[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 117 (Thursday, July 12, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H6129-H6154]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 
                             2018 AND 2019


                             General Leave

  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Emmer). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 989 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 6237.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Weber) to preside 
over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1337


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 6237) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Weber of Texas in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  General debate shall not exceed 1 hour, equally divided and 
controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 6237, the Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
  Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is the most 
important tool Congress has to conduct effective oversight of the 
intelligence activities of the United States Government.
  Today, the Intelligence Committee is bringing its annual intelligence 
authorization bill to the floor. Once again, the bill is a bipartisan 
product that reflects contributions from all committee members. It was 
reported out of the committee by a unanimous voice vote.
  The legislation provides the intelligence community the necessary 
resources and authorities to protect and defend the United States. For 
example, this bill authorizes a committee initiative to streamline 
defense intelligence related to the Defense Intelligence Agency. It 
enhances congressional oversight of intelligence activities by 
mandating intelligence community reports on threats to Federal 
elections, leaks of classified information, security clearance 
processing, and other vital activities. Furthermore, the bill increases 
pay for employees with unique cyber skills and creates a security 
center at the Department of Energy to protect our energy 
infrastructure.
  Mr. Chairman, the bill authorizes enhanced injury benefits to CIA 
employees injured overseas due to hostile acts of terrorist activities. 
Moreover, it reauthorizes the Public Interest Declassification Board, 
aligns the reporting structure of the intelligence community chief 
financial officer and chief intelligence officer with statutes that 
govern other Federal agencies, and codifies longstanding congressional 
reporting requirements regarding the intelligence community information 
technology environment.
  Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community comprises thousands of 
patriotic Americans who do difficult jobs, sometimes at great personal 
risk, to keep Americans safe from foreign threats. Today, these threats 
take many different forms and emanate from various parts of the world.
  In the Middle East, the threat from ISIS has not ceased, despite its 
dramatic loss of territory. In fact, our intelligence professionals now 
face the daunting task of tracking ISIS fighters fleeing Syria for 
countries throughout the region and beyond.
  Meanwhile, Iran is solidifying its influence, often through armed 
proxy militias, in its quest to control a Shiite Crescent across a wide 
swath of the Middle East.
  In Asia, China poses numerous security challenges related to its 
expanding military capabilities, its growing international force 
projection, and its extensive extraterritorial claims. Additionally, 
the Chinese regime is engaged in widespread efforts, including licit 
and illicit means, to acquire critical U.S. national security 
technologies and intellectual property.
  Furthermore, Russia continues to pose a pressing threat to the United 
States and many of our allies.
  This is just a small snapshot of the threats the intelligence 
community addresses every day.
  Additionally, our intelligence professionals confront an array of 
challenges posed by failed states, cyber warfare, nuclear 
proliferation, and many other matters.
  This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our 
intelligence community have the funding authorities and support they 
need to carry out the mission to keep the United States safe, while 
providing Congress with the tools it needs to provide robust oversight 
over their actions.
  I would like to thank the men and women of this country who serve in 
our intelligence community. I am honored to get to know so many of them 
in the course of the committee's oversight work.
  I would also like to thank all of the committee's members for their 
contributions to our oversight over the past year, and especially to 
our subcommittee chairmen and ranking members for their time and their 
efforts. The many hearings, briefings, and oversight visits our members 
carry out during the year provide the input for this authorization and 
the direction of this bill.
  Finally, I would like to thank all the committee staff for their hard 
work and for their daily oversight of the intelligence community.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.


[[Page H6130]]


                                         House of Representatives,


                               Committee on Homeland Security,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2018.
     Hon. Devin Nunes,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Nunes: I am writing to you regarding H.R. 
     6237, the ``Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.'' The bill includes 
     provisions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee 
     on Homeland Security.
       I recognize and appreciate the desire to bring this 
     legislation before the House of Representatives in an 
     expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on 
     Homeland Security will forego action on this bill. However, 
     this is conditional based on our mutual understanding that by 
     foregoing consideration of H.R. 6237 at this time does not 
     prejudice the Committee on Homeland Security with respect to 
     the appointment of conferees or to any future jurisdictional 
     claim over the subject matter contained in this bill or 
     similar legislation.
       This waiver is also given with the understanding that the 
     Committee on Homeland Security reserves its authority to seek 
     conferees on any provision within its jurisdiction during any 
     House-Senate conference that may be convened on this or 
     similar legislation, and requests your support for such a 
     request.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 6237, and ask that a 
     copy of this letter and your response be included in the 
     Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the 
     House floor. I look forward to working with the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence as this bill moves through 
     the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael T. McCaul,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                                    July 11, 2018.
     Hon. Michael T. McCaul,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     6237, the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019. As you noted, certain 
     provisions of the bill are related to the jurisdictional 
     interests of the Committee on Homeland Security. I agree that 
     your letter in no way diminishes or alters the jurisdiction 
     of the Committee on the Homeland Security with respect to the 
     appointment of conferees or any future jurisdictional claim 
     over the subject matters contained in the bill or any similar 
     legislation.
       I appreciate your willingness to assist in expediting this 
     legislation for floor consideration. I will include a copy of 
     your letter and this response in the Congressional Record 
     during consideration of the legislation on the House floor. 
     Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Devin Nunes,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I join the chairman in urging support for the combined 
2018 and 2019 Intelligence Authorization Act, which has been named in 
honor of Matthew Young Pollard, a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer 
who recently passed away, leaving behind a young son and bereaved 
colleagues both in the Senate and here in the House.
  For well over a year now, considerable attention has been focused on 
the House Intelligence Committee and the profound disagreements that we 
have had about the Russia investigation. Those differences remain, and 
the American people should know that my Democratic colleagues on the 
Intelligence Committee and I continue the important work of 
investigating Russia's interference in the 2016 Presidential election.
  Despite our disagreements over Russia with the majority, however, I 
have consistently and publicly maintained that the committee must seek 
to cordon off our disagreements over the Russia investigation and 
continue with our other work on as bipartisan a basis as possible. We 
owe the tens of thousands of men and women in the intelligence 
community nothing less, not only because they put themselves at 
personal risk every day, but also because their work is so important to 
the country that it demands the shared responsibility and oversight of 
the Congress.

                              {time}  1345

  The Intelligence Committee has a history of producing bipartisan 
bills even under the most difficult political circumstances.
  I am pleased that our staffs have worked to reach a mutually 
acceptable final text, and have been able to weed out provisions that 
would have made it impossible to move forward jointly.
  Much of the committee's oversight work is reflected in the bill as 
classified, but we can discuss some of the 2018-2019 IAA's elements 
openly, including the fact that the bill helps to better ensure that 
our elections are free from interference or manipulation.
  This is essential to our democracy, and the bill includes important 
provisions that continue the work that we have been doing in the 
committee during the course of the work on the Russia investigation, 
and as a part of our normal oversight to maintain the integrity of our 
election system.
  The bill also provides funding to our intelligence community in order 
to meet all threats from terrorism to nation-state actors. The bill 
authorizes funding across a wide range of endeavors that will allow the 
intelligence community and the Department of Defense to not only 
respond to threats, but to preempt them.
  The bill takes steps to prevent a repeat of the Russian active 
measures campaign that targeted our 2016 election, by including a 
minority-authored provision requiring a briefing to key congressional 
leaders, including members of the intelligence community and committee, 
if the United States faces a significant foreign cyber intrusion or 
active measures campaign directed at a federal election.
  The bill also ensures that America's technological advantage remains 
a priority for our intelligence services. As such, the bill resources 
and directs efforts that will promote our advantages across a range of 
cutting-edge domains, from space to artificial intelligence.
  It enhances transparency and allows public access to certain work of 
the IC. The bill reauthorizes for 10 years the Public Interest 
Declassification Board which advises the President and executive branch 
agencies on the review and declassification of IC records of historical 
importance.
  The bill also includes minority provisions related to parental leave, 
student loan repayment, and diversity and inclusiveness that are 
intended to make an exceptional workforce even better.
  In the end, the men and women who serve in the intelligence community 
and the Defense Department are the most important factor in the success 
of our national security.
  There are many other provisions in the bill that will build on the 
work of past years and move us further along technical and other 
pathways to meet new challenges and those still on the horizon.
  This bill advances our national security, reinforces the principle of 
congressional oversight, and honors our values as a Nation.
  Mr. Chair, I urge the support of the House, and look forward to 
considering amendments that will make a good bill even better. I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Conaway), the chairman of the Agriculture Committee.
  Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding and for 
his dedicated work on the committee leading us through these rather 
tumultuous times on a lot of fronts, but he has done a terrific job, 
and I have been proud to serve on the committee with him.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in support of the 2018 
Intelligence Authorization Act. Intelligence gathering is of utmost 
importance in our national security and is essential in keeping 
Americans safe here at home.
  It is imperative that we provide to those dedicated individuals of 
our intelligence community the tools, resources, and support they need 
to carry out missions successfully, and Mr. Chairman, this bill does 
just that.
  The successful completion of increasingly difficult missions by these 
consummate professionals ensures policymakers are provided the crucial 
information that they need to make the most informed decisions to 
counter our near-term threats and those peaking on the horizon.
  This bill addresses both challenges of a constantly changing threat 
environment and advances in technology to keep American cybersecurity 
at the forefront of global efforts and a step ahead of our adversaries.
  Mr. Chair, as you and others in the room know as well, our democratic

[[Page H6131]]

elections have become the target of foreign influence campaigns, not 
only here at home, but across the Western world by adversaries seeking 
to undermine and disrupt one of our most sacred democratic 
institutions.
  Mr. Chair, this bill allows for a path for the IC to advise and 
inform those on the front lines of our elections of the perceived 
threats from abroad. In addition, it also ensures that Congress stays 
informed of ongoing adversarial influence campaigns again democratic 
elections across the globe and here at home as well, as well as the 
actions that our IC is taking to counter those threats.
  Mr. Chair, I rise in strong support of this year's Intelligence 
Authorization Act. I encourage all of my colleagues to vote for it. I 
look forward to implementing this in the next year, and the oversight, 
authorities and tools that it gives Congress to be able to continue to 
provide the correct oversight for our intelligence agencies across the 
executive branch.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Carson). He is the ranking 
member on the Emerging Threats Subcommittee and brings a wealth of 
experience in homeland security to the Congress.
  Mr. CARSON of Indiana. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to say a few words about this very 
important bill. I say important because as we face threats around the 
world, threats like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism, 
the annual Intelligence Authorization Act is meant to provide our 
intelligence personnel with the resources and authorities they need to 
keep America safe.

  In some respects, Mr. Chairman, this bill accomplishes that very 
goal. We refocus our resources on countering our most significant 
adversary states. We better equip the intel community to counter 
foreign interference in our elections, which is very critical going 
into 2018, all the way to 2020.
  We give new authorities related to pervasive challenges, including 
threats to our supply chain, recruitment and development of minority 
talent, and strengthening of the cyber and technical workforce.
  I support these very important developments. Unfortunately, Mr. 
Chairman, the bill also supports or indicates significant problematic 
changes to many classified authorities. I am particularly concerned 
about what this means for the way we conduct counterterrorism 
operations.
  Mr. Chairman, the Trump administration has changed counterterrorism 
policies in a way that does not make America safer. By expanding the 
areas where the U.S. Government may be operating and broadening 
authorities, Mr. Chairman, we are planting the seeds of anger and hate 
which will fester and grow, increasing the threat of an attack in the 
future.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in protecting the United States and 
her allies. But, if two decades of the war against terrorism have 
taught us anything, it is that we can't fight our way out of this. Yes, 
we need to target known terrorist leaders, Mr. Chairman, but we also 
need to actively minimize actions that spur new hatred and drive people 
to terrorism.
  After years of striving for a more comprehensive, targeted, and 
productive counterterrorism approach, this bill sends us back to the 
days of broad unrestrained authorities. With so much on the line, Mr. 
Chairman, we should be using this bill to send a message to this 
administration that America must maintain her values.
  Success at any cost is not success at all, but a foolhardy approach 
to leverage power. We must keep America safe, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Alabama (Ms. Sewell). She is the ranking member on the Department of 
Defense Intelligence and Overhead Architecture Subcommittee and does a 
fabulous job for our committee.
  Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal years 2018 and 2019. This 
bill recognizes the critical work that every member of the intelligence 
community performs to protect our Nation: first, by enhancing resources 
and authorities for our highest priority intelligence initiatives, and 
secondly, by enforcing and reinforcing the principles of good 
governance, transparency, and accountability to the American people.
  Mr. Chairman, I am a strong advocate for transparency, which is a 
challenge for the intelligence community because of the need to protect 
sensitive sources and equities, but a challenge that can be met. One 
groundbreaking example is the unclassified January 2017 intelligence 
community assessment that notified Americans about the Russian attack 
on our democracy in the 2016 election.
  This bill directs the intelligence community to continue public 
awareness reporting related to election security because the threat 
from Russia is still ongoing.
  As a ranking member on the HPSCI Subcommittee on Department of 
Defense Intelligence and Overhead Architecture for the last 3 years, 
one of my priorities is to ensure that the United States achieves and 
maintains a leadership position in next-generation technologies, 
especially in space.
  Space is an emerging battleground, so it is imperative for our 
national security that America maintains a strategic advantage in space 
as well as we do on the ground and at sea. Over the last year, the 
subcommittee has continued our dialogue with the intelligence community 
about its accomplishments, but also the challenges it faces and the 
resources it needs to meet these challenges.
  I am pleased to report that this bill includes provisions that 
strengthen our Nation's access and resilience in space by investing in 
next-generation technologies and assets.
  Mr. Chairman, I am also a strong believer that the success of our 
Nation's intelligence operation hinges on our most important asset: our 
people. As our intelligence missions and objectives continue to evolve, 
we will undoubtedly require a more diverse workforce in the 
intelligence community to meet our needs. We must work together to 
build and promote an intelligence community that is truly 
representative of the rich diversity and inclusive society that makes 
our Nation great.
  In order to more effectively address these emerging and ongoing 
threats, we need an agile workforce with a wide range of backgrounds, 
experiences, skill sets, and talents. For that reason, Congress has 
invested in American universities and colleges to provide all students 
with the skills that they need to serve in our intelligence community.
  As smart investors, we want to see that the investment is 
accomplishing the objectives and encouraging qualified graduates to 
apply to join the intelligence community. This bill directs the 
Director of National Intelligence to take a more active role in 
ensuring that one program, in particular, the Intelligence Community 
Centers for Academic Excellence, achieves that objective of diversity.
  I also strongly support the Hastings amendment that directs the 
intelligence community to intensify recruitment outreach at every 
corner of our Nation. Encouraging geographical diversity in the 
intelligence community will naturally also enhance racial, gender, 
cultural, and economic diversity.
  I want to see that every interested student, whether in a big city or 
a small town, is aware of the career opportunities in the intelligence 
community. It is a path that is most important.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from Alabama.
  Ms. SEWELL of Alabama. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, I believe for these 
reasons and others that my colleagues should support this bill.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Heck), someone who we have come to 
rely on in our committee in a great many areas, but, in particular, the 
threat posed by foreign actors investing in American technologies, with 
an eye toward either appropriating our intellectual property, or making 
use of those

[[Page H6132]]

technologies for the purpose of spying on Americans.
  Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member. I am here to 
support the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act.
  Mr. Chair, I was just placed on the Intel Committee a year ago 
January, and I have learned an awful lot, most notably, how incredibly 
difficult it really is to do the work of an intelligence officer. And I 
want to, frankly, take this opportunity to thank all of the members of 
the IC for their dedication and service.
  For as difficult a job as it is, it is even more difficult, if not 
impossible, to do it without a security clearance. In the first 
quarter--you are hearing this number correctly--of this year, the 
average processing time for a top security clearance was 534 days. That 
backlog creates difficulties in hiring in the intelligence and defense 
agencies. And, frankly, it is creating a legacy problem for our future.
  And you are hearing this number correctly, too. The backlog of people 
waiting for those clearances is now over 700,000, and that is what has 
led the Government Accountability Office to declare this ``a high risk 
issue,'' and that means that it is one of the areas that the GAO 
believes is most in need of reform.
  The country cannot wait 2 years to recruit top talent for our IC. 
Applicants for clearance, of course, should be carefully scrutinized, 
and the United States should take care that only responsible and 
trustworthy parties gain access to our Nation's classified information.

                              {time}  1400

  We absolutely should guard it as a national treasure. But we need to 
give the IC the people it needs to collect, process, analyze, and 
distribute information, pure and simple. So the bill before us today 
does, in fact, include language to address the issue of security 
clearances.
  As we progress forward, we must do so methodically, with feedback 
from the most affected. We have a long process ahead of us, but if we 
don't take steps now, frankly, pretty soon it is going to be too late. 
We must address the security clearance dilemma, and we must pass this 
bill to begin that process.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), who is the former ranking member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a great stalwart for the 
men and women who work within the IC.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member 
for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bipartisan bill. First 
and foremost, intelligence is about people. We cannot collect, analyze, 
and utilize intelligence effectively unless we can recruit, hire, and 
retain the best people possible. Therefore, I want to thank Chairman 
Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff, and their staffs, for working with me 
to include provisions in this bill that improve parental leave policies 
of the intelligence community.
  These provisions will ensure that these benefits are, to the fullest 
extent possible, in line with the private sector. Doing so will help 
the IC develop and retain the workforce required to keep America safe 
against all our foes, both new and old.
  This legislation also takes important steps to ensure the IC provides 
critical updates to Congress in the event the United States faces a 
foreign cyber attack or other active measures that threaten the heart 
of our democracy: our elections. There is no doubt that Russia will 
continue to exert a malign influence on the heart and soul of our 
democracy.
  This cannot be tolerated, and I strongly support the efforts of the 
chairman and ranking member to ensure Congress will be informed of the 
most critical threats to our democracy.
  I thank the chairman and ranking member, and the entire intelligence 
community and staff, for their dedicated oversight of the intelligence 
community and their commitment to enhancing national security.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I will briefly say that the former ranking 
member, Mr. Ruppersberger, who has many intelligence professionals in 
his district, is highly regarded in our committee, and I respect and am 
thankful for his support of the bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire of the gentleman whether he 
has any further speakers?
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I have no further speakers.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I will take this opportunity to close, and 
I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, 1 month ago, the CIA held its annual memorial ceremony 
to honor its fallen. This year, the agency added four stars to the 
memorial wall, signifying four officers killed in the line of duty but 
who cannot be publicly named even in death. That, Mr. Chairman, is the 
sacrifice that we ask of our intelligence professionals, and it is one 
that they are prepared to make.
  In exchange for that fidelity, it is our job to provide the 
intelligence community with the tools and authorities that it needs to 
keep us safe, all while exercising our constitutional authority of 
oversight and direction. This bill meets that responsibility, and I 
urge its passage by the House.
  I would also like to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues on 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and our incredible 
staff. In particular, I thank Shannon Stuart, Carly Blake, Alan Souza, 
Mark Stewart, Wells Bennett, Scott Glabe, Rheanne Wirkkala, Amanda 
Rogers Thorpe, Thomas Eager, Kris Breaux, Christine Bocchino, Maher 
Bitar, Shannon Green, Linda Cohen, Patrick Boland, and Tim Bergreen.
  These staff members labor three floors below the Capitol in a space 
we affectionately call--and sometimes unaffectionately call--the 
bunker. They do so for long hours and without daylight. We are very 
grateful to them and for their service.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I thank the staffs on both the majority and minority sides. They do 
put in a lot of effort. It is one of the smallest staffs in the Capitol 
of any committee, so we are thankful that we were able to get this bill 
done in a bipartisan manner. We look for its passage on the floor this 
afternoon.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on House consideration of 
H.R. 6237, the ``Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2018 and 2019.''
  I thank Chairman Nunes, Ranking Member Schiff for their work to bring 
this bill before the full House of consideration.
  Our nation's national security professionals require our support in 
words as well as deeds in the form of legislation like the 
authorization measure we are debating and sufficient funding to carry 
out the work of protecting our great nation from our enemies.
  I offered several Jackson Lee Amendments for consideration under this 
bill.
  I thank the Rules Committee for making in order Jackson Lee Amendment 
No. 3, designated as No. 33 on the Rules Committee roster for 
consideration for this bill.
  This Jackson Lee Amendment, amends the Sense of Congress already in 
the bill on the importance of re-review of security clearances held by 
individuals by adding consideration of whether the security clearance 
holder's association or sympathy with persons or organizations that 
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or 
unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising 
their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of 
any state, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability, 
or other impermissible factors.
  In addition to this amendment, I offered three other Jackson Lee 
Amendments to H.R. 6237:
  The first Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 32 on the Rules 
Committee roster, and would have amended the Sense of Congress already 
in the bill that addresses the importance of conducting background 
checks for retention of security clearances or the issuance of new 
clearances to also consider an applicant's membership in a hate group 
and their participation in activities espoused by hate groups that 
involve violence or incitement of violence which disrupts civic life.
  The second Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 34, on the 
Rules Committee rosters, and would have amended the Sense of Congress 
already in the bill on the

[[Page H6133]]

importance of review of a security clearance by adding that a security 
clearance should not be held by an individual who actively engages in 
violent acts in the United States or its territories that target 
persons based upon their race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity for the purpose of inflicting 
physical harm or emotional distress with the objective of normalizing 
anti-social behavior towards vulnerable groups.
  The third Jackson Lee Amendment is designated as No. 38 on the Rules 
Committee rosters, and would have required that the Director of 
National Intelligence conduct an assessment and report to Congress on 
the reliance of intelligence activities on civilian contractors to 
support Government activities, including intelligence analysis.
  Each of these Jackson Lee Amendments sought to strengthen and improve 
the process of security clearance awards and oversight of contractors 
engaged in national security work.
  The rights and dignity of all Americans must be held dear and 
protected from assaults that challenge the very freedom we value most.
  It is our diversity and our capacity for tolerance of others who are 
different that is the essence of American exceptionalism.
  As a nation we have come through many struggles and challenges to 
reach a point where we accept the diversity of our nation as a strength 
and not a weakness.
  A period in our history that challenges the very foundation of our 
nation was framed by a speech given by Abraham Lincoln on the occasion 
of his nomination to become the Senator from the State of Illinois.
  He said: ``A house divided against itself, cannot stand. I believe 
this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free. I 
do not expect the Union to be dissolved--I do not expect the house to 
fall--but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all 
one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest 
the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest 
in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its 
advocates will push it forward, till it shall become lawful in all the 
States, old as well as new--North as well as South.''
  He was speaking of the pernicious national shame of slavery that led 
ultimately to the Civil War that cost more than 600,00 lives over the 
very question of human rights and human dignity for all persons.
  Although the question of equality and justice for all has been asked 
and answered during pivotal moments in our nation's history today we 
are facing another challenge to our core beliefs.
  I offered these Jackson Lee Amendments to establish that this 
Congress is not wavering in its commitment to protect the lives, 
liberties or freedom of Americans from those who seek to do them harm.
  Specifically, four of the Jackson Lee Amendments were prompted by the 
actions of Mr. Miselis who has a security clearance and worked for 
Northrup Grumman, a major defense contractor, at the time he engaged in 
physical violence against persons protesting racism and white supremacy 
in Charlottesville, Virginia.
  In May 2018, Northrup Grumman was informed of Mr. Miselis' membership 
in RAM and the violent assaults he initiated while he was in 
Charlottesville participating in activities in support of white 
supremacy, which were captured on video and in photos.
  Mr. Miselis worked for a government contractor and held a security 
clearance authorizing him to work on projects that were of vital 
interest to our nation and its defense.
  Northrup Grumman did not dismiss him until the story broke earlier 
this month with media reports on the violence Mr. Miselis engaged in at 
the white supremacists' rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia.
  The violence of RAM members has been a hallmark of the group and its 
members.
  The Anti-Defamation League describes RAM as a white supremacist group 
whose members believe they are fighting against a ``modern world'' 
corrupted by the ``destructive cultural influences'' of liberals, Jews, 
Muslims and non-white immigrants.
  They refer to themselves as the ``premier MMA (mixed martial arts) 
club of the Alt-Right.''
  RAM is characterized as operating like a street-fighting club.
  Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological 
foes, and have been involved in violent clashes during political 
rallies and demonstrations.
  RAM members consider themselves to be part of the ``Alt Right.''
  RAM's membership has deep roots in California's racist skinhead 
movement, and includes individuals who have faced serious criminal 
charges, including assault, robbery and weapon offenses.
  RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazis and racist 
skinheads who were formerly known as the DIY Division, but rebranded 
themselves as the Rise Above Movement in the spring of 2017.
  The FBI has opened an informal investigation into this group because 
of the violence associated with its members.
  The United States is a nation of laws, which gives us the freedom to 
agree and most importantly disagree with not only each other but with 
our government.
  But the limitations to the right to disagree can be best described by 
the ancient wisdom: ``Your right to swing your arms ends just where the 
other person's nose begins.''
  There is a limit to the expression of free speech and the freedom to 
assemble and that limit is violence.
  I know that the work of our intelligence community is difficult and 
often goes without notice by the American public.
  I firmly believe that the actions of those who hold security 
clearances as they go about their lives should reflect the higher goals 
and values of nation.
  To engage in violent acts against persons engaged in constitutionally 
protected activity on account of race, religion, color, gender, sexual 
orientation, language of original, immigration status, or creed is an 
affront to the framers of the Constitution for this great nation.
  The actions of Mr. Miselis put at risk not only his career, but also 
the reputation of people who hold national security clearances.
  The awarding of security clearances to contractors must be better 
managed and the consequences for involvement in activities that would 
be cause for dismissal from the armed services or any federal agency 
should not go unnoticed.
  I am committed to the task of building the capacity and resources of 
the intelligence community to ensure that our nation's national 
security and national defense are all that they need to be.
  I ask that my colleagues support the Jackson Lee Amendment made in 
order for consideration of H.R. 6237, and support the underlying bill.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Poe of Texas). All time for general debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommend by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it 
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 115-80. That 
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 6237

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Matthew 
     Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
     2018 and 2019''.
       (b) Organization.--This Act is organized into two divisions 
     as follows:
       (1) Division a.--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2018.
       (2) Division b.--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2019.

    DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

     SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this 
     division is as follows:

Sec. 101. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 102. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 1101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 1102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 1103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 1104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 1201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 1202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 1301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 1302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 1401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of 
              the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 1402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing 
              environment.
Sec. 1403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.

[[Page H6134]]

                   TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 1501. Period of overseas assignments for certain foreign service 
              officers.
Sec. 1502. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns 
              directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 1503. Foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to 
              Federal election campaigns.
Sec. 1504. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 1505. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 1506. Report on cyber exchange program.
Sec. 1507. Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 1508. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with 
              respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 1509. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 1510. Reports on intelligence community participation in 
              vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 1511. Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures of 
              classified information.
Sec. 1512. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.

     SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.

       In this division, the terms ``congressional intelligence 
     committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have the meaning 
     given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 1101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Funds are hereby authorized to be 
     appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for the conduct of the 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
     following elements of the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.
       (b) Certain Specific Authorization.--Funds appropriated by 
     the Department of Defense Missile Defeat and Defense 
     Enhancements Appropriations Act, 2018 (division B of Public 
     Law 115-96) for intelligence or intelligence-related 
     activities are specifically authorized by the Congress for 
     purposes of section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3094), as specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations pursuant to section 1102, and are subject to 
     such section 504.

     SEC. 1102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 1101 and, subject to section 
     1103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 
     2018, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the 
     elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 
     1101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations prepared to accompany this division.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 1103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2018 by 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 1102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed--
       (1) 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel 
     authorized under such schedule for such element; or
       (2) 10 percent of the number of civilian personnel 
     authorized under such schedule for such element for the 
     purposes of converting the performance of any function by 
     contractors to performance by civilian personnel.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 1102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--Not 
     later than 15 days prior to the exercise of an authority 
     described in subsection (a), the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees--
       (1) a written notice of the exercise of such authority; and
       (2) in the case of an exercise of such authority subject to 
     the limitation in subsection (a)(2), a written justification 
     for the contractor conversion that includes a comparison of 
     whole-of-Government costs.

     SEC. 1104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2018 the sum of $546,900,000.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 797 positions as of 
     September 30, 2018. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account for fiscal year 2018 such additional 
     amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 1102(a).
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2018, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 1102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 1201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2018 the sum of $514,000,000.

     SEC. 1202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Computation of Annuities.--
       (1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period at the 
     end and inserting ``, as determined by using the annual rate 
     of basic pay that would be payable for full-time service in 
     that position.'';
       (B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-month'' 
     and inserting ``2-year'';
       (C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year'' and 
     inserting ``two years'';
       (D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year'' each 
     place such term appears and inserting ``two years'';
       (E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k), and 
     (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m), respectively; 
     and
       (F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
       ``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor 
     Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
       ``(1)  Authority to make designation.--Subject to the 
     rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 
     222, at the time of retirement a married participant found by 
     the Director to be in good health may elect to receive an 
     annuity reduced in accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and 
     designate in writing an individual having an insurable 
     interest in the participant to receive an annuity under the 
     system after the participant's death, except that any such 
     election to provide an insurable interest survivor annuity to 
     the participant's spouse shall only be effective if the 
     participant's spouse waives the spousal right to a survivor 
     annuity under this Act. The amount of the annuity shall be 
     equal to 55 percent of the participant's reduced annuity.
       ``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the participant making such election shall be 
     reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection 
     (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the 
     designated individual is younger than the participant. The 
     total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 
     percent.
       ``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity 
     payable to the designated individual shall begin on the day 
     after the retired participant dies and terminate on the last 
     day of the month before the designated individual dies.
       ``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of 
     designated individual.--An

[[Page H6135]]

     annuity which is reduced under this subsection shall, 
     effective the first day of the month following the death of 
     the designated individual, be recomputed and paid as if the 
     annuity had not been so reduced.''.
       (2) Conforming amendments.--
       (A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The 
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2001 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(1)), by 
     striking ``221(h),'' and inserting ``221(i),''; and
       (ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2082(h)(4)), by 
     striking ``221(k)'' and inserting ``221(l)''.
       (B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 14 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 
     221(i), 221(l),'' and inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 
     221(m),''.
       (b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of 
     section 222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by 
     striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two years''.
       (c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 
     252(b)(3) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 
     1990'' both places that term appears and inserting ``March 
     31, 1991''.
       (d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections 
     (c) and (d), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall 
     have the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time 
     basis in accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United 
     States Code.''.
       (e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by 
     subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as 
     if enacted on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to 
     computations or participants, respectively, as of such date.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 1301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this division shall 
     not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 1302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 1401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER 
                   EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
                   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such 
     personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may 
     designate;'' and inserting ``current and former personnel of 
     the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their 
     immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence 
     may designate;''.

     SEC. 1402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION-
                   SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

       (a) Information-sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of 
     the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
     (6 U.S.C. 485(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and 
     inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places 
     that term appears and inserting ``Director of National 
     Intelligence''.
       (b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 
     U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by striking ``The individual 
     designated as the program manager shall serve as program 
     manager until removed from service or replaced by the 
     President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and 
     inserting ``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, each 
     individual designated as the program manager shall be 
     appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 1403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

       Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
     Center.''.

                   TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 1501. PERIOD OF OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                   SERVICE OFFICERS.

       (a) Length of Period of Assignment.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 502 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
     3982) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(3) In making assignments under paragraph (1), and in 
     accordance with section 903, and, if applicable, section 503, 
     the Secretary shall assure that a member of the Service may 
     serve at a post for a period of not more than six consecutive 
     years.''.
       (b) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--Section 702 
     of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022) is 
     amended by--
       (1) redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Foreign Language Deployment Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, with the 
     assistance of other relevant officials, shall require all 
     members of the Service who receive foreign language training 
     in Arabic, Farsi, Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), Turkish, 
     Korean, and Japanese by the institution or otherwise in 
     accordance with subsection (b) to serve three successive 
     tours in positions in which the acquired language is both 
     relevant and determined to be a benefit to the Department.
       ``(2) Overseas deployments.--In carrying out paragraph (1), 
     at least one of the three successive tours referred to in 
     such paragraph shall be an overseas deployment.
       ``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
     application of paragraph (1) for medical or family hardship 
     or in the interest of national security.
       ``(4) Congressional notification.--The Secretary of State 
     shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives and Committees on 
     Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate at the end 
     of each fiscal year of any instances during the prior twelve 
     months in which the waiver authority described in paragraph 
     (3) was invoked.''.

     SEC. 1502. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 
                   CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND 
                   REFERENDA.

       (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report containing an analytical assessment of 
     the most significant Russian influence campaigns, if any, 
     conducted during the 3-year period preceding the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant 
     current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. 
     Such assessment shall include--
       (1) a summary of such significant Russian influence 
     campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by 
     which such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or 
     likely will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific 
     goal of each such campaign;
       (2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such 
     Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the 
     elections or referenda;
       (3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the 
     intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of 
     assisting the government of such foreign state in defending 
     against or responding to such Russian influence campaigns; 
     and
       (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and 
     responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
       (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) may be 
     submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall 
     contain an unclassified summary.
       (c) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, 
     covert or overt, and by any means, attributable to the 
     Russian Federation directed at an election, referendum, or 
     similar process in a country other than the Russian 
     Federation or the United States.

     SEC. 1503. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CYBERSECURITY 
                   THREATS TO FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.

       (a) Reports Required.--
       (1) In general.--As provided in paragraph (2), for each 
     Federal election, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     coordination with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, shall make publicly available on an 
     internet website an advisory report on foreign 
     counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election 
     campaigns for Federal offices. Each such report shall 
     include, consistent with the protection of sources and 
     methods, each of the following:
       (A) A description of foreign counterintelligence and 
     cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal 
     offices.
       (B) A summary of best practices that election campaigns for 
     Federal offices can employ in seeking to counter such 
     threats.
       (C) An identification of any publicly available resources, 
     including United States Government resources, for countering 
     such threats.
       (2) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this subsection 
     shall be made available as follows:
       (A) In the case of a report regarding a special election 
     held for the office of Senator or Member of the House of 
     Representatives during 2019, not later than the date that is 
     60 days before the date of such special election.
       (B) In the case of a report regarding an election for a 
     Federal office during any subsequent year, not later than the 
     date that is 1 year before the date of the election.
       (3) Information to be included.--A report under this 
     subsection shall reflect the most current information 
     available to the Director of National Intelligence regarding 
     foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats.
       (b) Treatment of Campaigns Subject to Heightened Threats.--
     If the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
     the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
     Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for 
     Federal office is subject to a

[[Page H6136]]

     heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity 
     threat, the Director and the Under Secretary, consistent with 
     the protection of sources and methods, may make available 
     additional information to the appropriate representatives of 
     such campaign.

     SEC. 1504. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY 
                   CLEARANCES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive 
     branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and 
     adjudicating security clearances persists, both within 
     elements of the intelligence community and in other 
     departments of the Federal Government, with some processing 
     times exceeding a year or even more;
       (2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the 
     ability of elements of the intelligence community to hire and 
     retain highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the 
     missions of such elements;
       (3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some 
     such individuals from seeking employment with the 
     intelligence community in the first place, and, when faced 
     with a long wait time, those with conditional offers of 
     employment may opt to discontinue the security clearance 
     process and pursue different opportunities;
       (4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security 
     clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
       (5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of 
     the intelligence community to hire and retain highly 
     qualified personnel, elements should consider, to the extent 
     possible and consistent with national security, permitting 
     new employees to enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and 
     to perform, on a temporary basis pending final adjudication 
     of their security clearances, work that either does not 
     require a security clearance or requires only a low-level 
     interim clearance.
       (b) In General.--Section 506H of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a period; and
       (C) by striking subparagraph (C);
       (2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new 
     subsection (b):
       ``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than 
     March 1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives a report on the security clearances 
     processed by each element of the intelligence community 
     during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall 
     separately identify security clearances processed for Federal 
     employees and contractor employees sponsored by each such 
     element.
       ``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
     include each of the following for each element of the 
     intelligence community for the fiscal year covered by the 
     report:
       ``(A) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
       ``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic 
     reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
       ``(C) The total number of initial security clearance 
     background investigations for new applicants that were 
     adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the 
     prospective applicant, including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably and 
     granted access to classified information; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic 
     background investigations that were adjudicated with notice 
     of a determination provided to the existing employee, 
     including--
       ``(i) the total number that were adjudicated favorably; and
       ``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated unfavorably 
     and resulted in a denial or revocation of a security 
     clearance.
       ``(E) The total number of pending security clearance 
     background investigations, including initial applicant 
     investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not 
     adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained 
     pending as follows:
       ``(i) For 180 days or less.
       ``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12 months.
       ``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18 months.
       ``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24 months.
       ``(v) For 24 months or longer.
       ``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations 
     completed or pending during the year preceding the year for 
     which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12 
     months to complete--
       ``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays incurred 
     during the period covered by the report; and
       ``(ii) the number of such delays involving a polygraph 
     requirement.
       ``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations, 
     including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that 
     resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
       ``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that resulted in incomplete information.
       ``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations 
     that did not result in enough information to make a decision 
     on potentially adverse information.
       ``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.''; and
       (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections 
     (a)(1) and (b)''.

     SEC. 1505. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
     the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report containing 
     an assessment of Russian threat finance. The assessment shall 
     be based on intelligence from all sources, including from the 
     Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the 
     Department of the Treasury.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include each of the following:
       (1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period 
     preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat 
     finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at 
     the behest of--
       (A) officials of the Government of Russia;
       (B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision of law 
     imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
       (C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any other 
     provision of law; or
       (D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
       (2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in 
     threat finance activities relating to Russia, including 
     common methods of conducting such activities and global nodes 
     of money laundering used by Russian threat actors described 
     in paragraph (1) and associated entities.
       (3) An assessment of any connections between Russian 
     individuals involved in money laundering and the Government 
     of Russia.
       (4) A summary of engagement and coordination with 
     international partners on threat finance relating to Russia, 
     especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement 
     and coordination.
       (5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
       (6) An identification of--
       (A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and 
     associated entities into the United States;
       (B) any vulnerabilities within the United States legal and 
     financial system, including specific sectors, which have been 
     or could be exploited in connection with Russian threat 
     finance activities; and
       (C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian money 
     laundering and other forms of threat finance, as well as the 
     threat to the United States financial system and United 
     States efforts to enforce sanctions and combat organized 
     crime.
       (7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) may be submitted in classified form.
       (d) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``threat finance'' means--
       (1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence 
     campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation, 
     terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
       (2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move, 
     raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of 
     threat actors;
       (3) sanctions evasion; and
       (4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or 
     internationally, as defined by the President.

     SEC. 1506. REPORT ON CYBER EXCHANGE PROGRAM.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the potential establishment of a fully voluntary 
     exchange program between elements of the intelligence 
     community and private technology companies under which--
       (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
     with demonstrated expertise and work experience in 
     cybersecurity or related disciplines may elect to be 
     temporarily detailed to a private technology company that has 
     elected to receive the detailee; and
       (2) an employee of a private technology company with 
     demonstrated expertise and work experience in cybersecurity 
     or related disciplines may elect to be temporarily detailed 
     to an element of the intelligence community that has elected 
     to receive the detailee.
       (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An assessment of the feasibility of establishing the 
     exchange program described in such subsection.
       (2) Identification of any challenges in establishing the 
     exchange program.
       (3) An evaluation of the benefits to the intelligence 
     community that would result from the exchange program.

     SEC. 1507. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER 
                   MATTERS.

       (a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General 
     of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
     inspectors general for the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review of the 
     authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other 
     practices and procedures relating to intelligence community 
     whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors 
     general.
       (b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review 
     required under subsection (a) is to

[[Page H6137]]

     identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or other issues, 
     which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of 
     intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate 
     inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence 
     committees, and the fair and expeditious investigation and 
     resolution of such matters.
       (c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall take such measures as the 
     Inspector General determines necessary in order to ensure 
     that the review required by subsection (a) is conducted in an 
     independent and objective fashion.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a written report containing the 
     results of the review required under subsection (a), along 
     with recommendations to improve the timely and effective 
     reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to 
     inspectors general and to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the fair and expeditious investigation and 
     resolution of such matters.

     SEC. 1508. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN 
                   INVESTMENTS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the heads of the elements of the 
     intelligence community determined appropriate by the 
     Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the role of the Director in preparing 
     analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the 
     Federal Government of national security risks associated with 
     potential foreign investments into the United States.
       (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       (1) a description of the current process for the provision 
     of the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
       (2) an identification of the most significant benefits and 
     drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the 
     Director, including the sufficiency of resources and 
     personnel to prepare such materials; and
       (3) recommendations to improve such process.

     SEC. 1509. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF 
                   UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       ``(a) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
     months, each covered official shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on 
     investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of 
     classified information.
       ``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period, 
     the following:
       ``(A) The number of investigations opened by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information.
       ``(B) The number of investigations completed by the covered 
     official regarding an unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information.
       ``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations 
     identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred to the 
     Attorney General for criminal investigation.
       ``(b) Department of Justice Reporting.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6 
     months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
     of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the 
     Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the 
     status of each referral made to the Department of Justice 
     from any element of the intelligence community regarding an 
     unauthorized disclosure of classified information made during 
     the most recent 365-day period or any referral that has not 
     yet been closed, regardless of the date the referral was 
     made.
       ``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a 
     minimum, the following:
       ``(A) The date the referral was received.
       ``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged 
     unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was 
     substantiated by the Department of Justice.
       ``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of 
     classification of the information that was revealed in the 
     unauthorized disclosure.
       ``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal 
     investigation related to the referral is active.
       ``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal charges 
     have been filed related to the referral.
       ``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department of 
     Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized 
     disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
       ``(c) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this 
     section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have 
     a classified annex.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' 
     means--
       ``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence 
     community; and
       ``(B) the inspectors general with oversight responsibility 
     for an element of the intelligence community.
       ``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any 
     inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an 
     unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
       ``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--
     The term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information' 
     means any unauthorized disclosure of classified information 
     to any recipient.
       ``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified 
     information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of 
     classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of 
     classified information to a journalist or media 
     organization.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
     inserting after the item relating to section 1104 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized 
              disclosures of classified information.''.

     SEC. 1510. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
                   VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL 
                   GOVERNMENT.

       (a) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Policy and Process.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a written report describing--
       (A) with respect to each element of the intelligence 
     community--
       (i) the title of the official or officials responsible for 
     determining whether, pursuant to criteria contained in the 
     Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document or any 
     successor document, a vulnerability must be submitted for 
     review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
       (ii) the process used by such element to make such 
     determination; and
       (B) the roles or responsibilities of that element during a 
     review of a vulnerability submitted to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Process.
       (2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days 
     after any significant change is made to the process and 
     criteria used by any element of the intelligence community 
     for determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review 
     under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report describing such change.
       (3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this 
     subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
     include a classified annex.
       (b) Annual Reports.--
       (1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each 
     calendar year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     classified report containing, with respect to the previous 
     year--
       (A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for review 
     under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
       (B) the number of vulnerabilities described in subparagraph 
     (A) disclosed to each vendor responsible for correcting the 
     vulnerability, or to the public, pursuant to the 
     Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
       (C) the aggregate number, by category, of the 
     vulnerabilities excluded from review under the 
     Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in paragraph 
     5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
     document.
       (2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that 
     contains--
       (A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to 
     vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Process; and
       (B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed to 
     vendors or the public pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Process known to have been patched.
       (3) Nonduplication.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     may forgo submission of an annual report required under this 
     subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing that, with 
     respect to the same calendar year, an annual report required 
     by paragraph 4.3 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and 
     Process document already has been submitted to Congress, and 
     such annual report contains the information that would 
     otherwise be required to be included in an annual report 
     under this subsection.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
     The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process 
     document'' means the executive branch document entitled 
     ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process'' dated 
     November 15, 2017.
       (2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term 
     ``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency 
     review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities 
     Equities Policy and Process document or any successor 
     document.
       (3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a 
     weakness in an information system or its components (for 
     example, system security procedures, hardware design, and 
     internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect 
     confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.

     SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CERTAIN 
                   DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires 
     elements of the intelligence community to keep the 
     congressional intelligence

[[Page H6138]]

     committees ``fully and currently informed'' about all 
     ``intelligence activities'' of the United States, and to 
     ``furnish to the congressional intelligence committees any 
     information or material concerning intelligence activities * 
     * * which is requested by either of the congressional 
     intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized 
     responsibilities.''.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community 
     authorities, obligate an element of the intelligence 
     community to submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees written notification, by not later than 7 days 
     after becoming aware, that an individual in the executive 
     branch has disclosed covered classified information to an 
     official of an adversary foreign government using methods 
     other than established intelligence channels; and
       (2) each such notification should include--
       (A) the date and place of the disclosure of classified 
     information covered by the notification;
       (B) a description of such classified information;
       (C) identification of the individual who made such 
     disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure was 
     made; and
       (D) a summary of the circumstances of such disclosure.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary 
     foreign government'' means the government of any of the 
     following foreign countries:
       (A) North Korea.
       (B) Iran.
       (C) China.
       (D) Russia.
       (E) Cuba.
       (2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered 
     classified information'' means classified information that 
     was--
       (A) collected by an element of the intelligence community; 
     or
       (B) provided by the intelligence service or military of a 
     foreign country to an element of the intelligence community.
       (3) Established intelligence channels.--The term 
     ``established intelligence channels'' means methods to 
     exchange intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence 
     relationships, as established pursuant to law by the Director 
     of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency, or other head of an element of the intelligence 
     community.
       (4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term 
     ``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or 
     employee of the executive branch, including individuals--
       (A) occupying a position specified in article II of the 
     Constitution;
       (B) appointed to a position by an individual described in 
     subparagraph (A); or
       (C) serving in the civil service or the senior executive 
     service (or similar service for senior executives of 
     particular departments or agencies).

     SEC. 1512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
                   ENERGY.

       (a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--
       (1) Clarification of functions of the administrator for 
     nuclear security.--Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 
     2402(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and
       (B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as 
     paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.
       (2) Counterintelligence programs.--Section 3233(b) of the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 
     2423(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting 
     ``Department''; and
       (B) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the Office 
     of''.
       (b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the 
     Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended 
     by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
       (c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of 
     section 106(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and 
     Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
       (2) by striking subparagraph (F);
       (3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as 
     subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively; and
       (4) in subparagraph (H), as so redesignated, by realigning 
     the margin of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left.

    DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this 
     division is as follows:

Sec. 201. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 202. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science, 
              technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and 
              addition of special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 2304. Repeal of Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 2305. Permanent enhanced procurement authority to manage supply 
              chain risks.
Sec. 2306. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 2307. Development of secure cellular voice solution for 
              intelligence community.
Sec. 2308. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 2309. Submission of intelligence community policies.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 2401. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2402. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 2411. CIA subsistence for personnel assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation 
              payments and other payments for CIA personnel.
Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the 
              Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
              certain senior level positions in the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.

     Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 
                          Department of Energy

Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of 
              Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive 
              Committee and budget reporting requirement.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 2431. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security 
              personnel at field locations.
Sec. 2432. Framework for roles, missions, and functions of Defense 
              Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2433. Consultation by Secretary of Defense with Director of 
              National Intelligence for certain functions.
Sec. 2434. Construction of National Security Agency East Campus 
              Building 3.
Sec. 2435. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance 
              Office.

                   TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 2501. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 2502. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 2503. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and 
              active measures campaigns directed at elections for 
              Federal offices.
Sec. 2504. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related 
              programs.
Sec. 2505. Comptroller General of the United States report on senior 
              executives of the Office of the Director of National 
              Intelligence.
Sec. 2506. Briefings on counterintelligence activities of the Federal 
              Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 2507. Briefing on FBI offering permanent residence to sources and 
              cooperators.
Sec. 2508. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security 
              Act of 1947.

     SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

       In this division, the terms ``congressional intelligence 
     committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have the meaning 
     given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

[[Page H6139]]

  


     SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the 
     intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs 
     (1) through (16) of section 2101, are those specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany 
     this division.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     subsection (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, 
     within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2019 the sum of $514,524,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 2102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2020.
       (b) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to 
     be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2019 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 2102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2019 the sum of $514,000,000.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

     SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this division shall 
     not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, 
                   TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS 
                   POSITIONS AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY 
                   FOR CYBER POSITIONS.

       Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3049a) is amended--
       (1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
       ``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring 
     Expertise in Science, Technology, Engineering, or 
     Mathematics.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5, 
     United States Code, the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of 
     positions in such element that require expertise in science, 
     technology, engineering, or mathematics--
       ``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
       ``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of pay of 
     the pay range for each grade or level, subject to subsection 
     (b) or (c), as applicable.
       ``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting 
     from the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) 
     shall be basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those 
     specified in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States 
     Code.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as 
     subsections (c) through (g), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the 
     Director of the National Security Agency may establish a 
     special rate of pay--
       ``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for level 
     II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313 of title 5, 
     United States Code, if the Director certifies to the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with 
     the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
     that the rate of pay is for positions that perform functions 
     that execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
       ``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for the 
     Vice President of the United States under section 104 of 
     title 3, United States Code, if the Director certifies to the 
     Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that have advanced 
     skills and competencies and that perform critical functions 
     that execute the cyber mission of the Agency.
       ``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate 
     under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay 
     limitation that parallels the limitation established in 
     section 5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that--
       ``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other 
     similar cash payment in addition to basic pay that is 
     authorized under title 10, United States Code, (or any other 
     applicable law in addition to title 5 of such Code, excluding 
     the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) 
     shall also be counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
       ``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate 
     established for the Vice President of the United States under 
     section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
       ``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of 
     individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph 
     (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
       ``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of 
     pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may 
     not be used as comparative references for the purpose of 
     fixing the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of 
     qualified positions under section 1599f of title 10, United 
     States Code, or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 147).'';
       (4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), a minimum'';
       (5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
       (6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017'' and inserting ``Not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)'' after 
     ``subsection (a)''.

     SEC. 2304. REPEAL OF JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.

       (a) Repeal.--Section 101A of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022) is hereby repealed.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of such Act is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 101A.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 102A(c)(1)(B) of such 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by striking ``and, after 
     obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community 
     Council''.

     SEC. 2305. PERMANENT ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE 
                   SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS.

       Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-87; 125 Stat. 1875; 50 
     U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking subsection (g).

     SEC. 2306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
                   ENVIRONMENT.

       (a) Roles and Responsibilities.--
       (1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating 
     the performance by elements of the intelligence community of 
     IC ITE, including each of the following:
       (A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable IC ITE rules 
     and regulations.
       (B) Ensuring IC ITE measurable performance goals exist.
       (C) Documenting IC ITE standards and practices.
       (D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the intelligence 
     community related to any disagreements arising out of the 
     implementation of IC ITE.
       (E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of the 
     intelligence community and carrying out such other 
     responsibilities as are necessary for the effective 
     implementation of IC ITE.
       (2) Key service providers.--Key service providers shall be 
     responsible for--
       (A) providing key services, in coordination with the 
     Director of National Intelligence; and
       (B) providing the Director with information requested and 
     required to fulfill the responsibilities of the Director 
     under paragraph (1).
       (3) Use of key services.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     each element of the intelligence community shall use key 
     services when such services are available.
       (B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence may 
     provide for a written exception to the requirement under 
     subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there is a 
     compelling financial or mission need for such exception.
       (b) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall designate and maintain one or 
     more accountable IC ITE executives to be responsible for--
       (1) IC ITE management, financial control, and integration;
       (2) ensuring the performance of each key service, including 
     establishing measurable service requirements and schedules;
       (3) ensuring independent testing of each IC ITE core 
     service, including testing by the intended users, to evaluate 
     performance against measurable service requirements and to 
     ensure the capability meets user requirements; and
       (4) coordinate IC ITE transition or restructuring efforts, 
     including phase out of legacy systems.
       (c) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the

[[Page H6140]]

     Director of National Intelligence shall develop and maintain 
     a security plan for IC ITE.
       (d) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the 
     second and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that shall 
     include each of the following:
       (1) A description of the minimum required and desired key 
     service requirements, including--
       (A) key performance parameters; and
       (B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
       (2) IC ITE implementation milestones, including each of the 
     following:
       (A) A schedule for expected deliveries of key service 
     capabilities during each of the following phases:
       (i) Concept refinement and technology maturity 
     demonstration.
       (ii) Development, integration, and demonstration,
       (iii) Production, deployment, and sustainment.
       (iv) System retirement.
       (B) Dependencies of such key service capabilities.
       (C) Plans for the transition or restructuring necessary to 
     incorporate key service capabilities.
       (D) A description of any legacy systems and discontinued 
     capabilities to be phased out.
       (3) Such other matters as the Director determines 
     appropriate.
       (e) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and during each of the second 
     and fourth fiscal quarters thereafter, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a business plan that includes each of 
     the following:
       (1) A uniform approach to identify IC ITE key service 
     funding requests within the proposed budget, including 
     multiyear plans to implement the long-term roadmap required 
     by subsection (d).
       (2) A uniform approach by which each element of the 
     intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy 
     information technology or alternative capabilities where IC 
     ITE services will also be available.
       (3) A uniform effort by which each element of the 
     intelligence community shall identify transition and 
     restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring IC ITE 
     services, as well as IC ITE services that have changed 
     designations among core service, service of common concern, 
     and agency unique service.
       (4) A fair and equitable rate structure for use of IC ITE.
       (f) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the 
     congressional intelligence committees quarterly updates 
     regarding ongoing implementation of IC ITE as compared to the 
     requirements in the most recently submitted security plan 
     required by subsection (c), long-term roadmap required by 
     subsection (d), and business plan required by subsection (e).
       (g) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide timely notification to the 
     congressional intelligence committees regarding any policy 
     changes related to or affecting IC ITE, new initiatives or 
     strategies related to or impacting IC ITE, and changes or 
     deficiencies in the execution of the security plan required 
     by subsection (c), long-term roadmap required by subsection 
     (d), and business plan required by subsection (e).
       (h) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``agency unique service'' means a capability 
     that is unique to and used only within one element of the 
     intelligence community.
       (2) The term ``core service'' means a capability that is 
     available to multiple elements of the intelligence community 
     and required for consistent operation of IC ITE.
       (3) The term ``intelligence community information 
     technology environment'' or ``IC ITE'' means all of the 
     information technology services across the intelligence 
     community, including the data sharing and protection 
     environment across multiple classification domains.
       (4) The term ``key service'' is a core service or service 
     of common concern, but is not an agency unique service.
       (5) The term ``key service provider'' is the entity 
     responsible and accountable for implementing a key service 
     within the IC ITE.
       (6) The term ``service of common concern'' means a 
     capability available across IC ITE that is of interest to two 
     or more elements of the intelligence community.
       (i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after 
     September 30, 2024.

     SEC. 2307. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE CELLULAR VOICE SOLUTION FOR 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall certify and approve the operation of a National 
     Intelligence Program enterprise-wide secure voice cellular 
     solution that leverages commercially available technology and 
     operates on existing commercial cellular networks.
       (b) Policy.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     establish an intelligence community policy for the cellular 
     voice solution required by subsection (a) that addresses each 
     of the following:
       (1) Determinations regarding eligibility to use a device 
     covered by such cellular voice solution.
       (2) The appropriate classification levels associated with 
     the use of secure cellular phones.
       (3) Measures that should be taken prior to initiating or 
     receiving a secure cellular call.
       (4) Appropriate methods for storage of secure devices when 
     not in the physical possession of an authorized user.
       (5) Such other matters as the Director determines 
     appropriate.
       (c) Costs.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
     ensure that annual operating costs of the secure cellular 
     solution requirement in subsection (a), excluding initial 
     development and deployment, are born on a cost-reimbursable 
     basis by each relevant element of the intelligence community.

     SEC. 2308. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.

       (a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish a policy for minimum insider 
     threat standards.
       (b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community shall implement the policy established 
     under subsection (a).

     SEC. 2309. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.

       (a) Submission of Policies.--
       (1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees using the electronic repository all non-publicly 
     available policies, directives, and guidance issued by the 
     Director of National Intelligence for the intelligence 
     community that are in effect as of the date of the 
     submission.
       (2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the 
     date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues, 
     modifies, or rescinds a policy, directive, or guidance of the 
     intelligence community, the Director shall--
       (A) notify the congressional intelligence committees of 
     such addition, modification, or removal; and
       (B) update the electronic repository with respect to such 
     addition, modification, or removal.
       (b) Electronic Repository Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``electronic repository'' means the electronic 
     distribution mechanism, in use as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, or any successor electronic 
     distribution mechanism, by which the Director of National 
     Intelligence submits to the congressional intelligence 
     committees information.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

     SEC. 2401. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new sentence: ``The Chief Financial Officer shall report 
     directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.

     SEC. 2402. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new sentence: ``The Chief Information Officer shall report 
     directly to the Director of National Intelligence.''.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

     SEC. 2411. CIA SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE 
                   LOCATIONS.

       Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,'' 
     and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
       (2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):
       ``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during 
     any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence 
     to any personnel assigned to an overseas location designated 
     by the Agency as an austere location.''.

     SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' 
                   COMPENSATION PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR 
                   CIA PERSONNEL.

       (a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 19 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY 
                   REASON OF WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR 
                   TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

       ``(a) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
       ``(1) Increase.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency may increase the amount of monthly compensation paid 
     to a covered employee under section 8105 of title 5, United 
     States Code. Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may 
     determine the amount of each such increase by taking into 
     account--
       ``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
       ``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee 
     became injured; and
       ``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
       ``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, 
     United States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation 
     increased under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay 
     of the maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General 
     Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(b) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director 
     may pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a 
     covered employee, a covered individual, or a covered 
     dependent, or may reimburse a covered employee, a covered 
     individual, or a covered dependent for such costs, that are 
     not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States 
     Code, or other provision of Federal law.
       ``(c) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of 
     the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to 
     this section

[[Page H6141]]

     shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent' 
     means a family member of a covered employee who, on or after 
     September 11, 2001--
       ``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned duty 
     station in a foreign country; and
       ``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
       ``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means 
     an officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency 
     who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by 
     reason of a qualifying injury.
       ``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual' 
     means an individual who--
       ``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency 
     from other agencies of the United States Government or from 
     the Armed Forces; or
       ``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency, 
     as determined by the Director; and
       ``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured 
     by reason of a qualifying injury.
       ``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury' 
     means the following:
       ``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury 
     incurred--
       ``(i) during war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist 
     activities occurring during a period in which the covered 
     dependent is accompanying the covered employee to an assigned 
     duty station in a foreign country; and
       ``(ii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of 
     the covered dependent.
       ``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered 
     individual, an injury incurred--
       ``(i) during war, insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist 
     activities occurring during a period of assignment to a duty 
     station in a foreign country; and
       ``(ii) that was not the result of the willful misconduct of 
     the covered employee or the covered individual.''.
       (b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency shall--
       (1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable 
     implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
       (2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
     such regulations.
       (c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply 
     with respect to--
       (1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such 
     section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code, 
     beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; 
     and
       (2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 
     19A occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE 
                   JURISDICTION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY.

       Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence 
     Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Policemen'' 
     and inserting ``Police Officers''; and
       (2) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and 
     inserting ``500 yards;''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and 
     inserting ``500 yards.''.

     SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT 
                   FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--
     Section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3036) is amended by striking subsection (g).
       (b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
     (Public Law 108-487) is amended by striking subsection (c).

     Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of 
                          Department of Energy

     SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

       (a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy 
     Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as 
     follows:


            ``office of intelligence and counterintelligence

       ``Sec. 215. 
       ``(a) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of 
     Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be 
     under the National Intelligence Program.
       ``(b) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the 
     Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior 
     Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the 
     Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service 
     that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of 
     National Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of 
     the Office shall report directly to the Secretary.
       ``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as 
     the Director from among individuals who have substantial 
     expertise in matters relating to the intelligence community, 
     including foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
       ``(c) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and 
     control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such 
     duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may 
     prescribe.
       ``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing 
     policy for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and 
     activities at the Department.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section, the terms 
     `intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program' 
     have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).''.
       (b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of 
     Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of the Department of Energy Organization Act is 
     amended by striking the items relating to sections 215 and 
     216 and inserting the following new item:

``215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.

     SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
                   CENTER.

       Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection (d):
       ``(d) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The 
     President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security 
     Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools 
     to analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the 
     security of the energy infrastructure of the United States.
       ``(B) The Secretary shall appoint the head of the Energy 
     Infrastructure Security Center.
       ``(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be 
     located within the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence.
       ``(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security 
     Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and 
     Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and 
     objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence 
     relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of the 
     United States:
       ``(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United 
     States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
     intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States 
     pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of 
     the United States.
       ``(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies 
     have full access to and receive intelligence support needed 
     to execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and 
     perform independent, alternative analyses.
       ``(C) Establishing a central repository on known and 
     suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the 
     United States, including with respect to any individuals, 
     groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such 
     infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and 
     networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.
       ``(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to 
     the security of the energy infrastructure of the United 
     States, including threats and analyses, to the President, to 
     the appropriate departments and agencies, and to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress.
       ``(3) The President may waive the requirements of this 
     subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President 
     determines that such requirements do not materially improve 
     the ability of the United States Government to prevent and 
     halt attacks against the energy infrastructure of the United 
     States. Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and 
     shall include a description of how the missions and 
     objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.
       ``(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver 
     authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall 
     submit to Congress from time to time updates and plans 
     regarding the establishment of an Energy Infrastructure 
     Security Center.''.

     SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE 
                   EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENT.

       Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 7144a) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(a) Duty of Secretary.--''; and
       (2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

     SEC. 2431. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                   SECURITY PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.

       Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis shall transfer not less than 40 
     personnel who are stationed, as of the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, at the Department of Homeland Security 
     headquarters located at Nebraska Avenue Northwest, 
     Washington, District of Columbia, to locations at least 30 
     miles from such headquarters in order to collocate such 
     personnel with and provide support for Department of Homeland 
     Security operational units from Customs and Border 
     Protection, the Transportation Security Administration, 
     Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or other elements of the 
     Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 2432. FRAMEWORK FOR ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS OF 
                   DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a framework 
     to ensure the appropriate balance of resources for the roles, 
     missions, and functions of the Defense Intelligence Agency in 
     its capacity as an element of the intelligence community and 
     as a combat support agency. The framework shall include 
     supporting processes to provide for the consistent and 
     regular reevaluation of the responsibilities and resources of 
     the Defense Intelligence Agency to prevent imbalanced 
     priorities, insufficient or misaligned resources, and the 
     unauthorized expansion of mission parameters.
       (b) Matters for Inclusion.--The framework required under 
     subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

[[Page H6142]]

       (1) A lexicon providing for consistent definitions of 
     relevant terms used by both the intelligence community and 
     the Department of Defense, including each of the following:
       (A) Defense intelligence enterprise.
       (B) Enterprise manager.
       (C) Executive agent.
       (D) Function.
       (E) Functional manager.
       (F) Mission.
       (G) Mission manager.
       (H) Responsibility.
       (I) Role.
       (J) Service of common concern.
       (2) An assessment of the necessity of maintaining separate 
     designations for the intelligence community and the 
     Department of Defense for intelligence functional or 
     enterprise management constructs.
       (3) A repeatable process for evaluating the addition, 
     transfer, or elimination of defense intelligence missions, 
     roles, and functions, currently performed or to be performed 
     in the future by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which 
     includes each of the following:
       (A) A justification for the addition, transfer, or 
     elimination of a mission, role, or function.
       (B) The identification of which, if any, element of the 
     Federal Government performs the considered mission, role, or 
     function.
       (C) In the case of any new mission, role, or functions--
       (i) an assessment of the most appropriate agency or element 
     to perform such mission, role, or function, taking into 
     account the resource profiles, scope of responsibilities, 
     primary customers, and existing infrastructure necessary to 
     support such mission, role, or function; and
       (ii) a determination of the appropriate resource profile 
     and an identification of the projected resources needed and 
     the proposed source of such resources over the future-years 
     defense program, to be provided in writing to any elements of 
     the intelligence community or the Department of Defense 
     affected by the assumption, transfer, or elimination of any 
     mission, role, or function.
       (D) In the case of any mission, role, or function proposed 
     to be assumed, transferred, or eliminated, an assessment, 
     which shall be completed jointly by the heads of each element 
     affected by such assumption, transfer, or elimination, of the 
     risks that would be assumed by the intelligence community and 
     the Department if such mission, role, or function is assumed, 
     transferred, or eliminated.
       (E) A description of how determinations are made regarding 
     the funding of programs and activities under the National 
     Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program, 
     including--
       (i) which programs or activities are funded under each such 
     Program;
       (ii) which programs or activities should be jointly funded 
     under both such Programs and how determinations are made with 
     respect to funding allocations for such programs and 
     activities; and
       (iii) the thresholds and process for changing a program or 
     activity from being funded under one such Program to being 
     funded under the other such Program.

     SEC. 2433. CONSULTATION BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WITH DIRECTOR 
                   OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS.

       Section 105(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3038(b)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph 
     (1) by inserting ``, in consultation with the Director of 
     National Intelligence,'' after ``the Secretary of Defense''.

     SEC. 2434. CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY EAST 
                   CAMPUS BUILDING 3.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that in 
     carrying out the construction at the National Security Agency 
     East Campus, the Director of the National Security Agency 
     should prioritize the consolidation of national intelligence 
     mission activities on such campus and away from disparate 
     leased facilities in the Washington-Baltimore region.
       (b) Incremental Construction of East Campus Building 3.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of the National Security 
     Agency may provide for the construction of East Campus 
     Building 3, as authorized in section 2102, in increments, 
     subject to annual appropriations, except that the total 
     amount expended on the construction of East Campus Building 3 
     may not exceed $775,000,000.
       (2) Fiscal year 2019.--The authorization of appropriations 
     for East Campus Building 3 under section 2102 is an 
     authorization to proceed with the construction of East Campus 
     Building 3. The Director of the National Security Agency 
     shall conduct necessary activities during fiscal year 2019 to 
     avoid delays in project completion.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security 
     Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a plan for the construction of East Campus 
     Building 4 and East Campus Building 5. Such plan shall 
     include--
       (1) a list of commercial leases in the Washington-Baltimore 
     region that could be terminated if Congress authorizes the 
     construction of East Campus Building 4 and East Campus 
     Building 5; and
       (2) an analysis of options to accelerate East Campus 
     construction efforts.

     SEC. 2435. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL 
                   RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       (a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Advisory Board.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National 
     Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section 
     referred to as the `Board').
       ``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
       ``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, including with respect to space, 
     overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters; and
       ``(B) advise and report directly the Director with respect 
     to such matters.
       ``(3) Members.--
       ``(A) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be composed 
     of 5 members appointed by the Director from among individuals 
     with demonstrated academic, government, business, or other 
     expertise relevant to the mission and functions of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office.
       ``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a term of 
     2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph (C), a member may 
     not serve more than 3 terms.
       ``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy 
     occurring before the expiration of the term for which the 
     member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only 
     for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the 
     expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken 
     office.
       ``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be 
     appointed by the Director from among the members.
       ``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel 
     expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in 
     accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of 
     chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint an 
     executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
       ``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than 
     quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the 
     Director.
       ``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the 
     Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on the activities of the 
     Board during the preceding year.
       ``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not 
     apply to the Board.''.
       (b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office shall appoint the initial 5 
     members to the advisory board under subsection (d) of section 
     106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041a), 
     as added by subsection (a).

                   TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 2501. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

       Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act 
     of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended 
     by striking ``2018'' and inserting ``2028''.

     SEC. 2502. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Correcting Long-standing Material Weaknesses.--Section 
     368 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2010 (Public Law 110-259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby 
     repealed.
       (b) Annual Report on Interactions Between Intelligence 
     Community and Entertainment Industry.--Section 308 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division 
     N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 813; 50 U.S.C. 3222) is 
     amended by striking subsection (c).
       (c) Declassification Review With Respect to Detainees 
     Transferred From United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
     Cuba.--Section 601 of such Act (division N of Public Law 115-
     31; 131 Stat. 827) is hereby repealed.
       (d) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--
     Section 210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 
     124k) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (c); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as 
     subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
       (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
       (A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     period; and
       (B) by striking paragraph (9).
       (e) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (g); and
       (2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections 
     (g) and (h), respectively.

     SEC. 2503. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER 
                   INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS 
                   DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.

       (a) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions 
     and Active Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
     jointly carry out subsection (b) if such Directors and the 
     Secretary jointly determine--
       (1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures 
     campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any 
     Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and
       (2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion 
     or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a 
     foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.
       (b) Briefing.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a 
     determination under subsection (a), the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall 
     jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, 
     the congressional intelligence committees

[[Page H6143]]

     and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, 
     the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing 
     shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:
       (A) A description of the significant foreign cyber 
     intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, 
     covered by the determination.
       (B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign 
     nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such 
     intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
       (C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release 
     of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures 
     campaign.
       (D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary 
     jointly determine appropriate.
       (2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With 
     respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a 
     determination under subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any 
     electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such 
     intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that 
     may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be 
     classified and made available only to individuals with 
     appropriate security clearances.
       (3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection 
     shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the 
     protection of sources and methods.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures 
     campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence 
     operation.
       (2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms 
     ``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the 
     meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
       (3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional 
     leadership'' includes the following:
       (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
       (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
       (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.
       (4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an 
     electronic occurrence that actually or imminently 
     jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election 
     infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of information within such infrastructure.
       (5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term 
     ``electronic election infrastructure'' means an electronic 
     information system of any of the following that is related to 
     an election for Federal office:
       (A) The Federal Government.
       (B) A State or local government.
       (C) A political party.
       (D) The election campaign of a candidate.
       (6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
       (7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with 
     respect to a determination, means that the determination is 
     based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
       (8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'', 
     with respect to a determination, means that a determination 
     is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient 
     quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher 
     level of confidence.
       (9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 2504. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT 
                   AND RELATED PROGRAMS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) there should be established, through the issuing of an 
     Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an 
     intelligence community-wide program for student loan 
     repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, 
     and related matters, for employees of the intelligence 
     community;
       (2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of 
     the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, 
     and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect 
     to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;
       (3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility 
     requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the 
     ability of the elements of the intelligence community to 
     recruit, hire, and retain highly qualified personnel, 
     including with respect to mission-critical and hard-to-fill 
     positions; and
       (4) to the extent possible, such a program should be 
     uniform throughout the intelligence community and publicly 
     promoted by each element of the intelligence community to 
     both current employees of the element as well as to 
     prospective employees of the element.
       (b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-wide 
     Program.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements 
     of the intelligence community and the heads of any other 
     appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government, 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on potentially establishing and carrying out an 
     intelligence community-wide program for student loan 
     repayment, student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, 
     and related matters, as described in subsection (a).
       (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
     include, at a minimum, the following:
       (A) A description of the financial resources that the 
     elements of the intelligence community would require to 
     establish and initially carry out the program specified in 
     paragraph (1).
       (B) A description of the practical steps to establish and 
     carry out such a program.
       (C) The identification of any legislative action the 
     Director determines necessary to establish and carry out such 
     a program.
       (c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the covered programs. Each such report 
     shall include, with respect to the period covered by the 
     report, the following:
       (A) The number of personnel from each element of the 
     intelligence community who used each covered program.
       (B) The total amount of funds each element expended for 
     each such program.
       (C) A description of the efforts made by each element to 
     promote each covered program pursuant to both the personnel 
     of the element of the intelligence community and to 
     prospective personnel.
       (2) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term 
     ``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan 
     forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar 
     programs, established pursuant to title X of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other 
     provision of law that may be administered or used by an 
     element of the intelligence community.

     SEC. 2505. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT ON 
                   SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
                   OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on the number of Senior Executive Service 
     positions in the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following:
       (1) The number of required Senior Executive Service 
     positions for the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence.
       (2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the 
     mission of the Office.
       (3) A discussion of how the levels of the Senior Executive 
     Service positions in the Office compare to the number of 
     senior positions at other elements of the intelligence 
     community.
       (c) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall provide to the Comptroller General any information 
     requested by the Comptroller General to carry out this 
     section by not later than 5 business days after the date on 
     which the Comptroller General makes such request.
       (d) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, 
     United States Code, and includes any position above the GS-
     15, step 10, level of the General Schedule under section 5332 
     of such title.

     SEC. 2506. BRIEFINGS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
                   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Quarterly Briefings.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, and on a quarterly basis 
     thereafter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall provide to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a briefing on the counterintelligence activities 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall 
     include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
       (1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
       (2) matters of counterintelligence concern; and
       (3) any other information relating to the 
     counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the 
     Director determines necessary to keep the congressional 
     intelligence committees fully and currently informed as 
     required by section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3091).
       (b) Guidelines.--The Director, in coordination with the 
     Attorney General and in consultation with the congressional 
     intelligence committees, shall develop guidelines governing 
     the scope of the briefings provided under subsection (a).

     SEC. 2507. BRIEFING ON FBI OFFERING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO 
                   SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.

       Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     briefing on the ability of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to offer, as an inducement to assisting the 
     Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to 
     foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in 
     counterintelligence or other national security-related 
     investigations. The briefing shall address the following:
       (1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers, 
     whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies 
     and departments of the United States Government, including a 
     discussion of the authorities provided by section 
     101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law 
     under which the Bureau may make such offers.

[[Page H6144]]

       (2) An overview of the policies and operational practices 
     of the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
       (3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with 
     respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as 
     sources for such investigations, or both.
       (4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions 
     to improve such policies and practices, particularly with 
     respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.

     SEC. 2508. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the 
     beginning of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3001 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';

       (2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
       (3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, 
              engineering, or mathematics positions.'';

       (4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 
     204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
       (5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.

       (b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further 
     amended--
       (1) in section 102A--
       (A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of subsection (g), 
     by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; 
     and
       (B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the 
     margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
       (2) in section 106--
       (A) by inserting ``sec. 106'' before ``(a)''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of subsection (b), 
     by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
       (3) by striking section 107;
       (4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified 
     and an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in 
     classified form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
       (5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)'' 
     and inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
       (6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       ``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of 
     this Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 
     5, United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department 
     of Defense.'';
       (7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and 
     (c) as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
       (8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
       (9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
       (10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and 
     inserting ``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
       (11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;
       (12) in section 503--
       (A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
       (i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the 
     left; and
       (ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph (B) of such 
     paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
       (B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the 
     margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
       (13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) 
     of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2 
     ems to the right.

  The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a 
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 115-
815. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in 
the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered 
as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall 
not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for 
division of the question.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Schiff

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, as the designee of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating), I offer amendment No. 1.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 17, line 2, insert ``Russian,'' after ``Korean,''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer this amendment on 
behalf of its author, Mr. Keating of Massachusetts, who is one of our 
fine members who has great experience in public safety prior to coming 
to the Congress.
  This amendment builds on an initiative from Chairman Nunes to extend 
tour lengths of deployed U.S. Government personnel, particularly those 
who are proficient in difficult languages such as Arabic, Farsi, 
Chinese, and Korean. Specifically, the amendment adds the Russian 
language to that list.
  In view of the continuing threat to our national security posed by 
the aggressive action of the Russian Government, the U.S. Government 
must fully engage its cadre of personnel proficient in the Russian 
language.
  I am a slow talker. I am talking even more slowly, and my colleague 
has arrived. I want to thank my colleague for his work.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge support of this amendment, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, although I am not opposed to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Nunes) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the amendment, and I 
strongly encourage Members to support this amendment.
  I have no further comments at this time, and I reserve the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating), who is the author of the 
amendment.
  Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I thank my two colleagues from California.
  Mr. Chairman, I am here rising in support of my amendment to H.R. 
6237.
  The underlying bill requires all members of the Foreign Service to 
serve three consecutive terms if they have received language training 
in certain languages. My amendment adds the Russian language to that 
list.
  Extending Foreign Service officers' length of service in these 
positions is vital to our foreign policy and national security 
objectives. Through this continuity of service, they can develop and 
deploy their cultural and language expertise to make the most of our 
diplomatic efforts in-country. Putin has become one of the greatest 
antagonists of the United States. He attacked our elections and those 
of our allies, and he is behind a number of cyber-related incidents 
recently.
  He has invaded sovereign nations when they looked toward 
strengthening ties with the West. His government and government-
controlled entities spread lies and misinformation about the United 
States--not only in Russia, but here in the U.S. as well--through fake 
social media accounts that attempt to sow division among all Americans.
  He seeks to undermine all aspects of civil society and a free 
political process that challenge him and his control over the Russian 
Government and its people.
  Putin presents a serious security threat to the United States and our 
interests. We must respond to these actions through sanctions, 
indictments, and other means, whether related to election interference, 
incursions into Ukraine, or human rights violations.
  However, we must also keep our eyes on the long game. Russian 
language is broadly spoken around the globe, not just in Russia, but 
across Eastern Europe and many parts of Central Asia as well.
  Representing the United States and our ideals abroad means being able 
to actually have meaningful person-to-person exchanges with local 
communities and build the relationships that will help us combat 
Putin's misinformation apparatus.
  It means we can talk to local press in-country to clarify 
misunderstandings and to communicate directly with the local population 
about what we actually stand for. It means having the most accurate 
understanding of real-time security information, so that the United 
States can respond quickly and appropriately.
  Today, we are not operating at full capacity in this regard when it 
comes to Russia, and, frankly, we cannot afford to keep looking the 
threat from Russia and Putin in the face and refusing not to do 
everything we can about it.
  We have heard many times that the Russian people themselves have 
great

[[Page H6145]]

concern and great antagonism to Putin and his leadership. We need to 
have skilled people fluent in the language and understanding the 
culture there and on the front lines of our efforts to encourage them 
to stand up within their own country, and to make sure that our allies 
in Europe know that we are there, using every tool at our disposal to 
stop his aggression and interference.
  Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment passes.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of the amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage also, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Schneider

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 20, line 7, before the period insert ``, including an 
     identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate 
     person, group, or entity to which such threat has been 
     attributed''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Schneider) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, we are still uncovering more troubling 
evidence on the extent of Russia's interference in our most recent 
election. These Russian actions were an attack on our democracy, and we 
need to respond both to hold them to account for past actions and to 
protect against future aggressions. With our next national election 
less than 4 months away, we must act now.
  So I am pleased this bill takes steps to require a publicly available 
advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity 
threats facing our Federal elections. This joint report from the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and the FBI will help campaigns identify and counter these threats.
  My amendment strengthens the reporting requirements to ensure we are 
publicly identifying the foreign state or nonstate actors that our 
intelligence officials identify as responsible for these threats.
  The American people deserve to know who is trying to interfere in our 
democratic process, and they deserve a government that will hold these 
countries and these groups to account.
  Protecting the integrity of our elections from outside influence by 
malign foreign actors is of paramount importance. I urge my colleagues 
to support this amendment to help ensure that we treat the threat of 
foreign election interference with the seriousness it demands.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Schiff), who is the ranking member.

                              {time}  1415

  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for offering this 
amendment.
  I am pleased to rise in support. This amendment clarifies section 
1503 of the bill dealing with foreign counterintelligence and 
cybersecurity threats to Federal election campaigns.
  The current provision directs that, for each Federal election, the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security, and the FBI will make publicly available a report on foreign 
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to our elections.
  Section 1503 strengthens our elections by providing information to 
the public about these threats by providing information about best 
practices and resources which may be used to counter these threats.
  Mr. Schneider's amendment adds to the publicly available report the 
identification of the foreign actor, when possible. This public 
attribution can be very powerful, not only in terms of protecting the 
public, but also in deterring any foreign intervention in our 
democratic affairs.
  I want to thank my colleague again for his work, and I am happy to 
support the amendment.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, though I am not opposed.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge support of the amendment, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Schneider).
  The amendment was agreed to.


               Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 22, line 16, strike ``and''.
       Page 23, line 2, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
       Page 23, after line 2, insert the following new paragraph:
       (6) an immediate review of a clearance may be triggered 
     when a security clearance holder is reported to have engaged 
     in violent acts against individuals, property, or public 
     spaces based on the security clearance holder's association 
     or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, 
     threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or 
     unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from 
     exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the 
     United States or of any State, based on factors including, at 
     a minimum, race, religion, national origin, or disability.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman 
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I thank the ranking member and the 
chairman for bringing this bill to the floor and working on some very 
important items, including diversity, outreach, HBCUs, issues of which 
I have worked on as well. So I thank them very much, because bringing 
the expertise of diversity to the national security and intelligence 
community can only make us stronger.
  Mr. Chairman, I have just left the Judiciary Committee where we have 
been spending a period of time dealing with questions that wrap 
themselves around the intelligence community and the importance of 
preserving confidential sources and as well the importance of the 
intelligence community as it relates to the ongoing Russian 
investigation.
  Equally important, of course, is to ensure that we have a community 
that is well-recognized to have security clearances that are not 
impacted by actions or views that would do harm to the American people.
  My amendment adds to the sense of Congress in the bill that a re-
review of a security clearance holder's credentials can be triggered by 
his or her association or empathy with persons or organizations that 
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence or any other illegal or 
unconstitutional means in an effort to prevent others from exercising 
their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of 
any State, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability, 
or other impermissible factors, which maybe include LGBTQ, and whether 
one is, in essence, considered different. That is the basis of I think 
a very positive addition to this legislation.
  Mr. Chair, I include in the Record an article published on July 6, 
2018, by PBS FRONTLINE about Michael Miselis, an active member of the 
California-based Rise Above Movement, RAM, as a well-known violent 
white supremacist group.

   He Is a Member of a Violent White Supremacist Group; So Why Is He 
      Working for a Defense Contractor With a Security Clearance?

       This story is part of an ongoing collaboration between 
     ProPublica and FRONTLINE that includes documentaries 
     scheduled to begin on PBS in August 2018.

[[Page H6146]]

       If you've witnessed or experienced hate crimes, harassment 
     or incidents of bias, you can use this form to send 
     information to FRONTLINE, ProPublica and other partners in 
     the Documenting Hate project.
       Update, July 6, 2018: One day after being exposed as a 
     member of a violent white supremacist group, Michael Miselis 
     has lost his job as an aerospace engineer. In an email, 
     company spokesman Tim Paynter told ProPublica and FRONTLINE 
     that Miselis ``is no longer an employee of Northrop 
     Grumman.'' Paynter did not say whether Miselis was fired or 
     resigned from his position.
       There likely isn't such a thing as a ``typical'' violent 
     white extremist in America in 2018. Still, Michael Miselis--a 
     University of California, Los Angeles doctoral student with a 
     U.S. government security clearance to work on sensitive 
     research for a prominent defense contractor--makes for a 
     pretty unusual case.
       For months, ProPublica and FRONTLINE have been working to 
     identify the white supremacists at the center of violent 
     demonstrations across the country, including the infamous 
     Unite the Right rally last August in Charlottesville, 
     Virginia. The Rise Above Movement, a Southern California 
     group that expresses contempt for Muslims, Jews, and 
     immigrants, became a focus of that effort. ProPublica and 
     FRONTLINE were able to quickly identify a number of the 
     group's leaders, and find evidence that put them in the 
     middle of violence in Charlottesville and Berkeley, 
     California, among other places.
       But one seeming member of RAM was harder to nail down. In 
     video shot in Charlottesville, a bearded, husky man is seen 
     in a red Make America Great Again hat with his hands wrapped 
     in tape that came in handy for the brawling that occurred 
     that day. During one encounter, the unidentified man in the 
     red hat pushed an African-American protester to the ground 
     and began pounding on him, video of the episode shows; 
     moments later, a known RAM member choked and bloodied a pair 
     of female counter-protesters. The possible RAM member also 
     had turned up in video shot during hours of combat at a Trump 
     rally in Berkeley, as well. Wearing protective goggles to 
     ward off pepper spray, the man fought alongside RAM members, 
     wrestling one protester to the ground and punching others.
       Ultimately, ProPublica and FRONTLINE determined the man in 
     the violent footage was Miselis, a 29-year-old pursuing a 
     Ph.D. in UCLA's aerospace engineering program. Miselis was 
     identified using video footage and social media posts, and 
     reporters confirmed his identity in an encounter with him 
     outside his home. In interviews, a number of California law 
     enforcement officials said Miselis was a member of RAM.
       In addition to his scholarly pursuits, Miselis works as a 
     systems engineer for Northrop Grumman, the giant defense 
     contractor with a plant in Redondo Beach, California.
       When approached by ProPublica and FRONTLINE in front of his 
     home in Lawndale, a small city south of Los Angeles, Miselis 
     said he ``didn't know anything'' about what happened in 
     Charlottesville.
       ``I think you got the wrong guy,'' he said before driving 
     off in his car.
       Miselis did not respond to questions about his involvement 
     with RAM. He did not answer additional questions sent by 
     email.
       Several current and former employees at Northrop Grumman 
     told ProPublica and FRONTLINE that Miselis has received a 
     security clearance to work in a computer modeling and 
     simulation group within Northrop's aerospace division. Such 
     security clearances are typically issued in a two-step 
     process. The federal Office of Personnel Management conducts 
     an investigation into the individual. The agency's findings 
     are then forwarded to a special unit within the Department of 
     Defense, which makes the final determination on whether the 
     person should receive a clearance, a status that often allows 
     the person access to classified or otherwise sensitive 
     information concerning national security.
       Public affairs officers at the Defense Department declined 
     to comment about Miselis and his security clearance. The 
     federal personnel management office referred questions 
     regarding Miselis to Northrop Grumman.
       Northrop Grumman did not respond to several requests for 
     comment. However, interviews with current and former Northrop 
     employees, as well as an internal email, make clear the 
     company knows of Miselis' actions in Charlottesville and 
     involvement with RAM. Miselis informed his superiors about 
     his contact with reporters from ProPublica and FRONTLINE, as 
     is required by any individual who holds a higher-level 
     security clearance, the people said.
       So far, it seems, the company has taken no action against 
     Miselis, who remains employed.
       Keegan Hankes, an analyst with the Southern Poverty Law 
     Center who follows RAM closely, said he was surprised that 
     nothing has been done about Miselis' employment and security 
     clearance.
       ``It's ridiculous,'' Hankes said.
       ``They're openly motivated by racism,'' he added of RAM.
       As ProPublica has previously reported, RAM first surfaced 
     publicly last spring and has quickly established itself as 
     one of the violent groups in the resurgent white supremacist 
     scene; members, who regularly train in boxing and martial 
     arts, have been documented engaging in a string of melees. 
     Founded in early 2017 by Robert Rundo, a Queens, New York, 
     native who served an 18-month prison sentence for stabbing a 
     rival gang member six times during a 2009 street fight, the 
     group's core membership is small--15 to 20 young men--but 
     capable of real menace, ProPublica's reporting has shown.
       Rundo has recruited followers from the Orange County and 
     San Diego chapters of the Hammerskin Nation, the country's 
     largest Nazi skinhead gang, and one the authorities say has 
     been behind at least nine murders. One of the Hammerskins who 
     joined up with RAM, Matthew Branstetter, went to prison in 
     California in 2011 on hate crime charges for robbing and 
     assaulting a Jewish man in an Orange County park. The attack 
     left the victim with ``a concussion, broken jaw, eye socket 
     fracture, broken nose, cracked ribs, severe facial bruising, 
     and cuts and bruises to his body and face,'' according to a 
     news release issued by county prosecutors at the time. Other 
     RAM members have spent time in prison and Los Angeles County 
     jail on charges for robbery, firearms possession and other 
     offenses.
       The FBI has taken notice. Several law enforcement officials 
     familiar with the bureau's work said agents have opened a 
     formal investigation into RAM. In a statement, the FBI said: 
     ``While the FBI neither confirms nor denies the existence of 
     an investigation, our agents investigate activity which may 
     constitute a federal crime or pose a threat to national 
     security. Our focus is not on membership in particular groups 
     but on criminal activity. The FBI cannot initiate an 
     investigation based solely on an individual's race, 
     ethnicity, national origin, religion, or the exercise of 
     their First Amendment rights, and we remain committed to 
     protecting those rights for all Americans.''
       Since last August, local prosecutors have brought charges 
     against a handful of participants in the Charlottesville 
     rally, successfully convicting several men so far, including 
     activists on both sides of the clashes. Now federal 
     authorities are targeting neo-Nazi James Alex Fields, the man 
     accused of killing counter-protester Heather Heyer and 
     injuring more than two dozen others. Federal prosecutors 
     recently filed 30 charges against Fields, including 28 hate 
     crime charges.
       A native of Stockton, California, Miselis earned a 
     bachelor's of science degree in mechanical engineering from 
     UCLA in 2011. UCLA's website today lists Miselis as a Ph.D. 
     candidate in the engineering department's hypersonics and 
     computational aero-dynamics group. After FRONTLINE and 
     ProPublica began making inquiries about Miselis, the school 
     issued a brief statement saying only that he is technically 
     on leave from the doctoral program.
       Miselis was clearly prepared for the unrest in Berkeley in 
     the spring of 2017. At the Trump rally he wore protective 
     goggles to ward off pepper spray or tear gas, taped his hands 
     up like a boxer, and wore a gray active-wear uniform, as did 
     several other RAM members that day. In video footage reviewed 
     by ProPublica and FRONTLINE, Miselis can be seen fighting 
     alongside other RAM members.
       The event turned into a multi-hour street battle pitting 
     Trump supporters, including fascists and extreme-right 
     activists, against counter-protesters, some of them militant 
     anti-fascists. Police made 20 arrests, confiscating knives, 
     pepper spray, a stun gun, an axe-handle and many wooden dowel 
     rods, which were used as clubs by participants. At least 
     seven people were transported to the hospital for their 
     injuries. Rundo, RAM's founder, was arrested and detained for 
     assault on a police officer, but Alameda County District 
     Attorney Nancy O'Malley declined to file charges. ``We 
     determined we didn't have enough evidence to prove the 
     charges beyond a reasonable doubt,'' said Teresa Drenick, an 
     Alameda County deputy district attorney.
       After the Berkeley rally, Miselis traveled across the 
     country to take part in the massive white supremacist 
     convergence in Charlottesville, where his activities were 
     photographed and recorded on video, both by professional 
     journalists and other people equipped with smart phones. At 
     the rally on Aug. 12, pictures taken by photojournalist Jason 
     Andrew show Miselis walking alongside two other RAM members 
     previously identified by ProPublica, Tom Gillen and Ben 
     Daley.
       At roughly 10 a.m., Miselis and the other RAM members 
     confronted counter-protesters a few steps away from 
     Emancipation Park, where white supremacists had gathered 
     beneath a statue of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee.
       Daley attacked two female counter-protesters, kicking and 
     punching them, a scene captured in video obtained by 
     ProPublica and FRONTLINE. He wrapped both hands around the 
     throat of one woman, throttling her until she fell to the 
     ground, blood seeping from a gash on her temple. The other 
     woman emerged from the incident with a laceration across her 
     forehead. On video, she screams as blood drips across her 
     face.
       Miselis jumped into the fracas. In addition to FRONTLINE 
     and ProPublica, National Geographic produced video 
     documenting the brawl.
       A sequence of pictures shot by photojournalist Edu Bayer, 
     who was on assignment for The New York Times, show Miselis 
     hurling what appears to be a can of soda at counter-
     protesters. In one photo he flexes his biceps muscles in 
     celebration.
       It's this sort of street combat that worries the SPLC's 
     Hankes. In his view, such brazen

[[Page H6147]]

     criminal activity should be a red flag for both Northrop 
     Grumman and the Pentagon.
       ``I can't believe that participation in an organized white 
     supremacist group focused on street-level violence wouldn't 
     jeopardize your security clearance,'' Hankes said.

  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, this gentleman was at Charlottesville 
speaking loudly, intimidating my fellow alumni and students, having 
gone to the University of Virginia School of Law. I spoke to the 
president and officers there, and the students were patently and 
conspicuously intimidated and frightened. But more importantly, this 
individual had a security clearance, and he worked for a defense 
contractor.
  My amendment would ensure that the American people have strong 
national security, a strong intelligence community, but individuals who 
receive a clearance can receive it appropriately and that they 
themselves will not be a jeopardy to the citizens of the United States.
  Mr. Chair, the Jackson Lee Amendment No. 3, designated as No. 33 on 
the Rules Committee rosters, amends the Sense of Congress already in 
the bill on the importance of re-review of security clearances held by 
individuals by adding consideration of whether the security clearance 
holder's association or sympathy with persons or organizations that 
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or any other illegal or 
unconstitutional means, in an effort to prevent others from exercising 
their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of 
any state, on account of race, religion, national origin, disability, 
or other impermissible factors.
  Mr. Miselis has a security clearance and worked for Northrup Grumman, 
a major defense contractor, at the time he engaged in physical violence 
against persons protesting racism and white supremacy in 
Charlottesville, Virginia.
  In May 2018, Northrup Grumman was informed of Mr. Miselis' membership 
in RAM and the violent assaults he initiated while he was in 
Charlottesville participating in activities in support of white 
supremancy, which were captured on video and in photos.
  Mr. Miselis worked for a government contractor and held a security 
clearance authorizing him to work on projects that were of vital 
interest to our nation and its defense.
  Northrup Grumman did not dismiss him until the story broke earlier 
this month with media reports on the violence Mr. Miselis engaged in at 
white supremacists' rally held in Charlottesville, Virginia.
  The violence of RAM members has been a hallmark of the group and its 
members.
  The Anti-Defamation League describes RAM as a white supremacist group 
whose members believe they are fighting against a ``modern world'' 
corrupted by the ``destructive cultural influences'' of liberals, Jews, 
Muslims and non-white immigrants.
  They refer to themselves as the ``premier MMA (mixed martial arts) 
club of the Alt-Right.''
  RAM is characterized as operating like a street-fighting club.
  Members actively train to do physical battle with their ideological 
foes, and have been involved in violent clashes during political 
rallies and demonstrations.
  RAM members consider themselves to be part of the ``Alt-Right.''
  RAM's membership has deep roots in California's racist skinhead 
movement, and includes individuals who have faced serious criminal 
charges, including assault, robbery and weapon offenses.
  RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazis and racist 
skinheads who were formerly known as the DIY Division, but rebranded 
themselves as the Rise Above Movement in the spring of 2017.
  The FBI has opened an informal investigation into this group because 
of the violence associated with its members.
  The United States is a nation of laws, which gives us the freedom to 
agree and most importantly disagree with not only each other but with 
our government.
  But the limitations to the right to disagree can be best described by 
the ancient wisdom: ``Your right to swing your arms ends just where the 
other person's nose begins.''
  There is a limit to the expression of free speech and the freedom to 
assemble and that limit is violence.
  The awarding of security clearances to contractors must be better 
managed and the consequences for involvement in activities that would 
be cause for dismissal from the armed services or any federal agency 
should not go unnoticed.
  This Jackson Lee Amendment is an opportunity to make a clear 
statement to government contractors that the awarding of contracts that 
involve the security of our nation should not be taken lightly and that 
Congress will not tolerate the allocation of federal funds to 
contractors who employ persons who advocate or participate in acts 
against persons on account of their race, creed, religious beliefs, or 
gender who engage in constitutionally protected activities.
  I ask that my colleagues support this Jackson Lee Amendment to H.R. 
6237.
  Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, though I am not opposed.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from Texas has 2\1/4\ minutes 
remaining.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/4\ minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by my friend and colleague, the gentlewoman from Texas, Congresswoman 
Sheila Jackson Lee.
  This amendment complements other provisions in the bill focused on 
improving the security clearance process in the Intelligence Committee. 
Specifically, Ms. Jackson Lee's amendment recognizes that an immediate 
review may be called for when a security clearance holder is reported 
to have engaged in certain violent acts against individuals, property, 
or public spaces based on an association or sympathy with persons or 
organizations seeking to prevent others from exercising their 
constitutional rights. Such rights include those related to race, 
religion, national origin, or disability.
  I thank the gentlewoman for offering this amendment. I am pleased to 
support it, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I am prepared to accept the amendment, and I 
continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, RAM, the group that I have indicated 
in the letter I submitted for the Record, of which the gentleman in the 
article was a member of, is characterized as operating like a street 
fighting club. Members actively train to do physical battle with their 
ideological foes and have been involved in violent clashes during 
political rallies and demonstrations.
  RAM members consider themselves a part of the alt-right. RAM's 
membership has deep roots in California, with the Skinheads and other 
individuals who face serious criminal charges. But more importantly, 
RAM consists of several dozen loosely affiliated neo-Nazi racist 
Skinheads.
  It is not an emphasis on that group. This amendment is broadly 
structured to deal with protecting the security clearance process and 
the American people. I join with my colleagues in hoping and helping 
the intelligence community to be able to have the resources for the 
backlog of thousands and thousands of those seeking security clearance, 
so that they can be particular and astute to ensure that for the people 
who receive it, it is a benefit. It is, in essence, a gift. It is an 
honor to receive a security clearance.
  The clearance that I and Members of Congress have, we hold with the 
highest respect and dignity. Therefore, if it is given to anyone, it 
should be given in that manner.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I will just close by saying that the 
security clearance process needs a lot of work. So we support this 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Vargas

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:


[[Page H6148]]


  

       Page 29, line 13, after ``methods'' insert ``, including 
     the use of virtual currencies,''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Vargas) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
support my amendment to H.R. 6237.
  By adding the use of virtual currencies to section 1505, we will 
ensure it is included in the assessment of threat financing related to 
Russia.
  This assessment includes officials of the government of Russia, 
persons subject to sanctions with respect to Russia, Russian nationals 
subject to sanction, and Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
  Mr. Chairman, as you may know, a virtual currency is a digital 
representation of value that can be digitally traded.
  Since the creation of Bitcoin, the first and most widely known 
example of a cryptocurrency, thousands of cryptocurrencies have emerged 
that are designed to serve a variety of purposes.
  Just as virtual currencies have grown in use in legitimate commerce, 
they have become an increasingly popular financial payment method for 
criminals and other transnational bad actors.
  Virtual currencies have been and continue to be exploited to pay for 
goods and services associated with illicit activities and as an 
effective tool to launder money or avoid sanctions.
  If we are to craft effective solutions to combat Russia's threat 
finance, we need to fully understand how virtual currencies may be used 
to finance activities against the United States and our allies, 
especially NATO. By including the use of virtual currencies in the 
report, we will ensure a robust analysis that will help us to impede 
Russian financing of cyber operations.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. 
Murphy).
  Mrs. MURPHY of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, Mr. 
Vargas, for yielding, and I support his amendment.
  I also support this bill more generally because it supports the quiet 
heroes in our intelligence community. They don't seek public praise; in 
fact, they shun it. While others enjoy the limelight, they work hard in 
the shadows.
  Section 1511 is a version of legislation I wrote called the POISE 
Act. I filed it after the President disclosed highly sensitive 
information to Russian officials at a White House meeting. This 
information had been entrusted to the U.S. by a key ally.
  Section 1511, drawing on the POISE Act, says Congress must be 
notified when a member of the executive branch, including the 
President, discloses top secret information to an adversary government 
outside established intelligence channels.
  As a former specialist at the Department of Defense, I know these 
disclosures are dangerous because our adversary could use it to harm 
U.S. interests. Our partners could stop sharing intelligence if they 
don't trust us to keep it confidential.
  The congressional notification requirement will deter irresponsible 
disclosures and enable Congress to conduct oversight and limit any 
damage caused by the disclosure.
  I also wanted to express my disappointment on a matter of national 
security. Congressman Curbelo and I offered a bipartisan amendment to 
require the DNI to report to Congress on the national security threat 
posed by deep fake technology and how the intelligence community will 
counter it. Deep fake technology is the digital falsification of 
images, video, and audio to portray an individual as having done or 
said something he or she didn't do or say.
  Senator Rubio has raised alarms about how foreign intelligence 
service could use deep fake technology to undermine our Nation's 
security and democracy.
  Frankly, I was dismayed our amendment was not ruled in order, despite 
being supported by the Intelligence Committee. I know the Rules 
Committee often makes decisions for reasons unrelated to policy. But 
the exclusion of this amendment was a serious mistake, and I will look 
for other ways to ensure our country is prepared for the emerging 
threat posed by deep fake technology.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, though I am not opposed.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, I would simply then urge my colleagues to 
support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Vargas).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mrs. Torres

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2509. NORTH KOREA FOLLOW THE MONEY ACT.

       (a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Intelligence and Research and the Assistant 
     Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, 
     shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue 
     sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall 
     include revenue from the following sources:
       (1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
       (2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean 
     territorial waters.
       (3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, 
     silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other 
     stores of value.
       (4) Trade in textiles.
       (5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
       (6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and 
     other associated purposes.
       (7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the 
     Director of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
       (8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner 
     intended to generate significant revenue, directly or 
     indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
       (9) The provision of non-humanitarian goods (such as food, 
     medicine, and medical devices) and services by other 
     countries.
       (10) The provision of services, including banking and other 
     support, including by entities located in the Russian 
     Federation, China, and Iran.
       (11) Online commercial activities of the Government of 
     North Korea, including online gambling.
       (12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and 
     counterfeit goods.
       (b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a) 
     shall include an identification of each of the following:
       (1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
       (2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply 
     chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through 
     which North Korea accesses the United States and 
     international financial systems and repatriates and exports 
     capital, goods, and services; and
       (3) the global financial institutions, money services 
     business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with 
     financial transactions.
       (c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the 
     assessment required under subsection (a), the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy of 
     such assessment.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman 
from California (Mrs. Torres) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.

                              {time}  1430

  Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer my amendment to H.R. 6237, 
the Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2018 and 2019.
  Mr. Chairman, nearly 1 year and 3 months ago today, the North Korean 
regime announced that it had successfully executed an intercontinental 
ballistic missile test launch. That announcement raised the real 
possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack on American soil.
  President Trump, rightly, has spent much of last year seeking a deal 
for the

[[Page H6149]]

denuclearization of North Korea. Secretary Pompeo is actively engaged 
in finding a solution, and Congress should be providing him with all of 
the resources we can to ensure a solution is meaningful and effective.
  To prevent advancement of their nuclear weapons program, we need to 
obtain specific information regarding North Korean revenue sources; 
however, the U.S. Government does not have a sufficient understanding 
of this critical question. That is why I have offered this amendment, 
which is modeled after my North Korea Follow the Money Act.
  This amendment directs the Director of National Intelligence to 
produce a National Intelligence Estimate of the revenue sources of 
North Korea. Any effective agreement between the U.S. and North Korea 
must consider all of the sources of funding, both legitimate and 
illegitimate, that have enabled this North Korean regime.
  I am proud to offer this bipartisan amendment with Representative 
Wagner, who has been a longtime partner of mine on this legislation, 
and I also appreciate Chairman Nunes and his staff and Ranking Member 
Schiff and his staff for working with me on this amendment.
  Mr. Chair, I am hopeful that we can continue to work together for the 
security of our Nation, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Missouri (Mrs. Wagner).
  Mrs. WAGNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this amendment, 
of which I am a proud cosponsor.
  Nearly 1 year ago, I traveled to Korea, Japan, and China. I visited 
the DMZ and the Chinese border town of Dandong. I watched as trucks 
loaded with goods drove across the China-Korea Friendship Bridge into 
North Korea.
  Mr. Chair, 70 percent of North Korea's trade passes over that bridge, 
and it was a stark reminder that, in order to change North Korea's 
malign behavior, we need sanctions that undermine the financial 
networks that keep the Kim regime afloat.
  Over the past year, the President has taken tremendous steps towards 
disrupting North Korean cash flows, but we still have an imperfect 
understanding of where and how North Korea gets its revenue, and our 
limited knowledge has weakened international sanctions.
  This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to 
study North Korean financial and trade networks, weapons sales, labor 
exports, and supply chains to better understand the sources of the 
regime's revenue. It would aid the international community in closing 
gaps in sanctions against North Korea. The report will help us support 
our diplomats as they seek to restore stability on the Korean 
Peninsula.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this critical amendment.
  Mrs. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment. Until we know where the North Korean regime gets its money, 
we won't know how much money they have to spend.
  Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' and equip Secretary 
Pompeo with the tools that he needs to act in the best interests of our 
national security, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Torres).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Hastings

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2509. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT 
                   EFFORTS.

       In order to further increase the diversity of the 
     intelligence community workforce, not later than 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in consultation with heads of elements 
     of the Intelligence Community, shall create, implement, and 
     submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written 
     plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented regions are 
     more fully and consistently represented in such elements' 
     employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the 
     congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit 
     comments to the Director of National Intelligence before such 
     plan shall be implemented.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Hastings) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, my staff and I worked with Democratic 
staff members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
and received input from the majority staff to craft what I believe is a 
commonsense amendment that will increase diversity throughout the 
intelligence community.
  Mr. Chair, I just want to depart from my prepared remarks to say a 
word about the young man who is seated with me, Tony Matthews. It is a 
good indication of what the Brookings Institution does when they send 
us fellows from either the Democratic or Republican side, and I am very 
pleased that he has been with my office and, in many respects, is the 
author of this amendment.
  The amendment directs the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence to, in consultation with heads of other intelligence 
community agencies, create and implement a plan that will successfully 
expand the intelligence community's recruitment efforts so that rural 
and underserved regions in the United States are more fully represented 
in these efforts.
  It is my belief that this amendment will provide a unique opportunity 
for the intelligence community agencies to actively join forces in 
order to broaden their respective recruitment efforts and, by so doing, 
increase the diversity among their ranks. Although we have seen 
improvement in some areas--for instance, an increase in minority hiring 
for fiscal year 2017 over that of fiscal year 2016--we have also seen a 
disappointing decrease in the percentage of women hired over that same 
period of time. I believe that we can do better in both metrics, and I 
think one smart way of doing that is getting agencies to broaden their 
searches geographically.
  This country's strength is born from its dedication to the rule of 
law, the belief that the best form of government is one that is of the 
people, by the people, and for the people--and from its diversity.
  It is time for our intelligence community agencies to more fully 
commit to reaching all American people in an effort to let them know 
that inspiring and important work awaits them in the intelligence 
community. Indeed, by more fully tapping into this diversity, we can be 
assured of at least one result: the strengthening of our intelligence 
community. If the intelligence community is to succeed in its global 
mission, it must have a global force.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``yes'' vote on my amendment, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the distinguished ranking 
member with whom I had the pleasure of serving on the Intelligence 
Committee when I was there some 100 years ago.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  It is a great pleasure to team up with the gentleman again in pursuit 
of important priorities for the intelligence community and for our 
committee.

[[Page H6150]]

  Enhancing diversity in the intelligence community is a continuing 
priority for the House and, unfortunately, remains a continuing 
challenge for the IC. While there are many intelligence professionals 
who are sincerely working to create a culture of inclusion, they 
acknowledge that progress is slow.
  Mr. Hastings' amendment, together with initiatives championed by 
committee colleagues, Representatives Terri Sewell and Andre Carson, 
will help ensure that the Director of National Intelligence increases 
geographic outreach in IC recruitment efforts.
  As coordinator of the IC, the DNI and his team are well postured to 
consolidate the separate recruitment activities of each IC entity into 
a comprehensive recruitment campaign that reaches every corner of our 
Nation, especially underserved regions that have had little interaction 
with the intelligence community.
  With the DNI's leadership, smart division of labor among IC agencies, 
and innovative use of virtual communications vehicles, I am confident 
that a comprehensive recruitment campaign can cover the Nation more 
effectively and attract a workforce that is more representative of 
America.
  Once again, I want to thank my colleague, Mr. Hastings, as well as my 
HPSCI colleagues for their commitment to diversity, and I encourage my 
colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support this amendment. I think 
we should expand more capabilities into rural areas and do more 
recruitment in rural areas. I appreciate this amendment. It has my full 
support.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Schneider

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2509. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA 
                   AND LEBANON.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services, 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate a report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria 
     and Lebanon and the threat posed to Israel, other United 
     States regional allies, and other specified interests of the 
     United States as a result of such support.
       (b) Matters for Inclusion.--The report required under 
     subsection (a) shall include information relating to the 
     following matters with respect to both the strategic and 
     tactical implications for the United States and its allies:
       (1) A description of arms or related material transferred 
     by Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number 
     of such arms or related material and whether such transfer 
     was by land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional 
     technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
       (2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled 
     personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria, 
     including the number and geographic distribution of such 
     personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli 
     borders with Syria and Lebanon.
       (3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons 
     learned based on its recent experiences in Syria.
       (4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in 
     Lebanon for non-state actors, including whether such 
     facilities were assessed to be built at the direction of 
     Hizballah leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation 
     between Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
       (5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains 
     that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid 
     Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production 
     facilities, including the geographic distribution of such 
     foreign and domestic supply chains.
       (6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or 
     technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah 
     to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
       (7) An identification of foreign persons that are, based on 
     credible information, facilitating the transfer of 
     significant financial support or arms or related material to 
     Hizballah.
       (8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other 
     United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of 
     arms or related material or other support offered to 
     Hizballah and other proxies from Iran.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.
       (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``arms or 
     related material'' means--
       (1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons 
     or materials or components of such weapons;
       (2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials or 
     components of such weapons;
       (3) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced 
     conventional weapons;
       (4) defense articles or defense services, as those terms 
     are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of 
     section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
       (5) defense information, as that term is defined in section 
     644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403); 
     or
       (6) items designated by the President for purposes of the 
     United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Schneider) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of my bipartisan 
amendment to require the Director of National Intelligence to report on 
Iran's support for proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon.
  I thank my colleague from North Carolina, Mark Meadows, for his 
partnership in this endeavor, as well as Kyrsten Sinema and Norma 
Torres for cosponsoring this amendment.
  Mr. Chair, Iran's destabilizing activities in the Middle East are no 
secret, and, of late, their malign influence has grown dramatically 
across the region, including in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.
  Specifically with respect to Syria, Iran is menacingly working to 
develop a permanent foothold in the country, increasing the threat to 
our key allies Jordan and, in particular, Israel. They are also 
assisting terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in supporting Assad. 
Battle-tested Hezbollah fighters are subsequently returning to Lebanon 
more capable and more dangerous than ever before.
  Additionally, with assistance from Iran, Lebanese Hezbollah has been 
able to amass nearly 150,000 rockets and missiles on the border with 
Israel. This figure is a staggering increase from the, roughly, 15,000 
rockets they had in 2006.
  Iran has exploited several means of transferring weapons to 
Hezbollah, including by land and by air. Israel has often targeted 
these transfers to stop the weapons from reaching Lebanon. To eliminate 
the susceptibility of these transfers to interdiction, Iran is 
reportedly building missile production facilities in Lebanon to enable 
indigenous rocket-producing capability for Hezbollah.
  A domestic missile production capability in Lebanon would enable 
Hezbollah to more easily continue to build its rocket arsenal not only 
with more weapons, but more sophisticated, more deadly weapons, and 
with less reliance on risky transits.
  That is why I am offering my amendment today, to focus our 
intelligence community on this urgent threat. A DNI report would help 
us better understand the extent of Iran's support for terrorist proxies 
such as Hezbollah and the threat this support poses to Israel and other 
U.S. regional allies.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important 
amendment.
  Mr. Chair, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I am 
proud to support the amendment offered by Representatives Schneider, 
Meadows, Torres, and Sinema.
  Mr. Chair, it is imperative that our Intelligence, Armed Services, 
and Foreign Affairs Committees with oversight of Iran's role in Syria 
and Lebanon stay informed of proxy forces operating there and the 
strategic threat posed to

[[Page H6151]]

Israel, our other allies, and our Nation's interests in the region.
  Requiring that the Director of National Intelligence report on areas 
such as arms transfers from Iran to Hezbollah and other militias, 
weapons facilities, supply chains, and financial capabilities will help 
us gain greater understanding of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapon proliferation in the region.
  I thank my colleagues for offering the amendment. I appreciate Mr. 
Schneider's leadership on this issue, and I urge the House to support 
it.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chair, I urge support of the amendment, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Schneider).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  1445


                  Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Bera

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2509. BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND 
                   PANDEMICS.

       (a) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall provide to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects 
     of emerging infectious disease (including deliberate, 
     accidental, and naturally occurring infectious disease 
     threats) and pandemics, and their implications on the 
     national security of the United States.
       (b) Content.--The briefing under subsection (a) shall 
     assess--
       (1) the economic, social, political, and security risks, 
     costs, and impacts of emerging infectious diseases on the 
     United States and the international political and economic 
     system;
       (2) the economic, social, political, and security risks, 
     costs, and impacts of a major transnational pandemic on the 
     United States and the international political and economic 
     system; and
       (3) contributing trends and factor to the matters assessed 
     under paragraphs (1) and (2).
       (c) Examination of Response Capacity.--In examining the 
     risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and 
     a possible transnational pandemic under subsection (b), the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the 
     briefing under subsection (a) the response capacity within 
     affected countries and the international system. In 
     considering response capacity, the Director shall include--
       (1) the ability of affected nations to effectively detect 
     and manage emerging infectious diseases and a possible 
     transnational pandemic;
       (2) the role and capacity of international organizations 
     and nongovernmental organizations to respond to emerging 
     infectious disease and a possible pandemic, and their ability 
     to coordinate with affected and donor nations; and
       (3) the effectiveness of current international frameworks, 
     agreements, and health systems to respond to emerging 
     infectious diseases and a possible transnational pandemic.
       (d) Form.--The briefing under subsection (a) may be 
     classified.
       (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Bera) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, as a doctor, I know that understanding and 
managing infectious diseases is one of the most important parts of our 
security and our national security. The intelligence community has 
found that a country's health is directly linked to their stability and 
their well-being. We are reminded of this every few years through mass 
pandemics that are not going away.
  In 2014, we saw the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and just 2 years 
ago, we witnessed the Zika outbreak in Central and South America. And, 
unfortunately, as a doctor, I know we are going to continue to see 
these and other diseases again and again, and we need to be prepared.
  So we offer this amendment as a way of getting the intelligence 
community to help us with that preparedness, to inform us and make sure 
we are not just protecting lives overseas, but we are also protecting 
our national interests and our national security.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Connolly).
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from California 
for his leadership in this very important amendment, and I am proud to 
be an original cosponsor with him.
  This amendment would require an intelligence briefing on the 
anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging infectious diseases and 
pandemics. These threats have serious implications for the national 
security of the country. Just ask Director of National Intelligence, 
Daniel Coats, who earlier this year warned that the increase in the 
frequency and diversity of reported disease outbreaks probably will 
continue, including the potential of a severe global health emergency 
that could lead to major economic and societal disruptions, strain 
governmental international resources, and increase calls to the United 
States for support.
  An outbreak in a remote village can spread to major cities in all six 
continents in less than 36 hours. Such an event can lead nations to 
close borders, disrupting the flow of people, goods, and services, and 
incurring grave economic, social, political, and security costs.
  Nearly 70 percent of the world's nations are underprepared to manage 
and control such outbreaks.
  These are not just hypotheticals. SARS, for example, spread across 
four continents, infected 8,100 people, killed more than 700, and cost 
the global economy $40 billion between February and July of 2003. The 
Ebola and Zika outbreaks cost the American taxpayers more than $6 
billion.
  Understanding the ability, Mr. Chairman, of affected nations and 
international organizations to detect and manage infectious diseases 
and transnational pandemics is a vital step to ensuring an effective 
response. I urge all of our colleagues to support Mr. Bera's and my 
amendment.
  I thank Mr. Bera for his leadership.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  One hundred years ago, the great influenza pandemic, often called the 
Spanish flu, caused about 50 million deaths worldwide, between 3 to 6 
percent of the global population, and far more than the deaths from 
combat casualties in World War I. Public health officials have warned 
that we are overdue for another pandemic that will likely spread even 
more virulently in our globalized world.
  While global health may not be a topic that leaps to mind when 
thinking of the roles and missions of the intelligence community, the 
IC does play a pivotal role in defending us from microscopic threats. 
The IC's unique capabilities can be as valuable in combating disease as 
the other threats we face.
  During the Ebola crisis, NGA and other IC agencies provided 
geospatial and other intelligence to health workers battling the 
outbreak. Ensuring

[[Page H6152]]

that we are prepared for any potential pandemic will be essential to 
saving American lives.
  I wholeheartedly support the bipartisan amendment by my colleagues 
from California, Virginia, and Washington, and I thank them for working 
with the committee staff to refine and perfect it.
  Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional comments, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Bera).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Kennedy

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2509. REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MALIGN 
                   INFLUENCE RESPONSE CENTER.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on 
     the potential establishment of a center, to be known as the 
     ``Foreign Malign Influence Response Center'' that--
       (1) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate elements 
     of the intelligence community, including elements with 
     related diplomatic and law enforcement functions;
       (2) has access to all intelligence and other reporting 
     acquired by the United States Government on foreign efforts 
     to influence, through overt and covert malign activities, 
     United States political processes and elections;
       (3) provides comprehensive assessment, and indications and 
     warning, of such activities; and
       (4) provides for enhanced dissemination of such assessment 
     to United States policy makers.
       (b) Contents.--The Report required by subsection (a)--
       (1) shall contain, at a minimum, a discussion of the 
     desirability of the establishment of such center and any 
     barriers to such establishment; and
       (2) may contain any recommendations the Director determines 
     appropriate.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman and Ranking Member Schiff 
for all their support and advocacy to make this amendment possible 
today.
  Mr. Chairman, just a few weeks ago, DNI Director Dan Coats warned our 
Nation and the world that ``we continue to see Russian targeting of 
American society in ways that could affect our midterm elections.''
  It is indisputable that Russia succeeded in meddling in our election 
in 2016. It is indisputable that their success, with little 
consequence, will inspire similar attacks in the future. And it is 
indisputable that our response to these threats has been inadequate.
  States, cities, and towns have scrambled to secure their own 
elections without enough guidance and support from our national 
intelligence community.
  Voters continue to face a torrent of misinformation online.
  Candidates for Congress, city council, and school boards race towards 
November 6 uncertain that they will become Putin's next target.
  The multiple Federal agencies that are responsible for our Nation's 
response rarely coordinate or receive little guidance from our Nation's 
government at the highest levels.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment helps to begin to consolidate and 
concentrate our response to foreign efforts to influence our political 
processes and elections with one center drawing expertise across all 
relevant sectors of our government.
  If anything, our adversaries have grown more confident in their 
ability to sway our elections and sow discord and dysfunction at every 
level of our society.
  Our urgency lies now in one simple truth: Our democracy stands tall 
when our elections stand secure.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment because those who put 
ballot boxes in our crosshairs do not ascribe to one political party or 
the other.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim time in opposition to the amendment, 
even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy).
  The amendment was agreed to.


           Amendment No. 10 Offered by Miss Rice of New York

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 102, after line 13, insert the following:

     SEC. 2509. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL 
                   CURRENCIES BY TERRORIST ACTORS.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop 
     Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
       (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the possible exploitation of 
     virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall 
     include the following elements:
       (1) An assessment of the means and methods by which 
     international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of 
     terrorism use virtual currencies.
       (2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and 
     State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to 
     the use by such organizations and States of other forms of 
     financing to support operations, including an assessment of 
     the collection posture of the intelligence community on the 
     use of virtual currencies by such organizations and States.
       (3) A description of any existing legal impediments that 
     inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting 
     information on or helping prevent the use of virtual 
     currencies by international terrorist organizations and State 
     sponsors of terrorism and an identification of any gaps in 
     existing law that could be exploited for illicit funding by 
     such organizations and States.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentlewoman 
from New York (Miss Rice) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.
  Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would require the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treasury to 
develop and submit a threat assessment report on the use of virtual 
currencies by terrorist organizations.
  In the 17 years since the deadliest terrorist attack in American 
history, the United States has led the global campaign to combat 
terrorism, thwarting plots and preventing attacks on American soil, 
identifying and disrupting terrorist networks around the world, hunting 
down terrorists wherever they hide, and proving that they can and will 
be brought to justice.
  We know that the threat of terrorism is not the same as it was 17 
years ago. It is a threat that constantly evolves, and we need to 
evolve with it. We need to evolve ahead of it. That is why I have 
introduced this amendment.
  In recent years, we have seen instances in which members of terrorist 
groups have turned to virtual currencies to finance and support their 
operations. In 2016, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies 
investigated a terrorist funding campaign in which a terrorist group in 
the Gaza Strip received donations through the virtual currency bitcoin. 
Last year, Indonesian authorities also reported that a Syria-

[[Page H6153]]

based Indonesian national with ties to ISIL used virtual currency to 
fund attacks in Indonesia.
  Virtual currencies offer high-speed, low-cost financial networks with 
access to users across the globe. Many also offer their users 
anonymity, making it difficult for law enforcement to track 
transactions. These factors have made virtual currencies an 
increasingly appealing tool for terrorists seeking to circumvent 
American law enforcement and financial institutions.
  Research suggests that terrorists' use of virtual currencies have so 
far been limited to a handful of instances, but, as terrorist 
organizations and lone-wolf attackers become more technologically 
sophisticated and virtual currencies become more widely accessible, the 
conditions are ripe for this threat to significantly increase in a very 
short period of time. That is why it is critical that we act now to 
assess and understand this emerging threat.
  There is no denying it: Virtual currencies have exposed deep 
vulnerabilities in our counterterrorism efforts, and, unfortunately, 
right now, our government lacks a comprehensive response and strategy 
to address this threat.
  My amendment would direct the Director of National Intelligence and 
the Treasury Department to report to Congress on how terrorist 
organizations and state sponsors of terrorism could use virtual 
currencies to finance terrorism, gaps in Federal and State regulations 
that could be exploited by terrorists, and recommendations to update 
regulations to more effectively address these vulnerabilities.
  Enacting this amendment would give counterterrorism and law 
enforcement officials at all levels the information and strategies they 
desperately need to confront this threat head-on with 21st century 
solutions.
  I want to thank Congressman Peter King for cosponsoring my amendment. 
This is a commonsense bipartisan priority, and I urge all of my 
colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim time in opposition to the amendment, 
even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Bost). Without objection, the gentleman from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may 
consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding, and I 
rise in support of the amendment offered by the Representatives from 
New York, Rice and King.
  This amendment requires that the Director of National Intelligence, 
with the Department of the Treasury, submit to Congress a report on the 
possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors, 
including state sponsors of terrorism.
  It has long been said that if you wish to uncover the truth about 
malign activity, then follow the money. This remains true with the 
development and use of virtual currencies.
  The IC must always remain one step ahead of our adversaries, and this 
amendment will help ensure that they continue to do just that.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Miss RICE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Nunes and 
Ranking Member Schiff for supporting the amendment, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from New York for 
working in a bipartisan manner with a longtime member of our committee, 
Mr. King, and I urge passage of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from New York (Miss Rice).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  1500


                Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Lipinski

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title V of division B, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 2509. REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN 
                   MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
     report describing Iranian expenditures in the previous 
     calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside 
     the country, including each of the following:
       (1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by 
     the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities 
     providing support for--
       (A) Hezbollah;
       (B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
       (C) Hamas;
       (D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
       (E) any other entity or country the Director determines to 
     be relevant.
       (2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic 
     missile research and testing or other activities that the 
     Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East 
     region.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chair and ranking member of 
the committee for their work on this bill. This bill is very important 
to help make America more secure.
  My amendment will help to address the threat of Iran better in this 
bill.
  According to the State Department, Iran is the world's foremost state 
sponsor of terrorism. In spite of Iran's weak economy and U.S.-imposed 
sanctions in response to their support for terrorism, abuse of human 
rights, and acquisition of prohibited weapons, Iran continues to 
support violent groups abroad.
  As our diplomatic and military leaders determine how best to respond 
to Iran's ongoing destabilization, they should have a detailed 
accounting of the amounts spent by Iran to support specific terrorist 
groups and foreign military. This is especially important in light of 
the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran-backed forces in Syria, 
which has only gotten worse in the last couple of days. This 
information will send a clear message to Iran and our allies that we do 
not tolerate support of terrorism.
  In addition, the nonclassified version of this report will shed light 
on Iran's behavior for all the world to see.
  Specifically, my amendment will require an annual report from the 
Director of National Intelligence, describing Iranian expenditures on 
military and terrorist activities outside the country, including 
support for Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, proxy forces in 
Iraq and Syria, and any other entity or country the Director determines 
relevant.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, even though I am not opposed to it.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff), the ranking member of the committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of the amendment offered 
by my colleague from Illinois, Congressman Lipinski.
  This amendment requires that the Director of National Intelligence 
submit a report to Congress describing spending by Iran on military and 
terrorist activities outside of the country, including spending to 
support Hezbollah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, and proxy forces 
elsewhere.
  The intelligence community rightly remains focused on Iran's support 
for malign foreign military and terrorist activities abroad.
  This amendment helps ensure that Congress has full visibility into 
the judgments and assessments of the IC

[[Page H6154]]

on Iran's spending to support these groups, and for that reason I 
support the amendment.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff for 
their support of this amendment, and I thank them for their work on 
this important bipartisan bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for working with our 
committee to get support from both sides of the aisle for this 
amendment, I urge its passage, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Lipinski).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Davidson

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 
printed in House Report 115-815.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title V of division B, add the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 2509. INCLUSION OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN ANNUAL REPORT 
                   RELATING TO SECTION 702.

       Section 707(b)(1)(G)(ii) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881f(b)(1)(G)(ii)) is 
     amended by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, 
     including whether disciplinary actions were taken as a result 
     of such an incident of noncompliance and the extent of such 
     disciplinary actions''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 989, the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Davidson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, today, I offer an amendment that is very 
straightforward. It simply takes an already existing reporting 
requirement within the section 702 program and adds an additional layer 
of congressional oversight. This will ensure that the Judiciary 
Committee and the Intelligence Committee have insight into how the 
intelligence community enforces its own internal guidelines for 
handling sensitive data.
  Currently, the attorney general provides these committees with 
semiannual reports about incidents of intelligence community 
noncompliance with the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures 
within the 702 program. These are important features that ensure the 
collection and use of data is solely for targeting dangerous terrorists 
and does not threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans.
  However, this report is lacking because it does not describe what, if 
any, disciplinary actions are taken by agencies in response to 
noncompliance. My amendment would simply require that this report 
include information about disciplinary action.
  For example, was a violation simply flagged for agency records? Or 
was someone given additional training, disciplinary suspension, 
termination, or, perhaps, even prosecution?
  My amendment intends to provide Congress with a high-level look at 
how agencies address the incidents they are already reporting on.
  The privacy safeguards contained in the section 702 program are 
critical for protecting the constitutional rights of everyday 
Americans, and, indeed, the high functioning capability of this 
important program for national security.
  Congress has the responsibility to make sure agencies are taking 
steps to mitigate abuse and enforce statutes, guidelines, and court 
orders relevant to this powerful surveillance tool.
  This is a commonsense amendment that I have drafted in coordination 
with the House Intelligence Committee, and I urge my colleagues to 
support its adoption.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment, though I am not opposed.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Lamborn). Without objection, the gentleman from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Chairman, I think the thing I would emphasize is 
that it is important for us to understand: A) we should preserve the 
702 program; and B) there are some incremental reforms that could make 
the program high functioning, and also give the American people peace 
of mind that their Fourth Amendment rights are protected.
  It is also important for the intelligence community to know that the 
programs they have are working, and it can send an important message 
that there are disciplinary actions for those who don't follow the 
guidelines.
  This will give Congress insight into how well that system is 
functioning and what disciplinary actions, if any, are taken.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank all of the Members who offered amendments 
today. This is a critical piece of legislation, and I look forward to 
working with the Senate to send this bill to the President.
  This year's bill is named after Matthew Young Pollard, who passed 
away earlier this year while carrying out the work of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee. Matt was a friend to many on both sides of the 
aisle of our committee, a dedicated staff member, and a member of the 
Army National Guard. While his loss is devastating to us, we honor his 
service to the United States by naming this bill in his memory.
  I thank the ranking member for his support on this bill, I urge 
passage of the amendment, and urge passage of H.R. 6237, the Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 
2019.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Bost) having assumed the chair, Mr. Lamborn, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 6237) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 989, he reported the bill 
back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the 
Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment 
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
  If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

                          ____________________