[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 7 (Thursday, January 11, 2018)]
[House]
[Pages H137-H160]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         RAPID DNA ACT OF 2017

  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 682, I call up 
the bill (S. 139) to implement the use of Rapid DNA instruments to 
inform decisions about pretrial release or detention and their 
conditions, to solve and prevent violent crimes and other crimes, to 
exonerate the innocent, to prevent DNA analysis backlogs, and for other 
purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 682, an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules 
Committee Print 115-53, shall be considered as adopted, and the bill, 
as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                                 S. 139

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``FISA 
     Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
              1978.

     TITLE I--ENHANCEMENTS TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND 
               SAFEGUARDS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

Sec. 101. Querying procedures required.
Sec. 102. Use and disclosure provisions.
Sec. 103. Congressional review and oversight of abouts collection.
Sec. 104. Publication of minimization procedures under section 702.
Sec. 105. Section 705 emergency provision.
Sec. 106. Compensation of amici curiae and technical experts.
Sec. 107. Additional reporting requirements.
Sec. 108. Improvements to Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 109. Privacy and civil liberties officers.
Sec. 110. Whistleblower protections for contractors of the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 111. Briefing on notification requirements.
Sec. 112. Inspector General report on queries conducted by Federal 
              Bureau of Investigation.

 TITLE II--EXTENSION OF AUTHORITIES, INCREASED PENALTIES, REPORTS, AND 
                             OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 201. Extension of title VII of FISA; effective dates.
Sec. 202. Increased penalty for unauthorized removal and retention of 
              classified documents or material.
Sec. 203. Report on challenges to the effectiveness of foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 204. Comptroller General study on the classification system and 
              protection of classified information.
Sec. 205. Technical amendments and amendments to improve procedures of 
              the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
Sec. 206. Severability.

     SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978.

       Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this 
     Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an 
     amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision, 
     the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or 
     other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).

     TITLE I--ENHANCEMENTS TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND 
               SAFEGUARDS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

     SEC. 101. QUERYING PROCEDURES REQUIRED.

       (a) Querying Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Section 702 (50 U.S.C. 1881a) is amended--
       (A) by redesignating subsections (f) through (l) as 
     subsections (g) through (m), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(f) Queries.--
       ``(1) Procedures required.--
       ``(A) Requirement to adopt.--The Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 
     shall adopt querying procedures consistent with the 
     requirements of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of 
     the United States for information collected pursuant to an 
     authorization under subsection (a).
       ``(B) Record of united states person query terms.--The 
     Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of 
     National Intelligence, shall ensure that the procedures 
     adopted under subparagraph (A) include a technical procedure 
     whereby a record is kept of each United States person query 
     term used for a query.
       ``(C) Judicial review.--The procedures adopted in 
     accordance with subparagraph (A) shall be subject to judicial 
     review pursuant to subsection (j).
       ``(2) Access to results of certain queries conducted by 
     fbi.--
       ``(A) Court order required for fbi review of certain query 
     results in criminal investigations unrelated to national 
     security.--Except as provided by subparagraph (E), in 
     connection with a predicated criminal investigation opened by 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation that does not relate to 
     the national security of the United States, the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation may not access the contents of 
     communications acquired under subsection (a) that were 
     retrieved pursuant to a query made using a United States 
     person query term that was not designed to find and extract 
     foreign intelligence information unless--
       ``(i) the Federal Bureau of Investigation applies for an 
     order of the Court under subparagraph (C); and
       ``(ii) the Court enters an order under subparagraph (D) 
     approving such application.
       ``(B) Jurisdiction.--The Court shall have jurisdiction to 
     review an application and to enter an order approving the 
     access described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(C) Application.--Each application for an order under 
     this paragraph shall be made by a Federal officer in writing 
     upon oath or affirmation to a judge having jurisdiction under 
     subparagraph (B). Each application shall require the approval 
     of the Attorney General based upon the finding of the 
     Attorney General that the application satisfies the criteria 
     and requirements of such application, as set forth in this 
     paragraph, and shall include--
       ``(i) the identity of the Federal officer making the 
     application; and
       ``(ii) an affidavit or other information containing a 
     statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the 
     applicant to justify the belief of the applicant that the 
     contents

[[Page H138]]

     of communications described in subparagraph (A) covered by 
     the application would provide evidence of--

       ``(I) criminal activity;
       ``(II) contraband, fruits of a crime, or other items 
     illegally possessed by a third party; or
       ``(III) property designed for use, intended for use, or 
     used in committing a crime.

       ``(D) Order.--Upon an application made pursuant to 
     subparagraph (C), the Court shall enter an order approving 
     the accessing of the contents of communications described in 
     subparagraph (A) covered by the application if the Court 
     finds probable cause to believe that such contents would 
     provide any of the evidence described in subparagraph 
     (C)(ii).
       ``(E) Exception.--The requirement for an order of the Court 
     under subparagraph (A) to access the contents of 
     communications described in such subparagraph shall not apply 
     with respect to a query if the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation determines there is a reasonable belief that 
     such contents could assist in mitigating or eliminating a 
     threat to life or serious bodily harm.
       ``(F) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may 
     be construed as--
       ``(i) limiting the authority of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to conduct lawful queries of information 
     acquired under subsection (a);
       ``(ii) limiting the authority of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to review, without a court order, the results 
     of any query of information acquired under subsection (a) 
     that was reasonably designed to find and extract foreign 
     intelligence information, regardless of whether such foreign 
     intelligence information could also be considered evidence of 
     a crime; or
       ``(iii) prohibiting or otherwise limiting the ability of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation to access the results of 
     queries conducted when evaluating whether to open an 
     assessment or predicated investigation relating to the 
     national security of the United States.
       ``(3) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) The term `contents' has the meaning given that term 
     in section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(B) The term `query' means the use of one or more terms 
     to retrieve the unminimized contents or noncontents located 
     in electronic and data storage systems of communications of 
     or concerning United States persons obtained through 
     acquisitions authorized under subsection (a).''.
       (2) Application.--Subsection (f) of section 702 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a), as added by paragraph (1), shall apply with respect 
     to certifications submitted under subsection (h) of such 
     section to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court after 
     January 1, 2018.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Amendments to section 702 of fisa.--Such section 702 is 
     further amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``with subsection 
     (i)(3)'' and inserting ``with subsection (j)(3)'';
       (B) in subsection (c)--
       (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``with subsection 
     (g)'' and inserting ``with subsection (h)'';
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``to subsection (i)(3)'' 
     and inserting ``to subsection (j)(3)''; and
       (iii) in paragraph (3)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``with subsection 
     (g)'' and inserting ``with subsection (h)''; and
       (II) in subparagraph (B)--

       (aa) by striking ``to subsection (i)(1)(C)'' and inserting 
     ``to subsection (j)(1)(C)''; and
       (bb) by striking ``under subsection (i)'' and inserting 
     ``under subsection (j)'';
       (C) in subsection (d)(2), by striking ``to subsection (i)'' 
     and inserting ``to subsection (j)'';
       (D) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``to subsection (i)'' 
     and inserting ``to subsection (j)'';
       (E) in subsection (h), as redesignated by subsection 
     (a)(1)--
       (i) in paragraph (2)(A)(iii), by striking ``with subsection 
     (f)'' and inserting ``with subsection (g)'';
       (ii) in paragraph (3), by striking ``with subsection 
     (i)(1)(C)'' and inserting ``with subsection (j)(1)(C)''; and
       (iii) in paragraph (6), by striking ``to subsection (i)'' 
     and inserting ``to subsection (j)'';
       (F) in subsection (j), as redesignated by subsection 
     (a)(1)--
       (i) in paragraph (1)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e)'' and inserting ``targeting, 
     minimization, and querying procedures adopted in accordance 
     with subsections (d), (e), and (f)(1)'';
       (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e)'' and inserting ``targeting, 
     minimization, and querying procedures adopted in accordance 
     with subsections (d), (e), and (f)(1)''; and
       (III) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``targeting and 
     minimization procedures adopted in accordance with 
     subsections (d) and (e)'' and inserting ``targeting, 
     minimization, and querying procedures adopted in accordance 
     with subsections (d), (e), and (f)(1)'';

       (ii) in paragraph (2)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``with subsection 
     (g)'' and inserting ``with subsection (h)''; and
       (II) by adding at the end the following:

       ``(D) Querying procedures.--The querying procedures adopted 
     in accordance with subsection (f)(1) to assess whether such 
     procedures comply with the requirements of such 
     subsection.'';
       (iii) in paragraph (3)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A)--

       (aa) by striking ``with subsection (g)'' and inserting 
     ``with subsection (h)''; and
       (bb) by striking ``targeting and minimization procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e)'' and 
     inserting ``targeting, minimization, and querying procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsections (d), (e), and 
     (f)(1)''; and

       (II) in subparagraph (B), in the matter before clause (i)--

       (aa) by striking ``with subsection (g)'' and inserting 
     ``with subsection (h)''; and
       (bb) by striking ``with subsections (d) and (e)'' and 
     inserting ``with subsections (d), (e), and (f)(1)''; and
       (iv) in paragraph (5)(A)--

       (I) by striking ``with subsection (g)'' and inserting 
     ``with subsection (h)''; and
       (II) by striking ``with subsections (d) and (e)'' and 
     inserting ``with subsections (d), (e), and (f)(1)''; and

       (G) in subsection (m), as redesignated by subsection 
     (a)(1)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), in the matter before subparagraph 
     (A)--

       (I) by striking ``targeting and minimization procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e)'' and 
     inserting ``targeting, minimization, and querying procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsections (d), (e), and 
     (f)(1)''; and
       (II) by striking ``with subsection (f)'' and inserting 
     ``with subsection (g)''; and

       (ii) in paragraph (2)(A)--

       (I) by striking ``targeting and minimization procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsections (d) and (e)'' and 
     inserting ``targeting, minimization, and querying procedures 
     adopted in accordance with subsections (d), (e), and 
     (f)(1)''; and
       (II) by striking ``with subsection (f)'' and inserting 
     ``with subsection (g)''.

       (2) Amendments to fisa.--The Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further 
     amended--
       (A) by striking ``section 702(h)'' each place it appears 
     and inserting ``section 702(i)'';
       (B) by striking ``section 702(g)'' each place it appears 
     and inserting ``section 702(h)''; and
       (C) in section 707(b)(1)(G)(ii), by striking ``subsections 
     (d), (e), and (f)'' and inserting ``subsections (d), (e), 
     (f)(1), and (g)''.
       (3) Amendments to fisa amendments act of 2008.--Section 404 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 50 U.S.C. 1801 
     note) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(7)(B)--
       (i) by striking ``under section 702(i)(3)'' and inserting 
     ``under section 702(j)(3)''; and
       (ii) by striking ``of section 702(i)(4)'' and inserting 
     ``of section 702(j)(4)'';
       (B) in subsection (b)--
       (i) in paragraph (3)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``to section 702(h)'' 
     and inserting ``to section 702(i)''; and
       (II) in subparagraph (B)--

       (aa) by striking ``section 702(h)(3) of'' and inserting 
     ``section 702(i)(3) of''; and
       (bb) by striking ``to section 702(h)'' and inserting ``to 
     section 702(i)''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (4)--

       (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and sections 
     702(l)'' and inserting ``and sections 702(m)''; and
       (II) in subparagraph (B)(iv), by striking ``or section 
     702(l)'' and inserting ``or section 702(m)''.

     SEC. 102. USE AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS.

       (a) End Use Restriction.--Section 706(a) (50 U.S.C. 
     1881e(a)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Information acquired'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Information acquired''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) United states persons.--
       ``(A) In general.--Any information concerning a United 
     States person acquired under section 702 shall not be used in 
     evidence against that United States person pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) in any criminal proceeding unless--
       ``(i) the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained an order 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to access such 
     information pursuant to section 702(f)(2); or
       ``(ii) the Attorney General determines that--

       ``(I) the criminal proceeding affects, involves, or is 
     related to the national security of the United States; or
       ``(II) the criminal proceeding involves--

       ``(aa) death;
       ``(bb) kidnapping;
       ``(cc) serious bodily injury, as defined in section 1365 of 
     title 18, United States Code;
       ``(dd) conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that is 
     a specified offense against a minor, as defined in section 
     111 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 
     (34 U.S.C. 20911);
       ``(ee) incapacitation or destruction of critical 
     infrastructure, as defined in section 1016(e) of the USA 
     PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e));
       ``(ff) cybersecurity, including conduct described in 
     section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)) 
     or section 1029, 1030, or 2511 of title 18, United States 
     Code;
       ``(gg) transnational crime, including transnational 
     narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime; or
       ``(hh) human trafficking.
       ``(B) No judicial review.--A determination by the Attorney 
     General under subparagraph (A)(ii) is not subject to judicial 
     review.''.
       (b) Intelligence Community Disclosure Provision.--Section 
     603 (50 U.S.C. 1873) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``good faith estimate of 
     the number of targets of such orders;'' and inserting the 
     following: ``good faith estimate of--
       ``(A) the number of targets of such orders;
       ``(B) the number of targets of such orders who are known to 
     not be United States persons; and

[[Page H139]]

       ``(C) the number of targets of such orders who are known to 
     be United States persons;'';
       (B) in paragraph (2)--
       (i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting 
     ``, including pursuant to subsection (f)(2) of such 
     section,'' after ``section 702'';
       (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as 
     subparagraphs (B) and (C), respectively;
       (iii) by inserting before subparagraph (B), as so 
     redesignated, the following:
       ``(A) the number of targets of such orders;'';
       (iv) in subparagraph (B), as so redesignated, by striking 
     ``and'' at the end; and
       (v) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(D) the number of instances in which the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation opened, under the Criminal Investigative 
     Division or any successor division, an investigation of a 
     United States person (who is not considered a threat to 
     national security) based wholly or in part on an acquisition 
     authorized under such section;'';
       (C) in paragraph (3)(A), by striking ``orders; and'' and 
     inserting the following: ``orders, including--
       ``(i) the number of targets of such orders who are known to 
     not be United States persons; and
       ``(ii) the number of targets of such orders who are known 
     to be United States persons; and'';
       (D) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as 
     paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
       (E) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
       ``(4) the number of criminal proceedings in which the 
     United States or a State or political subdivision thereof 
     provided notice pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of section 
     106 (including with respect to information acquired from an 
     acquisition conducted under section 702) or subsection (d) or 
     (e) of section 305 of the intent of the government to enter 
     into evidence or otherwise use or disclose any information 
     obtained or derived from electronic surveillance, physical 
     search, or an acquisition conducted pursuant to this Act;''; 
     and
       (2) in subsection (d)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(4), or (5)'' and 
     inserting ``(5), or (6)'';
       (B) in paragraph (2)(A)--
       (i) by striking ``Paragraphs (2)(A), (2)(B), and (5)(C)'' 
     and inserting ``Paragraphs (2)(B), (2)(C), and (6)(C)''; and
       (ii) by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``, except with respect to information required 
     under paragraph (2) relating to orders issued under section 
     702(f)(2)''; and
       (C) in paragraph (3)(A), in the matter preceding clause 
     (i), by striking ``subsection (b)(2)(B)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (b)(2)(C)''.

     SEC. 103. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF ABOUTS 
                   COLLECTION.

       (a) In General.--Section 702(b) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(b)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
       ``(5) may not intentionally acquire communications that 
     contain a reference to, but are not to or from, a target of 
     an acquisition authorized under subsection (a), except as 
     provided under section 103(b) of the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017; and''.
       (b) Congressional Review and Oversight of Abouts 
     Collection.--
       (1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) The term ``abouts communication'' means a communication 
     that contains a reference to, but is not to or from, a target 
     of an acquisition authorized under section 702(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a(a)).
       (B) The term ``material breach'' means significant 
     noncompliance with applicable law or an order of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court concerning any acquisition of 
     abouts communications.
       (2) Submission to congress.--
       (A) Requirement.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, and except as provided in paragraph (4), if the Attorney 
     General and the Director of National Intelligence intend to 
     implement the authorization of the intentional acquisition of 
     abouts communications, before the first such implementation 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General 
     and the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives a written notice of the intent to 
     implement the authorization of such an acquisition, and any 
     supporting materials in accordance with this subsection.
       (B) Congressional review period.--During the 30-day period 
     beginning on the date written notice is submitted under 
     subparagraph (A), the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives shall, as 
     appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain 
     information in order to fully review the written notice.
       (C) Limitation on action during congressional review 
     period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and 
     subject to paragraph (4), unless the Attorney General and the 
     Director of National Intelligence make a determination 
     pursuant to section 702(c)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(c)(2)), the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     may not implement the authorization of the intentional 
     acquisition of abouts communications before the end of the 
     period described in subparagraph (B).
       (3) Written notice.--Written notice under paragraph (2)(A) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) A copy of any certification submitted to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court pursuant to section 702 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a), or amendment thereto, authorizing the intentional 
     acquisition of abouts communications, including all 
     affidavits, procedures, exhibits, and attachments submitted 
     therewith.
       (B) The decision, order, or opinion of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court approving such certification, 
     and any pleadings, applications, or memoranda of law 
     associated with such decision, order, or opinion.
       (C) A summary of the protections in place to detect any 
     material breach.
       (D) Data or other results of modeling, simulation, or 
     auditing of sample data demonstrating that any acquisition 
     method involving the intentional acquisition of abouts 
     communications shall be conducted in accordance with title 
     VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1881 et seq.), if such data or other results exist at 
     the time the written notice is submitted and were provided to 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       (E) Except as provided under paragraph (4), a statement 
     that no acquisition authorized under subsection (a) of such 
     section 702 shall include the intentional acquisition of an 
     abouts communication until after the end of the 30-day period 
     described in paragraph (2)(B).
       (4) Exception for emergency acquisition.--
       (A) Notice of determination.--If the Attorney General and 
     the Director of National Intelligence make a determination 
     pursuant to section 702(c)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(c)(2)) with respect 
     to the intentional acquisition of abouts communications, the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall notify the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives as soon as 
     practicable, but not later than 7 days after the 
     determination is made.
       (B) Implementation or continuation.--
       (i) In general.--If the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Court approves a certification that authorizes the 
     intentional acquisition of abouts communications before the 
     end of the 30-day period described in paragraph (2)(B), the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     may authorize the immediate implementation or continuation of 
     that certification if the Attorney General and the Director 
     of National Intelligence jointly determine that exigent 
     circumstances exist such that without such immediate 
     implementation or continuation intelligence important to the 
     national security of the United States may be lost or not 
     timely acquired.
       (ii) Notice.--The Attorney General and the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the Committee on the 
     Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives notification of a determination pursuant to 
     clause (i) as soon as practicable, but not later than 3 days 
     after the determination is made.
       (5) Reporting of material breach.--Subsection (m) of 
     section 702 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as redesignated by section 
     101, is amended--
       (A) in the heading by striking ``and Reviews'' and 
     inserting ``Reviews, and Reporting''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) Reporting of material breach.--
       ``(A) In general.--The head of each element of the 
     intelligence community involved in the acquisition of abouts 
     communications shall fully and currently inform the 
     Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Senate and the congressional intelligence committees 
     of a material breach.
       ``(B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       ``(i) The term `abouts communication' means a communication 
     that contains a reference to, but is not to or from, a target 
     of an acquisition authorized under subsection (a).
       ``(ii) The term `material breach' means significant 
     noncompliance with applicable law or an order of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court concerning any acquisition of 
     abouts communications.''.
       (6) Appointment of amici curiae by foreign intelligence 
     surveillance court.--For purposes of section 103(i)(2)(A) of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803(i)(2)(A)), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     shall treat the first certification under section 702(h) of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 1881a(h)) or amendment thereto that 
     authorizes the acquisition of abouts communications as 
     presenting a novel or significant interpretation of the law, 
     unless the court determines otherwise.

     SEC. 104. PUBLICATION OF MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES UNDER 
                   SECTION 702.

       Section 702(e) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(e)) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Publication.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
     in consultation with the Attorney General, shall--
       ``(A) conduct a declassification review of any minimization 
     procedures adopted or amended in accordance with paragraph 
     (1); and
       ``(B) consistent with such review, and not later than 180 
     days after conducting such review, make such minimization 
     procedures publicly available to the greatest extent 
     practicable, which may be in redacted form.''.

     SEC. 105. SECTION 705 EMERGENCY PROVISION.

       Section 705 (50 U.S.C. 1881d) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(c) Emergency Authorization.--
       ``(1) Concurrent authorization.--If the Attorney General 
     authorized the emergency employment of electronic 
     surveillance or a physical

[[Page H140]]

     search pursuant to section 105 or 304, the Attorney General 
     may authorize, for the effective period of the emergency 
     authorization and subsequent order pursuant to section 105 or 
     304, without a separate order under section 703 or 704, the 
     targeting of a United States person subject to such emergency 
     employment for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence 
     information while such United States person is reasonably 
     believed to be located outside the United States.
       ``(2) Use of information.--If an application submitted to 
     the Court pursuant to section 104 or 303 is denied, or in any 
     other case in which the acquisition pursuant to paragraph (1) 
     is terminated and no order with respect to the target of the 
     acquisition is issued under section 105 or 304, all 
     information obtained or evidence derived from such 
     acquisition shall be handled in accordance with section 
     704(d)(4).''.

     SEC. 106. COMPENSATION OF AMICI CURIAE AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS.

       Subsection (i) of section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``(11) Compensation.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, a court established under subsection (a) or (b) may 
     compensate an amicus curiae appointed under paragraph (2) for 
     assistance provided under such paragraph as the court 
     considers appropriate and at such rate as the court considers 
     appropriate.''.

     SEC. 107. ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 107 (50 U.S.C. 1807) 
     is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 107. REPORT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

       ``(a) Annual Report.--In April of each year, the Attorney 
     General shall transmit to the Administrative Office of the 
     United States Courts and to the congressional intelligence 
     committees and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with 
     respect to the preceding calendar year--
       ``(1) the total number of applications made for orders and 
     extensions of orders approving electronic surveillance under 
     this title;
       ``(2) the total number of such orders and extensions either 
     granted, modified, or denied; and
       ``(3) the total number of subjects targeted by electronic 
     surveillance conducted under an order or emergency 
     authorization under this title, rounded to the nearest 500, 
     including the number of such individuals who are United 
     States persons, reported to the nearest band of 500, starting 
     with 0-499.
       ``(b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, to the extent consistent with 
     national security. Not later than 7 days after the date on 
     which the Attorney General submits each such report, the 
     Attorney General shall make the report publicly available, 
     or, if the Attorney General determines that the report cannot 
     be made publicly available consistent with national security, 
     the Attorney General may make publicly available an 
     unclassified summary of the report or a redacted version of 
     the report.''.
       (b) Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices.--Section 406 
     (50 U.S.C. 1846) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(6) a good faith estimate of the total number of subjects 
     who were targeted by the installation and use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device under an order or emergency 
     authorization issued under this title, rounded to the nearest 
     500, including--
       ``(A) the number of such subjects who are United States 
     persons, reported to the nearest band of 500, starting with 
     0-499; and
       ``(B) of the number of United States persons described in 
     subparagraph (A), the number of persons whose information 
     acquired pursuant to such order was reviewed or accessed by a 
     Federal officer, employee, or agent, reported to the nearest 
     band of 500, starting with 0-499.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Each report under subsection (b) shall be submitted 
     in unclassified form, to the extent consistent with national 
     security. Not later than 7 days after the date on which the 
     Attorney General submits such a report, the Attorney General 
     shall make the report publicly available, or, if the Attorney 
     General determines that the report cannot be made publicly 
     available consistent with national security, the Attorney 
     General may make publicly available an unclassified summary 
     of the report or a redacted version of the report.''.

     SEC. 108. IMPROVEMENTS TO PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
                   OVERSIGHT BOARD.

       (a) Appointment of Staff.--Subsection (j) of section 1061 
     of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(j)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs 
     (3) and (4), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(2) Appointment in absence of chairman.--If the position 
     of chairman of the Board is vacant, during the period of the 
     vacancy, the Board, at the direction of the unanimous vote of 
     the serving members of the Board, may exercise the authority 
     of the chairman under paragraph (1).''.
       (b) Meetings.--Subsection (f) of such section (42 U.S.C. 
     2000ee(f)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``The Board shall'' and inserting ``The 
     Board'';
       (2) in paragraph (1) by striking ``make its'' and inserting 
     ``shall make its''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by striking ``hold public'' and inserting ``shall hold 
     public''; and
       (B) by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``, but may, notwithstanding section 552b of title 
     5, United States Code, meet or otherwise communicate in any 
     number to confer or deliberate in a manner that is closed to 
     the public''.

     SEC. 109. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.

       Section 1062(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1(a)) is amended by 
     inserting ``, the Director of the National Security Agency, 
     the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation'' after 
     ``the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.

     SEC. 110. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR CONTRACTORS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Prohibited Personnel Practices in the Intelligence 
     Community.--Section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``or a contractor 
     employee'' after ``character)''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) Contractor employee.--The term `contractor employee' 
     means an employee of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, 
     subgrantee, or personal services contractor, of a covered 
     intelligence community element.'';
       (2) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections 
     (d) and (e), respectively;
       (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection (c):
       ``(c) Contractor Employees.--(1) Any employee of a 
     contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal 
     services contractor, of a covered intelligence community 
     element who has authority to take, direct others to take, 
     recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with 
     respect to such authority, take or fail to take a personnel 
     action with respect to any contractor employee as a reprisal 
     for a lawful disclosure of information by the contractor 
     employee to the Director of National Intelligence (or an 
     employee designated by the Director of National Intelligence 
     for such purpose), the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community, the head of the contracting agency (or an employee 
     designated by the head of that agency for such purpose), the 
     appropriate inspector general of the contracting agency, a 
     congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a 
     congressional intelligence committee, which the contractor 
     employee reasonably believes evidences--
       ``(A) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation 
     (including with respect to evidence of another employee or 
     contractor employee accessing or sharing classified 
     information without authorization); or
       ``(B) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse 
     of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
     health or safety.
       ``(2) A personnel action under paragraph (1) is prohibited 
     even if the action is undertaken at the request of an agency 
     official, unless the request takes the form of a 
     nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the 
     agency official making the request.'';
       (4) in subsection (b), by striking the heading and 
     inserting ``Agency Employees.--''; and
       (5) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
     inserting ``contractor employee,'' after ``any employee,''.
       (b) Federal Bureau of Investigation.--
       (1) In general.--Any employee of a contractor, 
     subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services 
     contractor, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who has 
     authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or 
     approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such 
     authority, take or fail to take a personnel action with 
     respect to a contractor employee as a reprisal for a 
     disclosure of information--
       (A) made--
       (i) to a supervisor in the direct chain of command of the 
     contractor employee;
       (ii) to the Inspector General;
       (iii) to the Office of Professional Responsibility of the 
     Department of Justice;
       (iv) to the Office of Professional Responsibility of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (v) to the Inspection Division of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation;
       (vi) to the Office of Special Counsel; or
       (vii) to an employee designated by any officer, employee, 
     office, or division described in clauses (i) through (vii) 
     for the purpose of receiving such disclosures; and
       (B) which the contractor employee reasonably believes 
     evidences--
       (i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation 
     (including with respect to evidence of another employee or 
     contractor employee accessing or sharing classified 
     information without authorization); or
       (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse 
     of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
     health or safety.
       (2) Actions by request.--A personnel action under paragraph 
     (1) is prohibited even if the action is undertaken at the 
     request of an official of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, unless the request takes the form of a 
     nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the 
     official making the request.
       (3) Regulations.--The Attorney General shall prescribe 
     regulations to ensure that a personnel action described in 
     paragraph (1) shall not be taken against a contractor 
     employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a reprisal 
     for any disclosure of information described in subparagraph 
     (A) of such paragraph.
       (4) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the 
     enforcement of this subsection.
       (5) Definitions.--In this subsection:

[[Page H141]]

       (A) The term ``contractor employee'' means an employee of a 
     contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal 
     services contractor, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (B) The term ``personnel action'' means any action 
     described in clauses (i) through (x) of section 2302(a)(2)(A) 
     of title 5, United States Code, with respect to a contractor 
     employee.
       (c) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and 
     Access Determinations.--Section 3001(j) of the Intelligence 
     Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 
     3341(j)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(8) Inclusion of contractor employees.--In this 
     subsection, the term `employee' includes an employee of a 
     contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal 
     services contractor, of an agency. With respect to such 
     employees, the term `employing agency' shall be deemed to be 
     the contracting agency.''.

     SEC. 111. BRIEFING ON NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the 
     Director of National Intelligence, shall provide to the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate a briefing with respect to how the 
     Department of Justice interprets the requirements under 
     sections 106(c), 305(d), and 405(c) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(c), 
     1825(d), and 1845(c)) to notify an aggrieved person under 
     such sections of the use of information obtained or derived 
     from electronic surveillance, physical search, or the use of 
     a pen register or trap and trace device. The briefing shall 
     focus on how the Department interprets the phrase ``obtained 
     or derived from'' in such sections.

     SEC. 112. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON QUERIES CONDUCTED BY 
                   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court first approves 
     the querying procedures adopted pursuant to section 702(f) of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a(f)), as added by section 101, the Inspector General of 
     the Department of Justice shall submit to the Committee on 
     the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives a report containing a review by the Inspector 
     General of the interpretation of, and compliance with, such 
     procedures by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include, at a minimum, an assessment of the following:
       (1) The interpretations by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation and the National Security Division of the 
     Department of Justice, respectively, relating to the querying 
     procedures adopted under subsection (f) of section 702 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a(f)), as added by section 101.
       (2) The handling by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of 
     individuals whose citizenship status is unknown at the time 
     of a query conducted under such section 702.
       (3) The practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     with respect to retaining records of queries conducted under 
     such section 702 for auditing purposes.
       (4) The training or other processes of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation to ensure compliance with such querying 
     procedures.
       (5) The implementation of such querying procedures with 
     respect to queries conducted when evaluating whether to open 
     an assessment or predicated investigation relating to the 
     national security of the United States.
       (6) The scope of access by the criminal division of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation to information obtained 
     pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), including with respect to 
     information acquired under subsection (a) of such section 702 
     based on queries conducted by the criminal division.
       (7) The frequency and nature of the reviews conducted by 
     the National Security Division of the Department of Justice 
     and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
     relating to the compliance by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation with such querying procedures.
       (8) Any impediments, including operational, technical, or 
     policy impediments, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     to count--
       (A) the total number of queries where the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation subsequently accessed information acquired 
     under subsection (a) of such section 702;
       (B) the total number of such queries that used known United 
     States person identifiers; and
       (C) the total number of queries for which the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation received an order of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court pursuant to subsection (f)(2) 
     of such section 702.
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form to the extent consistent with 
     national security, but may include a classified annex.

 TITLE II--EXTENSION OF AUTHORITIES, INCREASED PENALTIES, REPORTS, AND 
                             OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 201. EXTENSION OF TITLE VII OF FISA; EFFECTIVE DATES.

       (a) Extension.--Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act 
     of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2474) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``December 31, 2017'' and inserting 
     ``December 31, 2023''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and by the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017'' after ``section 101(a)''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
     (A), by striking ``December 31, 2017'' and inserting 
     ``December 31, 2023''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 404(b) of the FISA 
     Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 122 Stat. 2476), 
     as amended by section 101, is further amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``December 31, 2017'' and 
     inserting ``December 31, 2023''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and by the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017'' after ``section 101(a)'';
       (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``and by the FISA 
     Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017'' after ``section 
     101(a)''; and
       (3) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) by inserting ``and amended by the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017'' after ``as added by section 
     101(a)'' both places it appears; and
       (B) by inserting ``and by the FISA Amendments 
     Reauthorization Act of 2017'' after ``as amended by section 
     101(a)'' both places it appears.
       (c) Effective Date of Amendments to FAA.--The amendments 
     made to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261) 
     by this section shall take effect on December 31, 2017.

     SEC. 202. INCREASED PENALTY FOR UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL AND 
                   RETENTION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS OR MATERIAL.

       Section 1924(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``one year'' and inserting ``five years''.

     SEC. 203. REPORT ON CHALLENGES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General, in coordination 
     with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to 
     the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate a report on current and future 
     challenges to the effectiveness of the foreign intelligence 
     surveillance activities of the United States authorized under 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801 et seq.).
       (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) 
     shall include, at a minimum, the following:
       (1) A discussion of any trends that currently challenge the 
     effectiveness of the foreign intelligence surveillance 
     activities of the United States, or could foreseeably 
     challenge such activities during the decade following the 
     date of the report, including with respect to--
       (A) the extraordinary and surging volume of data occurring 
     worldwide;
       (B) the use of encryption;
       (C) changes to worldwide telecommunications patterns or 
     infrastructure;
       (D) technical obstacles in determining the location of data 
     or persons;
       (E) the increasing complexity of the legal regime, 
     including regarding requests for data in the custody of 
     foreign governments;
       (F) the current and future ability of the United States to 
     obtain, on a compulsory or voluntary basis, assistance from 
     telecommunications providers or other entities; and
       (G) any other matters the Attorney General and the Director 
     of National Intelligence determine appropriate.
       (2) Recommendations for changes, including, as appropriate, 
     fundamental changes, to the foreign intelligence surveillance 
     activities of the United States to address the challenges 
     identified under paragraph (1) and to ensure the long-term 
     effectiveness of such activities.
       (3) Recommendations for any changes to the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) that the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence determine necessary to address the challenges 
     identified under paragraph (1).
       (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
     in classified or unclassified form.

     SEC. 204. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY ON THE CLASSIFICATION 
                   SYSTEM AND PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Study.--The Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall conduct a study of the classification system of the 
     United States and the methods by which the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4))) protects classified 
     information.
       (b) Matters Included.--The study under subsection (a) shall 
     address the following:
       (1) Whether sensitive information is properly classified.
       (2) The effect of modern technology on the storage and 
     protection of classified information, including with respect 
     to--
       (A) using cloud storage for classified information; and
       (B) any technological means to prevent or detect 
     unauthorized access to such information.
       (3) Any ways to improve the classification system of the 
     United States, including with respect to changing the levels 
     of classification used in such system and to reduce 
     overclassification.
       (4) How to improve the authorized sharing of classified 
     information, including with respect to sensitive 
     compartmented information.
       (5) The value of polygraph tests in determining who is 
     authorized to access classified information and in 
     investigating unauthorized disclosures of classified 
     information.
       (6) Whether each element of the intelligence community--
       (A) applies uniform standards in determining who is 
     authorized to access classified information; and

[[Page H142]]

       (B) provides proper training with respect to the handling 
     of classified information and the avoidance of 
     overclassification.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit 
     to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate a report containing the study 
     under subsection (a).
       (d) Form.--The report under subsection (c) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.

     SEC. 205. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS AND AMENDMENTS TO IMPROVE 
                   PROCEDURES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW.

       (a) Technical Amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended 
     as follows:
       (1) In section 103(b) (50 U.S.C. 1803(b)), by striking 
     ``designate as the'' and inserting ``designated as the''.
       (2) In section 302(a)(1)(A)(iii) (50 U.S.C. 
     1822(a)(1)(A)(iii)), by striking ``paragraphs (1) through 
     (4)'' and inserting ``subparagraphs (A) through (D)''.
       (3) In section 406(b) (50 U.S.C. 1846(b)), by striking 
     ``and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate''.
       (4) In section 604(a) (50 U.S.C. 1874(a))--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(D), by striking ``contents'' and 
     inserting ``contents,''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``comply in the into'' 
     and inserting ``comply into''.
       (5) In section 701 (50 U.S.C. 1881)--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``The terms'' and 
     inserting ``In this title, the terms''; and
       (B) in subsection (b)--
       (i) by inserting ``In this title:'' after the subsection 
     heading; and
       (ii) in paragraph (5), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 401a(4))'' 
     and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 3003(4))''.
       (6) In section 702(h)(2)(A)(i) (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a(h)(2)(A)(i)), as redesignated by section 101, by 
     inserting ``targeting'' before ``procedures in place''.
       (7) In section 801(7) (50 U.S.C. 1885(7)), by striking 
     ``(50 U.S.C. 401a(4))'' and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 
     3003(4))''.
       (b) Court-related Amendments.--The Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further 
     amended as follows:
       (1) In section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803)--
       (A) in subsection (b), by striking ``immediately''; and
       (B) in subsection (h), by striking ``the court established 
     under subsection (a)'' and inserting ``a court established 
     under this section''.
       (2) In section 105(d) (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) A denial of the application made under section 104 
     may be reviewed as provided in section 103.''.
       (3) In section 302(d) (50 U.S.C. 1822(d)), by striking 
     ``immediately''.
       (4) In section 402(d) (50 U.S.C. 1842(d)), by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) A denial of the application made under this 
     subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.''.
       (5) In section 403(c) (50 U.S.C. 1843(c)), by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) A denial of the application made under subsection 
     (a)(2) may be reviewed as provided in section 103.''.
       (6) In section 501(c) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)), by adding at the 
     end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) A denial of the application made under this 
     subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.''.

     SEC. 206. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, any amendment made by this 
     Act, or the application thereof to any person or 
     circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder 
     of the Act, of any such amendments, and of the application of 
     such provisions to other persons and circumstances shall not 
     be affected thereby.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 
1 hour, with 40 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and 
ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and 20 minutes equally divided and controlled by the 
chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  After 1 hour of debate on the bill, as amended, it shall be in order 
to consider the further amendment printed in House Report 115-504, if 
offered by the Member designated in the report, which shall be 
considered read, shall be separately debatable for the time specified 
in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent, and shall not be subject to a demand for a division of the 
question.
  The gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) each will control 20 minutes. The gentleman 
from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Nadler) each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Stewart).


                             General Leave

  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous material on the bill, S. 139.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Utah?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 139.
  On January 19, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 will expire. This 
vital legislation includes section 702, which permits the government to 
target foreign citizens located overseas to obtain foreign intelligence 
information. Section 702 is one of the most, if not the most, critical 
national security tool used by our intelligence community to obtain 
intelligence on foreign terrorists located overseas.
  Now, some claim section 702 vacuums bulk information without due 
regard to the intended target. This assertion is simply false. Section 
702 is a targeted program, with roughly 106,000 foreign targets 
worldwide. Given that the worldwide population is about 7.5 billion, 
this program can hardly be described as bulk collection.
  Section 702 targets spies, terrorists, weapons proliferators, and 
other foreign adversaries who threaten the United States, and locating 
them is crucial to protecting our troops and our homeland.
  As an example, Hajji Iman, who was the second-in-command of ISIS, was 
located via section 702 and later removed from the battlefield. While 
the vast majority of examples remain classified, this is just one 
instance that demonstrates the necessity of this authority.
  Subject to multiple layers of oversight by all three branches of 
government, section 702 is one of the government's most rigorously 
overseen foreign intelligence collection authorities. To date, while 
compliance incidents occur and are dealt with appropriately, there has 
never been a known, intentional abuse of this authority. Nevertheless, 
the program should be subject to regular adjustments, as necessary, to 
ensure the effectiveness of privacy protections.
  Therefore, after careful consideration of the best way to strengthen 
privacy protections without hindering the program's effectiveness, the 
committee supports S. 139, a bipartisan bill that includes provisions 
and addresses concerns raised by the House Judiciary Committee and the 
Senate.
  The bill's reforms include:
  Requiring specific section 702 query procedures, separate from 
existing minimization procedures, which must be reviewed by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court every year;
  Limiting the instances in which the government can use section 702 
information to prosecute U.S. people;
  Requiring the inspector general of the Department of Justice to 
conduct a review of the FBI's interpretation and implementation of the 
FBI's section 702 query procedures;
  Temporarily codifying the end of the NSA's section 702 upstream 
``abouts'' collection until the government develops new procedures and 
briefs the congressional Intelligence and Judiciary Committees;
  And, finally, improving transparency by mandating the publication of 
section 702 minimization procedures and requiring additional reporting 
to Congress on how the intelligence community is using other FISA 
authorities.
  Mr. Speaker, during discussions over the past several months, both 
the House and the Senate have made several concessions to achieve this 
compromised language in order to reauthorize this critical national 
security authority. Accordingly, S. 139 now includes a probable cause-
based order requirement for the FBI to access the content of a section 
702 communication during FBI criminal investigations on Americans, 
unrelated to national security.
  This order requirement does not reflect the committee's belief or 
intent that law enforcement access to lawfully acquired information 
constitutes a separate search under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth 
Amendment, as interpreted by numerous Federal courts, does not require 
the FBI to obtain a separate order from the FISC to review lawfully 
acquired 702 information.
  Though not required by the Constitution, this compromise is meant to 
provide additional protections for U.S.

[[Page H143]]

person information that is incidentally collected under section 702. 
Along with the restrictions on the use of section 702 information in 
criminal prosecutions, this should provide further assurances to the 
American public that this vital national security tool is used strictly 
to discover and mitigate foreign threats to the United States, and the 
handling and use of any incidental U.S. person information is carefully 
controlled and monitored.
  Mr. Speaker, America faces an array of international threats more 
complicated than anything we have endured in the past.

                              {time}  0930

  Speaking for the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I 
cannot emphasize enough that now is not the time to draw back on key 
national security authorities.
  I am dismayed by the amount of disinformation being propagated by 
those who oppose section 702 for purely ideological reasons. When 
Congress must reauthorize this program again in 2023, we hope those who 
debate these issues, both inside and outside this Chamber, do so with 
intellectual honesty and integrity.
  The USA RIGHTS Act, which has been offered as an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, is an attempt to kill this compromise. In its 
place, the amendment would begin resurrecting the information-sharing 
walls between national security and law enforcement that the 9/11 
Commission identified as a major factor in the failure to identify and 
thwart the 9/11 plot.
  If individuals in this body cannot learn from history, they are 
doomed to repeat it. There is no support for this bill in the majority 
of the committees of jurisdiction whose members understand that this 
amendment would render section 702 inoperable.
  Therefore, in order to keep the U.S. interests and troops abroad safe 
from harm, we must ensure that the intelligence community has the tools 
it needs to provide intelligence to our soldiers abroad. Section 702 is 
critical in that regard, and S. 139 provides the intelligence community 
with the authorities needed to protect the homeland while implementing 
key privacy enhancements.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of S. 139, and I reserve the balance of 
my time.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, as HPSCI's ranking member and a former member of the 
Judiciary Committee, I have long advocated for reforms to surveillance 
authorities to balance the imperatives of national security and 
counterterrorism with the privacy rights and civil liberties of 
Americans.
  Today, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act seeks to reauthorize 
the program while making changes to protect privacy interests. 
Nonetheless, and I indicated before we took up the bill, in light of 
the significant concerns that have been raised by members of our 
Caucus, and in light of the irresponsible and inherently contradictory 
messages coming out of the White House today, I would recommend that we 
withdraw consideration of the bill today to give us more time to 
address the privacy questions that have been raised as well as to get a 
clear statement from the administration about their position on the 
bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I do this reluctantly. Section 702, I think, is among 
the most important of all of our surveillance programs. Nonetheless, I 
think that the issues that have been raised will need more time to be 
resolved, and I think we need to get a clear statement from the 
administration of whether they are in support of this legislation or 
they are not.
  This morning, as my colleagues are aware, the President issued a 
statement via Twitter suggesting that this authority was used illegally 
by the Obama administration to surveil him. Of course, that is 
blatantly untrue but, nonetheless, casts an additional cloud over the 
debate today.
  In light of these circumstances, I think the better course would be 
for us to defer consideration, give us more time to address the issues 
that have been raised by the privacy community within my own Caucus, 
but also within the administration about its inaccurate, conflicting, 
and confusing statements on the morning of debate.
  Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly urge my colleagues to postpone 
consideration so that we can take up this bill when it is more ripe for 
consideration.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Conaway).
  Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Utah. While I am 
not unappreciative of my colleague from California's comments, I do 
think we are at a place where we do need to move forward. If we succumb 
to the emotions of what is going on around us and don't stick to the 
facts, stick to what we are trying to get done, I think that we do that 
to our detriment. So I have great respect for my colleague and his 
opinions, but I personally believe that plays into the emotions of what 
is going on rather than the facts of what is going on. If we can, I 
believe we should just continue to push forward.
  First, let me say that the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act is a 
bipartisan compromise bill that preserves the operational flexibility 
of section 702 while instituting key reforms to further protect U.S. 
personal privacy.
  One of the major issues discussed over the past year has been NSA's 
``abouts communication'' collection--a tortured title, but, 
nevertheless, we will stick with the phrase, ``abouts communication.'' 
So ``abouts communication'' collection takes place in NSA's upstream 
collection and, due to how the internet communications work, allows NSA 
to collect the communications that may reference a section 702 target's 
email address.
  Despite what some of my colleagues may push in their propaganda, 
``abouts'' collection does not collect names of targets, just 
selectors. Some of my colleagues also suggest that ``abouts 
communication'' is inherently in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.
  While the FISA court has raised concerns about ``abouts 
communication'' collections in the past, NSA has been able to conduct 
such collections with the approval of the FISA court. This type of 
collection is at issue today because it was the subject to a compliance 
incident in 2016. NSA self-reported a problem to the FISA court and 
decided to cease ``abouts communication'' collection until a fix could 
be implemented and demonstrated to the court. I would like to note that 
that type of self-reporting of compliance incidents is expected of the 
intelligence community elements and proves that oversight mechanisms 
are in place and that they work.
  Other potential legislation, including the amendments to today's base 
bill, would seek to permanently end ``abouts communication'' 
collection. This is a shortsighted and a dangerous proposition that 
will limit the NSA's ability to identify threat networks in the future.
  Rather than ending ``abouts communication'' collection, S. 139 
strikes, I believe, that right balance. If NSA wants to reestablish 
``abouts communication'' collection, NSA would first need to go back to 
court, convince the judge that it has satisfied the court's concerns. 
After achieving judicial approval that NSA has made the necessary 
technical changes, NSA would then brief congressional Intelligence and 
Judiciary Committees on how they plan to reinstitute this type of 
collection. Barring congressional action, NSA can then start ``abouts 
communication'' collection, 30 days after those briefings.
  Some of our opponents to S. 139 claim that 30 days is not enough. To 
the folks that claim that 30 days is not enough, there is nothing 
stopping Congress from acting after that 30-day window. However, NSA 
should not be penalized and America's security should not be 
compromised and prevented from obtaining valuable foreign intelligence 
information that the FISA court has deemed consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment just because Congress can't pass legislation in 30 days.
  This compromise of the bill that is on the floor today, I believe, is 
the right answer, and I hope my colleagues will support S. 139.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, once again, I would reluctantly urge that we withdraw 
consideration of the bill for today. I certainly have been working as 
hard, I

[[Page H144]]

think, as anyone to try to agree to a compromise that would move 
forward this very important surveillance authority but would strike the 
right balance between our security interests and our privacy interests, 
but I do think we need more time to work on this bill. And I think that 
it was only underscored this morning with the contradictory statements 
coming out of the administration.
  An issue of this magnitude and this seriousness really deserves 
serious and sober consideration. I think we need more time to discuss 
this with our Members, and I would urge my colleagues not to bring this 
to a vote today to give us more time to work on it.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues believe that Congress should go 
above and beyond what is required by the Fourth Amendment and institute 
additional safeguards on how the government handles any potential U.S. 
personal information that may be incidentally collected under section 
702. While the varying committees may have different ideas as to how to 
strike the right balance between additional privacy measures and 
national security, the art of the compromise brings us to the current 
junction.
  Under S. 139, if the bill conducts a U.S.-person query into its 
database during a criminal investigation not related to national 
security and conducts a section 702 communication, the FBI must obtain 
an order from the FISA court prior to assessing the content of the 
communication.
  The committee does not believe that such an order is necessary under 
the Fourth Amendment, but it is adding more protections, as a matter of 
policy, in order to address unfounded concerns by opponents of section 
702 that the authority is being used to investigate U.S. people.
  Proponents of the USA RIGHTS Act amendment will say that S. 139 does 
not go far enough in its current form and that they have crafted a 
great compromise that allows the intelligence community to do its job.
  Unfortunately, they are selling a poison pill that is extraordinarily 
harmful to our national security. Per the office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, under the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, the FBI 
would not be able to look at lawfully collected data related to 
suspicious activities similar to that of the 9/11 hijackers. This is 
unethical to the 9/11 Commission Report, and anyone who thinks about 
voting for the USA RIGHTS Act amendment should pick up a copy and skim 
it prior to voting.
  Unlike the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, S. 139 is able to balance 
national security and privacy while adhering to the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission reporting. I echo the White House statement last 
night strongly opposing the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, and I urge all of 
my colleagues in the House to support S. 139.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MARINO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes to make a 
statement.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 139, the FISA Amendments 
Reauthorization Act. As a former United States attorney, I know 
firsthand the enormous value that programs like section 702 provide in 
protecting our country.
  The worst threats have been thwarted due to our intelligence and law 
enforcement communities having tools like section 702. Chairman 
Goodlatte, along with the members of the Judiciary Committee, worked 
diligently on legislation to implement meaningful reforms while 
ensuring the law enforcement and Intelligence Committee still had the 
necessary tools available. This bill includes many other reforms from 
the USA Liberty Act, enhances section 702 protections, and maintains 
law enforcement abilities.
  Mr. Speaker, I would ask all Members to join me in voting ``yes'' on 
this legislation to implement real reforms, while ensuring that we 
still provide the tools necessary to keep American citizens safe.
  In conclusion, as a U.S. attorney, I have used this section. My 
office used this section. We followed the law to the letter. There were 
no complaints, and I want the American people to realize something: we 
in law enforcement, law enforcement throughout the U.S., we have to be 
right and on spot every second of every day. It only takes a terrorist 
a moment to get lucky and set off a bomb killing Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  0945

  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in strong opposition to the FISA Amendments Reauthorization 
Act of 2017, which reauthorizes section 702 of FISA for 6 years without 
enacting adequate protections for our privacy.
  Supporters of this measure want to convince us a new, incredibly 
narrow warrant provision actually constitutes reform. It does not. Our 
right to privacy does not begin when the Department of Justice has a 
fully formed criminal case against us, nor does it begin when 
prosecutors enter our emails and text messages into evidence against us 
in court.
  The Constitution guarantees far more than this. Our right to privacy 
protects us when the government first makes its decision to search our 
private communications for information it might find useful. S. 139 
falls well short of this basic guarantee. We, therefore, cannot--we 
must not--support this bill.
  Make no mistake: S. 139 is not a compromise. The Judiciary Committee, 
the technology companies, civil society, and other critical 
stakeholders were shut out of this conversation long ago.
  S. 139 does not include a meaningful warrant requirement. The rule in 
this bill does not apply to most searches of the section 702 database. 
It does not apply to a query for any information that ``could mitigate 
a threat,'' an exception that threatens to swallow the entire rule. As 
a result, S. 139 allows the FBI unfettered access to this information 
for purely domestic nonterrorism cases without a warrant.
  What does that mean in the year of Jeff Sessions and Donald Trump? It 
means that absolutely nothing stops the Department of Justice from 
trolling the database for evidence that you use marijuana or failed to 
pay your taxes or may be in the country unlawfully or possess a firearm 
that you should not have. None of these cases have anything to do with 
the core purposes of section 702, and all of them should require a 
warrant based on individualized suspicion and probable cause.
  I agree with Chairman Goodlatte that section 702 should be 
reauthorized. I understand its importance to the intelligence agencies. 
But none of us should support this bill which pretends at reform while 
codifying some of the worst practices of the intelligence community in 
domestic crimes.
  When we came to Congress, each of us took an oath to defend and 
protect the Constitution of the United States. I ask that each of my 
colleagues honor that oath today and that we work together to defeat 
this bill and to bring the right set of reforms to the floor without 
delay.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MARINO. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Poe).
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am a former prosecutor and a former 
judge. I despise terrorists. We ought to go after them and get them. 
Section 702 was written to go after terrorists, but it is being used to 
go after Americans.
  Normally, when I was a judge, I would sign a warrant. Before the 
government could go into your house, they had to have a warrant to go 
into the house and to seize something based on probable cause.
  Under FISA, as it is used against Americans--forget the terrorists--
as it is used against Americans, government has already seized your 
house of communications, all of it. They look around, and sometimes--
sometimes--they go back to a secret judge in a secret court and get a 
secret warrant by a FISA judge, and they come in and seize something 
and prosecute based on something irrelevant about terrorism. That is 
why this bill violates the Fourth Amendment.
  Get a warrant before you go into the house of communications and 
effects

[[Page H145]]

and papers of Americans or stay out of that house. These documents have 
been seized. Communications have been seized by government. They are 
kept forever.
  Keep government out. Without a warrant, you stay out, because 
government, as we learned from the British, cannot be trusted.
  Get a warrant. Stay out of the house of communications.
  Vote against this bill. Let's redraft it and protect Americans.
  And that is just the way it is.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, like the ranking member, I oppose this 
bill. It does not meet the standards that we should have for adhering 
to the Constitution.
  Now, this is a confusing debate in some ways because what is it we 
are talking about?
  We are all against terrorism, and we have authorized the collection 
of data of terrorists communicating with each other. In section 702, if 
they communicate with somebody here, we can collect that, too.
  But because of the architecture of the internet, we are collecting 
vast amounts--we can't go into the numbers here in open session--vast 
amounts of data. It is not metadata; it is content. It is the content 
of your phone calls, content of your emails, and the content of your 
text messages and video messages. Under section 702, you can search 
that for Americans for crimes that have nothing to do with terrorism. 
We should change that.
  As Judge Poe has said, you need a warrant to go after Americans for a 
nonterrorism crime. There is a reason why a left-right coalition--the 
NAACP and FreedomWorks, Color of Change and Gun Owners of America--has 
joined together on the same point of view. We should stand up for the 
privacy rights of Americans and reject this bill and have a warrant 
requirement for searching for the information of Americans that is in 
this vast database.
  Just one further point: The very weak predicate criminal 
investigation trigger for a warrant which is at the end of the 
investigation would apply only to the FBI. So if you are the ATF, you 
would never have to get a warrant. If you were the DEA, you would never 
have to get a warrant. This bill is inadequate, and it ought to be 
defeated.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to control the 
time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Virginia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, as you all know, the Judiciary Committee worked 
diligently for a year on legislation that does two things: one, protect 
Americans' civil liberties by requiring a court order to access section 
702 data during domestic criminal investigations; and, two, reauthorize 
the 702 program, which is our Nation's most indispensable national 
security tool.
  We achieved that by passing the USA Liberty Act in the House 
Judiciary Committee last year by an overwhelming bipartisan vote, which 
is no easy task; however, we were able to responsibly balance civil 
liberties with national security.
  The bill we will vote on today was drafted in the spirit of the USA 
Liberty Act. It is not perfect and the process getting here was not 
ideal, but the bill requires, for the first time, a warrant to access 
section 702-collected communications on U.S. persons in criminal 
investigations.
  Moreover, in routine criminal cases, when the FBI accesses U.S. 
person communications that were incidentally collected without first 
obtaining a warrant, the FBI will not be permitted to use those 
communications in a criminal prosecution. This will prevent a national 
security tool from advancing run-of-the-mill criminal prosecutions.
  These are meaningful reforms. The bill that was presented to us 
before Christmas with its optional warrant construct was not real 
reform. The bill we are debating today, however, contains meaningful 
reforms.
  I would have preferred to include additional reforms, but I cannot 
stress to my colleagues enough that our choice cannot be between a 
perfect reform bill and expiration of this program. The 702 program is 
far too important for that. With this bill, we can have meaningful 
reform and reauthorization. In its current form, this bill will pass 
the Senate.
  I also want to caution everyone that we cannot go too far in seeking 
to alter this program. There is an amendment that will be offered 
sponsored by Mr. Amash and Ms. Lofgren that would prevent the FBI from 
ever querying its 702 database using a U.S. person term.
  Imagine the FBI getting a tip from a flight instructor whose student 
acts suspiciously by expressing great interest in learning how to take 
off and fly a plane but has no interest in learning how to land the 
plane. This could be innocent behavior, but we want law enforcement to 
at least be able to perform a search to see if they already have, in 
their possession, any communications between the student and a foreign 
actor involved in organizing terrorist plots.
  The Judiciary Committee-passed bill would have allowed the search and 
allowed law enforcement to view the metadata without a warrant while 
requiring a warrant to view the content of the communications.
  The Amash-Lofgren amendment, which was rejected in the Judiciary 
Committee, goes too far and would prevent such a search from even being 
done. It would, thus, kill this critical program by preventing the FBI 
from even looking at its own databases without a warrant, rendering it 
ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks and stifling its ability to 
gather necessary intelligence. It must not be adopted.
  I will vote to support this bill. I will oppose the Amash-Lofgren 
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to join me. Vote for reform and 
reauthorization.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, many of us are opposing this bill and 
supporting the amendment because it is very different from the 
Judiciary Committee bill that we reported, which was a good bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. 
Cicilline).
  Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill.
  Supporters of this bill have called it reform. This is not reform. It 
is a massive expansion of the government's ability to pry into the 
private lives of innocent people. If you need proof, just look at the 
bill's section 702 which is supposed to authorize spying on foreign 
adversaries, but it has emboldened some in law enforcement to collect 
and read private communications of American citizens without a warrant.

  Instead of curbing these practices, S. 139 would codify and expand 
some of the most abusive of surveillance practices used in recent 
years, including ``abouts'' collection and backdoor searches.
  There is no more important responsibility that we have than keeping 
the American people safe, but we have to do it in a way that is 
consistent with our values and our Constitution. This bill undermines 
our values of privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose S. 139 and to support the Amash-
Lofgren amendment, which allows intelligence agencies to do their jobs 
without undermining our values as Americans. We can do both things, Mr. 
Speaker: keep the American people safe and honor and respect our 
Constitution, which protects the privacy of all American citizens.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge defeat of this bill and support of the amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Chabot), who is a member of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership in 
ensuring that a number of important reforms to section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act were included in this 
legislation.
  I rise in support of this modified version of S. 139. While this does 
not go as far to reform FISA section 702 as the USA Liberty Act, which 
passed out of the Judiciary Committee in November with my support, the 
reforms that are included help to provide a more appropriate balance 
between protecting our

[[Page H146]]

civil liberties and providing the intelligence community an important 
national security tool for another 6 years before its expiration this 
Friday.
  FISA section 702 is a critical tool used by the intelligence 
community to protect American citizens from foreign threats and has 
been successfully used numerous times to prevent terrorist plots. Since 
we last reauthorized FISA section 702, much has changed not only in who 
our foreign threats are, but also in the methods that they use against 
us. The bottom line is we need to protect the safety of the American 
people. We need to make sure constitutional protections are in place, 
and this is the proper balance.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, let me repeat the refrain of those of 
us who are members of the Judiciary Committee who have gone through 
this process since 9/11, and that is that we support the integrity and 
the importance of section 702 as a national security tool, and we want 
it reauthorized, but we want it right.
  Our job and our task is also to be the protectors of the Fourth 
Amendment, and that is the protection of the American people against 
unreasonable search and seizure.
  No matter how much my friends on the other side of the aisle argue, 
we know that the FBI can have the tools that it needs; but, in the 
instance of this underlying bill, similar to the bill that was passed 
in 2007 by the Bush administration, on which the Judiciary Committee 
came back and amended it and made it a bill that provides the tools 
that were needed by those who are on the front lines in the United 
States military and the FBI, ultimately, it was changed to deny those 
rights.
  In this instance, the warrant that my friends are talking about is 
revised only to fully predicated cases. It does not apply to the 
searching of documents that will have information about Americans.
  I ask my colleagues to postpone this. Let us work together on behalf 
of the American people. Who are we if we cannot uphold the 
Constitution? It is not protected in this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, I rise in 
strong opposition to S. 139, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 
2017.''
  S. 139 reauthorizes Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, which is scheduled to expire on January 19, 2018.
  Section 702 authorizes the Justice Department and NSA to collect non-
U.S. persons' communications that are sent while abroad.
  The collection programs have to be approved each year by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court).
  The FISA Court was set up by the 1978 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA; Public Law 95-511) to oversee intelligence-
gathering activities and ensure compliance with the U.S. Constitution.
  Under FISA, the term ``U.S. person'' covers citizens, green card 
holders, associations with a ``substantial number of members'' who are 
U.S. citizens or permanent residents, and U.S.-incorporated companies.
  Title VII also allows intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance 
on a specific U.S. person reasonably believed to be outside of the 
country, with the approval of the FISA Court.
  The NSA's use of section 702 authority to collect Americans' 
information from their communications with foreign surveillance targets 
was revealed by former government contractor Edward Snowden in 2013.
  Snowden also revealed that the NSA obtains communications from U.S.-
based providers such as Google, Verizon, and Facebook.
  Although Section 702 is a critical national security tool set to 
expire on January 19, 2018, events of the recent past strongly suggest 
that Section 702 should not be reauthorized without necessary and 
significant reforms that are not included in the legislation before us.
  So as the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, I oppose the bill for 
several compelling reasons:
  1. S. 139 fails to address the core concerns of Members of Congress 
and the American public--the government's use of Section 702 
information against United States citizens investigations that have 
nothing to do with national security.
  2. The warrant ``requirement'' contained in the bill is riddled with 
loopholes and applies only to fully predicated, official FBI 
investigations, not to the hundreds of thousands searches the FBI runs 
every day to run down a lead or check out a tip.
  3. S. 139 exacerbates existing problems with Section 702 by codifying 
so-called ``about collection,'' a type of surveillance that was shut 
down after it twice failed to meet Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
  4. S. 139 is universally opposed by technology companies, privacy, 
and civil liberties groups across the political spectrum from the ACLU 
to FreedomWorks.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill before us comes from the Intelligence 
Committee, where it was passed on a strict party-line vote.
  This stands in stark contrast to H.R. 3989, the USA Liberty Act the 
bipartisan bill reported by the Judiciary Committee after multiple 
hearings, an open markup process, and a bipartisan vote of approval.
  The USA Liberty Act enjoys much broader support, contains meaningful 
reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and is far 
superior to the bill before us.
  Inexplicably, the House Republican leadership did choose the best 
option, which was to bring the USA Liberty Act to the floor for debate 
and vote; instead, they chose the worst option, which is S. 139, the 
bill before us.
  For this reason, I urge all members to join me in supporting the 
Amash-Lofgren Amendment, the best option remaining before us.
  The Amash-Lofgren strike the text of S. 139 in its entirety and 
substitutes in its place the text of the ``Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Reforming and Improving the Government's High-Tech 
Surveillance Act'' (``USA RIGHTS Act'').
  In contrast to S. 139, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' enacts necessary and 
meaningful reforms to Section 702, which are necessary in light of the 
past abuses of surveillance authorities, contemporary noncompliance 
with this authority, and the danger posed by potential future abuses.
  First, the USA RIGHTS Act creates a search warrant requirement that 
closes the so-called ``backdoor search loophole'' through which the 
government searches, without first obtaining a court-issued warrant 
based on probable cause, for information about U.S. persons or persons 
inside the U.S.
  The ``USA RIGHTS Act'' provides an exception for emergencies, but 
requires a court warrant afterward.
  Second, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' prohibits the collection of domestic 
communications and permanently ends ``about'' collection, an illegal 
practice the National Security Agency recently stopped because of 
persistent and significant compliance violations.
  This is important because while ``reverse targeting'' is prohibited 
under the Jackson Lee Amendment incorporated in the USA Freedom Act 
enacted on June 2, 2016 (Pub. L. 114-23), this prohibition was often 
skirted by collecting information from communications that merely 
mention an intelligence target.
  Under the ``USA RIGHTS Act'', collections would be limited to 
communications that are ``to'' or ``from'' a target, and the 
intentional collection of wholly domestic communications is prohibited.
  Third, the ``USA RIGHTS Act'' requires the government give notice 
when it uses information obtained or derived from Section 702 
surveillance in proceedings against U.S. persons or people on U.S. soil 
which will enable a defendant to assert his or her constitutional 
rights and help ensure that foreign intelligence surveillance is not 
being misused.
  Fourth, under the ``USA RIGHTS Act'', Section 702 authority sunsets 
in 4 years, which will obligate the Congress to exercise regular 
oversight and provide the opportunity to make necessary reforms before 
reauthorization.
  Mr. Speaker, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
was enacted to protect the liberty and security of Americans, not to 
diminish their constitutional rights.
  All Americans want to find the common ground where commonsense rules 
and regulations relating to fighting terrorism at home and abroad can 
exist while still protecting the cherished privacy and civil liberties 
which Americans hold close to our collective hearts.
  That is why Section 702 should not be reauthorized with reforms to 
prevent the government from using information against its political 
opponents or members of religious, ethnic, or other groups.
  One way to do that without interfering with the national security 
objectives of 702 surveillance is simply to reject S. 139 and support 
the USA RIGHTS Act by voting for the Amash-Lofgren Amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I noted in an op-ed published way back in October 2007, 
that as Alexis de Tocqueville, the most astute student of American 
democracy, observed nearly two centuries ago, the reason democracies 
invariably prevail in any military conflict is because democracy is the 
governmental form that best rewards and encourages those traits that 
are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation, courage, and a 
love of justice.
  And the best way to keep America safe and strong is to remain true to 
the valued embedded in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

[[Page H147]]

  S. 139 does not strike the proper balance between our cherished 
liberties and smart security.
  We can do better; we should reject S. 139 and support the Amash-
Lofgren Amendment.

                              {time}  1000

  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), a member of the Judiciary Committee and 
the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations 
Subcommittee.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill, 
and I will speak later on some of the other parts.
  I want to talk about the ``abouts'' stuff that is reauthorized in 
this bill after the NSA itself stopped doing it earlier last year.
  What ``abouts'' collection means is that, for example, if you have 
two jihadists that are in Pakistan and are communicating with each 
other that they didn't like something that Mr. Nadler said against 
jihadists, the FBI can pick up the name ``Nadler'' and go into all of 
his emails, all of his texts, all of the information that they have on 
him and be able to see what Mr. Nadler had said about jihadists and 
much, much more. That is why this bill opens the door to something that 
the NSA has closed itself.
  We will hear from people who support ``abouts'' collection that 
Congress has got a chance to review it. They give us 30 days to do it. 
We can't get anything done in 30 days.
  Vote ``no'' on the bill.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Ted Lieu).
  Mr. TED LIEU of California. Mr. Speaker, having served on Active Duty 
in the United States military, when it comes to foreign terrorists on 
foreign soil, we need to track them down and kill them. That is why I 
support the FISA Act, as applied to foreigners.
  But, unfortunately, this act has now been used to apply to Americans. 
If you are going to do that, you need to follow the Constitution, you 
need to put in a warrant requirement. Unfortunately, the Nunes FISA 
bill does not do that. That is why I support the USA RIGHTS amendment.
  At the end of the day, this is not about terrorists or terrorism. It 
is about: Can you use warrantless information against Americans in a 
domestic court?
  That is what this issue is about. Don't let the intelligence agencies 
scare you.
  Vote ``no'' on the Nunes bill and ``yes'' on the USA RIGHTS 
amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining 
on each side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Carter of Georgia). The gentleman from 
Virginia has 2 minutes remaining. The gentleman from New York has 2\1/
4\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Johnson).
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, our times are this: the 
President is abusing his authority. He is stacking the courts with 
incompetent and ideological judges. He is usurping the powers of the 
Justice Department and the FBI. He is turning them into political 
animals.
  At the same time as he is doing this, we are considering this 
legislation, which leaves the door wide open for the abuse of Fourth 
Amendment rights of Americans.
  This is a bad bill for a particularly bad time. I am asking my 
colleagues to vote ``no.'' We can do better than this. I am asking my 
colleagues to vote in favor of the USA RIGHTS amendment. If that 
amendment is not passed, then I ask Members to vote ``no'' on this 
overall bill. We can't afford to let this happen.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Speaker, in response to those who advocate for the Amash-Lofgren 
amendment, this amendment will very, very seriously damage our national 
security. Section 702 is a program for which there is no evidence of 
abuse and is used to gather information about non-United States 
citizens outside the United States. In a targeted fashion, they have to 
go to the court and get approval for the selectors to gather 
information on a quarterly basis. They gather information incidental to 
that. Sometimes there is information about United States citizens.
  But guess what. The information does not come with little labels 
attached saying: this is a United States citizen communicating here, or 
the communication involves someone in the United States.
  Therefore, it is absolutely vitally important that we not impair the 
most important electronic intelligence-gathering mechanism that the 
United States has to keep us safe. Oppose the Amash amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
Washington (Ms. Jayapal).
  Ms. JAYAPAL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill 
that does nothing to stop the unconstitutional collection of Americans' 
international communications without first obtaining a warrant, and it 
codifies the practice of indiscriminately sweeping up massive amounts 
of domestic communications.
  What makes us different from those who would harm us is our 
commitment to our constitutional values: that we are innocent until 
proven guilty and that our government must obtain a warrant and show 
probable cause that there is a legitimate reason to listen in on our 
conversations.
  This bill will further expose people to warrantless prosecutions or 
detention and deportation in cases that have absolutely no connection 
whatsoever to national security.
  I hope we reject this bill, unless we approve the Amash-Lofgren 
amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I have only one speaker remaining to 
close, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished Democratic leader.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I am proud of the House of Representatives 
for coming together on the floor of the House and in our various 
caucuses and conferences to discuss the important challenge that we all 
face: the balance that we have to protect the American people. That is 
the oath we take: to protect and defend. As we defend the Constitution, 
we defend the privacy and the civil liberties of the American people.

  It is difficult.
  Over 20 years ago, I was on the Intelligence Committee for the 
purpose of protecting civil liberties and privacy, and also to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, two really important 
overarching issues. So I come to the floor today as one who has worked 
on this issue for a very long time.
  I thank our men and women in the intelligence community for the work 
they do. We are so proud of what they do.
  In those days, almost 25 years ago, when I was first on the 
committee, it was about force protection and trying to have enough 
intelligence to avoid conflict, but if we were to engage, we would have 
the intelligence to protect our forces. It was about force protection. 
In the nineties, it became more about fighting terrorism and other 
overarching issues as well.
  We live in a dangerous world and force protection on the ground, in 
theater, is still an essential part of what the intelligence community 
does. Again, I thank the men and women in the intelligence community 
for their patriotism and their courage.
  The issue that relates to fighting terrorism is one that sometimes 
has a frightening manifestation on our own soil. But as we protect and 
defend the American people and the Constitution and their rights, we 
have to have that balance. It was Benjamin Franklin who said: If we 
don't fight for security and freedom, we won't have either.
  I want to particularly thank our ranking member on the Intelligence 
Committee. He has made us all proud in going across the country to 
honor our Constitution, talking about undermining our election system, 
talking about protecting the American people in ways that is consistent 
with our Constitution. I thank Mr. Schiff and I support him today in 
his support of the bill that came from his committee.

[[Page H148]]

  Is it perfect?
  I have never voted for a perfect bill in this House.
  I also thank Mr. Nadler, a genius on all of these issues that relate 
to our Constitution. I also thank the members of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  We have very few members on the Intelligence Committee who are 
deputized by the Speaker and by the leaders of each party to go to the 
Intelligence Committee to deal with issues that relate to the balance 
between security and privacy.
  With all the respect in the world for the magnificent members of the 
Judiciary Committee, all of whom I respect, it is not right to say 
there is nothing in this bill that protects the privacy of the American 
people.
  In fact, when I was supporting the Judiciary Committee bill, outside 
groups were complaining. They wanted the Zoe Lofgren amendment. They 
didn't want that bill. They were complaining about it. Now, today, they 
are saying that is what they want.
  Studying the issue, I think one of the differences along the way is 
when it is appropriate in terms of a warrant. That is why I am so 
pleased that we will be offering a motion to recommit that addresses 
just that concern, which is what I am hearing about from folks.
  The amendment, the motion to recommit, addresses concerns of people 
on both sides of the aisle, certainly in our Democratic Caucus, that 
seeks to secure the highest possible protections for American civil 
liberties. At the same time, it ensures that the intelligence community 
and law enforcement can continue to keep Americans safe.
  This amendment would go a step further from the modified bill that is 
on the floor under consideration to ensure law enforcement secures a 
warrant before accessing Americans' information.
  Let me repeat that. The amendment will go a step further than the 
modified bill under consideration to ensure law enforcement secures a 
warrant before accessing Americans' information.
  Under this amendment, a court order would be required to access 
Americans' data in connection with any nonnational security criminal 
investigation by the FBI.
  This amendment removes predicate--that is the operational word--
standards and it expands the universe of investigations that would 
require a warrant.
  A vote for this amendment--and I hope it would be bipartisan, 
especially from those who are objecting to the bill on the floor--is a 
vote for privacy protections and for civil liberties. We would have 
preferred to have this in the original bill that is coming to the 
floor. We couldn't get that in committee. Hopefully, we can get it on 
the floor.
  Voting against the motion to recommit means fewer protections, less 
oversight, and more risk that Americans' rights will be violated.

  In the course of this, I mentioned this issue about the warrant and 
arrest. I talked about the Judiciary Committee's bill. At the offset of 
all of this, we all opposed the first Intelligence Committee's bill. We 
supported the Judiciary Committee's bipartisan bill being criticized by 
some outside groups for supporting it, rather than the Lofgren 
amendment.
  But changes were made in the Intelligence Committee's bill to this 
effect. We asked the Speaker to take out the masking provisions, which 
have no place in this bill. The chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
Mr. Nunes, foolishly put that in this bill. It made it a complete 
nonstarter. I thank the Speaker for removing it.
  By the way, somebody should tell the President because he thinks it 
is still in the bill. With that being said, I personally directed the 
unmasking process be fixed. It isn't fixed in the bill, Mr. President. 
That would be a second tweet of the day, confusing matters even worse, 
unfortunately. The administration, although they probably would like an 
extension of the status quo, understands we have to do more than that.
  The other provision that was in the bill was an expansion of agents 
of foreign governments. Agents of foreign governments opened up more 
people who would be subjected to surveillance. We said: That doesn't 
fly. That has to be closed. The Speaker did that.
  Then, on the ``abouts'' language, I think most people who understand 
that--it is a complicated issue--understand that it is really not a 
factor in this discussion. People don't want it mentioned, but the fact 
is that it had to be addressed. It is not being used and it is 
unconstitutional. Until it can be proven to be constitutional, it can't 
be used. When it is used, they would have to go to the FISA court to 
get permission, and then come to Congress for ratification of that. So 
there are many protections there.
  It is hard, I know. I had a hard time when I was Speaker and we 
passed a bill to address the gross violations of Vice President Cheney 
doing the Bush-Cheney surveillance. It was appalling, in my view. I 
considered it unconstitutional, others did not. But, nonetheless, we 
put in many, many protections where there were none, and then renewed 
and improved them when we renewed the bill subsequently in its 
reauthorization.

                              {time}  1015

  This isn't about the other side of the aisle that is saying you don't 
care about privacy if you support this bill. It isn't about that. It is 
about where you strike the balance when you weigh the equities.
  We have to come down in favor of honoring our Constitution and our 
civil liberties, but we cannot do that completely at the expense. And I 
believe that the Members and Mr. Nadler understand that full well, and 
I commend him for his deep understanding of the vital national security 
issues and the invaluable work that his committee has done to strike a 
balance between security and privacy and has made a difference.
  But the choice we have today is to pass something that is--defeat 
this bill. Okay. You have done that, if you want to do that. Pass an 
amendment that won't go anyplace, you can do that, and we will be left 
with extension of the status quo of the current law.
  As one who has participated in writing it those years ago, I 
understand its merit. I also understand the changes in technology, of 
tactics of terrorists who are out there, and that we have to improve 
the bill.
  I don't consider it a reform bill. It is not that vast. It is some 
improvements in how we can collect, protect, again, keep the American 
people safe as well as protect their civil liberties.
  Just a couple other things about it. Since this legislation was 
designed to address concerns related to the use of information 
collected under FISA section 702, an important foreign intelligence 
collection authority--we have to keep that emphasis on ``an important 
foreign intelligence authority.''
  So, my colleagues, to that end, this modifies that it requires a 
court order based on probable cause for FBI criminal investigators to 
view Americans' communication in the section 702 database and mandates 
an inspector general study of 702 data. So let's keep the vigilance on, 
even as we go forward. It contains refined language related to 
``abouts'' collection. It requires the executive branch to secure 
explicit approval from the FISA court for collection. It further 
objects ``abouts'' collections to--subjects a 30-day congressional 
review process. I know Mr. Sensenbrenner said nobody can do anything in 
30 days, but I think we can.
  The bill strengthens the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. 
That was something I was instrumental in establishing when I was on the 
Intelligence Committee. I know it is important, but I also know that it 
has to be strengthened and it has to be respected as a watchdog.
  So, I mean, the list goes on requiring public reporting on the use of 
702 data, just saying to the intelligence community: Don't try to 
minimize any violations that may have occurred; we want the facts; we 
want the truth.
  And that is why I am so glad it has expanded whistleblower 
protections and briefings to the Oversight Committee, which we have 
required. Unlike the original House Intelligence bill, which I oppose, 
this bill does not include language that would have likely expanded the 
universe of FISA targets who are now, as I mentioned before, agents of 
foreign policy powers. It excludes the language on unmasking; somebody 
tell the President.
  It gives me great pride in our Caucus, if you could have heard the 
beautiful debate between Mr. Nadler and Mr.

[[Page H149]]

Schiff on this subject. We are not that far apart. I think that the 
motion to recommit addresses most of the concerns we have been getting 
from the outside groups, and communities have dedicated their--whose 
organized purpose is to protect the civil liberties of the American 
people.
  But, again, with great respect for everyone's opinions and whatever 
they have put forth, again, saluting our men and women in the 
intelligence community for the work that they do, we want to be sure we 
strengthen their hand in terms of protecting the national security of 
our country, which is our first responsibility, keep the American 
people safe, and, as we do so, to honor our oath of office to the 
Constitution, to honor the principles of the Constitution.
  Our Founders knew full well the challenge between security and civil 
liberties. They lived in a world when they were under attack. The War 
of 1812 came very soon after the establishment of our country, so this 
was not a foreign idea to them, and they bequeathed to us the 
responsibility to protect, defend, protect our liberties.
  And, again, respectful of this debate on this issue, I myself will be 
voting to support my ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, Mr. 
Schiff, our ranking member, and Members will follow their conscience on 
this. I just wanted you to know, from my experience in all of this and 
with weighing the equities involved, that that is the path that I will 
take.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Judiciary Committee, to 
close the debate on this side.
  Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, and I also thank the minority leader for her remarks in 
support of 702.
  I rise in support of the 702 reauthorization. It is critical to our 
national security. You would see the color drain out of the faces of 
all of our security personnel, the entire national security community, 
if we lost the ability and went dark on 702.
  We have got to follow through in this Congress. We have got to 
provide the flexibility for them to use the tools that we have 
available to us, and we have set up procedures that will approve of 
this annually under the FISA courts. We have got a probable cause 
requirement for any criminal investigation. That protects U.S. persons. 
And we don't need to be protecting anything but U.S. persons when it 
comes to this.
  The gentlewoman spoke of civil liberties, and I stand in defense of 
those civil liberties as well and in defense of the national security. 
We have got an IG report that is written into this bill.

  But I would remind the people who are concerned about this focus on 
these civil liberties that Google and Facebook and Verizon and AT&T, 
they hold more data than the U.S. Government has. That is where the 
real information is, and if they are concerned about that, they should 
raise that issue.
  Meanwhile, I am going to oppose the Amash amendment and support the 
reauthorization of 702. Our people in this America, U.S. persons, 
deserve that protection for national security reasons. I urge its 
adoption.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate on the bill has expired.


                  Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Amash

  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 1, strike line 1 and all that follows and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Uniting 
     and Strengthening America by Reforming and Improving the 
     Government's High-Tech Surveillance Act'' or the ``USA RIGHTS 
     Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification on prohibition on querying of collections of 
              communications to conduct warrantless queries for the 
              communications of United States persons and persons 
              inside the United States.
Sec. 3. Prohibition on reverse targeting under certain authorities of 
              the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 4. Prohibition on acquisition, pursuant to certain FISA 
              authorities to target certain persons outside the United 
              States, of communications that do not include persons 
              targeted under such authorities.
Sec. 5. Prohibition on acquisition of entirely domestic communications 
              under authorities to target certain persons outside the 
              United States.
Sec. 6. Limitation on use of information obtained under certain 
              authority of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
              1947 relating to United States persons.
Sec. 7. Reforms of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Sec. 8. Improved role in oversight of electronic surveillance by amici 
              curiae appointed by courts under Foreign Intelligence 
              Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 9. Reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Sec. 10. Study and report on diversity and representation on the FISA 
              Court and the FISA Court of Review.
Sec. 11. Grounds for determining injury in fact in civil action 
              relating to surveillance under certain provisions of 
              Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 12. Clarification of applicability of requirement to declassify 
              significant decisions of Foreign Intelligence 
              Surveillance Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
              Court of Review.
Sec. 13. Clarification regarding treatment of information acquired 
              under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 14. Limitation on technical assistance from electronic 
              communication service providers under the Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 15. Modification of authorities for public reporting by persons 
              subject to nondisclosure requirement accompanying order 
              under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 16. Annual publication of statistics on number of persons targeted 
              outside the United States under certain Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 authority.
Sec. 17. Repeal of nonapplicability to Federal Bureau of Investigation 
              of certain reporting requirements under Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 18. Publication of estimates regarding communications collected 
              under certain provision of Foreign Intelligence 
              Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 19. Four-year extension of FISA Amendments Act of 2008.

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION ON PROHIBITION ON QUERYING OF 
                   COLLECTIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CONDUCT 
                   WARRANTLESS QUERIES FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS OF 
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS AND PERSONS INSIDE THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       Section 702(b) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(b)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) as 
     subparagraphs (A) through (E), respectively, and indenting 
     such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, an additional two ems 
     from the left margin;
       (2) by striking ``An acquisition'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--An acquisition''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Clarification on prohibition on querying of 
     collections of communications of united states persons and 
     persons inside the united states.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) 
     and (C), no officer or employee of the United States may 
     conduct a query of information acquired under this section in 
     an effort to find communications of or about a particular 
     United States person or a person inside the United States.
       ``(B) Concurrent authorization and exception for emergency 
     situations.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a query for 
     communications related to a particular United States person 
     or person inside the United States if--
       ``(i) such United States person or person inside the United 
     States is the subject of an order or emergency authorization 
     authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search under 
     section 105, 304, 703, 704, or 705 of this Act, or under 
     title 18, United States Code, for the effective period of 
     that order;
       ``(ii) the entity carrying out the query has a reasonable 
     belief that the life or safety of such United States person 
     or person inside the United States is threatened and the 
     information is sought for the purpose of assisting that 
     person;

[[Page H150]]

       ``(iii) such United States person or person in the United 
     States is a corporation; or
       ``(iv) such United States person or person inside the 
     United States has consented to the query.
       ``(C) Queries of federated data sets and mixed data.--If an 
     officer or employee of the United States conducts a query of 
     a data set, or of federated data sets, that includes any 
     information acquired under this section, the system shall be 
     configured not to return such information unless the officer 
     or employee enters a code or other information indicating 
     that--
       ``(i) the person associated with the search term is not a 
     United States person or person inside the United States; or
       ``(ii) if the person associated with the search term is a 
     United States person or person inside the United States, one 
     or more of the conditions of subparagraph (B) are satisfied.
       ``(D) Matters relating to emergency queries.--
       ``(i) Treatment of denials.--In the event that a query for 
     communications related to a particular United States person 
     or a person inside the United States is conducted pursuant to 
     an emergency authorization authorizing electronic 
     surveillance or a physical search described in subsection 
     (B)(i) and the application for such emergency authorization 
     is denied, or in any other case in which the query has been 
     conducted and no order is issued approving the query--

       ``(I) no information obtained or evidence derived from such 
     query may be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in 
     any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any 
     court, grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory 
     body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United 
     States, a State, or political subdivision thereof; and
       ``(II) no information concerning any United States person 
     acquired from such query may subsequently be used or 
     disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or 
     employees without the consent of such person, except with the 
     approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates 
     a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.

       ``(ii) Assessment of compliance.--The Attorney General 
     shall assess compliance with the requirements under clause 
     (i).''.

     SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON REVERSE TARGETING UNDER CERTAIN 
                   AUTHORITIES OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as amended by section 2, is further 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1)(B), as redesignated by section 2, 
     by striking ``the purpose of such acquisition is to target'' 
     and inserting ``a significant purpose of such acquisition is 
     to acquire the communications of'';
       (2) in subsection (d)(1)(A)--
       (A) by striking ``ensure that'' and inserting the 
     following: ``ensure--
       ``(i) that''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii) that an application is filed under title I, if 
     otherwise required, when a significant purpose of an 
     acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is to acquire the 
     communications of a particular, known person reasonably 
     believed to be located in the United States; and'';
       (3) in subsection (g)(2)(A)(i)(I)--
       (A) by striking ``ensure that'' and inserting the 
     following: ``ensure--
       ``(aa) that''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(bb) that an application is filed under title I, if 
     otherwise required, when a significant purpose of an 
     acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is to acquire the 
     communications of a particular, known person reasonably 
     believed to be located in the United States; and''; and
       (4) in subsection (i)(2)(B)(i)--
       (A) by striking ``ensure that'' and inserting the 
     following: ``ensure--

       ``(I) that''; and

       (B) by adding at the end the following:

       ``(II) that an application is filed under title I, if 
     otherwise required, when a significant purpose of an 
     acquisition authorized under subsection (a) is to acquire the 
     communications of a particular, known person reasonably 
     believed to be located in the United States; and''.

     SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON ACQUISITION, PURSUANT TO CERTAIN FISA 
                   AUTHORITIES TO TARGET CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE 
                   THE UNITED STATES, OF COMMUNICATIONS THAT DO 
                   NOT INCLUDE PERSONS TARGETED UNDER SUCH 
                   AUTHORITIES.

       Section 702(b)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978, as redesignated by section 2, is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), as redesignated by section 2, by 
     striking ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (G); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
       ``(E) may not acquire a communication as to which no 
     participant is a person who is targeted pursuant to the 
     authorized acquisition;''.

     SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON ACQUISITION OF ENTIRELY DOMESTIC 
                   COMMUNICATIONS UNDER AUTHORITIES TO TARGET 
                   CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 702(b)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978, as redesignated by section 2 and amended by 
     section 4, is further amended by inserting after subparagraph 
     (E), as added by section 4, the following:
       ``(F) may not acquire communications known to be entirely 
     domestic; and''.

     SEC. 6. LIMITATION ON USE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED UNDER 
                   CERTAIN AUTHORITY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1947 RELATING TO UNITED 
                   STATES PERSONS.

       Section 706(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881e(a)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Information acquired'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Information acquired''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Limitation on use in criminal, civil, and 
     administrative proceedings and investigations.--No 
     communication to or from, or information about, a person 
     acquired under section 702 who is either a United States 
     person or is located in the United States may be introduced 
     as evidence against the person in any criminal, civil, or 
     administrative proceeding or used as part of any criminal, 
     civil, or administrative investigation, except--
       ``(A) with the prior approval of the Attorney General; and
       ``(B) in a proceeding or investigation in which the 
     information is directly related to and necessary to address a 
     specific threat of--
       ``(i) terrorism (as defined in clauses (i) through (iii) of 
     section 2332(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code);
       ``(ii) espionage (as used in chapter 37 of title 18, United 
     States Code);
       ``(iii) proliferation or use of a weapon of mass 
     destruction (as defined in section 2332a(c) of title 18, 
     United States Code);
       ``(iv) a cybersecurity threat from a foreign country;
       ``(v) incapacitation or destruction of critical 
     infrastructure (as defined in section 1016(e) of the USA 
     PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e))); or
       ``(vi) a threat to the armed forces of the United States or 
     an ally of the United States or to other personnel of the 
     United States Government or a government of an ally of the 
     United States.''.

     SEC. 7. REFORMS OF THE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
                   BOARD.

       (a) Inclusion of Foreign Intelligence Activities in 
     Oversight Authority of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board.--Section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (c), by inserting ``and to conduct 
     foreign intelligence activities'' after ``terrorism'' each 
     place such term appears; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by inserting ``and to conduct 
     foreign intelligence activities'' after ``terrorism'' each 
     place such term appears.
       (b) Submission of Whistleblower Complaints to the Privacy 
     and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee), as 
     amended by subsection (a), is further amended--
       (A) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) Whistleblower complaints.--
       ``(A) Submission to board.--An employee of, or contractor 
     or detailee to, an element of the intelligence community may 
     submit to the Board a complaint or information that such 
     employee, contractor, or detailee believes relates to a 
     privacy or civil liberties concern. The confidentiality 
     provisions under section 2409(b)(3) of title 10, United 
     States Code, shall apply to a submission under this 
     subparagraph. Any disclosure under this subparagraph shall be 
     protected against discrimination under the procedures, 
     burdens of proof, and remedies set forth in section 2409 of 
     such title.
       ``(B) Authority of board.--The Board may take such action 
     as the Board considers appropriate with respect to 
     investigating a complaint or information submitted under 
     subparagraph (A) or transmitting such complaint or 
     information to any other Executive agency or the 
     congressional intelligence committees.
       ``(C) Relationship to existing laws.--The authority under 
     subparagraph (A) of an employee, contractor, or detailee to 
     submit to the Board a complaint or information shall be in 
     addition to any other authority under another provision of 
     law to submit a complaint or information. Any action taken 
     under any other provision of law by the recipient of a 
     complaint or information shall not preclude the Board from 
     taking action relating to the same complaint or information.
       ``(D) Relationship to actions taken under other laws.--
     Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent--
       ``(i) any individual from submitting a complaint or 
     information to any authorized recipient of the complaint or 
     information; or
       ``(ii) the recipient of a complaint or information from 
     taking independent action on the complaint or information.''; 
     and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(n) Definitions.--In this section, the terms 
     `congressional intelligence committees' and `intelligence 
     community' have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).''.
       (2) Prohibited personnel practices.--Section 2302(b)(8)(B) 
     of title 5, United States Code, is amended, in the matter 
     preceding clause (i), by striking ``or to the Inspector of

[[Page H151]]

     an agency or another employee designated by the head of the 
     agency to receive such disclosures'' and inserting ``the 
     Inspector General of an agency, a supervisor in the 
     employee's direct chain of command (up to and including the 
     head of the employing agency), the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board, or an employee designated by any 
     of the aforementioned individuals for the purpose of 
     receiving such disclosures''.
       (c) Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Subpoena 
     Power.--Section 1061(g) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(g)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(D), by striking ``submit a written 
     request to the Attorney General of the United States that the 
     Attorney General'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (3) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs 
     (2) and (3), respectively.
       (d) Appointment of Staff of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board.--Section 1061(j) of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee(j)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs 
     (3) and (4), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
       ``(2) Appointment in absence of chairman.--If the position 
     of chairman of the Board is vacant, during the period of the 
     vacancy the Board, at the direction of the majority of the 
     members of the Board, may exercise the authority of the 
     chairman under paragraph (1).''.
       (e) Tenure and Compensation of Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board Members and Staff.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform 
     and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee), as 
     amended by subsections (a) and (b), is further amended--
       (A) in subsection (h)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``full-time'' after ``4 
     additional''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking ``, except that'' and 
     all that follows through the end and inserting a period;
       (B) in subsection (i)(1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``level III of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5314'' and inserting ``level 
     II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313''; and
       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``level IV of the 
     Executive Schedule'' and all that follows through the end and 
     inserting ``level III of the Executive Schedule under section 
     5314 of title 5, United States Code.''; and
       (C) in subsection (j)(1), by striking ``level V of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5316'' and inserting ``level 
     IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315''.
       (2) Effective date; applicability.--
       (A) In general.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)--
       (i) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 
     Act; and
       (ii) except as provided in paragraph (2), shall apply to 
     any appointment to a position as a member of the Privacy and 
     Civil Liberties Oversight Board made on or after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       (B) Exceptions.--
       (i) Compensation changes.--The amendments made by 
     subparagraphs (B)(i) and (C) of paragraph (1) shall take 
     effect on the first day of the first pay period beginning 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (ii) Election to serve full time by incumbents.--

       (I) In general.--An individual serving as a member of the 
     Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board on the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, including a member continuing to 
     serve as a member under section 1061(h)(4)(B) of the 
     Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 
     U.S.C. 2000ee(h)(4)(B)), (referred to in this clause as a 
     ``current member'') may make an election to--

       (aa) serve as a member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board on a full-time basis and in accordance with 
     section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee), as amended by this 
     section; or
       (bb) serve as a member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board on a part-time basis in accordance with such 
     section 1061, as in effect on the day before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, including the limitation on service 
     after the expiration of the term of the member under 
     subsection (h)(4)(B) of such section, as in effect on the day 
     before the date of the enactment of this Act.

       (II) Election to serve full time.--A current member making 
     an election under subclause (I)(aa) shall begin serving as a 
     member of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board on 
     a full-time basis on the first day of the first pay period 
     beginning not less than 60 days after the date on which the 
     current member makes such election.

       (f) Provision of Information About Government Activities 
     Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to 
     the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.--The 
     Attorney General shall fully inform the Privacy and Civil 
     Liberties Oversight Board about any activities carried out by 
     the Government under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), including by providing 
     to the Board--
       (1) copies of each detailed report submitted to a committee 
     of Congress under such Act; and
       (2) copies of each decision, order, and opinion of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review required to be 
     included in the report under section 601(a) of such Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1871(a)).

     SEC. 8. IMPROVED ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
                   BY AMICI CURIAE APPOINTED BY COURTS UNDER 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) Role of Amici Curiae Generally.--
       (1) In general.--Section 103(i)(1) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(i)(1)) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Any amicus 
     curiae designated pursuant to this paragraph may raise any 
     issue with the Court at any time.''.
       (2) Referral of cases for review.--Section 103(i) of such 
     Act is amended--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (10) as 
     paragraphs (6) through (11), respectively; and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
       ``(5) Referral for review.--
       ``(A) Referral to foreign intelligence surveillance court 
     en banc.--If the court established under subsection (a) 
     appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2)(A) to assist 
     the Court in the consideration of any matter presented to the 
     Court under this Act and the Court makes a decision with 
     respect to such matter, the Court, in response to an 
     application by the amicus curiae or any other individual 
     designated under paragraph (1), may refer the decision to the 
     Court en banc for review as the Court considers appropriate.
       ``(B) Referral to foreign intelligence surveillance court 
     of review.--If the court established under subsection (a) 
     appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2)(A) to assist 
     the Court in the consideration of any matter presented to the 
     Court under this Act and the Court makes a decision with 
     respect to such matter, the Court, in response to an 
     application by the amicus curiae or any other individual 
     designated under paragraph (1) may refer the decision to the 
     court established under subsection (b) for review as the 
     Court considers appropriate.
       ``(C) Referral to supreme court.--If the Court of Review 
     appoints an amicus curiae under paragraph (2) to assist the 
     Court of Review in the review of any matter presented to the 
     Court of Review under this Act or a question of law that may 
     affect resolution of a matter in controversy and the Court of 
     Review makes a decision with respect to such matter or 
     question of law, the Court of Review, in response to an 
     application by the amicus curiae or any other individual 
     designated under paragraph (1) may refer the decision to the 
     Supreme Court for review as the Court of Review considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(D) Annual report.--Not later than 60 days after the end 
     of each calendar year, the Court and the Court of Review 
     shall each publish, on their respective websites, a report 
     listing--
       ``(i) the number of applications for referral received by 
     the Court or the Court of Review, as applicable, during the 
     most recently concluded calendar year; and
       ``(ii) the number of such applications for referral that 
     were granted by the Court or the Court of Review, as 
     applicable, during such calendar year.''.
       (3) Assistance.--Section 103(i)(6) of such Act, as 
     redesignated, is further amended to read as follows:
       ``(6) Assistance.--Any individual designated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) may raise a legal or technical issue or any 
     other issue with the Court or the Court of Review at any 
     time. If an amicus curiae is appointed under paragraph 
     (2)(A)--
       ``(A) the court shall notify all other amicus curiae 
     designated under paragraph (1) of such appointment;
       ``(B) the appointed amicus curiae may request, either 
     directly or through the court, the assistance of the other 
     amici curiae designated under paragraph (1); and
       ``(C) all amici curiae designated under paragraph (1) may 
     provide input to the court whether or not such input was 
     formally requested by the court or the appointed amicus 
     curiae.''.
       (4) Access to information.--Section 103(i)(7) of such Act, 
     as redesignated, is further amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) in clause (i)--

       (I) by striking ``that the court'' and inserting the 
     following: ``that--
       ``(I) the court''; and
       (II) by striking ``and'' at the end and inserting the 
     following: ``or
       ``(II) are cited by the Government in an application or 
     case with respect to which an amicus curiae is assisting a 
     court under this subsection;'';

       (ii) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and
       (iii) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
       ``(ii) shall have access to an unredacted copy of each 
     decision made by a court established under subsection (a) or 
     (b) in which the court decides a question of law, 
     notwithstanding whether the decision is classified; and'';
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``may'' and inserting 
     ``shall''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (C)--
       (i) in the subparagraph heading, by striking ``Classified 
     information'' and inserting ``Access to information''; and
       (ii) by striking ``court may have access'' and inserting 
     the following: ``court--

[[Page H152]]

       ``(i) shall have access to unredacted copies of each 
     opinion, order, transcript, pleading, or other document of 
     the Court and the Court of Review; and
       ``(ii) may have access''.
       (5) Public notice and receipt of briefs from third 
     parties.--Section 103(i) of such Act, as amended by this 
     subsection, is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(12) Public notice and receipt of briefs from third 
     parties.--Whenever a court established under subsection (a) 
     or (b) considers a novel question of law that can be 
     considered without disclosing classified information, 
     sources, or methods, the court shall, to the greatest extent 
     practicable, consider such question in an open manner--
       ``(A) by publishing on its website each question of law 
     that the court is considering; and
       ``(B) by accepting briefs from third parties relating to 
     the question under consideration by the court.''.
       (b) Participation of Amici Curiae in Oversight of 
     Authorizations for Targeting of Certain Persons Outside the 
     United States Other Than United States Persons.--
       (1) In general.--Section 702(i)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1881a(i)(2)) is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by redesignating clauses (i) and 
     (ii) as subclauses (I) and (II), respectively, and adjusting 
     the indentation of the margin of such subclauses, as so 
     redesignated, two ems to the right;
       (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as 
     clauses (i) through (iii), respectively, and adjusting the 
     indentation of the margin of such clauses, as so 
     redesignated, two ems to the right;
       (C) by inserting before clause (i), as redesignated by 
     subparagraph (B), the following:
       ``(A) In general.--''; and
       (D) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Participation by amici curiae.--In reviewing a 
     certification under subparagraph (A)(i), the Court shall 
     randomly select an amicus curiae designated under section 
     103(i) to assist with such review.''.
       (2) Schedule.--Section 702(i)(5)(A) of such Act is amended 
     by striking ``at least 30 days prior to the expiration of 
     such authorization'' and inserting ``such number of days 
     before the expiration of such authorization as the Court 
     considers necessary to comply with the requirements of 
     paragraph (2)(B) or 30 days, whichever is greater''.
       (c) Public Notice of Questions of Law Certified for 
     Review.--Section 103(j) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(j)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``Following'' and inserting the following:
       ``(1) In general.--Following''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Public notice.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     whenever a court established under subsection (a) certifies a 
     question of law for review under paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection, the court shall publish on its website--
       ``(i) a notice of the question of law to be reviewed; and
       ``(ii) briefs submitted by the parties, which may be 
     redacted at the discretion of the court to protect sources, 
     methods, and other classified information.
       ``(B) Protection of classified information, sources, and 
     methods.--Subparagraph (A) shall apply to the greatest extent 
     practicable, consistent with otherwise applicable law on the 
     protection of classified information, sources, and 
     methods.''.

     SEC. 9. REFORMS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   COURT.

       (a) FISA Court Judges.--
       (1) Number and designation of judges.--Section 103(a)(1) of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803(a)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1)(A) There is a court which shall have jurisdiction to 
     hear applications for and to grant orders approving 
     electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States 
     under the procedures set forth in this Act.
       ``(B)(i) The court established under subparagraph (A) shall 
     consist of 13 judges, one of whom shall be designated from 
     each judicial circuit (including the United States Court of 
     Appeals for the District of Columbia and the United States 
     Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
       ``(ii) The Chief Justice of the United States shall--
       ``(I) designate each judge of the court established under 
     subparagraph (A) from the nominations made under subparagraph 
     (C); and
       ``(II) make the name of each judge of such court available 
     to the public.
       ``(C)(i) When a vacancy occurs in the position of a judge 
     of the court established under subparagraph (A) from a 
     judicial circuit, the chief judge of the circuit shall 
     propose a district judge for a judicial district within the 
     judicial circuit to be designated for that position.
       ``(ii) If the Chief Justice does not designate a district 
     judge proposed under clause (i), the chief judge shall 
     propose 2 other district judges for a judicial district 
     within the judicial circuit to be designated for that 
     position and the Chief Justice shall designate 1 such 
     district judge to that position.
       ``(D) No judge of the court established under subparagraph 
     (A) (except when sitting en banc under paragraph (2)) shall 
     hear the same application for electronic surveillance under 
     this Act which has been denied previously by another judge of 
     such court.
       ``(E) If any judge of the court established under 
     subparagraph (A) denies an application for an order 
     authorizing electronic surveillance under this Act, such 
     judge shall provide immediately for the record a written 
     statement of each reason for the judge's decision and, on 
     motion of the United States, the record shall be transmitted, 
     under seal, to the court of review established in subsection 
     (b).''.
       (2) Tenure.--Section 103(d) of such Act is amended by 
     striking ``redesignation,'' and all that follows through the 
     end and inserting ``redesignation.''.
       (3) Implementation.--
       (A) Incumbents.--A district judge designated to serve on 
     the court established under subsection (a) of such section 
     before the date of enactment of this Act may continue to 
     serve in that position until the end of the term of the 
     district judge under subsection (d) of such section, as in 
     effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (B) Initial appointment and term.--Notwithstanding any 
     provision of such section, as amended by paragraphs (1) and 
     (2), and not later than 180 days after the date of enactment 
     of this Act, the Chief Justice of the United States shall--
       (i) designate a district court judge who is serving in a 
     judicial district within the District of Columbia circuit and 
     proposed by the chief judge of such circuit to be a judge of 
     the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) for 
     an initial term of 7 years; and
       (ii) designate a district court judge who is serving in a 
     judicial district within the Federal circuit and proposed by 
     the chief judge of such circuit to be a judge of such court 
     for an initial term of 4 years.
       (b) Court of Review.--Section 103(b) of such Act is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``The Chief Justice'' and inserting ``(1) 
     Subject to paragraph (2), the Chief Justice''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) The Chief Justice may designate a district court 
     judge or circuit court judge to a position on the court 
     established under paragraph (1) only if at least 5 associate 
     justices approve the designation of such individual.''.

     SEC. 10. STUDY AND REPORT ON DIVERSITY AND REPRESENTATION ON 
                   THE FISA COURT AND THE FISA COURT OF REVIEW.

       (a) Study.--The Committee on Intercircuit Assignments of 
     the Judicial Conference of the United States shall conduct a 
     study on how to ensure judges are appointed to the court 
     established under subsection (a) of section 103 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803) and the court established under subsection (b) of such 
     section in a manner that ensures such courts are diverse and 
     representative.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Committee on Intercircuit 
     Assignments shall submit to Congress a report on the study 
     carried out under subsection (a).

     SEC. 11. GROUNDS FOR DETERMINING INJURY IN FACT IN CIVIL 
                   ACTION RELATING TO SURVEILLANCE UNDER CERTAIN 
                   PROVISIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978.

       Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a), as amended by sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 
     and 8(b), is further amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(m) Challenges to Government Surveillance.--
       ``(1) Injury in fact.--In any claim in a civil action 
     brought in a court of the United States relating to 
     surveillance conducted under this section, the person 
     asserting the claim has suffered an injury in fact if the 
     person--
       ``(A) has a reasonable basis to believe that the person's 
     communications will be acquired under this section; and
       ``(B) has taken objectively reasonable steps to avoid 
     surveillance under this section.
       ``(2) Reasonable basis.--A person shall be presumed to have 
     demonstrated a reasonable basis to believe that the 
     communications of the person will be acquired under this 
     section if the profession of the person requires the person 
     regularly to communicate foreign intelligence information 
     with persons who--
       ``(A) are not United States persons; and
       ``(B) are located outside the United States.
       ``(3) Objective steps.--A person shall be presumed to have 
     taken objectively reasonable steps to avoid surveillance 
     under this section if the person demonstrates that the steps 
     were taken in reasonable response to rules of professional 
     conduct or analogous professional rules.''.

     SEC. 12. CLARIFICATION OF APPLICABILITY OF REQUIREMENT TO 
                   DECLASSIFY SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS OF FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW.

       Section 602 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1872) shall apply with respect to decisions, 
     orders, and opinions described in subsection (a) of such 
     section that were issued on, before, or after the date of the 
     enactment of the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
     Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over 
     Monitoring Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-23).

     SEC. 13. CLARIFICATION REGARDING TREATMENT OF INFORMATION 
                   ACQUIRED UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) Derived Defined.--

[[Page H153]]

       (1) In general.--Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(q) For the purposes of notification provisions of this 
     Act, information or evidence is `derived' from an electronic 
     surveillance, physical search, use of a pen register or trap 
     and trace device, production of tangible things, or 
     acquisition under this Act when the Government would not have 
     originally possessed the information or evidence but for that 
     electronic surveillance, physical search, use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device, production of tangible 
     things, or acquisition, and regardless of any claim that the 
     information or evidence is attenuated from the surveillance 
     or search, would inevitably have been discovered, or was 
     subsequently reobtained through other means.''.
       (2) Policies and guidance.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall publish the 
     following:
       (i) Policies concerning the application of subsection (q) 
     of section 101 of such Act, as added by paragraph (1).
       (ii) Guidance for all members of the intelligence community 
     (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3003)) and all Federal agencies with law 
     enforcement responsibilities concerning the application of 
     such subsection.
       (B) Modifications.--Whenever the Attorney General and the 
     Director modify a policy or guidance published under 
     subparagraph (A), the Attorney General and the Director shall 
     publish such modifications.
       (b) Use of Information Acquired Under Title VII.--Section 
     706 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1881e) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``, except for the 
     purposes of subsection (j) of such section''; and
       (2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
       ``(b) Information Acquired Under Sections 703-705.--
     Information acquired from an acquisition conducted under 
     section 703, 704, or 705 shall be deemed to be information 
     acquired from an electronic surveillance pursuant to title I 
     for the purposes of section 106.''.

     SEC. 14. LIMITATION ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM ELECTRONIC 
                   COMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS UNDER THE 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       Section 702(h)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a(h)(1)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses 
     (i) and (ii), respectively, and moving such clauses 2 ems to 
     the right;
       (2) by striking ``With respect to'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), in carrying 
     out''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Limitations.--The Attorney General or the Director of 
     National Intelligence may not request assistance from an 
     electronic communication service provider under subparagraph 
     (A) without demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the Court, 
     that the assistance sought--
       ``(i) is necessary;
       ``(ii) is narrowly tailored to the surveillance at issue; 
     and
       ``(iii) would not pose an undue burden on the electronic 
     communication service provider or its customers who are not 
     an intended target of the surveillance.
       ``(C) Compliance.--An electronic communication service 
     provider is not obligated to comply with a directive to 
     provide assistance under this paragraph unless--
       ``(i) such assistance is a manner or method that has been 
     explicitly approved by the Court; and
       ``(ii) the Court issues an order, which has been delivered 
     to the provider, explicitly describing the assistance to be 
     furnished by the provider that has been approved by the 
     Court.''.

     SEC. 15. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES FOR PUBLIC REPORTING BY 
                   PERSONS SUBJECT TO NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT 
                   ACCOMPANYING ORDER UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) Modification of Aggregation Banding.--Subsection (a) of 
     section 604 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1874) is amended--
       (1) by striking paragraphs (1) through (3) and inserting 
     the following:
       ``(1) A semiannual report that aggregates the number of 
     orders, directives, or national security letters with which 
     the person was required to comply into separate categories 
     of--
       ``(A) the number of national security letters received, 
     reported--
       ``(i) for the first 1000 national security letters 
     received, in bands of 200 starting with 1-200; and
       ``(ii) for more than 1000 national security letters 
     received, the precise number of national security letters 
     received;
       ``(B) the number of customer selectors targeted by national 
     security letters, reported--
       ``(i) for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in 
     bands of 200 starting with 1-200; and
       ``(ii) for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the 
     precise number of customer selectors targeted;
       ``(C) the number of orders or directives received, 
     combined, under this Act for contents--
       ``(i) reported--

       ``(I) for the first 1000 orders and directives received, in 
     bands of 200 starting with 1-200; and
       ``(II) for more than 1000 orders and directives received, 
     the precise number of orders received; and

       ``(ii) disaggregated by whether the order or directive was 
     issued under section 105, 402, 501, 702, 703, or 704;
       ``(D) the number of customer selectors targeted under 
     orders or directives received, combined, under this Act for 
     contents--
       ``(i) reported--

       ``(I) for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in 
     bands of 200 starting with 1-200; and
       ``(II) for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the 
     precise number of customer selectors targeted; and

       ``(ii) disaggregated by whether the order or directive was 
     issued under section 105, 402, 501, 702, 703, or 704;
       ``(E) the number of orders or directives received under 
     this Act for noncontents--
       ``(i) reported--

       ``(I) for the first 1000 orders or directives received, in 
     bands of 200 starting with 1-200; and
       ``(II) for more than 1000 orders or directives received, 
     the precise number of orders received; and

       ``(ii) disaggregated by whether the order or directive was 
     issued under section 105, 402, 501, 702, 703, or 704; and
       ``(F) the number of customer selectors targeted under 
     orders or directives under this Act for noncontents--
       ``(i) reported--

       ``(I) for the first 1000 customer selectors targeted, in 
     bands of 200 starting with 1-200; and
       ``(II) for more than 1000 customer selectors targeted, the 
     precise number of customer selectors targeted; and

       ``(ii) disaggregated by whether the order or directive was 
     issued under section 105, 402, 501, 702, 703, or 704.''; and
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (2).
       (b) Additional Disclosures.--Such section is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (b) through (d) as 
     subsections (c) through (e), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Additional Disclosures.--A person who publicly 
     reports information under subsection (a) may also publicly 
     report the following information, relating to the previous 
     180 days, using a semiannual report that indicates whether 
     the person was or was not required to comply with an order, 
     directive, or national security letter issued under each of 
     sections 105, 402, 501, 702, 703, and 704 and the provisions 
     listed in section 603(e)(3).''.

     SEC. 16. ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF STATISTICS ON NUMBER OF 
                   PERSONS TARGETED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
                   UNDER CERTAIN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                   ACT OF 1978 AUTHORITY.

       Not less frequently than once each year, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall publish the following:
       (1) A description of the subject matter of each of the 
     certifications provided under subsection (g) of section 702 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1881a) in the last calendar year.
       (2) Statistics revealing the number of persons targeted in 
     the last calendar year under subsection (a) of such section, 
     disaggregated by certification under which the person was 
     targeted.

     SEC. 17. REPEAL OF NONAPPLICABILITY TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
                   UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 
                   1978.

       Section 603(d)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
     Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1873(d)(2)) is amended by striking 
     ``(A) Federal bureau'' and all that follows through 
     ``Paragraph (3)(B) of'' and inserting ``Paragraph (3)(B)''.

     SEC. 18. PUBLICATION OF ESTIMATES REGARDING COMMUNICATIONS 
                   COLLECTED UNDER CERTAIN PROVISION OF FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall publish an 
     estimate of--
       (1) the number of United States persons whose 
     communications are collected under section 702 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881a); or
       (2) the number of communications collected under such 
     section to which a party is a person inside the United 
     States.
       (b) In Case of Technical Impossibility.--If the Director 
     determines that publishing an estimate pursuant to subsection 
     (a) is not technically possible--
       (1) subsection (a) shall not apply; and
       (2) the Director shall publish an assessment in 
     unclassified form explaining such determination, but may 
     submit a classified annex to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress as necessary.
       (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees (as defined 
     in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3003));

[[Page H154]]

       (2) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 19. FOUR-YEAR EXTENSION OF FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008.

       (a) Extension.--Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act 
     of 2008 (Public Law 110-261) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1) (50 U.S.C. 1881-1881g note), by 
     striking ``December 31, 2017'' and inserting ``September 30, 
     2021''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2) (18 U.S.C. 2511 note), in the material 
     preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``December 31, 2017'' 
     and inserting ``September 30, 2021''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of section 404(b)(1) 
     of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-261; 50 
     U.S.C. 1801 note) is amended by striking ``December 31, 
     2017'' and inserting ``September 30, 2021''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 682, the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash) and a Member opposed each will 
control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, my amendment replaces the underlying bill with the USA 
RIGHTS Act. Like the base bill, under the USA RIGHTS Act, the 
government can still use section 702 for its purpose of surveilling 
foreigners overseas; and the government can continue to store, share, 
and access that data to investigate national security threats.
  The key difference is, in USA RIGHTS, it has to do with the 
collection and use of innocent Americans' data, not foreign 
intelligence. This means the amendment cannot harm section 702 programs 
if, as the government says, they are designed solely for foreign 
intelligence rather than domestic surveillance on Americans.
  We all want the intelligence community to be able to do its job, and 
I have offered the USA RIGHTS amendment to give them the tools to 
collect foreign intelligence while also protecting the Fourth 
Amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized 
for 10 minutes.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  This amendment, plain and simple, would disable 702, our most 
important national security tool. If passed, any chance of reform 
through the underlying bill is dead on arrival in the United States 
Senate. We cannot risk 702 collection ending.
  This Chamber cannot be complicit in allowing terrorists to fly under 
the radar if this amendment kills 702, and I sincerely urge you to 
oppose the Amash amendment and not lose the opportunity to successfully 
balance national security and civil liberties, which is what the 
underlying bill does.
  We definitely need to have a move toward more protection of our 
Fourth Amendment rights, and a warrant requirement in domestic criminal 
cases and a requirement that if you are doing a national security 
investigation and you find that the information is useful in a criminal 
case and it is precluded from court are two major improvements to our 
702 law that protect Americans' civil liberties.
  This bill must be passed. It is absolutely essential for our 
protection. It surveys people outside of the United States who are not 
United States citizens. The fact that it collects incidental 
information about U.S. citizens should not be a prohibition on this 
effort. But if you apply this amendment, you are not going to be able 
to have our national intelligence officials looking at this information 
carefully, and they are going to have to, in many instances, get a 
warrant when they need to act because they think it is a national 
security concern. A warrant either will be unattainable or it will be 
in a circumstance where it is too late, and, in both instances, we 
cannot allow that.
  This bill provides balance. That bill goes too far. The amendment 
goes too far. I urge my colleagues to oppose it.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lofgren).
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, it is important that we pass this 
amendment. The government conducts 702 searches and broadly defines 
foreign intelligence investigations that may have no nexus to national 
security, and we are using this database for just criminal 
investigations that are domestic.
  When you say ``incidental collection,'' it sounds like it is not 
much. Well, the fact is it is a huge amount of data in its content. 
What this amendment says is: if you are going to search for the 
information of an American who has been collected in that database and 
it is not terrorism but domestic criminal investigation, get a warrant. 
Get a warrant. That is what the Fourth Amendment requires.
  Now, I took exception to the comment that 702 would go dark. We know 
that this existing FISA order goes through April, so the 702 program is 
not going dark. We have time to do this right. We have time to make 
sure that the Fourth Amendment is adhered to in the reauthorization of 
702. Put the ``foreign'' back in the FISA bill.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Utah (Mr. Stewart).
  Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, before I begin, I want to emphasize how 
dismayed I am by the amount of disinformation being propagated by 
opponents of section 702. I have heard some things over the last couple 
of days, and I just wonder, how in the world can someone believe that.
  Let me tell you why this amendment must be opposed. Under the USA 
RIGHTS Act, the intelligence community would not be able to query the 
name of the suspected terrorist supporter in the United States to see 
if he is in contact with terrorist recruiters. It would not be able to 
query the name of a person in the United States who has been 
suspiciously approaching U.S. Government employees with security 
clearances to determine if that person is part of a foreign espionage 
network.
  We would not be able to query the name of a registered owner of a 
suspicious vehicle parked in front of the Washington Monument to see if 
that person is in contact with terrorist operatives overseas. We would 
not be able to query the name of a person in the aftermath of a mass 
casualty attack on the United States to see if he has terrorist 
connections, or as a follow on, if potential follow-on attacks are 
imminent.
  We would not be able to query the name of a foreign national who 
travels to the United States to take flight training but doesn't care 
about learning how to land.
  Individuals in this room who want to end section 702 know that they 
have an opportunity to do with their vote, but they would be putting 
troops and American lives at risk. And if that is okay with you, then 
go ahead and vote for the USA RIGHTS Act amendment, but I promise you, 
you will regret it when, some day, in this dangerous world we live in, 
we have to answer to our constituents for our votes here today.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, my amendment protects the rights of Americans 
consistent with the Constitution.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe).

                              {time}  1030

  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, we are not talking about terrorism. We 
are talking about the protection of Americans and their information. 
All of the rhetoric and the fear tactics that this will destroy our 
ability to go after terrorists is wrong.
  The USA RIGHTS Act is important to protect Americans. The other side 
talks about protecting Americans. Let's protect their Fourth Amendment 
rights. We can protect them against terrorists if we amend this 
legislation with the USA RIGHTS Act and protect their rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.
  Every American's data is being seized by the Justice Department, the 
CIA, and the NSA. We have asked them how many times that has been 
queried. They will not tell us because the information is massive.
  All we are saying under the USA RIGHTS Act is that, if you want to go 
into that information on Americans, get a warrant from a judge, not a 
query. You can't go search it. Get a warrant under the Fourth Amendment 
or stay out of that information and still go after terrorists under 702 
and under FISA.

[[Page H155]]

  We need to have this amendment to make the bill better to protect 
Americans overseas and at home.
  And that is just the way it is.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the amendment. I respect and 
share the sponsor's commitment to privacy and civil liberties, but this 
amendment would go vastly beyond the legislation advanced by either the 
Intelligence Committee or the Judiciary Committee. It would prevent the 
intelligence community from querying lawfully collected 702 
information, even in situations directly related to counterterrorism 
and national security. It would make section 702 a far less effective 
tool at a significant cost to the national security of the United 
States.
  The amendment would require a probable cause warrant or its 
equivalent before the government can query lawfully collected 702 data 
in an effort to find communications concerning someone who may be a 
U.S. person or a foreign person located in the United States even when 
such person is communicating with foreign terrorists or intelligence 
targets.
  Probable cause will be lacking in many, if not most, intelligence and 
counterterrorism contexts. In such situations, the USA RIGHTS Act would 
prevent the government from detecting and disrupting plots against 
Americans or identifying and preventing foreign espionage on our soil.
  It would also require publication of information related to 702 
certifications that would disclose the sources and methods of 
intelligence gathering, imperilling our ability to obtain foreign 
intelligence information. That, to me, poses an intolerably high risk.
  Instead, the underlying bill strikes a far better compromise. In the 
underlying bill, a warrant would be required in most nonnational 
security and nonterrorism cases when there is an open investigation. In 
the absence of such a warrant, the bill provides that evidence that 
would be obtained would be excluded from use in court.
  That seems, to me, a very sensible balance: requiring a warrant in 
most nonnational security and nonterrorism cases and providing, in the 
absence of such a warrant in an open investigation, that information or 
evidence would be barred from use in court.
  That addresses the gravamen of the concern over this program that it 
could be used for fishing expeditions against ordinary Americans. This 
amendment, on the other hand, would largely cripple the program. Mr. 
Speaker, for that reason, I urge opposition to the amendment and 
support for the underlying bill.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, any responsible effort to authorize section 
702 must pass three tests:
  It must include a meaningful warrant requirement;
  It must end the ``abouts'' collection until Congress says otherwise; 
and
  It must not restrict the government's ability to collect intelligence 
on valid targets operating outside of the United States.
  The underlying bill does not include a meaningful warrant 
requirement, and it does not end ``abouts'' collection.
  The Amash-Lofgren amendment, on the other hand, passes all three 
tests:
  It includes a warrant agreement that comports with the Fourth 
Amendment;
  It puts an end to ``abouts'' collection; and
  It leaves the core functionality of section 702 perfectly intact. It 
would be harder to use this authority to spy on United States citizens, 
but the government's ability to gather intelligence on suspected 
terrorists and others overseas will not be affected.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to adopt this amendment and make a 
meaningful change to section 702.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the many sponsors of this amendment for their 
leadership in this important fight.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
being offered and in support of the underlying bill and the increased 
oversight in transparency it provides to the body of the intelligence 
community and the American public that it protects.
  I thank the ranking member and also Chairman Goodlatte for allowing 
me to have this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I want Americans at home to know what this program is 
not. It is not a dragnet surveillance program; it is not a program that 
could ever be used to target Americans; and it is not an unchecked 
intelligence tool. In fact, it may be one of the most heavily overseen 
programs that we have. This bill strengthens that accountability.
  As former ranking member of the Intelligence Committee and 
Representative of the district that is home to NSA, I have taken many 
of my colleagues in this Chamber on trips to NSA so that they can see 
firsthand how these programs work to protect Americans and also to 
protect our freedom and civil liberties.
  This is not a debate on constitutionality. The Federal courts have 
affirmed that this program's current authorization and operation are 
legal and consistent with the Fourth Amendment. This body has voted 
several times with bipartisan majorities to reauthorize it.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Ted Lieu).
  Mr. TED LIEU of California. Mr. Speaker, let me make this issue 
really simple for the American people: spying on foreigners without 
following the Constitution, that is okay; spying on Americans without 
following the Constitution, that is not okay.
  The Fourth Amendment does not have an asterisk that says our 
intelligence agencies don't have to follow it. The Constitution applies 
to all of government. That is why I support the USA RIGHTS Act.
  Support this amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Costa).
  Mr. COSTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this amendment--I think it 
is in the wrong direction--and to support the underlying bill.
  The bill, I think, strikes a balance. Americans cherish and strongly 
want us to protect their privacy. We all agree on that, and I think 
this bill threads the needle. The underlying bill protects our Fourth 
Amendment through the FISA process through this improved effort.
  We know we live in a dangerous world. Terrorism is a constant threat 
that we all clearly understand. When we take our oath of office, we 
swear to protect and defend our Nation from all enemies, foreign and 
domestic. I believe this underlying bill does that with increased 
transparency.
  Clearly, it is not perfect. We never vote on any perfect legislation. 
But this is an improved piece of legislation. The amendment is an 
overreach in the wrong direction.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the underlying bill.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner).
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, when James Madison wrote the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, one of his overriding concerns was 
to prevent any branch of the three in government from becoming too 
powerful. That is why he put the checks and balances in the 
Constitution, so that the other branches could oversee and make sure 
that a branch that was trying to push the edge of the envelope would 
not be able to succeed in that.
  The warrant amendment that has been talked about quite a bit today 
during the debate really is not effective. It is nothing at all. It 
ends up putting James Madison's legacy into the trash bin of history, 
and it does not deserve to go there.
  Yesterday, The Washington Post reported that FBI officials told aides 
of Mr. Nadler that, under the proposed bill--meaning the underlying 
bill--they anticipate rarely, if ever, needing permission from the FISC 
to review query results. So this warrant requirement of the supporters 
of the bill and the opponents of the amendment basically doesn't mean 
anything at all because the FBI told Mr. Nadler's aides that that was 
the case.
  Now, we have a debate here today on whether to put the F back into 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The F means ``foreign.'' 
That is why

[[Page H156]]

the amendment should be adopted, or, if it fails, then the underlying 
bill should be defeated.
  This is a time to stand up for the oath of office that every one of 
us took a year ago to protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The only way we can 
do that today is by supporting the Amash amendment and defeating the 
underlying bill.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time each side 
has remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 3\3/4\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Virginia has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Ohio (Mr. Wenstrup).
  Mr. WENSTRUP. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the amendment and support the 
underlying bill.

  I served a year in Iraq, and every day we got foreign intelligence 
information to us. Why? Because it helped us prepare. It helped us 
plan. It helped us deter. It helped us save American lives--not only 
the lives of our troops in theater, but the lives of people at home.
  I am all in favor of protecting American citizens and their privacy; 
do not get me wrong. I hope that, in the information we collected in 
theater, there were no Americans involved.
  But guess what this amendment will do. It will virtually guarantee 
that terrorists are going to make sure that they have an American, 
complicit or otherwise, involved with every one of their 
communications, email, or through a phone call. Why? Because that 
protects them. That will protect terrorists.
  That is what this amendment would do. That is why I oppose the 
amendment and stand in favor of the underlying bill.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, my amendment protects the rights of Americans 
consistent with the Constitution.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Davidson).
  Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Amash amendment 
and in strong opposition to the underlying bill.
  As a former Army ranger, I know the importance of section 702 in 
defeating the enemies of our country. The foreign enemies of our 
country are not subject to the protections of our Constitution; 
American citizens, however, are.
  The supporters of the underlying bill would have you believe that the 
only way to secure America is by ignoring the Fourth Amendment, and I 
strongly disagree. It is the data of American citizens that is at 
subject here. The Fourth Amendment does not change when communications 
shift from the Postal Service, also in the hands of the government, to 
a database. It should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge support of the Amash amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, Congress has sometimes made the 
difficult job of the intelligence community harder by not providing 
adequate controls and oversight. We have created a vast Department of 
Homeland Security, a vast security sprawling intelligence network that 
results in the collection of data that my friend, Mr. Poe, talked 
about. Yes, warrants can sometimes be inconvenient, but we have judged 
it as a small price to pay to protect Americans from government 
overreach.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 45 seconds to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry).
  Mr. PERRY. Mr. Speaker, servicemembers in the combat zone depend on 
702 to keep them safe. 702 must continue to gather information on 
foreign terrorists to keep us and servicemembers safe. However, 
Americans in uniform serve to preserve an ideal that the Constitution 
protects the rights of Americans.
  The bill, unamended, enshrines in law the abuse of the Fourth 
Amendment rights of American citizens, and it just cannot happen. This 
is not only about criminal prosecution but about political persecution.
  Mr. Speaker, that abuse and the associated persecution is unfolding 
on the front pages and on TV right before us today. Don't lower the bar 
any further. Vote to preserve the rights of American citizens. Vote for 
this amendment.

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 1\3/4\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Garrett).
  Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the patron of this amendment for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, we have covered many things in the past year, to include 
tax policy, healthcare, helping eviscerate ISIS, but I would argue this 
is the most important moment in the time that I have been in this 
building.
  Not only is the Fourth Amendment at stake, so, too, I would argue, 
are due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth.
  We must stand strong for individual liberty and privacy. That is who 
we are as a nation. If we do not put the ``F'' back in FISA, it becomes 
ISA, and all eyes are on you.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, this body cannot be afraid of the 
Constitution. It has been our guiding moral force for this Nation for 
all of our beginnings and our nows.
  This amendment is truly an amendment that will protect and provide 
for the FBI to do its work and to protect our men and women around the 
world who are wearing the uniform unselfishly. But let me be very 
clear: all this amendment does, frankly, is provide a roadmap for the 
FBI to utilize when it is surveying and it is using the private data of 
Americans. All the amendment does is ask the FBI and the Attorney 
General, where there is probable cause, that such communication provide 
evidence of a crime; and, as well, if there is a foreign power or 
foreign agent, to be able to utilize a warrant, and that is the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.
  Uphold the Constitution. Vote for the Amash-Lofgren amendment and 
let's move forward on this legislation.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to whether the gentleman has 
additional speakers?
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining 
on each side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia has 1\1/2\ 
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Michigan has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, let me pose a hypothetical about the Amash amendment. In 
the criminal world, if an FBI agent is told through a tip that someone 
has just purchased unusual amounts of fertilizer that could be used to 
make a bomb, the Amash amendment would prevent that FBI agent from 
looking at the FBI's databases to determine if the suspicious 
individual's email address or other identifier--not the content of the 
email, just the email address or identifier--is located in the 702 
database.
  What would the American people say if we hamper our law enforcement 
from protecting them? What would people of this country say if we had 
another Murrah Building blow up and the FBI couldn't look at even an 
email address?
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time each side 
has remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 1 minute 
remaining. The gentleman from Virginia has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I yield myself 
such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the underlying bill and the USA RIGHTS amendment present 
a stark choice.

[[Page H157]]

  The underlying bill allows the government to warrantlessly collect an 
astounding volume of Americans' communications, makes no material 
reforms to the collection and use of that data against Americans, and 
explicitly allows even more surveillance than the law currently 
permits.
  In contrast, USA RIGHTS allows the government to conduct broad 
foreign surveillance and share intelligence throughout the relevant 
agencies, but it also adds protections to prevent the erosion of 
Americans' Fourth Amendment rights.
  These are two very different options, Mr. Speaker, but for all of us 
who care about civil liberties, who believe the United States can 
protect itself without retiring the Fourth Amendment, and who believe 
Congress has an independent obligation to protect the Constitution, the 
choice is clear: support the USA RIGHTS amendment.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Ryan), the Speaker of the House.
  Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, first, I just want to say to all 
my colleagues that I respect the passionate views that are on display 
here. I think this has been a very passionate and interesting debate. 
What I would like to do is try and bring a little clarity to this 
debate.
  I want to thank the minority leader for coming up and speaking 
against the Amash amendment and in favor of the underlying bipartisan 
amendment.
  We, on a bipartisan basis, have been working with the Senate and the 
White House to get this right, to add even more privacy protections to 
the law, even more than the status quo, to add the warrant requirement 
that this underlying bill has.
  Let me try and clear up some of the confusion. There has been wide 
reporting and discussion here in the House about parts of the FISA 
statute that affect citizens. It is a big law. It is a big statute with 
lots of pieces. Title I of the FISA law is what you see in the news 
that applies to U.S. citizens. That is not what we are talking about 
here. This is Title VII section 702.

  This is about foreign terrorists on foreign soil. That is what this 
is about. So let's clear up some of the confusion here. Let me give you 
two examples of what this program has done to keep our people safe, two 
declassified examples.
  Number one, this program, in March of 2016, gave us the intelligence 
we needed to go after and kill ISIS' finance minister, because of the 
intelligence collected under this program, a foreign terrorist on 
foreign soil, the number two man at ISIS who was in line to become the 
next leader. This program helped us get the information to stop him.
  I came here before 9/11. I remember hearing upon hearing in the 9/11 
Commission about the old firewall. We were seeing what was going on 
overseas, terrorists like Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan were doing all 
these things, and we couldn't pass that information on to our 
authorities here in America. We had this firewall that prevented us 
from connecting the dots. That was the big phrase we used back then in 
the early 2000s.
  If we pass the Amash amendment, we bring that firewall right back up. 
You pass the Amash amendment and defeat this underlying bill, we go 
back to those days where we are flying blind on protecting our country 
from terrorism.
  Let me give Members an example. This program has not only stopped 
many attacks, but let me tell you about one: a plot in 2009 to blow up 
New York's subway system. This was used to understand what people were 
planning overseas and what they were trying to do here in America so 
that we could connect the dots and stop that particular terrorist 
attack.
  That is why this has to be renewed. That is why, among many other 
reasons, section 702, a program designed to go after foreign terrorists 
on foreign soil, is so essential. If this Amash amendment passes, it 
kills the program.
  If this underlying bill fails, there is one of two things that will 
happen. The status quo will be continued, meaning no additional privacy 
protections, no warrant requirement--status quo. That doesn't do 
anything to advance the concerns that have been voiced on the floor or, 
even worse, we go dark; 702 goes down. We don't know what the 
terrorists are up to. We can't send that information to our authorities 
to prevent terrorist attacks. The consequences are really high.
  One of the most important things we are placed in charge to do is to 
make decisions, not based on TV, not based on internet, but based on 
facts, based on reality, and we are supposed to make those decisions to 
keep our country safe.
  This strikes the balance that we must have between honoring and 
protecting privacy rights of U.S. citizens, honoring civil liberties, 
and making sure that we have the tools we need in this day and age of 
21st century terrorism to keep our people safe. That is what this does. 
That is why I ask everyone, on a bipartisan basis, to vote ``no'' on 
the Amash amendment and to vote ``yes'' on the underlying bill.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the previous question 
is ordered on the bill, as amended, and on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).
  The question is on the amendment by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Amash).
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on adoption of the amendment will be followed 
by 5-minute votes on:
  A motion to commit, if ordered;
  Passage of the bill, if ordered; and
  The motion to suspend the rules and pass H.R. 4578.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 183, 
nays 233, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 14]

                               YEAS--183

     Amash
     Barragan
     Barton
     Bass
     Beatty
     Beyer
     Biggs
     Blum
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brat
     Brooks (AL)
     Budd
     Burgess
     Butterfield
     Capuano
     Carson (IN)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Comer
     Connolly
     Correa
     Courtney
     Crist
     Crowley
     Davidson
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     Davis, Rodney
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellison
     Emmer
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Evans
     Farenthold
     Foster
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garrett
     Gianforte
     Gohmert
     Gomez
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Gosar
     Graves (LA)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffith
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harris
     Hastings
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Issa
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Jordan
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (MS)
     Kennedy
     Khanna
     Kihuen
     Kildee
     Krishnamoorthi
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (MN)
     Lieu, Ted
     Lofgren
     Loudermilk
     Lowenthal
     Lujan Grisham, M.
     Lujan, Ben Ray
     Lynch
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Massie
     Mast
     Matsui
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McGovern
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meadows
     Meeks
     Meng
     Mooney (WV)
     Moore
     Moulton
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Norman
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Payne
     Pearce
     Perlmutter
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Posey
     Price (NC)
     Raskin
     Richmond
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Roybal-Allard
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez
     Sanford
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schrader
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Soto
     Speier
     Takano
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Walz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Welch
     Wittman
     Woodall
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Zeldin

                               NAYS--233

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allen
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Bacon
     Banks (IN)
     Barletta
     Barr
     Bera
     Bergman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blunt Rochester
     Bost
     Brady (TX)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (MD)
     Brownley (CA)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Bustos
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)

[[Page H158]]


     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello (PA)
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Curbelo (FL)
     Curtis
     Delaney
     Demings
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     Diaz-Balart
     Donovan
     Duffy
     Dunn
     Estes (KS)
     Esty (CT)
     Faso
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frankel (FL)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gaetz
     Gallagher
     Gibbs
     Goodlatte
     Gottheimer
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Grothman
     Guthrie
     Handel
     Harper
     Hartzler
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Higgins (LA)
     Higgins (NY)
     Hill
     Himes
     Holding
     Hollingsworth
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Joyce (OH)
     Kaptur
     Katko
     Kelly (PA)
     Kilmer
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger
     Knight
     Kuster (NH)
     Kustoff (TN)
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lance
     Langevin
     Latta
     Lawson (FL)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Love
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     MacArthur
     Maloney, Sean
     Marchant
     Marino
     Marshall
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McEachin
     McKinley
     McSally
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Mullin
     Murphy (FL)
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Norcross
     Nunes
     O'Halleran
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Paulsen
     Pelosi
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pittenger
     Poliquin
     Quigley
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Rice (NY)
     Rice (SC)
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rooney, Francis
     Rooney, Thomas J.
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rosen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce (CA)
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Russell
     Rutherford
     Ryan (WI)
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Scott, Austin
     Sessions
     Sewell (AL)
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Sires
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smucker
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Suozzi
     Swalwell (CA)
     Taylor
     Tenney
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Torres
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Visclosky
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Wasserman Schultz
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Womack
     Young (IA)

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Adams
     Babin
     Carbajal
     Cardenas
     Cummings
     DeSaulnier
     Hanabusa
     Huffman
     Kind
     McHenry
     McNerney
     Nolan
     Pascrell
     Rush
     Scalise
     Wilson (FL)

                              {time}  1116

  Ms. SINEMA, Messrs. THOMPSON of California, FRELINGHUYSEN, MARCHANT, 
and Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. WALZ, Ms. CLARKE of New York, Messrs. O'ROURKE, WELCH, and MEEKS 
changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the third reading of the 
bill.
  The bill was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the third 
time.


                            Motion to Commit

  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to commit at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. HIMES. I am opposed to the bill in its current form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to commit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Himes moves to commit S. 139 to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence with instructions to report the 
     same back to the House forthwith, with the following 
     amendment:
       Page 4, line 3, strike ``predicated''.
       Page 4, line 4, strike ``opened''.
       Page 6, line 21, insert ``or'' after the semicolon.
       Page 7, line 5, strike ``; or'' and all that follows 
     through line 12 and insert a period.
       Page 42, strike lines 15 through 19 (and redesignate the 
     subsequent paragraphs accordingly).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Connecticut is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion.
  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, members of the Intelligence Committee, on 
which few of us have an opportunity to serve, lead very odd lives. 
Every single day, we descend in the bowels of this Capitol, four floors 
down. We surrender our iPhones, we surrender our BlackBerrys, and we go 
into windowless rooms where, on a daily basis, we hear about some of 
the most grotesque threats to American safety and interests that you 
can imagine: threats to American lives, threats to American interests, 
and threats to our very way of life.
  We see, every day, how essential 702 authorities are. The 
intelligence that we gather under this authority is critical to our 
safety, our security, and our lives. It saves lives. This program 
cannot be interrupted, and, if it is, God forbid, we will have much to 
answer for.
  Even if this motion fails, the base bill, to those of you with 
substantial civil liberties concerns--and I count myself amongst you--
the base bill makes important and meaningful civil liberties 
improvements over the status quo.
  I deeply appreciate the efforts of many in this Chamber that oppose 
this bill, the efforts that they have made. Each and every one of us 
swears an oath to protect and defend the Constitution, and no one 
should ever be criticized for working hard to make sure that that 
process is served; not Mr. Nadler, not Ms. Lofgren, not Mr. Amash, not 
Mr. Poe.
  Mr. Speaker, I have spent much of the last several days trying to 
improve this bill with respect to civil liberties. I presented 
amendments to the Rules Committee which were, sadly, not made in order.
  But the fact is that these protections exist. There are strict 
processes and procedures in place at the FBI as to how exactly U.S.-
person information can be queried and used. On top of that, the entire 
702 program is reviewed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
the PCLOB, and is subject to meaningful congressional oversight by each 
and every one of us.
  To authorize this program each year, a Federal judge must find it has 
met all statutory requirements and is consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. Mr. Speaker, three district courts and the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals have deemed this program constitutional.
  But, Mr. Speaker, no bill is perfect, and so the motion I offer would 
encompass all FBI matters--not just predicated investigations, but all 
FBI matters not related to national security--and require court orders 
founded on probable cause before the FBI could access U.S.-person 
information under 702.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a critical national security asset. It is as 
important as our best operator, as our best technology, as our most 
powerful weapons, and I appreciate the efforts that have been made to 
secure our civil liberties. This motion to commit pushes this bill 
slightly in that direction, building on the meaningful improvements to 
the status quo, and I urge its passage.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I claim the time in opposition to the motion.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, I will just be really brief today. I want to 
thank all of my colleagues. There are a lot of strong opinions on both 
sides of the aisle on this issue, and we have taken many steps at the 
House Intelligence Committee to take Members out to the agencies that 
are doing this work.
  We have offered time for Members to come down to the SCIF to read all 
of the information because, at the end of the day, we all take the 
American people's constitutional liberties seriously. I think the 
robust debate that has occurred in this House over the last year on 
this issue, through many markups, through many committees, and then 
even today on the floor here in the House of Representatives, has been 
a tough fight because it is a tough issue.
  But in closing, this really is a compromise. We worked with the House 
Judiciary Committee for many months. I can't thank Chairman Goodlatte 
enough for all of his very difficult work in trying to find a 
compromise. At the same time, the House Intelligence Committee, we have 
worked to come to a compromise with the Democrats on the other side of 
the aisle.
  So with all of that said, this is one of those days, if we get this 
bill passed, I think we can walk out of here proud that we all stood 
our ground for stances that we really believe in, but, at the end of 
the day, the House is going to work its will in a bipartisan manner.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page H159]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to commit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to commit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. HIMES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 189, 
noes 227, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 15]

                               AYES--189

     Aguilar
     Amash
     Barragan
     Barton
     Bass
     Beatty
     Bera
     Beyer
     Bishop (GA)
     Blumenauer
     Blunt Rochester
     Bonamici
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (MD)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Cooper
     Correa
     Costa
     Courtney
     Crist
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Demings
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellison
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Esty (CT)
     Evans
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Gohmert
     Gomez
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Gottheimer
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hastings
     Heck
     Higgins (NY)
     Himes
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Khanna
     Kihuen
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster (NH)
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lawson (FL)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lieu, Ted
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham, M.
     Lujan, Ben Ray
     Lynch
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Maloney, Sean
     Massie
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McEachin
     McGovern
     Meeks
     Meng
     Moore
     Moulton
     Murphy (FL)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Norcross
     O'Halleran
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Panetta
     Pascrell
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Raskin
     Rice (NY)
     Richmond
     Rosen
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Sinema
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Soto
     Speier
     Suozzi
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Torres
     Tsongas
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Welch
     Yarmuth

                               NOES--227

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Bacon
     Banks (IN)
     Barletta
     Barr
     Bergman
     Biggs
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (MI)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Bost
     Brady (TX)
     Brat
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Buchanan
     Buck
     Bucshon
     Budd
     Burgess
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comer
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Costello (PA)
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Culberson
     Curbelo (FL)
     Curtis
     Davidson
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Donovan
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Dunn
     Emmer
     Estes (KS)
     Farenthold
     Faso
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frelinghuysen
     Gaetz
     Gallagher
     Gianforte
     Gibbs
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (LA)
     Graves (MO)
     Grothman
     Guthrie
     Handel
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Hice, Jody B.
     Higgins (LA)
     Hill
     Holding
     Hollingsworth
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Joyce (OH)
     Katko
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger
     Knight
     Kustoff (TN)
     Labrador
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latta
     Lewis (MN)
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Loudermilk
     Love
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     MacArthur
     Marchant
     Marino
     Marshall
     Mast
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Mooney (WV)
     Mullin
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Norman
     Nunes
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Pittenger
     Poe (TX)
     Poliquin
     Posey
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Rice (SC)
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney, Francis
     Rooney, Thomas J.
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce (CA)
     Russell
     Rutherford
     Sanford
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smucker
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Taylor
     Tenney
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Zeldin

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Adams
     Babin
     Carbajal
     Cummings
     DeSaulnier
     Garrett
     Griffith
     Hanabusa
     Kind
     McHenry
     McNerney
     Nolan
     Payne
     Scalise
     Wilson (FL)

                              {time}  1132

  Messrs. RUSH, GOTTHEIMER, and GONZALEZ of Texas changed their vote 
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the motion to commit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 256, 
nays 164, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 16]

                               YEAS--256

     Abraham
     Aderholt
     Aguilar
     Allen
     Amodei
     Arrington
     Bacon
     Banks (IN)
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Bera
     Bergman
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (MI)
     Blunt Rochester
     Bost
     Boyle, Brendan F.
     Brady (TX)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (MD)
     Brownley (CA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Bustos
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Carson (IN)
     Carter (GA)
     Carter (TX)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Cheney
     Clyburn
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Comer
     Comstock
     Conaway
     Cook
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello (PA)
     Cramer
     Crawford
     Crist
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Curbelo (FL)
     Curtis
     Davis, Rodney
     Delaney
     Demings
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Donovan
     Dunn
     Estes (KS)
     Faso
     Ferguson
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Fortenberry
     Foster
     Foxx
     Frankel (FL)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gaetz
     Gallagher
     Garamendi
     Gianforte
     Gibbs
     Goodlatte
     Gottheimer
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Grothman
     Guthrie
     Handel
     Harper
     Hartzler
     Hensarling
     Hice, Jody B.
     Higgins (LA)
     Higgins (NY)
     Hill
     Himes
     Holding
     Hollingsworth
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huizenga
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurd
     Issa
     Jenkins (KS)
     Jenkins (WV)
     Johnson (LA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Joyce (OH)
     Katko
     Keating
     Kelly (MS)
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger
     Knight
     Krishnamoorthi
     Kuster (NH)
     Kustoff (TN)
     LaHood
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Langevin
     Latta
     Lawson (FL)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Love
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan Grisham, M.
     MacArthur
     Maloney, Sean
     Marchant
     Marino
     Marshall
     Mast
     McCarthy
     McCaul
     McEachin
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McSally
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Messer
     Mitchell
     Moolenaar
     Moulton
     Mullin
     Murphy (FL)
     Newhouse
     Noem
     Norcross
     Nunes
     O'Halleran
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Palmer
     Panetta
     Paulsen
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pittenger
     Poliquin
     Posey
     Quigley
     Ratcliffe
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Rice (NY)
     Rice (SC)
     Roby
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rokita
     Rooney, Francis
     Rooney, Thomas J.
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rosen
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Rouzer
     Royce (CA)
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Russell
     Rutherford
     Ryan (WI)
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sessions
     Sewell (AL)
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smucker
     Stefanik
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Suozzi
     Swalwell (CA)
     Taylor
     Tenney
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Torres
     Trott
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Veasey
     Wagner
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walker
     Walorski
     Walters, Mimi
     Wasserman Schultz
     Wenstrup
     Westerman
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Womack
     Woodall
     Young (AK)
     Young (IA)
     Zeldin

[[Page H160]]


  


                               NAYS--164

     Amash
     Barragan
     Bass
     Beatty
     Beyer
     Biggs
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Blum
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Brady (PA)
     Brat
     Buck
     Budd
     Burgess
     Butterfield
     Capuano
     Cardenas
     Castro (TX)
     Chu, Judy
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Correa
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Davidson
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle, Michael F.
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellison
     Emmer
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Espaillat
     Esty (CT)
     Evans
     Farenthold
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garrett
     Gohmert
     Gomez
     Gonzalez (TX)
     Gosar
     Graves (LA)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffith
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Harris
     Hastings
     Heck
     Herrera Beutler
     Huffman
     Jackson Lee
     Jayapal
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Khanna
     Kihuen
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Labrador
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lawrence
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (MN)
     Lieu, Ted
     Lofgren
     Loudermilk
     Lowenthal
     Lujan, Ben Ray
     Lynch
     Maloney, Carolyn B.
     Massie
     Matsui
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McGovern
     Meadows
     Meng
     Mooney (WV)
     Moore
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Norman
     O'Rourke
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Payne
     Pearce
     Perry
     Pingree
     Pocan
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Raskin
     Richmond
     Roe (TN)
     Rohrabacher
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez
     Sanford
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schrader
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Smith (WA)
     Soto
     Speier
     Takano
     Thompson (MS)
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Vargas
     Vela
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Waters, Maxine
     Watson Coleman
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Welch
     Williams
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Yoho

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Adams
     Babin
     Carbajal
     Cummings
     DeSaulnier
     Hanabusa
     Kind
     McHenry
     McNerney
     Nolan
     Scalise
     Wilson (FL)


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes 
remaining.

                              {time}  1139

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________