[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 64 (Thursday, April 19, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2306-S2308]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Russian Election Interference
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I come to the floor to continue my series of
speeches about Russia's actions in the 2016 election and the threat
that Russia poses for the 2018 midterm elections and our national
security.
Free, fair, and open elections are the foundation of our country. The
Framers created a unique system that has stood for over 200 years and
served as a beacon around the world.
Regrettably, the Russian hybrid operations and malign influence
against the 2016 election has put the sanctity and security of our
democracy in question.
Our duty as citizens and as legislators is to recognize this crisis
and take concrete steps to protect our democracy. We must foster a
climate of vigilance and Federal-State cooperation when it comes to
elections integrity. So today, I wanted to take a moment to review what
happened and offer some steps that we should take immediately.
Some may say that there was no interference and that talking about
Russia's meddling against our democratic institutions is ``fake news.''
I wish it were ``fake news'', but the facts are very clear and are
acknowledged by experts of every political viewpoint. Let me take a
moment to review what happened before I discuss the threat and what we
should do.
Fifteen months have now passed since the intelligence community
released its assessment, which concluded that the Kremlin attacked the
heart of our democracy by interfering with our elections process. This
operation sought to weaken our democratic institutions, amplify and
exacerbate societal tensions, and generally sow chaos.
There is clear evidence that the Kremlin sought to influence the 2016
Presidential election. The key findings of the intelligence community's
assessment were these:
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential
election. Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in
the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and
harm her electability and potential presidency.
Moscow's influence campaign followed a Russian messaging
strategy that blends covert intelligence operations--such as
cyber activity--with overt efforts by Russian government
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and
paid social media users or ``trolls.''
Russia's state-run propaganda machine contributed to the
influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin
messaging to Russian and international audiences.
In February of this year, leaders of the intelligence community
appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee and reaffirmed these
findings. In a related action, in February, the special counsel's
office issued indictments against 13 Kremlin-linked trolls for
conducting ``information warfare against the United States'' with the
purpose of interfering with U.S. political and electoral processes,
including the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.
These tactics are aspects of a larger coordinated operation of hybrid
aggression conducted by the Kremlin, using the broad spectrum of
military and nonmilitary tools at its disposal. The main tenets of the
Kremlin's hybrid operations are these: information operations with
cyber tools, which people commonly think of as hacking; propaganda and
disinformation; manipulation of social media; and malign influence,
which can be deployed through political and financial channels.
Furthermore, throughout this hybrid campaign, Russia has denied its
involvement and engaged in deception to hide its fingerprints.
Russia recognizes that, for now, its military capabilities are
limited relative to the United States and NATO, and it will seek to
avoid a direct military conflict with the West. Instead, Russian
tactics leverage their strengths and exploit our open society and free
markets in ways that they hope will have a strategic impact without
leading to conventional war.
As laid out in the ``Russian National Security Strategy'' in 2015,
the Kremlin's approach to how they respond to conflict includes
weaponizing tools and resources from across their government and
society.
The Russian strategy states:
Interrelated political, military, military-technical,
diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are
being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic
deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts.
This strategy describes the conventional and nonconventional use of
warfare as the Kremlin sees it and how Russia has utilized all the
tools of statecraft to engage an adversary without, in many cases,
actually firing actual shots. These different disciplines together can
be called a Russian hybrid approach to confrontation below the
threshold of direct armed conflict, which has been developing and
escalating since the earliest days of Putin's rise to power.
Russia's attacks have not ceased since the 2016 election. As former
FBI Director James Comey so presciently stated about the Russians,
``They'll be back.''
Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper assessed that
the Kremlin has ``been emboldened'' by the success of their operations
to date and warned that hybrid operations ``will continue.'' At a
Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February, CIA Director Pompeo
confirmed that the intelligence community has seen ``Russian activity
and intentions'' to affect the 2018 midterm elections.
Director of National Intelligence Coats stated at this same hearing
that our intelligence experts expect that Russia will conduct bolder
and more disruptive cyber operations in the coming year. The agency
heads from across our intelligence community agreed with this
assessment.
The warnings from our current and former intelligence officials
appear to be spot-on. There has been a steady pace of Russian hybrid
operations deployed against us, our allies, and partners, with varying
degrees of intensity and mixes of tools and methods. The techniques
unleashed against us in the 2016 elections as laid out by our
intelligence community were deployed with maximum intensity during last
year's French Presidential elections. There was also evidence of hybrid
operations against the German Federal elections held in September of
2017. Kremlin-linked trolls targeted the people of Spain, exacerbating
divisions during the referendum on Catalonian independence. Outgoing
National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said we have seen ``initial
signs'' that the Kremlin is using tools from its hybrid arsenal against
the upcoming Mexican elections. After last month's poisoning of the
former Russian spy and his daughter on British soil, an estimated 2,800
Kremlin-linked bots were unleashed to cast doubt on Prime Minister
May's assessment that Russia was responsible and to amplify divisions
among the British people. While the majority of the interference
appears to have come from Russia, others are catching on and deploying
these tools as well.
As highlighted in the Economist last week, a coalition of Indonesian
religious extremist groups used propaganda and disinformation to affect
a local election in Jakarta last year. The frontrunner, a Christian,
was falsely accused of insulting Islam and huge rallies were organized
against him. In the end, he lost to a candidate that
[[Page S2307]]
held the support of Muslim groups. This more overt interference has
been coupled with covert information operations, using social media to
smear candidates they deem ``not Muslim enough.''
A second Christian candidate in upcoming Indonesian regional
elections has been portrayed as a front for Christian domination in a
country that has an estimated 90-percent Muslim population and has been
featured in a video that falsely claimed that he was part of a massive
church building campaign.
With voters in this area spending an average of 4 to 5 hours a day
looking at social media on their phones, videos and messages have
quickly gone viral. As this example highlights, these campaigns don't
even have to be sophisticated. They use tactics out of the Kremlin's
playbook and they indicate how ubiquitous this type of activity is
becoming across the world.
We also continue to see evidence of the Kremlin and Kremlin-linked
agents deploy hybrid tools to sow division, exacerbate racial and
religious divides, and amplify social tensions here at home. We don't
have to look far for examples.
Kremlin-linked trolls flooded Twitter with messages intended to sow
division and disinformation in the wake of the tragic shootings in Las
Vegas and Parkland, FL.
During the special election to fill the Alabama Senate seat vacated
by now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, one candidate gained 1,100
Russian-origin Twitter followers over a 3-day period, with many of the
accounts appearing to be artificial.
January press reports indicate that Fancy Bear--the Russian military-
linked hackers who perpetrated attacks on the Democratic National
Committee in the 2016 election--have been attempting to penetrate the
emails of Senate offices in the run-up to the 2018 midterm elections.
Kremlin propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik continue to try to
capitalize on our open press and public debates to spread
disinformation and amplify division.
In sum, Kremlin and Kremlin-linked agents are still trying to hack
us, our allies, and partners to fuel their information operations. They
are still using trolls and bots to manipulate social media and
targeting us with disinformation campaigns and still deploying
propaganda.
In the absence of strategic action to deter these kinds of attacks,
Russia sees our 2018 midterm elections as another prime target.
Despite this threat and multiple warnings from across our
intelligence community, Trump administration officials have testified
to Congress dating back to last spring that the President has not
directed his Cabinet or senior staff to work on a strategy to protect
our democratic institutions. When I asked Defense Secretary Mattis on
June 13, 2017, whether the President had directed him to begin
intensive planning to protect our electoral system against the next
Russian cyber attack, he was not able to point to any guidance
indicating that the President recognizes the urgency of the Russian
threat or the necessity of preparing to counter it during midterm
elections.
On June 21, 2017, I asked officials from the Department of Homeland
Security, who are in charge of election security, whether the President
had directed them to come up with a plan to protect our critical
election infrastructure. They responded no.
On October 19, 2017, I asked leading officials from the Pentagon, the
FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, who are in charge of
protecting critical cyber infrastructure, including our electoral
infrastructure, if the President had directed them to counter the
Russian threat. They could not point to any specific direction coming
from the White House to do so.
On February 13, 2018, I asked the top directors of our intelligence
community whether the President had directed them to take specific
action to blunt or disrupt ongoing Russian influence activities. I
received no affirmative responses. FBI Director Wray said he had not
been ``specifically directed by the President.'' Admiral Rogers, who
serves as head of both the National Security Agency and Cyber Command,
responded: ``I can't say that I have been explicitly directed to `blunt
or actively stop.' '' The other witnesses could not point to any
directives from the President to confront or blunt Russian influence
operations either.
On February 27, 2018, I asked Admiral Rogers whether he has the
authority and the capability to disrupt hacking operations where they
originate. He responded that he does not have the authority from the
President to go after these perpetrators and stated that the government
as a whole has so far, in his words, ``opted not to engage.''
The bottom line is that the President has not directed anyone in the
intelligence community, his Cabinet, or elsewhere in his administration
to develop or implement a strategy to disrupt, blunt, or retaliate
against Russia for its hybrid aggression against our democracy. This
threat is clear, and it only grows as we move closer to our midterm
elections in November. It is past time for the President to step up and
provide strategic leadership against Russian interference.
Russia has gone to school on our social and political divisions and
our democratic institutions and will continue to adapt. They have
learned how to exploit our vulnerabilities and are planning future
operations to hit our blind spots. We are fooling ourselves if we are
only looking to protect against the threats from the last Russian
operation. We need to be prepared to blunt what comes next.
February testimony from the Armed Services Cybersecurity Subcommittee
highlights this evolving threat. Professor Richard Harknett, a cyber
security expert from the University of Cincinnati, warned that Russia's
2016 campaign against our elections was the ``stone age'' relative to
the sophistication of cyber activities we are likely to see in the
coming elections. Similarly, Russia expert Heather Conley from the
Center for Strategic and International Studies testified at the same
hearing. She said:
If we're preparing for what Russia did in 2016, it will be
very different in November. It will be very different in
2020. It will look more American. It will look less Russian.
And so this is adaptation. We are already fighting the last
war.
As an article from the May issue of ``Atlantic'' portrayed, we may
soon find ourselves in an era where doctored images are used to further
aspects of hybrid operations. New technology exists that can
superimpose a person onto video of an activity they did not participate
in. Franklin Foer, the author, wrote of this phenomenon:
The genre is one of the cruelest, most invasive forms of
identity theft invented in the internet era. . . . A casual
observer can't easily detect the hoax.
As was highlighted recently on a ``60 Minutes'' show, we know the
Russians targeted election systems in 21 States in the 2016 election
and that Kremlin or Kremlin-linked actors compromised websites or voter
registration systems in 7 States. The fact we have not yet taken steps
to correct all the vulnerabilities does not inspire confidence for the
2018 midterm elections. Former FBI agent and expert on Russian
information operations, Clint Watts, said recently on ``Meet the
Press,'' ``at this point we can't ensure the vote is accurate or not
changed'' and that his number one priority would be protecting the
elections and the vote ahead of the 2018 elections. We cannot continue
to have a wait-and-see attitude with regard to the Kremlin's hybrid
operations because, next time, it could and likely will be worse. They
might actually be able to change ballots or tamper with voter rolls or
carry out another operation entirely that we haven't even thought of.
We are behind the curve in preparing our defenses against Russian
interference in 2018--these elections that are coming. Even by the
administration's own admission, we are not doing enough. At an October
18, 2017, hearing, Senator Sasse asked Attorney General Sessions
whether the administration had prepared to counter future interference
by Russia and other foreign adversaries in the information space.
Attorney General Sessions responded:
Probably not. We're not. And the matter is so complex that
for most of us, we are not able to fully grasp the technical
dangers that are out there.
This is not an acceptable response to such a pressing problem. Russia
attacked the heart of our democracy, and if we do not try to find
solutions and guard our infrastructure, we are derelict in our duties.
[[Page S2308]]
One of the last acts of the Obama administration was to deem election
infrastructure critical, which put it in a priority category for
assistance to guard against election interference. While appropriate
and important, that is the mere beginning of a solution, and we have
hardly progressed in the last 14 months.
I recently asked General Curt Scaparrotti, the head of European
Command, who is on the frontline of blunting Russian aggression in
Europe, whether we had a sufficient whole-of-government to combat such
hybrid operations. He responded that we did not have an ``effective
unification'' across the government and affirmed that additional focus
was needed immediately because of the nature of the threat.
We need a whole-of-government approach with the weight of the White
House behind it. We need an approach that will enable coordination
across the different agencies of our government and support effective
outreach and collaboration with State and local officials and the
private sector, including the media. Given the nature of Russia's
asymmetric aggression, conducted below the level of direct military
conflict, we must deploy a range of tools, including cyber; diplomacy;
economic sanctions; financial investigations to counter foreign
corruption, money laundering, and malign political influence; and
strategic communications.
This administration has not effectively employed the nonmilitary
tools in its arsenal, and it has been slow to respond in any meaningful
way. The administration's dithering is exemplified in its foot-dragging
in utilizing the State Department's Global Engagement Center to counter
Russian propaganda and its delay in implementing sanctions to punish
Russia. While recent actions to expel Russian diplomats after the
poisoning of the Russian spy and his daughter on British soil and the
decision to finally implement sanctions targeted against Putin's base
of power are encouraging, they do not add up to a policy of effective
deterrence.
In this regard, I would note that a former senior Defense Department
cyber policymaker recently testified to the Armed Services Committee
that a standing joint interagency task force is required to bring to
bear the right capabilities and resources spread across the government
to respond effectively to Russian aggression. Such a task force would
utilize expertise from across our government, including the
intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the State
Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Treasury
Department, and would allow effective coordination and collaboration on
policy to counter Russia. The minority staff report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on Russian asymmetric operations in Europe
recommended a similar mechanism. I think this is a good way forward,
and I intend to continue to work with my colleagues on the Foreign
Relations Committees and other committees of jurisdiction on how best
to stand up such a capability.
The Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member, has
recently issued recommendations to improve election security. The
committee urges retaining States' primacy in running elections and
providing them with necessary assistance; creating effective
deterrence; improving information sharing on threats; and securing
election-related systems. All of these are important steps and should
be implemented without delay.
Several of my Senate colleagues have thoughtfully incorporated these
recommendations into legislation, the Secure Elections Act, and I
strongly support this effort. This bill would improve information
sharing between Federal Government and local election agencies, assist
States with cyber security preparedness, and support them in replacing
outdated and insecure electronic voting machines. I thank Senators
Klobuchar, Lankford, Graham, Collins, and Heinrich for their work on
this bill, and I look forward to working with them on further
legislation to protect the institutions that are essential to our
democracy.
As I laid out, these operations against our elections are part of a
broad pattern of Russian hybrid attacks against us and our allies and
partners. As Vice President Biden and former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Michael Carpenter reminded us in a recent article in Foreign
Affairs:
More than a decade has passed since Estonia became the
first NATO country to see its government institutions and
media organizations attacked by hackers based in Russia. In
the intervening period, the risk of a far more debilitating
attack has increased, but planning for how to defend against
it has lagged.
There are countries, such as those in the Baltics, that have been
dealing with these Russian threats for far longer than we have and have
developed effective approaches for countering them.
Department of Defense National Guard units, which regularly deploy to
Eastern Europe and the Baltics, may be uniquely positioned to share
information on Russian hybrid attacks with State and local officials
and explain procedures they learn from our European partners.
With regard to building credible deterrence--one of the Intelligence
Committee's key recommendations--it does not appear that we have
mounted an effective policy against Russia. As DNI Coats testified
earlier this year, Russian influence operations in cyber space are
intended to achieve ``strategic objectives'' and will continue unless
and until there are clear repercussions for Russia. In February,
Lieutenant General Nakasone testified to the Armed Services Committee
that the Russians, amongst several other adversaries, don't fear us and
have calculated that, in his words, ``not much will happen to them'' in
retaliation for cyber attacks on America. Cyber Commander Admiral
Rogers also testified in February to the Armed Services Committee that
Vladimir Putin has concluded there is little price to pay for Russian
aggression against the United States, and he has no incentive to stop
these hybrid attacks. In outgoing National Security Advisor McMaster's
last remarks, he even admitted ``we have failed to impose sufficient
costs'' on Russia.
In the absence of Presidential leadership to set a policy to blunt
Russian aggression and send the message to our foreign adversaries that
we will not stand for attacks of this nature, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 requires a comprehensive plan
from the administration to counter Russian malign influence. That plan
is overdue. The Act also requires that the President develop a national
cyber policy, including any capabilities that be used to impose costs
on adversaries in response to a cyber attack or malicious cyber
activity. There is no time to waste, and I urge the administration to
deliver these strategies and actually implement them, which would work
toward imposing costs on our foreign adversaries.
I intend to return to speak further on these issues, as I believe the
American people deserve a comprehensive explanation of the threats that
face our democracy. I also intend to work with my colleagues on
additional measures to secure our political system and election
infrastructure against malign foreign influence.
None of this is to say that States will lose their traditional
primacy over elections. Rhode Island is one of the States that is
taking this issue very seriously by adopting new technologies to
streamline voting and guard voter information.
My State is also working with the Department of Homeland Security to
shore up election security, but election security must be a national
priority, and the Federal Government must be a reliable partner. I must
commend our Secretary of State, Nellie Gorbea, for her great efforts.
One thing remains clear. The Russians attacked our elections
process--the heart of our democracy--and are primed to do it again
unless the administration provides effective deterrence. This is not a
Democratic issue or a Republican issue; it is an issue of national
security. As the old saying goes, ``Fool me once, shame on you; fool me
twice, shame on me.'' We have no time to waste.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from Alaska.