[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 117 (Thursday, July 12, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H6129-H6154]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS
2018 AND 2019
General Leave
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Emmer). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 989 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 6237.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Weber) to preside
over the Committee of the Whole.
{time} 1337
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 6237) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018 and 2019
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Weber of Texas in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
General debate shall not exceed 1 hour, equally divided and
controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 6237, the Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most
important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the
intelligence activities of the United States Government.
Today, the Intelligence Committee is bringing its annual intelligence
authorization bill to the floor. Once again, the bill is a bipartisan
product that reflects contributions from all committee members. It was
reported out of the committee by a unanimous voice vote.
The legislation provides the intelligence community the necessary
resources and authorities to protect and defend the United States. For
example, this bill authorizes a committee initiative to streamline
defense intelligence related to the Defense Intelligence Agency. It
enhances congressional oversight of intelligence activities by
mandating intelligence community reports on threats to Federal
elections, leaks of classified information, security clearance
processing, and other vital activities. Furthermore, the bill increases
pay for employees with unique cyber skills and creates a security
center at the Department of Energy to protect our energy
infrastructure.
Mr. Chairman, the bill authorizes enhanced injury benefits to CIA
employees injured overseas due to hostile acts of terrorist activities.
Moreover, it reauthorizes the Public Interest Declassification Board,
aligns the reporting structure of the intelligence community chief
financial officer and chief intelligence officer with statutes that
govern other Federal agencies, and codifies longstanding congressional
reporting requirements regarding the intelligence community information
technology environment.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community comprises thousands of
patriotic Americans who do difficult jobs, sometimes at great personal
risk, to keep Americans safe from foreign threats. Today, these threats
take many different forms and emanate from various parts of the world.
In the Middle East, the threat from ISIS has not ceased, despite its
dramatic loss of territory. In fact, our intelligence professionals now
face the daunting task of tracking ISIS fighters fleeing Syria for
countries throughout the region and beyond.
Meanwhile, Iran is solidifying its influence, often through armed
proxy militias, in its quest to control a Shiite Crescent across a wide
swath of the Middle East.
In Asia, China poses numerous security challenges related to its
expanding military capabilities, its growing international force
projection, and its extensive extraterritorial claims. Additionally,
the Chinese regime is engaged in widespread efforts, including licit
and illicit means, to acquire critical U.S. national security
technologies and intellectual property.
Furthermore, Russia continues to pose a pressing threat to the United
States and many of our allies.
This is just a small snapshot of the threats the intelligence
community addresses every day.
Additionally, our intelligence professionals confront an array of
challenges posed by failed states, cyber warfare, nuclear
proliferation, and many other matters.
This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our
intelligence community have the funding authorities and support they
need to carry out the mission to keep the United States safe, while
providing Congress with the tools it needs to provide robust oversight
over their actions.
I would like to thank the men and women of this country who serve in
our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so many of them
in the course of the committee's oversight work.
I would also like to thank all of the committee's members for their
contributions to our oversight over the past year, and especially to
our subcommittee chairmen and ranking members for their time and their
efforts. The many hearings, briefings, and oversight visits our members
carry out during the year provide the input for this authorization and
the direction of this bill.
Finally, I would like to thank all the committee staff for their hard
work and for their daily oversight of the intelligence community.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2018.
Hon. Devin Nunes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Nunes: I am writing to you regarding H.R.
6237, the ``Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.'' The bill includes
provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee
on Homeland Security.
I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this
legislation before the House of Representatives in an
expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on
Homeland Security will forego action on this bill. However,
this is conditional based on our mutual understanding that by
foregoing consideration of H.R. 6237 at this time does not
prejudice the Committee on Homeland Security with respect to
the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional
claim over the subject matter contained in this bill or
similar legislation.
This waiver is also given with the understanding that the
Committee on Homeland Security reserves its authority to seek
conferees on any provision within its jurisdiction during any
House-Senate conference that may be convened on this or
similar legislation, and requests your support for such a
request.
I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 6237, and ask that a
copy of this letter and your response be included in the
Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the
House floor. I look forward to working with the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence as this bill moves through
the legislative process.
Sincerely,
Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
July 11, 2018.
Hon. Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
6237, the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019. As you noted, certain
provisions of the bill are related to the jurisdictional
interests of the Committee on Homeland Security. I agree that
your letter in no way diminishes or alters the jurisdiction
of the Committee on the Homeland Security with respect to the
appointment of conferees or any future jurisdictional claim
over the subject matters contained in the bill or any similar
legislation.
I appreciate your willingness to assist in expediting this
legislation for floor consideration. I will include a copy of
your letter and this response in the Congressional Record
during consideration of the legislation on the House floor.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes,
Chairman.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I join the chairman in urging support for the combined
2018 and 2019 Intelligence Authorization Act, which has been named in
honor of Matthew Young Pollard, a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer
who recently passed away, leaving behind a young son and bereaved
colleagues both in the Senate and here in the House.
For well over a year now, considerable attention has been focused on
the House Intelligence Committee and the profound disagreements that we
have had about the Russia investigation. Those differences remain, and
the American people should know that my Democratic colleagues on the
Intelligence Committee and I continue the important work of
investigating Russia's interference in the 2016 Presidential election.
Despite our disagreements over Russia with the majority, however, I
have consistently and publicly maintained that the committee must seek
to cordon off our disagreements over the Russia investigation and
continue with our other work on as bipartisan a basis as possible. We
owe the tens of thousands of men and women in the intelligence
community nothing less, not only because they put themselves at
personal risk every day, but also because their work is so important to
the country that it demands the shared responsibility and oversight of
the Congress.
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The Intelligence Committee has a history of producing bipartisan
bills even under the most difficult political circumstances.
I am pleased that our staffs have worked to reach a mutually
acceptable final text, and have been able to weed out provisions that
would have made it impossible to move forward jointly.
Much of the committee's oversight work is reflected in the bill as
classified, but we can discuss some of the 2018-2019 IAA's elements
openly, including the fact that the bill helps to better ensure that
our elections are free from interference or manipulation.
This is essential to our democracy, and the bill includes important
provisions that continue the work that we have been doing in the
committee during the course of the work on the Russia investigation,
and as a part of our normal oversight to maintain the integrity of our
election system.
The bill also provides funding to our intelligence community in order
to meet all threats from terrorism to nation-state actors. The bill
authorizes funding across a wide range of endeavors that will allow the
intelligence community and the Department of Defense to not only
respond to threats, but to preempt them.
The bill takes steps to prevent a repeat of the Russian active
measures campaign that targeted our 2016 election, by including a
minority-authored provision requiring a briefing to key congressional
leaders, including members of the intelligence community and committee,
if the United States faces a significant foreign cyber intrusion or
active measures campaign directed at a federal election.
The bill also ensures that America's technological advantage remains
a priority for our intelligence services. As such, the bill resources
and directs efforts that will promote our advantages across a range of
cutting-edge domains, from space to artificial intelligence.
It enhances transparency and allows public access to certain work of
the IC. The bill reauthorizes for 10 years the Public Interest
Declassification Board which advises the President and executive branch
agencies on the review and declassification of IC records of historical
importance.
The bill also includes minority provisions related to parental leave,
student loan repayment, and diversity and inclusiveness that are
intended to make an exceptional workforce even better.
In the end, the men and women who serve in the intelligence community
and the Defense Department are the most important factor in the success
of our national security.
There are many other provisions in the bill that will build on the
work of past years and move us further along technical and other
pathways to meet new challenges and those still on the horizon.
This bill advances our national security, reinforces the principle of
congressional oversight, and honors our values as a Nation.
Mr. Chair, I urge the support of the House, and look forward to
considering amendments that will make a good bill even better. I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Conaway), the chairman of the Agriculture Committee.
Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding and for
his dedicated work on the committee leading us through these rather
tumultuous times on a lot of fronts, but he has done a terrific job,
and I have been proud to serve on the committee with him.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in support of the 2018
Intelligence Authorization Act. Intelligence gathering is of utmost
importance in our national security and is essential in keeping
Americans safe here at home.
It is imperative that we provide to those dedicated individuals of
our intelligence community the tools, resources, and support they need
to carry out missions successfully, and Mr. Chairman, this bill does
just that.
The successful completion of increasingly difficult missions by these
consummate professionals ensures policymakers are provided the crucial
information that they need to make the most informed decisions to
counter our near-term threats and those peaking on the horizon.
This bill addresses both challenges of a constantly changing threat
environment and advances in technology to keep American cybersecurity
at the forefront of global efforts and a step ahead of our adversaries.
Mr. Chair, as you and others in the room know as well, our democratic
[[Page H6131]]
elections have become the target of foreign influence campaigns, not
only here at home, but across the Western world by adversaries seeking
to undermine and disrupt one of our most sacred democratic
institutions.
Mr. Chair, this bill allows for a path for the IC to advise and
inform those on the front lines of our elections of the perceived
threats from abroad. In addition, it also ensures that Congress stays
informed of ongoing adversarial influence campaigns again democratic
elections across the globe and here at home as well, as well as the
actions that our IC is taking to counter those threats.
Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of this year's Intelligence
Authorization Act. I encourage all of my colleagues to vote for it. I
look forward to implementing this in the next year, and the oversight,
authorities and tools that it gives Congress to be able to continue to
provide the correct oversight for our intelligence agencies across the
executive branch.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Carson). He is the ranking
member on the Emerging Threats Subcommittee and brings a wealth of
experience in homeland security to the Congress.
Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to say a few words about this very
important bill. I say important because as we face threats around the
world, threats like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism,
the annual Intelligence Authorization Act is meant to provide our
intelligence personnel with the resources and authorities they need to
keep America safe.
In some respects, Mr. Chairman, this bill accomplishes that very
goal. We refocus our resources on countering our most significant
adversary states. We better equip the intel community to counter
foreign interference in our elections, which is very critical going
into 2018, all the way to 2020.
We give new authorities related to pervasive challenges, including
threats to our supply chain, recruitment and development of minority
talent, and strengthening of the cyber and technical workforce.
I support these very important developments. Unfortunately, Mr.
Chairman, the bill also supports or indicates significant problematic
changes to many classified authorities. I am particularly concerned
about what this means for the way we conduct counterterrorism
operations.
Mr. Chairman, the Trump administration has changed counterterrorism
policies in a way that does not make America safer. By expanding the
areas where the U.S. Government may be operating and broadening
authorities, Mr. Chairman, we are planting the seeds of anger and hate
which will fester and grow, increasing the threat of an attack in the
future.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in protecting the United States and
her allies. But, if two decades of the war against terrorism have
taught us anything, it is that we can't fight our way out of this. Yes,
we need to target known terrorist leaders, Mr. Chairman, but we also
need to actively minimize actions that spur new hatred and drive people
to terrorism.
After years of striving for a more comprehensive, targeted, and
productive counterterrorism approach, this bill sends us back to the
days of broad unrestrained authorities. With so much on the line, Mr.
Chairman, we should be using this bill to send a message to this
administration that America must maintain her values.
Success at any cost is not success at all, but a foolhardy approach
to leverage power. We must keep America safe, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Alabama (Ms. Sewell). She is the ranking member on the Department of
Defense Intelligence and Overhead Architecture Subcommittee and does a
fabulous job for our committee.
Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. This
bill recognizes the critical work that every member of the intelligence
community performs to protect our Nation: first, by enhancing resources
and authorities for our highest priority intelligence initiatives, and
secondly, by enforcing and reinforcing the principles of good
governance, transparency, and accountability to the American people.
Mr. Chairman, I am a strong advocate for transparency, which is a
challenge for the intelligence community because of the need to protect
sensitive sources and equities, but a challenge that can be met. One
groundbreaking example is the unclassified January 2017 intelligence
community assessment that notified Americans about the Russian attack
on our democracy in the 2016 election.
This bill directs the intelligence community to continue public
awareness reporting related to election security because the threat
from Russia is still ongoing.
As a ranking member on the HPSCI Subcommittee on Department of
Defense Intelligence and Overhead Architecture for the last 3 years,
one of my priorities is to ensure that the United States achieves and
maintains a leadership position in next-generation technologies,
especially in space.
Space is an emerging battleground, so it is imperative for our
national security that America maintains a strategic advantage in space
as well as we do on the ground and at sea. Over the last year, the
subcommittee has continued our dialogue with the intelligence community
about its accomplishments, but also the challenges it faces and the
resources it needs to meet these challenges.
I am pleased to report that this bill includes provisions that
strengthen our Nation's access and resilience in space by investing in
next-generation technologies and assets.
Mr. Chairman, I am also a strong believer that the success of our
Nation's intelligence operation hinges on our most important asset: our
people. As our intelligence missions and objectives continue to evolve,
we will undoubtedly require a more diverse workforce in the
intelligence community to meet our needs. We must work together to
build and promote an intelligence community that is truly
representative of the rich diversity and inclusive society that makes
our Nation great.
In order to more effectively address these emerging and ongoing
threats, we need an agile workforce with a wide range of backgrounds,
experiences, skill sets, and talents. For that reason, Congress has
invested in American universities and colleges to provide all students
with the skills that they need to serve in our intelligence community.
As smart investors, we want to see that the investment is
accomplishing the objectives and encouraging qualified graduates to
apply to join the intelligence community. This bill directs the
Director of National Intelligence to take a more active role in
ensuring that one program, in particular, the Intelligence Community
Centers for Academic Excellence, achieves that objective of diversity.
I also strongly support the Hastings amendment that directs the
intelligence community to intensify recruitment outreach at every
corner of our Nation. Encouraging geographical diversity in the
intelligence community will naturally also enhance racial, gender,
cultural, and economic diversity.
I want to see that every interested student, whether in a big city or
a small town, is aware of the career opportunities in the intelligence
community. It is a path that is most important.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from Alabama.
Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, I believe for these
reasons and others that my colleagues should support this bill.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Heck), someone who we have come to
rely on in our committee in a great many areas, but, in particular, the
threat posed by foreign actors investing in American technologies, with
an eye toward either appropriating our intellectual property, or making
use of those
[[Page H6132]]
technologies for the purpose of spying on Americans.
Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member. I am here to
support the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.
Mr. Chair, I was just placed on the Intel Committee a year ago
January, and I have learned an awful lot, most notably, how incredibly
difficult it really is to do the work of an intelligence officer. And I
want to, frankly, take this opportunity to thank all of the members of
the IC for their dedication and service.
For as difficult a job as it is, it is even more difficult, if not
impossible, to do it without a security clearance. In the first
quarter--you are hearing this number correctly--of this year, the
average processing time for a top security clearance was 534 days. That
backlog creates difficulties in hiring in the intelligence and defense
agencies. And, frankly, it is creating a legacy problem for our future.
And you are hearing this number correctly, too. The backlog of people
waiting for those clearances is now over 700,000, and that is what has
led the Government Accountability Office to declare this ``a high risk
issue,'' and that means that it is one of the areas that the GAO
believes is most in need of reform.
The country cannot wait 2 years to recruit top talent for our IC.
Applicants for clearance, of course, should be carefully scrutinized,
and the United States should take care that only responsible and
trustworthy parties gain access to our Nation's classified information.
{time} 1400
We absolutely should guard it as a national treasure. But we need to
give the IC the people it needs to collect, process, analyze, and
distribute information, pure and simple. So the bill before us today
does, in fact, include language to address the issue of security
clearances.
As we progress forward, we must do so methodically, with feedback
from the most affected. We have a long process ahead of us, but if we
don't take steps now, frankly, pretty soon it is going to be too late.
We must address the security clearance dilemma, and we must pass this
bill to begin that process.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), who is the former ranking member of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a great stalwart for the
men and women who work within the IC.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member
for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bipartisan bill. First
and foremost, intelligence is about people. We cannot collect, analyze,
and utilize intelligence effectively unless we can recruit, hire, and
retain the best people possible. Therefore, I want to thank Chairman
Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff, and their staffs, for working with me
to include provisions in this bill that improve parental leave policies
of the intelligence community.
These provisions will ensure that these benefits are, to the fullest
extent possible, in line with the private sector. Doing so will help
the IC develop and retain the workforce required to keep America safe
against all our foes, both new and old.
This legislation also takes important steps to ensure the IC provides
critical updates to Congress in the event the United States faces a
foreign cyber attack or other active measures that threaten the heart
of our democracy: our elections. There is no doubt that Russia will
continue to exert a malign influence on the heart and soul of our
democracy.
This cannot be tolerated, and I strongly support the efforts of the
chairman and ranking member to ensure Congress will be informed of the
most critical threats to our democracy.
I thank the chairman and ranking member, and the entire intelligence
community and staff, for their dedicated oversight of the intelligence
community and their commitment to enhancing national security.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I will briefly say that the former ranking
member, Mr. Ruppersberger, who has many intelligence professionals in
his district, is highly regarded in our committee, and I respect and am
thankful for his support of the bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire of the gentleman whether he
has any further speakers?
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I will take this opportunity to close, and
I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, 1 month ago, the CIA held its annual memorial ceremony
to honor its fallen. This year, the agency added four stars to the
memorial wall, signifying four officers killed in the line of duty but
who cannot be publicly named even in death. That, Mr. Chairman, is the
sacrifice that we ask of our intelligence professionals, and it is one
that they are prepared to make.
In exchange for that fidelity, it is our job to provide the
intelligence community with the tools and authorities that it needs to
keep us safe, all while exercising our constitutional authority of
oversight and direction. This bill meets that responsibility, and I
urge its passage by the House.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues on
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and our incredible
staff. In particular, I thank Shannon Stuart, Carly Blake, Alan Souza,
Mark Stewart, Wells Bennett, Scott Glabe, Rheanne Wirkkala, Amanda
Rogers Thorpe, Thomas Eager, Kris Breaux, Christine Bocchino, Maher
Bitar, Shannon Green, Linda Cohen, Patrick Boland, and Tim Bergreen.
These staff members labor three floors below the Capitol in a space
we affectionately call--and sometimes unaffectionately call--the
bunker. They do so for long hours and without daylight. We are very
grateful to them and for their service.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I thank the staffs on both the majority and minority sides. They do
put in a lot of effort. It is one of the smallest staffs in the Capitol
of any committee, so we are thankful that we were able to get this bill
done in a bipartisan manner. We look for its passage on the floor this
afternoon.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on House consideration of
H.R. 6237, the ``Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018 and 2019.''
I thank Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member Schiff for their work to bring
this bill before the full House of consideration.
Our nation's national security professionals require our support in
words as well as deeds in the form of legislation like the
authorization measure we are debating and sufficient funding to carry
out the work of protecting our great nation from our enemies.
I offered several Jackson Lee Amendments for consideration under this
bill.
I thank the Rules Committee for making in order Jackson Lee Amendment
No. 3, designated as No. 33 on the Rules Committee roster for
consideration for this bill.
This Jackson Lee Amendment, amends the Sense of Congress already in
the bill on the importance of re-review of security clearances held by
individuals by adding consideration of whether the security clearance
holder's association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or
unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising
their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any state, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability,
or other impermissible factors.
In addition to this amendment, I offered three other Jackson Lee
Amendments to H.R. 6237:
The first Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 32 on the Rules
Committee roster, and would have amended the Sense of Congress already
in the bill that addresses the importance of conducting background
checks for retention of security clearances or the issuance of new
clearances to also consider an applicant's membership in a hate group
and their participation in activities espoused by hate groups that
involve violence or incitement of violence which disrupts civic life.
The second Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 34, on the
Rules Committee rosters, and would have amended the Sense of Congress
already in the bill on the
[[Page H6133]]
importance of review of a security clearance by adding that a security
clearance should not be held by an individual who actively engages in
violent acts in the United States or its territories that target
persons based upon their race, religion, ethnicity, national origin,
sexual orientation, or gender identity for the purpose of inflicting
physical harm or emotional distress with the objective of normalizing
anti-social behavior towards vulnerable groups.
The third Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 38 on the Rules
Committee rosters, and would have required that the Director of
National Intelligence conduct an assessment and report to Congress on
the reliance of intelligence activities on civilian contractors to
support Government activities, including intelligence analysis.
Each of these Jackson Lee Amendments sought to strengthen and improve
the process of security clearance awards and oversight of contractors
engaged in national security work.
The rights and dignity of all Americans must be held dear and
protected from assaults that challenge the very freedom we value most.
It is our diversity and our capacity for tolerance of others who are
different that is the essence of American exceptionalism.
As a nation we have come through many struggles and challenges to
reach a point where we accept the diversity of our nation as a strength
and not a weakness.
A period in our history that challenges the very foundation of our
nation was framed by a speech given by Abraham Lincoln on the occasion
of his nomination to become the Senator from the State of Illinois.
He said: ``A house divided against itself, cannot stand. I believe
this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free. I
do not expect the Union to be dissolved--I do not expect the house to
fall--but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all
one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest
the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest
in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its
advocates will push it forward, till it shall become lawful in all the
States, old as well as new--North as well as South.''
He was speaking of the pernicious national shame of slavery that led
ultimately to the Civil War that cost more than 600,00 lives over the
very question of human rights and human dignity for all persons.
Although the question of equality and justice for all has been asked
and answered during pivotal moments in our nation's history today we
are facing another challenge to our core beliefs.
I offered these Jackson Lee Amendments to establish that this
Congress is not wavering in its commitment to protect the lives,
liberties or freedom of Americans from those who seek to do them harm.
Specifically, four of the Jackson Lee Amendments were prompted by the
actions of Mr. Miselis who has a security clearance and worked for
Northrup Grumman, a major defense contractor, at the time he engaged in
physical violence against persons protesting racism and white supremacy
in Charlottesville, Virginia.
In May 2018, Northrup Grumman was informed of Mr. Miselis' membership
in RAM and the violent assaults he initiated while he was in
Charlottesville participating in activities in support of white
supremacy, which were captured on video and in photos.
Mr. Miselis worked for a government contractor and held a security
clearance authorizing him to work on projects that were of vital
interest to our nation and its defense.
Northrup Grumman did not dismiss him until the story broke earlier
this month with media reports on the violence Mr. Miselis engaged in at
the white supremacists' rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia.
The violence of RAM members has been a hallmark of the group and its
members.
The Anti-Defamation League describes RAM as a white supremacist group
whose members believe they are fighting against a ``modern world''
corrupted by the ``destructive cultural influences'' of liberals, Jews,
Muslims and non-white immigrants.
They refer to themselves as the ``premier MMA (mixed martial arts)
club of the Alt-Right.''
RAM is characterized as operating like a street-fighting club.
Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological
foes, and have been involved in violent clashes during political
rallies and demonstrations.
RAM members consider themselves to be part of the ``Alt Right.''
RAM's membership has deep roots in California's racist skinhead
movement, and includes individuals who have faced serious criminal
charges, including assault, robbery and weapon offenses.
RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazis and racist
skinheads who were formerly known as the DIY Division, but rebranded
themselves as the Rise Above Movement in the spring of 2017.
The FBI has opened an informal investigation into this group because
of the violence associated with its members.
The United States is a nation of laws, which gives us the freedom to
agree and most importantly disagree with not only each other but with
our government.
But the limitations to the right to disagree can be best described by
the ancient wisdom: ``Your right to swing your arms ends just where the
other person's nose begins.''
There is a limit to the expression of free speech and the freedom to
assemble and that limit is violence.
I know that the work of our intelligence community is difficult and
often goes without notice by the American public.
I firmly believe that the actions of those who hold security
clearances as they go about their lives should reflect the higher goals
and values of nation.
To engage in violent acts against persons engaged in constitutionally
protected activity on account of race, religion, color, gender, sexual
orientation, language of original, immigration status, or creed is an
affront to the framers of the Constitution for this great nation.
The actions of Mr. Miselis put at risk not only his career, but also
the reputation of people who hold national security clearances.
The awarding of security clearances to contractors must be better
managed and the consequences for involvement in activities that would
be cause for dismissal from the armed services or any federal agency
should not go unnoticed.
I am committed to the task of building the capacity and resources of
the intelligence community to ensure that our nation's national
security and national defense are all that they need to be.
I ask that my colleagues support the Jackson Lee Amendment made in
order for consideration of H.R. 6237, and support the underlying bill.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Poe of Texas). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommend by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 115-80. That
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H.R. 6237
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018 and 2019''.
(b) Organization.--This Act is organized into two divisions
as follows:
(1) Division a.--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018.
(2) Division b.--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019.
DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
division is as follows:
Sec. 101. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 102. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 1101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 1102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 1103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 1104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 1201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 1202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 1301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 1302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 1401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 1402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing
environment.
Sec. 1403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
[[Page H6134]]
TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 1501. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service
officers.
Sec. 1502. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 1503. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to
Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 1504. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 1505. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 1506. Report on cyber exchange program.
Sec. 1507. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 1508. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 1509. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 1510. Reports on intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 1511. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of
classified information.
Sec. 1512. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.
In this division, the terms ``congressional intelligence
committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have the meaning
given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 1101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--Funds are hereby authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
(b) Certain Specific Authorization.--Funds appropriated by
the Department of Defense Missile Defeat and Defense
Enhancements Appropriations Act, 2018 (division B of Public
Law 115-96) for intelligence or intelligence-related
activities are specifically authorized by the Congress for
purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3094), as specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations pursuant to section 1102, and are subject to
such section 504.
SEC. 1102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 1101 and, subject to section
1103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30,
2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the
elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section
1101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 1103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 1102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed--
(1) 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel
authorized under such schedule for such element; or
(2) 10 percent of the number of civilian personnel
authorized under such schedule for such element for the
purposes of converting the performance of any function by
contractors to performance by civilian personnel.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 1102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--Not
later than 15 days prior to the exercise of an authority
described in subsection (a), the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees--
(1) a written notice of the exercise of such authority; and
(2) in the case of an exercise of such authority subject to
the limitation in subsection (a)(2), a written justification
for the contractor conversion that includes a comparison of
whole-of-Government costs.
SEC. 1104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2018 the sum of $546,900,000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 797 positions as of
September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional
amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 1102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 1102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 1201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000.
SEC. 1202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Computation of Annuities.--
(1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate
of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in
that position.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month''
and inserting ``2-year'';
(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and
inserting ``two years'';
(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each
place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and
(l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively;
and
(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor
Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the
rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section
222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by
the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an
annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and
designate in writing an individual having an insurable
interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the
system after the participant's death, except that any such
election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to
the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the
participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor
annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be
equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity
payable to the participant making such election shall be
reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection
(a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the
designated individual is younger than the participant. The
total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40
percent.
``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity
payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day
after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last
day of the month before the designated individual dies.
``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of
designated individual.--An
[[Page H6135]]
annuity which is reduced under this subsection shall,
effective the first day of the month following the death of
the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the
annuity had not been so reduced.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et
seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by
striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by
striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
(B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection
(a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2),
221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j),
221(m),''.
(b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of
section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by
striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
(c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section
252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
(50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1,
1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March
31, 1991''.
(d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall
have the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time
basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United
States Code.''.
(e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as
if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to
computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 1301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall
not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 1302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SEC. 1401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER
EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may
designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their
immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence
may designate;''.
SEC. 1402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION-
SHARING ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Information-sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6
U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by striking ``The individual
designated as the program manager shall serve as program
manager until removed from service or replaced by the
President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and
inserting ``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, each
individual designated as the program manager shall be
appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 1403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.''.
TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 1501. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN
SERVICE OFFICERS.
(a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of
section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in
accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503,
the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may
serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive
years.''.
(b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is
amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the
assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all
members of the Service who receive foreign language training
in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish,
Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in
accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive
tours in positions in which the acquired language is both
relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1),
at least one of the three successive tours referred to in
such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship
or in the interest of national security.
``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State
shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on
Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end
of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve
months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph
(3) was invoked.''.
SEC. 1502. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE
CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND
REFERENDA.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing an analytical assessment of
the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any,
conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the
enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant
current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any.
Such assessment shall include--
(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence
campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by
which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or
likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific
goal of each such campaign;
(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the
elections or referenda;
(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of
assisting the government of such foreign state in defending
against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns;
and
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and
responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall
contain an unclassified summary.
(c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section,
the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort,
covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the
Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or
similar process in a country other than the Russian
Federation or the United States.
SEC. 1503. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY
THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.
(a) Reports Required.--
(1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each
Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an
internet website an advisory report on foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election
campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall
include, consistent with the protection of sources and
methods, each of the following:
(A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal
offices.
(B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for
Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such
threats.
(C) An identification of any publicly available resources,
including United States Government resources, for countering
such threats.
(2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection
shall be made available as follows:
(A) In the case of a report regarding a special election
held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives during 2019, not later than the date that is
60 days before the date of such special election.
(B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a
Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the
date that is 1 year before the date of the election.
(3) Information to be included.--A report under this
subsection shall reflect the most current information
available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
(b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.--
If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for
Federal office is subject to a
[[Page H6136]]
heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity
threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with
the protection of sources and methods, may make available
additional information to the appropriate representatives of
such campaign.
SEC. 1504. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive
branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and
adjudicating security clearances persists, both within
elements of the intelligence community and in other
departments of the Federal Government, with some processing
times exceeding a year or even more;
(2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the
ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and
retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the
missions of such elements;
(3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some
such individuals from seeking employment with the
intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced
with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of
employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance
process and pursue different opportunities;
(4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security
clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
(5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of
the intelligence community to hire and retain highly
qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent
possible and consistent with national security, permitting
new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and
to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication
of their security clearances, work that either does not
require a security clearance or requires only a low-level
interim clearance.
(b) In General.--Section 506H of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (C);
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than
March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives a report on the security clearances
processed by each element of the intelligence community
during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall
separately identify security clearances processed for Federal
employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such
element.
``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall
include each of the following for each element of the
intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the
report:
``(A) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic
reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
``(C) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations for new applicants that were
adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the
prospective applicant, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and
granted access to classified information; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were adjudicated with notice
of a determination provided to the existing employee,
including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably
and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security
clearance.
``(E) The total number of pending security clearance
background investigations, including initial applicant
investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not
adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained
pending as follows:
``(i) For 180 days or less.
``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
``(v) For 24 months or longer.
``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the year preceding the year for
which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12
months to complete--
``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred
during the period covered by the report; and
``(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph
requirement.
``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations,
including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that
resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that resulted in incomplete information.
``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that did not result in enough information to make a decision
on potentially adverse information.
``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.''; and
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections
(a)(1) and (b)''.
SEC. 1505. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report containing
an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall
be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the
Department of the Treasury.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include each of the following:
(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period
preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat
finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at
the behest of--
(A) officials of the Government of Russia;
(B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law
imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
(C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other
provision of law; or
(D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in
threat finance activities relating to Russia, including
common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes
of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described
in paragraph (1) and associated entities.
(3) An assessment of any connections between Russian
individuals involved in money laundering and the Government
of Russia.
(4) A summary of engagement and coordination with
international partners on threat finance relating to Russia,
especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement
and coordination.
(5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(6) An identification of--
(A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and
associated entities into the United States;
(B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and
financial system, including specific sectors, which have been
or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat
finance activities; and
(C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money
laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the
threat to the United States financial system and United
States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized
crime.
(7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(a) may be submitted in classified form.
(d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term
``threat finance'' means--
(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence
campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation,
terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move,
raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of
threat actors;
(3) sanctions evasion; and
(4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.
SEC. 1506. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary
exchange program between elements of the intelligence
community and private technology companies under which--
(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community
with demonstrated expertise and work experience in
cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be
temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has
elected to receive the detailee; and
(2) an employee of a private technology company with
demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity
or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed
to an element of the intelligence community that has elected
to receive the detailee.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of the feasibility of establishing the
exchange program described in such subsection.
(2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the
exchange program.
(3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence
community that would result from the exchange program.
SEC. 1507. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER
MATTERS.
(a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the
inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the
authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors
general.
(b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review
required under subsection (a) is to
[[Page H6137]]
identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues,
which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of
intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate
inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence
committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and
resolution of such matters.
(c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the
Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure
that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an
independent and objective fashion.
(d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a written report containing the
results of the review required under subsection (a), along
with recommendations to improve the timely and effective
reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to
inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence
committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and
resolution of such matters.
SEC. 1508. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community determined appropriate by the
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing
analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the
Federal Government of national security risks associated with
potential foreign investments into the United States.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) a description of the current process for the provision
of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
(2) an identification of the most significant benefits and
drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the
Director, including the sufficiency of resources and
personnel to prepare such materials; and
(3) recommendations to improve such process.
SEC. 1509. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
``(a) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, each covered official shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on
investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of
classified information.
``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period,
the following:
``(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
``(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered
official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations
identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the
Attorney General for criminal investigation.
``(b) Department of Justice Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security
of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee
on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the
status of each referral made to the Department of Justice
from any element of the intelligence community regarding an
unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during
the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not
yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was
made.
``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a
minimum, the following:
``(A) The date the referral was received.
``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged
unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was
substantiated by the Department of Justice.
``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of
classification of the information that was revealed in the
unauthorized disclosure.
``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal
investigation related to the referral is active.
``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges
have been filed related to the referral.
``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of
Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized
disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
``(c) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have
a classified annex.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official'
means--
``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility
for an element of the intelligence community.
``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any
inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--
The term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information'
means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information
to any recipient.
``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified
information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a journalist or media
organization.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the
following new item:
``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.''.
SEC. 1510. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
(a) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a written report describing--
(A) with respect to each element of the intelligence
community--
(i) the title of the official or officials responsible for
determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in the
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any
successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted for
review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(ii) the process used by such element to make such
determination; and
(B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a
review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process.
(2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days
after any significant change is made to the process and
criteria used by any element of the intelligence community
for determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review
under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report describing such change.
(3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(b) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each
calendar year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
classified report containing, with respect to the previous
year--
(A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review
under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
(B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph
(A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the
vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(C) the aggregate number, by category, of the
vulnerabilities excluded from review under the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in paragraph
5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document.
(2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that
contains--
(A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to
vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process; and
(B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to
vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process known to have been patched.
(3) Nonduplication.--The Director of National Intelligence
may forgo submission of an annual report required under this
subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the
congressional intelligence committees in writing that, with
respect to the same calendar year, an annual report required
by paragraph 4.3 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and
Process document already has been submitted to Congress, and
such annual report contains the information that would
otherwise be required to be included in an annual report
under this subsection.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document'' means the executive branch document entitled
``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process'' dated
November 15, 2017.
(2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency
review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process document or any successor
document.
(3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a
weakness in an information system or its components (for
example, system security procedures, hardware design, and
internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.
SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires
elements of the intelligence community to keep the
congressional intelligence
[[Page H6138]]
committees ``fully and currently informed'' about all
``intelligence activities'' of the United States, and to
``furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any
information or material concerning intelligence activities *
* * which is requested by either of the congressional
intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized
responsibilities.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community
authorities, obligate an element of the intelligence
community to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees written notification, by not later than 7 days
after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive
branch has disclosed covered classified information to an
official of an adversary foreign government using methods
other than established intelligence channels; and
(2) each such notification should include--
(A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified
information covered by the notification;
(B) a description of such classified information;
(C) identification of the individual who made such
disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was
made; and
(D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary
foreign government'' means the government of any of the
following foreign countries:
(A) North Korea.
(B) Iran.
(C) China.
(D) Russia.
(E) Cuba.
(2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered
classified information'' means classified information that
was--
(A) collected by an element of the intelligence community;
or
(B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a
foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
(3) Established intelligence channels.--The term
``established intelligence channels'' means methods to
exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence
relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director
of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence
community.
(4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term
``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or
employee of the executive branch, including individuals--
(A) occupying a position specified in article II of the
Constitution;
(B) appointed to a position by an individual described in
subparagraph (A); or
(C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive
service (or similar service for senior executives of
particular departments or agencies).
SEC. 1512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY.
(a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--
(1) Clarification of functions of the administrator for
nuclear security.--Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C.
2402(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as
paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.
(2) Counterintelligence programs.--Section 3233(b) of the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C.
2423(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting
``Department''; and
(B) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the Office
of''.
(b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended
by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
(c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of
section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and
Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (F);
(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as
subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
(4) in subparagraph (H), as so redesignated, by realigning
the margin of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left.
DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
division is as follows:
Sec. 201. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and
addition of special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 2304. Repeal of Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 2305. Permanent enhanced procurement authority to manage supply
chain risks.
Sec. 2306. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 2307. Development of secure cellular voice solution for
intelligence community.
Sec. 2308. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 2309. Submission of intelligence community policies.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 2401. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2402. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 2411. CIA subsistence for personnel assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation
payments and other payments for CIA personnel.
Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and budget reporting requirement.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 2431. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations.
Sec. 2432. Framework for roles, missions, and functions of Defense
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2433. Consultation by Secretary of Defense with Director of
National Intelligence for certain functions.
Sec. 2434. Construction of National Security Agency East Campus
Building 3.
Sec. 2435. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance
Office.
TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 2501. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 2502. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 2503. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measures campaigns directed at elections for
Federal offices.
Sec. 2504. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related
programs.
Sec. 2505. Comptroller General of the United States report on senior
executives of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 2506. Briefings on counterintelligence activities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 2507. Briefing on FBI offering permanent residence to sources and
cooperators.
Sec. 2508. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947.
SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.
In this division, the terms ``congressional intelligence
committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have the meaning
given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
[[Page H6139]]
SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to
be appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the
intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs
(1) through (16) of section 2101, are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany
this division.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule,
within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2019 the sum of $514,524,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 2102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2020.
(b) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to
be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2019 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 2102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2019 the sum of $514,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall
not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS
POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY
FOR CYBER POSITIONS.
Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3049a) is amended--
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring
Expertise in Science, Technology, Engineering, or
Mathematics.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5,
United States Code, the head of each element of the
intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of
positions in such element that require expertise in science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics--
``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of
the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection
(b) or (c), as applicable.
``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting
from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1)
shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those
specified in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States
Code.'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as
subsections (c) through (g), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the
Director of the National Security Agency may establish a
special rate of pay--
``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level
II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
that the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions
that execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the
Vice President of the United States under section 104 of
title 3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the
Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced
skills and competencies and that perform critical functions
that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.
``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay
limitation that parallels the limitation established in
section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that--
``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other
similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is
authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other
applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.))
shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate
established for the Vice President of the United States under
section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of
individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph
(1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of
pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may
not be used as comparative references for the purpose of
fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of
qualified positions under section 1599f of title 10, United
States Code, or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).'';
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in
subsection (b), a minimum'';
(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017'' and inserting ``Not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)'' after
``subsection (a)''.
SEC. 2304. REPEAL OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.
(a) Repeal.--Section 101A of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022) is hereby repealed.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item
relating to section 101A.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of such
Act (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by striking ``and, after
obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community
Council''.
SEC. 2305. PERMANENT ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE
SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS.
Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-87; 125 Stat. 1875; 50
U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking subsection (g).
SEC. 2306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Roles and Responsibilities.--
(1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating
the performance by elements of the intelligence community of
IC ITE, including each of the following:
(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable IC ITE rules
and regulations.
(B) Ensuring IC ITE measurable performance goals exist.
(C) Documenting IC ITE standards and practices.
(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence
community related to any disagreements arising out of the
implementation of IC ITE.
(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the
intelligence community and carrying out such other
responsibilities as are necessary for the effective
implementation of IC ITE.
(2) Key service providers.--Key service providers shall be
responsible for--
(A) providing key services, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) providing the Director with information requested and
required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director
under paragraph (1).
(3) Use of key services.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
each element of the intelligence community shall use key
services when such services are available.
(B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence may
provide for a written exception to the requirement under
subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a
compelling financial or mission need for such exception.
(b) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or
more accountable IC ITE executives to be responsible for--
(1) IC ITE management, financial control, and integration;
(2) ensuring the performance of each key service, including
establishing measurable service requirements and schedules;
(3) ensuring independent testing of each IC ITE core
service, including testing by the intended users, to evaluate
performance against measurable service requirements and to
ensure the capability meets user requirements; and
(4) coordinate IC ITE transition or restructuring efforts,
including phase out of legacy systems.
(c) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the
[[Page H6140]]
Director of National Intelligence shall develop and maintain
a security plan for IC ITE.
(d) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the
second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that shall
include each of the following:
(1) A description of the minimum required and desired key
service requirements, including--
(A) key performance parameters; and
(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
(2) IC ITE implementation milestones, including each of the
following:
(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of key service
capabilities during each of the following phases:
(i) Concept refinement and technology maturity
demonstration.
(ii) Development, integration, and demonstration,
(iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.
(iv) System retirement.
(B) Dependencies of such key service capabilities.
(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to
incorporate key service capabilities.
(D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued
capabilities to be phased out.
(3) Such other matters as the Director determines
appropriate.
(e) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second
and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a business plan that includes each of
the following:
(1) A uniform approach to identify IC ITE key service
funding requests within the proposed budget, including
multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required
by subsection (d).
(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy
information technology or alternative capabilities where IC
ITE services will also be available.
(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify transition and
restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring IC ITE
services, as well as IC ITE services that have changed
designations among core service, service of common concern,
and agency unique service.
(4) A fair and equitable rate structure for use of IC ITE.
(f) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the
congressional intelligence committees quarterly updates
regarding ongoing implementation of IC ITE as compared to the
requirements in the most recently submitted security plan
required by subsection (c), long-term roadmap required by
subsection (d), and business plan required by subsection (e).
(g) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the
congressional intelligence committees regarding any policy
changes related to or affecting IC ITE, new initiatives or
strategies related to or impacting IC ITE, and changes or
deficiencies in the execution of the security plan required
by subsection (c), long-term roadmap required by subsection
(d), and business plan required by subsection (e).
(h) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``agency unique service'' means a capability
that is unique to and used only within one element of the
intelligence community.
(2) The term ``core service'' means a capability that is
available to multiple elements of the intelligence community
and required for consistent operation of IC ITE.
(3) The term ``intelligence community information
technology environment'' or ``IC ITE'' means all of the
information technology services across the intelligence
community, including the data sharing and protection
environment across multiple classification domains.
(4) The term ``key service'' is a core service or service
of common concern, but is not an agency unique service.
(5) The term ``key service provider'' is the entity
responsible and accountable for implementing a key service
within the IC ITE.
(6) The term ``service of common concern'' means a
capability available across IC ITE that is of interest to two
or more elements of the intelligence community.
(i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after
September 30, 2024.
SEC. 2307. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE CELLULAR VOICE SOLUTION FOR
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall certify and approve the operation of a National
Intelligence Program enterprise-wide secure voice cellular
solution that leverages commercially available technology and
operates on existing commercial cellular networks.
(b) Policy.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
establish an intelligence community policy for the cellular
voice solution required by subsection (a) that addresses each
of the following:
(1) Determinations regarding eligibility to use a device
covered by such cellular voice solution.
(2) The appropriate classification levels associated with
the use of secure cellular phones.
(3) Measures that should be taken prior to initiating or
receiving a secure cellular call.
(4) Appropriate methods for storage of secure devices when
not in the physical possession of an authorized user.
(5) Such other matters as the Director determines
appropriate.
(c) Costs.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
ensure that annual operating costs of the secure cellular
solution requirement in subsection (a), excluding initial
development and deployment, are born on a cost-reimbursable
basis by each relevant element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 2308. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.
(a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a policy for minimum insider
threat standards.
(b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the
intelligence community shall implement the policy established
under subsection (a).
SEC. 2309. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.
(a) Submission of Policies.--
(1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees using the electronic repository all non-publicly
available policies, directives, and guidance issued by the
Director of National Intelligence for the intelligence
community that are in effect as of the date of the
submission.
(2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the
date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues,
modifies, or rescinds a policy, directive, or guidance of the
intelligence community, the Director shall--
(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of
such addition, modification, or removal; and
(B) update the electronic repository with respect to such
addition, modification, or removal.
(b) Electronic Repository Defined.--In this section, the
term ``electronic repository'' means the electronic
distribution mechanism, in use as of the date of the
enactment of this Act, or any successor electronic
distribution mechanism, by which the Director of National
Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence
committees information.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 2401. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: ``The Chief Financial Officer shall report
directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 2402. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: ``The Chief Information Officer shall report
directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 2411. CIA SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE
LOCATIONS.
Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,''
and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):
``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during
any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence
to any personnel assigned to an overseas location designated
by the Agency as an austere location.''.
SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR
CIA PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 19 the following new section:
``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY
REASON OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
``(a) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
``(1) Increase.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may increase the amount of monthly compensation paid
to a covered employee under section 8105 of title 5, United
States Code. Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may
determine the amount of each such increase by taking into
account--
``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee
became injured; and
``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5,
United States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation
increased under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay
of the maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
``(b) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director
may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a
covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered
dependent, or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered
individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, that are
not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States
Code, or other provision of Federal law.
``(c) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to
this section
[[Page H6141]]
shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of title 5,
United States Code.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent'
means a family member of a covered employee who, on or after
September 11, 2001--
``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty
station in a foreign country; and
``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means
an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by
reason of a qualifying injury.
``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual'
means an individual who--
``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency
from other agencies of the United States Government or from
the Armed Forces; or
``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency,
as determined by the Director; and
``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured
by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury'
means the following:
``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury
incurred--
``(i) during war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist
activities occurring during a period in which the covered
dependent is accompanying the covered employee to an assigned
duty station in a foreign country; and
``(ii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of
the covered dependent.
``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered
individual, an injury incurred--
``(i) during war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist
activities occurring during a period of assignment to a duty
station in a foreign country; and
``(ii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of
the covered employee or the covered individual.''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable
implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees
such regulations.
(c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply
with respect to--
(1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such
section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code,
beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section
19A occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE
JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Policemen''
and inserting ``Police Officers''; and
(2) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and
inserting ``500 yards;''; and
(B) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and
inserting ``500 yards.''.
SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT
FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--
Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3036) is amended by striking subsection (g).
(b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
(Public Law 108-487) is amended by striking subsection (c).
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as
follows:
``office of intelligence and counterintelligence
``Sec. 215.
``(a) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be
under the National Intelligence Program.
``(b) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior
Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the
Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of
National Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of
the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as
the Director from among individuals who have substantial
expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community,
including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
``(c) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such
duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may
prescribe.
``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing
policy for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and
activities at the Department.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
`intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program'
have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of the Department of Energy Organization Act is
amended by striking the items relating to sections 215 and
216 and inserting the following new item:
``215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.
SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
CENTER.
Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act
(42 U.S.C. 7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection (d):
``(d) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The
President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools
to analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the
security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.
``(B) The Secretary shall appoint the head of the Energy
Infrastructure Security Center.
``(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be
located within the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
``(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and
objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence
relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the
United States:
``(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of
the United States.
``(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies
have full access to and receive intelligence support needed
to execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and
perform independent, alternative analyses.
``(C) Establishing a central repository on known and
suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the
United States, including with respect to any individuals,
groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such
infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and
networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.
``(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to
the security of the energy infrastructure of the United
States, including threats and analyses, to the President, to
the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the
appropriate committees of Congress.
``(3) The President may waive the requirements of this
subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President
determines that such requirements do not materially improve
the ability of the United States Government to prevent and
halt attacks against the energy infrastructure of the United
States. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and
shall include a description of how the missions and
objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.
``(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver
authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall
submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans
regarding the establishment of an Energy Infrastructure
Security Center.''.
SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING
REQUIREMENT.
Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act
(42 U.S.C. 7144a) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) Duty of Secretary.--''; and
(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 2431. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.
Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis shall transfer not less than 40
personnel who are stationed, as of the date of the enactment
of this Act, at the Department of Homeland Security
headquarters located at Nebraska Avenue Northwest,
Washington, District of Columbia, to locations at least 30
miles from such headquarters in order to collocate such
personnel with and provide support for Department of Homeland
Security operational units from Customs and Border
Protection, the Transportation Security Administration,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or other elements of the
Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 2432. FRAMEWORK FOR ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS OF
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a framework
to ensure the appropriate balance of resources for the roles,
missions, and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency in
its capacity as an element of the intelligence community and
as a combat support agency. The framework shall include
supporting processes to provide for the consistent and
regular reevaluation of the responsibilities and resources of
the Defense Intelligence Agency to prevent imbalanced
priorities, insufficient or misaligned resources, and the
unauthorized expansion of mission parameters.
(b) Matters for Inclusion.--The framework required under
subsection (a) shall include each of the following:
[[Page H6142]]
(1) A lexicon providing for consistent definitions of
relevant terms used by both the intelligence community and
the Department of Defense, including each of the following:
(A) Defense intelligence enterprise.
(B) Enterprise manager.
(C) Executive agent.
(D) Function.
(E) Functional manager.
(F) Mission.
(G) Mission manager.
(H) Responsibility.
(I) Role.
(J) Service of common concern.
(2) An assessment of the necessity of maintaining separate
designations for the intelligence community and the
Department of Defense for intelligence functional or
enterprise management constructs.
(3) A repeatable process for evaluating the addition,
transfer, or elimination of defense intelligence missions,
roles, and functions, currently performed or to be performed
in the future by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which
includes each of the following:
(A) A justification for the addition, transfer, or
elimination of a mission, role, or function.
(B) The identification of which, if any, element of the
Federal Government performs the considered mission, role, or
function.
(C) In the case of any new mission, role, or functions--
(i) an assessment of the most appropriate agency or element
to perform such mission, role, or function, taking into
account the resource profiles, scope of responsibilities,
primary customers, and existing infrastructure necessary to
support such mission, role, or function; and
(ii) a determination of the appropriate resource profile
and an identification of the projected resources needed and
the proposed source of such resources over the future-years
defense program, to be provided in writing to any elements of
the intelligence community or the Department of Defense
affected by the assumption, transfer, or elimination of any
mission, role, or function.
(D) In the case of any mission, role, or function proposed
to be assumed, transferred, or eliminated, an assessment,
which shall be completed jointly by the heads of each element
affected by such assumption, transfer, or elimination, of the
risks that would be assumed by the intelligence community and
the Department if such mission, role, or function is assumed,
transferred, or eliminated.
(E) A description of how determinations are made regarding
the funding of programs and activities under the National
Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program,
including--
(i) which programs or activities are funded under each such
Program;
(ii) which programs or activities should be jointly funded
under both such Programs and how determinations are made with
respect to funding allocations for such programs and
activities; and
(iii) the thresholds and process for changing a program or
activity from being funded under one such Program to being
funded under the other such Program.
SEC. 2433. CONSULTATION BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS.
Section 105(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3038(b)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph
(1) by inserting ``, in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence,'' after ``the Secretary of Defense''.
SEC. 2434. CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EAST
CAMPUS BUILDING 3.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that in
carrying out the construction at the National Security Agency
East Campus, the Director of the National Security Agency
should prioritize the consolidation of national intelligence
mission activities on such campus and away from disparate
leased facilities in the Washington-Baltimore region.
(b) Incremental Construction of East Campus Building 3.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the National Security
Agency may provide for the construction of East Campus
Building 3, as authorized in section 2102, in increments,
subject to annual appropriations, except that the total
amount expended on the construction of East Campus Building 3
may not exceed $775,000,000.
(2) Fiscal year 2019.--The authorization of appropriations
for East Campus Building 3 under section 2102 is an
authorization to proceed with the construction of East Campus
Building 3. The Director of the National Security Agency
shall conduct necessary activities during fiscal year 2019 to
avoid delays in project completion.
(c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a plan for the construction of East Campus
Building 4 and East Campus Building 5. Such plan shall
include--
(1) a list of commercial leases in the Washington-Baltimore
region that could be terminated if Congress authorizes the
construction of East Campus Building 4 and East Campus
Building 5; and
(2) an analysis of options to accelerate East Campus
construction efforts.
SEC. 2435. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(d) Advisory Board.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National
Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section
referred to as the `Board').
``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National
Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to space,
overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and
``(B) advise and report directly the Director with respect
to such matters.
``(3) Members.--
``(A) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be composed
of 5 members appointed by the Director from among individuals
with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other
expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the
National Reconnaissance Office.
``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a term of
2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may
not serve more than 3 terms.
``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy
occurring before the expiration of the term for which the
member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only
for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the
expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken
office.
``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be
appointed by the Director from among the members.
``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint an
executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National
Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than
quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the
Director.
``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the
Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the activities of the
Board during the preceding year.
``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not
apply to the Board.''.
(b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial 5
members to the advisory board under subsection (d) of section
106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a),
as added by subsection (a).
TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 2501. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act
of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended
by striking ``2018'' and inserting ``2028''.
SEC. 2502. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Correcting Long-standing Material Weaknesses.--Section
368 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010 (Public Law 110-259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby
repealed.
(b) Annual Report on Interactions Between Intelligence
Community and Entertainment Industry.--Section 308 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division
N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 813; 50 U.S.C. 3222) is
amended by striking subsection (c).
(c) Declassification Review With Respect to Detainees
Transferred From United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.--Section 601 of such Act (division N of Public Law 115-
31; 131 Stat. 827) is hereby repealed.
(d) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--
Section 210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
124k) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as
subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
period; and
(B) by striking paragraph (9).
(e) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (g); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections
(g) and (h), respectively.
SEC. 2503. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER
INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS
DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.
(a) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions
and Active Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
jointly carry out subsection (b) if such Directors and the
Secretary jointly determine--
(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures
campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any
Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and
(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion
or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a
foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(b) Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a
determination under subsection (a), the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership,
the congressional intelligence committees
[[Page H6143]]
and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods,
the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing
shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber
intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be,
covered by the determination.
(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign
nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such
intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release
of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures
campaign.
(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary
jointly determine appropriate.
(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With
respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a
determination under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any
electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such
intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that
may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be
classified and made available only to individuals with
appropriate security clearances.
(3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection
shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the
protection of sources and methods.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures
campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence
operation.
(2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms
``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the
meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an
electronic occurrence that actually or imminently
jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election
infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of information within such infrastructure.
(5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term
``electronic election infrastructure'' means an electronic
information system of any of the following that is related to
an election for Federal office:
(A) The Federal Government.
(B) A State or local government.
(C) A political party.
(D) The election campaign of a candidate.
(6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the
meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with
respect to a determination, means that the determination is
based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
(8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'',
with respect to a determination, means that a determination
is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient
quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher
level of confidence.
(9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 2504. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT
AND RELATED PROGRAMS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) there should be established, through the issuing of an
Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an
intelligence community-wide program for student loan
repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling,
and related matters, for employees of the intelligence
community;
(2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of
the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire,
and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect
to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;
(3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility
requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the
ability of the elements of the intelligence community to
recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel,
including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill
positions; and
(4) to the extent possible, such a program should be
uniform throughout the intelligence community and publicly
promoted by each element of the intelligence community to
both current employees of the element as well as to
prospective employees of the element.
(b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-wide
Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements
of the intelligence community and the heads of any other
appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on potentially establishing and carrying out an
intelligence community-wide program for student loan
repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling,
and related matters, as described in subsection (a).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the financial resources that the
elements of the intelligence community would require to
establish and initially carry out the program specified in
paragraph (1).
(B) A description of the practical steps to establish and
carry out such a program.
(C) The identification of any legislative action the
Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such
a program.
(c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the covered programs. Each such report
shall include, with respect to the period covered by the
report, the following:
(A) The number of personnel from each element of the
intelligence community who used each covered program.
(B) The total amount of funds each element expended for
each such program.
(C) A description of the efforts made by each element to
promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel
of the element of the intelligence community and to
prospective personnel.
(2) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term
``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan
forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar
programs, established pursuant to title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other
provision of law that may be administered or used by an
element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 2505. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT ON
SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on the number of Senior Executive Service
positions in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(1) The number of required Senior Executive Service
positions for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the
mission of the Office.
(3) A discussion of how the levels of the Senior Executive
Service positions in the Office compare to the number of
senior positions at other elements of the intelligence
community.
(c) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall provide to the Comptroller General any information
requested by the Comptroller General to carry out this
section by not later than 5 business days after the date on
which the Comptroller General makes such request.
(d) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this
section, the term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has
the meaning given that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5,
United States Code, and includes any position above the GS-
15, step 10, level of the General Schedule under section 5332
of such title.
SEC. 2506. BRIEFINGS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) Quarterly Briefings.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and on a quarterly basis
thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence
committees a briefing on the counterintelligence activities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall
include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
(2) matters of counterintelligence concern; and
(3) any other information relating to the
counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the
Director determines necessary to keep the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed as
required by section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3091).
(b) Guidelines.--The Director, in coordination with the
Attorney General and in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, shall develop guidelines governing
the scope of the briefings provided under subsection (a).
SEC. 2507. BRIEFING ON FBI OFFERING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO
SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a
briefing on the ability of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to offer, as an inducement to assisting the
Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to
foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in
counterintelligence or other national security-related
investigations. The briefing shall address the following:
(1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers,
whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies
and departments of the United States Government, including a
discussion of the authorities provided by section
101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law
under which the Bureau may make such offers.
[[Page H6144]]
(2) An overview of the policies and operational practices
of the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
(3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with
respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as
sources for such investigations, or both.
(4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions
to improve such policies and practices, particularly with
respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.
SEC. 2508. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
(a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the
beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the
following new item:
``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';
(2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
(3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology,
engineering, or mathematics positions.'';
(4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203,
204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
(5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the
following new item:
``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.
(b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further
amended--
(1) in section 102A--
(A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g),
by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
and
(B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
(2) in section 106--
(A) by inserting ``sec. 106'' before ``(a)''; and
(B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b),
by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
(3) by striking section 107;
(4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified
and an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in
classified form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
(5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)''
and inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
(6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:
``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title
5, United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department
of Defense.'';
(7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and
(c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
(8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
(9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
(10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and
inserting ``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
(11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;
(12) in section 503--
(A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
(i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the
left; and
(ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such
paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a)
of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2
ems to the right.
The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 115-
815. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in
the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered
as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall
not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for
division of the question.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating), I offer amendment No. 1.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 17, line 2, insert ``Russian,'' after ``Korean,''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer this amendment on
behalf of its author, Mr. Keating of Massachusetts, who is one of our
fine members who has great experience in public safety prior to coming
to the Congress.
This amendment builds on an initiative from Chairman Nunes to extend
tour lengths of deployed U.S. Government personnel, particularly those
who are proficient in difficult languages such as Arabic, Farsi,
Chinese, and Korean. Specifically, the amendment adds the Russian
language to that list.
In view of the continuing threat to our national security posed by
the aggressive action of the Russian Government, the U.S. Government
must fully engage its cadre of personnel proficient in the Russian
language.
I am a slow talker. I am talking even more slowly, and my colleague
has arrived. I want to thank my colleague for his work.
Mr. Chairman, I urge support of this amendment, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, although I am not opposed to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California
(Mr. Nunes) is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the amendment, and I
strongly encourage Members to support this amendment.
I have no further comments at this time, and I reserve the balance of
my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating), who is the author of the
amendment.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank my two colleagues from California.
Mr. Chairman, I am here rising in support of my amendment to H.R.
6237.
The underlying bill requires all members of the Foreign Service to
serve three consecutive terms if they have received language training
in certain languages. My amendment adds the Russian language to that
list.
Extending Foreign Service officers' length of service in these
positions is vital to our foreign policy and national security
objectives. Through this continuity of service, they can develop and
deploy their cultural and language expertise to make the most of our
diplomatic efforts in-country. Putin has become one of the greatest
antagonists of the United States. He attacked our elections and those
of our allies, and he is behind a number of cyber-related incidents
recently.
He has invaded sovereign nations when they looked toward
strengthening ties with the West. His government and government-
controlled entities spread lies and misinformation about the United
States--not only in Russia, but here in the U.S. as well--through fake
social media accounts that attempt to sow division among all Americans.
He seeks to undermine all aspects of civil society and a free
political process that challenge him and his control over the Russian
Government and its people.
Putin presents a serious security threat to the United States and our
interests. We must respond to these actions through sanctions,
indictments, and other means, whether related to election interference,
incursions into Ukraine, or human rights violations.
However, we must also keep our eyes on the long game. Russian
language is broadly spoken around the globe, not just in Russia, but
across Eastern Europe and many parts of Central Asia as well.
Representing the United States and our ideals abroad means being able
to actually have meaningful person-to-person exchanges with local
communities and build the relationships that will help us combat
Putin's misinformation apparatus.
It means we can talk to local press in-country to clarify
misunderstandings and to communicate directly with the local population
about what we actually stand for. It means having the most accurate
understanding of real-time security information, so that the United
States can respond quickly and appropriately.
Today, we are not operating at full capacity in this regard when it
comes to Russia, and, frankly, we cannot afford to keep looking the
threat from Russia and Putin in the face and refusing not to do
everything we can about it.
We have heard many times that the Russian people themselves have
great
[[Page H6145]]
concern and great antagonism to Putin and his leadership. We need to
have skilled people fluent in the language and understanding the
culture there and on the front lines of our efforts to encourage them
to stand up within their own country, and to make sure that our allies
in Europe know that we are there, using every tool at our disposal to
stop his aggression and interference.
Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment passes.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of the amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage also, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Schneider
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 20, line 7, before the period insert ``, including an
identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate
person, group, or entity to which such threat has been
attributed''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Schneider) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, we are still uncovering more troubling
evidence on the extent of Russia's interference in our most recent
election. These Russian actions were an attack on our democracy, and we
need to respond both to hold them to account for past actions and to
protect against future aggressions. With our next national election
less than 4 months away, we must act now.
So I am pleased this bill takes steps to require a publicly available
advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity
threats facing our Federal elections. This joint report from the
Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the FBI will help campaigns identify and counter these threats.
My amendment strengthens the reporting requirements to ensure we are
publicly identifying the foreign state or nonstate actors that our
intelligence officials identify as responsible for these threats.
The American people deserve to know who is trying to interfere in our
democratic process, and they deserve a government that will hold these
countries and these groups to account.
Protecting the integrity of our elections from outside influence by
malign foreign actors is of paramount importance. I urge my colleagues
to support this amendment to help ensure that we treat the threat of
foreign election interference with the seriousness it demands.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff), who is the ranking member.
{time} 1415
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for offering this
amendment.
I am pleased to rise in support. This amendment clarifies section
1503 of the bill dealing with foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns.
The current provision directs that, for each Federal election, the
Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the FBI will make publicly available a report on foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to our elections.
Section 1503 strengthens our elections by providing information to
the public about these threats by providing information about best
practices and resources which may be used to counter these threats.
Mr. Schneider's amendment adds to the publicly available report the
identification of the foreign actor, when possible. This public
attribution can be very powerful, not only in terms of protecting the
public, but also in deterring any foreign intervention in our
democratic affairs.
I want to thank my colleague again for his work, and I am happy to
support the amendment.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, though I am not opposed.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the amendment, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Schneider).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in House Report 115-815.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 22, line 16, strike ``and''.
Page 23, line 2, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
Page 23, after line 2, insert the following new paragraph:
(6) an immediate review of a clearance may be triggered
when a security clearance holder is reported to have engaged
in violent acts against individuals, property, or public
spaces based on the security clearance holder's association
or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate,
threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or
unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State, based on factors including, at
a minimum, race, religion, national origin, or disability.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the ranking member and the
chairman for bringing this bill to the floor and working on some very
important items, including diversity, outreach, HBCUs, issues of which
I have worked on as well. So I thank them very much, because bringing
the expertise of diversity to the national security and intelligence
community can only make us stronger.
Mr. Chairman, I have just left the Judiciary Committee where we have
been spending a period of time dealing with questions that wrap
themselves around the intelligence community and the importance of
preserving confidential sources and as well the importance of the
intelligence community as it relates to the ongoing Russian
investigation.
Equally important, of course, is to ensure that we have a community
that is well-recognized to have security clearances that are not
impacted by actions or views that would do harm to the American people.
My amendment adds to the sense of Congress in the bill that a re-
review of a security clearance holder's credentials can be triggered by
his or her association or empathy with persons or organizations that
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence or any other illegal or
unconstitutional means in an effort to prevent others from exercising
their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any State, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability,
or other impermissible factors, which maybe include LGBTQ, and whether
one is, in essence, considered different. That is the basis of I think
a very positive addition to this legislation.
Mr. Chair, I include in the Record an article published on July 6,
2018, by PBS FRONTLINE about Michael Miselis, an active member of the
California-based Rise Above Movement, RAM, as a well-known violent
white supremacist group.
He Is a Member of a Violent White Supremacist Group; So Why Is He
Working for a Defense Contractor With a Security Clearance?
This story is part of an ongoing collaboration between
ProPublica and FRONTLINE that includes documentaries
scheduled to begin on PBS in August 2018.
[[Page H6146]]
If you've witnessed or experienced hate crimes, harassment
or incidents of bias, you can use this form to send
information to FRONTLINE, ProPublica and other partners in
the Documenting Hate project.
Update, July 6, 2018: One day after being exposed as a
member of a violent white supremacist group, Michael Miselis
has lost his job as an aerospace engineer. In an email,
company spokesman Tim Paynter told ProPublica and FRONTLINE
that Miselis ``is no longer an employee of Northrop
Grumman.'' Paynter did not say whether Miselis was fired or
resigned from his position.
There likely isn't such a thing as a ``typical'' violent
white extremist in America in 2018. Still, Michael Miselis--a
University of California, Los Angeles doctoral student with a
U.S. government security clearance to work on sensitive
research for a prominent defense contractor--makes for a
pretty unusual case.
For months, ProPublica and FRONTLINE have been working to
identify the white supremacists at the center of violent
demonstrations across the country, including the infamous
Unite the Right rally last August in Charlottesville,
Virginia. The Rise Above Movement, a Southern California
group that expresses contempt for Muslims, Jews, and
immigrants, became a focus of that effort. ProPublica and
FRONTLINE were able to quickly identify a number of the
group's leaders, and find evidence that put them in the
middle of violence in Charlottesville and Berkeley,
California, among other places.
But one seeming member of RAM was harder to nail down. In
video shot in Charlottesville, a bearded, husky man is seen
in a red Make America Great Again hat with his hands wrapped
in tape that came in handy for the brawling that occurred
that day. During one encounter, the unidentified man in the
red hat pushed an African-American protester to the ground
and began pounding on him, video of the episode shows;
moments later, a known RAM member choked and bloodied a pair
of female counter-protesters. The possible RAM member also
had turned up in video shot during hours of combat at a Trump
rally in Berkeley, as well. Wearing protective goggles to
ward off pepper spray, the man fought alongside RAM members,
wrestling one protester to the ground and punching others.
Ultimately, ProPublica and FRONTLINE determined the man in
the violent footage was Miselis, a 29-year-old pursuing a
Ph.D. in UCLA's aerospace engineering program. Miselis was
identified using video footage and social media posts, and
reporters confirmed his identity in an encounter with him
outside his home. In interviews, a number of California law
enforcement officials said Miselis was a member of RAM.
In addition to his scholarly pursuits, Miselis works as a
systems engineer for Northrop Grumman, the giant defense
contractor with a plant in Redondo Beach, California.
When approached by ProPublica and FRONTLINE in front of his
home in Lawndale, a small city south of Los Angeles, Miselis
said he ``didn't know anything'' about what happened in
Charlottesville.
``I think you got the wrong guy,'' he said before driving
off in his car.
Miselis did not respond to questions about his involvement
with RAM. He did not answer additional questions sent by
email.
Several current and former employees at Northrop Grumman
told ProPublica and FRONTLINE that Miselis has received a
security clearance to work in a computer modeling and
simulation group within Northrop's aerospace division. Such
security clearances are typically issued in a two-step
process. The federal Office of Personnel Management conducts
an investigation into the individual. The agency's findings
are then forwarded to a special unit within the Department of
Defense, which makes the final determination on whether the
person should receive a clearance, a status that often allows
the person access to classified or otherwise sensitive
information concerning national security.
Public affairs officers at the Defense Department declined
to comment about Miselis and his security clearance. The
federal personnel management office referred questions
regarding Miselis to Northrop Grumman.
Northrop Grumman did not respond to several requests for
comment. However, interviews with current and former Northrop
employees, as well as an internal email, make clear the
company knows of Miselis' actions in Charlottesville and
involvement with RAM. Miselis informed his superiors about
his contact with reporters from ProPublica and FRONTLINE, as
is required by any individual who holds a higher-level
security clearance, the people said.
So far, it seems, the company has taken no action against
Miselis, who remains employed.
Keegan Hankes, an analyst with the Southern Poverty Law
Center who follows RAM closely, said he was surprised that
nothing has been done about Miselis' employment and security
clearance.
``It's ridiculous,'' Hankes said.
``They're openly motivated by racism,'' he added of RAM.
As ProPublica has previously reported, RAM first surfaced
publicly last spring and has quickly established itself as
one of the violent groups in the resurgent white supremacist
scene; members, who regularly train in boxing and martial
arts, have been documented engaging in a string of melees.
Founded in early 2017 by Robert Rundo, a Queens, New York,
native who served an 18-month prison sentence for stabbing a
rival gang member six times during a 2009 street fight, the
group's core membership is small--15 to 20 young men--but
capable of real menace, ProPublica's reporting has shown.
Rundo has recruited followers from the Orange County and
San Diego chapters of the Hammerskin Nation, the country's
largest Nazi skinhead gang, and one the authorities say has
been behind at least nine murders. One of the Hammerskins who
joined up with RAM, Matthew Branstetter, went to prison in
California in 2011 on hate crime charges for robbing and
assaulting a Jewish man in an Orange County park. The attack
left the victim with ``a concussion, broken jaw, eye socket
fracture, broken nose, cracked ribs, severe facial bruising,
and cuts and bruises to his body and face,'' according to a
news release issued by county prosecutors at the time. Other
RAM members have spent time in prison and Los Angeles County
jail on charges for robbery, firearms possession and other
offenses.
The FBI has taken notice. Several law enforcement officials
familiar with the bureau's work said agents have opened a
formal investigation into RAM. In a statement, the FBI said:
``While the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of
an investigation, our agents investigate activity which may
constitute a federal crime or pose a threat to national
security. Our focus is not on membership in particular groups
but on criminal activity. The FBI cannot initiate an
investigation based solely on an individual's race,
ethnicity, national origin, religion, or the exercise of
their First Amendment rights, and we remain committed to
protecting those rights for all Americans.''
Since last August, local prosecutors have brought charges
against a handful of participants in the Charlottesville
rally, successfully convicting several men so far, including
activists on both sides of the clashes. Now federal
authorities are targeting neo-Nazi James Alex Fields, the man
accused of killing counter-protester Heather Heyer and
injuring more than two dozen others. Federal prosecutors
recently filed 30 charges against Fields, including 28 hate
crime charges.
A native of Stockton, California, Miselis earned a
bachelor's of science degree in mechanical engineering from
UCLA in 2011. UCLA's website today lists Miselis as a Ph.D.
candidate in the engineering department's hypersonics and
computational aero-dynamics group. After FRONTLINE and
ProPublica began making inquiries about Miselis, the school
issued a brief statement saying only that he is technically
on leave from the doctoral program.
Miselis was clearly prepared for the unrest in Berkeley in
the spring of 2017. At the Trump rally he wore protective
goggles to ward off pepper spray or tear gas, taped his hands
up like a boxer, and wore a gray active-wear uniform, as did
several other RAM members that day. In video footage reviewed
by ProPublica and FRONTLINE, Miselis can be seen fighting
alongside other RAM members.
The event turned into a multi-hour street battle pitting
Trump supporters, including fascists and extreme-right
activists, against counter-protesters, some of them militant
anti-fascists. Police made 20 arrests, confiscating knives,
pepper spray, a stun gun, an axe-handle and many wooden dowel
rods, which were used as clubs by participants. At least
seven people were transported to the hospital for their
injuries. Rundo, RAM's founder, was arrested and detained for
assault on a police officer, but Alameda County District
Attorney Nancy O'Malley declined to file charges. ``We
determined we didn't have enough evidence to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt,'' said Teresa Drenick, an
Alameda County deputy district attorney.
After the Berkeley rally, Miselis traveled across the
country to take part in the massive white supremacist
convergence in Charlottesville, where his activities were
photographed and recorded on video, both by professional
journalists and other people equipped with smart phones. At
the rally on Aug. 12, pictures taken by photojournalist Jason
Andrew show Miselis walking alongside two other RAM members
previously identified by ProPublica, Tom Gillen and Ben
Daley.
At roughly 10 a.m., Miselis and the other RAM members
confronted counter-protesters a few steps away from
Emancipation Park, where white supremacists had gathered
beneath a statue of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee.
Daley attacked two female counter-protesters, kicking and
punching them, a scene captured in video obtained by
ProPublica and FRONTLINE. He wrapped both hands around the
throat of one woman, throttling her until she fell to the
ground, blood seeping from a gash on her temple. The other
woman emerged from the incident with a laceration across her
forehead. On video, she screams as blood drips across her
face.
Miselis jumped into the fracas. In addition to FRONTLINE
and ProPublica, National Geographic produced video
documenting the brawl.
A sequence of pictures shot by photojournalist Edu Bayer,
who was on assignment for The New York Times, show Miselis
hurling what appears to be a can of soda at counter-
protesters. In one photo he flexes his biceps muscles in
celebration.
It's this sort of street combat that worries the SPLC's
Hankes. In his view, such brazen
[[Page H6147]]
criminal activity should be a red flag for both Northrop
Grumman and the Pentagon.
``I can't believe that participation in an organized white
supremacist group focused on street-level violence wouldn't
jeopardize your security clearance,'' Hankes said.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, this gentleman was at Charlottesville
speaking loudly, intimidating my fellow alumni and students, having
gone to the University of Virginia School of Law. I spoke to the
president and officers there, and the students were patently and
conspicuously intimidated and frightened. But more importantly, this
individual had a security clearance, and he worked for a defense
contractor.
My amendment would ensure that the American people have strong
national security, a strong intelligence community, but individuals who
receive a clearance can receive it appropriately and that they
themselves will not be a jeopardy to the citizens of the United States.
Mr. Chair, the Jackson Lee Amendment No. 3, designated as No. 33 on
the Rules Committee rosters, amends the Sense of Congress already in
the bill on the importance of re-review of security clearances held by
individuals by adding consideration of whether the security clearance
holder's association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or
unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising
their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any state, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability,
or other impermissible factors.
Mr. Miselis has a security clearance and worked for Northrup Grumman,
a major defense contractor, at the time he engaged in physical violence
against persons protesting racism and white supremacy in
Charlottesville, Virginia.
In May 2018, Northrup Grumman was informed of Mr. Miselis' membership
in RAM and the violent assaults he initiated while he was in
Charlottesville participating in activities in support of white
supremancy, which were captured on video and in photos.
Mr. Miselis worked for a government contractor and held a security
clearance authorizing him to work on projects that were of vital
interest to our nation and its defense.
Northrup Grumman did not dismiss him until the story broke earlier
this month with media reports on the violence Mr. Miselis engaged in at
white supremacists' rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia.
The violence of RAM members has been a hallmark of the group and its
members.
The Anti-Defamation League describes RAM as a white supremacist group
whose members believe they are fighting against a ``modern world''
corrupted by the ``destructive cultural influences'' of liberals, Jews,
Muslims and non-white immigrants.
They refer to themselves as the ``premier MMA (mixed martial arts)
club of the Alt-Right.''
RAM is characterized as operating like a street-fighting club.
Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological
foes, and have been involved in violent clashes during political
rallies and demonstrations.
RAM members consider themselves to be part of the ``Alt-Right.''
RAM's membership has deep roots in California's racist skinhead
movement, and includes individuals who have faced serious criminal
charges, including assault, robbery and weapon offenses.
RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazis and racist
skinheads who were formerly known as the DIY Division, but rebranded
themselves as the Rise Above Movement in the spring of 2017.
The FBI has opened an informal investigation into this group because
of the violence associated with its members.
The United States is a nation of laws, which gives us the freedom to
agree and most importantly disagree with not only each other but with
our government.
But the limitations to the right to disagree can be best described by
the ancient wisdom: ``Your right to swing your arms ends just where the
other person's nose begins.''
There is a limit to the expression of free speech and the freedom to
assemble and that limit is violence.
The awarding of security clearances to contractors must be better
managed and the consequences for involvement in activities that would
be cause for dismissal from the armed services or any federal agency
should not go unnoticed.
This Jackson Lee Amendment is an opportunity to make a clear
statement to government contractors that the awarding of contracts that
involve the security of our nation should not be taken lightly and that
Congress will not tolerate the allocation of federal funds to
contractors who employ persons who advocate or participate in acts
against persons on account of their race, creed, religious beliefs, or
gender who engage in constitutionally protected activities.
I ask that my colleagues support this Jackson Lee Amendment to H.R.
6237.
Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, though I am not opposed.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from Texas has 2\1/4\ minutes
remaining.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the
Intelligence Committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered
by my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Texas, Congresswoman
Sheila Jackson Lee.
This amendment complements other provisions in the bill focused on
improving the security clearance process in the Intelligence Committee.
Specifically, Ms. Jackson Lee's amendment recognizes that an immediate
review may be called for when a security clearance holder is reported
to have engaged in certain violent acts against individuals, property,
or public spaces based on an association or sympathy with persons or
organizations seeking to prevent others from exercising their
constitutional rights. Such rights include those related to race,
religion, national origin, or disability.
I thank the gentlewoman for offering this amendment. I am pleased to
support it, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to accept the amendment, and I
continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, RAM, the group that I have indicated
in the letter I submitted for the Record, of which the gentleman in the
article was a member of, is characterized as operating like a street
fighting club. Members actively train to do physical battle with their
ideological foes and have been involved in violent clashes during
political rallies and demonstrations.
RAM members consider themselves a part of the alt-right. RAM's
membership has deep roots in California, with the Skinheads and other
individuals who face serious criminal charges. But more importantly,
RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazi racist
Skinheads.
It is not an emphasis on that group. This amendment is broadly
structured to deal with protecting the security clearance process and
the American people. I join with my colleagues in hoping and helping
the intelligence community to be able to have the resources for the
backlog of thousands and thousands of those seeking security clearance,
so that they can be particular and astute to ensure that for the people
who receive it, it is a benefit. It is, in essence, a gift. It is an
honor to receive a security clearance.
The clearance that I and Members of Congress have, we hold with the
highest respect and dignity. Therefore, if it is given to anyone, it
should be given in that manner.
Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I will just close by saying that the
security clearance process needs a lot of work. So we support this
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Vargas
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
[[Page H6148]]
Page 29, line 13, after ``methods'' insert ``, including
the use of virtual currencies,''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Vargas) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to
support my amendment to H.R. 6237.
By adding the use of virtual currencies to section 1505, we will
ensure it is included in the assessment of threat financing related to
Russia.
This assessment includes officials of the government of Russia,
persons subject to sanctions with respect to Russia, Russian nationals
subject to sanction, and Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
Mr. Chairman, as you may know, a virtual currency is a digital
representation of value that can be digitally traded.
Since the creation of Bitcoin, the first and most widely known
example of a cryptocurrency, thousands of cryptocurrencies have emerged
that are designed to serve a variety of purposes.
Just as virtual currencies have grown in use in legitimate commerce,
they have become an increasingly popular financial payment method for
criminals and other transnational bad actors.
Virtual currencies have been and continue to be exploited to pay for
goods and services associated with illicit activities and as an
effective tool to launder money or avoid sanctions.
If we are to craft effective solutions to combat Russia's threat
finance, we need to fully understand how virtual currencies may be used
to finance activities against the United States and our allies,
especially NATO. By including the use of virtual currencies in the
report, we will ensure a robust analysis that will help us to impede
Russian financing of cyber operations.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs.
Murphy).
Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, Mr.
Vargas, for yielding, and I support his amendment.
I also support this bill more generally because it supports the quiet
heroes in our intelligence community. They don't seek public praise; in
fact, they shun it. While others enjoy the limelight, they work hard in
the shadows.
Section 1511 is a version of legislation I wrote called the POISE
Act. I filed it after the President disclosed highly sensitive
information to Russian officials at a White House meeting. This
information had been entrusted to the U.S. by a key ally.
Section 1511, drawing on the POISE Act, says Congress must be
notified when a member of the executive branch, including the
President, discloses top secret information to an adversary government
outside established intelligence channels.
As a former specialist at the Department of Defense, I know these
disclosures are dangerous because our adversary could use it to harm
U.S. interests. Our partners could stop sharing intelligence if they
don't trust us to keep it confidential.
The congressional notification requirement will deter irresponsible
disclosures and enable Congress to conduct oversight and limit any
damage caused by the disclosure.
I also wanted to express my disappointment on a matter of national
security. Congressman Curbelo and I offered a bipartisan amendment to
require the DNI to report to Congress on the national security threat
posed by deep fake technology and how the intelligence community will
counter it. Deep fake technology is the digital falsification of
images, video, and audio to portray an individual as having done or
said something he or she didn't do or say.
Senator Rubio has raised alarms about how foreign intelligence
service could use deep fake technology to undermine our Nation's
security and democracy.
Frankly, I was dismayed our amendment was not ruled in order, despite
being supported by the Intelligence Committee. I know the Rules
Committee often makes decisions for reasons unrelated to policy. But
the exclusion of this amendment was a serious mistake, and I will look
for other ways to ensure our country is prepared for the emerging
threat posed by deep fake technology.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, though I am not opposed.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I would simply then urge my colleagues to
support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Vargas).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mrs. Torres
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. NORTH KOREA FOLLOW THE MONEY ACT.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis,
shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue
sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall
include revenue from the following sources:
(1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
(2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean
territorial waters.
(3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper,
silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other
stores of value.
(4) Trade in textiles.
(5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
(6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and
other associated purposes.
(7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the
Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner
intended to generate significant revenue, directly or
indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
(9) The provision of non-humanitarian goods (such as food,
medicine, and medical devices) and services by other
countries.
(10) The provision of services, including banking and other
support, including by entities located in the Russian
Federation, China, and Iran.
(11) Online commercial activities of the Government of
North Korea, including online gambling.
(12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and
counterfeit goods.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a)
shall include an identification of each of the following:
(1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
(2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply
chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through
which North Korea accesses the United States and
international financial systems and repatriates and exports
capital, goods, and services; and
(3) the global financial institutions, money services
business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with
financial transactions.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the
assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy of
such assessment.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman
from California (Mrs. Torres) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
{time} 1430
Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer my amendment to H.R. 6237,
the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018 and 2019.
Mr. Chairman, nearly 1 year and 3 months ago today, the North Korean
regime announced that it had successfully executed an intercontinental
ballistic missile test launch. That announcement raised the real
possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack on American soil.
President Trump, rightly, has spent much of last year seeking a deal
for the
[[Page H6149]]
denuclearization of North Korea. Secretary Pompeo is actively engaged
in finding a solution, and Congress should be providing him with all of
the resources we can to ensure a solution is meaningful and effective.
To prevent advancement of their nuclear weapons program, we need to
obtain specific information regarding North Korean revenue sources;
however, the U.S. Government does not have a sufficient understanding
of this critical question. That is why I have offered this amendment,
which is modeled after my North Korea Follow the Money Act.
This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence to
produce a National Intelligence Estimate of the revenue sources of
North Korea. Any effective agreement between the U.S. and North Korea
must consider all of the sources of funding, both legitimate and
illegitimate, that have enabled this North Korean regime.
I am proud to offer this bipartisan amendment with Representative
Wagner, who has been a longtime partner of mine on this legislation,
and I also appreciate Chairman Nunes and his staff and Ranking Member
Schiff and his staff for working with me on this amendment.
Mr. Chair, I am hopeful that we can continue to work together for the
security of our Nation, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Missouri (Mrs. Wagner).
Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this amendment,
of which I am a proud cosponsor.
Nearly 1 year ago, I traveled to Korea, Japan, and China. I visited
the DMZ and the Chinese border town of Dandong. I watched as trucks
loaded with goods drove across the China-Korea Friendship Bridge into
North Korea.
Mr. Chair, 70 percent of North Korea's trade passes over that bridge,
and it was a stark reminder that, in order to change North Korea's
malign behavior, we need sanctions that undermine the financial
networks that keep the Kim regime afloat.
Over the past year, the President has taken tremendous steps towards
disrupting North Korean cash flows, but we still have an imperfect
understanding of where and how North Korea gets its revenue, and our
limited knowledge has weakened international sanctions.
This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to
study North Korean financial and trade networks, weapons sales, labor
exports, and supply chains to better understand the sources of the
regime's revenue. It would aid the international community in closing
gaps in sanctions against North Korea. The report will help us support
our diplomats as they seek to restore stability on the Korean
Peninsula.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this critical amendment.
Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment. Until we know where the North Korean regime gets its money,
we won't know how much money they have to spend.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' and equip Secretary
Pompeo with the tools that he needs to act in the best interests of our
national security, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Torres).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Hastings
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT
EFFORTS.
In order to further increase the diversity of the
intelligence community workforce, not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of elements
of the Intelligence Community, shall create, implement, and
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented regions are
more fully and consistently represented in such elements'
employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the
congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit
comments to the Director of National Intelligence before such
plan shall be implemented.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, my staff and I worked with Democratic
staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and received input from the majority staff to craft what I believe is a
commonsense amendment that will increase diversity throughout the
intelligence community.
Mr. Chair, I just want to depart from my prepared remarks to say a
word about the young man who is seated with me, Tony Matthews. It is a
good indication of what the Brookings Institution does when they send
us fellows from either the Democratic or Republican side, and I am very
pleased that he has been with my office and, in many respects, is the
author of this amendment.
The amendment directs the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence to, in consultation with heads of other intelligence
community agencies, create and implement a plan that will successfully
expand the intelligence community's recruitment efforts so that rural
and underserved regions in the United States are more fully represented
in these efforts.
It is my belief that this amendment will provide a unique opportunity
for the intelligence community agencies to actively join forces in
order to broaden their respective recruitment efforts and, by so doing,
increase the diversity among their ranks. Although we have seen
improvement in some areas--for instance, an increase in minority hiring
for fiscal year 2017 over that of fiscal year 2016--we have also seen a
disappointing decrease in the percentage of women hired over that same
period of time. I believe that we can do better in both metrics, and I
think one smart way of doing that is getting agencies to broaden their
searches geographically.
This country's strength is born from its dedication to the rule of
law, the belief that the best form of government is one that is of the
people, by the people, and for the people--and from its diversity.
It is time for our intelligence community agencies to more fully
commit to reaching all American people in an effort to let them know
that inspiring and important work awaits them in the intelligence
community. Indeed, by more fully tapping into this diversity, we can be
assured of at least one result: the strengthening of our intelligence
community. If the intelligence community is to succeed in its global
mission, it must have a global force.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``yes'' vote on my amendment, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the distinguished ranking
member with whom I had the pleasure of serving on the Intelligence
Committee when I was there some 100 years ago.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
It is a great pleasure to team up with the gentleman again in pursuit
of important priorities for the intelligence community and for our
committee.
[[Page H6150]]
Enhancing diversity in the intelligence community is a continuing
priority for the House and, unfortunately, remains a continuing
challenge for the IC. While there are many intelligence professionals
who are sincerely working to create a culture of inclusion, they
acknowledge that progress is slow.
Mr. Hastings' amendment, together with initiatives championed by
committee colleagues, Representatives Terri Sewell and Andre Carson,
will help ensure that the Director of National Intelligence increases
geographic outreach in IC recruitment efforts.
As coordinator of the IC, the DNI and his team are well postured to
consolidate the separate recruitment activities of each IC entity into
a comprehensive recruitment campaign that reaches every corner of our
Nation, especially underserved regions that have had little interaction
with the intelligence community.
With the DNI's leadership, smart division of labor among IC agencies,
and innovative use of virtual communications vehicles, I am confident
that a comprehensive recruitment campaign can cover the Nation more
effectively and attract a workforce that is more representative of
America.
Once again, I want to thank my colleague, Mr. Hastings, as well as my
HPSCI colleagues for their commitment to diversity, and I encourage my
colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment. I think
we should expand more capabilities into rural areas and do more
recruitment in rural areas. I appreciate this amendment. It has my full
support.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Schneider
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA
AND LEBANON.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services,
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria
and Lebanon and the threat posed to Israel, other United
States regional allies, and other specified interests of the
United States as a result of such support.
(b) Matters for Inclusion.--The report required under
subsection (a) shall include information relating to the
following matters with respect to both the strategic and
tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
(1) A description of arms or related material transferred
by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number
of such arms or related material and whether such transfer
was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional
technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
(2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled
personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria,
including the number and geographic distribution of such
personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli
borders with Syria and Lebanon.
(3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons
learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.
(4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in
Lebanon for non-state actors, including whether such
facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of
Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation
between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
(5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains
that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid
Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production
facilities, including the geographic distribution of such
foreign and domestic supply chains.
(6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or
technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah
to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
(7) An identification of foreign persons that are, based on
credible information, facilitating the transfer of
significant financial support or arms or related material to
Hizballah.
(8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other
United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of
arms or related material or other support offered to
Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
(d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``arms or
related material'' means--
(1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons
or materials or components of such weapons;
(2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or
components of such weapons;
(3) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons;
(4) defense articles or defense services, as those terms
are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of
section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
(5) defense information, as that term is defined in section
644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403);
or
(6) items designated by the President for purposes of the
United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Schneider) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of my bipartisan
amendment to require the Director of National Intelligence to report on
Iran's support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon.
I thank my colleague from North Carolina, Mark Meadows, for his
partnership in this endeavor, as well as Kyrsten Sinema and Norma
Torres for cosponsoring this amendment.
Mr. Chair, Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East are no
secret, and, of late, their malign influence has grown dramatically
across the region, including in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.
Specifically with respect to Syria, Iran is menacingly working to
develop a permanent foothold in the country, increasing the threat to
our key allies Jordan and, in particular, Israel. They are also
assisting terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in supporting Assad.
Battle-tested Hezbollah fighters are subsequently returning to Lebanon
more capable and more dangerous than ever before.
Additionally, with assistance from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah has been
able to amass nearly 150,000 rockets and missiles on the border with
Israel. This figure is a staggering increase from the, roughly, 15,000
rockets they had in 2006.
Iran has exploited several means of transferring weapons to
Hezbollah, including by land and by air. Israel has often targeted
these transfers to stop the weapons from reaching Lebanon. To eliminate
the susceptibility of these transfers to interdiction, Iran is
reportedly building missile production facilities in Lebanon to enable
indigenous rocket-producing capability for Hezbollah.
A domestic missile production capability in Lebanon would enable
Hezbollah to more easily continue to build its rocket arsenal not only
with more weapons, but more sophisticated, more deadly weapons, and
with less reliance on risky transits.
That is why I am offering my amendment today, to focus our
intelligence community on this urgent threat. A DNI report would help
us better understand the extent of Iran's support for terrorist proxies
such as Hezbollah and the threat this support poses to Israel and other
U.S. regional allies.
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important
amendment.
Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I am
proud to support the amendment offered by Representatives Schneider,
Meadows, Torres, and Sinema.
Mr. Chair, it is imperative that our Intelligence, Armed Services,
and Foreign Affairs Committees with oversight of Iran's role in Syria
and Lebanon stay informed of proxy forces operating there and the
strategic threat posed to
[[Page H6151]]
Israel, our other allies, and our Nation's interests in the region.
Requiring that the Director of National Intelligence report on areas
such as arms transfers from Iran to Hezbollah and other militias,
weapons facilities, supply chains, and financial capabilities will help
us gain greater understanding of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapon proliferation in the region.
I thank my colleagues for offering the amendment. I appreciate Mr.
Schneider's leadership on this issue, and I urge the House to support
it.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I urge support of the amendment, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Schneider).
The amendment was agreed to.
{time} 1445
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Bera
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND
PANDEMICS.
(a) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional
committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects
of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate,
accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease
threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the
national security of the United States.
(b) Content.--The briefing under subsection (a) shall
assess--
(1) the economic, social, political, and security risks,
costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the
United States and the international political and economic
system;
(2) the economic, social, political, and security risks,
costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the
United States and the international political and economic
system; and
(3) contributing trends and factor to the matters assessed
under paragraphs (1) and (2).
(c) Examination of Response Capacity.--In examining the
risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and
a possible transnational pandemic under subsection (b), the
Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the
briefing under subsection (a) the response capacity within
affected countries and the international system. In
considering response capacity, the Director shall include--
(1) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect
and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible
transnational pandemic;
(2) the role and capacity of international organizations
and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging
infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability
to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and
(3) the effectiveness of current international frameworks,
agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging
infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.
(d) Form.--The briefing under subsection (a) may be
classified.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Bera) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, as a doctor, I know that understanding and
managing infectious diseases is one of the most important parts of our
security and our national security. The intelligence community has
found that a country's health is directly linked to their stability and
their well-being. We are reminded of this every few years through mass
pandemics that are not going away.
In 2014, we saw the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and just 2 years
ago, we witnessed the Zika outbreak in Central and South America. And,
unfortunately, as a doctor, I know we are going to continue to see
these and other diseases again and again, and we need to be prepared.
So we offer this amendment as a way of getting the intelligence
community to help us with that preparedness, to inform us and make sure
we are not just protecting lives overseas, but we are also protecting
our national interests and our national security.
Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Connolly).
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from California
for his leadership in this very important amendment, and I am proud to
be an original cosponsor with him.
This amendment would require an intelligence briefing on the
anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious diseases and
pandemics. These threats have serious implications for the national
security of the country. Just ask Director of National Intelligence,
Daniel Coats, who earlier this year warned that the increase in the
frequency and diversity of reported disease outbreaks probably will
continue, including the potential of a severe global health emergency
that could lead to major economic and societal disruptions, strain
governmental international resources, and increase calls to the United
States for support.
An outbreak in a remote village can spread to major cities in all six
continents in less than 36 hours. Such an event can lead nations to
close borders, disrupting the flow of people, goods, and services, and
incurring grave economic, social, political, and security costs.
Nearly 70 percent of the world's nations are underprepared to manage
and control such outbreaks.
These are not just hypotheticals. SARS, for example, spread across
four continents, infected 8,100 people, killed more than 700, and cost
the global economy $40 billion between February and July of 2003. The
Ebola and Zika outbreaks cost the American taxpayers more than $6
billion.
Understanding the ability, Mr. Chairman, of affected nations and
international organizations to detect and manage infectious diseases
and transnational pandemics is a vital step to ensuring an effective
response. I urge all of our colleagues to support Mr. Bera's and my
amendment.
I thank Mr. Bera for his leadership.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
One hundred years ago, the great influenza pandemic, often called the
Spanish flu, caused about 50 million deaths worldwide, between 3 to 6
percent of the global population, and far more than the deaths from
combat casualties in World War I. Public health officials have warned
that we are overdue for another pandemic that will likely spread even
more virulently in our globalized world.
While global health may not be a topic that leaps to mind when
thinking of the roles and missions of the intelligence community, the
IC does play a pivotal role in defending us from microscopic threats.
The IC's unique capabilities can be as valuable in combating disease as
the other threats we face.
During the Ebola crisis, NGA and other IC agencies provided
geospatial and other intelligence to health workers battling the
outbreak. Ensuring
[[Page H6152]]
that we are prepared for any potential pandemic will be essential to
saving American lives.
I wholeheartedly support the bipartisan amendment by my colleagues
from California, Virginia, and Washington, and I thank them for working
with the committee staff to refine and perfect it.
Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional comments, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Bera).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Kennedy
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MALIGN
INFLUENCE RESPONSE CENTER.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on
the potential establishment of a center, to be known as the
``Foreign Malign Influence Response Center'' that--
(1) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate elements
of the intelligence community, including elements with
related diplomatic and law enforcement functions;
(2) has access to all intelligence and other reporting
acquired by the United States Government on foreign efforts
to influence, through overt and covert malign activities,
United States political processes and elections;
(3) provides comprehensive assessment, and indications and
warning, of such activities; and
(4) provides for enhanced dissemination of such assessment
to United States policy makers.
(b) Contents.--The Report required by subsection (a)--
(1) shall contain, at a minimum, a discussion of the
desirability of the establishment of such center and any
barriers to such establishment; and
(2) may contain any recommendations the Director determines
appropriate.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman and Ranking Member Schiff
for all their support and advocacy to make this amendment possible
today.
Mr. Chairman, just a few weeks ago, DNI Director Dan Coats warned our
Nation and the world that ``we continue to see Russian targeting of
American society in ways that could affect our midterm elections.''
It is indisputable that Russia succeeded in meddling in our election
in 2016. It is indisputable that their success, with little
consequence, will inspire similar attacks in the future. And it is
indisputable that our response to these threats has been inadequate.
States, cities, and towns have scrambled to secure their own
elections without enough guidance and support from our national
intelligence community.
Voters continue to face a torrent of misinformation online.
Candidates for Congress, city council, and school boards race towards
November 6 uncertain that they will become Putin's next target.
The multiple Federal agencies that are responsible for our Nation's
response rarely coordinate or receive little guidance from our Nation's
government at the highest levels.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment helps to begin to consolidate and
concentrate our response to foreign efforts to influence our political
processes and elections with one center drawing expertise across all
relevant sectors of our government.
If anything, our adversaries have grown more confident in their
ability to sway our elections and sow discord and dysfunction at every
level of our society.
Our urgency lies now in one simple truth: Our democracy stands tall
when our elections stand secure.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment because those who put
ballot boxes in our crosshairs do not ascribe to one political party or
the other.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim time in opposition to the amendment,
even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 10 Offered by Miss Rice of New York
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10
printed in House Report 115-815.
Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:
SEC. 2509. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES BY TERRORIST ACTORS.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop
Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall
submit to Congress a report on the possible exploitation of
virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall
include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the means and methods by which
international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of
terrorism use virtual currencies.
(2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and
State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to
the use by such organizations and States of other forms of
financing to support operations, including an assessment of
the collection posture of the intelligence community on the
use of virtual currencies by such organizations and States.
(3) A description of any existing legal impediments that
inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting
information on or helping prevent the use of virtual
currencies by international terrorist organizations and State
sponsors of terrorism and an identification of any gaps in
existing law that could be exploited for illicit funding by
such organizations and States.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman
from New York (Miss Rice) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.
Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would require the
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury to
develop and submit a threat assessment report on the use of virtual
currencies by terrorist organizations.
In the 17 years since the deadliest terrorist attack in American
history, the United States has led the global campaign to combat
terrorism, thwarting plots and preventing attacks on American soil,
identifying and disrupting terrorist networks around the world, hunting
down terrorists wherever they hide, and proving that they can and will
be brought to justice.
We know that the threat of terrorism is not the same as it was 17
years ago. It is a threat that constantly evolves, and we need to
evolve with it. We need to evolve ahead of it. That is why I have
introduced this amendment.
In recent years, we have seen instances in which members of terrorist
groups have turned to virtual currencies to finance and support their
operations. In 2016, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
investigated a terrorist funding campaign in which a terrorist group in
the Gaza Strip received donations through the virtual currency bitcoin.
Last year, Indonesian authorities also reported that a Syria-
[[Page H6153]]
based Indonesian national with ties to ISIL used virtual currency to
fund attacks in Indonesia.
Virtual currencies offer high-speed, low-cost financial networks with
access to users across the globe. Many also offer their users
anonymity, making it difficult for law enforcement to track
transactions. These factors have made virtual currencies an
increasingly appealing tool for terrorists seeking to circumvent
American law enforcement and financial institutions.
Research suggests that terrorists' use of virtual currencies have so
far been limited to a handful of instances, but, as terrorist
organizations and lone-wolf attackers become more technologically
sophisticated and virtual currencies become more widely accessible, the
conditions are ripe for this threat to significantly increase in a very
short period of time. That is why it is critical that we act now to
assess and understand this emerging threat.
There is no denying it: Virtual currencies have exposed deep
vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts, and, unfortunately,
right now, our government lacks a comprehensive response and strategy
to address this threat.
My amendment would direct the Director of National Intelligence and
the Treasury Department to report to Congress on how terrorist
organizations and state sponsors of terrorism could use virtual
currencies to finance terrorism, gaps in Federal and State regulations
that could be exploited by terrorists, and recommendations to update
regulations to more effectively address these vulnerabilities.
Enacting this amendment would give counterterrorism and law
enforcement officials at all levels the information and strategies they
desperately need to confront this threat head-on with 21st century
solutions.
I want to thank Congressman Peter King for cosponsoring my amendment.
This is a commonsense bipartisan priority, and I urge all of my
colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim time in opposition to the amendment,
even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Bost). Without objection, the gentleman from
California is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may
consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding, and I
rise in support of the amendment offered by the Representatives from
New York, Rice and King.
This amendment requires that the Director of National Intelligence,
with the Department of the Treasury, submit to Congress a report on the
possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors,
including state sponsors of terrorism.
It has long been said that if you wish to uncover the truth about
malign activity, then follow the money. This remains true with the
development and use of virtual currencies.
The IC must always remain one step ahead of our adversaries, and this
amendment will help ensure that they continue to do just that.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Nunes and
Ranking Member Schiff for supporting the amendment, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from New York for
working in a bipartisan manner with a longtime member of our committee,
Mr. King, and I urge passage of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from New York (Miss Rice).
The amendment was agreed to.
{time} 1500
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Lipinski
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title V of division B, add the following new
section:
SEC. 2509. REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN
MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
report describing Iranian expenditures in the previous
calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside
the country, including each of the following:
(1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities
providing support for--
(A) Hezbollah;
(B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
(C) Hamas;
(D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
(E) any other entity or country the Director determines to
be relevant.
(2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic
missile research and testing or other activities that the
Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East
region.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chair and ranking member of
the committee for their work on this bill. This bill is very important
to help make America more secure.
My amendment will help to address the threat of Iran better in this
bill.
According to the State Department, Iran is the world's foremost state
sponsor of terrorism. In spite of Iran's weak economy and U.S.-imposed
sanctions in response to their support for terrorism, abuse of human
rights, and acquisition of prohibited weapons, Iran continues to
support violent groups abroad.
As our diplomatic and military leaders determine how best to respond
to Iran's ongoing destabilization, they should have a detailed
accounting of the amounts spent by Iran to support specific terrorist
groups and foreign military. This is especially important in light of
the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran-backed forces in Syria,
which has only gotten worse in the last couple of days. This
information will send a clear message to Iran and our allies that we do
not tolerate support of terrorism.
In addition, the nonclassified version of this report will shed light
on Iran's behavior for all the world to see.
Specifically, my amendment will require an annual report from the
Director of National Intelligence, describing Iranian expenditures on
military and terrorist activities outside the country, including
support for Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, proxy forces in
Iraq and Syria, and any other entity or country the Director determines
relevant.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of the amendment offered
by my colleague from Illinois, Congressman Lipinski.
This amendment requires that the Director of National Intelligence
submit a report to Congress describing spending by Iran on military and
terrorist activities outside of the country, including spending to
support Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, and proxy forces
elsewhere.
The intelligence community rightly remains focused on Iran's support
for malign foreign military and terrorist activities abroad.
This amendment helps ensure that Congress has full visibility into
the judgments and assessments of the IC
[[Page H6154]]
on Iran's spending to support these groups, and for that reason I
support the amendment.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for
their support of this amendment, and I thank them for their work on
this important bipartisan bill.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for working with our
committee to get support from both sides of the aisle for this
amendment, I urge its passage, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Davidson
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12
printed in House Report 115-815.
Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title V of division B, add the following new
section:
SEC. 2509. INCLUSION OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN ANNUAL REPORT
RELATING TO SECTION 702.
Section 707(b)(1)(G)(ii) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881f(b)(1)(G)(ii)) is
amended by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``,
including whether disciplinary actions were taken as a result
of such an incident of noncompliance and the extent of such
disciplinary actions''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Davidson) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, today, I offer an amendment that is very
straightforward. It simply takes an already existing reporting
requirement within the section 702 program and adds an additional layer
of congressional oversight. This will ensure that the Judiciary
Committee and the Intelligence Committee have insight into how the
intelligence community enforces its own internal guidelines for
handling sensitive data.
Currently, the attorney general provides these committees with
semiannual reports about incidents of intelligence community
noncompliance with the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures
within the 702 program. These are important features that ensure the
collection and use of data is solely for targeting dangerous terrorists
and does not threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans.
However, this report is lacking because it does not describe what, if
any, disciplinary actions are taken by agencies in response to
noncompliance. My amendment would simply require that this report
include information about disciplinary action.
For example, was a violation simply flagged for agency records? Or
was someone given additional training, disciplinary suspension,
termination, or, perhaps, even prosecution?
My amendment intends to provide Congress with a high-level look at
how agencies address the incidents they are already reporting on.
The privacy safeguards contained in the section 702 program are
critical for protecting the constitutional rights of everyday
Americans, and, indeed, the high functioning capability of this
important program for national security.
Congress has the responsibility to make sure agencies are taking
steps to mitigate abuse and enforce statutes, guidelines, and court
orders relevant to this powerful surveillance tool.
This is a commonsense amendment that I have drafted in coordination
with the House Intelligence Committee, and I urge my colleagues to
support its adoption.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment, though I am not opposed.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Lamborn). Without objection, the gentleman from
California is recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the thing I would emphasize is
that it is important for us to understand: A) we should preserve the
702 program; and B) there are some incremental reforms that could make
the program high functioning, and also give the American people peace
of mind that their Fourth Amendment rights are protected.
It is also important for the intelligence community to know that the
programs they have are working, and it can send an important message
that there are disciplinary actions for those who don't follow the
guidelines.
This will give Congress insight into how well that system is
functioning and what disciplinary actions, if any, are taken.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank all of the Members who offered amendments
today. This is a critical piece of legislation, and I look forward to
working with the Senate to send this bill to the President.
This year's bill is named after Matthew Young Pollard, who passed
away earlier this year while carrying out the work of the Senate
Intelligence Committee. Matt was a friend to many on both sides of the
aisle of our committee, a dedicated staff member, and a member of the
Army National Guard. While his loss is devastating to us, we honor his
service to the United States by naming this bill in his memory.
I thank the ranking member for his support on this bill, I urge
passage of the amendment, and urge passage of H.R. 6237, the Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and
2019.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Bost) having assumed the chair, Mr. Lamborn, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 6237) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 989, he reported the bill
back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the
Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
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