[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 130 (Wednesday, August 1, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5544-S5547]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the fiscal year 2019 
National Defense Authorization Act.
  I am very pleased that we were able to pass the conference report 
with a bipartisan vote of 87 to 10. I think it represents the quality 
of the work that was done by my colleagues Senator Inhofe; Congressman 
Thornberry, the chairman of the House committee; and also Ranking 
Member Smith. I thank them for their thoughtfulness and cooperation 
throughout the conference.
  The passage in the Senate follows the passage last week by a vote of 
359 to 54 in the House of Representatives--another strong bipartisan 
endorsement of the legislation on behalf of the men and women in 
uniform and the national security of the United States.
  Also, at this point, I would like to take a moment to recognize 
Senator John McCain. He has been an extraordinary leader throughout my 
tenure in the Senate, someone who has been committed to the welfare of 
the men and women of the military, someone who has spent his life in 
service to the Nation with courage, with valor, and with exceptional 
self-sacrifice for all of us. I am sure he is very proud today that 
this legislation, which bears his name, has passed and become law. 
Senator McCain has also done something that some people would think 
impossible; that is, to have a West Point graduate admit that, in many 
cases, he is indispensable to the national security of the United 
States. I say that with great affection and great sincerity.

  Let me highlight several areas that I think are important in this 
legislation. The bill includes important personnel funding and policy 
provisions, including a 2.6-percent, across-the-board pay raise for our 
men and women in uniform. It fully funds the military services' end-
strength requests for fiscal year 2019. We are going to bring our 
troops--particularly, the Army--to the desired strength of our military 
leaders. It provides $50 million in impact aid for heavily impacted 
local school districts all across the country. This is critical of the 
quality of life for the families who serve us, as well as their 
servicemembers.
  There are a number of provisions updating the Officer Personnel 
Management System to enhance recruitment, promotion, and retention of 
highly skilled officers.
  With respect to the Army, the bill fully funds a number of critical 
Army programs, to include the Abrams battle tanks, as well as Apache 
and Blackhawk helicopters. The bill also makes targeted investments to 
improve the range and lethality of Army artillery systems, and it 
supports the fielding of active protection systems on our combat 
vehicles in order to better protect our soldiers.
  With respect to the Navy, the conference agreement provides 
additional funds for vessels for the Navy, including two more littoral 
combat ships, three more ship-to-shore connectors, and a cable repair 
ship. The agreement also provides additional money to help second- and 
third-tier contractors ramp up production to support our Columbia- and 
Virginia-class submarine acquisition programs.
  With regard to the Air Force, the bill provides for additional 
funding to support the light attack aircraft, or the

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OA-X. The agreement also ensures the Air Force will maintain the 
current capability of the JSTARS aircraft fleet while they develop new 
capabilities to replace, and perhaps even improve, the current ground 
support capability of the JSTARS fleet.
  This bill represents what has been the hallmark of Secretary Mattis's 
strategic vision. It reflects the strategic shift toward prioritization 
of the strategic competition between Russia and China. It supports the 
President's budget request for resources to deter and, if necessary, 
defend against aggression from near-peer competitors. This includes 
$6.3 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative as a continuing 
demonstration of our commitment to the security of our European allies 
and the deterrence of Russian expansionism. It also requires a 5-year 
plan from the Department for the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative on 
the necessary resources and activities that counter China's 
destabilizing behavior in the region.
  The bill also includes a provision calling on the administration to 
urgently complete a comprehensive strategy to counter Russian malign 
influence below the level of direct military conflict. Russia attacked 
the heart of our democracy in 2016, and our intelligence experts warn 
of even more sophisticated Russian attacks targeting this year's 
midterm elections. Yet the administration has failed to bring together 
our military and nonmilitary tools of national power to counter this 
Russian aggression, despite a requirement in last year's NDAA to submit 
to Congress a whole-of-government strategy to counter Russian malign 
influence. This bill expresses the sense of the Congress that the 
administration should complete a counter-Russian influence strategy 
without delay.
  The conference report also includes a provision that authorizes the 
President to employ Department of Defense cyber forces to take actions 
to disrupt the operations of Russian actors attempting to penetrate our 
election systems and campaign organizations and to plant false and 
divisive information on social media sites.
  As I mentioned, the Secretary's national defense policy, which the 
President endorses, focuses on the shift to the near-peer adversaries 
of Russia and China. Our legislation reflects that, but we cannot 
forget the threat from ISIS and extremist organizations. It persists. 
This bill continues critical programs aimed at countering these groups. 
Of note, it extends the Iraqi and Syrian train-and-equip programs at 
the requested funding levels, while requiring appropriate information 
with respect to the partner forces to be trained and the expected level 
of engagement with U.S. forces. This is a prudent approach that 
recognizes the continued threat from ISIS while ensuring appropriate 
oversight of these authorities in a dynamic environment.
  I am also pleased the bill includes provisions designed to 
incorporate lessons learned from the campaign against ISIS that could 
be more effectively used to account for and respond to allegations of 
civilian casualties going forward.
  The bill fully funds the request for U.S. Special Operations Command 
and includes important provisions to enhance the ability of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict to act as the ``service secretary-like'' civilian responsible 
for the oversight and advocacy of the Special Operations forces that do 
so much for us.
  As we discussed before the vote, the bill also focuses on the issue 
of the ZTE-Huawei issue that came before this Congress. The conference 
agreement includes a provision that prohibits the Federal Government 
and government contractors--this is governmentwide--from buying or 
using or providing grants and loans to entities buying or using 
telecommunications equipment and services provided by Chinese companies 
ZTE and Huawei due to our serious concerns that these companies 
represent security risks and have violated U.S. sanctions and export 
control laws.
  The provision also bans the use of video surveillance equipment from 
several Chinese companies due to concerns about security risks and 
infringement of intellectual property rights. The conferees recognize 
the burden this ban will place on some telecommunications providers, 
particularly in rural areas, and included direction that government 
agencies shall prioritize available funding to enable these providers 
to replace the equipment they have procured from Chinese companies.
  I am also particularly pleased the conference agreement includes a 
Senate floor amendment that I authored to ensure that as we proceed to 
develop new or modified nuclear weapons, the Congress is in a position 
to provide rigorous oversight to any such request. Given the powerful 
nature of these weapons, it is essential we maintain our oversight 
capability on this subject matter.
  The conference report also contains important oversight language to 
ensure our Nation can produce the plutonium pits the Department of 
Defense requires. Los Alamos is our Nation's center of excellence in 
research and manufacturing of plutonium, and we need to maintain our 
focus on this laboratory in order to ensure the Department of Defense 
meets their stockpile requirements with respect to pit production.

  The conference report contains a number of important provisions 
related to Turkey. I want to acknowledge the valuable leadership of 
Senators Shaheen and Tillis in this regard. Turkey is an important NATO 
ally, and the U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation is multifaceted and deep. 
However, Turkey's announcement of its intent to buy the Russian S-400 
air defense system threatens the integrity of the NATO alliance and 
would have a significant negative impact on defense cooperation between 
the United States and Turkey.
  In addition, the Turkish Government's unlawful detention of Pastor 
Brunson and other wrongfully held Americans has raised serious 
questions and concerns about its commitment to the shared values of the 
NATO alliance and the rule of law. The NDAA conference report calls for 
their immediate release and requires the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, to report to Congress on the 
status of the U.S.-Turkey relationship, including the impact of 
Turkey's potential purchase of the S-400 system on the bilateral 
relationship.
  The report must also assess, should Turkey proceed with the S-400 
purchase, what the impact would be of a significant change in Turkey's 
participation in the F-35 aircraft program, including reduction or 
elimination of Turkey's participation. The assessment must include the 
steps required to mitigate the negative impact of such a change on the 
United States and other international partners in the F-35 program. The 
provision also prohibits the Department of Defense from delivering any 
F-35 aircraft to Turkey until the required report is submitted to the 
appropriate congressional committees.
  One issue in this year's NDAA conference negotiations related to 
Russia sanctions is the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act, or CAATSA. CAATSA was an excellent piece of legislation, 
and the Presiding Officer knows very well because he was the chief 
author and architect of this bill.
  I want to take a moment to explain exactly what the conference report 
does with respect to CAATSA and how the Defense Department intends to 
use the limited waiver for secondary sanctions provided in this year's 
NDAA.
  As I said, I strongly support CAATSA. It was a remarkable piece of 
work, passing this Senate by 98 to 2. Again, it is a tribute to the 
leadership not only of the Presiding Officer but Senator Menendez of 
New Jersey and all of our colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.
  Its sanctions are powerful tools for holding Russia accountable for 
its interference in our elections and its aggression in Ukraine and 
elsewhere. As I said, the Senate passed it overwhelmingly, 98 to 2. We 
have found that the Trump administration has been resisting fully 
implementing the tough sanctions against Russia that are found in 
CAATSA, and I urge those sanctions be vigorously enforced.
  During Senate consideration of the fiscal year 2019 defense budget 
request, Defense Secretary Mattis raised a concern about one aspect of 
CAATSA, relating to the secondary sanctions in section 231 on countries 
or entities

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that do business with the Russian intelligence or defense sectors. 
These mandatory sanctions restrict U.S. arms sales and certain 
financial dealings with countries or entities that engage in a 
significant transaction to purchase major Russian weapons systems.
  As Secretary Mattis testified, these secondary sanctions can, 
however, have the unintended consequence of punishing certain strategic 
partners that have legacy Russian weapons systems but are looking to 
transition away from Russia and toward increased purchases of U.S. 
major defense equipment. Because these countries may buy Russian 
systems to maintain current capabilities, section 231 sanctions would 
block U.S. arms sales to them, effectively pushing these countries 
closer to Russia and making them more dependent on Russian weapons 
systems. This is the opposite effect of what CAATSA is intended to 
achieve and undermines our efforts to isolate Russia globally.
  To address these concerns, Secretary Mattis requested a straight 
national security waiver to section 231 mandatory sanctions. While 
CAATSA, as enacted, does include a broad national security waiver, the 
waiver is subject to CAATSA's expedited review procedures, which 
provides Congress between 30 and 60 days to review the waiver request. 
If Congress objects, Congress can try to pass a joint resolution of 
disapproval under the expedited procedures. If Congress fails to enact 
a resolution of disapproval within the review period, then the waiver 
takes effect.
  The administration contended that CAATSA's national security waiver, 
subject to the expedited review procedures, was unworkable. They 
claimed that because the mandatory sanctions that would kick in while 
Congress reviewed the waiver request for up to 60 days or more--this 
would cause significant harm to our defense partnerships with these 
countries and drive them away from purchasing major U.S. defense 
equipment.
  In response, the House bill included authority for the President to 
waive section 231's mandatory sanctions on countries or entities buying 
major Russian defense equipment if the President makes certain 
certifications, primarily that the purchaser is reducing its reliance 
on the Russian defense sector.
  The House bill was a very wide-open waiver. The only representation 
of certification the President would make is that the Nation was 
attempting to move away from Russian influence and Russian supplies.
  We worked very closely with House colleagues. The Senate version of 
the NDAA did not have any language with CAATSA, but we had to respond 
to the House because it was a legitimate issue in conference. Indeed, 
one of the reasons we avoided any sort of discussion with respect to 
CAATSA in the Senate was the feeling that there might be a negative 
impact on the ongoing bilateral relationship with Turkey to persuade 
the Turkish Government to reverse its decision to buy the Russian S-400 
air defense system. Turkey's purchase of the S-400 would almost trigger 
mandatory sanctions under section 231 and put our defense cooperation 
with Turkey at risk, including on the F-35 aircraft.
  The final conference outcome, after discussions back and forth, in a 
very serious and very thoughtful way, was a very narrow waiver for 
section 231 sanctions only and reflects a number of important changes 
to the House provision that raised the bar for the President even to be 
able to invoke this waiver.
  First, the conference outcome preserves all existing CAATSA sanctions 
currently in effect against Russia, including sanctions for Russia's 
election interference and aggression against Ukraine.
  Second, the waiver is not available for any transactions with 
entities in the Russian defense and intelligence sectors that were 
directly involved in Russian cyber intrusions, including the Russian 
military intelligence, or GRU. This preserves the purpose of section 
231 sanctions, which is to impose costs on the Russian defense and 
intelligence sectors for cyber intrusions.
  Third, the waiver is limited in order to keep the pressure on Turkey 
to reverse its decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense 
system. The waiver is not available for any deals to purchase Russian 
weapons systems that would harm the integrity of NATO or other 
alliances in which the United States participates or that would 
adversely affect ongoing U.S. or coalition operations or that would 
harm U.S. defense cooperation with the country involved or that would 
significantly increase the risk of compromising U.S. defense systems or 
operational capabilities, including through the diversion of sensitive 
U.S. defense technology.
  These restrictions are intended to let the Government of Turkey know 
that the waiver is not a get-of-jail-free card for section 231's 
mandatory sanctions if Turkey goes ahead and purchases the S-400.
  Fourth, the conference outcome allows for continued defense 
cooperation with countries transitioning away from Russia. Secondary 
sanctions may be waived only if the country is reducing its dependence 
on Russian major weapons systems or is cooperating with the United 
States on security matters critical to our strategic interests.
  This restriction should be narrowly understood to mean that the 
country involved is cooperating with the United States in the strategic 
competition with Russia or China, consistent with the administration's 
national defense strategy authored by Secretary Mattis. As set in the 
national defense strategy, the central challenge to U.S. security today 
is the ``re-emergence of long-term strategic competition'' by 
revisionist powers--specifically Russia and China.
  Fifth, the conference outcome provides for congressional review under 
a 30-day notice-and-wait period as an alternative to expedited 
congressional review procedures provided under CAATSA. Congress would 
still have 30 days to review the President's certifications with regard 
to any sanctionable activity and to weigh in with its concerns.
  Sixth, the conference outcome also enhances congressional oversight 
of CAATSA's secondary sanctions by adding a report. This report will 
provide an important baseline for measuring the extent to which 
countries are reducing their reliance on Russia and requires updated 
information for the next 5 years on which countries are reducing their 
transactions with the Russian defense sector.
  Some of my colleagues have expressed concern that the conference 
report's waiver for section 231 sanctions is delinked from CAATSA's 
expedited review procedures. They are concerned that Congress may be 
giving up its ability to conduct oversight on administrative attempts 
to invoke waivers.
  First, let me try to clear up one thing. The authority under CAATSA, 
as enacted, for a broad national security waiver--subject to an 
expedited congressional review process--remains unchanged under the 
conference report and continues to apply to the vast majority of 
sanctions against Russia under CAATSA.
  More importantly, we should keep in mind how the Department of 
Defense intends to use the limited waiver to section 231 provided in 
the NDAA. As Secretary Mattis wrote to Chairman McCain on July 24, the 
Department seeks a ``limited exception'' that would ``allow the United 
States to sell military equipment and enable countries pulling away 
from the Russian orbit.'' Secretary Mattis further noted that U.S. arms 
sales are subject to congressional notification in advance. In other 
words, Secretary Mattis is seeking to avoid the disruption to U.S. arms 
sales to key strategic partners that would result under section 231 
sanctions and to prevent the negative impact such sanctions would have 
on our strategic relationships with these countries as they transition 
away from Russia.
  Even with the limited exception provided under this bill, Congress 
will still have significant oversight of any U.S. arms sales to 
countries being exempted from section 231 sanctions. Any sale of U.S. 
major defense equipment to these transitioning countries--like India, 
for example--will continue to be subject to congressional review under 
the well-established requirements of the Arms Export Control Act.
  That means that Congress typically will have at least 30 days, and 
often more, to review and approve any foreign military sale for major 
defense

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equipment to a country that has received the waiver to 
secondary sanctions under section 231. Large arms sales are likely to 
be subject to the FMS review process, but significant direct commercial 
sales must also be notified to the Foreign Relations Committee 30 days 
in advance of the export license being issued. The result is that 
Congress has the ability to conduct oversight of these transactions.

  Furthermore, under the Arms Export Control Act, Congress has 
procedures for pursuing a resolution of disapproval prohibiting or 
modifying the proposed arms sales. Congress's oversight of any major 
U.S. arms sales that might flow from a waiver of secondary sanctions 
under section 231 provides us an additional ability to revise and 
supervise the administration's implementation of this waiver authority.
  There are specific cases that one could talk about in terms of 
countries that we are actually trying to engage, such as India, 
Indonesia, and other countries, but I think what we have tried to do is 
to structure a very discrete and, in the terms the Secretary of Defense 
has used, very stringent conditions to the exercise of the sanctions.
  Let me conclude by again thanking Senator Inhofe, Chairman 
Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and all of the conferees for their 
bipartisanship throughout the process. This process has been collegial, 
and this is an example of a strong piece of legislation that addresses 
concerns of Members on both sides of the aisle.
  I would also like to thank the staff of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and the House Armed Services Committee for all of their hard 
work on drafting a thoughtful and comprehensive bill. Their diligent 
work is a tribute to us all.
  I would be remiss if I didn't single out these extraordinary 
individuals. I thank Senator McCain's staff director, Chris Brose, who 
did a superb job; Senator Inhofe's staff director, Luke Holland, Tony 
McLain; on my staff, Jody Bennett, Jon Clark, Gary Leeling, Creighton 
Greene, Jonathan Epstein, Ozge Guzelsu, Jon Green, Kirk McConnell, John 
Quirk, Arun Seraphin, Carolyn Chuhta, Maggie McNamara, Mike Noblet, 
Jorie Feldman, Bill Monahan, and my staff director, Elizabeth King. I 
also want to thank Jen Stewart and Paul Arcangeli. They are the staff 
directors for Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith, 
respectfully. They did a superb job.
  With their work and with the inspiration of Senator McCain, we were 
able to pass an extraordinary and I think very effective piece of 
legislation.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator withhold?
  Mr. REED. I will be happy to.

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