[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 104 (Thursday, June 21, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4338-S4339]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT

  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, today I would like to raise concerns 
about efforts to erode the effectiveness of the Countering America's 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA. This law requires the 
administration to impose a host of costs on the government of the 
Russian Federation for its interference in democratic processes around 
the world, its support for the brutal regime of Bashar Al-Assad, and 
its active role in destabilizing Ukraine. Ninety-eight Senators voted 
in favor of this legislation and should expect the administration to 
fully implement it.
  Of particular concern to me today is section 231, which requires the 
imposition of sanctions on those who conduct significant transactions 
with specific entities in the Russian defense and intelligence sectors. 
We targeted those sectors because our intelligence community deemed 
them responsible for the attack on our election in 2016. The law is 
meant to cut financial income for these sectors.
  Using the model implemented in the CISADA sanctions regime on Iran, 
section 231 includes a provision to delay sanctions if the individual 
in question can show that they are substantially reducing significant 
transactions from these Russian entities. This model was extremely 
effective in diminishing the volume of energy products that Iran was 
able to sell to the rest of the world and ultimately helped to drive 
them to the negotiating table. This model allows for some flexibility 
while maintaining appropriate pressure to wind down business with these 
sectors in Russia. It can work if we allow it to.
  The State Department reports that the law is actually already having 
an impact. Billions of dollars' worth of deals around the world with 
the Russian defense sector have been turned off due to leverage created 
by this law. That means billions of dollars less for Russia to 
interfere in elections and sow discord in democratic societies, 
billions of dollars less to support war crimes in Syria, billions of 
dollars less to kill Ukrainians and violate the sovereignty of that 
country. If the administration fully allows the law to work, the 
Russian Government will have less money for all of these things.
  The leverage CAATSA provides is critically necessary. In Turkey, this 
leverage is vital in our efforts to ensure that the Erdogan government 
does not purchase the Russian S400 air defense system. Such a purchase 
would be a win for Putin in a strategically important part of the world 
and could pose a security and intelligence threat to U.S. and NATO 
personnel and equipment already in the country. CAATSA gives our 
negotiators an important tool which we hope can leverage the right 
policy decisions in Ankara.
  Over the course of the debate on the NDAA, voices in the 
administration want to weaken section 231 and have called for blanket 
waiver authority. I opposed these efforts, not because I want sanctions 
on our close friends who continue to do business with Russian defense 
sector, but because such a move would gut CAATSA and render this key 
provision of the law toothless. We need to remain true to the 
principles laid out in in the law. Either we want to increasingly 
maintain pressure on the Russian defense and intelligence sectors--or 
we don't. Either we want to send a strong message to the Kremlin that 
interfering in our elections and those of our allies is unacceptable--
or we don't. Either we want to defend our democracy--or we don't.
  No one wants to impose sanctions on our close friends, especially as 
defense relationships with those countries are improving. We should 
continue building on the positive momentum around our defense 
cooperation with several countries around the world. It is precisely 
for this reason that countries should begin to make a choice. Either 
they want a strong and growing defense partnership with the United 
States--or they don't. Either they want access to the best defense 
technology that the U.S. has to offer--or they don't. Either they 
believe that standing up for democratic institutions matters--or they 
don't.
  The choice seems pretty clear to me.
  We built flexibility into CAATSA that allows them to avoid sanctions 
if they can show a substantial reduction in purchases over time.
  I would also stress to my colleagues here: CAATSA is the only 
significant bipartisan piece of foreign policy legislation passed since 
Donald Trump came into office. We should be proud of this brief moment 
of bipartisanship in support of our collective national security. Our 
responsibility did not end with one vote. Stringent oversight matters 
now more than ever. Will you stand by the law or buckle to attempts by 
the administration to fundamentally weaken it?
  A central challenge in the administration's implementation of section 
231 is its refusal to make formal determinations that individuals have 
in fact conducted significant transactions with specific Russian 
Federation entities. Without such a baseline of information, it is 
impossible to determine whether individuals are substantially reducing 
significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence 
sectors. I sought to remedy this shortcoming with an amendment to the 
NDAA which would require the administration to regularly report on 
whether such transactions have taken place. While the amendment did not 
make it into the bill, I will continue to urge such reporting moving 
forward and more transparency from the administration on how this law 
is being implemented.
  I want to acknowledge the work of those at the State and Treasury 
Departments, especially the Office of Foreign Assets Control, who have 
done the

[[Page S4339]]

hard work of preparing sanctions packages related to the executive 
orders and the Magnitsky laws. More than 200 designations of Russian 
entities and individuals have been made, constraining their ability to 
carry out a Kremlin agenda of aggression around the globe. I want to 
acknowledge the leadership of people like Assistant Secretary of State 
Wess Mitchell in working to advance a realistic policy with respect to 
President Putin's actions and intentions. There is no denying that our 
government is populated with career civil servants and some political 
appointees who are clear-eyed about the threat posed by the Kremlin and 
are working every day to counter it. I just wish that our President had 
their back.
  Time and again, this President insists on making statements that 
serve to hinder the good work done by our diplomats and civil servants.
  He insisted that Russia rejoin the G7 though Moscow has done nothing 
to remedy the reason for its suspension in the first place: the 
invasion of Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea.
  He insisted that most people in Crimea speak Russian so therefore 
want to be part of Russia. This is wrong and an insult to thousands of 
dead Ukrainians and their families.
  He insisted on trashing our oldest allies while seeking to curry 
favor with Putin.
  Given the scale and nature of this threat, we need a fully aligned 
policy apparatus where the President and bureaucracy are on the same 
page. With this President, I am not sure that can be achieved, but it 
is incumbent upon us, in this oversight body, Republican and Democrat, 
to indeed insist that the President end his irrational affection for 
the Kremlin. He must finally marshal all the resources of our 
government to address this threat to our security and to our democracy.
  It starts with the NATO summit next month. The President must be rock 
solid in his commitment to article 5 of the alliance charter. He should 
be firm about allies meeting their commitment of 2 percent of GDP to 
defense, but not allow that issue to crowd out a real conversation and 
coordination on addressing the threat posed by Russia. Our allies take 
this threat seriously and want a President, in the tradition of Kennedy 
and Reagan, who will show leadership and clarity of purpose at a NATO 
summit. The President should use the summit to build common cause on 
sanctions with those members of the EU present at the meeting. 
Specifically, he should work with Europe to impose cyber sanctions on 
Russian actors who threaten our democracies.
  In closing, despite some progress in designating some key Russian 
actors, I remain concerned that seven mandatory provisions of CAATSA 
have not been implemented. This is simply unacceptable. Secretary 
Pompeo committed during a recent Foreign Relations Committee hearing 
that he would pursue the mandatory provisions under the law. To make 
sure everyone is on the same page, let me run through the mandatory 
provisions that have not been implemented under CAATSA authorities: 
section 225, mandatory sanctions related to special Russian crude oil 
products; section 226, mandatory sanctions with respect to Russian and 
other foreign financial institutions; section 227, mandatory imposition 
of sanctions with respect to significant corruption in the Russian 
Federation; section 228, mandatory sanctions with respect to certain 
transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights 
abusers in the Russian Federation; section 231, mandatory sanctions 
with respect to persons engaging in transactions with the intelligence 
and defense sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation; 
section 233, mandatory sanctions with respect to investment in or 
facilitation of privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian 
Federation; and section 234, mandatory sanctions with respect to the 
transfer of arms and related materiel to Syria.
  I again implore the administration to follow the law and impose these 
sanctions with urgency.
  Let us recapture the bipartisan spirit we found to collectively 
confront threats to our national security when this body passed CAATSA 
nearly a year ago. I urge my colleagues to again join together and now 
ensure implementation of this law. I urge my colleagues to stand firm 
in support of our democracy against all forms of aggression, especially 
from Moscow. There is still time before the 2018 election to make 
crystal clear to the Kremlin that their days of unfettered cyber 
hacking, bots, trolls, and lies are over.

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