[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 98 (Wednesday, June 13, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Page S3919]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 2894. Mr. BROWN (for himself, Mr. Casey, and Mr. Blumenthal)
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 2282
proposed by Mr. Inhofe (for himself and Mr. McCain) to the bill H.R.
5515, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2019 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of part I of subtitle C of title XVI, add the
following:
SECTION 1637. UKRAINE CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States established diplomatic relations with
Ukraine in 1992, following Ukraine's independence from the
Soviet Union.
(2) The United States attaches great importance to the
success of Ukraine's transition to a modern democratic
country with a flourishing market economy.
(3) In an effort to undermine democracy in Ukraine, hackers
targeted the country's voting infrastructure just days before
its 2014 presidential election.
(4) In December 2015, a malicious cyber intrusion into
Ukrainian electric utility companies resulted in widespread
power outages.
(5) As a result of the December 2015 cyber incident, the
United States sent an interagency team to Ukraine, including
representatives from the Department of Energy, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, to help with the investigation and
to assess the vulnerability of Ukraine's infrastructure to
cyber intrusion. The visit was followed up by another
interagency delegation to Ukraine in March 2016 and a May
2016 United States-Ukrainian tabletop exercise on mitigating
attacks against Ukraine's infrastructure.
(6) In response to an escalating series of cyber attacks on
the country's critical infrastructure--including its national
railway system, its major stock exchanges, and its busiest
airport--President Petro Poroshenko declared that
``Cyberspace has turned into another battlefield for state
independence.''.
(7) In May 2017, Ukraine cited activities on Russian social
media platforms, including pro-Russian propaganda and
offensive cyber operations, as threats to Ukrainian national
security.
(8) Following the June 2017 Petya malware event--a global
cyber incident that primarily affected Ukraine--the Secretary
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) said
``the cyber attacks we have seen. . . very much highlight the
importance of the support, the help NATO provides. . . gives.
. . or provides to Ukraine to strengthen its cyber defenses,
technical and other kinds of support. We will continue to do
that and it's an important part of our cooperation with
Ukraine.''.
(9) In September 2017, the United States and Ukraine
conducted the first United States-Ukraine Bilateral Cyber
Dialogue in Kyiv, during which both sides affirmed their
commitment to an internet that is open, interoperable,
reliable, and secure, and the United States announced $5
million in new cyber assistance to strengthen Ukraine's
ability to prevent, mitigate, and respond to cyber attacks.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to--
(1) reaffirm the United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic
Partnership, which highlights the importance of the bilateral
relationship and outlines enhanced cooperation in the areas
of defense, security, economics and trade, energy security,
democracy, and cultural exchanges;
(2) support continued cooperation between NATO and Ukraine;
(3) support Ukraine's political and economic reforms;
(4) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to the
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances;
(5) assist Ukraine's efforts to enhance its cybersecurity
capabilities; and
(6) improve Ukraine's ability to respond to Russian-
supported disinformation and propaganda efforts in
cyberspace, including through social media and other outlets.
(c) United States Cybersecurity Cooperation With Ukraine.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Secretary of State should take the following actions,
commensurate with United States interests, to assist Ukraine
to improve its cybersecurity:
(A) Provide Ukraine such support as may be necessary to
secure government computer networks from malicious cyber
intrusions, particularly such networks that defend the
critical infrastructure of Ukraine.
(B) Provide Ukraine support in reducing reliance on Russian
information and communications technology.
(C) Assist Ukraine to build its capacity, expand
cybersecurity information sharing, and cooperate on
international cyberspace efforts.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
a report on United States cybersecurity cooperation with
Ukraine. The report shall also include information relating
to the following:
(A) United States efforts to strengthen Ukraine's ability
to prevent, mitigate, and respond to cyber incidents,
including through training, education, technical assistance,
capacity building, and cybersecurity risk management
strategies.
(B) The potential for new areas of collaboration and mutual
assistance between the United States and Ukraine in
addressing shared cyber challenges, including cybercrime,
critical infrastructure protection, and resilience against
botnets and other automated, distributed threats.
(C) NATO's efforts to help Ukraine develop technical
capabilities to counter cyber threats.
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