[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 58 (Wednesday, April 11, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H3112-H3119]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  STRESS TEST IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2017

  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 780, I call 
up the bill (H.R. 4293) to reform the Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review process, the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test process, and for 
other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Katko). Pursuant to House Resolution 
780, in lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended 
by the Committee on Financial Services, printed in the bill, an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules 
Committee Print 115-63, modified by the amendment printed in part B of 
House Report 115-600, is adopted, and the bill, as amended, is 
considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 4293

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Stress Test Improvement Act 
     of 2017''.

     SEC. 2. CCAR AND DFAST REFORMS.

       Section 165(i) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
     Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 5365(i)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (B)(i)--
       (i) by striking ``3 different'' and inserting ``2 
     different''; and
       (ii) by striking ``, adverse,''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) CCAR requirements.--
       ``(i) Limitation on qualitative capital planning 
     objections.--In carrying out CCAR, the Board of Governors may 
     not object to a company's capital plan on the basis of 
     qualitative deficiencies in the company's capital planning 
     process.
       ``(ii) CCAR defined.--For purposes of this subparagraph and 
     subparagraph (E), the term `CCAR' means the Comprehensive 
     Capital Analysis and Review established by the Board of 
     Governors.''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``semiannual'' and 
     inserting ``annual''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking ``3 different sets 
     of conditions, including baseline, adverse,'' and inserting 
     ``2 different sets of conditions, including baseline''.

     SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       The amendments made by this Act may not be construed to 
     prohibit an appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined in 
     section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 
     1813)) from--
       (1) ensuring the safety and soundness of an entity 
     regulated by such an appropriate Federal banking agency; and
       (2) ensuring compliance with applicable laws, regulations, 
     and supervisory policies, and the following of appropriate 
     guidance, by an entity regulated by such an appropriate 
     Federal banking agency.

     SEC. 4. REDUCTION OF SURPLUS FUNDS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS.

       (a) In General.--Section 7(a)(3)(A) of the Federal Reserve 
     Act (12 U.S.C. 289(a)(3)(A)) is amended by striking 
     ``$7,500,000,000'' and inserting ``$7,480,000,000''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect on 
     June 1, 2018.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 
1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Financial Services.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling), and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Maxine Waters) each will control 30 minutes.
  The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.


                             General Leave

  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks 
and submit extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in very strong support of H.R. 4293, the 
Stress Test Improvement Act of 2017. I want to thank the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Zeldin), who is a real workhorse on the Financial 
Services Committee and a real leader in trying to ensure that we have 
affordable credit for our constituents so that they can achieve the 
American Dream. In his legislation, he will bring clarity and 
reasonableness to the stress test regime.
  Currently, as we know, banks face two separate, legally mandated 
stress tests: the CCAR and the DFAST. Together, these two programs 
constitute one of the greatest expansions of the Federal Reserve's 
supervisory powers in recent history. But what is important to note, 
Mr. Speaker, is that, in addition to these mandated stress tests, banks 
conduct stress tests every single week on one asset class or another.
  It is important to know how banks can withstand tough, stormy 
financial weather, but this was taking place even prior to either DFAST 
or CCAR. What has happened now, Mr. Speaker, is these particular tests 
are incredibly onerous to the point where the reports are not just 
measured in pages, they are measured in pounds, and it is doubtful that 
anyone actually reads them.
  Then, to compound the challenge, Mr. Speaker, the Federal Reserve's 
stress tests have become kind of a cat-and-mouse exercise in which the 
Fed staff and compliance officers attempt to outwit each other in a 
game that has no rules and no transparency. In other words, it is a 
secret test. Nobody really knows what is on it. It is difficult for 
Congress, it is difficult for our markets, and it is difficult for the 
public to even assess whether or not these tests are effective.
  Mr. Speaker, it is very important to note, if you don't know what is 
on the test, how can you adhere to the rule of law if you don't know 
what the law is? And so something really needs to change here.
  Now, it is fortunate that yesterday the Federal Reserve finally took 
action to begin to simplify and refine the CCAR stress testing regime. 
Recognizing the opacity of the stress test regime, Federal Reserve Vice 
Chairman for Supervision Randy Quarles said in a statement: ``Our 
regulatory measures are most effective when they are as simple and 
transparent as possible.'' I couldn't agree more, as does the gentleman 
from New York as well.

[[Page H3113]]

  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this particular proposal is somewhat 
modest in its attempt to simplify the process. It does follow the 
results of a review undertaken by former Fed Chair Yellen, which found 
a need to reduce the burden resulting from stress testing requirements. 
Almost everybody agrees with that, especially on our smaller financial 
institutions. So that is one more reason why this is needed.
  I am glad the Federal Reserve recognizes the need to reform the 
stress test regime because, again, it contributes to a climate of legal 
and regulatory uncertainty when the rule of law is so critical to the 
foundation of our society and it is so critical to economic growth.
  But in light of the Fed's announcement yesterday, it is also 
important to point out what the Fed did can easily be undone next week, 
next month, or next year. That is why it is critical that Congress has 
to make improvements in the stress testing regime permanent, especially 
for the CCAR process, which is not--I repeat, not--a creation of 
statute.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Zeldin) has come up again with just 
the right bill, H.R. 4293, and it will help provide a commonsense, and, 
oh, by the way, bipartisan reform that will inject badly needed 
accountability, transparency, and targeted relief to reduce legal and 
regulatory uncertainty for financial institutions.
  Why is this important, Mr. Speaker? At the end of the day, it is not 
really the banks that are the subject of these regulations. At the end 
of the day, it is their customers. And what this committee and what 
this House has to do is ensure that there is affordable and available 
credit to help fund people's American Dreams.

  I heard from a gentleman by the name of John in my district from 
Mesquite, Texas. He said:

       Credit helped me obtain my first home, and 13 years later, 
     I am still in it. It has helped us grow from one child, when 
     we moved in, to four. We ran into some bad times, but I was 
     able to withstand it all with the help of the available 
     credit lines that I had at the time. Without the credit, it 
     would have been nearly impossible to still be where me and my 
     family are today.

  That is why it is so important, Mr. Speaker. People need credit to 
pay their bills, to buy their homes, to pay for their car repairs; and 
all of these regulations, the regulatory onslaught that has been taking 
place for almost a decade, makes that credit less available and more 
expensive. It shrinks the American Dream, and we can't allow that to 
happen on our watch, Mr. Speaker.
  That is why it is so important that we bring some rationality to the 
stress test so that, hopefully, people like John in Mesquite can 
continue to get that line of credit. Mr. Speaker, that is why it is so 
important that we all vote for H.R. 4293 today.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose H.R. 4293, the Stress Test Improvement 
Act, which is designed to line Wall Street's pockets by weakening a 
critical tool to prevent a future financial crisis.
  Bank stress tests are a forward-looking tool where a hypothetical 
scenario or two are tested, such as, how would a megabank fare if a 
major recession occurred next year with unemployment and foreclosures 
going way up? These tests, incredibly, are very helpful to see if banks 
might need to maintain more capital to help buffer against such a 
scenario.

                              {time}  1430

  These are similar to crash tests for cars where a manufacturer runs 
their cars through crash test simulations to see if passengers will 
remain safe in various kinds of crashes. Such testing provides valuable 
insights regarding what design adjustments might be needed to ensure 
the car is as safe as possible.
  So let us take a look at how this safeguard developed. When President 
Obama took office, his administration inherited an economy in free fall 
with about 800,000 jobs lost that very month. Many wondered how many 
more financial firms might fail. So Treasury Secretary Geithner worked 
with the Federal Reserve, and together they designed the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program.
  These stress tests checked how resilient the largest banks were if, 
in fact, the economy continued to deteriorate. Results were published, 
and we learned that 10 of the 19 participating firms were collectively 
about $75 billion short of the required capital ratios. These tests 
provided criminal transparency to the market, thereby enabling the 
banks to begin recapitalizing themselves with new funds from investors 
who themselves had renewed confidence in the banking industry.
  Following this success, Congress decided to mandate these stress 
tests to be regularly required of the Nation's largest banks in Dodd-
Frank. This would ensure banks and their regulators remained vigilant, 
especially when times were good, so that they could spot problems much 
earlier and take corrective action.
  The Federal Reserve implemented these Dodd-Frank stress tests 
alongside their Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, known as 
CCAR, which added a capital planning component to the tests.
  According to credit rating agencies and financial analysts, these 
stress tests, along with Dodd-Frank's other enhanced prudential 
requirements of the largest banks, have made our financial system much 
safer.
  Now, let me give you some numbers. Since 2009, the 34 largest banks 
have increased their capital by $750 billion, bringing the industry's 
total capital buffer to nearly $2 trillion today. That is $750 billion 
in more high-quality funding that banks can safely lend and invest, 
which helps explain why business lending has also increased almost 80 
percent the last 8 years.
  But H.R. 4293, this bill, would undermine all of that and proposes 
three changes that megabanks like Wells Fargo would love to see. First, 
the bill would eliminate the adverse scenario from Fed-run stress 
tests. But like in car crash tests today, multiple scenarios can help 
ensure an institution can survive a wider range of unforeseen events.
  Second, the bill would bar the Fed from making qualitative objections 
to a bank's capital plan. Even the Federal Reserve led by President 
Trump's appointees issued a lengthy proposal yesterday altering some of 
the stress testing rules, and their proposal maintains their ability to 
make qualitative objections. So there is no basis for Congress to 
unilaterally make it harder for regulators to ensure megabanks are well 
run and capitalized.
  Third, the bill would allow Wall Street megabanks to conduct fewer 
company-run stress tests--annually instead of semiannually. But given 
how quickly tides can shift, routine, semiannual testing can better 
identify problems before they grow into larger problems.
  As a former Federal Reserve official wrote last year: ``Had stress 
tests as conducted now been in place before the crisis, they could have 
made firms more resilient to unexpected losses, and at a minimum could 
have given supervisors the ability to question banks' continued 
dividend and share buybacks in the quarters leading to the height of 
the crisis.''
  Accordingly, I strongly urge Members to reject this rollback for Wall 
Street megabanks.
  Let me just add by saying: Why would we do this?
  Why would we, knowing what we went through in 2008 where we had this 
subprime meltdown, we went into a recession--almost a depression--and 
we discovered that the banks were undercapitalized and they could not 
deal with this kind of change in the economy, they could not deal with 
the fact that something had gone wrong and be prepared to deal with it 
rather than us having to bail them out in the way that we did?
  I don't know why we would do this now. So I would simply ask Members 
to ask the question: Why is it we would take away something that would 
make the banks safer, that would make them more stable, and that would 
make them able to be able to sustain despite the fact there was a 
crisis developing in the economy?
  Why would we want to take away this safety that we have built with 
stress testing?
  So, with that, Mr. Speaker, I would ask the Members to reject this 
rollback for Wall Street megabanks, and I reserve the balance of my 
time.

[[Page H3114]]

  

  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Zeldin), who is a hardworking member of the House 
Financial Services Committee and the bill's sponsor.
  Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for all of his great 
leadership and mentorship throughout this process to get this bill to 
the floor today.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4293, the Stress Test 
Improvement Act. It is critical bipartisan legislation that injects 
transparency, consistency, and fairness into the stress testing 
process.
  I especially want to thank my bipartisan supporter and partner on 
this important bill, Congressman  David Scott of Georgia.
  Stress tests are one of the aspects of current law that are 
contributing to the climate of legal and regulatory uncertainty because 
the Federal Reserve has failed to provide the necessary transparency 
around this process.
  A stress test is a financial analysis performed internally by a 
financial institution or done externally by a regulator to assess if a 
bank can withstand stressful economic conditions. Stress tests, when 
done correctly, are an important way for banks and regulators to 
understand the ability of financial institutions to survive a 
contracting economy or weather a major economic storm like a recession.

  Ensuring that these tests are done right, with fairness and 
objectivity, is essential for protecting depositors and the overall 
financial system. That is why passing the reforms in this bill should 
be a priority on both sides of the aisle.
  Working together on a bipartisan basis, Mr. Scott offered an 
amendment to this bill that was accepted unanimously by the members of 
the Financial Services Committee, including the ranking member, and 
this bill cleared a committee markup with a bipartisan vote of 38-21.
  By focusing the bill on three core reforms, we are improving this 
important process to protect soundness in the banking system, while 
also reforming the negative unintended consequences and damaging 
overreach of Dodd-Frank.
  By striking the adverse scenario requirement from stress testing, 
these important tests can actually focus on real-world conditions to 
protect financial institutions and the customers they serve from 
threats to the stability of the financial system.
  By repealing the ability of the Federal Reserve to reject a company's 
capital plan based solely on a qualitative stress test, we are making 
the process more transparent and fair.
  This legislation ends the ability of regulators to arbitrarily reject 
a financial institution's capital plan without feedback or constructive 
criticism. These secretive rejections by regulators have done little to 
protect consumers and inserted more, not less, uncertainty into the 
financial system.
  By eliminating the midcycle review and shifting from biannual to 
annual stress testing requirements, we are lessening the compliance tax 
that has raised the cost of lending and hurt consumers who have lost 
access to the small business loans or mortgages that help finance their 
American Dream.
  Without needed reform, rather than ensuring financial stability, the 
Federal Reserve's stress tests are likely missing real risks while 
constraining the competitive flow of financial services that is 
critical to increasing economic opportunity.
  While a valuable resource, stress test results may be creating a 
false sense of security, while at the same time sowing the seeds of 
financial instability. In order to succeed, a stress test must build 
from an accurate forecast of the next macroeconomic storm, and even the 
best forecasts tend to be wrong.
  The Stress Test Improvement Act will make stress testing more 
effective by making the rules more transparent and fair. We are not 
gutting standards but making them work for the real world. This bill is 
a bipartisan team effort to accomplish these goals.
  Without transparency about what the stress testing rules are, there 
is no way to ensure the government plays by the rules. By subjecting 
financial institutions to a questionable regime that lacks 
accountability and transparency, regulators are failing to achieve the 
important goals that they are tasked with: ensuring safety and 
soundness.
  With the critical reforms in this legislation, we are upholding 
sensible standards for financial institutions, while clarifying the 
requirements for and the frequency of stress tests.
  To the hardworking men and women in my district and nationwide, it is 
common sense that banks ought to know the standards and tests their 
regulators are subjecting them to. By injecting some transparency and 
consistency into the stress testing regime, we are taking needed 
capital off the sidelines so it can be invested in the private economy 
to create jobs and wealth.
  I want to thank Chairmen Hensarling and Luetkemeyer for their 
leadership on this important issue. I also want to thank my Democratic 
partner on this important bill,  David Scott.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this bill.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Utah (Mrs. Love).
  Mrs. LOVE. Mr. Speaker, when it comes to bank regulation, the job of 
the regulator is to balance the need for economic growth with the 
safety and soundness of the financial system. With fresh memories of 
the most recent financial crisis, it is natural for regulators to err 
on the side of being overly cautious so they aren't blamed when 
something goes wrong.
  Unfortunately, this has led to a situation in which regulators are 
evaluating stress tests based on subjective and unclear standards. The 
stress tests are opaque; it is like asking banks to kick a field goal 
when they don't even know where the goal posts are. What is more, the 
regulators keep ratcheting up the standards.
  For the stress tests to achieve their goal, however--the goal of 
keeping the financial system safe and sound--they need to be 
transparent and they need to be fair.
  H.R. 4293, a bill with bipartisan support, would approve the stress 
testing process for bank holding companies by repealing the ability of 
regulators to reject a financial institution's stress test based on 
subjective and opaque standards.
  Another important improvement to the process would be the elimination 
of the overly burdensome midcycle review by shifting from biannual to 
annual stress testing requirements.
  These reforms would make it easier for Congress, the markets, and the 
public to assess both the integrity of the findings of the stress tests 
and the effectiveness of the Fed's regulatory oversight.
  Some critics, nonetheless, have claimed that this bill would weaken 
Dodd-Frank. On the contrary, H.R. 4293 would improve the flawed 
standards of Dodd-Frank and strengthen the stress testing process to 
ensure that it produces the results we seek: a safer and more stable 
financial system.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from New York, Lee Zeldin, and 
Congressman  David Scott for supporting this bill, and I urge my 
colleagues to support this bill.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, again, I raise the question of why are we considering a 
bill that would reduce the amount of scrutiny that we have with this 
stress testing from the biggest banks in America, when, in fact, we 
know that this stress testing was created because of the problems that 
we were faced with in 2008?
  We learned an awful lot about what we should not do and what we 
should change in order never to be in the position again where we have 
to bail out all of these big banks.

                              {time}  1445

  We are simply saying: Banks, you have to be tested. You have to have 
a stress test to see if you can withstand the difficulty that will be 
presented if, in fact, the economy gets in trouble. It is as simple as 
that.
  Do you have enough capital? Are you organized in such a way that you 
won't go under, that you won't create a problem in our economy because 
of the size of your bank if you get in trouble?

[[Page H3115]]

  So I would simply ask our Members to reject this bill because this 
bill is not needed. It is simply a way by which to comply with the 
megabanks' request to not have to do the work that is necessary to 
prove that they are safe. And I don't know why we would do that.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from New York (Ms. Tenney), another hardworking member of the House 
Financial Services Committee.
  Ms. TENNEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4293, the Stress 
Test Improvement Act, bipartisan legislation by my great colleague, the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Zeldin).
  We keep hearing about megabanks, but all banks affect industries, 
small businesses, and large businesses. So every time we adjust the 
marketplace and we make more regulations, you also impact small 
businesses as well, and our ability to survive. As the owner of a small 
business, this affects me as well.
  But stress testing is an important tool that can encourage the safety 
and soundness of an individual depository institution and the overall 
health of the banking system, including all banks, across all sizes and 
sectors. However, the Federal Reserve has implemented its stress 
testing in a manner that imposes unnecessary burdens without providing 
proportionate benefits. This is especially true for smaller 
institutions for which the cost of this exercise is disproportionately 
burdensome. It can also affect larger banks.
  H.R. 4293 would fix the tests so they can properly show smarter ways 
to strengthen a financial institution's planning. This legislation 
improves the Federal Reserve's stress testing processes mandated by the 
Dodd-Frank Act by requiring a select group of banks, or bank holding 
companies, to conduct internal, company-run stress tests once a year 
rather than semiannually.
  I want to thank Mr. Zeldin again for sponsoring this, as always, a 
bipartisan piece of legislation. And it is important to note that, if 
we are going to reduce regulations and burdensome fees and procedures 
on companies, it has to be across all sectors, not just one. And I 
think this legislation shows that and shows the sponsor's willingness 
to do that.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I urge all my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle to support this legislation.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with Members a Communications 
Workers of America letter to us on H.R. 4293.
  And they state: H.R. 4293 would undermine the effectiveness of the 
Federal Reserve's Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review--that is, 
CCAR--stress test. Specifically, the bill would prohibit the Federal 
Reserve from objecting to a capital plan on the basis of qualitative 
reasons; such as, the reasonableness of the assumptions and analysis 
underlying the plan. The bill would also cut the frequency of CCAR 
tests in half, taking away tools and reducing the amount of information 
available to the Federal Reserve about bank health and is a 
fundamentally bad idea.
  Really, it is basically what we have been saying. We have been saying 
that this would reduce the stress tests from semiannually to an annual 
test.
  Why would you want to have less scrutiny of these banks? Why would 
you want to reduce the amount of time that they would have relative to 
being able to prove that they are safe?
  Also, I think it is very important what is being said here about the 
Fed and the Fed's ability to basically review, on the basis of 
qualitative reasons, such as reasonableness and of assumptions and 
analyses underlying the plan.
  So they are looking to see if these banks are well capitalized, if 
these banks can withstand, again, problems in our economy that would 
arise that could create unemployment and all kinds of other adverse 
conditions.
  So I would ask the Members to oppose this bill. This is just another 
deregulation bill for the biggest banks in America. We should not be 
doing that because these are the banks that, if they are 
undercapitalized, if they don't have what is needed to withstand 
problems in our society that could arise in the economy, it could cause 
us to go into another recession, even a depression perhaps.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kentucky (Mr. Barr), the chairman of our Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade.
  Mr. BARR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for the recognition and 
the author of this legislation, Mr. Zeldin, for his leadership on the 
Stress Test Improvement Act, which I strongly support.
  Mr. Speaker, the Federal Reserve administers two stress tests that 
they believe analyze the ability of U.S. firms to weather various forms 
of economic turbulence. While the Fed failed to sound the alarm prior 
to the last financial crisis, the thought is that, with these tests, 
one of which was instituted by the Dodd-Frank financial control law in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Fed can prevent or at least 
mitigate the severity of the next crisis.
  I believe that stress tests can be very productive and useful, but 
there is such a thing as overkill. When a relatively healthy patient 
goes to the doctor, the doctor typically doesn't say: And you need to 
go to another doctor, and you need to come see me again every month. 
That is really not required. It adds costs, it is redundant, it is 
duplicative, and it doesn't materially benefit the patient in terms of 
better health outcomes.

  The analogy applies to banks. Stress testing is good, but overkill is 
costly, and it costs the financial system and doesn't materially add to 
financial stability. Certainly there is merit to stress testing, but 
there is no doubt that the cloud of secrecy surrounding these tests 
confounds the ability of financial firms to correctly identify systemic 
risks, to take corrective action, to chart a more sustainable or 
profitable path for the future. As a result, financial firms, many of 
them banks, are left trying to anticipate these Fed models, wasting 
valuable time and resources that could be used to actually address 
risks that threaten our economy.
  So this environment of regulatory uncertainty actually, I would 
argue, undermines financial stability because it distracts from the 
mission of the institution, and it certainly is costly in terms of 
driving up costs and taking away access to capital for productive 
activities that actually strengthen the economy. For these reasons, I 
am a proud supporter of this bill, which is a great first step to clean 
up some of the regulatory uncertainties surrounding these tests.
  The bill does a few things. First, it reduces the frequency of the 
required company-run stress tests to once per year. One is enough to 
identify risks, instead of two. Second, it eliminates one of the 
supervisory scenarios that must be run, leaving just two, again 
eliminating redundancy and superfluous, costly activities. Finally, it 
prohibits the Federal Reserve from objecting to a bank holding 
company's capital plan based on unknown qualitative reasons.
  These institutions need to know what the Fed is looking for in order 
to satisfy the stress testing that is applied to them. Again, I applaud 
Congressman Zeldin and Chairman Hensarling for their hard work on this 
commonsense regulatory improvement bill. It is not deregulation. It is 
better regulation. It is more effective regulation to not only unleash 
greater capital under the economy but actually enhance financial 
stability.
  For those reasons, Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the American economy and 
for financial stability, I urge my colleagues to vote for the Stress 
Test Improvement Act.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I don't know what this overkill argument is all about. 
This is about deregulation. The banks, these megabanks, don't need any 
more deregulation or help from Congress. In 2016, the industry made 
record-breaking profits, more than $170 billion in profits. The 
Republicans gave the eight largest Wall Street banks a $15 billion 
windfall from their tax scam bill. And CEOs are making more money on 
Wall

[[Page H3116]]

Street, as much as they made in 2006, before they drove our economy 
into a massive ditch.
  Megabanks need reasonable but strong stress tests to keep our economy 
safe. And I want to tell you, after Dodd-Frank reforms were put in 
place--and the stress test was one of the things that had to be done--
the banks resisted it, but finally they came into compliance. And it 
took them several years, and then they did it the way that Dodd-Frank 
would have them do it. So there are no problems.
  These stress tests now are stress tests that reveal exactly what is 
going on in the bank. And so why are we trying to undo this? Why do you 
want to see them once a year instead of twice a year? Twice a year has 
proven that we can keep them straight, that we can make sure that they 
are well capitalized, that we can make sure they have a good financial 
plan.
  So I would simply say, let's not get involved in more deregulation 
and take us back to where we were when we got in trouble in 2008. I 
would ask the Members to vote ``no'' on this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time I have 
remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Palazzo). The gentleman from Texas has 
11\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I listened very carefully to the distinguished ranking 
member, who observed that our banks have more capital today. And this 
is a good thing. To the extent that Dodd-Frank had anything to do with 
it, I would say congratulations to the Dodd-Frank Act. But I also 
noticed that, for many of us, many of our banks are still 
undercapitalized.
  And the ranking member had every opportunity to vote for the 
Financial CHOICE Act that would require 10 percent, far more capital 
than these banks that she is concerned about failing have today, but 
she rejected that.
  She often uses the phrase ``Wall Street megabanks,'' but it is her 
side of the aisle that supports a taxpayer bailout fund for what she 
calls the Wall Street megabanks. That comes from our friends on that 
side of the aisle, Mr. Speaker; not on this side. She says we have to 
bail out these banks.
  No, we don't have to. We don't have to. We should support bankruptcy 
over bailout. And we should support high levels of capital over 
incredibly intrusive Federal control, Federal control that ultimately 
gets resolved into less credit and more expensive credit for many of 
our constituents.
  Again, Mr. Speaker, I would add, banks have stress-tested themselves 
long before the appearance of Dodd-Frank. Long before the appearance of 
Dodd-Frank. In fact, stress tests are taking place on some group of 
assets at every bank in America every day. Many, many banks, 
particularly the larger banks, may do up to 200 stress tests a week.
  What the gentleman from New York is trying to do is add some level of 
clarity, sanity, and reasonableness to the federally instituted CCAR 
process, something that can take literally 40,000 pages--40,000 pages--
can take tens of millions, if not over $100 million, to produce that 
could have been used to loan to our constituents to buy their home, to 
repair their car, to put groceries on the table, to pay for their 
healthcare premiums.

                              {time}  1500

  And some say, well, these tests have to be conducted semiannually. 
Why semiannually? What is wrong with annually? What is sacrosanct about 
semiannually? And, oh, by the way, why are we testing for both worst-
case scenario and some mid- scenario?
  Okay. Either you are going to survive the 100-year flood or you are 
not. If you can survive the 100-year flood, surely you can survive the 
50-year flood. So why do we need that other test?
  I mean, what we hear from our friends on the other side of aisle: Oh, 
my God, we can't question the Federal regulators. I mean, they come 
from Mount Olympus. They have this great wisdom that we can never 
challenge them.
  Well, the truth is we are Article I of the Constitution, and we are 
the ones who make the law, and that is why we have hearings, and we 
listen very closely. We listen closely to our regulators; we listen 
closely to our constituents; we listen closely to market participants; 
and then we make judgments. We make judgments.
  So, yes, there is a balance. There is a balance between economic 
opportunity and financial stability. We want there to be strong 
financial stability, but we also want there to be strong, strong 
economic opportunity for all of our constituents.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to share with Members the opinions of 
former Chair Janet Yellen, who has stated that stress testing improves 
public understanding of risk at large banking firms, provides a 
forward-looking examination of firms' potential losses, and has 
contributed to significant improvement in risk management.
  Former Chair Ben Bernanke has praised stress testing for playing a 
crucial role in the recovery of the economy and creating a more 
resilient postcrisis U.S. banking system.
  The deceptively named Stress Test Improvement Act--that is, this 
bill--severely weakens this key element of bank oversight and must be 
rejected. We cannot ignore the analyses that are being given by these 
former Fed Chairs. I mean, they are saying do not be tricked, do not be 
fooled, that this is a deceptive bill, and that stress testing must 
continue in order to ensure the stability of our banks in the event the 
economy goes awry.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr.  David Scott), the Democratic cosponsor of this 
legislation and a proud member of the Financial Services Committee.
  Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Hensarling 
and my distinguished ranking member, who has some very serious 
concerns.
  I want to take a moment to explain that the bill is basically my 
bipartisan amendment that Mr. Zeldin and I worked on that passed in 
committee, and I think it is very important for me to work through this 
to explain how it will not affect as my ranking member has stated. 
However, I want to make sure that people know we have got things in 
here to address.
  It keeps intact the essence of what we were trying to accomplish with 
stress tests in Dodd-Frank. Now, my amendment essentially rewrote this 
bill, as I said, so that we are left with just three simple things, 
tweaks that we are making.
  The first one is, in today's CCAR test, banks are now required to run 
stress tests that have, one, a baseline, adverse, and severely adverse 
scenario. My amendment simply removes the adverse requirement.
  And why is that? Because, in talking about how we can stimulate more 
growth for our banks while at the same time maintaining the proper 
stress test, we heard that the adverse scenario rarely proved or shed 
any light on the health of the bank that isn't already shown when 
testing a bank for a severely adverse scenario. So we didn't need the 
other one if one is doing it, and so we eliminated that.
  Secondly, my amendment eliminated the Fed's ability to reject a 
capital plan solely on what we refer to as the qualitative portion of 
the test. Now, Mr. Speaker, we did this because stress tests are tests 
of both the bank's books, which is the quantitative side, and a test of 
the bank's internal controls, which is the qualitative side. So 
rejecting a capital plan solely on the qualitative portion of the test 
generates a lot of uncertainty within our banking system for banks, and 
it is something that the Federal regulators already, earlier last year, 
stopped requiring the banks under $250 million from having to do. So we 
simply removed that.
  And then, lastly, my amendment eliminated the midyear tests that 
banks are required to do internally. Why did we do that? Because right 
now, if you are a bank above a certain

[[Page H3117]]

asset size, you are required to do internal tests. My amendment just 
changes this so that the tests are done.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Duncan of Tennessee). The time of the 
gentleman has expired.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman.
  Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I want to urge my colleagues 
who are looking at this that I very carefully listened to my ranking 
member, and I have made sure, when we worked it in the process, that we 
adhered to that. No phase of this stress test is eliminated.
  And the thing I want to add, over in the Senate, in the reg bill, S. 
2155, two of the three parts of this bill and my amendment are already 
captured in S. 2155, which received 67 bipartisan votes.
  So it is with gracious affection to my ranking member, because 
oftentimes we have to work together, and respect to my chairman that I 
urge all our Members, both Democrats and Republicans, to support this 
very important and worthwhile legislation.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes t the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Rothfus), who served as our vice chairman of the 
Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit.

  Mr. ROTHFUS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding.
  I rise to express my support for H.R. 4293, the Stress Test 
Improvement Act.
  I also want to commend my colleague Representative Zeldin for his 
work on this important issue.
  Those of us who travel our districts to speak with the men and women 
who work at financial institutions are well aware of the high costs and 
lack of clarity in the stress test process. Companies are being forced 
to dedicate substantial resources and immense amounts of time to go 
through the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, or CCAR, and the 
Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests, DFAST.
  I have spoken to compliance staff who reported submissions in the 
tens of thousands of pages. For each dollar or staffer put towards CCAR 
or DFAST, there are fewer resources being dedicated to innovation or 
helping customers.
  Of course, we all believe that stress tests can and should be useful 
experiences. Some of the information turned up in stress tests could be 
helpful, but we are desperately in need to enact meaningful reform to 
provide better transparency, clarity, and reduce undue burden.
  Columbia University Professor Charles Calomiris described the process 
as one in which ``regulators punish banks for failing to meet standards 
that are never stated.'' Let me repeat that: ``. . . failing to meet 
standards that are never stated.'' It is sort of a Kafkaesque creature 
of our bureaucracy.
  Zeldin's bill improves the stress testing process by requiring the 
Federal Reserve to follow regular notice-and-comment practices and 
issue clear regulations on economic conditions and methodologies and to 
assess the effectiveness of the Fed's models. It also alleviates the 
compliance burden on firms by spacing out CCARs and DFASTs. These are 
targeted, reasonable reforms that can greatly improve the process. This 
will enhance, not hurt, financial stability and leave us with a 
healthier more vibrant economy.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to support the Stress Test Improvement 
Act.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time 
I have left.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman has 15\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle continue to 
focus on pushing through giveaways to Wall Street and megabanks like 
Wells Fargo that could be harmful to consumers, investors, and our 
Nation's economy. Week after week, Republicans advance legislation that 
is basically reckless and misguided. H.R. 4293 is yet another bad bill 
from the Republicans that weakens critical protections put in place by 
Democrats to prevent another financial crisis.
  As we have discussed, the bill undermines the stress test framework 
for our Nation's largest banks. Stress tests are an important 
regulatory tool that have much improved the safety of our financial 
system.
  Mr. Speaker, when we crafted Dodd-Frank, we mandated these stress 
tests and put in place other enhanced prudential guardrails for large 
banks to not only prevent damage to our economy, but also help grow our 
economy, and they are working. H.R. 4293 weakens the rigor and 
frequency of these stress tests, a move that simply makes no sense.
  Rather than harmful measures such as this one, Congress should be 
working to strengthen consumer protections, reform our broken system of 
credit reporting, provide tailored, responsible relief for community 
banks, and ensure that recidivist megabanks are held accountable for 
breaking the law.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on this bill, and I urge Members again to simply 
ask the question: Why, at this point in time, would we want to 
basically reduce the ability for us to know exactly what is going on in 
those banks, whether or not they are fully capitalized, whether or not 
they could withstand a serious problem in our economy?
  I don't think that the opposite side of the aisle, my friends, could 
really answer that question because this is simply a deregulatory bill 
for the biggest banks in America, for the megabanks, not needed, and 
certainly we need the information. We never want to go through a period 
of time like we did in 2008 where we discovered that our banks were not 
well capitalized and could not withstand the problems that we 
encountered.
  I simply ask all Members to oppose this bill, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time I have left.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas has 2 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Well, the ranking member poses the question, ``Why?'' I can tell you 
why, Mr. Speaker. It is because Therese from Waco has written:

       I would like to express my disappointment at being rejected 
     for a home loan, which would cost less than the house I 
     presently have been renting for 5 years. As a small-business 
     owner, I run my design studio out of my home office and take 
     every tax break that is legal to offset the taxes payable if 
     I didn't.

  We do it for Sherry from Eustace, who writes:

       After a divorce 4 years ago, I needed to buy a car because 
     my car was over 10 years old. I have a checking account in my 
     name, I have a savings account, but they did not loan me 
     money.

  There is an onslaught of financial regulations that is costly, 
intrusive, burdensome, and is causing credit to be less available--less 
available--to the people who need it. That is why we do this, Mr. 
Speaker, week after week after week. We do it to make sure that our 
constituents can buy homes, that they can have cars. If they have tough 
times, if they lose a job, if they go through a painful divorce, that 
is why we do it, Mr. Speaker.

                              {time}  1515

  Again, stress-tests are important. That is why banks do it themselves 
every single week.
  But the question is: How do we calibrate this?
  We have used the ranking member's prescription, and that of my 
friends on the other side of the aisle, and it brought us 1.6 percent 
economic growth. Thankfully, today, with a new Congress and with a new 
President, we have 3 percent economic growth, and all types of 
opportunities are coming.
  We should not listen and go back to those days. It is time to go 
forward to a better America with greater opportunity for all Americans. 
That means we have to reform the stress test to ensure that not only do 
we have financial stability, but we have financial opportunity as well. 
That is the work of the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge everyone to support H.R. 4293, the Stress Test 
Improvement Act of 2017, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page H3118]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 780, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                           Motion to Recommit

  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to 
recommit at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. In its current form, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Ms. Maxine Waters of California moves to recommit the bill 
     H.R. 4293 to the Committee on Financial Services with 
     instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith 
     with the following amendment:
       Page 2, line 7, strike ``and''.
       Page 2, line 14, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
       Page 2, after line 14, insert the following:
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) Treatment of certain gsib bad actors.--
       ``(A) In general.--The following shall apply to any global 
     systemically important bank holding company and any 
     subsidiary thereof, if such global systemically important 
     bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof has engaged in 
     a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices 
     and other violations related to consumer harm:
       ``(i) The Board of Governors shall provide for an 
     additional adverse set of condition under paragraph (1)(B)(i) 
     for the evaluation required by paragraph (1).
       ``(ii) Subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall not apply.
       ``(iii) The stress tests required by paragraph (2)(A) shall 
     be required semiannually.
       ``(iv) In issuing regulations under paragraph (2)(C), each 
     Federal primary financial regulatory agency shall establish 
     methodologies for the conduct of stress tests required by 
     paragraph (2) that shall provide for an additional adverse 
     set of condition.
       ``(B) Definitions.--For purposes of this paragraph:
       ``(i) Federal consumer financial law.--The term `Federal 
     consumer financial law' has the meaning given that term under 
     section 1002 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 
     (12 U.S.C. 5481).
       ``(ii) Global systemically important bank holding 
     company.--

       ``(I) In general.--The term `global systemically important 
     bank holding company' means--

       ``(aa) a bank holding company that has been identified by 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as a 
     global systemically important bank holding company pursuant 
     to section 217.402 of title 12, Code of Federal Regulations; 
     and
       ``(bb) a global systemically important foreign banking 
     organization, as defined under section 252.2 of title 12, 
     Code of Federal Regulations.

       ``(II) Treatment of existing gsibs.--A company or 
     organization described under clause (i) or (ii) of 
     subparagraph (A) on the date of the enactment of this Act 
     shall be deemed a global systemically important bank holding 
     company for purposes of this Act.

       ``(iii) Pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking 
     practices and other violations related to consumer harm.--The 
     term `pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking 
     practices and other violations related to consumer harm' 
     means engaging in all of the following activities, to the 
     extent each activity was discovered or occurred at least once 
     in the 10 years preceding the date of the enactment of this 
     Act:

       ``(I) Having unsafe or unsound practices in the 
     institution's risk management and oversight of the 
     institution's sales practices, as evidenced by--

       ``(aa) an institution lacking an enterprise-wide sales 
     practices oversight program that enables the institution to 
     adequately monitor sales practices to prevent and detect 
     unsafe or unsound sales practices and mitigate risks that may 
     result from such unsafe and unsound sales practices; and
       ``(bb) an institution lacking a comprehensive customer 
     complaint monitoring process that--
       ``(AA) enables the institution to assess customer complaint 
     activity across the institution;
       ``(BB) adequately monitors, manages, and reports on 
     customer complaints; and
       ``(CC) analyzes and understands the potential risks posed 
     by the institution's sales practices.

       ``(II) Engaging in unsafe and unsound sales practices, as 
     evidenced by the institution--

       ``(aa) opening more than one million unauthorized deposit, 
     credit card, or other accounts;
       ``(bb) performing unauthorized transfers of customer funds; 
     and
       ``(cc) performing unauthorized credit inquiries for 
     purposes of the conduct described in clause (i) or (ii).

       ``(III) Lacking adequate oversight of third-party vendors 
     for purposes of risk-mitigation, to prevent abusive and 
     deceptive practices in the vendor's provision of consumer 
     products or services.
       ``(IV) Having deficient policies and procedures for sharing 
     customers' personal identifiable information with third-party 
     vendors for litigation purposes that led to inadvertent 
     disclosure of such information to unintended parties.
       ``(V) Violating Federal consumer financial laws with 
     respect to mortgage loans, including charges of hidden fees 
     and unauthorized or improper disclosures tied to home 
     mortgage loan modifications.
       ``(VI) Engaging in unsafe or unsound banking practices 
     related to residential mortgage loan servicing and 
     foreclosure processing.
       ``(VII) Violating the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.''.

  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I 
ask unanimous consent that the reading be waived.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes in support of her motion.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, this is the final 
amendment to the bill, which will not kill the bill or send it back to 
committee. If adopted, the bill will immediately proceed to final 
passage, as amended.
  Mr. Speaker, we have talked at length about how H.R. 4293 is a bill 
for Wall Street megabanks to line their pockets while reducing 
safeguards that better protect the Main Street economy from another 
financial crisis. While I deeply disagree with the bill's approach, I 
offer this motion to recommit, not in a manner that sends the bill to 
the committee and kills the bill, but rather to attempt to improve the 
bill before the House votes on final passage of the measure.
  We all know megabanks have been given a free ride in Washington for 
far too long when it comes to repeated, egregious offenses. They just 
get a fine--the equivalent of a slap on the wrist--for harming 
consumers.
  Since 2010, megabanks have racked up over $160 billion worth of 
fines, yet they keep breaking the law.
  We have talked about Wells Fargo's growing list of illegal actions 
that have harmed millions of consumers. Sure they have been fined, but 
these fines, even $1 billion in fines, are just the cost of doing 
business for a company that made over $22 billion in profit in 2017. 
This soft enforcement approach is just increasing their operational 
risk and losses, which, at the end of the day, will impact not only all 
of their consumers, but the broader economy as well.
  I hope Republicans and Democrats can all agree that any megabank that 
engages in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices 
and other egregious violations that has resulted in profound consumer 
harm in the last 10 years is not entitled to any benefit of regulatory 
relief provided under this bill, especially regulatory relief that 
would eliminate the type of oversight that makes sure our economy stays 
safe. So my amendment would exclude a megabank like Wells Fargo that 
has fraudulently opened millions of accounts without their customers' 
consent, enrolled consumers in life insurance policies without their 
consent, and forced nearly 1 million Americans to purchase auto 
insurance they didn't need.
  Since 2016, I have been calling for Wells Fargo to face real 
penalties. I introduced H.R. 3937, the Megabank Accountability and 
Consequences Act, to compel the Federal bank regulators to fully 
utilize existing authorities to stop megabanks from repeatedly flouting 
the law and harming millions of consumers. So I was glad to see Janet 
Yellen, on her last day at the Fed, take bold action to cap the bank's 
size until it cleans up its act.
  We must do more to send a strong message to all megabanks that there 
will be real consequences for their bad actions that mislead, abuse, or 
deceive its customers. H.R. 4293, in its current form, would send the 
opposite message to recidivist megabanks and undermine the hard work we 
have done since the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to adopt this motion to recommit so 
that we do not reward a recidivist megabank like Wells Fargo for 
repeated operational failures that ripped

[[Page H3119]]

off millions of consumers, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, as the ranking member talks about the 
hundreds of millions of dollars of fines that these banks have paid, 
who have violated provisions of civil law, maybe that means the system 
is working. That is what ought to happen to wrongdoers. There ought to 
be fines.
  No one can defend what happened at Wells Fargo. I hope that the 
current management team is cleaning up what has been a mess and what 
has harmed consumers for many, many years under the previous team.
  But I do know this: that Wells Fargo has been fined almost a half a 
billion dollars already. Their former CEO had $75 million clawed back 
in compensation. They lost $29 billion of market value--their 
investors--and investigations are ongoing, as it well should be.
  But I would point out that our prudential regulators continue to have 
full authority to enforce all of our consumer protection laws: the 
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, the Consumer Leasing Act, 
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and 
the Fair Credit Billing Act. When they find violations, people are 
fined, as they well should be.
  But what we are talking about, once again, is trying to create 
economic opportunity for all those who need it, to make credit more 
available and less expensive for people who are trying to buy a home, 
repair a car, and put groceries on the table.
  What the gentleman from New York is saying, again, when it comes to a 
federally imposed stress test, after hours and hours of testimony, we 
believe that maybe that test ought to be administered annually, instead 
of semiannually. That would be a better balance. That is what is 
happening from the gentleman from New York.
  What the ranking member's motion to recommit would do is simply water 
that down when all of our consumer protection laws remain fully in 
effect. They are working.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge rejection of the motion to recommit, I urge 
adoption of H.R. 4293, the Stress Test Improvement Act, from Mr. Zeldin 
from New York.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the 
yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

                          ____________________