[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 64 (Thursday, April 19, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2306-S2308]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                     Russian Election Interference

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I come to the floor to continue my series of 
speeches about Russia's actions in the 2016 election and the threat 
that Russia poses for the 2018 midterm elections and our national 
security.
  Free, fair, and open elections are the foundation of our country. The 
Framers created a unique system that has stood for over 200 years and 
served as a beacon around the world.
  Regrettably, the Russian hybrid operations and malign influence 
against the 2016 election has put the sanctity and security of our 
democracy in question.
  Our duty as citizens and as legislators is to recognize this crisis 
and take concrete steps to protect our democracy. We must foster a 
climate of vigilance and Federal-State cooperation when it comes to 
elections integrity. So today, I wanted to take a moment to review what 
happened and offer some steps that we should take immediately.
  Some may say that there was no interference and that talking about 
Russia's meddling against our democratic institutions is ``fake news.'' 
I wish it were ``fake news'', but the facts are very clear and are 
acknowledged by experts of every political viewpoint. Let me take a 
moment to review what happened before I discuss the threat and what we 
should do.
  Fifteen months have now passed since the intelligence community 
released its assessment, which concluded that the Kremlin attacked the 
heart of our democracy by interfering with our elections process. This 
operation sought to weaken our democratic institutions, amplify and 
exacerbate societal tensions, and generally sow chaos.
  There is clear evidence that the Kremlin sought to influence the 2016 
Presidential election. The key findings of the intelligence community's 
assessment were these:

       We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an 
     influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 
     election. Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in 
     the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and 
     harm her electability and potential presidency.
       Moscow's influence campaign followed a Russian messaging 
     strategy that blends covert intelligence operations--such as 
     cyber activity--with overt efforts by Russian government 
     agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and 
     paid social media users or ``trolls.''
       Russia's state-run propaganda machine contributed to the 
     influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin 
     messaging to Russian and international audiences.

  In February of this year, leaders of the intelligence community 
appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee and reaffirmed these 
findings. In a related action, in February, the special counsel's 
office issued indictments against 13 Kremlin-linked trolls for 
conducting ``information warfare against the United States'' with the 
purpose of interfering with U.S. political and electoral processes, 
including the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.
  These tactics are aspects of a larger coordinated operation of hybrid 
aggression conducted by the Kremlin, using the broad spectrum of 
military and nonmilitary tools at its disposal. The main tenets of the 
Kremlin's hybrid operations are these: information operations with 
cyber tools, which people commonly think of as hacking; propaganda and 
disinformation; manipulation of social media; and malign influence, 
which can be deployed through political and financial channels.
  Furthermore, throughout this hybrid campaign, Russia has denied its 
involvement and engaged in deception to hide its fingerprints.
  Russia recognizes that, for now, its military capabilities are 
limited relative to the United States and NATO, and it will seek to 
avoid a direct military conflict with the West. Instead, Russian 
tactics leverage their strengths and exploit our open society and free 
markets in ways that they hope will have a strategic impact without 
leading to conventional war.
  As laid out in the ``Russian National Security Strategy'' in 2015, 
the Kremlin's approach to how they respond to conflict includes 
weaponizing tools and resources from across their government and 
society.
  The Russian strategy states:

       Interrelated political, military, military-technical, 
     diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are 
     being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic 
     deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts.

  This strategy describes the conventional and nonconventional use of 
warfare as the Kremlin sees it and how Russia has utilized all the 
tools of statecraft to engage an adversary without, in many cases, 
actually firing actual shots. These different disciplines together can 
be called a Russian hybrid approach to confrontation below the 
threshold of direct armed conflict, which has been developing and 
escalating since the earliest days of Putin's rise to power.
  Russia's attacks have not ceased since the 2016 election. As former 
FBI Director James Comey so presciently stated about the Russians, 
``They'll be back.''
  Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper assessed that 
the Kremlin has ``been emboldened'' by the success of their operations 
to date and warned that hybrid operations ``will continue.'' At a 
Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February, CIA Director Pompeo 
confirmed that the intelligence community has seen ``Russian activity 
and intentions'' to affect the 2018 midterm elections.
  Director of National Intelligence Coats stated at this same hearing 
that our intelligence experts expect that Russia will conduct bolder 
and more disruptive cyber operations in the coming year. The agency 
heads from across our intelligence community agreed with this 
assessment.
  The warnings from our current and former intelligence officials 
appear to be spot-on. There has been a steady pace of Russian hybrid 
operations deployed against us, our allies, and partners, with varying 
degrees of intensity and mixes of tools and methods. The techniques 
unleashed against us in the 2016 elections as laid out by our 
intelligence community were deployed with maximum intensity during last 
year's French Presidential elections. There was also evidence of hybrid 
operations against the German Federal elections held in September of 
2017. Kremlin-linked trolls targeted the people of Spain, exacerbating 
divisions during the referendum on Catalonian independence. Outgoing 
National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said we have seen ``initial 
signs'' that the Kremlin is using tools from its hybrid arsenal against 
the upcoming Mexican elections. After last month's poisoning of the 
former Russian spy and his daughter on British soil, an estimated 2,800 
Kremlin-linked bots were unleashed to cast doubt on Prime Minister 
May's assessment that Russia was responsible and to amplify divisions 
among the British people. While the majority of the interference 
appears to have come from Russia, others are catching on and deploying 
these tools as well.
  As highlighted in the Economist last week, a coalition of Indonesian 
religious extremist groups used propaganda and disinformation to affect 
a local election in Jakarta last year. The frontrunner, a Christian, 
was falsely accused of insulting Islam and huge rallies were organized 
against him. In the end, he lost to a candidate that

[[Page S2307]]

held the support of Muslim groups. This more overt interference has 
been coupled with covert information operations, using social media to 
smear candidates they deem ``not Muslim enough.''
  A second Christian candidate in upcoming Indonesian regional 
elections has been portrayed as a front for Christian domination in a 
country that has an estimated 90-percent Muslim population and has been 
featured in a video that falsely claimed that he was part of a massive 
church building campaign.
  With voters in this area spending an average of 4 to 5 hours a day 
looking at social media on their phones, videos and messages have 
quickly gone viral. As this example highlights, these campaigns don't 
even have to be sophisticated. They use tactics out of the Kremlin's 
playbook and they indicate how ubiquitous this type of activity is 
becoming across the world.
  We also continue to see evidence of the Kremlin and Kremlin-linked 
agents deploy hybrid tools to sow division, exacerbate racial and 
religious divides, and amplify social tensions here at home. We don't 
have to look far for examples.
  Kremlin-linked trolls flooded Twitter with messages intended to sow 
division and disinformation in the wake of the tragic shootings in Las 
Vegas and Parkland, FL.
  During the special election to fill the Alabama Senate seat vacated 
by now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, one candidate gained 1,100 
Russian-origin Twitter followers over a 3-day period, with many of the 
accounts appearing to be artificial.
  January press reports indicate that Fancy Bear--the Russian military-
linked hackers who perpetrated attacks on the Democratic National 
Committee in the 2016 election--have been attempting to penetrate the 
emails of Senate offices in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections.
  Kremlin propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik continue to try to 
capitalize on our open press and public debates to spread 
disinformation and amplify division.
  In sum, Kremlin and Kremlin-linked agents are still trying to hack 
us, our allies, and partners to fuel their information operations. They 
are still using trolls and bots to manipulate social media and 
targeting us with disinformation campaigns and still deploying 
propaganda.
  In the absence of strategic action to deter these kinds of attacks, 
Russia sees our 2018 midterm elections as another prime target.
  Despite this threat and multiple warnings from across our 
intelligence community, Trump administration officials have testified 
to Congress dating back to last spring that the President has not 
directed his Cabinet or senior staff to work on a strategy to protect 
our democratic institutions. When I asked Defense Secretary Mattis on 
June 13, 2017, whether the President had directed him to begin 
intensive planning to protect our electoral system against the next 
Russian cyber attack, he was not able to point to any guidance 
indicating that the President recognizes the urgency of the Russian 
threat or the necessity of preparing to counter it during midterm 
elections.
  On June 21, 2017, I asked officials from the Department of Homeland 
Security, who are in charge of election security, whether the President 
had directed them to come up with a plan to protect our critical 
election infrastructure. They responded no.
  On October 19, 2017, I asked leading officials from the Pentagon, the 
FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, who are in charge of 
protecting critical cyber infrastructure, including our electoral 
infrastructure, if the President had directed them to counter the 
Russian threat. They could not point to any specific direction coming 
from the White House to do so.
  On February 13, 2018, I asked the top directors of our intelligence 
community whether the President had directed them to take specific 
action to blunt or disrupt ongoing Russian influence activities. I 
received no affirmative responses. FBI Director Wray said he had not 
been ``specifically directed by the President.'' Admiral Rogers, who 
serves as head of both the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, 
responded: ``I can't say that I have been explicitly directed to `blunt 
or actively stop.' '' The other witnesses could not point to any 
directives from the President to confront or blunt Russian influence 
operations either.
  On February 27, 2018, I asked Admiral Rogers whether he has the 
authority and the capability to disrupt hacking operations where they 
originate. He responded that he does not have the authority from the 
President to go after these perpetrators and stated that the government 
as a whole has so far, in his words, ``opted not to engage.''
  The bottom line is that the President has not directed anyone in the 
intelligence community, his Cabinet, or elsewhere in his administration 
to develop or implement a strategy to disrupt, blunt, or retaliate 
against Russia for its hybrid aggression against our democracy. This 
threat is clear, and it only grows as we move closer to our midterm 
elections in November. It is past time for the President to step up and 
provide strategic leadership against Russian interference.
  Russia has gone to school on our social and political divisions and 
our democratic institutions and will continue to adapt. They have 
learned how to exploit our vulnerabilities and are planning future 
operations to hit our blind spots. We are fooling ourselves if we are 
only looking to protect against the threats from the last Russian 
operation. We need to be prepared to blunt what comes next.
  February testimony from the Armed Services Cybersecurity Subcommittee 
highlights this evolving threat. Professor Richard Harknett, a cyber 
security expert from the University of Cincinnati, warned that Russia's 
2016 campaign against our elections was the ``stone age'' relative to 
the sophistication of cyber activities we are likely to see in the 
coming elections. Similarly, Russia expert Heather Conley from the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies testified at the same 
hearing. She said:

       If we're preparing for what Russia did in 2016, it will be 
     very different in November. It will be very different in 
     2020. It will look more American. It will look less Russian. 
     And so this is adaptation. We are already fighting the last 
     war.

  As an article from the May issue of ``Atlantic'' portrayed, we may 
soon find ourselves in an era where doctored images are used to further 
aspects of hybrid operations. New technology exists that can 
superimpose a person onto video of an activity they did not participate 
in. Franklin Foer, the author, wrote of this phenomenon:

       The genre is one of the cruelest, most invasive forms of 
     identity theft invented in the internet era. . . . A casual 
     observer can't easily detect the hoax.

  As was highlighted recently on a ``60 Minutes'' show, we know the 
Russians targeted election systems in 21 States in the 2016 election 
and that Kremlin or Kremlin-linked actors compromised websites or voter 
registration systems in 7 States. The fact we have not yet taken steps 
to correct all the vulnerabilities does not inspire confidence for the 
2018 midterm elections. Former FBI agent and expert on Russian 
information operations, Clint Watts, said recently on ``Meet the 
Press,'' ``at this point we can't ensure the vote is accurate or not 
changed'' and that his number one priority would be protecting the 
elections and the vote ahead of the 2018 elections. We cannot continue 
to have a wait-and-see attitude with regard to the Kremlin's hybrid 
operations because, next time, it could and likely will be worse. They 
might actually be able to change ballots or tamper with voter rolls or 
carry out another operation entirely that we haven't even thought of.
  We are behind the curve in preparing our defenses against Russian 
interference in 2018--these elections that are coming. Even by the 
administration's own admission, we are not doing enough. At an October 
18, 2017, hearing, Senator Sasse asked Attorney General Sessions 
whether the administration had prepared to counter future interference 
by Russia and other foreign adversaries in the information space. 
Attorney General Sessions responded:

       Probably not. We're not. And the matter is so complex that 
     for most of us, we are not able to fully grasp the technical 
     dangers that are out there.

  This is not an acceptable response to such a pressing problem. Russia 
attacked the heart of our democracy, and if we do not try to find 
solutions and guard our infrastructure, we are derelict in our duties.

[[Page S2308]]

  One of the last acts of the Obama administration was to deem election 
infrastructure critical, which put it in a priority category for 
assistance to guard against election interference. While appropriate 
and important, that is the mere beginning of a solution, and we have 
hardly progressed in the last 14 months.
  I recently asked General Curt Scaparrotti, the head of European 
Command, who is on the frontline of blunting Russian aggression in 
Europe, whether we had a sufficient whole-of-government to combat such 
hybrid operations. He responded that we did not have an ``effective 
unification'' across the government and affirmed that additional focus 
was needed immediately because of the nature of the threat.
  We need a whole-of-government approach with the weight of the White 
House behind it. We need an approach that will enable coordination 
across the different agencies of our government and support effective 
outreach and collaboration with State and local officials and the 
private sector, including the media. Given the nature of Russia's 
asymmetric aggression, conducted below the level of direct military 
conflict, we must deploy a range of tools, including cyber; diplomacy; 
economic sanctions; financial investigations to counter foreign 
corruption, money laundering, and malign political influence; and 
strategic communications.
  This administration has not effectively employed the nonmilitary 
tools in its arsenal, and it has been slow to respond in any meaningful 
way. The administration's dithering is exemplified in its foot-dragging 
in utilizing the State Department's Global Engagement Center to counter 
Russian propaganda and its delay in implementing sanctions to punish 
Russia. While recent actions to expel Russian diplomats after the 
poisoning of the Russian spy and his daughter on British soil and the 
decision to finally implement sanctions targeted against Putin's base 
of power are encouraging, they do not add up to a policy of effective 
deterrence.
  In this regard, I would note that a former senior Defense Department 
cyber policymaker recently testified to the Armed Services Committee 
that a standing joint interagency task force is required to bring to 
bear the right capabilities and resources spread across the government 
to respond effectively to Russian aggression. Such a task force would 
utilize expertise from across our government, including the 
intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the State 
Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Treasury 
Department, and would allow effective coordination and collaboration on 
policy to counter Russia. The minority staff report of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on Russian asymmetric operations in Europe 
recommended a similar mechanism. I think this is a good way forward, 
and I intend to continue to work with my colleagues on the Foreign 
Relations Committees and other committees of jurisdiction on how best 
to stand up such a capability.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member, has 
recently issued recommendations to improve election security. The 
committee urges retaining States' primacy in running elections and 
providing them with necessary assistance; creating effective 
deterrence; improving information sharing on threats; and securing 
election-related systems. All of these are important steps and should 
be implemented without delay.
  Several of my Senate colleagues have thoughtfully incorporated these 
recommendations into legislation, the Secure Elections Act, and I 
strongly support this effort. This bill would improve information 
sharing between Federal Government and local election agencies, assist 
States with cyber security preparedness, and support them in replacing 
outdated and insecure electronic voting machines. I thank Senators 
Klobuchar, Lankford, Graham, Collins, and Heinrich for their work on 
this bill, and I look forward to working with them on further 
legislation to protect the institutions that are essential to our 
democracy.
  As I laid out, these operations against our elections are part of a 
broad pattern of Russian hybrid attacks against us and our allies and 
partners. As Vice President Biden and former Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Michael Carpenter reminded us in a recent article in Foreign 
Affairs:

       More than a decade has passed since Estonia became the 
     first NATO country to see its government institutions and 
     media organizations attacked by hackers based in Russia. In 
     the intervening period, the risk of a far more debilitating 
     attack has increased, but planning for how to defend against 
     it has lagged.

  There are countries, such as those in the Baltics, that have been 
dealing with these Russian threats for far longer than we have and have 
developed effective approaches for countering them.
  Department of Defense National Guard units, which regularly deploy to 
Eastern Europe and the Baltics, may be uniquely positioned to share 
information on Russian hybrid attacks with State and local officials 
and explain procedures they learn from our European partners.
  With regard to building credible deterrence--one of the Intelligence 
Committee's key recommendations--it does not appear that we have 
mounted an effective policy against Russia. As DNI Coats testified 
earlier this year, Russian influence operations in cyber space are 
intended to achieve ``strategic objectives'' and will continue unless 
and until there are clear repercussions for Russia. In February, 
Lieutenant General Nakasone testified to the Armed Services Committee 
that the Russians, amongst several other adversaries, don't fear us and 
have calculated that, in his words, ``not much will happen to them'' in 
retaliation for cyber attacks on America. Cyber Commander Admiral 
Rogers also testified in February to the Armed Services Committee that 
Vladimir Putin has concluded there is little price to pay for Russian 
aggression against the United States, and he has no incentive to stop 
these hybrid attacks. In outgoing National Security Advisor McMaster's 
last remarks, he even admitted ``we have failed to impose sufficient 
costs'' on Russia.

  In the absence of Presidential leadership to set a policy to blunt 
Russian aggression and send the message to our foreign adversaries that 
we will not stand for attacks of this nature, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 requires a comprehensive plan 
from the administration to counter Russian malign influence. That plan 
is overdue. The Act also requires that the President develop a national 
cyber policy, including any capabilities that be used to impose costs 
on adversaries in response to a cyber attack or malicious cyber 
activity. There is no time to waste, and I urge the administration to 
deliver these strategies and actually implement them, which would work 
toward imposing costs on our foreign adversaries.
  I intend to return to speak further on these issues, as I believe the 
American people deserve a comprehensive explanation of the threats that 
face our democracy. I also intend to work with my colleagues on 
additional measures to secure our political system and election 
infrastructure against malign foreign influence.
  None of this is to say that States will lose their traditional 
primacy over elections. Rhode Island is one of the States that is 
taking this issue very seriously by adopting new technologies to 
streamline voting and guard voter information.
  My State is also working with the Department of Homeland Security to 
shore up election security, but election security must be a national 
priority, and the Federal Government must be a reliable partner. I must 
commend our Secretary of State, Nellie Gorbea, for her great efforts.
  One thing remains clear. The Russians attacked our elections 
process--the heart of our democracy--and are primed to do it again 
unless the administration provides effective deterrence. This is not a 
Democratic issue or a Republican issue; it is an issue of national 
security. As the old saying goes, ``Fool me once, shame on you; fool me 
twice, shame on me.'' We have no time to waste.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from Alaska.