,
without any markup, without any adequate opportunity for review by the
public, by legal experts, or by stakeholders. So it is not a surprise
that we are left with many unanswered questions and concerns about the
impact of the bill.
The term ``crime of violence'' is referred to throughout the criminal
code and is, for example, used to determine whether a juvenile may be
prosecuted as an adult in Federal court. It also has serious
implications in immigration law because a noncitizen convicted of an
aggravated felony, described under the Immigration and Nationality Act
to include a crime of violence under this section, is deportable and
would be denied the opportunity for certain discretionary relief from
removal.
If we do not define this term properly, it could have significant
adverse consequences. H.R. 6691 specifies a long list of offenses that
would be considered crimes of violence, some of which are not currently
included in the Federal criminal code. The bill further defines some of
the offenses that are in the code, adding layers of confusion to the
bill.
We need proper definitions. For example, the crime of fleeing is
identified as a crime of violence. Now, if by fleeing you mean that,
when the cop pulls you over, you hit the gas and flee at 100 miles per
hour, endangering anybody on the road, that is a crime of violence. But
if by fleeing it is meant that you don't pull over immediately because
you are looking for a safe place to stop, well, that probably shouldn't
be a crime of violence, and yet, in this bill, it seems to be.
We should carefully examine all of these offenses to determine which
are appropriate to be included in this definition, and we should
consider what the consequences will be for each one.
In writing for the majority in Dimaya, Justice Kagan noted that:
A host of issues respecting the definition of ``crime of
violence'' application to specific crimes divide the Federal
appellate courts.
Although Congress has the power to clarify the definition or to
establish a new one, as this bill would do, it is absolutely essential
that we consider carefully what offenses should be included.
Indeed, in considering a change to the definition of ``crime of
violence'' for the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, the United
States Sentencing Commission held a hearing and received testimony. It
also sought public comments in response to proposed revisions. At a
minimum, we should do the same.
Finally, I note that, even in the brief time since the bill has been
introduced, a week, a broad array of advocates have expressed
opposition to this bill, including the American Civil Liberties Union
and Families Against Mandatory Minimums.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for the additional
time.
Others opposing the bill are Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the
Immigrant Justice Network, the Immigrant Defense Project, the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and others. Such opposition should, at the very least, tell us
that we should not be considering this legislation without thoughtful
deliberation.
This bill is a perfect example of a bill whose topics should be
covered, but we could do it properly instead of having a sloppily
drafted bill that does things we don't know it does and doesn't do
things we think it does. We must have a hearing. We should have
testimony. We should carefully consider this bill, and then we should
pass some version of it.
For those reasons, I oppose passage of this version of this bill, and
I ask that we take the time to examine this issue through regular
order.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, again, I want to make the point that time
really is of the essence in being able to protect due process and,
equally and perhaps more importantly, being able to protect victims of
certain violent crimes.
For example, right now, today, under Fourth Circuit precedent, sex
trafficking is not considered a crime of violence; and I think that
most of us would all agree that sex trafficking is, indeed, a crime of
violence.
Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Georgia has 14\3/4\
minutes remaining.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).
Mr. MARINO. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make some clarifications.
First of all, I am tired of hearing from the other side that bills are
rushed through, bills are pushed through, there is no thought put into
this, which is nothing more than a red herring.
{time} 1000
The Supreme Court said that the term ``crime of violence'' is not
specific enough. So what we did was we put into this new statute this
new law explaining what murder is, and voluntary manslaughter, sexual
abuse, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual abuse, child abuse,
kidnapping, robbery, carjacking, firearms use, burglary, arson,
extortion, communication of threats, and fleeing.
These are already laws that have been on the books for two decades.
The Court just simply said it wants the specifics in the legislation
for removing someone who is here illegally and who has committed one of
these crimes.
Now, let's go into this. They are making, again, a red herring, a big
deal, out of this term ``fleeing.'' Now, all the crimes, plus there
were many more in here that I didn't have time to go over, explain and
define those.
One thing I want to talk about in ``fleeing'' is, it is not if a
person is speeding and an officer wants to stop that person and the
person drives a little longer to find a safe place to pull over. That
is absurd.
Here is the term. ``Fleeing'' means knowingly operating a motor
vehicle and, following a law enforcement officer's signal to bring the
motor vehicle to a stop: A, failing or refusing to comply; or, B,
fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.
The term ``force'' means the level of force capable of physical pain
or injury, or needed or intended to overcome resistance.
That means that that individual is fleeing in that automobile at a
high rate of speed to get away from the officer because they don't want
to be caught, and that person could cause much more havoc, much more
danger and death, to somebody else if, when they are fleeing, they
cause an accident.
My colleagues on the other side leave out these important details. It
is all listed here. It is very specific. It is exactly what the Court
asked for, and this is good law.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren), the ranking member of
the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security of the Judiciary
Committee.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, there are some things in this bill that
probably make sense, and there are some things in this bill that I
think are very poorly crafted and will have adverse implications for
juvenile law or for sentencing reform.
We should have had a hearing. We should have looked into this whole
[[Page H7932]]
matter and come up with something that we could all support.
Now, one of the things, I hate to say, is that there is a sense of
urgency here. The problem is the majority sat on their hands.
This decision of the Supreme Court was April 17 of this year. What
did the committee do in response? Nothing. Nothing. No bill was
introduced. No hearings were held. Then, last week, this piece of
legislation was introduced and rushed to the floor without adequate
thought.
So, yes, we need to act, but we need to act like grownups. We need to
make sure that we are doing something that makes sense.
I am actually going to vote ``present'' on this vote, because I don't
want a ``no'' vote on the portions of the bill that I know are correct
having to do with child abduction.
But I can't support something that is so poorly crafted, that is a
product of such disdain for the need to be serious about this issue.
If we don't want to trample on the good work we did, and we have yet
to bring to fruition on sentencing reform the juvenile justice issues
that loom so large in our communities, we just can't go ahead blindly
on this bill.
I thought it was important to point out that the majority has a
responsibility to react to court decisions, and they failed in this
case.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Texas has 16\1/4\
minutes remaining.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, sometimes vagueness is the extinguishing of
constitutional rights. I know, and I will have the numbers, that the
predominant numbers of incarcerated persons throughout the Nation are
African Americans and Hispanics. That is men and women. A rising number
of women are being incarcerated, some of them tied to crimes of their
boyfriend, husband, or other significant other.
Juveniles are also being incarcerated throughout the State system.
Mass incarceration is a big deal, so it behooves us to be diligent.
In this particular bill, yes, Mr. Speaker, it should have been
collaborative and bipartisan, because none of us will yield to a
dastardly criminal act that impacts our constituents or the American
people. But a fact is a fact. This generates racial disparities.
As my friend from California indicated, individuals who put on the
uniform, who may be legal permanent residents, veterans, have the
potential, in spite of the uniform that they put on and their
willingness to sacrifice their life for America, caught in the wrong
situation, could be deported.
This is not to be taken lightly. Frankly, if my friends had studied
the Constitution and read the Supreme Court decision, they would have
seen the statement that Justice Kagan made, and that is that this is
dividing the Federal appellate courts. She raised the question: Does
car burglary qualify as a violent felony under 16(b)? She indicated
that some courts say yes, some courts say no.
She went on to say, residential trespass, what is that? The same is
true. She went on to say, it does not exhaust the conflict in the
courts.
Well, you don't answer the conflict by doing as was stated in the
Families Against Mandatory Minimums letter dated September 6. On
substantive grounds, H.R. 6691 has the potential to have severe
unintended consequences on sentencing in our justice system writ large.
Under this bill, seemingly nonviolent offenses will be considered
violent offenses, for example, under H.R. 6691, burglary of an
unoccupied home. How many teenagers--I am not condoning that--may we
find in an unoccupied home? I am not condoning burglary, but it would
be considered a violent offense.
Burglary is a serious offense, but should it be considered violent if
the perpetrator does not even interact with another person? Yes, they
should be prosecuted. But you have in this bill violent offense.
Then, of course, in this legislation, legal service providers who
filed an amicus brief, these are the guys and ladies who are our public
defenders who see these people every day--the indigent, and many of
them minority--they wind up, as everyone says, up the road in these
large, massive prisons, and their lives are ruined because we have not
fixed the criminal justice system.
Legal service providers who filed the amicus brief in the Dimaya case
described the different applications of subsection (b) of section 16
across Federal circuits, using the example of residential trespass,
which was considered a crime of violence by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals but not by the Seventh Circuit. This bill does little to
resolve the inconsistent way courts apply the crime of violence based
on subsection (b) because it includes vague definitions of offenses and
creates definitions for the same crimes that differ from those
currently in the criminal code.
That is a denial of due process, and that is not taking on this
important issue. As was mentioned, there is a list of important
elements. I support the fact that these are difficult and a terrible
dilemma. But it can be done in a manner that is preferable, and that is
through unceasing commitment and effort.
Mr. Speaker, this is why we are here today having different
positions. I cannot yield to what will be claimed as individuals who do
not understand how important this bill is when I know the young African
American men and young men of color who are entrapped in this system,
and that the better approach and the better angels are for us to do
comprehensive criminal justice reform and, I might add, immigration
reform as well.
But let me indicate that we support victims of crime, especially
those who are victims of violent crimes. We want relief for them.
This bill dangerously leads to overcriminalization, and we should not
take the task of amending the definition of ``crime of violence''
lightly.
In the Rules Committee, we addressed overcriminalization and mass
incarceration. Representative Torres aptly stated that we should not
proceed with haste, which will further exacerbate the overcrowdedness
in our prisons.
One Member suggested, in the Rules Committee, just build prisons,
that is how we stop this criminal siege, as indicated, even though the
FBI and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have indicated that crime is
going down.
Yes, we have our concerns. Even conservative groups that work with
these very complicated and important criminal justice reform issues,
like the Cook Foundation and Right on Crime, do not agree that building
more prisons is the answer. Right on Crime states that, by reducing
excessive sentence lengths and holding nonviolent offenders accountable
through prison alternatives, public safety can often be achieved.
We recognize that the violent perpetrators should be incarcerated. If
that is the case, I would stand with my colleague.
I would also stand with the Mothers of the Movement who saw their
sons gunned down, in that we need to have relief in that direction.
There are many issues of criminal justice reform that should be on
this floor--as I mentioned, sentencing reduction and juvenile justice
reform--but we have not come to that point.
So I would ask, Mr. Speaker, that my colleagues vote ``no,'' because
as Justice Kagan said in her opinion, the interpretation of crime and
violence has divided the Federal appellate courts because the answer is
not obvious. Therefore, we must carefully consider the alternatives to
the approach prepared in this bill. We must do more than eliminate
vagueness. We must achieve a just and fair result.
Nothing in this Supreme Court opinion, nothing, says, go alone, put a
bill on the floor for 1 week, give Members no chance to amend, try to
deny due process, build more prisons, make sure that the disparities of
those who go into our jails rises and goes up, rather than giving our
young people opportunities, a fair chance, and justice. So I ask my
colleagues to oppose this bill.
{time} 1015
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record letters from the ACLU, the
Center for American Progress, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the
National Center
[[Page H7933]]
for Lesbian Rights, and immigrant rights organizations ranging from the
National Immigrant Justice Center to others.
ACLU,
September 6, 2018.
Re The ACLU Says Vote NO on H.R. 6691 Community Safety and
Security Act of 2018.
Hon. Paul D. Ryan,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Minority Leader, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Speaker Ryan and Minority Leader Pelosi: On behalf of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), we write to urge
you to vote NO on H.R. 6691, the Community Safety and
Security Act of 2018. H.R. 6691 is overbroad and expands the
definition of a ``crime of violence'' to include a number of
offenses that have no element of violence which will further
fuel mass incarceration for low level offenses. The ACLU will
include your vote on The Community Safety and Security Act in
our voting scorecard for the 115th Congress.
For nearly 100 years, the ACLU has been our nation's
guardian of liberty, working in courts, legislatures, and
communities to defend and preserve the individual rights and
liberties that the Constitution and the laws of the United
States guarantee everyone in this country. With more than 2
million members, activists, and supporters, the ACLU is a
nationwide organization that fights tirelessly in all 50
states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. for the principle
that every individual's rights must be protected equally
under the law, regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, or national origin.
The Community Safety and Security Act is a flawed attempt
to address the unconstitutionally vague definition of a crime
of violence after the Supreme Court's decision in Dimaya v.
Sessions. To the contrary, the bill does not fix the
vagueness issue, but actually renders the statute even less
clear and concise than the unconstitutional language that the
Supreme Court struck down.
h.r. 6691 will exacerbate mass incarceration by expanding the
definition of ``crime of violence''
While H.R. 6691 amends only one definition, it has far
reaching impact. The definition of ``crime of violence'' in
18 U.S.C. Sec. 16 is referenced throughout U.S. Code in
various contexts including in immigration law. Amending the
definition of a ``crime of violence'' would expand the impact
of a number of federal sentencing provisions as well as
impact pretrial detention decisions. It would allow for
severe, costly, and punitive sentences to apply to low level
crimes, and could prevent people accused of misdemeanors from
being released pretrial. This hastily drafted legislation
would have wide, costly, and harmful consequences.
vagueness has not been solved
While attempting to address the vague language found
unconstitutional in Dimaya, this bill creates even more
statutory uncertainty in its wake. In the Dimaya decision,
sub-section (b) of Section 16 was declared unconstitutionally
vague in the immigration context due to the arbitrary and
unpredictable decisions that were sure to result from its
wording. H.R. 6691 however, creates new, imprecise
definitions of crimes, adding confusing and ambiguous
language to the statute.
Perhaps most concerning is this bill's inclusion of conduct
and offenses unrelated to actual violence in a definition for
a ``crime of violence.'' For example, the definitions of
fleeing, coercion, burglary, and carjacking in H.R. 6691
would include within their list of qualifying conduct for a
``crime of violence'' acts without threats to or actual
bodily harm. The definition of coercion for example, includes
coercion by fraud, carrying no risk of actual bodily harm,
threatened bodily harm, or fear of bodily harm to the victim.
By not connecting behavior that is actually violent to the
meaning of a ``crime of violence'' the legislation diminishes
the meaning of violence and opens the door for people
convicted of low level, nonviolent offenses to face the same
severe sentences as those convicted of more serious offenses.
Legal services providers who filed an amicus brief in the
Dimaya case described the different application of subsection
(b) of Sec. 16 across federal circuits, using the example of
residential trespass which was considered a ``crime of
violence'' by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but not by
the Seventh Circuit. This bill does little to resolve the
inconsistent way courts applied the ``crime of violence''
based on subsection (b) because it too includes vague
definitions of offenses and creates definitions for the same
crimes that differ from those currently in the criminal code.
For instance, this legislation offers new and alternative
meanings to carjacking, fleeing, coercion, and extortion
among others without amending the respective criminal code to
make them consistent. The definition of carjacking in the
bill expands the language to include acts without intent to
cause death or serious bodily harm as well as acts that are
considered merely unauthorized use of a vehicle. The most
confusing and ill-advised expansion in the bill is
``fleeing'' as a ``crime of violence'' offering one
definition of the offense as simply failing to comply with an
officer's signal to pull over. On top of being somewhat
confusing and vague, these new definitions could include
routine traffic stops and joyriding. This bill is so broad as
to include acts considered nonviolent while creating a
numerous conflicting definitions of the same conduct.
Instead of attempting to expand the definition of crime of
violence to the point of rendering the word ``violent''
meaningless, a more thoughtful approach would be to adopt the
U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines list of ``crimes of
violence'' in Sec. 4B1.2 that hold true to the meaning of
``violent'' while solving the vagueness issue found in
Dimaya. Sec. 4B1.2 offers a definition of ``crime of
violence'' as ``a murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson,
extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm
described in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5845(a) or explosive materials
defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 841(c).''
h.r. 6691 is duplicative and excessively punitive when applied to cases
of deportations
The term ``crime of violence'' is included in one of the
harshest provisions of our immigration laws--triggering
mandatory detention and leading to deportation with little to
no due process. By expanding the existing ``crime of
violence'' definition, H.R. 6691 would lead to generally non-
violent offenses--such as communication of threats or simple
assault (which could include minor offenses such as spitting
on another person)--triggering no-bond detention and
deportation. Currently, immigrants who have had contact with
the criminal justice system are often subject to harsh and
overbroad immigration penalties. Residents who have lived
here for decades, including lawful permanent residents, can
face deportation for minor offenses like shoplifting or using
a false bus pass. Given there is already an exhaustive list
of crimes that are addressed by current immigration laws,
this bill is unnecessary, duplicative, and excessively harsh.
At a time when resources are limited and the public is
concerned with over-criminalization, this bill would expand
the way in which our laws criminalize immigrants and
communities of color.
conclusion
H.R. 6691 would impose a sweeping and unwise expansion of
what are known as ``crimes of violence'' that would have
significant and wide-ranging impacts on immigrant communities
and communities of color and further burden our failing
criminal justice system.
For these reasons, the ACLU urges you to vote ``No'' on
H.R. 6691 the Community Safety and Security Act of 2018. If
you have any additional questions, please feel free to
contact Jesselyn McCurdy, Deputy Director.
Sincerely,
Faiz Shakir,
National Political Director, National Political Advocacy
Department.
Jesselyn McCurdy,
Deputy Director, Washington Legislative Office.
____
[From the Center for American Progress]
Community Safety and Security Act--H.R. 6691
analysis
The Center for American Progress is deeply concerned about
H.R. 6691, a bill to amend Title 18, United States Code,
which purports to clarify the definition of a ``crime of
violence'' in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16. The bill was written in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Dimaya v.
Sessions, which held that subsection (b), known as the
``residual clause,'' is unconstitutionally vague. Yet,
instead of taking time to fashion a definition that takes
into consideration the many legal ramifications across
federal proceedings of changing this term, the bill's
sponsors are recklessly pushing forward a definition of a
crime of violence for political purposes. The bill is
unnecessary, overbroad, and could have substantial harmful
effects.
The bill is overbroad and includes in its list of crimes of
violence a number of offenses that have no element of
violence at all. Burglary, for example, is included in the
list of crimes of violence though it is defined as the
unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building. Likewise, the
bill lists coercion through fraud as a violent felony though
no element of violence is part of that criminal offense.
Simple assault is also considered a violent crime even in
circumstances where the underlying act was merely a push or
shove.
One of the more egregious examples of an offense listed as
a crime of violence is ``fleeing'' which is described as
``knowingly operating a motor vehicle and, following a law
enforcement officer's signal to bring the motor vehicle to a
stop, (A) failing or refusing to comply; or (B) fleeing or
attempting to elude a law enforcement officer.'' Depending on
factual circumstances, this provision elevates what could
have amounted to a traffic violation to a crime of violence.
The bill dangerously expands the definition of violent
crime which leads to overcriminalization. Every existing
definition of a crime of violence in federal law or for
federal purposes includes as an element the use, threatened
use, or attempted use of force--see 18 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 924(c)(3), 3156; Uniform Crime Reports. But H.R.
6691 omits this crucial and basic requirement. The
consequences are
[[Page H7934]]
dangerous, especially in the hands of a Sessions Justice
Department which has displayed a general tendency to use a
sprawling definition of violent crime to justify more arrests
and prosecutions and longer prison sentences. The residual
clause, while expansive, at least had the requirement that
the crime of violence be classified as a felony that involves
a substantial risk of force against person or property, but
even that requirement has been removed by H.R. 6691.
A new definition of crime of violence is unnecessary, even
in light of Dimaya. The Court in Dimaya held that the
residual clause is unconstitutional but left in place
subsection (a) which defines a crime of violence as ``an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.'' While not an ideal formulation, it can
for now suffice as an adequate placeholder until Congress can
undertake a more deliberate approach instead of a reflexive
one.
H.R. 6691 could have significant exclusionary effects on
federal criminal justice laws and legislation. Carelessly
expanding the definition of a ``crime of violence'' will
change criminal procedures under current law and lead to more
people being unnecessarily detained both pretrial and post-
conviction. This goes against bipartisan efforts to reform
the criminal justice system. For example, proposed
legislation such as H.R. 4833 (Bail Fairness Act); H.R. 5043
(Fresh Start Act); and H.R. 5575 (Pathway to Parenting Act)
bars people convicted of a crime of violence from pretrial
release considerations, expungement of crimes, and receiving
visitors. Expanding the definition of a crime of violence
would exclude some of the very people meant to be helped by
these bills.
____
[From Asian Americans Advancing Justice,]
AAJC Opposes H.R. 6691
Asian Americans Advancing Justice--AAJC, a national civil
rights organization, urges Members of Congress to vote NO on
the House Community Safety and Security Act (H.R. 6691)--a
measure that would dangerously expand the definition of a
``crime of violence'' to include many offenses that have no
element of violence at all, leading to overcriminalization
and unnecessary detention.
This bill's overly broad definition opens the door to a
massive increase in people being unjustifiably detained both
pre-trial and post-conviction because the bill omits the
crucial requirement that a ``crime of violence'' involve the
use, threatened use, or attempted use of force. Such severe
adverse consequences are highly likely to occur, especially
since the Department of Justice has exhibited an alarming
tendency to use an overly broad definition of a violent crime
to justify increased arrests, prosecutions, and harsher
prison sentences.
Congress owes a duty to the American public to carefully
craft a definition of a ``crime of violence'' that takes into
consideration the many harmful legal consequences that might
flow from changing such a key term. Instead of following a
reasoned, deliberate approach to lawmaking, the sponsors of
this bill have hastily proposed a damaging definition that
would frustrate current bipartisan efforts to reform the
criminal justice system.
We oppose any expanded definition of ``crime of violence''
that would criminalize at-risk and marginalized communities.
We need more fairness and relief within our criminal justice
system, not less. This bill would disproportionately harm
communities of color, including Southeast Asian refugees who
are already being deported in high numbers for old criminal
convictions. A new, sprawling definition for ``crime of
violence'' would have negative ripple effects for community
members' eligibility for immigration relief, further fueling
Trump's draconian, anti-immigrant enforcement agenda.
We urge Congress to stand with us against this harmful and
reckless bill. If you have any questions, please contact
Megan Essaheb or Hannah Woerner.
____
National Center for
Lesbian Rights,
Washington, DC.
Dear Member of Congress: The National Center for Lesbian
Rights urges you to vote ``No'' on HR 6691, Community Safety
and Security Act of 2018. This bill would only serve to
exacerbate mass incarceration and racial inequality in our
country. The bill vastly broadens the scope of the federal
term ``crime of violence,'' a definition with sentencing
repercussions throughout the federal criminal code.
Additionally, because the term is also referred to in various
immigration statutes, the bill would also expand the already
vast category of crimes that render even lawfully present
immigrants subject to immigration mandatory detention and
deportation.
This bill will likely lead to more lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people being incarcerated or
detained, where they are more likely to experience violence
than non-LGBTQ people. Currently LGBTQ people, especially
those of color, are disproportionally incarcerated due to
higher rates of poverty and to a history of anti-LGBTQ
discrimination, including by law enforcement. For adults 40%
of incarcerated women and 9% of incarcerated men are sexual
minorities. Additionally, one in eight transgender people
have been incarcerated; among transgender women, that number
jumps to one in five. The rate of incarceration is higher for
transgender people of color, with one in four trans Latinas
and nearly half of Black trans people experiencing
incarceration. In the last year, transgender people were
incarcerated at twice the rate of the general population,
with Black (9%) and American Indian (6%) transgender women
being the most impacted.
Incarceration exposes LGBTQ people to verbal, physical, and
sexual harassment and abuse. LGBTQ prisoners are
significantly more likely to be sexually assaulted in prison,
with 12% of gay and bisexual men and 40% of transgender
people reporting a sexual assault in 2011. In a survey of
LGBTQ inmates, 85% of respondents had been placed in solitary
confinement--many purportedly for their own protection--and
approximately half had spent two years or more in solitary.
LGBTQ, and especially transgender inmates are often denied
needed medical care while incarcerated including transition-
related care, HIV-related care, and mental and behavioral
care. In the previous year 37% of transgender people who were
on hormone treatment were denied medication once
incarcerated. Furthermore, LGBTQ individuals held at federal
immigration detention centers are 97 times more likely to be
sexually assaulted than other detainees.
By causing more people to be deported, this bill will lead
to LGBTQ immigrants being sent back to countries where they
have little to no legal rights and are more likely to
experience anti-LGBTQ violence and possibly death. Nearly 80
countries criminalize same-sex relationships and many without
explicit laws remain very dangerous for the LGBTQ community.
We urge you to vote ``No'' on HR 6691, because this bill
would hurt LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ people, especially those who
are of color and immigrants. As a community that experiences
high rates of violence, LGBTQ people understand the important
of addressing violence in our communities. However,
incarceration is not the solution to violence. Instead,
Congress should support community-based prevention strategies
and address the structural causes of violence.
For more information, you can read the attached documents
which further explain the harms this bill would cause.
Warmly,
Tyrone Hanley, Esq.
Policy Counsel.
____
[September 5, 2018]
Immigrants' Rights Organizations Encourage Members of Congress to Vote
No on H.R. 6691, a Retrogressive Mass Incarceration Bill
H.R. 6691 is a retrogressive measure that seeks to expand
the federal criminal code and exacerbate mass incarceration
at a time when the vast majority of Americans believe the
country is ready for progressive criminal justice reform. The
bill vastly broadens the scope of the federal term ``crime of
violence,'' a definition with sentencing repercussions
throughout the federal criminal code. Because the term is
also referenced in one of the harshest provisions of
immigration law, the bill would also expand the already vast
category of crimes that render even lawfully present
immigrants subject to immigration detention and deportation.
The bill will cause numerous harms, outlined here and
described in detail below:
1. H.R. 6691's expansion of Section 16 of Title 18 of the
United States Code, the definition of a ``crime of
violence,'' will expand the criminal justice and
incarceration systems. Because this definition is cross-
referenced widely throughout the criminal code and
incorporated into federal immigration law, this bill will
trigger a significant expansion of the penalties attached to
even minor criminal conduct in federal criminal court,
exacerbate the mass incarceration crisis, and render even
more immigrants subject to the disproportionate penalty of
deportation.
2. H.R. 6691 broadens the ``crime of violence'' definition
far beyond what the statute included prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Dimaya, including offenses as minor as
simple assault and as vague as ``communication of threats.''
3. H.R. 6691 will expand the already overly punitive
immigration consequences of involvement in the criminal
justice system by further broadening the already sweeping
list of offenses that constitute an ``aggravated felony,'' in
a manner almost entirely duplicative and sometimes at odds
with other provisions in federal immigration law.
4. If H.R. 6691 became law, there would be serious
questions about its constitutionality.
This bill represents a cynical effort to deepen the
penalties attached to even minor criminal offenses, further
criminalizing immigrants and communities of color. The
Immigrant Justice Network, Immigrant Defense Project,
Immigrant Legal Resource Center, National Immigrant Justice
Center, and the National Immigration Project of the National
Lawyers Guild urge Members of Congress to vote NO on H.R.
6691.
1. H.R. 6691 expands the federal definition of ``crime of violence,''
with vast ripple effects
H.R. 6691 purports to amend only one provision of U.S.
law--the definition of what constitutes a ``crime of
violence'' as defined at Section 16 of Title 18 of the United
States Code. Section 16, however, serves as the ``universal
definition'' of a ``crime of violence'' for the entirety of
the federal criminal code. The language is cross-referenced
in the definitions and sentencing provisions for
[[Page H7935]]
numerous federal offenses, including racketeering, money
laundering, firearms, and domestic violence offenses.
Additionally, the definition is incorporated into the
Immigration and Nationality Act as one of a list of 21
different types of offenses that constitute an ``aggravated
felony,'' which in turn constitutes a ground of deportability
and a bar to nearly every type of defense to deportation.
Expanding the ``crime of violence'' definition is anathema
to progressive criminal justice reform, criminalizing more
conduct and attaching greater penalties across numerous
provisions of the federal code, all while rendering more
immigrants subject to the double penalty of deportation.
2. H.R. 6691 broadens the ``crime of violence'' definition far beyond
what the statute included prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Dimaya
H.R. 6691 is a solution in search of a problem. Section 16
is written in two sub-parts, (a) and (b). The text of the
statute already broadly defines ``crime of violence'' in sub-
section (a), including any offense ``that has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.'' We can assume
that H.R. 6691 was written in response to the Supreme Court's
April 2018 decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, in which the Court
struck down sub-section (b) as unconstitutional in the
immigration context. Section 16(b) includes any felony
offense that ``by its nature'' involves a substantial risk of
the use of such force; in Dimaya, the Court found its
application so vague as to create ``more unpredictability and
arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.'' In
short, the Court found the second half of the statute void
for vagueness, but left the first half intact.
The Dimaya decision remedied significant injustices that
had resulted from the inconsistent and often random
application of section 16(b). Immigration legal service
providers, serving as amid to the Dimaya Court, noted that
the statute's ``only predictable outcomes are continued
disagreements among the courts and continued harms to
immigrants.'' To demonstrate this harmful disparity, amici
described how the offense of residential trespass was
considered a crime of violence under section 16(b) in the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, but not in the Seventh
Circuit, which noted the offense could be committing simply
by walking into a neighbor's open door under ``the mistaken
belief that she is hosting an open house . . .''
Now comes H.R. 6691, which proposes to keep section 16(a)
intact while expanding the ``crime of violence'' definition
to encompass dozens of other offenses that are in some cases
given their own new definitions and in others defined via
reference to the existing criminal code. Many of these
offenses move section 16 far beyond its pre-Dimaya scope,
including offenses as minor as spitting on another person.
The bill stretches the imagination by calling generally
nonviolent offenses, such as simple assault, ``communication
of threats,'' and extortion, crimes of violence.
3. H.R. 6691 will expand the already overly punitive immigration
consequences of involvement in the criminal justice system, in a manner
almost entirely duplicative and sometimes at odd with other provisions
of federal immigration law
The immigration penalties of involvement in the criminal
justice system are already breathtakingly harsh and
overbroad; undocumented immigrants and decades-long lawful
permanent residents alike can face deportation for offenses
as minor as shoplifting, using a false bus pass, or simple
drug possession. Immigration detention and deportation are
frequently imposed as a penalty even in cases where a
criminal court judge found community service or an
entirely suspended sentence sufficient punishment for the
offense committed.
The ``crime of violence'' definition at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16
is incorporated as one of twenty-one types of offense that
constitute an ``aggravated felony'' as defined at section 101
of the Immigration and Nationality Act. An ``aggravated
felony'' is one of dozens of categories of offenses that
trigger deportation from or preclude entry to the United
States, layered on top of the provisions of federal
immigration law that authorize deportation for those
unlawfully present. The ``aggravated felony'' category is
different, however, because it triggers mandatory no-bond
detention in almost every case and categorically precludes
nearly all immigrants from presenting a defense to their
deportation.
By adding dozens of offenses to the existing ``crime of
violence'' definition, H.R. 6691 therefore grows the already
vast expanse of offenses that render lawfully present
immigrants in the United States subject to immigration
detention and enforcement.
The bill is largely duplicative of other grounds of
removability, in several cases putting forth new definitions
of offenses that are defined in other provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, setting up a nearly
impossible-to-effectuate removal scheme. Many of the offenses
delineated in the bill constitute their own independent
aggravated felony grounds (including, for example, murder and
burglary), their own independent ground of removability
(including, for example, child abuse, stalking, and domestic
violence), or--in nearly every other case--already fall
within the wide-reaching ``crime involving moral turpitude''
grounds of deportability and inadmissibility, and those
excluded from those grounds are by nature largely minor
offenses.
This bill will further criminalize immigrant communities,
communities already living in fear of increasingly
militarized immigration enforcement operations. The bill's
expanded list of ``crime of violence'' offenses includes
relatively minor offenses including simple assault, vaguely
worded offenses such as ``communication of threats,'' and a
sweeping list of inchoate offenses including solicitation or
``aiding and abetting'' any of the enumerated categories.
This bill will further marginalize historically
marginalized communities, triggering heightened immigration
penalties in already over-policed neighborhoods.
4. If this bill were to pass, it would raise serious constitutional
concerns
If this bill were to become law, there would be serious
questions about its constitutionality because it jeopardizes
the long established ``categorical approach'' in our legal
system.
What is the `categorical approach'? Over the years, the
Supreme Court has carefully crafted an efficient and
predictable legal framework to determine whether a non-
citizen's crime makes him or her deportable or inadmissible.
This framework is called the ``categorical approach,'' which
applies to determine deportability and inadmissibility for
criminal grounds. It sets a clear and uniform standard to
evaluate the immigration consequences of the crime of
conviction. The categorical approach helps to eliminate
subjectivity in adjudication by ensuring that convictions are
characterized based on their inherent nature and official
record, rather than on potentially disputed facts, and thus
ensures that two people convicted of the same crime will be
treated similarly under the law.
This bill makes a strong push to systematically switch from
the established framework of the ``categorical approach'' to
a ``conduct based'' definition. The conduct based definition
would effectively allow an immigration judge to go back and
``re-try'' a conviction that was already decided in a court
of law. This bill, if passed, would raise the same Sixth
Amendment concerns that the Supreme Court identified in
Mathis v. United States: ``. . . allowing a sentencing judge
to go any further would raise serious Sixth Amendment
concerns. This Court has held that only a jury, and not a
judge, may find facts that increase a maximum penalty, except
for the simple fact of a prior conviction. See Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). That means a judge
cannot go beyond identifying the crime of conviction to
explore the manner in which the defendant committed that
offense.''
Like the burglary provision analyzed in Mathis, the crime
of violence definition this bill amends is used as a
sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326(b)(2). As a
result of switching to a conduct-based definition rather than
``the simple fact of a prior conviction,'' the bill presents
the same Sixth Amendment concerns that troubled the Mathis
Court.
A yes vote on H.R. 6691 is a vote for mass incarceration,
for increased criminalization of communities of color, and
for even further militarization of immigration enforcement.
Members of Congress must vote no.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I leave my colleagues with a simple
challenge. The simple challenge is: Read the Constitution.
Vagueness can be the death of us. This bill is that kind of death,
and I would hope that we would have the opportunity to do this as it
should be: constitutionally sound and in a bipartisan way to save
lives.
Mr. Speaker, let me be clear. We support victims of crime, especially
those who are victims of violent crime. But classifying particular
offenses as crimes of violence has tremendous consequences for the
individuals accused of committing them. This bill dangerously leads to
over-criminalization and we should not take lightly the task of
amending the definition of ``crime of violence.''
At Rules on Wednesday, we addressed over-criminalization and mass
incarceration. Rep. Torres aptly stated that we should not proceed with
haste, which will further exacerbate the over crowdedness in our
prisons. Rep. Bucks responded that we should build more prisons to
address that problem.
Even conservative groups that work with these very complicated and
important criminal justice reform issues, like the Koch Foundation and
Right on Crime, do not agree that building more prisons is the answer.
Right on Crime states, ``by reducing excessive sentence lengths and
holding non-violent offenders accountable through prison alternatives,
public safety can often be achieved.''
In a recent forum, the Koch Foundation stated, ``After four decades
of increasing punitiveness and sky-rocketing levels of imprisonment,
American incarceration rates have declined in many states over the past
five years. In fact, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in favor of
major criminal justice reforms that would reduce mass incarceration
much further.''
The original spark for this coalition of ``unlikely bedfellows'' has
come from a group of conservative leaders who emphasize a variety of
different factors, ranging from economic, to
[[Page H7936]]
freedom, to religious groups embracing redemption and second chances.
The Koch Foundation went on to say, ``Although the 2016 presidential
election temporarily halted this movement's momentum, the coalition has
reemerged recently and seems prepared to make progress in 2018.''
So I disagree with the notion that we should build more prisons and
not exercise due diligence to ensure that in responding to the Supreme
Court's finding that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, that we
are doing so in a well-informed, heavily-engaged and thoughtful manner.
Due to the seriousness of our criminal justice system, we should
always use due care and give thorough considerations when amending the
criminal code.
For all these reasons, I oppose this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. HANDEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, first let me address the criticism regarding burglary
being too broad in the way it is addressed in the legislation. This is
the Federal generic definition of burglary and one that courts have
found satisfies the definition of ``crime of violence.''
Mr. Speaker, the detractors of this fail to recognize that these
definitions are not an expansion of actual State laws but only seek to
cover the generic definition and reasonable iterations found in State
law.
In fact, prior to the Dimaya Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court
had previously unanimously agreed in Leocal v. Ashcroft that ``burglary
is the classic example of a crime of violence under subsection 16(b).''
The Community Safety and Security Act of 2018 is a necessary, crucial
piece of legislation that will fix a major loophole in our system. We
squarely address the issues raised by the United States Supreme Court,
eliminating the vagueness, giving notice, and explaining which offenses
Congress intended to cover when they had first crafted the language in
clause 16(b) from the very beginning.
By moving the legislation, we are avoiding potentially dangerous
consequences of giving very serious, dangerous criminals a pass. We
have examined the case law surrounding these offenses; we have
considered the equities; we have been deliberative; and we have shown
great restraint in many ways.
Congress cannot sit idly by and allow criminals to disrupt our
communities because of this loophole. This bill is a product of
necessity, and we do not have the privilege to squabble over
hypotheticals that ultimately have no bearing on real-life applications
of this law. We must move to protect our communities to prevent more
victims of crime.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I can assure my colleagues that this bill is
not overly broad. It is not, as some have irresponsibly stated, a
``dangerous expansion of criminal law.'' Instead, it is a carefully
crafted response to the U.S. Supreme Court's recommendations in the
Dimaya case. Frankly, it is just the sort of bill that our system was
designed to produce.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' for this bill. Vote
``yes,'' and in doing so, demonstrate to your constituents your
commitment to protecting law-abiding Americans from violent criminals.
It is a simple choice. Make the correct one and vote ``yes.''
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, today I will vote present on H.R. 6691. I
support the premise of this legislation and agree that action needs to
be taken after the Supreme Court's ruling earlier this year. However,
in their finding the Court cautioned that careful consideration should
be exercised before any new or expanded criminal definitions are
finalized. This bill does not meet that test.
In April, the Supreme Court ruled that the current definition of
``crimes of violence'' was unconstitutionally vague and needed to be
clarified. I support efforts to rectify this issue and make certain we
are prosecuting criminals to the fullest extent of the law. Yet since
the Court's ruling, Republicans have taken no steps to meaningfully
consider what this new definition should be. Instead, they rushed the
bill to the floor without a hearing, markup or time for proper review.
I agree clarification is needed to ensure we are able to prosecute
those who are guilty and uphold our laws as they are intended. However,
rushing through a hasty definition of crimes of violence is dangerous
and irresponsible. The definition is used in a number of federal
criminal offenses beyond just the Immigration and Nationality Act. For
instance, it also applies when determining whether a juvenile may be
prosecuted as an adult in federal court.
There is simply too much potential for unintended consequences to
rush through a definition written impulsively and without proper
review. I would rather the House carefully consider what an appropriate
definition should include, in order to properly balance the rights of
Americans with the need to fully enforce our laws and protect our
fellow citizens.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 1051, the previous question is ordered
on the bill.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 247,
nays 152, answered ``present'' 2, not voting 28, as follows:
[Roll No. 393]
YEAS--247
Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Balderson
Banks (IN)
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Bera
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blum
Bost
Brady (TX)
Brat
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Bustos
Byrne
Calvert
Carbajal
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Chabot
Cheney
Cloud
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costa
Costello (PA)
Crawford
Crist
Cuellar
Curbelo (FL)
Curtis
Davidson
Denham
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Estes (KS)
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gottheimer
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Grothman
Guthrie
Handel
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Keating
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kuster (NH)
Kustoff (TN)
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamb
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lesko
Lewis (MN)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham, M.
Lynch
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Newhouse
Norman
Nunes
O'Halleran
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Panetta
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Peterson
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Polis
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rosen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Ruiz
Russell
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Suozzi
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin
NAYS--152
Adams
Aguilar
Amash
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Butterfield
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Cooper
Correa
Courtney
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
[[Page H7937]]
Engel
Espaillat
Esty (CT)
Evans
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Gomez
Gonzalez (TX)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Kelly (IL)
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Krishnamoorthi
Labrador
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan, Ben Ray
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Massie
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Nadler
Napolitano
Nolan
Norcross
O'Rourke
Pallone
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Pingree
Pocan
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Sherman
Sires
Smith (WA)
Soto
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--2
DeFazio
Lofgren
NOT VOTING--28
Blackburn
Capuano
Cramer
Culberson
Davis, Rodney
DeSantis
Ellison
Eshoo
Gianforte
Huffman
Jenkins (WV)
Jones
Kennedy
Maloney, Sean
Neal
Noem
Renacci
Richmond
Rooney, Thomas J.
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce (CA)
Ryan (OH)
Shea-Porter
Smith (TX)
Speier
Titus
Tsongas
Walz
{time} 1049
Messrs. SANFORD and SUOZZI changed their vote from ``nay'' to
``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________