[Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 10, 2018)]
[Senate]
[Pages S126-S127]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                                  IRAN

  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss my thoughts on 
recent protests in Iran and the important upcoming decisions by the 
President with respect to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or 
the JCPOA.
  While I am mindful that we have limited visibility into Iran and 
continue to learn more about the circumstances and motivations of the 
recent protests, one thing is clear: A significant portion of the 
Iranian people are not satisfied with their government and are 
increasingly willing to make their dissatisfaction heard. It is 
important that we support their right to peacefully express their views 
and demand that the Iranian Government respond with constructive 
dialogue, rather than force.
  It was notable that Iranian President Ruhani implicitly recognized 
the validity of the protests earlier this week when he reportedly said:

       It would be a misrepresentation and also an insult to 
     Iranian people to say they only had economic demands. . . . 
     People had economic, political and social demands

  That is according to President Ruhani.
  Acknowledging the need for reform, Ruhani continued:

       We cannot pick a lifestyle and tell two generations after 
     us to live like that. It is impossible. The views of the 
     young generation about life and the world is different than 
     ours.

  Now is the time to support the Iranian people in their quest for a 
government that is more representative and supportive of their 
interests. Unfortunately, some have suggested that our response should 
be to withdraw from the JCPOA, an action that I believe would only 
serve to embolden the hardliners in Iran and leave the United States 
more isolated from our allies. Withdrawing from the JCPOA and 
reimposing nuclear-related sanctions on Iran would immediately change 
the narrative inside of Iran, uniting reformists and hardliners alike 
in their opposition to what they view as a hostile United States.
  While some would argue that the recent protests in Iran are 
symptomatic of what they view as a flawed JCPOA, I would suggest 
otherwise. In reality, the nuclear deal exposed one of the Iranian 
regime's central vulnerabilities--namely, that the regime can no longer 
simply blame sanctions imposed by the United States and the 
international community for its economic woes at home. It is becoming 
clearer to the Iranian people that it is actually the regime's 
corruption, financial mismanagement, funding of malign activities, and 
hegemonic ambitions that are at the root of their government's 
inability to enable job creation and to ensure that necessities like 
food and gasoline remain affordable.
  In the coming days, the President has several important decisions to 
make with respect to the JCPOA. In October, President Trump 
acknowledged that Iran is meeting its commitments under the JCPOA, but 
he chose not to certify that continued sanctions relief is 
``appropriate and proportionate'' to the actions taken by Iran with 
respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program. By the end of this 
week, President Trump is again required to decide whether to issue such 
a certification. I expect he will again choose not to do so.
  The more consequential decision for the President this week will be 
whether to continue waivers of nuclear-related sanctions, as he is 
required to do under the JCPOA. Choosing not to continue such waivers 
would immediately snap back U.S. nuclear-related sanctions, thereby 
putting the United States in violation of the JCPOA. Let me be clear. 
This would be a unilateral action on behalf of the United States that 
would put us in violation of an international agreement, not just with 
Iran but with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, 
as well.
  By all accounts, the JCPOA is working as intended, and Iran is 
verifiably meeting its commitments under the deal. It is important to 
remember what the JCPOA was designed to do and what it is now 
achieving. The JCPOA commits Iran to never seeking to develop or 
acquire a nuclear weapon; effectively cuts off all pathways for Iran to 
achieve a nuclear weapon during the period covered by the agreement; 
and increases the time it would take for Iran to acquire enough 
material for one nuclear bomb from 2 to 3 months to at least 1 year. 
When this agreement was signed, they were within months of having that 
capability. It dramatically reduces Iran's stockpile of enriched 
uranium and the number of installed centrifuges. It has prevented Iran 
from producing weapons-grade plutonium and has subjected Iran to robust 
monitoring by the IAEA to verify its compliance.
  Withdrawing from the JCPOA at this point would provide no benefit and 
would actually leave us more isolated and less able to deal with the 
various challenges posed by Iran. The crippling sanctions regime that 
brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place only worked 
because the international community was united in its determination to 
keep Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon. If we withdraw from the 
JCPOA unilaterally--and in the absence of a clear violation of the deal 
by Iran--there is no reason to believe that our partners in the P5+1 
would join us. In fact, French President Macron has said that there is 
``no alternative'' to the JCPOA and told the U.N. General Assembly that 
``renouncing it would be a grave error.''
  General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the 
Armed Services Committee last year:

       I believe that the U.S. would incur damage vis-a-vis our 
     allies if we unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA. Our allies 
     will be less likely to cooperate with us on future military 
     action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and 
     less likely to cooperate with us on countering other 
     destabilizing aspects of Iranian behavior that threaten our 
     collective interests.

  Our sanctions may snap back but not those imposed by the rest of the 
world, many of whom have begun building economic ties to Iran since the 
JCPOA was signed. Our international partners would then blame us, not 
Iran, for the failure of the deal.
  Some, including President Trump, have argued that we can and should 
dissolve the JCPOA and renegotiate a better deal. This is a highly 
unrealistic proposal. We were only able to achieve the JCPOA after 
years of sustained multilateral diplomatic efforts and the imposition 
of aggressive international sanctions in concert with our partners. It 
will likely be impossible to replicate those conditions if the United 
States unilaterally withdraws from the JCPOA.
  Contrary to President Trump's belief, threatening to walk away from 
the

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deal actually weakens our ability to address the JCPOA's perceived 
flaws by alienating our partners. Instead, we should remain committed 
to the JCPOA and lead the international community in imposing 
additional sanctions, where necessary, to change other Iranian 
behaviors--namely, their respect for human rights, ballistic missile 
development efforts, and other malign activities.
  We must also seek to help enable the Iranian people to make their 
choices heard, including by encouraging the adoption of social media 
and other means of communication. We could start by building upon 
general licenses issued by the Obama administration designed to 
encourage the export of communications technology to Iran.
  Secretary Mattis told the Armed Services Committee at his 
confirmation hearing: ``When America gives her word, we have to live up 
to it and work with our allies.''
  If the President decides this week not to continue nuclear-related 
sanctions relief for Iran, he will be effectively choosing to restart 
the Iranian nuclear program, thereby making military conflict with Iran 
more likely.
  Withdrawing from the deal would also be a devastating blow to our 
efforts toward diplomacy with North Korea--and for that matter, any 
future diplomatic efforts to constrain aggressive behavior by our 
adversaries. Why would any nation engage with us in serious dialogue to 
resolve differences if they fear we will later withdraw unilaterally, 
even when the other parties are complying with the agreement?
  Regardless of whether you supported the JCPOA before it was signed, 
the truth is that it has removed the greatest threat we faced from Iran 
while also preserving all other means to address Iran's malign 
activities. Let there be no doubt--Iran continues to be a state sponsor 
of terrorism and an abuser of human rights. Iran continues to 
destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles 
and support of proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. 
If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much 
worse a nuclear-armed Iran would be.

  Fortunately, our nonnuclear sanctions on Iran remain in place and are 
unaffected by the JCPOA. In fact, Congress authorized additional 
sanctions in July to help deal with these issues. The administration 
should work with our international partners and use all tools at its 
disposal, including by ramping up nonnuclear sanctions, where 
necessary, to counter Iran's unacceptable behavior in these other 
areas.
  Abrogating the JCPOA only invites another nuclear crisis like the one 
we are currently facing with North Korea--a concern echoed by General 
Dunford when he appeared before the Armed Services Committee and said: 
``It makes sense to me that our holding up agreements that we have 
signed, unless there's a material breach, would have impact on others' 
willingness to sign agreements.''
  Many have criticized the JCPOA as a ``flawed deal.'' For example, 
concerns have been raised that certain provisions sunset after a period 
of years, thereby delaying rather than permanently preventing Iran from 
achieving a nuclear weapon. If the concern is that Iran may seek to 
resume nuclear weapons development activities after these sunsets--a 
concern that I share--the appropriate course of action is not to throw 
out the deal but to work with our international partners to ensure that 
necessary restrictions on the JCPOA are appropriately extended or 
supplemented.
  As I noted before, Iran has committed in perpetuity not to develop or 
seek to acquire nuclear weapons. We should not take them at their word; 
we should verify their adherence to this commitment, just as we are 
doing under the JCPOA. If at any point in the future we have evidence 
to suggest Iran is taking steps that would indicate a violation of that 
commitment, we should use that information to rally the P5+1 and other 
international partners to take a unified stand against such efforts. 
Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would seriously damage our 
ability to exert such leadership in the future.
  Again, according to General Dunford, in the absence of the JCPOA, 
Iran would likely resume its nuclear weapons program and ``a nuclear-
armed Iran would likely be more aggressive in its actions and more 
dangerous in its consequences.'' General Dunford also told the 
committee that ``the intel community assessment is, in fact, that Iran 
is in compliance right now [with the JCPOA], and therefore, I think we 
should focus on addressing the other challenges: the missile threat 
they pose, the maritime threat they pose, the support of proxies, 
terrorists, and the cyber threat they pose.'' I wholeheartedly agree 
with General Dunford's assessment.
  Our troops in Iraq and Syria are operating in close proximity to 
Iranian-aligned militias, including those who previously targeted 
American troops. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA could embolden 
these hardline militias and possibly result in Iran giving them a green 
light to begin targeting U.S. forces once more.
  Furthermore, while I have full confidence in our military's ability 
to fight and win wars when necessary, we cannot escape the reality that 
military contingencies to respond to both a nuclear-armed North Korea 
and Iran would result in massive loss of life and national treasure and 
greatly stress our military's capacity and capabilities.
  In conclusion, I will return to where I began. Now is not the time to 
impose a self-inflicted wound upon our foreign policy and standing in 
the world. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would empower 
Iranian hardliners and dramatically undermine the reform-minded 
protests we should be seeking to empower. Worse still, it would leave 
us more isolated in the international community and, by extension, less 
able to address the range of national security challenges posed by 
Iran, North Korea, and our other potential adversaries.
  We must not abdicate the JCPOA or American leadership on these 
issues. Therefore, I urge the President to stay the course with respect 
to the JCPOA, while also rallying the international community to take 
effective actions intended to change other unacceptable behaviors by 
the Iranian regime to suppress dissent at home and sow instability 
abroad. We must not squander this opportunity by making the story about 
the United States rather than the courageous Iranians who at great risk 
to themselves have taken to the streets to demand a better future.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lee). Without objection, it is so ordered.