[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 130 (Wednesday, August 1, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5538-S5543]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019--CONFERENCE 
                                 REPORT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 
5515, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       Conference report to accompany H.R. 5515, an act to 
     authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2019 for military 
     activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
     construction, and for defense activities of the Department of 
     Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such 
     fiscal year, and for other purposes.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the cloture motion 
is withdrawn.
  Under the previous order, there will now be 1 hour of debate, with 30 
minutes controlled by the managers and 30 minutes under the control of 
the Senator from Florida, Mr. Rubio.
  The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. HOEVEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to be recognized 
for 3 minutes for comments relating to the appropriations bill prior to 
the NDAA bill debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                       Appropriations Legislation

  Mr. HOEVEN. Madam President, I want to thank my colleagues for 
advancing these appropriations bills, specifically the ag 
appropriations bill.
  I also want to thank Senator Merkley, my ranking member on the 
committee. Throughout the process, we have had open communications and 
have worked to advance the bill and to address amendments brought 
forward by our colleagues.
  I also want to thank specifically Senator Merkley's staff--Jessica 
Schulken, Dianne Nellor, and Bob Ross--for their work, as well as my 
crew--Carlisle Clarke, Patrick Carroll, Elizabeth Dent, Dan Auger, and 
Brita Endrud.
  This has been a process that has involved other subcommittees as 
well. I want to thank all of those who have worked on these 
appropriations bills, including Senator Collins and Senator Reed and 
their staffs on the Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development 
Subcommittee; Senators Murkowski and Udall and their staffs on the 
Interior bill; Senators Lankford and Coons on the Financial Services 
Subcommittee.
  This has certainly been a deliberative process--again, the way 
regular order is supposed to work. More than a dozen amendments that 
affected, for example, our agriculture bill have been accepted over the 
course of the bill. We

[[Page S5539]]

voted on others. So I am glad that we have had the open debate and been 
able to advance these bills, and, of course, particularly the 
Agriculture appropriations bill.
  I will just conclude with what I always like to remind people of 
whenever we talk about agriculture, and that is good farm policy. It 
benefits every single American every single day because what our 
farmers and ranchers do is they produce the highest quality, lowest 
cost food supply in the world, which benefits every American every day.
  I thank the Presiding Officer.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. RUBIO. Madam President, I am now halfway through my eighth year 
in the U.S. Senate, and in my time here, I have never once spoken 
against, voted against, or opposed in any way any of the National 
Defense Authorization Acts that have come before the Senate. The reason 
being, despite whatever flaws one might find on most occasions in any 
piece of legislation, the defense of our country is a fundamental 
obligation of our Federal Government. It comes before everything else.
  State governments run schools and build roads and do all sorts of 
activities at the State level. Communities do all sorts of things at 
the local level, but nothing is more important than the defense of our 
country in terms of a Federal obligation. So I never have opposed a 
National Defense Authorization Act, and I supported every single one of 
them, despite the fact that it didn't have everything I wanted and 
everything I liked, until today.
  There is a lot of good in this legislation, and it makes it difficult 
to be an opponent of it. For Florida, it authorizes over $200 million 
for military construction in the State--the littoral combat ship 
facilities at Naval Station Mayport, air traffic control towers at 
Whiting Field, F-35 facilities that are important at Eglin Air Force 
Base, KC-135 flight simulators at MacDill Air Force Base.
  It authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to build a cyber space 
facility at Eglin. It authorizes the conveyance of land for the Air 
Force Enlisted Village, which is a nonprofit corporation consisting of 
approximately 80 acres next to Eglin for independent living and 
apartments.
  It authorizes the continued development of the B-21 Bomber--work that 
is being done in Melbourne, FL. It fully supports the Joint Gulf Range 
Complex, a true treasure for our country, and it is the largest 
military range in the continental United States.
  As for the country, it also has all sorts of other very important 
things: an over 2.6-percent military pay raise. It increases the 
Active-Duty workforce by 15,600 personnel, bringing the total to over 
1.3 million. It tries to address the pilot shortage. It authorizes 
$10.7 billion to buy 77 more F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, $193 million 
in research and development funding for new software and improvements 
to be incorporated in future years in that program.
  It authorizes new missile defense, including $175 million intended to 
integrate the THAAD and Patriot Systems batteries in South Korea. It 
authorizes $23.7 billion for Navy shipbuilding, an increase of close to 
$2 billion over what the President requested. To go on and on, it does 
many important things in rebuilding our military strength in this 
country, but it failed on one important front, and that is what I 
believe to be a very significant and serious threat to the national 
security and the future of this country--one that we are only beginning 
to wake up to. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the 
United States is engaged in a geopolitical competition with a near-peer 
adversary.
  Since 1991, there has been no other nation on Earth that can project 
power anywhere close to what the United States could do--until now.
  Unlike our country, China is a nation with an ancient history, one 
that leaves them with a longstanding sense of victimhood but also one 
that leads them to believe they have a preordained destiny to, once 
again, be the most powerful nation on Earth. This is what they mean 
when they constantly use the phrase ``historical determinants.'' In 
summary, what they are saying is, they are predestined to be the 
world's most powerful country, and, therefore, they believe they are 
predestined to surpass the United States geopolitically, economically, 
and militarily.
  This is not a new ambition, by the way. For two decades, they have 
followed a strategy called hiding their power and biding their time, 
but all of that changed last year.

  In October, at their party congress, their President for life Xi laid 
out a vision for China and did it in clear, nationalistic terms. He 
said:

       Backed by the invincible force of 1.3 billion people, we 
     have an infinitely vast stage of our era, a historical 
     heritage of unmatched depth, and incomparable resolve . . . 
     we have arrived at a new era, where China is now in a leading 
     position in terms of economic and technological strength, 
     defense capabilities, and composite national strength . . . 
     and with a military which can fight and win.

  I will state that you see evidence of this belief in their impressive 
and massive military buildup and quantum leaps in technological 
advances. You see how they are working to destroy the current world 
order that was built by America and our allies and now seek to replace 
it with one they build and one that will be led by them.
  That is how they offer loans--not just to get their companies more 
business but to give them leverage and footholds in countries, and they 
do so with no questions asked about democracy or human rights. That is 
what the Asian Infrastructure Bank is all about. That is the Belt and 
Road Initiative.
  You also see what they are doing to overtake us economically. Their 
state-led economy runs large trade deficits with everyone while at the 
same time prohibiting market access to China. You see it in the 
widespread force technology transfers and the cyber theft, and it is 
working--5G, for example, will dominate most of the industries of the 
future, and they are on course to be the world standard on 5G.
  By 2020, China Mobile will be the only company in the world that can 
build a standalone 5G network. Huawei was the first company to gain 
approval to sell 5G stations in the European Union. They are moving 
hard to dominate pharma research and genome editing and all sorts of 
other leading industries for tomorrow. What is outrageous is how much 
of these advances are built, not just on ingenuity and hard work but on 
the theft of intellectual property from American companies, oftentimes 
through research funded by American taxpayers. They do it through cyber 
espionage. They do it through the forced transfer of technology, where 
they tell companies who do business in China, not only do you have to 
partner with a Chinese company, you have to give them the secrets to 
their trade. See how they are now buying up companies, buying off 
researchers in American universities and their research.
  Now, this is what they are moving toward--to become the most powerful 
country in the world. Why is that an issue, despite the fact that we 
seek to not be in second place to anyone? Because you can see what kind 
of country they will be and what kind of world we will have if they 
become the world's most dominant power.
  You see it, for example, in the conquest of the South China Sea 
through the military harassment of Southeast Asian nations. You see how 
they cut tourism to South Korea as leverage over our missile defense 
deployments; how they restricted exports of rare-earth minerals to 
Japan as leverage over the East China Sea disputes. We saw Filipino 
agricultural products rot on the docks during the South China Sea 
fights because they wouldn't let it come in.
  You see the threats to our businesses to deny them access to Chinese 
markets even further if they dare speak in support of President Trump's 
301 investigations of Chinese unfair practices.
  You see it in a U.S. citizen living in the United States of America--
not in China, not anywhere outside our borders--a U.S. citizen living 
in the United States of America was fired by Marriott Hotel because of 
a social media post that China complained about. That happened.
  You see it most recently by American and United Airlines being forced 
to change how they describe Taiwan on their website or they would not 
be allowed to continue to fly to China.
  The tactics they use over and over again are not sweeping changes; it 
is

[[Page S5540]]

typically slow but incremental yet more assertive demands, but over 
time these demands end up establishing a new normal. It is very much 
like the example of the frog in a boiling pot of water. If you throw 
the frog in the boiling pot of water, it jumps out right away, but if 
you put it in cold water and slowly boil it, it will boil to death and 
not even know it is boiling. That is what China is doing to the United 
States and to the world.
  There are only two things that China responds to when you confront 
them. The first is a committed and sustained escalation across the 
entire relationship between us and them, and the other is invoking the 
help of our foreign partners. That is why I strongly believe the U.S. 
should have worked with the European Union, Canada, Mexico, and Japan 
to confront China, not to start a trade war with them as well. I am 
happy to see that progress is being made on negotiations with Mexico, 
and there has been a pause in the challenges of Europe. Perhaps now is 
an opportunity to be able to do that second part of invoking the help 
of our foreign partners and confronting these cheating and stealing and 
unfair practices.

  What about a committed and sustained escalation across the entire 
relationship? I would say to you that, by and large, that has been what 
this administration has done, and it is having an impact. Just this 
morning, the New York Times reports about rare rebukes to President 
Xi's leadership inside of China because these disputes are beginning to 
have an impact on their economy.
  There is one glaring exception, and that is an ill-conceived deal to 
grant amnesty to a telephone and telecommunications Chinese company 
called ZTE. To have a committed and sustained escalation across the 
entire relationship means we can't make threats and back down, and we 
can't carve out one part of the relationship for a special 
accommodation. Sadly, that is what happened here.
  ZTE is a telecommunications company that was caught--not once but 
twice--in helping North Korea and Iran to evade U.S. sanctions. As a 
result, the Commerce Department imposed a penalty on them that 
basically was an equivalent of a business death penalty. It said that 
you can no longer buy American microchips. Without that, you can't 
function and the company was brought to its knees. I would argue that 
sanctions should have been imposed on them even if they didn't help 
evade sanctions because of the threat they pose to this country.
  If we allow these companies to embed themselves in the 
telecommunications infrastructure of the United States, it is a severe 
and significant national security threat to this country and one that 
grows every single year moving forward. Yet, inexplicably, at some 
point, for some reason, a deal was struck that allowed ZTE to survive. 
So the argument was, well, we are going to put a really big fine on 
ZTE, and we are going to put people on their board to make sure they 
are no longer violating sanctions. I will state that if this were only 
about sanctions relief, that penalty would be sufficient for me and 
should be sufficient for all. If it were Samsung, Nokia or Ericsson or 
some other company that had done this, I would say maybe it went too 
far.
  The problem is, those two measures will do nothing to contain the 
threat that ZTE poses to the United States and our national security. A 
fine--when they are backed by the Chinese Government, a multibillion-
dollar fine is nothing. You can put all the businesspeople you want on 
their board. It is not the businesspeople we should be concerned about, 
it is the technical people in these companies, the ones who can get ZTE 
routers embedded in American telecommunications, create backdoor access 
to our universities so they can steal our research, get into our 
communications systems so they can intercept our communications in 
military affairs and economic affairs. They can conduct cyber 
espionage, commercial espionage, and, potentially, denial of our 
command and control of our military one day if left unaddressed.
  Think about embedding these Trojan horses inside of our 
telecommunications systems and networks in America. Any company that 
poses that threat should not be allowed to operate, much less remain in 
business, and ZTE is one such company.
  Even if ZTE tells the Chinese Government we don't want to do this, 
they will have no choice or they will cease to exist or their leaders 
will be in jail, and somebody new will replace them who will do it. 
This is why this is so critical and why in the bill, as passed by the 
Senate, we reimposed these penalties, and it was taken out in 
conference.
  The threat posed by China and by telecommunications companies are so 
severe and so significant that it regrettably brings me to the point 
where I cannot support a bill I have always supported in my time here.
  We need to wake up to the threat that China poses to this country 
because we are running out of time to do so.
  Madam President, may I inquire how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 16 minutes remaining.
  Mr. RUBIO. I yield time to the Senator from Maryland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Florida, 
and I thank him not only for his leadership on the specific issue that 
was in the Defense authorization bill regarding ZTE but also for his 
leadership on the broader issue of protecting the United States against 
the grand theft of our technology by China and the risks that China 
poses to our national security in many areas.
  I want to review what happened with respect to ZTE, which is a 
Chinese telecommunications company.
  No. 1, for many years, they have been about the business of stealing 
technology from American companies. If you look at lawsuits and patent 
lawsuits filed over the last decade, you will see it has been grand 
larceny. We have a Chinese telecommunications company that has been 
ripping off U.S. companies in order to gain a market advantage, and 
they have been doing that in coordination and cooperation with the 
Government of China.
  They are stealing our technology. What are they using it for? Well, 
they are a big telecommunications company. We heard testimony from the 
Director of the FBI, and we heard testimony from the heads of U.S. 
intelligence agencies that they pose an espionage threat to the United 
States. All of them have said that it would be a great danger to our 
national security and the privacy of millions of Americans to let them 
anywhere near our telecommunications networks.
  First, they steal our technology. Second, they plan to use a lot of 
what they stole from us to spy on us. Then they went about violating 
U.S. sanctions on North Korea and on Iran, not just once, twice--and 
then they were caught again. Each time, they were warned, but they 
continued to flagrantly violate our sanctions.
  That is why the Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, finally got fed 
up with everything they were doing, and he imposed sanctions on ZTE, 
including what is called the denial order saying that U.S. companies 
should not be transferring technology to ZTE, which was then using that 
technology to get market advantages and to potentially spy on the 
United States. That was the right thing to do. Secretary Ross made a 
decision based on the law and based on our national security interests.
  A few days later, this is the tweet that went out from the President. 
On May 13, President Trump tweeted:

       President Xi of China, and I, are working together to give 
     massive Chinese phone company, ZTE, a way to get back into 
     business, fast. Too many jobs in China lost. Commerce 
     Department has been instructed to get it done!

  That was the tweet. With that tweet, which caught the Secretary of 
Commerce and so many others by surprise, the President reversed the key 
sanctions provision that the United States had imposed on ZTE for 
violating our sanctions and for other bad behavior. This Senate, on a 
bipartisan basis, said: Wait a minute. Secretary Ross was right. ZTE 
violated our sanctions. They pose an espionage threat, and, by the way, 
they have stolen a whole lot of U.S. technology over the years. He was 
right.
  That is why, on a bipartisan basis, we passed a provision that was 
included in the NDAA to reimpose those sanctions

[[Page S5541]]

that Secretary Ross and the Commerce Department had put on in the first 
place to protect our national security. Yet, as the weeks went by in 
the conference committee, despite the best efforts of our ranking 
member and many others, this got dropped.
  This got dropped because the White House wanted it dropped based on 
that earlier tweet. It got dropped because ZTE had spent $1.3 million 
in lobbying fees over the last couple of months. That is a lot of 
money. It was the highest amount of dollars spent in that period of 
time for any lobbying issue before this Congress, but it is a pittance 
for ZTE to pay to get its way and work with the administration to get 
the provision that had passed the Senate on a bipartisan basis dropped.
  I cannot tell you how difficult this is at this point in time. We 
have a bill before us that in all other respects is a really good 
bill--and a really good bill for our national security.
  I want to commend the chairman and ranking member and others who have 
been involved in that. But in the middle of a bill that is supposed to 
help protect our national security, we now have a big hole because, by 
taking out the amendment we had to penalize ZTE, the final result 
creates unnecessary exposure.
  It is sad to be here today. I am glad to join with my friend and 
colleague, the Senator from Florida, who has been a leader on this, and 
I think we both very much regret the fact that the Senate is in this 
position now and that the country is in the position now.
  I thank the Senator for his leadership and yield back to him the 
remainder of the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. RUBIO. Madam President, may I inquire how much time I have 
remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 10 minutes.
  Mr. RUBIO. Madam President, I will be brief in closing. I note that 
the manager of this needs to get through some things to get to our 
vote.
  There are three quick points I want to make. The first thing is that 
the Chinese have learned how to work our system and how to play us. 
They know, for example, that they can just go to American companies, go 
to Washington, go to the White House, go to Congress, and tell them how 
bad this is for you, and you will get them to change their minds or 
they just hire lobbyists, as the Senator from Maryland outlined.
  One company involved here was Qualcomm. They are the largest seller 
of chips to ZTE. They were involved in saying: Don't do this. 
Obviously, they were a customer, they didn't want to lose this 
customer. Qualcomm had a deal pending in China to purchase a Dutch 
company. I believe the understanding was if you allow ZTE to survive, 
not only do you get to keep this company as a customer, but you will 
probably help yourself get that deal in China with the Dutch company 
purchase.
  Guess what. On the day after it was announced that the conference 
committee had dropped this provision, Qualcomm announced it was 
dropping its pursuit of that deal in China because they couldn't make 
headway. The Chinese Government doesn't play. They got ZTE to stay 
alive, and they still blocked the deal.
  The second point is this issue: They are a cell phone maker, but the 
hand-held devices they make are the least problematic part of this. 
They make servers and cameras, and these are embedded in our 
telecommunications network. That is the way we communicate with each 
other on commercial secrets or, potentially, military secrets. If it is 
unclassified or sensitive information, all of it is potentially 
vulnerable to a company. They don't even need spies anymore. We brought 
them into our network and continue to do so, not to mention the role 
they play in networks around the world, which brings me to the last 
point.
  ZTE is a big danger. They are small compared to Huawei, which is a 
company even bigger than ZTE that poses an even greater systemic risk. 
If we can't even take on ZTE because they lobby and because of American 
companies coming here, how are we ever going to take on Huawei or any 
other dangers they pose to us?
  It is time we open our eyes. We are engaged in a geopolitical 
competition, not with some poor agrarian country trying to catch up but 
with a global superpower that is quickly nipping at our heels and doing 
so unfairly, with the intent of replacing us in the world as its most 
powerful country militarily, economically, geopolitically, and 
technologically.
  The history of America is short in comparison to the great empires of 
history and the great countries of history. Some 240-odd years in the 
scope of history is but a blink of an eye. History is full of examples 
of nations that became complacent and lost their standing and their way 
of life.
  I am not claiming that ZTE alone will be that, but it is a part of a 
broader problem; that is, we have yet to realize what a significant 
threat China poses to this country in every realm and every sphere. 
Until we do, we are going to continue to be in danger of surrendering 
and forfeiting our way of life and our place in the world. If we do 
that, the world will be worse off for it. We will have no one to blame 
but ourselves for failing to act.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Madam President, I concur entirely with the comments of my 
colleagues about the dangers and challenges presented by China in many 
different dimensions.
  I am not going to try to defend President Trump's decision to 
overrule his administration's penalties on ZTE for violating our 
sanctions, but the President's actions created facts on the ground. One 
of the principal facts was that part of that arrangement was a billion-
dollar payment by the Chinese Government to the United States Treasury, 
creating for the conferees the issue of trying to find a billion-dollar 
offset if we reimpose this penalty. That billion-dollar offset could 
come only from military programs of our jurisdiction, end strength of 
the military, platforms we might acquire; we found it difficult to work 
our way through that issue.
  More important, I think, is the notion that we did not simply drop 
this issue. In fact, we imposed, by legislation, a government-wide 
prohibition on the acquisition of ZTE and Huawei products going 
forward. It is now the law that we prohibit the Federal Government and 
government contractors from buying or using or providing grants and 
loans to entities buying or using telecommunications equipment and 
services provided by the Chinese companies, ZTE and Huawei. Huawei is 
not ignored here. It is legislatively a prohibition in the bill for 
future purchases.
  We understand, also, that there are some Chinese companies in the 
video surveillance equipment business that also are threats. They also 
have been banned going forward with respect to government acquisition 
or government contractor acquisitions. So we have recognized this 
issue, and we have done, I think, what we could do to ensure that our 
national security is not compromised in the future by ZTE or Huawei 
equipment.
  With that, I suggest that we move forward and pass this legislation, 
which does a remarkable job of helping the men and women of our Armed 
Forces.
  I will save my further remarks for later.
  Mr. CRAPO. Madam President, I rise to speak about title XVII of the 
NDAA, which reforms the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States, or CFIUS, and export controls.
  The last time CFIUS underwent reform was in 2007.
  Recognizing that the foreign investment and national security 
landscape has changed significantly over the past decade, Senators 
Cornyn and Feinstein led the charge by introducing the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, FIRRMA, last November.
  They and others deserve a tremendous amount of credit for their 
critical leadership on this issue.
  As the Banking Committee examined this issue, it became clear that 
the appropriate outlet for addressing the national security concerns 
highlighted by Senator Cornyn and others would involve not only CFIUS 
reform, but export control modernization as well.
  With the help of Senator Brown and all of my colleagues on the 
Banking

[[Page S5542]]

Committee, we were able to craft a bipartisan product which passed out 
of committee in May with a unanimous 25-0 vote.
  I thank Senator Brown and all of my colleagues on the committee for 
their efforts and contributions to the bill.
  Additionally, the bill would not have been possible without the 
technical expertise and leadership of the team at the Department of 
Treasury, as well as the Commerce and Defense Departments, and the 
other interagency stakeholders who provided input. I thank them as 
well.
  Throughout the entire process, we received strong support from the 
Armed Services Committee, who allowed us to include FIRRMA in this 
year's NDAA and maintained the integrity of the bill in that process. 
For that, I thank Chairman McCain, Senators Reed and Inhofe, and other 
members of the Armed Services Committee.
  Our counterparts on House Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, Energy 
and Commerce, and Armed Services Committees were equally instrumental 
in developing the final bill and seeing it across the finish line in 
the House.
  I thank Chairman Hensarling and Ranking Member Waters for their 
leadership on the concurrent House efforts and their work to improve 
the bill in conference.
  I also thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee for their work in repealing and replacing 
parts of the Export Administration Act, which was needed since the 
statute lapsed more than two decades ago.
  The final bill that appears in NDAA is the result of months of 
bipartisan, bicameral, and cross-government efforts to appropriately 
tailor and modernize CFIUS and export control authorities to ensure the 
continued protection of U.S. national security, while promoting foreign 
investments in the U.S.
  Notably, CFIUS's jurisdiction is expanded to cover four new areas of 
investments, namely certain minority, noncontrolling investments 
pertaining to critical technology, critical infrastructure, and 
exposure of sensitive personal data; changes in a foreigner's rights 
regarding a US business; the purchase, lease, or concession by or to a 
foreign person of certain real estate in close proximity to sensitive 
facilities; and any other vehicle designed to evade CFIUS.
  Additionally, the bill creates a concept of declarations, or ``light 
filings,'' which may be submitted voluntarily or are required for 
certain transactions where a foreign government has a substantial 
interest and may be required for transactions where critical technology 
is involved.
  The bill also makes critical improvements to the administrative 
workings of CFIUS including timing of reviews, structure, funding, and 
examination of resource needs.
  In addition to modifying parts of the Export Administration Act, the 
bill requires the President to establish an interagency process to 
identify emerging and foundational technologies that are not currently 
subject to export controls and authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to 
establish appropriate controls on such technology.
  To complement those new authorities, the bill strengthens export 
control enforcement authorities.
  The legislation that we are voting on today represents a very 
serious, bipartisan effort to ensure that our critical technologies are 
safeguarded, while preserving important free market principles and an 
open foreign investment environment.
  I am proud to support the final product and again thank my colleagues 
in the Senate, House, and various agencies for their hard work and 
efforts to advance this critical legislation.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, tomorrow marks 1 year since President 
Trump signed into law the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act of 2017, CAATSA, which passed with overwhelming 
bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate. He did so with 
strenuous objections to what he called an encroachment on the 
Executive's ability to negotiate, and claimed that, ``As President, I 
can make far better deals with foreign countries than Congress.''
  Unfortunately, despite his claims, the President has made no such 
deal. Russia continues its attacks on our country, with reports this 
week of another concerted effort on Facebook to influence the 2018 
midterm elections. Despite this, the President has repeatedly cast 
aside the facts of the Russian Government's interference in our 
democracy and inspires little confidence in this body that he will take 
seriously the duty to prevent it going forward.
  So I remind my colleagues today, we must take on the duty to protect 
our democracy from foreign interference, and we must continue to work 
in a bipartisan fashion to ensure appropriate legislative guard rails 
are in place on the U.S. policy toward Russia, to ensure that the 
Kremlin's aggression is punished, not excused, and to build resilience 
so that it will not happen again. The sanctions we enacted in CAATSA, 
including related to the Russian defense and intelligence sectors that 
were the source of past attacks against us, are part of this effort.
  I strongly oppose language in the conference version of the Fiscal 
Year 2019 NDAA which expands the scope of a waiver on CAATSA section 
231, which requires sanctions on significant transactions with Russian 
defense and intelligence sector entities. We targeted these sectors 
specifically because they attacked our 2016 election and imposed 
sanctions on them to dissuade anyone from doing business with them. The 
State Department argues that billions of dollars' worth of deals have 
been turned off as a result of the leverage created by section 231. I 
fear that these new waiver provisions severely undermine that leverage.
  Moreover, CAATSA includes a very important provision, the Russia 
Review Act codified in section 216, which requires the President to 
submit a report to the Congress before taking any action to terminate 
or waive sanctions or issuing a license that significantly alters the 
U.S. Russia policy. Section 216 imposes a reasonable and necessary 
limitation on President Trump's ability to precipitously lift sanctions 
or otherwise alter U.S. policy toward Russia without input from the 
Congress. This NDAA says that the Russia Review Act no longer applies 
to defense and intelligence sector sanctions. Without the Russia Review 
Act, Congress loses its voice and ability to ensure that section 231 
has teeth.
  It is our ongoing responsibility to hold the executive branch to 
account in fully implementing the laws we pass, including all of the 
mandatory provisions in CAATSA and its provision enabling us to review 
the President's decisions to lift or waive sanctions. This is all the 
more important given President Trump's inclination to act as a 
supplicant toward Vladimir Putin and his regime, even as that regime 
has and continues to attack our country. I strongly oppose the language 
in the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA that weakens CAATSA and will oppose any 
effort in the future toward that end. I will continue to work through 
other legislative vehicles to continue to go after Russia's most 
egregious offenders and continue to hold the administration accountable 
for protecting Americans and American interests.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, yesterday I had an opportunity to go 
through and thank all of the appropriate people.
  This is arguably the most significant bill that we will have this 
year--as we have had every year. This is the 58th consecutive year we 
had a Defense authorization bill. This is dedicated and named after 
Senator McCain. It is the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act. We are very proud of the input we had from his staff and from him, 
and we went through it in record time.
  I certainly thank my counterpart, Senator Reed. He and I have worked 
very closely together for many years.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. REED. Madam President, I also yield back the remainder of my time 
and urge passage of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on adoption of the conference report.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the 
Senator

[[Page S5543]]

from Arizona (Mr. Flake), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), and 
the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Paul).
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Are there any other Senators in the 
Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 87, nays 10, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.]

                                YEAS--87

     Alexander
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boozman
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cassidy
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cortez Masto
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Donnelly
     Duckworth
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Feinstein
     Fischer
     Gardner
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hassan
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Hyde-Smith
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Jones
     Kaine
     Kennedy
     King
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Risch
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Sasse
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Shaheen
     Shelby
     Smith
     Stabenow
     Sullivan
     Tester
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warner
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Young

                                NAYS--10

     Durbin
     Gillibrand
     Harris
     Lee
     Markey
     Merkley
     Rubio
     Sanders
     Warren
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Flake
     McCain
     Paul
  The conference report was agreed to
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority whip.

                          ____________________